Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Plaza Corp.

vs Robert Cullen Petitioner: MPMCP and

MLHI(Meridian)

Respondent: Robert Cullen

Ponente: PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. The nature
of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.

Facts: Robert H. Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium unit of the Medical Plaza Makati covered by

Condominium Certificate of Title No. 45808 of the Register of Deeds of Makati. Said title was later
cancelled and Condominium Certificate of Title No. 64218 was issued in the name of respondent. On
September 19, 2002, petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. JoseGiovanni E. Dimayuga, demanded
from respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues and assessments amounting to P145,567.42.
Respondent disputed this demand claiming that he had been religiously paying his dues shown by the fact
that he was previously elected president and director of petitioner. Petitioner,on the other hand, claimed
that respondent's obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI(previous owner). Consequently, respondent
was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the

2002 election of petitioner's Board of Directors. Respondent thus clarified from MLHI the veracity of
petitioner's claim, but MLHI allegedly claimed that the same had already been settled.

This prompted respondent to demand from petitioner an explanation why he was considered a delinquent
payer despite the settlement of the obligation. Petitioner failed to make such explanation. Hence, the
Complaint for Damages filed with Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.

Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. MLHI claims that it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which is vested
with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, raises the following
specific grounds for the dismissal of the complaint: (1) estoppel as respondent himself approved the
assessment when he was the president; (2) lack of jurisdiction as the case involves an intra-corporate
controversy; (3) prematurity for failure of respondent to exhaust all intra-corporate remedies; and (4) the
case is already moot and academic, the obligation having been settled between petitioner and MLHI.

RTC rendered a Decision granting petitioners and MLHIs motions to dismiss and, consequently,
dismissing respondents complaint.

The trial court agreed with MLHI that the action for specific performance filed by respondent clearly falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. 12 As to petitioner, the court held that the complaint states

no cause of action, considering that respondents obligation had already been settled by MLHI. It, likewise,
ruled that the issues raised are intra-corporate between the corporation and member
CA reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. Contrary to the RTC conclusion, the CA held that the controversy is an ordinary civil action
for damages which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts.

ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to
dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.

The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction
also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.

It obviously arose from the intra-corporate relations between the parties, and the questions involved pertain
to their rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of the
corporation.

Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made by respondent in
his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by petitioner
against respondent as well as the validity of petitioners act in preventing respondent from participating in
the election of the corporations Board of Directors. Respondent contested the alleged unpaid dues and
assessments demanded by petitioner. To be sure, this action partakes of the nature of an intra-corporate
controversy, the jurisdiction over which pertains to the SEC. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act No.
8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases
enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has been transferred to RTCs designated by
this Court as Special Commercial Courts. While the CA may be correct that the RTC has jurisdiction, the
case should have been filed not with the regular court but with the branch of the RTC designated as a special
commercial court. Considering that the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58 was not designated as a special
commercial court, it was not vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.31 The
CA, therefore, gravely erred in remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
 NESTOR SANDOVAL vs. HON. DOROTEO CAEBA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Branch
20, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF MANILA (RTC, Manila, Branch 20), and ESTATE DEVELOPERS &
INVESTORS CORPORATION

GANCAYCO, J.:

It is not the ordinary courts but the Natl Housing Authority (NHA) which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker of salesman; and (c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lot.

Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (Estate) filed a complaint against Nestor Sandoval in the RTC
for the collection of unpaid installments of a subdivision lot, pursuant to their agreement. The RTC ruled
in favor of Estate, and ordered Sandoval to pay. A writ of execution was issued which thereafter became
final and executor.

Facts: Sandoval filed a motion to vacate judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

An MR of the writ of execution was also filed by PET. Estate opposed both motions. RTC denied the
motion to vacate for the reason that it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the court to do so. A new writ of
execution was issued.

Sandoval filed a pet alleging that the RTC committed GADALEJ since the exclusive and original
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof is vested w the HLURB (PD 957).

Issue: Whether the ordinary courts have jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a
subdivision lot

Held: NO. Under Sec 1 of OD 957, the NHA was given the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION to hear and
decide certain cases of the following nature:

(a) Unsound real estate business practices;

(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condo unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of

subdivision lot or condo unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

The exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the PET and RES is vested not on the RTC but on the
NHA. The NHA was re-named Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and thereafter re-named as the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
 MAGPALE, JR. v CSC
G.R. No. 97381 November 5, 1992

Petitioner: BENIGNO V. MAGPALE, JR.

Respondent: CSC and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as the General Manager of the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA).

Ponente: MELO, J.

DOCTRINE(S):

1.)Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without jurisdiction
if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide the case. (Acena v. Civil Service Commission,
193 SCRA 623 [1991]).

2.)Appeal is merely a statutory right and must be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the
provision of the law. The phrase Adversely affected party in Sec 49 of EO 292 refers only to the aggrieved
government employee and not the State.

(BACKGROUND LANG TO NI PETITIONER)Petitioner started his career in government as an employee in

the Presidential Assistance on Community Development in 1960. Fifteen years later, or in 1975, he transferred to
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as Arrastre Superintendent. He was promoted to the position of Port Manager
in 1977 of the Port Management Unit (PMU), General Santos City. Then he was reassigned, in the same year to
PPA-PMU, Tacloban City where he likewise discharged the functions of Port Manager. On December 1, 1982, the
PPA General Manager designated Atty. William A. Enriquez as officer-in-charge of PPA-PMU, Tacloban City
effective December 6, 1982. On January 6, 1983, petitioner was ordered to immediately report to the Assistant
General Manager (AGM) for Operation, PPA, Manila, Petitioner reported at PPA Manila on the same date and
performed the duties and functions assigned to him.

FACTS:

In an Internal Control Department Report dated March 5, 1984, the PMU-Tacloban Inventory
Committee and the Commission on Audit (COA) stated that petitioner failed to account for equipment of
PPA value at P65,542.25 and to liquidate cash advances amounting to P130,069.61. He was found also to have
incurred unauthorized absences from May 25, 1984 to July 23, 1984. 19 months after he began reporting in
Manila, a formal charge for Dishonesty, Pursuit of Private Business without permission as required by Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, Frequent and Unauthorized Absences and Neglect of Duty was filed against
petitioner. Based on said charges he was ordered preventively suspended and has been out of service since
then.

For almost four years the case remained unacted upon. The formal investigation and hearing resumed on
September 18, 1987. On January 18, 1989 a Decision was rendered by the DOTC

Secretary, through its Administrative Action Board (AAB), finding petitioner guilty of Gross Negligence on
two counts:

a. (a) for his failure to account for the 44 assorted units of equipment, among them a Sony Betamax
 and a TV Camera, and

a. (b) for failing to render the required liquidation of his cash advances amounting to P44,877.00
for a period of four years.

Petitioner was also found guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences. Accordingly, he was meted
the penalty of dismissal from the service with the corresponding accessory penalties.

When petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision was denied, he appealed to the
Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of respondent Civil Service Commission which reversed the
decision of the DOTC AAB stating that the petitioner cannot be held liable for Gross Negligence for his alleged
failure to account for several properties and for failure to liquidate the cash advances he received as there was no
showing that he has been specifically required to do so either by law or regulation. The mere detail of
respondent to PPA-Manila will not necessarily obligate him to make accounting for the same. Moreover, PD 1445
Section 105 Chapter 5 (The Government

Auditing Code of the Philippines) measured the liability of an officer accountable for government property
only to the money value of said property. Though respondent is the person primarily liable for these funds and
property, he holds this liability jointly with the person who has the actual possession thereof and who has the
immediate responsibility for the safekeeping.

Thereafter the PPA, through its General Manager, herein respondent Rogelio A Dayan, filed an appeal with
the Civil Service Field Office-PPA, and the latter office indorsed the appeal to respondent CSC. On the other hand,
Magpale requested the Secretary of the DOTC to direct the PPA to implement the MSPB reinstatement decision as
it has become final and executory. Said request was reiterated by petitioner to OIC Wilfredo M. Trinidad of the
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Legal Affairs, DOTC. On March 13, 1990, petitioner filed
with the MSPB a Motion for Implementation of the MSPB decision. This was opposed by the PPA through its
General Manager.

On April 27, 1990 petitioner filed with respondent CSC his comment to the appeal, contending that:

1.) he is not an accountable officer and is under no obligation to account for the property and equipment;

2.) said property and equipment were not received by him as custodian and he should not be held liable for the loss
of the same;

3.)the said property and equipment were place in PPA-PMU Tacloban City which the herein petitioner left on
October 8, 1982 and since then had lost control over them. Moreover, petitioner averred that as to the unliquidated
cash advances of P44,877.00, the same had long been liquidated.

4.) Finally, petitioner claimed that his failure to secure the clearance for any possible property or financial obligation
in PMU-Tacloban was due to the urgency of his transfer to PPA-Manila and the absence of any order or demand to
secure the clearance.

On June 28, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal of PPA claiming that:

1. 1. Appeal of PPA was filed out of time and that the CSC has no jurisdiction over it;

1. 2. The PPA has not exhausted administrative remedies before appealing to the higher body, the CSC;

1. 3. The MSPB decision has become final and therefore cannot be disturbed anymore.
 On October 19, 1990, respondent CSC rendered its now assailed Resolution which reversed the MSPB
decision and reinstated the DOTC-AAB decision, but modified its penalty to 1 year suspension as it took into
account the length of service of petitioner and considered that it was his 1st offense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC exceeded its authority in taking jurisdiction of the PPAs Appeal.

HELD:

Yes. Although, as the respondent CSC is correct in stating that Under section 47 of EO 292, it has jurisdiction over
appeals on all Administrative cases involving the imposition of:
a. (a) a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or
b. (b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or

c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or

(d) removal or dismissal from office.

Such jurisdiction may be exercised only in relation with Section 49 of the same Code; or when the following
requisites concur:
a. (a) the decision must be appealable;

a. (b) the appeal must be made by the party adversely affected by the decision;

a. (c) the appeal must be made within fifteen days from receipt of the decision, unless a petition for the
reconsideration is seasonably filed; and

a. (d) the notice of appeal must be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward the records of
the case, together with the notice of appeal to the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing of the
notice of appeal, with its comments, if any.

The February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve dismissal or separation from office, rather, the
decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former position.

Consequently, Consistent with the cases of Mendez v. Civil Service Commission and Paredes vs. Civil Service
Commission, the MSPB decision was not a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
 JESUSA VDA. DE MURGA vs. JJUANITO CHAN
G.R. No. L-24680
October 7, 1968
25 SCRA 441

ANGELES, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner as lessor, entered into a contract of lease with respondent as lessee. Before the expiration
of the ten-year period of the lease, there had been intercourse of communications between the lessor and
the lessee for the renewal of the lease, but the parties failed to arrive at an agreement; hence, this action by
the lessor against the lessee. A letter of demand to vacate the leased premises was sent to lessee as follows:
Please be advised further that we reiterate our demand made to you in our registered letter dated February
4, 1959 (to vacate the leased premises) which was received by you on the 10th instant, unless you pay the
amount of Six Hundred pesos (P600.00) or Seven Hundred pesos (P700.00) as new rental per our letter of
January 19, 1959, before the expiration of the 15-day period granted you for vacating the same.
Without any further definite demand on the lessee to vacate the premises, petitioner filed a
complaint of unlawful detainer in the municipal court of Zamboanga City against the lessee, Juanito Chan,
to eject the latter from the leased premises. The facts alleged in the complaint as cause of action, consisted
in reproducing and reiterating the substance of the correspondence exchanged between lessor and lessee,
as narrated above, and claiming that the possession of the lessee of the premises had become illegal by his
failure and refusal to pay the increased new rental. For relief, the plaintiff prayed that the defendant be
ordered to vacate the premises, and "TO PAY THE NEW RENTS DEMANDED OF P600.00 or P700.00
FROM FEBRUARY 1, 1959 MONTHLY AS THE CASE MAY BE." Attached to the complaint, as
annexes thereto, were copies of the letters exchanged between the lessor and the lessee.

Issue:
Whether or not the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer,
and confer jurisdiction over the case to the municipal court (now city court) of Zamboanga City, under the
provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and decisions interpreting the same

Held:
The notice giving lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise to vacate the
land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after such
notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he
defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made.
In the case at bar, it clearly appears from the demand letter that the obligation to vacate the leased
premises would be dependent on the failure of the lessee to agree to the new rent demanded by the lessor.
As the lessee, however, was in the physical possession of the land by virtue of a prior contract of lease, and
the demand was in the alternative imposing a new rental, even without taking into account the efficacy of
the stipulation for an automatic renewal of the lease. Without any subsequent definite demand to vacate the
premises, subject to no condition, the lessee did not incur in default which would give rise to a right on the
part of the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer.
Clause "7" of the contract of lease, meant an express grant to the lessee to renew the lease at his
option, contrary to the claim of the lessor-appellee that there must be a prior mutual agreement of the parties.
Clause "7" provides the happening of two eventualities at the expiration of the lease either the lessor may
purchase the improvements constructed by the lessee on the land, or in case the lessor fails, for any cause
or reason, to exercise the option to buy, the lease shall be deemed automatically renewed. The evidence has
established that the lessor had refused to buy the buildings on the land. The statement in said clause "7" that
in case of renewal the duration of the lease and the new rental to be paid shall be adjusted by the parties, is
of no moment in the solution of the issue, whether or not the facts alleged in the complaint constitute a
cause of action of unlawful detainer. The pleadings of the parties, and the annexes thereto, clearly show
that the jugular vein of the controversy hinges on the correct interpretation of clause "7" of the contract of
lease, a matter outside the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Inasmuch as the controversy hinges on the
interpretation of clause "7" of the contract, that is, whether or not said clause contemplated an automatic
renewal of the lease, the action was not for unlawful detainer but one not capable of pecuniary estimation
and, therefore, beyond the competence of the municipal court.
 Padlan vs Dinglasan

Petitioners: Editha Padlan

Respondents: Elenita Dinglasan; Felicisimo Dinglasan. Ponente: PERALTA, J:

Doctrine: Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
FACTS: Respondent Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land which is covered by

TCT. While on board a jeepney, Elenitas mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura Passion regarding the
sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owners copy of the TCT
from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots under the name of Elenita
and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan. Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and
her husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers.

On April 26, 1990, Maura sold one of the lots to Lorna Ong (Lorna), who later sold the lot to petitioner

Editha Padlan for P4,000.00. Thus, TCT issued under the formers name was cancelled and another TCT was issued
in the name of Editha Padlan.

Respondents filed a case of Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC. Summons was, thereafter,
served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan.

The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed the
complaint. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the respondent.
Consequently, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the

TCT issued in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of respondentsown title. Aggrieved, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only did the complaint lacks merit, the lower court
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and the person of the petitioner. The same was
denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case

HELD: No. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the
real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action. Here, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was
sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would show the
valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings, respondents counsel informed the court that they
will present the tax declaration of the property in the next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the
Provincial Assessors Office. However, they did not present such copy.

To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof .

Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not
the RTC has jurisdiction over the action.

Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

 Lumbuan vs. Ronquillo

Petitioners: Milagros Lumbuan

Respondents: Alfredo A. Ronquillo
Ponente: Quisumbing
Doctrine:

SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition, action,
or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or
any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the
lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman.

It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat
is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.

Facts:

The petitioner was the registered owner of a property located in Tondo Manila. In 1995, the property was leased to
the respondent for a period of three years for the amount of P5000. Also in agreement was an annual increase of
10% for the succeeding two years, and that the property will be for the exclusive use of the fastfood business of the
respondent, unless any other use is given with the petiotioners prior written consent.

The property was initially used for the fastfood business of the respondent and later on converted into a residence
without the required written consent of the petitioner. The respondent also failed to pay the 10% increase in rent of
P500 a month starting 1996, and P1000 for the year 1997 to the present. Despite repeated demands, the respondent
refused to pay the arrears and vacate the premises.

On November 15, 1997, the petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay Chairmans office but the parties failed
to arrive at a settlement. The Barangay Chairman then issued a Certificate to File Action.

On December 8, 1997, a case for unlawful detainer was filed by the petitioner against the respondent. The
respondent received the summons and a copy of the complaint on December 15, 1997 and his answer by mail was
filed on December 24, 1997.

Before the MeTC could receive the respondents answer, the petitioner filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment dated January 7, 1998. Acting upon this motion, a decision was rendered ordering the respondent to
vacate and surrender possession of the leased premises and to pay the petitioner the amount of P46, 000 as unpaid
rentals with legal interest until fully paid and an additional P5000 for attorneys fees plus cost of the suit.

A manifestation was filed by the respondent calling the attention of the MeTC to the fact that his answer was filed
on time and praying that the decision be set aside. The MeTC denied the prayer, ruling that the Manifestation was
in the nature of a motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Summary Procedure.

Upon appeal, the case was raffled to the RTC of Manila. The RTC rendered its decision setting aside the MeTC
decision and directed the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further proceedings.
Strict compliance was directed with the condition that should the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the
entire records of the case will be remanded to the MeTC for it to decide the case anew.

The respondent sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion. Relief was thereafter sought from the CA
through a petition for review. The appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the
ejectment case. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the appellate court.

Pending this petition, the parties went through barangay conciliation proceedings as directed by the RTC of Manila.
Again, they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement prompting the RTC to issue an order remanding the case to
the MeTC.

A second decision was ordered by the MeTC ordering the defendant and all persons claiming right of possession
under him to voluntarily vacate the property and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff; to pay to plaintiff the
amount of P387,512.00 as actual damages in the form of unpaid rentals and its agreed increase up to January 2000
and to pay the amount of P6,500.00 a month thereafter until the

same is actually vacated; and to pay to plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus cost of the
suit.

The respondent appealed the decision and the case was raffled to the RTC of Manila. The RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioner and dismissed the appeal. The case was then elevated by the respondent to the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the complaint for the alleged failure of the parties
to comply with the mandatory mediation and conciliation proceedings in the barangay level.

Held/Ratio:

Yes. With the parties subsequent meeting with the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further conciliation
proceedings, the procedural defect was cured.

The petitioner alleges that the parties have gone through barangay conciliation proceedings to settle their dispute as
shown by the Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon/Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Lupon/Pangkat
Chairman. The respondent, on the other hand, contends that whether there was defective compliance or no
compliance at all with the required conciliation, the case should have been dismissed.

SECTION 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition, action,
or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or
any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the
lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman.

Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the Certificate to File Action stating that
no settlement was reached by the parties. While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the
parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The efforts of the Barangay Chairman,
however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was
substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before
the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court.
 People v Cawaling

Plaintiff: People of the Philippines

Accused: Ulysses M. Cawaling, Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, and Hilario Cajilo
Ponente: Panganiban

Doctrine:

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of
the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events.

Facts:

An administrative case was filed by Nelson Ilisan before the National Police Commission in which Policemen
Tumbagahan, De Los Santos, and Cajilo were charged with the killing of Ronie Ilisan. A decision was made which
found the police officers guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal from the service with prejudice.

Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed before the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon an
information for murder against the police officers and Mayor Cawaling. After due trial, the court rendered its
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The killing was qualified to
murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery. The trial court ruled
that there was a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and his assailant, as the latter were greater in
number and armed with guns.

Issue:

WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the the accused, as they were public
officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office.

Held:

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of
the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such
as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognised
exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in
the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.

The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD1606, PD 1850 and BP 129, as amended. Section 4 of PD 1606 provides
that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving offenses or felonies
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by
law is higher than prison correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000. However, Pres. Marcos
issued presidential decrees placing the members of the Integrated National Police under the jurisdiction of courts-
martial.

The jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP 129. Section 20 of which
provides that trial courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan which shall thereafter be exclusively taken cognisance of by the latter.
In Sanchez vs. Demetriou the court held that public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is
either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except
when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office in which event the penalty is
increased.

The use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element, and even as an aggravating circumstance, its
materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials
but from the manner of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the information filed against the accused contains
no allegation that they were public officers who committed the crime in relation to the office. In the absence of such
essential allegation, and since the present case does not involve charges of violation of the Anti-Graft Act, the
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present case.

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint of information. In the absence of any allegation that
the offense was committed in relation to the office of the accused or was necessarily

connected with the discharge of their functions, the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case.
 ZAMORA et al. v. HEIRS OF CARMEN IZQUIERDO

Petitioner: Wife and children of PABLO ZAMORA

Respondent: Heirs of CARMEN IZQUIERDO

Ponente: J. Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez

Doctrine: As a precondition to filing a complaint in court, parties shall go through the barangay
conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present case), or the
Pangkat.

Facts:

In 1973, Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation where the former leased to the latter
one of her apartment units located in Caloocan City. They agreed that the rental is P3,000.00 per month; the leased
premises is only for residence; and only a single family is allowed to occupy it. After Carmens death in 1996, her
attorney-in-fact, Anita Punzalan, representing the heirs, herein respondents, prepared a new contract of lease
where the rent was increased to P3,600.00 per month. Petitioners, however, refused to sign it. Pablo died in 1997
and his wife and children continued to reside in the apartment unit. They refused to pay the increased rental and
persisted in operating a photocopying business in the same apartment.

Meanwhile, Avelina Zamora applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (MWSS) for a water
line installation in the premises. Since written consent from the owner is required for installation, she requested
respondents attorney-in-fact to issue it. However, the latter declined because petitioners refused to pay the new
rental rate and violated the restrictions on the use of the premises by using a portion thereof for photocopying
business and allowing three families to reside therein.

Petitioner then filed with the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay 16, Zone 2, District 1, Caloocan
City a complaint against respondents docketed as: Usaping Bgy. Blg. 1-27-97, Ukol sa: Hindi Pagbibigay ng
Pahintulot sa Pagpapakabit ng Tubig.

During conciliation proceedings, petitioners still refused to sign the new lease contract and soon after, was sent a
demand letter by respondents to vacate the premises within 30 days. Failing to amicably settle the dispute, the
Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File Action. Consequently, respondents filed with the MTC Branch 49
Caloocan for unlawful detainer and damages.

Petitioner alleges that the barangay Certification to File Action is fatally defective because it pertains to another
dispute the refusal by respondents to give her written consent to petitioners request for installation of water
facilities in the premises. And, second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay (as Lupon Chairman), did not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo
before whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should have been conducted.

MTC rendered judgment in favor of Respondents ordering Petitioners to vacate premises and pay damages.

RTC Branch 125, on appeal, affirmed MTC judgment and subsequently denied Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

CA, on petition for review, affirmed RTC decision and thereafter denied Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

Issue:
W/N the Lupon conciliation alone, without the proceeding before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes
the law on the Katarungang Barangay as a precondition to filing a complaint in court.

Held: NO

The Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve
the dispute between the parties herein. Contrary to petitioners contention, the complaint does not only allege, as a
cause of action, the refusal of respondents attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the
installation of water facilities in the premises, but also petitioners violation of the terms of the lease, specifically
their use of a portion therein for their photocopying business and their failure to pay the increased rental.

As a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before
the Lupon Chairman (as what happened in the present case), or the Pangkat. It is thus manifest that there was
substantial compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence thereto.

We hold that petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint for unlawful detainer is proscribed by Section
19(a) of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which permits filing of such pleading only when the ground
for dismissal of the complaint is anchored on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure by the complainant
to refer the subject matter of his/her complaint to the Lupon for conciliation prior to its filing with the court.

Petition DENIED. CA Decision sustaining RTC Decision upholding MTC judgment AFFIRMED.