Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to
our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick
A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both
parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of

Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner a Filipina and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
"single" and "Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage andits subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis
of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify
or annual.

Hence, this Petition.18

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a

certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing
that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated
the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the
divorce decree before our courts."19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
 The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like
any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex
loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and
a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage
in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can
be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These
articles read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;

xxx xxx xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required
in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's
 presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document
a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive

evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment
is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country.32

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
 Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends
it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional

judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption
or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce
decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law
of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have
been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A
duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on
the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" Complaint;51 (b)
Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace
J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52(c) Exhibit "C"
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian)
on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and
Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S"
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d)
Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick
A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree
with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso
facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least,
to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that
the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already
in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one
in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official

capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying
reconsideration.3

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc.,
applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to
petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and
materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the
real estate industry to slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good during the first
quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to P71,879,228 that year.6

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income
taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount
of P26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.9

On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional
documents to support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus,
on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. 12 It invoked Section 229
of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner;
but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has
been paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years
from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that
may arise after payment:Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a
claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was
made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)

The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to
claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13

The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years
are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours,
and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days
which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis
supplied)

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for
the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return,
was filed beyond the reglementary period.15

Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article
13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the
CA:

The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a
leap year.19

In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to
April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a
total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor
construed.20

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus, this appeal.

Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly
construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against
respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing
of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted
returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730
days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-
year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is
not.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted
return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we
ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap
year.26

However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar

months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it
shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day
of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain."28It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up
to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month."29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1,
2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1,
2008 until February 29, 2008.30

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and
abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be
reasonably reconciled with the previous one).31Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above
only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and
unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses
entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably
reconciled.33

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987 deal with the same subject matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under
the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the
two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted
return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
1 month
2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
month
3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
month
4th calendar July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
month
5th calendar August 15, 1998 to September 14,
month 1998
6th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1998
month 1998
7th calendar October 15, 1998 to November 14,
month 1998
8th calendar November 15, to December 14,
month 1998 1998
9th calendar December 15, to January 14, 1999
month 1998
 10th calendar January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
month
11th calendar February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
month
12th calendar March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
month
Year 13th calendar April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
2 month
14th calendar May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
month
15th calendar June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
month
16th calendar July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
month
17th calendar August 15, 1999 to September 14,
month 1999
18th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1999
month 1999
19th calendar October 15, 1999 to November 14,
month 1999
20th calendar November 15, to December 14,
month 1999 1999
21st calendar December 15, to January 14, 2000
month 1999
22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
month
23rd calendar February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
month
24th calendar March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
month

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of
the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
filed within the reglementary period.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax
Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113
entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V.
Parcero.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice