CONSTI II. Dean Pangalangan, 2013-14.

I. RIGHTS-BASED DISCOURSE: NORMS, RIGHTS, AND THE PLACE OF JUDICIAL POWER

A. General

Art. VIII, Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Art. VIII, Sec. 2. . The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2). All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon.

Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2a). Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
- All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio. The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction is limitied to
those expressly provided by law. A recommendation to modify the act of the Chief Executive is not authorized.
To suggest that the Chief Executive modify its decision would be an attempt to influence the Chief Executive of
his political powers.

JM Tuason v. LTA. Statute is held to be constitutional given the opportunity and protection it affords to land
owners in recognizing their right to evict, subject to expropriation proceedings and just compensation.

Ex Post Facto Laws

Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

B. Case or Controversy Requirement

Standing.
Muskrat v. US.
- Judicial power is limited to case and controversies; the claims of litigants brought before the courts for the
protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs.
- Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of the courts. (No advisory opinions.)

People v. Vera. People of the Philippines can be the proper party in such a criminal proceeding in which they
have sustained, or will sustain, direct injury.

Flast v. Cohen. Taxpayer standing is appropriate when the plaintiff challenges an enactment under the taxing
and spending clause of the Constitution and the enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations on taxing
and spending.

Sierra Club v. Morton. Mere interest is not sufficient by itself to give standing.

US v. SCRAP.
- In applying injury in fact, standing is not confined to those who show economic harm.
- Party seeking review must be among the injured, with a direct stake in the controversy.
 Francisco v. House of Representatives.
- Direct Injury Test: petitioner must show a direct, personal, and substantial interest and that he has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury.
o As Citizen: involves assertion of a public right; show that not only is the law or government act
invalid, but also that he is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely in some indefinite way.
o As Taxpayer: must be a claim that public funds are illegally distributed, or that public money is
being used for any improper purpose.
o As Legislator: allowed question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes upon his
prerogatives as a legislator.
o As Association: specific showing that its members have standing under the Direct Injury Test.
- Transcendental Importance:
o Character of the funds or other assets involved.
o Presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition.
o Lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest.

Ripeness.
Tan v. Macapagal. A person who impugns the validity of a statute must have substantial interest in the case, and
stands to have direct injury as a result of the implementation. No standing for an injury only anticipated.

Poe v. Ullman. A penal statute is not ripe for constitutional challenge unless it is enforced by the state enacting
the statute.

US v. Richardson. Standing is denied to generalized grievances.

Mootness.
De Funis v. Odegaard. In Federal cases before the SC, there must be an actual case and controversy which exists
at the stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the time the action is initiated.

II. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

A. Procedural Due Process.

Ateneo v. CA. When a student was given notice of the court proceedings against him, the fact that he does not
inform his parents of this does not mean there is no due process.

Alcuaz v. PSBA. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings in courts of
justice. The minimum standards of procedural due process:
- Informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them.
- The right to answer the charges against them, with counsel if desired.
- They shall be informed of the evidence against them.
- They shall have the right to adduce evidence on their own behalf.
- Evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee.

Bell v. Burson. Once licenses are issued, they cannot be revoked without procedural due process required by
the 14th Amendment.

B. Old Substantive Due Process.

Lochner v. New York. Liberty to contract is implicit in the 14th Amendments Due Process Clause.

C. New Substantive Due Process.

Olmstead v. US. 4th Amendment (protection against unreasonable search and seizures) cannot be exoanded to
include telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendants house or office.

Skinner v. Oklahoma. The right to have offspring is a fundamental right, requiring a compelling state interest to
interfere with it.

Griswold v. Connecticut. Right to privacy in marriage is fundamental and basic.

 Eisenstadt v. Baird. Equal protection does not deny the State the power to treat different classes of persons in
different ways; it denies the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a
statute into different classes.

Poe v. Ullman. A penal statute is not ripe for constitutional challenge unless it is already being enforced by the
State

Roe v. Wade. The right to privacy is broad enough to encompass a womans decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy; however, this right is not unqualified and must be considered against compelling
state interests.

Bowers v. Hardwick. Illegal conduct is not always immunized whenever it occurs at home.

US v. Windsor. Guarantee of equality means that a bare Congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group.

Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC.

- The State, being secular, must resolve public moral disputes only on secular terms; the government
must pursue its secular goals and uphold religious liberty.
- Moral disapproval is not a sufficiently compelling state interest.

Ople v. Torres. Right to privacy is a fundamental right; burden of the government to show that any statute that
infringes upon privacy is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.

Duncan Assoc. v. Glaxo Welcome. While laws promote social justice, it does not mean that every labor dispute
will be ruled in favor of the laborers; Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce
policies to protect its right to reasonable returns on investment and growth.

Silverio v. Republic.
- The change of name in the civil registry is a privilege, not a right.
- No law allowing a change of entry in a birth certificate on the grounds of sex reassignment; no law
regarding sex reassignment.

White Light Corp. v. Manila.

- The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is based on two
standards of judicial review:
o Strict Scrutiny laws dealing with freedom of speech, race, other fundamental rights, or
restricting the political process.
Refers to the standard for determining the quality and amount of governmental interest
brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.
o Rational Basis Standard (Minimum Test of Rationality) equal protection challenges, and
economic legislation.
Under Rational Basis Standard, an ordinance is valid if:
It rationally furthers a legitimate government interest.
It uses reasonable measures to achieve the legitimate government interest.
- A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment.
- Liberty is the right to exist and be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude.

D. Protected Interests in Property.

Regulation under the Due Process Clause versus Taking of Property via the Power of Eminent
Domain.
Churchill v. Rafferty. The right to property indirectly includes the social and economic conditions that come
with it; when businesses affect the social and economic life of the nation, it is necessary for the State to
intervene by regulation.

US v. Toribio. To justify the exercise of police power, the State must prove that:
- The interest of the general public requires it.
- The means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and are not duly oppressive.

Art. III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
 People v. Fajardo. Property may be regulated in the interest of general welfare i.e. beautification of
neighborhoods, however, the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property solely to preserve the aesthetic appearance of the neighborhood.

Ynot v. IAC. Power to rule on constitutionality is not limited to the SC, it is inherent in the judiciary power
exercised in all courts.

US v. Causby. The character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage
is substantial, that determines the question whether or not it is a taking. (Case involves a farm owner
complaining about Army planes that were flying too low over his property causing damage to his farm animals)

Republic v. PLDT.
- Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation and possession of the
expropriated property.
o It can also be availed of to simply impose a burden upon the owner of the property, without loss of
title and possession.

Republic v. Castelvi. Taking under the power of eminent domain has five concurrent elements:
- Expropriator must enter a private property.
- Entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.
- Entry into the property must be under warrant or legal authority.
- Property must be devoted to a public use.
- Utilization of property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

MMDA v. Bel-Air. Police power can only be exercised by the National Legislature; cannot be exercised by
groups not possessing legislative power.

EPZA v. Dulay. Determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.

NAPOCOR v. CA. To determine due compensation for lands appropriated by the Government, the basis should
be the price or value at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government.

Takings under Eminent Domain versus Takings under the Social Justice Clause.
De Knecht v. Judge Bautista. Choosing of private property to be taken should not be arbitrary; a landowner is
covered by the mantle of protection due process affords.

Manotok v. National Housing Authority. Power of eminent domain is inherent in the State, and the Constitution
limits this exercise in order to protect the individual. Limitations are:
- Taking must be for public use.
- Payment of just compensation.
- Due process must be observed.

Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Sumulong v. Guerrero. Public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible
and evolving concept; whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement
of public use.

Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD.

- Police power is the most essential, insistent, and least limitable of powers, extending to all the great public
needs; it is the power to make, ordain, and establish reasonable laws.
- Property rights must bow to the primacy of police power.

III. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Art. II, Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
 Art. II, Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.

Ormoc Sugar Company v. Treasurer of Ormoc. A classification is reasonable when:

- It is based upon substantial distinctions.
- These are germane to the purpose of the law.
- Classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to
those present.
- Classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Dumlao v. COMELEC. Equal protection of the law is subject to rational classification; if groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class.

Quinto v. COMELEC.
- Equal protection clause is not absolute, and is subject to reasonable classification.
- Nature of equal protection: all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions.

Inchong v. Hernandez. Equal protection does not demand absolute equality. Difference in status between
citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification.

Korematsu v. US. Legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are subject to the most
rigid scrutiny; but pressing public necessity may sometimes justify such restrictions.

Grutter v. Bollinger. Race based action necessary to further a compelling governmental interest does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause so long as it is narrowly tailored to further that interest.

Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan. State can evoke a compensatory purpose to justify an otherwise
discriminatory classification only if members of the gender benefitted by the classification actually suffer a
disadvantage related to the classification.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins. Even if a law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, but is applied and
administered unequally, it practically makes the law unjust and discriminatory.

Board of Directors v. Rotary Club. Freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships
is a fundamental right of liberty; however, infringement may be justified if it serves a compelling State interest.

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. Freedom of expressive association is a fundamental right.

Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. Individual liberty and equality safeguards protect from both
freedom from unwarranted government intrusion into protected sprees of life and freedom to partake in
benefits created by the state for the common good.

Tecson v. COMELEC.
- Natural-born citizens are those who are Philippine citizens from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
- The right to run for public office includes the right to equal chance to compete; any failure to equalize the
chances of all candidates is to insure the defeat of the disfavored.

IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.

Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

A. Protected Speech.

Prior Restraint.
Near v. Minnesota. Liberty of the press means that publication has immunity from previous restraints or
censorship; restraint against publication is limited to exceptional cases, such as:
- Disclosure of military information.
- When decency must be enforced against obscene publications.
- Where security of community life requires protection against incitement to violent action.
 New York Times v. US. Prior restraint of publication is unjustified unless such publication would cause
inevitable, direct, and immediate peril.

Freedman v. Maryland. Safeguards to avoid unconstitutional burdens on free speech:

- The burden of proving that the exhibit is unprotected expression rests on the censor.
- The requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censors
determination; only judicial determination can impose a valid prior restraint.
- Exhibitor must be assured that the censor will either, within a specified brief period of time, issue a license
or go to court to restrain the film.

Chavez v. Gonzales.
- Freedom of expression is a fundamental right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic
freedom or other liberties.
- Action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden to prove the constitutionality of such restriction by the clear and
present danger rule.

Request for live radio-TV coverage. . . A limited intrusion into a persons privacy is permissible where the
person is a public figure and the information sought are matters of a public character.

Subsequent Punishment.
People v. Perez. Constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and of assembly and petition cannot be
abridged, except when the intention and effect of such are seditious.

Dennis v. US. Freedom of speech is not an unlimited, unqualified right, but the societal value of speech must, on
occasion, be subordinated to other values and considerations; certain kinds of speech are so undesirable as to
warrant sanction.

Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans. Clear and present danger test: words are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the evils that a lawmaker has a
right to prevent.

Speech Plus; Symbolic Speech.

US v. OBrien. Not all conduct can be labeled as speech just because the person engaged in it intends to
express an idea; when speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same conduct, a government
interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on speech.

Assembly and Petition.

Primicias v. Fugoso. The right to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are
fundamental rights, however, the exercise of those rights is not absolute; the exercise must not be injurious to
the rights of the community or society.

Navarro v. Villegas. Grounds for refusal to grant a permit to assemble:

- In the greater interest of the general public.
- In order not to duly disturb the life of the community.

IBP v. Atienza. A permit to assemble may be denied on the showing of a clear and present danger.

Free Speech and Suffrage.

Sanidad v. COMELEC. COMELEC has the power to supervise and regulate the use of franchise, permits, and
other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media, to the end that equal
opportunity among candidates are ensured.

National Press Club v. COMELEC. In supervising and regulating media, curtailment of free speech is
indispensible.

Adiong v. COMELEC. Free speech has the status of a preferred freedom; it is an indispensible condition of
nearly every other freedom.

ABS-CBN v. COMELEC. Concern with the possible non-communicative effect if exit polls disorder and confusion
in the voting centers does not justify a total ban on them.

B. Unprotected Speech.
 Defamatory Speech.
Policarpio v. Manila Times. A publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but also
fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks.

Lopez v. CA. A criminal suit for libel should not be utilized as a means for stifling press freedom; so long as it is
done in good faith, newspapers have the right to have and express opinions.

New York Times v. Sullivan. In order for a public official to recover in a defamation action involving his official
conduct, malice must be proved.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. Freedom of expression extends to all discussion involving matters of public or
general concern, without regard to WoN persons are famous or anonymous; if a matter is of public interest, it
cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved.

Fighting Words, Offensive Words.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.
- There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech that can be proscribed and regulated
without constitutional problem; these include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or fighting words.
- Fighting words: words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace.

Cohen v. California. Undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right
to freedom of speech; the Courts protect the two elements of speech as expression of emotion and expression
of ideas.

Obscenity.
Roth v. US.
- Obscenity is not protected speech; it is not communication and is without social value.
- Test to determine obscenity: whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.

Miller v. California. Test for obscenity:

- Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
- Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct.
- Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Pita v. CA. Tests for obscenity:

- Tendency to Corrupt test: Whether the tendency of the material charged as obscene is to deprave or
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences; that which shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency.
- Profit Motive Test: A profit motive would weigh strongly in favor of obscenity.
- Redeeming Element Test: if the work had one redeeming element i.e. that it might lead to the expression of
art, then it would not be obscene.

Reno v. ACLU. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the
content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than encourage it; the interest in
encouraging freedom of speech outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.

V. CHURCH AND STATE: THE WALL OF SEPARATION.

Art. II, Sec. 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.

Art. VI, Sec. 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
 priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.

A. Establishment Clause.

Garces v. Estenzo. Not all government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has
some religious tint is violative of the separation of church and state; no violation of separation of church and
state if private funds were used to fund a church activity or purchase.

Lemon v. Kurtzman. Establishment clause not violated when (Lemon Test):

- The statute has a secular legislative purpose.
- Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
- The state must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.

Abington School District v. Schempp. Constitution forbids laws respecting an establishment of religion; the
state cannot force a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.

Engel v. Vitale. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing
of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion.

B. Free Exercise Clause.

Gerona v. Secretary of Education. Freedom of religion does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-
compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules, and regulations.

Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of
religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.

McDaniel v. Paty. Free exercise guarantees the freedom to profess or practice that belief, even including doing
so for a livelihood.

German v. Barangan. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society
and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter.

Cassius Clay v. US. In order to qualify for classification as a conscientious objector, a registrant must satisfy:
- He is conscientiously opposed to war in any form.
- Opposition is based upon religious training and belief based on how this term has been construed by prior
decisions.
- Objection is sincere.

Estrada v. Escritor. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits.

C. Unusual Religious Beliefs and Practices.

Wisconsin v. Yoder. Conduct, even when religiously based, are often subject to police power; however, there
are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause and are thus beyond police power.

US v. Ballard. Freedom of religion does not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred
treatment, it puts them all in that position.

US v. Seeger. Test of religious belief is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those more popular religions.

VI. ACADEMIC FREEDOM.

Art. XIV, Sec. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and
shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

Art. XIV, Sec. 5(2). Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

Isabelo v. Perpetual Help. Acedemic freedom includes the freedom to determine:

 - Who may teach.
- What may be taught.
- How it shall be taught.
- Who may be admitted to study.

Reyes v. CA.
- Individual academic freedom: freedom to pursue studies in a particular specialty and thereafter make
known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the
event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be.
- University academic freedom: see Isabelo v. Perpetual Help.

DECS v. San Diego. The right to quality education is not absolute; every citizen has the right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirement.

VII. PROTECTED INTEREST S IN LIBERTY

A. Non-impairment of Obligations and Contracts.

Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

Home Builders and Loan Association v. Blaisdell. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of
its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts.

Juarez v. CA. Where there are contracts that affect the public welfare, to the point that it would require
interference from the state, police power must prevail over the impairment clause.

Caleon v. Agus Development. Non-impairment of obligations and contracts is limited by and subject to the
exercise of police power of the State in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.

B. Involuntary Servitude.
Art. III, Sec. 8(2). No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted.

Rubi v. Provincial Board. Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to
another.

C. Imprisonment for Non-Payment of Debt.

Art. III, Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

Lozano v. Martinez. BP22 does not run violate the ban on imprisonment for non-payment of debt.

D. Right Against Self-Incrimination.

US v. Navarro. The right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of public policy and
humanity; of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the
strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury; humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of
confessions by duress.

Villaflor v. Summers. Right against self-incrimination is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial
self-incrimination.

Beltran v. Samson. The inhibition against self-incrimination is directed not merely in giving of oral testimony,
but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short,
of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret.

Cabal v. Kapunan. The accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but
also to take the witness stand.

PNB v. Gancayco. Disclosure of confidential bank deposits is allowed in the following instances:
- Upon written permission of the depositor.
- In cases of impeachment.
- Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of a public officer.
- Cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation.
- In cases of unexplained wealth.
 Bengzon v. Blue Ribbon Committee. The right against self-incrimination extends to respondents in
administrative cases ONLY if the nature of the proceeding is criminal.

Galman v. Pamaran. The right against self-incrimination is not limited to criminal cases; it is the nature of the
proceeding that controls, not the character of the suit.
Miranda v. Arizona. Confessions not legally obtained are not admissible in court.

Rule on DNA Evidence. A court may order a DNA testing after hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing
of a biological sample exists that is relevant to the case. DNA profiles and other information obtained from DNA
testing shall be confidential.

Anti-Drunk Driving Law. A law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe a person is driving under
the influence of alcohol or other drugs by apparent indications, such as over speeding, weaving, sudden stops,
swerving, or the evident smell of alcohol, shall conduct field sobriety tests.

Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Sec. 8. Public officials and employees
have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know,
their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.

Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten Wealth.

D. Unlawful Search and Seizure.

Mapp v. Ohio. The right to privacy defends against the admissibility of evidence acquired unlawfully.
- An ocular search would be reasonable.

Stonehill v. Diokno. Constitution protects against unreasonable search and seizure.

- No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, which is determined by a judge.
- The warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

VIII. SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION.

A. Who are Entitled to Constitutional Protection.

Citizenship and Alienage.

ARTICLE IV. CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board.

- The President has the power to deport, but not arrest aliens.
- There are two ways to deport undesirable aliens:
o By order of the President, after due investigation.
o By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners.
- Aliens also enjoy the protections guaranteed by fundamental rights.

Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory
upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest.
- It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence is injurious to the public good.
- Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and not construed as punishment, but rather as a
preventive measure.
 Yu v. Defensor-Santiago. Express renunciation of citizenship means a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to interference or implication.

Juridical Persons.
Stonehill v. Diokno. Corporations enjoy the protection against illegal search and seizures.

Central Bank v, Morfe.

B. Who are Subject to Constitutional Prohibitions.

State Action Requirement.

People v. Marti. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.
- Constitutional proscription against unlawful search and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against
the government; if the search was made at the initiative of a private person, without interference of the
police, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of the private
individual.

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Sec. 1.

VSP