1. Alawi v. Alauya, 268 SCRA 639 1.

1. The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between
2. In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 985 the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State cannot be invoked by applicant. Applicant
3. In re: del Rosario, 52 Phil 399 is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore
4. In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish
etc. 92 SCRA1 nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
5. People v Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111 2. Article I of the Treaty are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting
6. Cayetano v Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession which have the force of law,
7. Adez Realty v CA, 251 SCRA 201 and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, require that before
8. People v Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692 anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must first successfully pass the
9. Director of Lands v Ababa, 88 SCRA 523 required bar examinations; and
10. In re: Gutierrez, 5 SCRA 661 3. The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the
11. Reyes v Gaa, 246 SCRA 4 Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
12. Co v Bernardino, 285 SCRA 102 admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department
13. Agdoma v Celestino, 6 SCRA 637 may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
14. Imbuido v Mangonon, 4 SCRA 760 for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement
15. Fernandez v Grecia, Adm. Case No. 3694, June 17 1993 such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
16. In re: Al C. Argosino, 246 SCRA 14
17. Quingwa v Puno, 19 SCRA 439 In Re: Felipe Del Rosario
18. Laguitan v Tinio, 179 SCRA 837 52 Phil 399 Legal Ethics Practice of Law is a Privilege
19. Lee v Abastillas, 234 SCRA 29
20. Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union v Lo Bu, 63 SCRA 321 Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took it in 1926
and he failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in which he alleged that
ALAWI VS ALAUYA there was a mistake in the computation of his exam results in the 1925 bar exams. He was then
Facts: admitted to the bar.
Sophia Alawi was a sale representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. of Davao
City. Ashari Alauya is the incumber executive of clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario, together
Marawi City. It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on with one Juan Villaflor a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some documents to
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm make it appear that Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted charged with falsification. Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded guilty but Del Rosario was
to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, or acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal however recommended Del Rosario to surrender his
more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & certificate of attorney.
Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company.
Ruling: ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct.
1. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence HELD: Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the
may only practice law before Shari'a courts. The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del Rosario
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, and it is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination.
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. But shouldnt the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again?

2. WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety
or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
IN RE GARCIA
Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines
without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among
others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino
parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he
was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central
University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado
En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under
the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in
the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
Rulings:
No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is
a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of
the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and
then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar.
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO".
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.
July 30, 1979
Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975
and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying
that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had
passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partners name in a professional firms name; there is no custom or
usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name
of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who
already passed away in the name of the firm? NO
Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners
from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages
and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have
to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm,
can initially ride on that old firms reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for
a particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property. Thus, it has been stated that the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute
the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.
PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA
FACTS: On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva
with crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the
Secretary of Justice.
Counsel for the accused presented a Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private
prosecutor in this case, this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised
Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
ISSUE: Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised
Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
RULING: The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word
private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It
has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate
supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
Cayetano vs. Monsod
201 SCRA 210
September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or
out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as
a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition
is DISMISSED.
ADEZ VS CA
Facts:
ALTERATION OF FACTUAL FINDINGS: DISBARRED
On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a
material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari,
thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of
misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was
disbarred from the practice of law.
He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc.,
in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's
secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing
the act for which he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.
Council to the President for appointment as regional trial judge.

MOTION TO LIFT DISBARMENT: LEARNED HIS LESSON WELL
Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old, has learned
his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised
that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He
appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial
Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San
Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and
Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian
College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge
Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon
City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City
Issue: Should the disbarment be lifted?
Held:
3 YEARS- ENOUGH TO REDEEM HIMSELF AND PROOF HIS WORTH IN PRACTICE
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given
him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem
himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the
dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and
reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession
demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M.
Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that
THE WARNING: ADHERENCE TO RIGID STANDARDS
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the
legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its
members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the
Court is demanded of its members . . .
HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide
as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court
of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of
a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which
deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless
check transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of
which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the
land."
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED
and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees.
This resolution is effective immediately.

People v Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the
suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In
1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a
total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold
pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice
of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she
was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law).
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further suspension against
Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is
now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension
was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law.
Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and
she is not guilty of the offense charged.
In Re: Diosdado Gutierrez

5 SCRA 661 Legal Ethics Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment

Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He
was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty,
he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he
shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against
Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without
a doubt, such a crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted
pardon.

HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his
sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his
conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was
actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of
motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from
the profession.

WELLINGTON REYES vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA

Case Nature: DISBARMENT- Violation of lawyers oath (RULE 138,

Section 27, Rules of Court

SOCORRO T. CO, complainant, vs. ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Socorro T. Co, a
businesswoman, against Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino charging him with unprofessional and
unethical conduct indicating moral deficiency and unfitness to stay in the profession of law.
Socorro T. Co alleged that in October 1989, as she was following up the documents for her
shipment at the Bureau of Customs, she was approached by respondent, Atty. Godofredo N.
Bernardino, introducing himself as someone holding various positions in the Bureau of Customs
such as Executive Assistant at the NAIA, Hearing Officer at the Law Division, and OIC of the
Security Warehouse. Respondent offered to help complainant and promised to give her some
business at the Bureau. In no time, they became friends and a month after, or in November of the
same year, respondent succeeded in borrowing from complainant P120,000.00 with the promise
to pay the amount in full the following month, broadly hinting that he could use his influence at the
Bureau of Customs to assist her. To ensure payment of his obligation, respondent issued to
complainant several postdated Boston Bank checks: No. 092601 dated 1 December 1989 for
P21,950.00, No. 092602 dated 4 December 1989 for P6,750.00, No. 092615 dated 15 January
1990 for P65,000.00 and No. 092622 dated 15 January 1990 for P10,000.00 (Exhs. "A-3," "B,"
"C," "D," respectively). Respondent also issued a postdated Urban Development Bank check No.
051946 dated 9 January 1990 for P5,500.00 (Exh. "E"). However, the checks covering the total
amount of P109,200.00 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds and closure of account.
Pressed to make good his obligation, respondent told complainant that he would be able to pay
her if she would lend him an additional amount of P75,000.00 to be paid a month after to be
secured by a chattel mortgage on his Datsun car.[1] As complainant agreed respondent handed
her three (3) copies of a deed of chattel mortgage which he himself drafted and six (6) copies of
the deed of sale of his car with the assurance that he would turn over its registration certificate
and official receipt. The agreement was not consummated as respondent later sold the same car
to another.
Despite several chances given him to settle his obligation respondent chose to evade complainant
altogether so that she was constrained to write him a final demand letter dated 22 September
1992[2] preceding the filing of several criminal complaints against him for violation of BP Blg. 22.[3]
Complainant also filed a letter-complaint dated 5 October 1992 with the Office of the
Ombudsman.[4]
It may be worth mentioning that a certain Emelinda Ortiz also filed several criminal and civil cases
against respondent similarly involving money transactions.[5] Ms. Ortiz claimed that respondent
had volunteered to sell to her a 20-footer container van filled with imported cotton fabric shirting
raw materials from the Bureau of Customs warehouse for P600,000.00 in time for the holidays.
However, despite her successive payments to respondent totalling P410,000.00, the latter failed
to deliver the goods as promised. Worse, respondent's personal check for P410,000.00
representing reimbursement of the amount he received from Ms. Ortiz was returned dishonored
for insufficiency of funds.
By way of defense, respondent averred that he gave the checks to complainant Co by way of
rediscounting and that these were fully paid when he delivered five cellular phones to her. He
brushed aside the allegations of complainant and Ms. Ortiz as ill-motivated, vague, confusing,
misleading and full of biases and prejudices. Although he is married he insinuated a special
relationship with the two (2) women which caused him to be careless in his dealings with them.
On 3 March 1993 the Court referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.
On 17 May 1997 the IBP issued a resolution recommending the suspension of respondent from
the practice of law for six (6) months based on the following findings -
1. No receipt has been produced by respondent showing that the face value of the subject checks
has been paid or that the alleged five (5) units of cellular phones have been delivered to the
complainant;
2. The Decision in the criminal cases that were filed vis-a-vis the subject bouncing checks and
wherein he was acquitted clearly shows that his acquittal was not due to payment of the obligation
but rather that 'private complainant knew at the time the accused issued the checks that the latter
did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the same. No violation of BP Blg. 22 is committed
where complainant was told by the drawer that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank; and
3. Respondent subsequently paid the complainant as shown by a receipt dated 26 August 1995 x
x x and the release of real estate mortgage x x x x If it is true that he had already paid his obligation
with five (5) cellular phones, why pay again?
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private
capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the
lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be
justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569
[1923]).
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross
misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts
his moral character in serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless
case in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very
much delayed.[6]
In the case at bar, it is glaringly clear that the procurement of personal loans through insinuations
of his power as an influence peddler in the Bureau of Customs, the issuance of a series of bad
checks and the taking undue advantage of his position in the aforesaid government office
constitute conduct in gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The recommended suspension of respondent for six (6) months is less than what he justly
deserves. His propinquity for employing deceit and misrepresentations as well as his cavalier
attitude towards incurring debts without the least intention of repaying them is reprehensible. This
disturbing behavior cannot be tolerated most especially in a lawyer who is an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO is SUSPENDED FOR ONE
(1) YEAR from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit
a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts in the land, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.

While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent
as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal services of respondent,
nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this Court. Thus we held in
Lizaso v. Amante[7] where Atty. Amante enticed complainant to invest in the casino business with
the proposition that her investment would yield her an interest of 10% profit daily, and Atty. Amante
not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but also the principal thereof
(P5,000.00) despite complainant's repeated demands -

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the
principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the
relationship of an attorney and client x x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm
said: x x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers
for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule
with many exceptions x x x x The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the
qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral
character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the
practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice
and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with
his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him x x x x[8]

Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo[9] where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from
the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an
attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for
gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy
lawyer. "The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is
FERMIN U. IMBUIDO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. FIDEL SOR. MANGONON, respondent.
not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep
out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him
Petitioner filed a charge of malpractice against respondent in view of certain misbehavior he had
x x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x
committed as member of the bar.
and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support."[10]
Petitioner claims that on June 14, 1948, he sold with the consent of his wife 10 parcels of land
Finally, reference is made to Rule 1.01, Chapter 1, entitled The Lawyer and Society of the Code
located at Manaoag, Pangasinan, which are covered by a certificate of title, with option to
of Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
repurchase, to Mrs. Maria E. Gonzales for P3,600.00, of which P3,000.00 were actually paid and
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this Rule, is not limited to conduct
the balance of P600.00 was applied to the payment of interest. It was intimated then that of the
exhibited in connection with the performance of professional duties.
parcels of land sold 7 had been previously encumbered in favor of other persons who were thereby
placed in their possession. According to the deed of sale the lands would be repurchased on or
before December 31, 1948 but unfortunately petitioner failed to exercise his right of redemption
and so Mrs. Gonzales consolidated her ownership over them and a new certificate of title was
issued in her name.
Sometime in December, 1949, petitioner engaged the services of respondent in an effort to
negotiate the redemption of the lands from Mrs. Gonzales which commission respondent accepted
although no mention was made then regarding his attorney's fees. Petitioner raised the sum of
P4,600.00 from the same persons to whom the 7 parcels of land had been encumbered with the
understanding that their previous contract would be changed into absolute sales for the amounts
respectively taken from them and delivered the same to respondent. Thereupon, respondent
proceeded to negotiate with Mrs. Gonzales for the repurchase of the lands having succeeded in
doing so for the sum of P4,056.00, including incidental expenses. The balance of the money was
kept by respondent as professional fees.
But to his astonishment, petitioner discovered that respondent repurchased the lands in his own
name in disregard of his instruction and had done so even without his knowledge and consent.
Respondent did more than that. After putting the lands in his name and securing a transfer
certificate of title in his favor, respondent disposed of them in favor of other persons realizing
therefrom an aggregate amount of P20,000.00, thereby depriving petitioner of the three parcels of
land which were not previously encumbered.1wph1.t engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. A lawyer shall at all times uphold
On March 17, 1951, petitioner filed an action before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
against respondent to recover the lands he misappropriated, plus damages, which was eventually
decided in favor of petitioner by granting him one year period within which to redeem the lands
sold by respondent. Because of this irregularity, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent
with the Presidential Complaint and Action Committee which in due course referred the matter to
the Department of Justice for investigation.
Petitioner prays that corresponding disciplinary action be taken against respondent.
HELD: It is true that respondent claims that he acted the way he did because he was then
representing not the petitioner but the persons to whom the lands had been previously
encumbered. Even if this may be true, the fact however remains that the vendor of the lands in
the sale Mrs. Gonzales was the petitioner and common sense dictates, as respondent should
know, that the reconveyance should be made in the name of the vendor. The fact that respondent
has afterwards executed different deeds of conveyance of the 8 parcels of land to several persons
among whom were those to whom they had been previously encumbered for the amounts they
had respectively advanced cannot erase the irregularity he has committed for that is contrary to
the ordinary course of law and the understanding he had with his client. Nor can respondent justify
the fact that he kept for himself the two parcels of land involved in the transaction under the pretext
that he had them placed in his name in payment of his attorney's fees, for there is nothing in the
evidence that may justify such claim. On the contrary, the evidence shows that out of the sum of
P4,600.00 that was given to him to effect the redemption he only paid P4,056.00 and kept the
balance to himself. In our opinion, these two parcels of land should be returned to petitioner without
prejudice to determining later the amount of professional fees respondent is entitled to in an
appropriate action.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent guilty of professional misconduct and so hereby
suspends him as member of the bar for a period of one (1) year from receipt of this decision.
Alberto Fernandez vs Atty. Benjamin Grecia
42 SCAD 438 Legal Ethics Gross Misconduct
In 1990, Linda Aves was admitted to St. Lukes Hospital. Among the doctors who treated her was
Dr. Alberto Fernandez. She was treated well hence she was sent home but then the next day she
died together with her unborn child. Damaso Aves, husband, then filed a damage suit against the
hospital and he impleaded the attending doctors which included Fernandez. Aves hired Atty.
Benjamin Grecia to represent him.
Grecia requested St. Luke to surrender before the court the medical records of Linda Aves. St.
Luke complied and the medical records were delivered to the Clerk of Court. In the morning of
July 16, 1991, Grecia went to the office of the clerk of court to borrow the said medical records.
While Grecia was examining the said medical records, he tore in front of the Clerk and one office
staff two pages from the medical records and then handed it back to the Clerk. The Clerk was
stunned as she watched Grecia walk away. She then reported the incident to the judge. The judge
immediately took action and the torn pages were eventually recovered as it turned out that Grecia
handed the torn pages to someone else.
Grecia was then administratively charged by Dr. Fernandez. Apparently, Grecia has been
disbarred before. However, he was able to get to the good side of the Supreme Court hence he
was reinstated to the profession.
ISSUE: Whether or not Grecia should be disbarred again.
HELD: Yes. Grecia violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a lawyer, he should not
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. A
lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice. Considering that this is his second offense, an incorrigible practitioner of dirty
tricks, like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of an instrument to advance the ends
of justice. By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and
disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member
of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide
in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the
affliction of severe physical injuries upon him in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the
university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two
(2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise
him.
Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he
passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted
to the practice of law. He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that
his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyers oath office and admit him to the practice
of law.
HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the STRICT,
INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. The court upheld the principle of maintaining the
good moral character of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so
far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was
asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become
a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to
certify that he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The petitioner is then allowed
to take the lawyers oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and thereafter to practice the legal profession.
Quingwa vs. Puno [A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967]
FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar,
with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public
school teacher for a number of years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June
1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for
sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for
sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy
supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the relationship
between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the
respondent whenever he asked from her.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense
averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under
section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.
HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section
2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by
evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree
of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. With respect to the special defense
raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in
the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled
rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken
as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers
of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held
that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states
that:
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and
learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of
morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates
unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all
times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the
law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is
ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Laguitan vTinio, 179 SCRA 837
In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May 1987, petitioner Perla Y. Laguitan charged
Atty. Salvador F. Tinio with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor General to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) for investigation and proper action.
Thus, in an order dated 18 August 1988, the Commission set the case for hearing on 9 September
1988 and required both complainant and respondent to submit additional copies of their pleadings
within ten (10) days from notice.
Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
submitted to us its findings and recommendation, which may be summed up as follows:
Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and in time became
lovers. Beginning in 1976, the parties lived together as husband and wife. As a result, complainant
bore respondent two (2) children: Sheila, now about ten (10) years old and Benedict, now
approximately nine (9) years old. In the course of this relationship, petitioner discovered that
respondent Tinio, before meeting her, had contracted marriage with someone else and that the
prior marriage was subsisting. Nonetheless, complainant continued living in with respondent until
eventually, ten (10) years later, she and her children by respondent Tinio were abandoned by the
latter in November 1986. Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she sought the help of respondent's
parents in supporting her children who were then already in school. Respondent's parents gave
her P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.
After examination of the record of this case and noting that respondent Tinio appeared before the
IBP Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit relationship with complainant and
his having begotten two (2) children by her, and promised the Commissioner that he would support
his illegitimate children but had not lived to his promise, we agree with the findings of fact of the
IBP Board. The IBP Board recommends that respondent Tinio be suspended from the practice of
law "not for having cohabited with the complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate
children," the suspension to remain in effect until respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of
support.
HELD: The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of law
but not merely because he has failed in his obligation to support the children complainant bore
him but also because for a prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with complainant, a
course of conduct inconsistent with the requirement of good moral character that is required for
the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar, Concubinage imports moral
turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.
Lee v Abastillas, 234 SCRA 29
FACTS:
Judge Renato E. Abastillas was the presiding judge of the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011,
where Johnson Lee and Bonny Moreno are defendants. Judge Abastillas solicited the amount of
PhP50, 000.00 from Atty. Chua to secure a favorable decision on the said criminal cases, which
he communicated to his clients (Lee and Moreno). Johnson Lee then financed the PhP20, 000.00
as a down payment and was delivered by Atty, Chua to Judge Abastillas. Lee had 3 meetings with
Judge Abastillas to discuss the merits of the case and the payment of $5, 000.00. Lee even Held:
recorded the telephone conversation he had with the respondent judge. On the other hand, Atty.
Chua was charged administratively for allowing himself to be used as a conduit for illegal and Writ of certiorari is granted and the order of Respondent CA reinstating appeal is nullified and set
immoral act. aside.

ISSUE(s):
WON Judge Abastillas has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct? 2.
WON Atty. Chua has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD:
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence (Rule 1.01). He should administer justice impartially and without delay
(Rule 1.02). He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01). It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing
and dispensing justice be developed to a high degree of proficiency, to gain the absolute
confidence of the public in the integrity and impartiality of its administration, because appearance
is as important as reality, so much so
that a judge, like Cesars wife, must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of
Judge Abastillas transgressed against the high standard of moral ethics required of judges. 2.
Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of the Code of Professional Responsibility in
view of his admission that he allegedly delivered PhP20, 000.00 as bribe money to Judge
Abastillas, thereby allowing himself to be used as a conduit for an illegal and immoral act. Rule
1.01 provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union (CFSWU) and Filemon Alvarez v. Lo Bu and Court
of Appeals No. L-40136, March 25, 1975, 63 SCRA 321
The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent CA being perpetually restrained from taking
any further action in such appeal, except that of dismissing it.
Courts should dismiss a suit which has all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to for
the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor controversy. There was a
replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith, Lo Bu, which was dismissed by the CFI Manila.
What is worse, private respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance , as he himself was the
petitioner in the certiorari proceedings before this Court. He was a prinicipal in the nefarious
scheme to frustrate the award in favor of the petitioner labor union.
Rule that certiorari will not be granted where petitioners have plain and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law will not be enforced where it would result in further delay in satisfaction of
judgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. It is about time that a halt be called to the
schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labors just
claim.
A legal counsel is expected to defend a clients cause but not at the expense of truth and in
defiance of the clear purpose of labor laws. For even such case, Atty Busmente had not exculpated
himself. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity
of the profession, requires that should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client,
ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts
into serious question his good standing in the bar.

Facts: After Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned , Ong Ting established Century Foundry Shop
where he and his family resided in the premises. After several attempts to settle a pending unfair
labor practice case proved unsuccessful, Ong Ting sold all his business, including equipment and
rights in the New Century Foundry Shop to his compadre Lo Bu, for Php20,000.

On Jan 16, 1973, petitioner CFSWU obtained from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias
writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. Thereafter, writ
was served January 17 and 18, 1973, levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry
Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale.

Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction
of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The CIR, in its order dated Feb 23, 1973, denied his
motion. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration.

Lo Bu appealed by certiorari but the Court denied this petition in its resolution dated July 17, 1993.
In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by Lo Bu in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila
covering the same properties.

Upon receipt of order from the Court denying certiorari, petitioner Labor Union filed a second
motion to dismiss complaint. After the complaint was dismissed by the lower court, decision was
elevated to the Court of Appeals.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner Labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition.

(2) Whether or not counsel Atty Busmente performed his obligation as an officer of the court while
sustaining the dignity of the profession while acting as counsel for Lo Bu.