II.

ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

CL.1.1 Manila Hotel Corp. vs. NLRC, 343 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 120077 October 13, 2000

FACTS: In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman with the Mazoon Printing Press when
he received a letter from Mr. Gerhard R. Shmidt, General Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing, China. Mr. Schmidt
informed respondent Santos that he was recommended by one Nestor Buenio, a friend of his. In June 1988, he
was recruited by Palace Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos agreed to the hotels job
offer and so he started working there in November 1988. The employment contract between him and Palace
Hotel was however without the intervention of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In
August 1989, Palace Hotel notified Santos that he will be laid off due to business reverses. In September 1989,
he was officially terminated.

In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and
Manila Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was impleaded but no summons were served upon
it. MHC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a foreign corporation (Hong
Kong). MHIL manages the affair of the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in favor of
Santos. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:

1. Not all cases involving Filipino citizens can be tried in the Philippines.
The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum. The SC noted that the main aspects of the case transpired in
two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has
with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign
corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here.

The employment contract.Respondent Santos was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer,
through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. He was
hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government.

MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers are not residents of
the Philippines.

Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the relevant facts pertaining to the case. It is not
competent to determine the facts because the acts complained of happened outside our jurisdiction. It cannot
determine which law is applicable. And in case a judgment is rendered, it cannot be enforced against the Palace
Hotel (in the first place, it was not served any summons).

2. Requisites before a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over a conflict of laws
case.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the
case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar. the Court granted the petition for certiorari in favor of the
petitioner and annulled the previous orders of the NLRC.

CL.2.0 Barretto-Gonzales v Gonzales

FACTS: Manuela Barretto Gonzalez and Augusto Gonzalez were both citizens of the Philippines. After seven
years of marriage, they voluntary separated and have not lived together as man and wife. They had 4 minor
children together. After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela for her and her childrens
support of P500 monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity and illness, and that the title of certain
properties be put in her name. Shortly after the agreement, Augusto went to Reno, Nevada and secured in that
jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he
went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well and had 3 children with her. When
Augusto left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of Manuela
Barreto and her children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
Augusto came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Manuela brought an action at the CFI-
Manila requesting to confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada and invoked sec 9
of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what
would have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents died
intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Manuela and Augusto be
declared dissolved and the latter be ordered to pay the former P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 and all the
expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons.
After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but reduced the attorneys fees
to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against the defendant, Hence, this appeal by Augusto
saying that the lower court erred in their decision.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce obtained in the United States should be recognized in the Philippines.
RULING: No. Litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal
relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in a manner which
our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals.
The court based its decision on Articles 9 and Art 11 of the Civil Code and The Divorce Law of the Philippines
which reads:
Article 9. The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity or persons,
are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.
Article 11. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to
promote public order and good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or
by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.

IV. STATUS VS CAPACITY

CL. 3.0 ROA VS COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS 13 PHIL 321

FACTS: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu recommitting the appellant, Tranquilino
Roa, to the custody of the Collector of Customs and declaring the Collector's right to effect appellant's deportation to
China as being a subject of the Chinese Empire and without right to enter and reside in the Philippine Islands. There is no
dispute as to the facts.

The appellant, Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of Luculan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on July 6, 1889. His
father was Basilio Roa Uy Tiong Co, a native of China, and his mother was Basilia Rodriguez, a native of this country.
His parents were legally married in the Philippine Islands at the time of his birth. The father of the appellant went to China
about the year 1895, and died there about 1900. Subsequent to the death of his father, in May, 1901, the appellant was sent
to China by his mother for the sole purpose of studying (and always with the intention of returning) and returned to the
Philippine Islands on the steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of Cebu October 1, 1910, from Amoy, China, and sought
admission to the Philippine Islands. At this time the appellant was a few days under 21 years and 3 months of age.

After hearing the evidence the board of special inquiry found that the appellant was a Chinese person and a subject of the
Emperor of China and not entitled to land. On appeal to the Insular Collector of Customs this decision was affirmed, and
the Court of First Instance of Cebu in these habeas corpus proceedings remanded the appellant to the Collector of
Customs.

The pertinent part of the decision of the board of special inquiry reads:

In view of the fact that the applicant for admission was born in lawful wedlock, he takes the nationality of his
father, and his father was not a subject of the King of Spain on April 11, 1899, the applicant, acquiring the
nationality of his father, becomes a subject of the Emperor of China and not a citizen of the Philippine Islands.

Upon appeal the Insular Collector of Customs in his decision dated February 17, 1911, said:

Under the laws of the Philippine Islands, children, while they remain under parental authority, have the nationality
of their parents. Therefore, the legitimate children born in the Philippine Islands of a subject of the Emperor of
China are Chinese subjects and the same rule obtained during Spanish sovereignty. Therefore, the provisions of
the Treaty of Paris and of the Philippine Bill with reference to Spanish subjects have no application in
determining the citizenship or nationality of the children of Chinese subjects in the Philippine Islands. Under the
Chinese Exclusion Laws, a person of the Chinese race and descent is not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands
except under the terms and conditions expressly provided for. No abuse of authority or discretion on the part of
the members of the board of special inquiry having been claimed or appearing, their decision in this matter is
sustained as being correct and proper on the showing made and in accordance with the law. The said Tranquilino
Roa is therefore refused landing.

ISSUE: The question presented is whether a child born in the Philippine Island in July, 1889, of parents, one of whom
(the father) was a Chinaman and the other a Filipina, who at the time of his birth were permanently domiciled and resided
in the Philippine Islands and were not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China,
becomes, at the time of his birth, a citizen of the Philippine Islands by virtue of law.

RULING: The questions presented in this case were definitely settled by the Supreme Court of the United States.
According to the doctrine here enunciated, it is quite clear that if the appellant in the case at bar had been born in the
United States and was now trying to reenter that country, he would be entitled to land upon the ground that he was a
citizen of the United States. By the laws of the United States, citizenship depends generally upon the place of birth. This is
the doctrine of jus soli, and predominates. Consequently, any person born in the United States (with certain specific
exceptions) is a citizen of that country, owes it allegiance, and is entitled to its protection.

The result is that both the United States and Spain have recognized, affirmed, and adopted the doctrine or principle of
citizenship by place of birth, by blood, and election, with the first predominating. Children born in the United States of
foreign parents, are citizens of that country, and it is assumed that they and their parents desire that such citizenship
continue; and this assumption stands until the contrary is shown. Under Spanish law, the contrary rule prevails. In both
countries, the nationality of the wife follows that of the husband. In the United States, the wife, on the dissolution of the
marriage by death, ipso facto, reacquires her original status unless she elects otherwise. In Spain, the widow must regain
her Spanish citizenship in the manner prescribed by law. In the United States, the nationality of the children does not, by
operation of law, follow that of our parents, while in Spain the converse is true. In both countries, the parents may elect
the nationality of their children while they are under parental authority, and after the children are released from such
authority they may elect for themselves their nationality. The mode of making that election in both countries is materially
different. What changes in these matters have taken place in the Philippine Islands by reason of the acquisition of the
territory by the United States?

Articles 17 to 27 , inclusive of the Civil Code deal entirely with the subject of Spanish citizenship. When these provisions
were enacted, Spain was and is now the sole and exclusive judge as to who shall and who shall not be subjects of her
kingdom, including her territories. Consequently, the said articles, being political laws (laws regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the former sovereign), must be held to have been abrogated upon the cession of the
Philippine Islands to the United States.

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or
otherwise, . . . those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899.)

While the municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the laws of the new sovereign continue in
force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chapter,
34 par. 14.) However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions
of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-
chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace.

Citizenship, says Moore on International Law, strictly speaking, is a term of municipal law and denotes the possession
within the particular state of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications, such as minority, sex, etc.
The conditions on which citizenship are acquired are regulated by municipal law. There is no such thing as international
citizenship nor international law (aside from that which might be contained in treaties) by which citizenship may be
acquired. It therefore follows that the only law applicable to the questions presented in the case at bar is the Treaty of
Paris and Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

The cession of the Philippine Islands definitely transferred the allegiance of the native inhabitants from Spain to the
United States (articles 3 and 9 of Treaty of Paris). Filipinos remaining in this country who were not natives of the
Peninsula could not, according to the terms of the treaty, elect to retain their allegiance to Spain. By the cession their
allegiance became due to the United States and they became entitled to its protection. The nationality of the Islands
American instead of Spanish.

Would it be in conflict with the provisions of the Act of July 1, 1902, any other Act of Congress, any provision of the
Constitution, any doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States or the general policy of the United
States, to now declare that the appellant is, by reason of the place of his birth, the death of his father, the present
nationality of his widowed mother, and his election, a citizen of the Philippine Islands? Section 4 of the Philippine Bill
must be read according to its spirit and intent, for a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a civil statute is
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmaker. The intent of the
law-makers is the law. The congressional meaning of section 4 is to be ascertained from the Act as a whole. This section
cannot be segregated, but every part of the Act must be construed with reference to every other part. It should be
construed to conform to the well-settled governmental policy of the United States on the subject of citizenship. It is to be
given that construction which best comports with the principles of reason and justice.

Was the appellant a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902? If so, the Act of Congress of that date did not
denationalize him. At the time this country was ceded to the United States, Basilio Roa, father of the appellant, was, let us
say, a subject of the Emperor of China, and the nationality of the appellant, let us further say, followed absolutely that of
his father. Basilio Roa died in China in 1900. Tranquilino was then a minor and living with his mother in this country. His
mother, before her marriage, was, as we have said, a Spanish subject. On the death of her husband she ipso
facto reacquired the nationality of the country of her birth, as she was then living in that country and had never left it. She
was then the natural guardian of Tranquilino. The question now arises, did the nationality of the appellant follow that of
his mother, admitting that before the death of his father he was a Chinese subject? If his nationality that of his mother, it
must have been not by reason of the Spanish law, as there was none in force in this country at the time on the subject, but
by means of analogous principles of citizenship in America. Upon the dissolution of a marriage between a female citizen
of the United States and a foreigner, sheipso facto reacquires American citizenship, if at that time she is residing in the
United States. There is no statutory declaration on the question as to whether or not her minor children would follow that
of their widowed mother. If the children were born in the United States, they would be citizens of that country. If they
were born in the country of which their father (and their mother during coverture) was a citizen, then they would be a
citizens of that country until the death of their father. But after his death, they being minors and their nationality would, as
a logical consequence, follow that of their mother, she having changed their domicile and nationality by placing them
within the jurisdiction of the United States. But, of course, such minor children, on reaching their majority, could elect,
under the principle that expatriation is an inherent right of all people, the nationality of the country of their birth.

The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the Philippine Islands on
July 1, 1902, and never having expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this country. 1awphil.net

We therefore conclude that the appellant is a citizen of the Philippine Islands and entitled to land. The judgment appealed
from is reversed and the appellant is ordered released from custody, with costs de oficio.

CL. 4.0 LORENZO LIM v. DELA ROSA L- 17790

MAIN POINT: If the person claiming to be a citizen of the country who is being required or compelled to
register as alien, can show, establish, prove that he is such citizen, the remedy of injunction to prevent the
offices from requiring or compelling him to register as alien is certainly the proper and adequate remedy to
protect his right.

FACTS: Claiming to be citizens of the Philippines, the spouses Lorenzo Lim and Juana Alvarez filed a petition
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin Francisco de la Rosa, Assistant Commissioner of Immigration,
and Jovito Palattao, Alien Control Officer stationed at Zamboanga City, from requiring or compelling them (the
spouses) to register as aliens. The answer of the respondents is that the petitioner Lorenzo Lim alias Lam Shun
Hock is not a citizen of the Philippines, as ruled by the Department of Justice in its opinions No. 378, Series of
1955, and No. 77, Series of 1956.

The reply of the petitioners mentions the application in 1957 by the petitioner Lorenzo Lain for a Filipino
passport which was issued to him (Passport No. 3590) upon a memorandum by the Citizenship Committee of
the Department of Foreign Affairs; an order or decree for a change of name prayed for by the petitioner Lorenzo
Lim entered by the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City where it was stated that the therein petitioner is a
Filipino citizen; and the opinion No. 31, Series of 1956, rendered by the Department of Justice denying the
reconsideration of opinion No. 77, Series of 1956, prayed for by the petitioner Lorenzo Lim.

After hearing, the Court rendered judgment holding "that the spouses Lorenzo Lim and Juana Alvarez Lim are
Filipino citizens either by reason of Lorenzo Lim's illegitimacy or, granting that the parents of Lorenzo Lim
were legally married, by Lorenzo Lim's mother reversion to Philippine citizenship when his father died," and
enjoining permanently the respondents from requiring the Petitioners' registration as aliens.

ISSUE: Whether Spouses Lorenzo Lim are indeed citizens of the Philippines

RULING: Yes. The petitioner presented documentary evidence to which the Solicitor made no objection. The
evidence presented shows, that Lorenzo Lim was born on January, 26, 1905, in Tulay, Jolo, Sulu, being the
illegitimate son of Lam Hing. The parents of petitioner, Lorenzo Lim are Lam Hing, Chinese citizen and Mora
Alsia a Filipino citizen whose parents were Abdul Hussin and Mora Tamsila both Filipinos. Lam Hing died in
1907 while Mora Alsia died in 1908. The parents of Lam Hing during their life time were never married.
Petitioner, Lorenzo Lim was never registered with the Bureau of Immigration as an alien and in all his
transactions with the government, he has been known to be a Filipino citizen. Furthermore the evidence shows
that Lorenzo Lim and Juana Alvarez were legally married. With the evidence presented, the Court believes that
the spouses Lorenzo Lim and Juana Alvarez Lim are Filipino citizens either; by reason of Lorenzo Lim's
illegitimacy, or, granting that the parents of Lorenzo Lim were legally married, by Lorenzo Lim's mother
reversion to Philippine citizenship when his father died.

Inasmuch as there was no marriage between the parents of petitioner, Lorenzo Lim, he is a Filipino citizen since
he follows the citizenship of his mother Mora Alsia from birth. RTC judgment was affirmed.

CL.5.0 BURCA RULING L-24252

FACTS: Zita Ngo is a Chinese national married to Florencio Burca a Filipino citizen. She claims that she
possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization as a Filipino citizen under
commonwealth Act 473 for cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration claiming she married a Filipino
citizen. This was opposed by the Solicitor General on the grounds that and, on the specific legal status of an
alien woman married to a citizen of the Phil, Congress in par 1, Sec 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Phil and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Phil, but the trial court dismissed the opposition and declare that
Zita Ngo Burca hass all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and that
she being married to a Filipino citizen is hereby declared as a citizen of the Philippines. Such judgment of the
trial court was appealed.
ISSUE: Whether Zita Ngo Burca is deemed a Filipino Citizen in accordance to the provi in the Revised Nat law
vis a vis the Constitution of the Phil?
RULING : NO. The SC discussed here that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of the
Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized. An alien woman married to a
Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship
reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance
where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any
action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or such as certifying or declaring that an
alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void. The following
Requisites are not present : indicate Residence and affidavits of at least 2 credible persons testifying she is
qualified and not disqualified under this provision of this Act

CL.6 Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration | G.R. No. L-21289 | 4 October 1971

FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February
1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into
the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others,
that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On
25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action
for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau
Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name
any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-
law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen.

RULING: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided
that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman
requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the
widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go
through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that
the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure
(a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of
her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it every time she
has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but
such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Every
time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered
as res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung,
was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

CL 8.0 MAQUILING VS COMELEC GR NO. 195649 APRIL 16, 2013

FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on Junly 10, 2008. On the
same day, an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Acquisition was issued in his favor. On April
3 2009, Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit if Renunciation of
his foreign citizenship, which states: On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, respondent Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a petition
to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in connection with the May 10, 2010 local and national elections.

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he
is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnados US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated December 3, 2009
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines. On April 30, 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt
thereof. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte. Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer. The
COMELEC First Division ruled that Arnados act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenship on April 3, 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. The COMELE En Banc ruled in
favor of Arnado. Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to
run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport.

ISSUE: Whether the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a
renunciation earlier made.

RULING: The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act
of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth,
who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the
other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to
personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the
express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for
a local elective.
CL 9.0 GALLIEGO VS VERA GR L- 48641 NOV. 24, 1941

FACTS: Pedro Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After studying in the Catarman Agricultural School in the
province of Samar, he was employed as a school teacher in the municipality of Catarman, Samar, as well as in
some other municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he ran for municipal mayor of his home town, but was defeated.
After his defeat in that election, he was in debt and unemployed so went to Malaybalay, Bukidnon on June 1938
and found employment as nurseryman in the chichona plantation of the Bureau of Forestry. He stayed in the
chinchona plantation until he resigned in September 1940. But during the period of his stay, there, his wife and
children remained in Abuyog, and he visited them in the month of August of the years 1938 and 1940. Although
the Government offered him a free house in the chinchona plantation, he never took his family there. Neither
did he avail himself of the offer of the Government of a parcel of the hectares of land within the reservation of
the chinchona plantation. He and his wife own real property in Abuyog, part of which he acquired during his
stay in Malaybalay. In 1940, he ran and was elected as mayor of Abuyog, Leyte but this was contested by his
opponent, Vicente Verra because he had already lost his domicile.

It is believed that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog Leyte at the time he was elected mayor there on
the grounds that:
1. He registered as a voter in Malaybalay, Bukidnon
2. He voted in Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen
3. He obtained a residence certificate from the municipality of Malaybalay

ISSUE: Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired a new domicile in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon
RULING: No. Gallego did not lose his domicile in Abuyog by working in Malaybalay as an employee,
registering as voter there and securing his residence certificate there for 1940.
In the definition of residence in the election law under the 1935 Constitution, it states that in order to acquire
a domicile by choice, there must concur: Residence or bodily precense in the new locality; An intention to
remain there; An intention to abandon the old domicile. The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an
indefinite period of time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely
because when he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned when
he ran for office in 1937. He departed from his place only for the purpose of making up for the financial
drawback caused by his loss in the election and he did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him.
He also bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him by the
government. Lastly, he visited his family no less than three times despite the great distance between Abuyog,
Leyte and Malaybalay Bukidnon The court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to exclude a stranger or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of
a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.

CL 10.0 MARCOS vs. COMELEC GR 119976

FACTS: Imelda Marcos established her domicile in Tacloban City, which was her fathers hometown, in 1938
when she was 8 years old. She pursued her studies (GS, HS, College) in the aforementioned city and
subsequently taught in the Leyte Chinese School. In 1952, she went to Manila to work in the House of
Representatives. Two years after, she married Pres. Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman in
Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. In1959, her husband was elected a Senator and they lived in San
Juan, Rizal where she again registered as a voter. And in 1965, she lived in the Malacanang Palace when her
husband became the President. This time, she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. After their exile in
Hawaii, she ran for President in 1992 and indicated in her CoC that she was a resident and register voter of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Mrs. Marcos filed her CoC for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. The
incumbent Representative, Montejo, filed for her disqualification alleging that she did not meet the 1 year
constitutional requirement for residency. Apparently, she wrote down in her CoC in item no.8, which asked for
the number of years of residency, that she had been a resident for 7 months. Marcos filed an amended CoC
changing 7 months to since childhood, claiming that it was an honest misinterpretation that she thought she
was being asked for her actual and physical presence in Tolosa, and not her domicile. The COMELEC found
the petition for her disqualification meritorious and cancelled her amended CoC. For them, it was clear that
Marcos has not complied with the 1 year residency requirement.
The COMELEC issued a resolution allowing for her proclamation should she obtain the highest number
of votes. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and directed the suspension of her
proclamation. Marcos found out that she was won by a landslide in the said elections and prayed for her
proclamation. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Mrs. Marcos possesses the necessary qualification or capacity to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte.
RULING: Yes. It cannot be contested that the petitioner held various residences in her lifetime. The Courts
reiterate that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has maintained different residences for different
purposes. None of these purposes pointed to her intention of abandoning her domicile of origin. The Courts
ruled in favor of Marcos because of the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the
purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one
only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she
chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

11.0 AGAPITO AQUINO VS COMELEC GR 120265

FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the
Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which,
under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the
elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as
mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.

RULING: Yes. In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his
certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that
elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and
unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of
candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City,
it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of onesoriginal domicile.

Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is
hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual
removal or an actualchange of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of clear and positive
proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.