DUNS SCOTO, Reportatio Parisiensis PDF

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized
by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the

information in books and make it universally accessible.
https://books.google.com
LLAN B. WOLTER, O.RM.
OLEG V. BYCHKOV, Ph.D.

John Duns Scotus-
THE EXAMINED REPORT
OF
THE PARIS LECTURE
REPORTATIO I-A
John Duns Scotus
THE EXAMINED REPORT
OF
THE PARIS LECTURE
REPORTATIO I-A
LATIN TEXT AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Allan B. Wolter, O.EM.

Oleg V. Bychkov
Copyright 2004
The Franciscan Institute
St. Bonaventure University
St. Bonaventure, NY
All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
without permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Control Number:

2004104899
ISBN: 1-57659-193-X
Printed in the United States of America

BookMasters, Inc.
Ashland, Ohio
Publisher's Foreword
The present translation combines the efforts of two

generations, two traditions, and two approaches to
the scholarly study of medieval texts. The life-long
expertise of Fr. Allan Wolter, an outstanding Scotus
scholar, is supplemented by the philological and
hermeneutic approach of the younger generation of
philologists. We believe that this collaboration con
tributes to the furtherance of Scotus studies.
This publication can be utilized as a tool both for schol

ars and for general readers interested in Duns Scotus,
medieval philosophy, and medieval theology. It
offers an accessible format in the English translation
and leaves the more technical aspects of textual re
search to forthcoming critical editions.
We are proud to present this volume as a complement

to the works in the Philosophical Writings of Blessed
John Duns Scotus series previously published by The
Franciscan Institute.
Margaret Carney, OSF, STD

Director, The Franciscan Institute
April, 2004
v
Index Generalis
Prologus
Quaestio 1: Utrum Deus sub propria ratione deitatis
possit esse per se subiectum alicuius
scientiae 1
Quaestio 2: Utrum veritates per se scibiles de Deo
sub ratione deitatis possint sciri ab
intellectu viatoris 52
Quaestio 3: Utrum ex puris naturalibus possimus
scire omnes veritates scibiles de Deo 74
Distinctio 1
Pars I
Quaestio unica: Utrum per se obiectum fruitionis sit
ultimus finis 89
Pars II
Quaestio 1: Utrum fine ultimo apprehenso necesse
sit frui voluntatem 94
Quaestio 2: Utrum frui sit idem delectationi vel
dilectioni 104
Pars III
Quaestio 1: Utrum Deus fruatur 110
Quaestio 2: Utrum viator fruatur 111
Quaestio 3: Utrum peccator fruatur 111
Distinctio 2
Pars I
Quaestio 1: Utrum sit aliquod ens primum
simpliciter 115
Quaestio 2: Utrum primitas possit competere entibus
alterius rationis 116
Quaestio 3: Utrum sit aliquod ens simpliciter et actu
infinitum 1 16
vi
Contents
Prologue
Question One: Can God be the per se subject of some
science under the proper aspect of 1
deity?
Question Two: Can truths that are knowable per se
of God as deity be known by the
intellect of the pilgrim? 52
Question Three: Can we know all the truths
knowable about God from what is
purely natural? 74
Distinction 1
PartI
Sole Question: Is the ultimate end the per se object
of fruition? 89
Part II
Question One: Must the will necessarily enjoy the
ultimate end once it is apprehended? 94
Question Two: Is fruition the same as enjoyment or
love? 104
Part III
Question One: Has God fruition? 110
Question Two: Does the pilgrim in this life have
fruition? 111
Question Three: Does the sinner have fruition? 111
Distinction 2
PartI
Question One: Is there some being that is first in an
unqualified sense? 115
Question Two: Can such primacy pertain to different
sorts of being? 1 16
Question Three: Is there some being that is simply
and actually infinite? 116
vii
Pars II
Quaestio unica: De unitate Dei 141
Pars III
Quaestio 1: Utrum personae divinae repugnet
quaecumque productio intrinseca realis 148
Quaestio 2: Utrum in natura divina possint esse
plures productiones intrinsecae 160
Quaestio 3: Utrum in Deo possint esse plures
productiones intrinsecae eiusdem
rationis 174
Quaestio 4: Utrum sint tantum tres personae in
natura divina 178
Distinctio 3
Quaestio 1: Utrum Deus sit naturaliter cognoscibilis
ab intellectu viatoris 187
Quaestio 2: Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum 200
Quaestio 3: Utrum vestigium Trinitatis sit in
qualibet creatura 204
Quaestio 4: Utrum memoria habeat speciem
intelligibilem distinctam 207
Quaestio 5: Utrum memoria conservet speciem
cessante actu intelligendi 221
Quaestio 6: Utrum in intellectu nostro sit aliqua
notitia actualiter genita 233
Quaestio 7: Utrum in mente sit imago Trinitatis 243
Distinctio 4
Quaestio 1: Utrum Deus genuit alium Deum 249
Quaestio 2: Utrum Deus est Pater et Filius et
Spiritus Sanctus 256
VIII
Part II
Sole Question: Is there numerically but one first
being? 141
Part III
Question One: Is any intrinsic real production
repugnant to the divine persons? 148
Question Two: Can there be several intrinsic
productions in the divine nature? 160
Question Three: Could there be more than one
internal production of the same sort
in God? 174
Question Four: Can there be but three persons in the
divine? 178
Distinction 3
Question One: Is God naturally knowable by the
intellect of a pilgrim? 187
Question Two: Is God's existence known per se? 200
Question Three: Is there a vestige of the Trinity in
every creature? 204
Question Four: Does memory have a distinct
intelligible species? 207
Question Five: Does the intellective memory
conserve the species when the act of
understanding ceases? 221
Question Six: Is there some actually generated
knowledge in our intellect? 233
Question Seven: Is there an image of the Trinity in
the mind? 243
Distinction 4
Question One: Has God generated another God? 249
Question Two: Is this true, "God is Father and Son
and Holy Spirit"? 256
ix
Distinctio 5
Pars I
Quaestio 1: Utrum essentia divina generet vel
generetur 260
Quaestio 2: Utrum essentia sit communicata vel
communicans 269
Pars II
Quaestio unica: Utrum Filius in divinis sit genitus
de substantia Patris 270
Pars III
Quaestio unica: Utrum relatio sit actus essentiae
divinae 287
Distinctio 6
Quaestio 1: Utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate 294
Quaestio 2: Utrum Pater volens genuerit Filium 298
Quaestio 3: Utrum Pater genuerit Filium necessitate 303
Distinctio 7
Quaestio 1: Utrum principium producendi in divinis
sit relatio vel essentia, sive absolutum
aliquid vel relativum 306
Quaestio 2: Utrum Filius in divinis posset generare 318
Quaestio 3: Utrum generatio divina sit univoca vel
aequivoca 326
Distinctio 8
Pars I 331
x
Distinction 5
PartI
Question One: Might the divine essence procreate or
be procreated? 260
Question Two: Is the essence communicated or
communicating? 269
Part II
Sole Question: Is the divine Son begotten from the
substance of the Father? 270
Part III
Sole Question: Is the relation an act of the divine
essence? 287
Distinction 6
Question One: Has the Father begotten the Son by
his will? 294
Question Two: Has the Father willingly procreated
the Son? 298
Question Three: Has the Father procreated the Son
by necessity? 303
Distinction 7
Question One: Is the principle of producing in the
divine a relation or the essence, or is
something absolute or relative? 306
Question Two: Could the Son in the divine
procreate? 318
Question Three: Is divine procreation a univocal or
an equivocal production? 326
Distinction 8
Part I 331
XI
Pars II
Quaestio 1: Utrum Deus sit mutabilis 332
Quaestio 2: Utrum Deus sit summe et perfecte
simplex 333
Quaestio 3: Utrum quodlibet aliud a Deo sit
simpliciter mutabile 341
Quaestio 4: Utrum simplicitas divina consistit ex hoc
quod Deus est quidquid habet 361
Quaestio 5: Utrum simplicitati divinae repugnet
quod aliquid dictum de eo formaliter sit
in genere praedicabili 364
Distinctio 9
Quaestio unica: Utrum generatio Filii in divinis sit
aeterna 381
Distinctio 10
Quaestio 1: Utrum voluntas divina possit esse
principium per se communicandi
essentiam divinam 385
Quaestio 2: Utrum voluntas possit esse principium
necessario producendi 395
Quaestio 3: Utrum necessitas et libertas compatia-
ntur se respectu eiusdem productionis 400
Quaestio 4: Utrum voluntas sit formale principium
producendi Spiritum Sanctum 404
Distinctio 11
Quaestio 1: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre
et Filio 407
Quaestio 2: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus, si non procede-
ret a Filio, posset realiter distingui ab eo 412
Distinctio 12
Quaestio 1: Utrum Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum
Sanctum in quantum unum sunt 422
Quaestio 2: Utrum Pater et Filius sint duo spiratores 428
Quaestio 3: Utrum Pater et Filius spirent
uniformiter Spiritum Sanctum 432
xii
Part II
Question One: Is God mutable? 332
Question Two: Is God supremely and perfectly simple? 333
Question Three: Is everything except God simply
mutable? 341
Question Four: Does divine simplicity consist in this
that God is whatever he has? 361
Question Five: Is it repugnant to divine simplicity
that something that is formally said
of him be in a predicable genus? 364
Distinction 9
Sole Question: Is the generation of the Son eternal in
the divine? 381
Distinction 10
Question One: Could the divine will be a per se
principle of communicating the divine
essence? 385
Question Two: Could the will be a necessary
principle of producing? 395
Question Three: Are necessity and liberty compatible
as regards the same production? 400
Question Four: Is the will a formal principle of
producing the Holy Spirit? 404
Distinction 11
Question One: Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the
Father and the Son? 407
Question Two: If the Holy Spirit did not proceed
from the Son, could he be really
distinguished from him? 412
Distinction 12
Question One: Do the Father and Son spirate the
Holy Spirit insofar as they are one? 422
Question Two: Are the Father and Son two spirators? 428
Question Three: Do the Father and Son spirate the
Holy Spirit uniformly? 432
xiii
Distinctio 13
Quaestio unica: Utrum processio Spiritus Sancti sit
generatio 437
Distinctiones 14-15
Quaestio 1: Utrum omnes personae divinae mittant
Filium et Spiritum Sanctum 450
Quaestio 2: Utrum quaelibet persona mittatur 451
Distinctio 16
Quaestio unica: Utrum Spiritui Sancto conveniat
missio visibilis 457
Distinctio 17
Pars I
Quaestio 1: Utrum in anima viatoris necesse sit
ponere caritatem creatam formaliter
inhaerentem 460
Quaestio 2: Utrum habens caritatem creatam sit
formaliter acceptatus Deo tanquam
dignus vita aeterna 474
Pars II
Quaestio 1: Utrum in augmentatione caritatis tota
caritas praeexsistens corrumpatur 481
Quaestio 2: Utrum illud positivum praeexsistens et
manens sit tota essentia caritatis
augmentatae 490
Quaestio 3: Utrum caritas augeatur per
extractionem partis novae de potentia ad
actum 501
Quaestio 4: Utrum augmentum caritatis fiat per
appositionem in essentia caritatis ad
gradum caritatis praeexsistentem 506
Quaestio 5: Utrum caritas possit diminui 515
xiv
Distinction 13
Sole Question: Is the procession of the Holy Spirit a
generation? 437
Distinctions 14-15
Question One: Do all the divine persons send the Son
and the Holy Spirit? 450
Question Two: Is any person whatsoever sent? 451
Distinction 16
Sole Question: Does a visible mission pertain to the
Holy Spirit? 457
Distinction 17
PartI
Question One: Is it necessary to posit created charity
formally inhering in the soul of the
pilgrim? 460
Question Two: Is the one who has created charity
formally accepted by God as worthy of
eternal life? 474
Part II
Question One: Is the whole of the preexisting charity
corrupted when charity is increased? 481
Question Two: Is that positive preexisting and
remaining thing the entire essence of
the augmented charity? 490
Question Three: Is charity increased by a new part
being drawn forth from potency to
act? 501
Question Four: Does the augmentation of charity
occur in the essence through the
addition of charity to the degree of
preexisting charity? 506
Question Five: Can charity be diminished? 515
xv
Distinctio 18
Quaestio unica: Utrum donum dicat proprietatem
personalem Spiritus Sancti 525
Distinctio 19
Pars I
Quaestio 1: Utrum personae divinae sint aequales
secundum magnitudinem 534
Quaestio 2: Utrum aequalitas divinarum persona-
rum praecise attendatur penes magnitu
dinem, potentiam, et aeternitatem 535
Quaestio 3: Utrum in divinis personis relatio
aequalitatis distinguatur a relatione
similitudinis et identitatis 535
Pars II
Quaestio 1: Utrum personae divinae sint in se
invicem per circumincessionem 547
Quaestio 2: Utrum in Deo sit aliqua ratio totalitatis
vel maioritatis 558
Distinctio 20
Quaestio 1: Utrum personae divinae sint aequales in
potentia 570
Quaestio 2: Utrum potentia generandi Filium per se
pertineat ad omnipotentiam 571
Distinctio 21
Quaestio unica: Utrum solus Pater sit Deus 584
xvi
Distinction 18
Sole Question: Is the gift the personal property of the
Holy Spirit? 525
Distinction 19
PartI
Question One: Are the divine persons equal in
magnitude? 534
Question Two: Is the equality of the divine persons
taken into account precisely through
the notions magnitude, power and
eternity? 535
Question Three: In the divine persons is the relation
of equality distinguished from the
relation of likeness and identity*? 535
Part II
Question One: Are the divine persons themselves in
one another through cirumincession? 547
Question Two: In God is there some aspect of
wholeness or superiority? 558
Distinction 20
Question One: Are the divine persons equal in
power? 570
Question Two: Does the power of generating the Son
per se pertain to omnipotence? 571
Distinction 21
Sole Question: Is only the Father God? 584
xvii
Introduction
The textual tradition1
John Major's (1469-1550) account of Scotus' career indicates that

"when he was no more than a boy, but had been already grounded
in grammar, he was taken by two Scottish Minorite friars to
Oxford ... at Oxford he made such progress that he left behind
him for the admiration of after ages a monumental work upon the
Metaphysics and four books of the Sentences. These writings are
commonly called the English or Oxford work. When he was
afterwards summoned by the Minorites of Paris to that city, he
produced another set of lectures on the Sentences more
compendious than the first edition and at the same time more
useful."2 These Oxford and Paris lectures were later printed in
Luke Wadding's Opera omnia of Duns Scotus. Carl Balic's studies
with the Scotistic Commission have proved that what Wadding
published as "Paris report" on Book I is actually the work of
William of Alnwick, Scotus' secretary, known as the Additiones
Magnae. These seem to be an attempt to update the Ordinatio
Scotus began at Oxford in 1300 with what he taught somewhat
differently at Paris before his exile in the June of 1303. When
Scotus returned to Paris in the spring of 1304 he began a second
series of lectures on the Sentences. The results of these two sets of
lectures are recorded in Reportatio I-A, also known as the "great,"
or as the "examined Paris lectures." The Reportatio I-A is
contained in five manuscripts.3 One (V) is the fourteenth-century
1The most exhaustive discussion of the textual tradition of Scotus'

Reportatumes can be found in: B. Hechich, // problema delle "Reportationes" nell
'eredita' dottrinale del B. Giovanni Duns Scoto, OFM (Rome: Antonianum, pro
manuscripto, 1995).
*A History of Greater Britain as well England as Scotland compiled from the
Ancient authorities by John Major, by name indeed a Scot, but by profession a
Theologian, ed. and trans. A. Constable (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1892), 206-7.
:,Concise descriptions of the MSS tradition of Reportatio I-A can also be
found in: A. Wolter, M. McCord Adams, "Duns Scotus' Parisian Proof for the
Existence of God," Franciscan Studies 42 (1982): 249-50; T.B. Noone, "Scotus on
Divine Ideas: Rep. Paris. I-A, d. 36," Medioevo 24 (1998): 391-2; J R. Soder.
Kontingenz und Wissen. Die Lehre von den futura contingentia bei Johannes
xix
John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A
manuscript from the Staatsbibliothek of Vienna Gat. 1453, ff. lra-

125va), chronologically the earliest witness.4 On folio 125va we
read: Explicit Reportatio super primum Sententiarum, sub
magistro Ioanne Scoto, et examinata cum eodem venerando
doctore ("Here ends the report [of the Commentary] on the first
[book] of the Sentences, [produced] under Master John [Duns]
Scotus and examined with the same venerable Doctor"). Frequent
interpolations in this MS, especially in the Prologue, occasionally
introduced by vel or vel sic, indicate that it combines two
alternate reports of the original Paris lectures. The fact that
most, if not all, interpolations in V are identical in wording to the
corresponding passages in the Additiones Magnae raises further
questions: first, as to the second source used to produce V, and
second, as to the meaning of the phrase "examined." Thus some
scholars openly claim that "examined" "must be uderstood in the
sense that this MS has been corrected after the text of the
Additiones Magnae, and not by Scotus himself,"5 while other
scholars "cannot give a certain answer" regarding either the
meaning of "examined" (e.g., does it mean "examined by a
follower of Scotus against another report"?) or the origin of the
interpolations.6 We made a decision to remove all interpolations
contained in V from the main text, but to retain them in the
footnotes (indicating their correspondence to the Additiones
Magnae),1 given the potential historical importance of the
"examined" version. The second (R) is also a fourteenth-century
MS from the Vatican Library (Borgh. lat. 325, f. lra-92vb).8 The
third manuscript (T) is from Turin (univers. K II 26, ff. 1ra-
Duns Scotus, Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des
Mittelalters, n.s. 49 (Minister: Aschendorff, 1999), 217ff, etc.
4See description in: Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, ed. C. Balid, vol. 1
(Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950), 123*-6*.
r,V. Richter, Studien zum literarischen Werk von Johannes Duns Scotus,
Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Veroffentlichungen der Kommission fiir
die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt 14
(Miinchen: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988), 42.
6Barnabas Hechich, private correspondence.
7 I.e., to the text reproduced in vol. 22 of the Vives edition of Duns Scotus;
see Bibliography.
"See description in: A. Maier, "Codices Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae,"
Studi e Testi 170 (1952): 370-1.
xx
Introduction
112rb), listed by G. Pasini as fourteenth-century9 and dated as

either fourteenth- or fifteenth-century by G. Mazzatinti.10 The
fourth and fifth manuscripts are from Oxford. One is from Merton
College (cod. 59, ff. 1r-192v), completed by John Reynbold in
1453, as indicated in the explicit.11 The other is from Balliol
College (cod. 205, ff. 1r-185v), also copied by Reynbold and
finished July 16th, 1463.12 Though some portions of the Ordinatio
I indicate that Scotus used the Reportatio I-A in composing it
(e.g., Dist. 4), in many respects this report seems to reflect a later
and more expanded development of the subjects treated compared
to the Ordinatio I (e.g., Dist. 26) or Lectura I. In any case, it
deserves special study as an original primary source of Scotistic
teaching.
Recreating and interpreting the text
The text of the Reportatio I-A presents a unique editorial and

hermeneutic problem. The usual (stemmatic) method of recon
structing a text that exists in several discrepant versions by
consistently applying the genealogical criterion of belonging to a
certain family works well when the textual tradition is subject to
certain statistical principles, as is the case, e.g., with texts blindly
copied by scribes. In the case of the five MSS of the Reportatio I-
A, however, every scholar who attempted to edit various parts of
the text admits that it is virtually impossible to develop a stemma
out of the five witnesses that are all imprefect. Except for the two
copied by Reynbold no one MS resembles another. Sometimes all
disagree with each other, and only loosely and partially fit into
"families." This often forces the editors to use the sense and
contents of the arguments in selecting a reading.13 In fact, what
'Codices manuscripti Bibliothecae Regit Taurinensis Athenaei: Pars altera

(Taurini: ex Typographia Regia, 1749), 52.
}0Inventari dei manoscritti delle biblioteche d'Italia, vol. 28 (Firenze: Leo S.
Obchki, 1922), 148.
1 1 It is described by F.M. Powicke in The Medieval Books of Merton College
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1931), 210-1.
1'Its description is given by R.A.B. Mynors in Catalogue of the Manuscripts
of Balliol College, Oxford (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), 200.
13Cf, e.g., K. Rodler's ("Der Prolog der Reportata Parisiensia der Johannes
Duns Scotus" [PhD thesis, Universitat Innsbruck, 1991], 45-58, 65) attempts to
xxi
we have here, in addition to the scarcity of MSS, is a text that

was obviously used for school purposes, i.e., understood by the
people who copied it, and often subjected to intelligent correction
that could make good sense. The impossibility of applying con
sistently a "scientific" method suggests the only viable solution: to
recreate the text intelligently, or "hermeneutically," which means
that reading and understanding the textin this case demanded
by the task of translationalso becomes the governing principle
of recreating the original.
Contemporary studies of the process of interpretation, in
fact, suggest that such an approach, implicitly or explicitly,
governs any process of recovering a traditional text for our
contemporaries.i4 In describing such interpretive reading, accor
ding to Gadamer, the model of a dialogue or conversation becomes
very productive. A traditional text also puts a question to the
interpreter (TM 369), just as the interpreter puts a question to
the text. The text becomes, as it were, another person or a
partner in a living conversation. As a result of such a dialogue,
the "fusion of the horizons of understanding" is achieved (TM
378): in the process of understanding, the interpreter bends the
text, and the text, in return, bends the interpreter, until, just as
in a conversation, a common ground is achieved. Although the
process of interaction with a medieval Latin text happens at
many levels, the main principle of such "dialogical" interpretation
of texts is simply to let this dialogue happen, unfold, and guide
the interpreter (TM 464). The only "rule" of true interpretation is
to listen to the text and follow what consistently follows from it
(ibid.). In other words, textual interpretation is not a "scientific"
method, but a creative ingenuous process (TM474).
For the above reasons, in order to finalize the Latin text
for the current translation project, the authors chose an approach
that is more in line with Gadamer's hermeneutics. The recreation
of the text happened simultaneously with its translation and
develop certain editorial strategies, Soder's (op. cit., 220) reflections on the
difficulties of selecting one MS as the main source and of constructing a stemma,
and Noone's observations to the same effect (op. cit., 392-4).
ME.g., see: H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. J. Weinsheimer and
D.G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1999). This translation will be further
referred to as TM.
xxii
Introduction
understanding, in the process of a constant interaction or

dialogue between the rough draft of the Latin text and the
emerging meaning in the English in the minds of the translators.
In all cases of textual discrepancies or difficulties with the
meaning in the translation all five original versions of the text
were reexamined. The final selection of variants for the Latin text
was ultimately based not on a strict adherence to the tradition of
a certain manuscript family, but on the criterion of clarity and
transparency for contemporary reading and interpretation. A
number of factors were involved in each decision, ranging from
purely philological issues to the general knowledge of Duns
Scotus' thought from other works.15
In sum, using the process of recovering the contemporary
meaning of the text through translation to adjust the original
Latin text, assumed for the present project, does the following. It
creates a particular reconstruction of the text that represents the
thought process of the editor/translator trying to make sense out
of the text, rather than a product of a "scientific" method. Such
hermeneutically created text, in fact, is more of a commentary
on a medieval text that exists in multiple versions, except in
this case it is the English translation, rather than scholarly
">Even apart from contemporary theories of interpretation, if one reflects on

the standard format of the critical edition, one would notice that, no matter what
sort of "scientific" mentality stands behind producing such a text, its intended
purpose is hermeneutic, and not at all incompatible with the approach used by
the authors for the present text. Indeed, if one is hoping to create a version of the
text that is absolutely correct and should not be changed for the purpose of
translation and understanding, one wonders why we should have a critical
edition at all. Truthfully recording all textual variants, together with a version
that the editors think is their best reconstruction of the text, cannot serve any
purpose other than providing potential readers/interpreters with an opportunity
to make their own recreation of the text if they were to question the editors'
version. Thus, even when an intelligent reader or translator interprets a text
edited critically, he/she never follows exactly the version provided by the editors,
but checks the variants and, when in difficulty, chooses the readings that seem to
make better sense, which is the intended purpose of the apparatus. Therefore, in
any cane a translator will start with reconstructing, out of the variants, the
version that makes the best sense, and only then proceed to translation. In this
respect, an intelligent translation based on using a critical edition with the text
derived by a stemmatic method would be no different from the one based on a
"hermeneutic" method that involves a simultaneous recreation of the most
transparent original text from several versions.
xxiii
comments, that explains the reason for the choice of variants.

Ultimately, in the case when a stemmatic reconstruction is close
to impossible, the main principles of this approach are hardly
more questionable than those of the stemmatic method.
The interpretive process of translating and recreating the
text of the Reportatio I-A have shown, e.g., that the best reading
is sometimes provided by only one MS out of the five; moreover,
that the best reading can come from the Vienna MS, which
confirms its status as a valuable witness, as noted by several
scholars,16 despite its general imperfection.17
Finally, we must acknowledge that we are greatly
indebted to Girard Etzkorn for cooperation in analyzing the five
manuscripts of the Reportatio I-A. We would also like to thank
Barnabas Hechich, President of the Scotistic Commission, for
providing the paragraph numbers to the Latin text (assumed for
this edition/translation) that are currently being used in referring
to Reportatio I-A in the Vatican edition of Scotus' Opera omnia.
Allan B. Wolter, Oleg V. Bychkov
",Cf. Wolter and McCord Adams (op. cit., 250) who defend the value of V;
also cf. Soder (op. cit., p. 220) who agrees that V sometimes yields good readings.
,7Cf. note to Dist. 20, n. 27 (English). Another clear example is in Dist. 21, n.
22: adiectivum habet suum modum significandi a substantivo, where the correct
reading suum (this is clear from the context) is given only by V (other MSS give
alium).
xxiv
Symbols and abbreviations
[] in the English text, indicates editorial

additions that are not expressly in the
Latin
indirect quotations; emphasized terms
Add. M. Additiones Magnae (see Introduction)
AL Aristoteles Latinus
AMPh Ancient and Medieval Philosophy
AviL Avicenna Latinus
BGPTM Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie
und Theologie Mittelalters
CCAA Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in
Aristotelem
CCCM Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio me-
diaevalis
CCSL Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina
CSEL Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum La-
tinorum
CPMA Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi
OPh Opera philosophica
PG Patrologia Graeca
PhB Les Philosophes Belges
PL Patrologia Latina
TPMA Textes philosophiques du moyen age
xxv
Bibliography
Additiones Magnae, see Ioannes Duns Scotus. Opera omnia.

Parisiis: L. Vives, 1894, vol. 22.
Aegidius Romanus. Primus Sententiarum. Venetiis, 1521.
Alexander de Hales. Summa theologica, libri I-III. 4 vols.
Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924, 1928, 1930,
1948.
S. Anselmus Cantuariensis. Opera omnia. Ed. F.S. Schmitt.
Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946.
Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis. Venetiis: apud
Iunctas, 1562-1574.
Averroes. De substantia orbis. Ed. A. Hyman, Corpus Philoso-
phorum Medii Aevi. Averroes Hebraicus. Medieval
Academy Books 96. Cambridge. Mass., Jerusalem: Medie
val Academy of America, 1986.
. Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros.
Ed. F.S. Crawford, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in
Aristotelem VI, 1. Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Aca
demy of America, 1953.
Avicenna. Opera philosophica. Venetiis, 1509.
. Liber De anima seu Sextus De naturalibus. Ed. S. Van
Riet, Avicenna Latinus. Louvain, Leiden: Editions
orientalistes, E.J. Brill, 1968.
. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina. Ed. S.
Van Riet, Avicenna Latinus. Louvain, Leiden: E. Peeters,
E.J. Brill, 1977, 1980.
Bonaventura. Opera omnia. Ed. PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura.
Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882-.
Busard, H.L.L., ed. The First Latin Translation of Euclid's
Elements commonly ascribed to Adelard of Bath, Studies
and Texts 64. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1983.
Corpus iuris canonici. Ed. A. Friedberg. Lipsiae: Bernard
Tauchnitz, 1979-81.
Denzinger, H., ed. Enchiridion symbolorum. Barcinone, Friburgi
Brisg., Romae: Herder, 1957.
Godefridus de Fontibus. Quodlibeta. Ed. J. Hoffmans et al., Les
Philosophes Belges. Louvain: Editions de Hnstitut
Superieur de Philosophie, 1904-1937.
xxvi
Gualterus Burleigh. De puritate artis logicae, Franciscan Institute
Publications, Text Series 9. St. Bonaventure, NY: The
Franciscan Institute, 1955.
Hamesse, J., ed. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: un florilege medieval,
Philosophes Medievaux 17. Louvain: Publications univer-
sitaires, 1974.
Henricus de Gandavo. Summa quaestionum ordinarium. 2 vols.
Parisiis: I. Badius Ascensius, 1520.
. Quodlibeta. Ed. R. Macken, Opera omnia. Ancient and
Medieval Philosophy 5-. Leuven, Leiden: Leuven Univer
sity Press, E.J. Brill, 1979-.
. Quodlibeta. Paris: I. Badius Ascensius, 1518.
Ioannes Duns Scotus. Opera omnia. Parisiis: L. Vives, 1891-1895.
. Opera omnia. Ed. C. Balic. Civitas Vaticana: Typis
Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-.
John Duns Scotus. God and Creatures. The Quodlibetal Ques
tions. Trans. A.B. Wolter and F. Alluntis. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975.
he Liber de causis. Ed. A. Pattin. Louvain: Editions du "Tijdschrift
voor filosofie," 1966.
Liber Sex Principiorum. Ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus
1.7. Bruges, Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1966.
Petrus I. Olivi. "Quaestio de Trinitate." In Der Liber Propugnato-
rius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede
zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus. II Teil: Die
trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen. Zweiter Band: Angang,
Texte, ed. M. Schmaus, Beitrage zur Geschichte der
Philosophie und Theologie Mittelalters 29, no. 2. 143*-
228*. Munster i. W.: Aschendorff, 1930.
Petrus Lombardus. Sententiae in IV libris distinctae. 2 vols,
Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4-5. Grottaferrata, Roma:
Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1971, 1981.
Porphyrius. Isagoge seu Liber de praedicabilibus. Ed. L. Minio-
Paluello and B.G. Dod, Aristoteles Latinus 1.6. Bruges,
Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1966.
Priscianus. Institutiones grammatical Ed. A. Krehl. Lipsiae:
Libraria Weidmannia, 1820.
Richard de Saint-Victor. De Trinitate. Ed. J. Ribaillier, Textes
philosophiques du moyen age 6. Paris: J. Vrin, 1958.
Richardus de Mediavilla. Super quattuor libros Sententiarum.
Vol. 1. Brixiae: Vincentius Sabbius, 1591.
xxvii
Thomas Aquinas. Opera omnia. Parmae: typis Petri Fiaccadori,
1852-1873.
. Opera omnia. Romae: Typographia Polyglotta, 1882-.
Thomas de Sutton. "Quodlibet IV, q. 1-4." In Der Liber Propugna-
torius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede
zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus. II Teil: Die
trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen. Zweiter Band: Angang,
Texte, ed. M. Schmaus, Beitrge zur Geschichte der
Philosophie und Theologie Mittelalters 29, no. 2. 58*-85*.
Mnster i. W.: Aschendorff, 1930.
Wolter, A. The Transcendentals and Their Function in the
Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. St. Bonaventure, NY:
Franciscan Institute, 1946.
, McCord Adams, M. "Duns Scotus' Parisian Proof for the
Existence of God." Franciscan Studies 42 (1982): 248-321.
, O'Neill, B. John Duns Scotus, Mary's Architect. Quincy,
IL: Franciscan Press, 1993.
xxviii
[Prologus
Quaestio 1
Utrum Deus sub propria ratione deitatis
possit esse per se subiectum alicuius scientiae]
1 Circa prologum libri Sententiarum primo quaeritur utrum

Deus sub propria ratione Deitatis possit esse per se subiectum
alicuius scientiae.
Videtur quod non:
Omne scibile de quocumque subiecto habet conceptum per
se alium a conceptu subiecti; sed nihil cognoscibile de Deo habet
conceptum per se alium a conceptu Dei; ergo etc.
2 Probatio maioris: idem per se conceptus non scitur de seipso,
VII Metaphysicae, cap. ultimo:1 "Propter quid ipsum est ipsum
nihil est quaerere". Similiter, V libro, cap. de 'per se':2 "Hominis
multae sunt causae, sed quare homo est homo non est alia causa".
Et IX Metaphysicae cap. ultimo,3 quod circa simplicia non
contingit decipi, quia aut totaliter ignorantur aut totaliter
cognoscuntur. Et I Posteriorum:4 'Conclusio per se scibilis est vera
per se secundo modo, et in isto secundo modo est alius conceptus
subiecti et praedicati'.
3 Probatio minoris: Si essent duo conceptus, aut correspon-
deret eis in re aliud et aliud, aut omnino idem. Non aliud propter
simplicitatem divinam. Nec omnino idem. Quia una res non
potest habere nisi unum conceptum adaequatum, ergo alii
conceptui nihil in re correspondebit, et tunc erit superfluus et
vanus.
1 Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 17 (1041a 14-5). Scotus' numbering comes from
the Latin Corpus of Aristotle where Bk. a is numbered as II, Bk. B as III, etc.
* Ibid., V (A), c. 18 (1022a 33-5).
:1 Ibid., IX (6), c. 10 (10516 17-26).
4 Aristot., Anal. Post. I, c. 4 (73a 37-736 2); Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. J.
Hamesse, 314): "Per se secundo sunt quaecumque insunt ipsis quae in ratione
insunt, ut propria passio per se est in subjecto".
1
Prologue
Question One
Can God be the per se subject of some science under the
proper aspect of deity?
1 In regard to the prologue of the Book of the Sentences first it

is asked whether God under the proper characteristic of deity
could be the subject of some science.
It seems not:
Every thing*1 scientifically knowable2 about any subject has
a per se concept other than that of the subject. Nothing knowable
about God has a concept intrinsically other than a concept of God,
therefore, etc.
2 Proof of the major: what is intrinsically the same concept is
not known scientifically3 about itself. According to [Aristotle's]
Metaphysics, VII, last chapter: "To ask why a thing is itself is a
meaningless question." Similarly in Bk. V, in the chapter on 'what
is per se': "There are many causes of man, but there is no other
cause why man is man." And in Bk. IX of the Metaphysics, the
last chapter: "One cannot be deceived about simple things,
because either one is totally ignorant of them, or they are known
completely." And in the Posterior Analytics I: A conclusion able to
be known scientifically per se is true in the second mode* of per se
predication,* and in this second mode the concept of the subject is
other than the concept of the predicate.
3 Proof of the minor: If there were two concepts, either what
would correspond to them in reality would be different or would
be entirely identical. But because of the divine simplicity they
could not be different things, nor entirely the same. For one thing
can have but one adequate concept. Therefore to other concept
nothing will correspond in reality, and then it would be
superfluous and in vain.
1 Terms marked with an asterisk appear in the Glossary at the end of the
volume
* The Latin term scire has a technical meaning and we use the expression
'scientifically known' to distinguish it from opinion or a true conclusion deduced
from contingent premises that are statements of existential facts.
1 That is. deduced syllogistically from some other concept by means of a
common middle term.
1
2 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A
4 Item, omne scibile de aliquo subiecto scitur per medium

quod notius inest subiecto primo quam ipsum scitum. Nihil sic
potest nosci de Deo, igitur etc. Probatio maioris. Quia conclusio
scita est mediata et scitur per principium immediatum. Probatio
minoris. Augustinus, VIII De Trinitate, cap. 3:5 "Quidquid
intelligibile est atque incommutabile, non est aliud alio verius",
igitur nec aliud alio notius.
5 Item, de subiecto demonstrationis oportet scire quid est, I
Posteriorum. 6 Sed Deus non habet quid est, quia nec definitionem,
secundum Avicennam, VIII Metaphysicae, cap. 2. 7
6 Contra:
Augustinus, VIII De Civitate Dei, cap. l:8 "Theologia est
sermo vel ratio de Deo".
[I. Ad quaestionem]
7 Ad solutionem huius quaestionis quattuor sunt videnda.

Primo, quae sit ratio scientiae. Secundo, quae sit ratio primi
subiecti scientiae. Tertio, an Deus possit concipi sub rationibus
pluribus distinctis a ratione essentiae. Quarto, an inter illas
rationes sub quibus potest concipi sit aliquis ordo, et quis. Et
tandem ex his quaestio exsolvetur.
[Articulus 1
Quid sit ratio scientiae]
8 De primo, non extendendo scientiam ad fidem, quomodo

loquitur Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, cap. 22:9 "Absit ut scire nos
negemus quae testimonio didicimus aliorum", etc. nec
restringendo scientiam prout distinguitur contra sapientiam
5 August., De Trin. VIII, c. 1, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 269; PL 42, 947).

6 Aristot., Anal. Post. I, c. 1 (71a 11-6); Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. J.
Hamesse, 311): "Unde iterum habemus quod in qualibet scientia oportet
praesupponere subjectum esse et quid significet ipsum".
7 Avicenna, Metaph. VIII, c. 4 (AviL, 402-3): "Primus igitur non habet
quiditatem, sed super habentia quiditates fluit esse ab eo...; primus igitur non
habet genus. Et ideo non habet differentiam..., ideo non habet definitionem"
8 August., De civ. Dei VIII. c. 1 (CCSL 47, 216-7; PL 41, 225)
!l August., De Trin. XV, c. 12, n. 21 (CCSL 50A. 493; PL 42, 1075).
Prologue, Question One 2
4 Also, every thing known scientifically about some subject is

known by means of some middle term present in that first subject
that is better known than what is deduced by means of it. But
nothing can be known in this way about God, therefore, etc. Proof
of the major: a conclusion known scientifically is mediated
knowledge deduced from something known immediately. Proof of
the minor: Augustine in Bk. VIII of The Trinity, chapter 3: "With
regard to whatever is intelligible and unchangeable, no one thing
is more true than another"; therefore neither is one more
knowable than another.
5 Also, as regards the subject of a demonstration it is
necessary to know what it is, according to Bk. I of the Posterior
Analytics. But God does not have quiddity,* nor does he have a
definition, according to Avicenna (Metaphysics VIII, chapter 2).
6 To the contrary:
Augustine in The City of God, VIII, chapter 1: 'Theology is
discursive knowledge or talk about God.'
To the Question
7 There are four items to be investigated to solve this

question. First, what is meant by 'science'? Secondly, what does
'the first subject of a science' mean? Third, can God be conceived
under several distinct characteristics that are distinct from the
notion of his essence? Fourth, does any order exist among such
characteristics, under which he could be conceived, and if so what
is it? And then from the answer to these the question will be
solved.
Article One
What is meant by science?
8 About the first, not extending the meaning of science to

include what is known by faith (as Augustine does in Bk. XIV of
The Trinity, chapter 22: "Far be it from us to deny that we know
scientifically what we learn from the testimony of others," etc.),
nor restricting the meaning of 'science' to exclude what is known
quomodo Augustinus distinguit, XII De Trinitate, cap. 36, 10 quod

"ad sapientiam pertinet rerum aeternarum cognitio intellectualis,
ad scientiam vero rerum temporalium cognitio rationalis",
medio igitur modo accipiendo scientiam prout definitur 'scire' I
Posteriorum,u dico quod scientia est cognitio certa veri necessarii
quod natum est habere evidentiam ab alio necessario prius
evidente applicato ad ipsum per discursum syllogisticum.
9 Prima condicio, scilicet quod scientia sit cognitio certa
excludens omnem deceptionem, opinionem et dubitationem,
convenit omni virtuti intellectuali. Quia omnis virtus
intellectualis est perfectio intellectus disponens ipsum ad
perfectam operationem, et perfecta operatio intellectualis est
cognitio veri. Ideo omnis virtus intellectualis est habitus quo
determinate verum dicimus, quo et deficiente verum perfecte non
cognoscimus. Propter quod opinio et suspicio quibus potest
subesse falsum non sunt virtutes intellectuales.
10 Secunda condicio, scilicet quod sit veri necessarii, sequitur
ex prima. Quia si scientia esset veri contingentis, posset sibi
subesse falsum propter mutationem obiecti, sicut contingit circa
obiectum opinionis. Scientia autem est necessarius habitus
essentialiter cognitivus veri. Ergo necessario includit essentialiter
non tantum relationem communem habitus ad obiectum sed
specialem, scilicet conformitatis ad ipsum obiectum. Nunc autem,
si ipsum obiectum non esset verum necessarium, posset habitus
idem manens quandoque conformari illi obiecto et quandoque non
propter mutationem illius obiecti, et tunc posset esse quandoque
verus, quandoque falsus. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus VII
Metaphysicae,12 quod corruptibilium non est demonstratio. Quia
sicut non contingit quandoque scientiam quandoque esse
ignorantiam, ita nec demonstrationem esse non demonstra-
tionem. Contingeret autem utrumque si esset non necessarii sed
contingentis.
"l August., De Trin. XII, c. 15, n. 25 (CCSL 50, 379; PL 42, 1012).
11 Aristot., Anal. Post. I, c. 2 (716 9-22).
1* Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 15 (10396 31- 1040a 5).
as wisdom (distinguishing, as Augustine does in Bk. XII, chapter

36 of The Trinity: "that to wisdom belongs the intellectual
cognition of eternal things, but to science the reasonable cognition
of temporal things"), but understanding 'science' in an
intermediate fashion, according to how 'to know scientifically'
[scire] is defined in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics, I say that
science is the certain cognition of a necessary truth that is suited
by nature* to be made evident from another necessary truth
that has been earlier made evidentby way of syllogistic
discourse.
9 The first condition, namely that this science is certain
cognition, excluding all deception, opinion and doubting, is
something that pertains to every intellectual cognitive power. For
every such cognitive power is a perfection of the intellect,
disposing it to a perfect operation, and a perfect intellectual
operation is knowing what is true. Therefore every intellectual
cognitive power is a habit* by which we say decisively what is
true, and by its deficiency we do not know perfectly what is true.
That is why opinion, and suspicion, both of which can be about
what is false, are not intellectual virtues.
10 The second condition, namely that it be cognition of a
necessary truth, follows from the first. For if a science were about
a contingent truth, it could fall under what is false by reason of a
change of object, just as it happens with the object of opinion. But
science is essentially a cognitive habit of a necessary truth.
Therefore, it necessarily includes essentially not only the common
relationship of a habit to its object, but a special relation, namely
of conformity to the object itself. But now, if the object itself were
not a necessary truth, the habit could, while remaining the same,
be at times conformed to that object and at other times not
conformed because of a change in that object, and then it could be
at times true, and at other times false. And that is what the
Philosopher expresses in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics, that there is
no demonstration of perishable things. For just as [knowledge]
does not happen to be at times science and at times ignorance, so
neither can demonstration not be demonstration. But both of
these could happen if they were not about what is necessary but
contingent.
11 Istae igitur duae condiciones communes sunt non tantum

scientiae sed et sapientiae et intellectui, et conveniunt istis
habitibus ex per se rationibus obiectorum quibus necessario
conformantur.
12 Tertia condicio est propria, distinguens scientiam ab
intellectu principiorum quia intellectus est veri habentis
evidentiam ex terminis, I Posteriorum:i3 "Principia cognoscimus
inquantum terminos cognoscimus". Scientia est veri habentis
evidentiam ex principiis.
13 Quarta condicio, scilicet quod notitia evidentiae posterioris
sit causata a priore per discursum syllogisticum, est
imperfectionis, nec est de per se ratione scientiae secundum se
sed tantum scientiae imperfectae, et non convenit scientiae nisi in
illo intellectu cui convenit discurrere et procedere a noto ad
ignotum.
14 Ex hoc sequitur corollarium quod de nullo potest aliquid
sciri nisi de quo possunt plures conceptus haberi, unus
quiditativus et alii quasi denominativi secundum ordinem
quemdam habentes ipsum quiditativum conceptum. Unde tres
primae condiciones consequuntur scientiam per se ratione
subiecti vel obiecti de quo natae sunt esse veritates necessariae
per se scibiles in evidentia ordinatae. Quarta non est ex ratione
obiecti sed ex comparatione ad intellectum talem vel talem quem
perficit.
[Articulus 2
Quid sit ratio primi subiecti scientiae
1. Solutio]
15 Quantum ad secundum articulum dico quod illud est per se
primum obiectum alicuius scientiae quod continet virtualiter
notitiam omnium veritatum illius scientiae.
16 Quod probo: quia in essentialiter ordinatis necesse est stare
ad aliquod simpliciter primum. Sed cognoscibilia alicuius
scientiae habent ordinem essentialem inter se in cognoscibilitate,
quia conclusiones cognoscuntur ex principiis et principia tandem,
i:l Aristot, Anal. Post. I. c. 3 (726 20-5); Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. J.
Hamesse, 313): "Principia cognoscimus in quantum terminos cognovimus"
11 These two conditions are common not only to science but

also to 'wisdom' and 'intellectual understanding of principles,*'
and they pertain to these habits because of the nature of their
objects to which they are necessarily conformed.
12 The third condition is proper, distinguishing science from
understanding of principles,' for the latter is knowledge of a true
statement based on the immediate evidence of its terms.
According to Posterior Analytics I: "We know principles in so far
as we know their terms." Science however is about a truth
deriving its evidence from principles.
13 The fourth condition, namely that it is subsequent
knowledge derived by syllogistic inference from earlier
knowledge, is a matter of imperfection, nor is it characteristic of
scientific* knowledge per se, but only of imperfect science, and it
does not pertain to science except in as much as this exists in an
intellect that moves discursively and proceeds from what is
known to what is unknown.
14 And from this a corollary follows that scientific knowledge
can only be about something of which there can be several
concepts, one of which is quidditative* and the others are quasi-
derivative, according to the certain order they have to the
quidditative concept itself. Hence, the first three conditions apply
to science per se by reason of its subject or object about which
necessary truths, well ordered in evidence, are suited by nature to
be scientifically knowable per se. The fourth condition is not by
reason of the object, but arises from its relationship to such and
such an intellect, which it perfects.
Article Two
What does the first object of a science mean?
Solution
15 As for the second article, I say that the per se primary object
of any science is that which contains virtually* the knowledge of
all the truths of that science.
16 I prove this. For in essentially ordered things it is necessary
to start with something that is simply first. But those things that
are able to be known in any science have an essential* order
si sint immediata, cognoscuntur ex terminis, sicut dictum est.

Terminus etiam praedicatus principii cognoscitur ex ratione
subiecti, quia principia communiter sunt per se secundo modo,
ergo subiectum cadit in definitione praedicati, VII Metaphy-
sicae.u In isto igitur ordine tandem est devenire ad aliquod
subiectum simplex quod est subiectum principii vel principiorum.
Ex cuius notitia cognoscuntur omnia pertinentia ad essentiam et
ipsum non cognoscitur ex aliis. Istud igitur recte dicitur scientiae
primum subiectum, quia primo continet in se virtualiter notitiam
pertinentium ad scientiam.
17 Additur autem 'primo' continere, quia, sicut illud quod non
dependet ab alio sed alia ab ipso, est primum, ita illud dicitur
primo continere quod non dependet ab aliis in continendo nec per
rationem alicuius alterius continet, hoc est, si per impossible
circumscripto omni alio in ratione obiecti maneret conceptus eius,
adhuc in ratione obiecti contineret illas veritates. Sicut verbi
gratia: isosceles continet virtualiter omnes conclusiones quas
continet triangulus quia continet rationem trianguli. Sed non
continet primo quia non per propriam rationem et specificam
isoscelis sed per rationem trianguli.
[2. Instantiae contra solutionem]
18 [Prima instantia] Contra ista obicituri5 sic: sicut se habet

primum obiectum potentiae ad potentiam, ita primum obiectum
habitus se habet ad habitum. Sed primum obiectum potentiae per
HAristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 5 (10306 14-27).

i5 Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 1, a. 7; Henricus Gand., Summa a. 19. q. 1 (I,
115C); a. 6, q. 3 ad 2 (ibid., 461).
among themselves as to how they are able to be known, because

conclusions are known from principles and principles in turn, if
they are immediate, are known from their terms, as has been
said. Also the predicate term of a principle is known by reason of
the subject, because principles are generally couched in the
second mode of per se predication; therefore the subject enters
into the definition of the predicate [by way of an addition],4
according to Bk. VII of the Metaphysics. Following this order one
eventually arrives at some simple subject, which is the subject of
a principle or principles. From the notion of this subject all that
pertains to the essence is known and the notion of the subject
itself is not known from anything else. This therefore is rightly
called the first or primary subject; it contains virtually in itself
the knowledge that pertains to the science.
17 Added, however, is the stipulation that the first object
primarily' contains. For just as that which does not depend upon
another, while other things depend upon it, is first, so that 'what
is said to contain primarily' is not dependent on others for what it
contains, nor does it contain through a notion of something else;
that is, to assume the impossible, if every thing other than what
the object means were excluded, its concept would still remain,
and in that notion 'of the object would still be contained those
truths [that comprise the science]. For example, an isosceles
contains virtually all the conclusions that triangle contains, since
it includes the notion of 'triangle.' But it does not contain these
conclusions primarily, because it does not do so because of its
specific characteristic of being isosceles, but rather by reason of
being a triangle.
Two objections to this explanation of the object
18 [First objection] Against the above this sort of objection is

raised. Just as the first object of a faculty is related to that
faculty, so the first object of a habit is related to habit. But the
4 The phrase in brackets needs to be added, to distinguish the second from

the first mode of per se predication. The first mode applies to the genus and
specific difference, which enter directly into the definition and not by way of an
added property [sicut additum).
se est commune ad omnia per se obiecta. Igitur similiter primum

obiectum habitus est aliquid commune ad omnia quae per se
respicit ille habitus et non aliquid virtualiter unum continens
omnia. Confirmatur hoc. Quia alioquin non inveniretur
adaequatio in obiecto, quae tamen requiritur in primo obiecto
cuiuscumque, sive potentiae sive habitus.
19 Item,16 communiter in scientiis assignatur pro primo obiecto
aliquod commune ad illa ad quae se extendit scientia, sicut in
metaphysica ens, in scientia naturali corpus vel ens mobile, in
geometria magnitudo, et sic de aliis, igitur etc.
20 [Secunda instantia] Secunda instantia17 est talis. Illud quod
continet virtualiter aliquam notitiam intellectus, non habet esse
in intellectu, sed potius in virtute fantastica. Obiectum scibile
habet esse in intellectu tantum quia est universale, et universale
non est in re extra nec in sensu, quia nihil habet ibi esse nisi sub
ratione singularis; igitur etc. Maior probatur. Quia quod
continet virtualiter notitiam intellectus est motivum intellectus
ad illam. Sed motivum est distinctum subiecto a mobili.18 Ergo, ut
est continens, non habet esse in intellectu,19 et habet esse in
nobis, quia intelligimus cum volumus, II De Anima,20 ergo
praecise habet esse in virtute fantastica.
10 Thomas Aquinas, Metaph. IV, lect. 1 (ed. Parmen. XX. 312a6); In librum
Bocthii De Trin. q. 5, a. 4 ad 6 (ed. Parmen. XVII, 389a).
" Godefridus de Font., Quodl. V, q. 10 (PhB III, 39-40).
1H Add. et nihil in intellectu potest distingui subiecto ab intellectu MB.
" V addit (cf. Add M ): [n. 21] Vel sic. Secunda instantia talis est: omnis actus
et habitus intellectualis virtualiter continetur praecise in aliquo quod est in
virtute phantastica; non ergo obiectum intelligibile continet virtualiter habitum
scientiae. Consequentia probatur, quia obiectum intelligibile, sub ratione per se
intelligibilis. non habet esse in virtute phantastica, quia nihil habet ibi esse nisi
sub ratione singularis; obiectum intelligibile est per se universale. Antecedens
probatur. quia movens subiecto distinguitur a moto, nihil autem in parte
intellectiva potest subiecto distingui ab intellectu; illud autem quod virtualiter
continet actum vel habitum intellectus, movet intellectum ad illum actum vel
habitum; ergo quod virtualiter continet habitum intellectus. non habet esse per
se in parte intellectiva.
*l Aristot., De anima II, c. 5 (4176 21-4).
first object of a faculty per se is common to all of its per se objects.

Therefore, similarly the first object of a habit is something
common to all, which that habit regards per se, and not some one
thing that virtually contains all. This is confirmed, because
otherwise no adequacy would be found in the object; but this is
required in the first object of anything, be it a faculty or a habit.
19 Also, generally in the sciences as a first object something is
assigned that is common to those things to which the science
extends, such as 'being' in metaphysics, 'body' or 'mobile being' in
physics, or 'magnitude' in geometry, and so in all the other
sciences; therefore etc.
20 [Second objection] A second objection is of this sort. What

contains some knowledge of the intellect virtually has no being in
the intellect, but rather in the faculty of imagination; a
scientifically knowable object has being in the intellect only
because it is universal, and a universal has no existence outside
in reality, nor does it exist in any sense faculty; nothing has
existence there except under the aspect of a singular; therefore
etc. The major is proved. For what contains knowledge of the
intellect virtually is what moves the intellect to know it.5 But
what moves is a subject distinct from what it is able to move.
What contains in this way, then, has no being in the intellect,6
and it has being in us, because 'we think when we want to,'
according to Bk. II of the De anima. Hence, it has being in the
faculty of the imagination.
' What moves the intellect according to the objector's theory of knowledge is
the sensible phantasm in the imagination when illumined by the agent intellect.
' V adds (cf. Add. M.): [n. 21] Or, it could be worded this way. The second
objection is such: every intellectual act or habit is contained virtually in
something that is in the faculty of the imagination; therefore, the intelligible
object [in the intellect] does not contain virtually the habit of science. The
implication is proved, because the intelligibile object, under the notion of the per
se intelligible, has no being in the faculty of the imagination, because nothing has
being there, except under the aspect of singularity; an intelligible object is
essentially a universal. The antecedent is proved, because the mover is a
distinct subject from that of the moved, but nothing in the intellective part can be
a distinct subject from that of the intellect. But that, which virtually contains the
act or habit of the intellect, moves the intellect to that act or habit; therefore,
that which virtually contains the habit of the intellect has no existence
essentially in the intellective part.
22 Illa autem propositio "Motivum et motum sunt distincta

subiecto", quamvis sit principium, tamen contra negantes proba-
tnr2i per rationem ducentem ad impossibile. Quia si negetur, pari
ratione dicetur quod in quolibet movens potest esse idem subiecto
cum moto, tunc lignum calefaciet se per aliquid quod est
subiective in illo, licet ad calefactionem illam requirantur multa
alia sicut causae sine quibus non.
[3. Responsio ad instantias

a. Ad primam instantiam]
23 Ad primam instantiam22 respondeo. Concedo quod primum

obiectum est adaequatum illi potentiae vel habitui cuius est
primum obiectum. Et haec ratio primitatis accipitur a Philosopho
I Posteriorum23 ubi vult quod praedicatum universale primo inest
illi subiecto, et vocat ibi universale Philosophus passionem
adaequatam ipsi subiecto. Hoc autem est commune tam obiecto
potentiae quam habitus, quod scilicet ipsum habet rationem
terminantis rationem utriusque. Sed aliud est speciale de obiecto
potentiae, quia obiectum potentiae, licet sit quandoque movens
potentiam, non tamen necessario virtualiter continet in se
perfectionem potentiae, obiectum autem scentiae ponitur ex dictis
virtualiter continere in se perfectionem illius habitus. Obiectum
autem scientiae proprie est mensura, ex V Metaphysicae, cap. de
"ad aliquid",24 non sic autem potentiae obiectum respectu eius.
24 Ad propositum: igitur quandocumque illud quod per se
convenit obiecto potentiae vel habitus, ut movere vel terminare
vel mensurare, convenit cuilibet per se obiecto per rationem
propriam, tunc non potest aliquod eorum esse aliquod unum
obiectum adaequatum illi potentiae et habitui, sed aliquod
commune cuius ratio salvatur in omnibus illis quae per se movent
vel terminant.
Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VI, q. 7 (PhB III, 155-6, 158); IX, q. 19 (PhB
IV, 272-3).
11 Cf. supra n. 18.
2:i Aristot. Anal. Post. I, c. 4 (736 26-33).
** Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 15 (10206 30-1).
22 As for the proposition, however, "The mover and the moved

are distinct as to subject" is a principle; nevertheless, for the sake
of those who might deny it, this proof from impossibility is
adduced. For if one denies the principle, by the same token one
can say that anything that moves can be in the same subject as
what is moved. And then wood can be heated through something
it contains subjectively in itself, although heating requires many
other causes as necessary conditions.
Reply to the objections

To the first objection
23 To the first instance [in n. 18] I reply. I concede that the

first object is adequate for that faculty or habit for which it is a
first object. And such understanding of first' is taken from Bk. I
of the Philosopher's Posterior Analytics, where he insists that it is
the universal predicate that is primarily in that subject, and he
declares here that a universal is an attribute adequate for this
subject. But this is something common to both the object of a
faculty and that of a habit, namely that it has the characteristic of
completing the notion of both. But there is something else that is
specific to the object of a faculty, because the object of a faculty,
though it sometimes moves the faculty, does not contain virtually
in itself the perfection of that faculty. But the object of a science,
from what has been said, is posited as virtually containing in
itself the perfection of that habit. The object of a science, however,
is properly a measure, according to Bk. V of the Metaphysics, in
the chapter on relatives.* But this is not the relationship that
exists between a faculty and its object.
24 As for my proposal, then: whenever what pertains per se to
the object of the potency* or habitsuch as to move, or complete,
or measurepertains to any per se object whatsoever by reason
of what it properly is, then none of these [objects] can be some
single object that is adequate to that potency or habit. Rather [the
adequate object] will be some common characteristic that is
preserved in every one of those things, which per se either move
or complete.
25 Ad primum25 ergo respondeo quod dupliciter potest intelligi

potentiam vel habitum se habere ad multa per se obiecta
indifferenter:
Uno modo, quod quodlibet eorum per rationem suam
formalem natum est respici a potentia tali vel habitu, et ibi
nullum eorum unum est primum obiectum potentiae, quia nec
adaequatum, eo quod nec ratio alicuius unius illorum salvatur in
quolibet quod per se respicitur a tali potentia vel habitu, et per
consequens nihil est adaequatum nisi commune omnibus illis
obiectis per se. Ita est de visu respectu omnium coloratorum.
Quia licet unus color sit perfectior aliis, puta albedo, tamen
nigredo per suam propriam naturam obicitur potentiae visivae et
non tantum virtute albi.
26 Alio modo potentia vel habitus indifferenter respicit plura
per se obiecta hoc modo quod unum praecise per rationem suam
respicitur et alia non nisi ex consequenti virtute primi. Et illud
primum inter per se obiecta est simpliciter adaequatum potentiae
et habitui et ideo simpliciter obiectum eius primum. Hoc modo est
de intellectu divino. Quia licet per se intelligat omnia intel-
ligibilia, tamen a nullo movetur ad actum intelligendi nisi a
primo obiecto suo. Nullum etiam obiectum secundarium primo
determinat per rationem propriam actum ipsius, sed tantum ex
consequenti virtute illius primi. Et ideo illud primum obiectum
per se adaequatum intellectui non est aliquod commune omnibus
per se intelligibilibus, sed aliquod primum intelligibile per se
continens omnia.
27 Ad propositum. Deus sub ratione Deitatis est primum in
entitate, ergo et in cognoscibilitate, ergo per rationem eius
possunt alia cognosci in alia scientia, ergo ipse potest esse
subiectum primum istius scientiae.
28 Praeterea, de Deo possunt cognosci aliqua propria sibi, ergo
illa cognoscibilia possunt pertinere ad aliquam scientiam. Illa
habebit aliquod subiectum primum, non aliud quam Deum sub
propria ratione. Quia quod est cognoscibile simpliciter perfectius
primo subiecto alicuius scientiae, non potest in illa scientia
cognosci quantum ad propria sibi. Sed Deus sub ratione Deitatis
Cf. supra n. 18.

25 I reply, then, to the first [n. 18] that one can understand in
a twofold way that a faculty or habit relates indifferently to many
things that are objects per se:
In one way, each of these by reason of its formal* notion is
naturally suited to regard such a faculty or habit, but no one of
them is their primary or adequate object, for its nature is not
something shared by everything related per se to such a faculty or
habit. As a consequence, nothing is adequate unless it is a
common characteristic of all of those objects per se. This is so
regarding vision as regards all colored things. For although one
color is more perfect than another, for example whiteness,
nevertheless blackness by its own proper nature is an object of
vision and it is not so by reason of being white.
26 In another way a potency or habit regards indifferently
several things as per se objects so that only one is regarded as
[first] object precisely by reason of what it is, whereas the other
things are only so because they follow in virtue of the first. And
that first among per se objects is simply adequate to the potency
and habit, and therefore it is simply its first object in an
unqualified sense. Such is the case with the divine intellect. For
although it understands per se all that is intelligible, nevertheless
it is not moved to an act of understanding by anything other than
by its first object. Also no secondary object through its proper
notion primarily determines an act of his, but rather by following
in virtue of that first, and therefore that first per se adequate
object is not something common to all per se intelligibles, but
some first intelligible that contains all per se.
27 To what we propose: God under the aspect of deity is first in
entity, therefore also first in his ability to be known. Therefore
under this characteristic of his the other things can be known in
another science; therefore he himself can be the first subject of
this science.
28 Furthermore, some properties about God can be known;
therefore these can pertain to some science. That science will
have some first subject, which is not other than God under a
proper concept. For what is simply more perfect than the primary
subject of a science cannot be known in that science in a proper
fashion. But God under the aspect of his deity is knowable in a
est cognoscibile simpliciter perfectius quocumque alio subiecto.

Ergo propria de ipso non possunt cognosci in scientia habente
aliud subiectum primum.
29 Praeterea tertio arguitur sic. Sex videntur esse condiciones
subiecti primi alicuius scientiae. Prima, quod ab ipso
determinetur et specificetur scientia sicut potentia per suum
primum obiectum. Secunda, quod ab ipso scientia habeat
dignitatem suam. Tertia, quod de ipso dicantur alia considerata
in scientia, sicut in propositione praedicatum dicitur de subiecto.
Quarta, quod ipsum sit primum quod ocurrit intellectui in illa
scientia et alia sub ratione eius. Quinta, quod ipsum possit esse
subiectum principiorum scientiae. Sexta, quod eius passiones et
proprietates considerentur in scientia. Sed Deus potest habere
omnes istas condiciones respectu alicuius scientiae, puta
theologiae, ergo etc.
30 Quod autem scientia ista sit de Deo sub ratione Deitatis
probatur. Primo, quia sub ista ratione et non alia continentur
infra eius ambitum omnia cognoscibilia de Deo. Secundo, quia
scientia divina est de ipso sub ista ratione, et quaelibet alia
scientia de Deo est participatio scientiae divinae et imitatur eam.
Tertio, quia sub ista sola ratione est subiectum primum obiectum
principiorum scientiae talis. Quarto, quia sub sola ista ratione est
obiectum scientiae beatorum. Quinto, quia transcendit omnes
scientias philosophicas. Ponitur autem ab aliis26 quod sub ista
ratione sit obiectum primum scientiae divinae, quia ista
transcendit omnem scientiam creaturae.
31 Ad propositum. Obiectum habitus habet continere vir-
tualiter aliquo modo ipsum habitum et etiam esse mensuram
eius, ex V Metaphysicae, cap. de "ad aliquid".27 Et istae
condiciones sunt propriae obiecto primo habitus, nec conveniunt
proprie obiecto primo potentiae, quia obiectum potentiae habet sic
quandoque movere potentiam, non tamen continet virtualiter
potentiam. Habet etiam obiectum habitus terminare actum eius,
et hoc est commune obiecto habitus et obiecto potentiae. Ergo si
aliquis habitus respiceret aliqua plura per se obiecta quorum
M Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 1, a. 5 et 7.

27 Aristot, Metaph. V (A), c. 15 (10206 30. 1021a 30-10216 1).
simply more perfect way than in virtue of any other subject

whatsoever. Therefore his properties cannot be known in a
science having anything other [than deity] as its first subject.
29 Furthermore, it is argued in this way. There are six
conditions of a first subject of some science. First, that from it the
science is first determined and specified as a potency is [specified]
through its first object. Second, a science derives its dignity
through it. Third, other things considered in that science are said
of it, in the way the predicate is affirmed of the subject in a
proposition. Fourth, that it is the first thing in that science that
occurs to the intellect and other things come to mind in virtue of
what it means. Fifth, that it can be the subject of the principles of
the science. Sixth, that its proper attributes and properties are
considered in the science. But God can have all these conditions
with respect to some science, for instance, theology; therefore etc.
30 Proof that there can be a science of God under the aspect of
deity. First, because under this notion and no other are contained
within its scope all the things that can be known about God.
Secondly, because the divine science is about him under this
aspect and every other science about God is a participation in the
divine science and patterned after it. Third, because under this
notion alone is the first subject the object of the principles of such
a science. Fourth, because under this aspect alone is [God] an
object of the science of the beatified. Fifth, because it transcends
all the philosophical sciences. Others, however, maintain that it is
the first object of the divine science under this notion [of deity],
because by this it transcends every science about creatures.
31 As for my proposal: the object of a habit in some fashion has
to contain virtually the habit itself and also to be its measure,
according to the chapter on relatives in Bk. 5 of the Metaphysics.
And these conditions are proper to the first object of the habit,
though they do not pertain to the proper object of a potency,
because the object of the potency has thus at times to move the
potency, not however virtually to contain the potency. The object
of a habit also has to be the term of its act, and this is something
that the object of a habit has in common with the object of a
potency. Therefore, if some habit would regard as per se objects
several things of which each by reason of its proper notion would
quodlibet per rationem propriam contineret illum habitum

virtualiter et esset mensura eius et primo terminaret actum illius
habitus, obiectum adaequatum esset commune ad omnia alia per
se obiecta. Sed si inter illa multa ad quae se extendit habitus sit
aliquod unum quod solum virtualiter continet habitum et sit
mensura eius et primo terminans actum eius, illud poneretur
obiectum habitus adaequatum. Ita est in scientiis. Nam non
quodlibet quod consideratur in scientia est virtualiter continens
ipsam vel mensura eius vel primo terminans sed aliquod unum ad
cuius rationem stat ultimate resolutio omnium principiorum et
conclusionum, sicut dictum est. Patet ergo quod simpliciter
primum subiectum scientiae est tale virtualiter continens, ut
dictum est, non commune ad omnia considerata in scientia.
32 Per hoc patet ad confirmationem.28 Quia utrobique
assignatur adaequatio in primo obiecto respectu illius cuius est
primum obiectum. Sed quaedam potentiae indifferenter
respiciunt plura per se obiecta ita quod nullum per rationem
alterius. Et ideo alicui potentiae numquam potest adaequari
obiectum nisi sit commune per praedicationem omnibus per se
obiectis. Habitui autem scientiae semper adaequatur aliquid
commune secundum virtualitatem ad omnia, non secundum
praedicationem.
33 Ad secundum:29 scientiae unius secundum genus est unum
primum obiectum secundum genus. Sed a multis obiectis
differentibus specie, quorum quodlibet est primum obiectum
respectu unius scientiae secundum speciem, potest abstrahi tale
unum commune obiectum, et sic illae scientiae habent unitatem
generis, et ideo pertinent ad unam scientiam secundum genus.
Ita in tali scientia secundum genus una assignatur unum
subiectum commune illis subiectis. Sed cuiuslibet scientiae unius
secundum speciem, quamvis multa distincta secundum speciem
consideret, tamen eius30 obiectum primum est unum secundum
speciem, in quo virtualiter omnia continentur.
34 Aliter et melius potest dici quod in obiecto communi quod
communiter assignatur in scientiis est una ratio primi obiecti
28 Cf. supra n. 18.

28 Cf. supra n. 19.
10 Eius: melius omitte.
contain the habit virtually and would be what measures it and

what serves as the primary end or perfection of the act of the habit,
its adequate object would be common to all other per se objects. But
if among these many things to which the habit extends there is
some one object that alone virtually contains the habit and is its
measure and primarily is the term of its act, then that is the
adequate object of the habit. It is this way in the sciences. For not
everything considered therein virtually contains the science or is
its measure or functions as its end. But there is some one concept
on which the resolution of all the principles and conclusions
ultimately rests, as has been said. It is clear therefore that what
is simply the first subject of the science is such [an object] that
contains virtually [all that is knowable], as has been said, and not
something common to all things considered in that science.
32 And this evidently answers the confirmation [of the
objection in n. 18]. For in both [a potency and a habit] their first
object is assigned adequacy with respect to that of which it is the
first object. But certain potencies regard indifferently several per
se objects in such a way that none of them is through the concept
of another. And therefore to some potency never can there be an
adequate object unless it is commonly predicated of all its per se
objects. But to the habit of a science there is always something
that is common to all according to virtuality, but not by reason of
common predication.
33 To the second argument [in n. 19]: a science generically one
has one first generic object. But from many specifically different
objects, of which each is a first object of a science specifically one,
it is possible to abstract one such common object, and thus all
those sciences have a generic unity, and therefore they pertain to
one generic science. And thus in such a generic science there is
assigned one subject common to those [specific] subjects. But any
science that is specifically one, although it considers many
specifically distinct things,7 nevertheless has its first object that
is one according to species and that virtually contains all.
34 Otherwise and better, one could say that in the common
object that is customarily assigned in sciences, there is one notion
7 For example, theology as a divine science with deity as its first object is
specifically one, even though it treats of specifically different secondary objects,
namely all the different species that make up God's creation.
quae est adaequata in terminando, et hoc sive in terminando per

se et primo sive in terminando per se et non primo. Deficit tamen
ratio mensurandi et continendi. Et ideo, licet tale obiectum
commune secundum aliquid posset dici communiter primum
obiectum, hoc tamen imperfecte est respectu istius primi obiecti
quod habet rationem assignatam, quia illud est adaequatum in
mensurando et continendo et etiam in terminando primo. Vel sic:
ubi assignatur subiectum commune, vel est primum subiectum
unius scientiae tantum secundum genus et ideo abstractum ab
obiectis specialibus multarum scientiarum secundum speciem, vel
si assignatur tale obiectum vel subiectum respectu scientiae
unius secundum speciem, imperfecte est primum quia unam
condicionem habet, scilicet adaequare in terminando, et in
duabus aliis deficit.
[b. Ad secundam instantiam]
35 Ad secundam instantiam:3i de phantasmatibus aliqui32

concedunt antecedens et negant consequentiam. Et ad
probationem consequentiae videtur posse responderi distinguen-
do de esse in subiective et obiective. Secundo modo minor vera et
primo modo maior vera.
ii Cf. supra n. 20.

" Henricus Gand., Quodl. IV, q. 8 (f. 970-98P); V, q. 14 (f. 1760-1770, R).
of a first object that is adequate in functioning as an end,

terminating either per se and primarily, or at least per se though
not primarily. But it is deficient in measuring and in containing.
And therefore such an object that is common according to
something, could commonly be called a first object, although it is
imperfectly such compared to a first object that has [this] notion
assigned because it is adequate in measuring and in containing as
well as in functioning as an end. Or to put it another way: where
a common subject is assigned, either it is a first subject of one
generic science and therefore is something abstracted from the
special objects of many sciences, each of which is one according to
species, or if such an object or subject is assigned with respect to a
science that is specifically one, it is imperfectly first, because it
has one condition, namely, adequacy in functioning as an end,8
and in two other ways it is deficient.
To the second objection
35 [An inadequate solution to the second objection] As for the

second objection [n. 20]: about phantasms*9 some concede the
antecedent and deny the implication.*10 As for the proof given for
the implication it seems that one could reply by distinguishing
between being in a subjective and objective way. In the second
way the minor11 is true and in the first way the major12 is true.
H God in knowing his deity knows all that is knowable. Deity therefore
virtually contains all that is knowable.
9 See the footnote to n. 20.
1u The unexpressed implication is: "If the phantasm that moves the intellect
as object is in the imagination, then the object that contains intellectual
knowledge virtually is not in the intellect as such." Godfrey concedes its
antecedent, since the phantasm or sensible image exists subjectively as an
accidental quality in the imagination, a corporeal or organic faculty. But he
denies the implication because, when illumined by the agent intellect, the
substantial nature of what exists as singular in the phantasm becomes
intelligible, and as an intelligible species impressed subjectively on the possible
intellect as an accidental quality, it reduces this non-organic cognitive potency to
act, and becomes what the intellect actually knows objectively.
1 1 Cf. the minor in n. 20: "A scientifically knowable object does have being in
the intellect." viz. objective being, for whatever is intelligible, since it is divested
of singularity, is at least potentially universal, and universals have no extra-
mental existence nor do they exist in any sense faculty.
11 Cf. the major and its proof in n. 20. What contains intellectual knowledge
virtually is the phantasm if illumined by the agent intellect. As a sense image the
36 Sed licet haec distinctio sit bona, non tamen evadit

difficultatem quia nihil potest esse in intellectu obiective nisi vel
obiciatur intellectui praesentialiter in seipso vel in aliquo
repraesentativo eius realiter exsistente. Nunc autem obiectum
scibile non oportet primo modo obici ad hoc ut praeintelligatur,
quia de non ente est sic scientia; ergo oportet quod obiciatur in
aliquo repraesentativo. Et tunc de illo arguitur. Si illud est
subiective in intellectu et movet intellectum ad notitiam obiecti
quod repraesentat, igitur movens et motum non sunt distincta
subiecto. Si illud non est subiective in intellectu et est in nobis,
quia intelligimus cum volumus, igitur est in parte sensitiva.
Igitur nihil realiter exsistens continet virtualiter aliquam
notitiam intellectus nostri nisi aliqua specifica forma sensata, non
igitur obiectum intelligibile quia, ut argutum est prius, obiectum
intelligibile est universale et universale non habet esse nisi in
intellectu.
36 But although this is a good distinction, it does not avoid the

difficulty, because nothing can be in the intellect objectively
unless it is presented to the intellect objectively in itself13 or in
something that represents it that really exists.14 Now an object
that can be scientifically known,15 however, does not need to be
objectively presented in the first way in order for it to be
understood beforehand, because there is science in this way about
non-being. 16 Hence it is only necessary that it be representatively
presented as an object. And then one could argue: if that is
subjectively in the intellect and moves the intellect to the
knowledge of the object that it represents, then moving and
moved are not distinct as to their subject. If that is not in the
intellect subjectively and it is in us because we understand what
we want to, therefore it is in the sensitive part. Therefore nothing
really existing contains virtually some of our intellectual
knowledge unless it be something perceived by the senses. Hence
it is not an intelligible object, because as was argued earlier, an
intelligible object is a universal and a universal does not have
being except in the intellect.
phantasm exists as an accidental quality in the imagination and as such is

singular and neither subjectively nor objectively in the intellect.
11 Scotus has in mind here intuitive knowledge in which the intellect knows
something immediately as existentially present here and now. He believes we
have such knowledge with respect to our own actions in the present life; only
when the intellect is apart from the body it is capable of having such knowledge
of other things as well. The intelligible species, however, is not the phantasm, but
is a distinct accidental quality impressed on the possible intellect. Agent and
possible intellect as non-organic or incorporeal faculties, are only formally, not
really distinct from the spiritual or intellective soul.
14 Scotus has in mind here abstractive knowledge, in which an intelligible
species exists subjectively in the intellect as a real accident that is in the first
species of a quality according to Aristotle. Henry of Ghent does not admit the
existence of intelligible species, but Godfrey of Fontaines does, and it is he whom
Scotus has in mind here. But Godfrey insists on the real subjective distinction
between what moves and is moved, whereas Scotus denies this. Intellectual
cognition in us is an example of self-movement. The intelligible species, once
received in the possible intellect, moves the intellect to actual cognition. Cf. his
Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, IX, q. 14, n. 17-20, 61.
Scientific knowledge, as a demonstrated conclusion, is a form of abstract
cognition.
16 Being' or 'thing' [ens] has the meaning of a real, extra-mental thing, when
not qualified as an ens rationis.
37 Hic dicit quidam33 sic quod species intelligibilis nec

virtualiter nec formaliter potest movere intellectum ad aliquam
notitiam, species autem sensibilis potest movere, et cum hoc stat
quod obiectum intelligatur sub ratione universalis.
38 Primum probatur sic:34 quod idem non potest movere se. Et
est una praecipua eius ratio. Quia movens est in actu tale quale
motum est in potentia. Et idem non potest simul esse in actu et in
potentia quia hoc est principium metaphysicum notum ex
repugnantia istorum principiorum generalium, et si negetur
alicubi, pari ratione negetur ubique.35 Ista eadem ratio concludit
quod movens et motum non possunt esse idem subiecto. Quia si
sic, licet alterum esset appropriate ratio agendi et alterum
patiendi, tamen totum ut totum ageret et pateretur quia agere et
pati est totius, et sic totum esset in actu et totum in potentia.
39 Secundum etiam declaratur: quia phantasma est suffi-
cienter distinctum subiecto ab intellectu ut possit ipsum movere,
quod sic ostenditur; quia anima36 potest considerari secundum
rationem essentiae, et sic ubique est in corpore; alio modo
secundum rationem potentiae, et tunc si organicae est in
determinata parte corporis; si non organicae qualis est
intellectus, est in nulla parte corporis. Sicut ergo potentia
exsistens in una parte corporis potest esse principium movendi
aliam in alia parte corporis, sic illud quod est in determinata
parte corporis potest esse principium movendi intellectum, qui
sub ratione potentiae non est in aliqua parte corporis.
: Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VI, q. 7 (PhB III, 172); Quodl. V, q. 10 (PhB

III, 36-7); Quodl. VIII, q. 2 (PhB IV, 30).
11 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Metaph. V, lect. 14 (ed. Parmen. XX, 412a).
m Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VI, q. 7 (PhB III, 170).
> Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VI, q. 7 (PhB III, 171-2).
37 [Godfrey of Fontaines's solution to the second objection]

Here a certain [teacher] puts it thus: an intelligible* species
neither virtually nor formally* can move the intellect to some
knowledge; but a sensible species can move it, and when this
takes place the object is understood as a universal.
38 It is proved first in this way: the same thing cannot move
itself. And there is one principal reason why this is so. For the
moving thing is in act whereas the thing moved is in potency. And
one and the same thing cannot be simultaneously in act and in
potency, for this is a metaphysical principle known from the
incompatibility of those general principles,i7 and if it is anywhere
denied, by the same token it must always be denied.i8 This same
reason implies that what is moving and what is moved cannot
have the identical subject. Because if such were the case,
although one thing could appropriately be the reason for acting
and another the reason for being acted upon, nevertheless it is
the whole qua whole that is either acting or being acted upon. For
to act and to be acted upon pertains to the whole, and thus the
whole is either in act or the whole is in potency.
39 There is a second way to explain this, for the sense image is
sufficiently distinct from the intellect as regards its subject so
that it could move the intellect; it is shown in this fashion. For the
soul can be considered by reason of its essence and in this way it
is everywhere in the body. It can also be understood by reason of
a faculty or potency it has, and then if this potency is organic, it is
in a definite part of the body, and if not organic such as the
intellect, it is in no part of the body. Therefore just as a potency
existing in one part of the body can be a principle for moving
another in a different part of the body, so that which is in a
definite part of the body can be a principle for moving the
intellect which is not in any part of the body.
i7 Namely, the opposition of act and potency, which are more general
principles.
18 According to Scotus (Metaph. IX, q. 14, n. 98 [OPh 4, 663]), Godfrey makes
this observation; cf. Godfrey's Quodl. VI, q. 7 (PhB III, 170).
40 Tertium declarator sic:37 quia haec est natura intellectus

agentis, quod cum tactu spirituali et virtuali luminis sui contingit
phantasma solum quantum ad illud quod pertinet ad quiditatem
eius. Et econverso haec est natura obiecti singularis quod sit
praecise tactum secundum suam quiditatem. Et quiditas, ut sic
attingitur praeter accidentia designantia, habeat rationem
universalis et apprehenditur ab intellectu possibili.
41 Contra ista tria:38
Et primo contra illud quod solum phantasma movet
intellectum nostrum arguo sic: accidens et subiectum sunt
indistincta subiecto, ergo cuicumque subiectum est idem, et
accidens erit idem illi. Anima autem intellectiva est eadem
subiecto virtuti phantasticae, ergo et intellectus est idem illi, ergo
et phantasmati quod est in ista virtute. Quod autem dicunt quod
intellectus in nulla parte corporis est, verum est determinate, sed
in qualibet est realiter et indistincte. Unde sicut si esset in solo
organo phantasiae esset indistinctum subiecto illi potentiae, ita
cum sit in alia potentia nec tamen minus vere est in ista, nec
minus est idem subiecto isti.
42 Praeterea, causa aequivoca principalis et totalis est
perfectior effectu. Igitur phantasma erit perfectius quocumque
actu alio qui potest haberi in mente. Quia phantasma secundum
istum movet intellectum ad notitiam obiecti quod repraesentat.
i7 Godefridus de Font., Quodl. V, q. 10 (PhB III, 38-9).

:lH Cf. supra n. 38-40.
40 There is a third way of explaining this, for this is the nature

of an agent* intellect. When by its spiritual touch and virtual
light it contacts the sense image, it reveals only what pertains to
its quiddity. And conversely such is the nature of a singular object
that only its quiddity is reached. And the quiddity, in as much as
it is reached apart from the accidents representing it, has the
aspect of a universal, and is apprehended by the possible*
intellect.
41 [Scotus's Refutation of Godfrey] Against these three
arguments [n. 38-40].
And primarily against that assertion that only the
phantasm moves the intellect, I argue in this way [First]: accident
and subject are indistinct as to their subject, therefore
whatsoever has the same subject, will also have the same
accident. But the intellective soul as to its subject is the same as
the imaginative power, and therefore the intellect is the same
thing as it [i.e., the imagination]; therefore is the same thing as
the phantasm which resides in this power.19 But they say that the
intellect is in no part of the body, which is true as to its not being
limited. Rather it is in every part really and without distinction.
Now just as if it were solely in the organ of the imagination, [and
in this case] were indistinct from this power as to its subject, in
the same way, when it is in another power, it would be no less
truly in this [power], nor would it be less identical with it as to its
subject.
42 [Second] Furthermore, an equivocal* cause that is the
principal and total cause is more perfect than its effect.20
Therefore the imagination will be more perfect than any other
act21 that can be had in the mind. It is because the imagination,
according to this [teacher], moves the intellect to a knowledge of
19 Scot us believes the spiritual soul is one simple spiritual substance; its
powers or faculties are only formally, not really distinct from it, though their
respective acts of intellection and sense perceptions are really distinct accidents.
But since accidents reside in the soul as modes of being, one and the same real
thing is both mover and moved.
20 A univocal cause is like its effect, an equivocal cause is not. but it cannot
be less perfect if it is the total or principal cause.
11 According to Godfrey, the intellect is purely passive in knowing, and its
information is the effect of the phantasm or sense image moving it as an
equivocal [or unlike] cause.
Et secundum hoc sequitur quod felicitas non erit actus perfectis-

simus, quod est contra philosophos,39 nec excedemus bruta
secundum mentem, quod est contra Augustinum.40
43 Quod si dicatur intellectum agentem esse principale agens
respectu aliorum actuum in mente, hoc negat ista opinio41 quia
intellectus agens est indistinctus subiecto a possibili. Unde
secundum eos non agit in possibilem secundum rationem causae
efficientis sed solum formaliter, non effective.
44 Quod si dicatur quod intellectus agens est circa
phantasmata, contra hoc est V et X Quodlibet42 ubi dicit quod
intellectus agens nihil imprimit in phantasmata.
45 Contra eos etiam est tertia ratio de voluntate ubi dicit iste
doctor43 quod totus processus in actibus humanis est mere per
modum naturae, ita quod nihil est in potestate hominis non magis
quam actus bruti est in potestate bruti. Sed de hoc alias.44
46 Quarto arguitur contra istos quod non requiritur habitus
intellectualis sed tantum habitus phantasticus, quia nihil in
passo est causa quare agentia ordinate agunt.
47 Quoad aliud quod dicunt phantasmata in virtute intellectus
agentis repraesentare universale. Contra. Intellectus agens, cum
sit potentia animae nostrae, est potentia signata, et per
consequens eius actio.
M Cf. Aristot., Eth. Nic. X, c. 7 (1 177a12-1 1776); c. 8 (11786 7-32, 1179a 22-
32); Avicenna, Metaph. IX, c. 7 (AviL, 507-9).
40 August., De Trin. XV, c. 1, n. 1 (CCSL 50A, 460; PL 42, 1057).
41 Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VI, q. 7 (PhB III, 172); q. 15 (ibid., 252); VIII,
q. 2 (PhB IV, 32).
42 Godefridus de Font., Quodl. V, q. 10 (PhB III, 36): "Actio intellectus
agentis per se sit in ipsum intellectum possibilem, non in phantasmata".
1:1 Godefridus de Font.. Quodl. VI, q. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 (PhB III, 170-1, 175-6,
207-8, 221. 230, 237); VIII, q. 16 (PhB IV, 159, 161, 167, 169, 172-4).
u V addit: Tunc nihil esset imputabile vel praemiabile, sicut nec casus
lapidis deorsum, quia natura non assuefit in oppositum.
the object that it represents. And according to this [opinion], it

follows that happiness*22 will not be the most perfect act, which is
contrary to the philosophers, nor would we be better than the
brute animal, which contradicts Augustine.
43 If one counters that the agent* intellect would be the
principal agent with respect to all the second acts* in the mind,
this opinion denies this, because the agent intellect is not a
distinct subject from the possible intellect. Hence according to
those [like Godfrey who hold this view], the agent intellect does
not act on the possible intellect under the aspect of an efficient
cause, but only formally, not effectively.
44 If one says that the agent intellect has to do with sense
images, this is contrary to [Godfrey's] V and X Quodlibet, where
he says that the agent intellect impresses nothing upon the sense
images. >
45 [Third] Against these [arguments of Godfrey] also is the
argument about the will* where this doctor says that the whole
process in human acts is merely acting after the manner of
nature [i.e. not freely], so that nothing is in the power of man any
more than the act of a brute animal is in the power of the brute.
But of this I say more elsewhere.23
46 Fourth it is argued against these men that [they believe] an
intellectual habit is not required, but only one in the imagination,
since [according to their theory of a purely passive possible
intellect] there is no reason in the patient* receiving the action
why agents [should] act in an orderly way.24
47 Another point, they say that in virtue of the agent intellect
sense images represent the universal. On the contrary, since the
agent intellect is a power of the soul it is a designated potency,
and as a consequence so too is its action.
a According to Aristotle, philosophy is born of wonder as to the cause of

things, and knowledge of the causes which is science brings happiness to the man
as a rational animal, by satiating his thirst for knowledge.
n V adds: Then nothing would be imputable or meritorious, just as in the
case of a stone falling, because nature does not allow the opposite.
2* That is, they deny that sense objects act exclusively on sense faculties and
only intellectual or intelligible objects act on the intellect.
48 Quoad aliud quod negat speciem intelligibilem. Contra.

Quia sic negatur memoria in mente,45 quod est contra
Augustinum XII De Trinitate, cap. 846 et XV, cap. 10.47 Item,
secundum hoc videtur quod anima per nihil intrinsecum potest
habere novam intellectionem vel volitionem, quia quodlibet tale
est indistinctum subjecto ab ipsa;48 et nihil, secundum istum,49
potest esse movens et motum idem, nec actu et potentia.
49 Si dicas quod praecipui philosophi non poterunt hoc videre.
Contra. Quia vel est falsum quod credimus de eis ex dictis
ipsorum, vel principium quod iste ponit erit falsum, scilicet quod
impossibile est idem esse movens et motum.
50 Quod si dicas obiectum movisse eos ad peccatum vel
errorem, ergo non fuit in potestate eorum sic moveri, sicut nec in
potestate eorum quod obiectum sic moveret. Item, obiectum in se
exsistens non movit, ergo ut relucens in divina essentia. Et per
consequens fuit causa erroris vel peccati.
51 Dico ad istam secundam instantiam50 quod aliquid exsistens
in intellectu, sive subiective ut species intelligibilis vel habitus,
sive obiective ut illud quod relucet intelligibiliter in intelligentia,
continet virtualiter notitiam intellectus. Quod horum verius alias
de hoc.
4r> V addit (cf. Add. M.): et per consequens imago, quia sic secundum eos
in mente non est proles a parente, id est verbum a memoria fecunda. quam
dico intellectum, scilicet informatum specie intelligibili...
August., De Trin. XII, c. 2, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 356-7; PL 42, 999).
47 August., De Trin. XV, c. 10, n. 19 (CCSL 50A, 486; PL 42, 1071). Add. Et
sic destrueretur totus liber Augustini propter auctoritates Averrois MBR.
1H V addit (cf. Add. M.): Si a Deo, ergo Deus causavit actum volitionis quo
angelus malus peccavit; nec ab objecto, quia si dicas obiectum movisse eos ad
peccatum vel erectionem, ergo non fuit in potestate eorum sic moveri; etc. Et
similiter obiectum volitionis eorum et intellectionis eorum potest esse Deus, et sic
ut principalius agens Deus moveret ad actum malum. .
Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VI, q. 7 (PhB III, 168-9).
50 Cf. supra n. 20-21.
48 As for their denial of any intelligible species,25 quite the

contrary is the case. For in this way they deny there is any
memory* in the mind,26 which is against what Augustine says in
The Trinity, Bk. XII, chapter 8 and Bk. XV, chapter 10. Also
according to this view it seems that the soul by reason of nothing
it possesses intrinsically can have any new intellectual knowledge
or volition. For nothing of this sort is distinct from the soul itself
qua subject.27 And nothing, according to him [i.e., Godfrey], can
be both moving and moved, or both in act and in potency.
49 If you say that the prominent philosophers could not have
detected this, quite the contrary. For either what we believe of
them on the basis of what they said is false, or the principle that
this [doctor] posits will be false, namely, that it is impossible for
the same thing to move and to be moved.
50 For if you say that the object has moved these [philosophers]
to sin or err, [I say] it was not in their power to be moved in this
fashion, just as it is not possible for the object to move them in
this way. Also the object existing in itself does not move, therefore
as illumined in the divine essence [it moves], and as a
consequence it was the cause of error or sin.
51 [Scotus's own solution to the second objection in n. 20-21] I
say to this second objection that something existing in the
intellect, whether it be subjectively as an intelligible species or
habit, or objectively as that which shines intelligibly in the
understanding, does contain virtually the knowledge of the
intellect. Even more obvious truths about this are treated
elsewhere.
-5 Henry of Ghent denies the existence of an intelligible species; Godfrey

only denies that it plays any active role in producing intellection; by informing
the possible intellect it reduces this passive potency to actual knowledge as a
form.
26 V adds (cf. Add. M.): and as a consequence, [they deny that] there is any
image, because in this way, according to them, in the mind there is no offspring
from the parent, that is, the word from the fecund memory, which I call the
intellect, namely, as informed by the intelligible species...
27 V adds (cf. Add. A/.): If [moved] by God, therefore God has caused the act
of volition whereby the bad angel has sinned; [however,] not by the object,
because if you say that the object has moved them to sin or rebel, then it was not
in their power to be moved in this way; etc. And similarly the object of their
volition and intellection can be God, and in this way, as the more principal agent,
God would move [them] to [commit] an evil act.
52 Tunc ad propositum "Movens et motum" etc., nego istam.

Immo doctor ille5i quem iste in pluribus sequitur, negat eam in
multis, tum quia ponit52 speciem intellectualem et per eam
tamquam per principium activum ponit intellectum reduci ad
actum intelligendi, tum quia ponit53 voluntatem movere
intellectum et econverso, diversimode tamen, tum quia ponit54
essentiam angeli movere intellectum suum, etc.
53 Ad probationem55 ergo dico quod si illud esset concessum de
actu et potentia, scilicet quod idem non potest esse in actu et
potentia, concluderet propositum de eodem simplici; non tamen
concluderet de eodem secundum subiectum quod est unum et
idem per accidens, et hoc ratione alterius et alterius quae essent
in illo eodem subiecto. Et sic non sequitur quod idem sit in
potentia et in actu nisi idem per accidens, et hoc ratione alterius
et alterius.
54 Et cum dicit "Totum per se agit" etc., respondeo: hoc debet
intelligi de toto includente suppositum et rationem formalem
agendi, non autem de toto includente duo aliqua in supposito
quorum unum est immediate subiectum alterius. Nam in talibus
possibile est quod unum nihil faciat ad actionem et reliquum nihil
faciat ad passionem. Exemplum: Calidum calefacit et frigescit
aliquando coniunctum cum alio.56
5i I.e., Thomas Aquinas.

52 Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 85, a. 2.
Ibid., q. 82, a. 4.
M Ibid., q. 56, a. 1.
55 Cf. supra n. 38.
56 V addit (cf. Add. M.): Quantum autem ad actionem calefaciendi nihil facit
superficies; quantum ergo ad passionem frigoris, nihil facit calor. Sic est in
proposito, nam cum dico 'Socrates habens potentiam intellectivam informatam
specie intelligit', dico formaliter duo tota. Unum totum est 'Socrates habens
intellectum', quia, secundum eos, intellectus est accidens superadditum essentiae
animae. Cum dico 'illud suppositum habens speciem intelligibilem', dico aliud
totum. Nunc autem licet intellectus, qui secundum eos est pure in potentia
passiva, nihil facit ad actionem intelligendi, sed tantum ad receptionem, species
vero intelligibilis, cum sit formalis ratio eliciendi actum intelligendi, facit quidem
ad actionem, sed non ad receptionem. Arguas ergo sic: 'Socrates intelligens agit
actum intelligendi per speciem intelligibilem et recepit actum intelligendi per
potentiam intellectivam'. Ergo hoc totum agit per unum et recipit per aliud.
Conclude ergo 'idem per accidens agit et patitur'.
52 As to what is proposed about [it being distinct subjects that

are] 'moving and moved' etc., I deny this. Indeed that doctor28
whom this one follows in several things, denies it in many cases,
(1) because he posits an intellectual species and through it as
through an active principle he says that the intellect is reduced to
the act of understanding, and (2) because he posits that the
intellect moves the will, and vice versa, but in different ways; and
(3) because he asserts the essence of the angel moves its intellect,
etc.
53 As for the proof [in n. 38], therefore, I say that if that were
conceded about act and potency,29 namely that the same thing
cannot be in act and in potency, one would conclude his proposal
[held only] about one and the same simple thing; it would not
hold good about something that is only incidentally one and the
same subject, and that only by reason of two different accidental
entities that are in that same subject. And thus it does not follow
that the same thing is both in potency and in act by reason of
what is two different [accidents].30
54 And when [in n. 38] he says "the whole thing acts per se,"
etc. I reply: This must be understood about the whole including
the individual supposit* as well as the formal reason by which it
acts.3i But it is not so about a whole that includes two things in
the same individual supposit of which one is immediately subject
to the other. For in things of this sort it is possible that one
contributes nothing to the action and the other nothing to what
can be acted upon, for example, what is hot heats as well as cools
when it is in something else.32
*8 Thomas Aquinas.
29 Scotus could concede the general principle that act and potency are
opposed, and would conclude further that one and the same simple entity cannot
itself be both actualized and yet only exist potentially. But Godfrey is arguing
further that one and the same subject cannot be moving itself being the cause of
the accidents it produces in itself.
i0 Scotus argues that the intellectual soul or an angel can be both the agent
and the recipient of its thoughts and volitions, since thinking and willing are
accidental qualities of a spiritual substance or intellectual being.
3i Scotus is distinguishing here between the principium quod* that is, the
person or thing that acts, and the principium quo* that is, the potency or power
by reason of which it acts.
3* Vadds (cf. Add. M.): As to the action of heating, however, the surface does
nothing, as to the receptivity of cold, the heat does nothing. And so it is in the
[Articulus 3
An Deus possit concipi sub rationibus pluribus distinctis
a ratione essentiae]
55 Circa tertium articulum sciendum quod in uno commu-

niter concordant doctores,57 scilicet quod intellectus viatoris non
movetur ad concipiendum Deum nisi ex creaturis. Nunc autem
perfectiones quae non includunt limitationem vel defectum quae
in creaturis sunt dispersae et distinctae, in Deo sunt unitae
propter eius simplicitatem, quae etiam in creaturis sunt im-
perfectae quia participatae, in Deo sunt simpliciter et perfectae et
illimitatae propter eius infinitatem. Ergo istae perfectiones in
creaturis, tam imperfectae quam perfectae, diversimode reprae-
sentant illas perfectiones unitas in Deo. Et sicut repraesentant,
ita movent intellectum nostrum ad cognitionem illarum. Ergo
intellectus viatoris qui non potest illas unite concipere ut sunt in
se, movetur ad formandos conceptus distinctos de illis,
proportionales conceptibus istarum perfectionum quae sunt in
creaturis. Quibus tamen conceptibus pluribus formatis
multipliciter et imperfecte concipit illud perfectum unum et
perfectiones unitas in ipso. Et sic intellectus viatoris potest
habere de Deo conceptum aliquem quiditativum et alios quasi
passionum, iuxta illud Augustini, XV De Trinitate, cap. 8 et 5:58
"Si dicitur aeternus, vivus, sapiens, potens, iustus, bonus, beatus,
spiritus etc., horum omnium novissimum quod posui quasi
57 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 12, a. 4; Henricus Gand., QuodI. V, q. 1 (f.

150v-154r); Godefridus de Font, Quodl. VII, q. 1 (PhB III, 267).
August., De Trin. XV, c. 5, n. 8 (CCSL 50A, -170; PL 42, 1062).
Article Three
Can God be conceived under the notions distinct from that
of the essence?
55 Regarding the third article there is one common point on

which all the teachers agree. The intellect of the pilgrim* in this
life is moved to conceive God only by way of creatures. Now
however the perfections that include neither limitation nor defect
in creatures are dispersed and distinct, but in God they are
united because of his simplicity. Also in creatures these
perfections are imperfect because they are participated; in God
they are simply perfect and unlimited because of his infinity.
Therefore, these perfections in creatures, both imperfect and
perfect, in different ways represent those perfections united in
God. And as they represent, so do they move our intellect to know
about them. Therefore the intellect of the pilgrim who cannot
conceive of these in the united way that they exist in themselves
is moved to form distinct concepts of these perfections that are
proportional to the concepts of those perfections as they exist in
creatures. But by means of these several concepts, formed in
various ways and imperfectly, [the intellect of the pilgrim]
conceives that 'perfect one' and the perfections united in Him.
And in this fashion the intellect of the pilgrim can have about
God some concept expressing just what he is and other concepts
about his quasi-attributes, according to what Augustine says in
Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 5: "If one says eternal, living,
knowing, potent, just, good, happy, a spirit, etc., of all of these
case at hand, for when I say: 'Socrates having an intellective potency informed by
an intelligible species understands' I am speaking formally about two wholes.
One whole is 'Socrates having an intellect,' becauseaccording to theseintellect
is an accident added over and above the essence of the soul. When I say 'that
supposit having an intelligible species,' I am speaking of another whole. But now,
on the one hand, the intellect, which according to those is a purely passive
potency, does nothing to produce the action of understanding, but only receives it.
On the other hand, the intelligible species, since it is the formal reason of
eliciting the act of understanding, contributes indeed to the action, but not to its
reception. You may argue, therefore, in this way 'Socrates understanding
produces the act of understanding through the intelligible species and receives
the act of understanding through the intellective potency.' Therefore, this whole
acts through one and receives through another Conclude therefore: 'What is
accidentally the same acts and receives.'
videtur significare substantiam, cetera vero substantiae quali-

tates". Unde dicit Damascenus, cap. 4:59 "Si bonum, si iustum, et
si quid aliud dixeris, non naturam dices Dei sed quae circa
naturam".
[1. An ipse Deus possit se et suas perfectiones

cognoscere sub distinctis rationibus]
56 Sed ultra illud verum quod dictum est de intellectu

viatoris inquirunt aliqui60 si Deus possit concipi sub distinctis
rationibus a quocumque intellectu, etiam divino. Et qualiter est
istud oportet videre propter quaestionem propositam, quia
quaestio non quaerit comparando Deum ad intellectum viatoris
sed absolute si Deus ex parte sui sit tale cognoscibile de quo
possit esse scientia in intellectu proportionato.
[2. Opinio Godefridi]
57 Hic sunt plures positiones, modo non repetam nisi unam. De

aliis autem dicetur ubi quaestio de hoc tractabitur, scilicet d. 3,
q. 1. Dicitur sic a quodam doctore61 quod intellectus divinus uno
simplici conceptu potest apprehendere actualiter et distincte
quaecumque intellectus viatoris potest apprehendere de eodem
pluribus actibus et distinctis. Cum ergo intellectus viatoris
secundum praedicta ex perfectionibus creaturarum concipiat
essentiam divinam sub alia et alia ratione huius perfectionis et
illius, non videtur rationabile quin intellectus divinus circa essen
tiam suam apprehendat distinctionem huiusmodi perfectionum.
Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 4 [I, c. 4] (ed. Buytaert, 21; PG 94, 800).

o Henricus Gand., Quodl. V, q. 1 (f. 150vB-C).
1 Cf. Godefridus de Font., Quodl VII, q. 1 (PhB III, 267).
only the last [viz. spirit] which I have mentioned seems to signify
his substance. The rest however are qualities of that substance."
Hence, as Damascene says in chapter 4: "If one has said he is
good, just, and anything else, one does not say anything about the
nature of God, but rather about those things that refer to his
nature."
Could God know himself and his perfections

under distinct notions?
56 But what is more, besides this truth about the intellect of

the pilgrim some others33 ask if God can be conceived under
distinct notions by any intellect whatsoever, also by the divine
intellect. And it is necessary to investigate in what way this
[would be], because of the question proposed. For the question
does not ask about God as related to the intellect of the pilgrim,
but absolutely [it asks] if God on his part is such an object as can
be known in a science that is in some proportionate intellect.
The opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines vs. that of

Henry of Ghent
57 Here there are several opinions, which I will not repeat,

except for one. About the others, however something will be said
where a question about this is treated, namely34 in distinction
three, question 1. It is stated here by a certain doctor that what
the divine intellect by one simple concept can apprehend actually
and distinctly, the intellect of the pilgrim can apprehend by
several distinct acts. Therefore, when the intellect of the pilgrim,
according to what was said earlier, from the perfections of
creatures conceives the divine essence under this or that different
notion of this or that perfection, it does not seem reasonable
without the divine intellect apprehending any distinction of such
perfections as regards its essence. Now he postulates that it is
11 Godfrey of Fontaines indicates that few doctors are concerned with how
God views his own attributes: Henry of Ghent, however, is an exception. Scotus
summarizes here Godfrey's critique of Henry.
H Only the Balliol manuscript 205 includes this reference, cf. f. 3v.
Modo ponit talem positionem quod impossibile est quemcumque

intellectum, divinum vel alium, concipere essentiam simplicem
sub istis rationibus distinctis nisi comparet ipsam ad aliqua
plura, vel econverso, nisi comparet plura ad ipsam. Ad hoc habet
duas rationes et unam auctoritatem et aliqua exempla.
58 Ratio sua fundamentalis est talis.62 Ab uno simplici uno
modo se habente secundum rem et conceptionem non possunt
sumi distinctiones. Essentia divina, ut secundum se consideratur
praeter respectum ad alia, est simplex omnino in se indistincta re
et ratione, ergo etc. Probatio maioris. Quia sic tunc ab uno
simplici eodem modo se habente secundum rem et conceptionem
sumeretur unitas et diversitas. Probatio minoris. Idem omnino
simplex apprehensum secundum se absque habitudine ad aliud
non potest apprehendi nisi secundum unam et simplicem
rationem.
59 Responsionem unam quae posset dari ad istam rationem
excludit, quae talis est.63 Conceditur quod illa essentia
apprehensa omnino secundum se, absque omni alia habitudine
tam ad intra quam ad extra, non potest apprehendi nisi
secundum unam rationem. Hoc autem modo apprehenditur
essentia in prima apprehensione, ad quam movet intellectum
ante omnem negotiationem. Sed circa essentiam sic apprehensam
secundum se et sub una ratione tantum, intellectus postea
negotians comparat ipsam sub una ratione ad seipsam sub alia
ratione; et sic circa essentiam est differentia rationum mutuo sese
respicientium absque omni comparatione ad extra. Sic autem
considerare sub istis rationibus possibile est intellectui, quia istae
rationes sunt virtualiter in obiecto, et ideo per intellectum
possunt actualiter explicari.64
1 Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 1 (PhB III, 270).

3 Cf. Henricus Gand., Quodl. V, q. 1 (f. 152vS). Godefridus hanc respon
sionem citat (ed. cit. , p. 268-9).
m Godefridus de Font.. Quodl. VII, q. 1 (PhB III, 271).
impossible for any intellect, divine or otherwise, to conceive a

simple essence under these distinct aspects unless one compares
it to several other things, or conversely unless several things are
compared to it. He has two arguments to prove this, one
authority, and some examples.
58 His basic reason is this. From one simple thing, having
conceptually and in reality but one way of being, no distinctions
can be drawn. The divine essence, considered in itself apart from
any relationship to something else is entirely simple in itself,
having no distinction in itself either really or conceptually;
therefore etc. Proof of the major: for in this way, then, from one
way of being that is really and conceptually simple, one could
draw unity and diversity.35 Proof of the minor. One and the same
completely simple thing apprehended simply in itself without any
relationship to another can only be apprehended in one simple
notion.
59 He excludes one response that [Henry] could raise against
his argument, which is this. One could concede that this essence,
apprehended exclusively in itself without any relationship either
within or without, can only be conceived of in one way. In this
way, however, the essence is grasped in the first act of
apprehension to which the intellect is moved prior to any
negotiation. But after thus apprehending the essence itself under
one notion, the intellect busies itself comparing one aspect of the
essence with another aspect, and thus apart from any outside
comparison there is a difference of mutually related aspects. But
to thus consider [the essence] under these various aspects is
something the intellect can do, because these characteristics are
virtually in the object and therefore they can be explicated
actually by the intellect.
v' Henry tries to draw both unity and diversity from God's simple essence,
which Godfrey considers absurd. See John Wippel, The Metaphysical Though of
Godfrey of Fontaines (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America
Press. 1981), 118-20.
[3. Reprobatio opinionis Godefridi a Scoto]
60 Contra istam responsionem arguo sic. "Quaecumque

apprehenduntur seu comparantur ut quaedam differentia sese
respicientia ... prius in sua differentia exsistere supponuntur".65
Intellectus negotians, per te, apprehendit circa essentiam istas
rationes ut distinctas mutuo sese respicientes. Ergo ante
apprehensionem actualem in ipsa essentia sunt actualiter ut
distincta, et ut sic movebunt intellectum ad concipiendum et
comparandum ipsa ut distincta. Ista conclusio est impossibilis
quod ipsa distincta sunt in essentia divina ante omnem
negotiationem intellectus et etiam quod ipsa moveant intellectum
divinum ad concipiendum seipsa66 sub tali distinctione, ergo
aliqua praemissarum est impossibilis. Non maior, sed minor quae
accipitur a respondente. Probatio maioris. Quaecumque per
intellectum comparantur ut differentia, ipso actu comparandi non
constituuntur ut differentia sicut nec constituuntur in esse
secundum quod habent istam differentiam, immo comparationem
ipsam necessario praecedit esse tale et differentia talis ipsorum.
61 Hoc ulterius probatur per simile in rebus. Quando enim res
naturae absolutae comparantur ad invicem, supponuntur habere
esse distinctum reale. Ergo cum entia rationis mutuo
comparantur, supponuntur habere esse distinctum secundum
rationem.
[4. Quod Deus non cognoscit se et suas perfectiones sub

distinctis rationibus]
62 Pro ista opinione est alia ratio communis et antiqua talis.

Cuicumque distinctioni rationis in aliquo correspondet distinctio
realis in aliis; illa distinctio rationis sumitur per comparationem
ad illa distincta realiter.67 Istud probatur per simile de dextro et
* Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 1 (PhB III, 271).

66 Seipsa: vide notam ad Dist. 13, q. un., n. 4.
07 Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 1 (PhB III, 264); ibid., 271-2.
Scotus's argument against the opinion of Godfrey
60 Against this explanation I argue in this way. "Before any

different mutual relations can be apprehended or compared [to
one another] ... they must first be assumed to exist as different."
The negotiating intellect, according to you, apprehends those
mutually related aspects of the essence as distinct; therefore, in
the essence itself before actual apprehension they are actually
distinct, and as such move the intellect to a conception and
comparison of them as distinct. But this conclusion is impossible,
[if one states] that these things are distinct in the divine essence
before any negotiation of the intellect, and also that they move
the divine intellect to conceive them under such a distinction.
Therefore one of the premises is impossible. Not the major,36
therefore the minor which was accepted by the respondent.37
Proof of the major. Whatever the intellect compares as different
cannot be constituted as different by the act of comparison itself;
nor are they constituted in being in virtue of having this
difference. Indeed, their being such' and 'being so different' must
necessarily precede this sort of comparison.
61 This is proved further by an analogy based on things, for
when things of an absolute nature are compared to one another,
they are presupposed to have distinct sorts of real being. Hence
when conceptual things are compared to one another, they are
presupposed to be conceptually distinct.
That God does not know himself and his perfections under
distinct notions
62 For this opinion there is another old and common argument.

To whatever conceptual distinction is in anything, there
corresponds a real distinction in something else. A conceptual
distinction is modeled upon some real distinction that
corresponds to it. This is proved by an argument from analogy
*' That is, something must exist as such before it can be apprehended as
such.
37 Henry, the respondent, would accept Godfrey's minor premise; hence it
needs no proof.
sinistro in columna et in animali, et de ratione principii et finis in

puncto respectu diversarum linearum. Nunc autem istae perfec
tions distinguuntur in Deo secundum rationem, et correspondent
eis in creatura alia distincta realiter. Ergo ista distinctio rationis
in Deo sumetur in quocumque intellectu per comparationem ad
ista distincta in re.
63 Pro isto est auctoritas Averrois XII Metaphysicae68 ubi dicit:
"Quando fuerit considerata dispositio et dispositum in
immaterialibus etc., tunc reducuntur ad unam intentionem
communem omnino, et nullus modus erit quo praedicatum
distinguitur a subiecto et disposito extra intellectum. Sed nullam
differentiam intelligit intellectus inter ea nisi secundum quod
recipit dispositum et dispositionem ut duo quorum proportio est
ad invicem sicut est proportio praedicati ad subiectum in rebus
compositis". Videtur plane intentio sua quod intellectus non
distinguit ista nisi concipiendo secundum proportionem ad
distincta realiter.
64 Istud confirmatur per exempla. Primum exemplum est quod
supposita unitate formae speciei secundum rem intellectus non
distinguit rationem generis et differentiae quae sunt diversae
rationes nisi comparet ea ad aliqua realiter differentia et
secundum quemdam ordinem illi unicae rei convenientia.69
65 Secundum exemplum est: Ratio boni et veri non distin-
guerentur nisi intelligere et velle distinguerentur et essent circa
aliquod idem obiectum alicubi actus realiter diversi et ad invicem
ordinati.70
66 Tertium exemplum est: Essentia divina non conciperetur ab
intellectu divino sub ratione diversarum idearum circumscripta
omnimoda comparatione ad diversas essentias creaturarum
realiter distinctas. 7i
lIH Averroes, Metaph. XII, com 39 (ed. luntina VIII, 323ra). Scotus hunc
textum secundum Godefridum de Font, citat, cf. Quodl. VII, q. 1 (PhB III, 276).
fl Godefridus de Font,, Quodl. VII, q. 1 (PhB III, 271-2).
Ibid., 272.
" Ibid.
about the right and left side in a column or an animal, or about

the beginning and end point with respect to different lines.38 Now
these perfections in God are distinguished conceptually, however,
real distinctions correspond to them in creatures. Therefore this
conceptual distinction in God is modeled in any intellect upon
what is distinct in reality.
63 For this there is the authority of Averroes in Bk. XII of the
Metaphysics where he says: "When the disposed and its
disposition in immaterial things may have been considered, etc.,
then they are reduced to one intellectual conception [intentio]
absolutely, and in no way will the predicate be distinguished from
the subject and the disposed, except in the intellect. But among
such [immaterial things] the intellect conceives no difference,
except between the disposed and its disposition as two, whose
relationship to one another resembles that of the predicate with
respect to the subject in composite things." His intention seems
clear. The intellect only distinguishes these [immaterial] things
by conceiving them analogically in comparison to things really
distinct.
64 This is confirmed by examples.
The first example is that, given a unity of form in a real
species, the intellect distinguishes genus and difference as diverse
notions only when these are compared to some things where they
really differ and are arranged in a certain order suited to [bring
out their conceptual difference in] that single thing.
65 The second example is: the notions of the good and of the
true would not be distinguished if 'to understand' and 'to will'
were not distinguished, and were not somewhere, as regards
some same object, really distinct acts ordered to one another.
66 The third example is: the divine intellect does not conceive
the divine essence under the aspect of diverse ideas apart from
comparing it with creatures' diverse essences that are really
distinct.
:w It is Henry of Ghent who refers to this analogy of the column and end
point frequently in Quodl. V, q. 1 rather than Godfrey in the Quodl. VII, q. 1
where he deals expressly with how the attributes are distinguished or in Quodl.
XIV, q. 5 (PhB V, 428) or Quodl. XV, q. 3 (PhB XIV, 18-9) where he refers in
passing to this distinction in God.
[5. Instantiae contra opinionem Godefridi]
67 Rationes alias factas contra istam opinionem repetit iste

doctor et nititur respondere. Sed hic non replico nisi duas.72
68 Prima ratio est ista.73 Distinctio secundum rationem
intellectus et voluntatis est fundamentum distinctionis ema-
nationum. Filius enim non procederet nascendo tamquam verbum
et Spiritus Sanctus non spiraretur liberaliter tamquam amor nisi
praesupponeretur distinctio intellectus et voluntatis tamquam
principiorum producendi. Nunc autem distinctio emanationum et
personarum non praesupponit aliquam comparationem ad
creaturas, ergo etc.
69 Secunda ratio est ista.74 Perfectum simpliciter et princi-
paliter habet quidquid sibi convenit secundum quod est
simpliciter perfectum. Hoc probatur. Quia imperfecta dependent
a perfecto, sed non econverso. Nunc autem habere intellectum et
voluntatem et huiusmodi competit simpliciter perfecto ut
simpliciter perfectum est. Ergo ista habet independenter et per
consequens absque comparatione ad extra. Quia si in habendo
ista formaliter necessario compararetur ad extra, videretur in
habendo ista dependere ad extra sicut relativum a correlativo, et
non esset mere absolutum, immo ab eo dependeret sicut
econverso quia correlativa aeque mutuo dependent.
70 Ad primam75 istarum respondet76 sic quod circumscripta
habitudine ad extra illud quod habet rationem principiandi
emanationes personales non apprehenditur sub istis diversis
rationibus intellectus et voluntatis sed solum sub ratione
essentiae divinae ut ei coniungitur respectus realis. Sed quia ipsis
emanationibus secundum quamdam proportionem respondent
Ibid.
73 Henricus Gand., Quodl. V, q, 1 (f. 152rP).
M Henricus Gand., Quodl. V, q. 1 (f. 152rO).
7r> Cf. supra n. 68.
Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 1 (PhB III, 274).
Objections to the opinion of Godfrey
67 This doctor repeats other arguments [of Henry] that militate

against this opinion39 and struggles to reply to them, but I will
cite only two.
68 The first is this: a conceptual distinction of the intellect and
will is the foundation of the distinction of emanations.40 For the
Son would not proceed by being born as the Word,* and the Holy
Spirit proceed freely as love, unless a distinction between the
intellect and will as principles of production* were presupposed.
But this distinction of the emanations and persons* does not
presuppose any comparison to creatures, therefore, etc.
69 The second argument is this: What is simply and primarily
perfect has whatever is needed for it to be perfect in an
unqualified sense. There is a proof for this. For imperfect things
depend upon the perfect, and not vice versa; now to have intellect,
and will, and other attributes of this sort pertains to what is
simply perfect as such. Therefore what is perfect possesses these
independently and hence apart from any comparison to what is
outside of it. For if in having these, the perfect would need to be
compared to something outside of it, the perfect would seem to
depend on what is outside, the way one relative depends upon a
another, and would cease to be purely absolute. Indeed it would
depend upon the other and vice versa, since correlatives are
equally dependent upon one another.
70 To the first of these [objections, n. 68] he responds in this
fashion. Apart from all relationships to what is outside it, that
principle from which these personal emanations stem is not
apprehended under these diverse aspects of intellect and will, but
solely under the aspect of the divine essence insofar as a real
relationship is joined to it. But because some emanations in
creatures correspond to these emanations analogically, for
example, to the emanation of the Son corresponds the production
!9 Godfrey cites and answers six objections raised by Henry of Ghent in

Quodl. V. q. 1, of which Scotus cites two.
40 'Emanation' is a theologically nuanced term used by trinitarians to
express how really distinct persons originate in such a way that they continue to
share in common one and the same individual divine nature and thus do not
compromise the Christo-Judaic monotheistic idea that God is one.
aliquae emanationes in creaturis, puta emanationi Filii productio

verbi in intellectu nostro et productioni Spiritus Sancti productio
amoris in voluntate nostra, ideo Deus apprehendens essentiam
suam ut est ratio principiandi ipsas emanationes in habitudine ad
diversa principia istarum emanationum in creatura, concipit
istam essentiam sub istis rationibus principiandi intellectus et
voluntatis.
71 Quae autem sit ista proportio? Explicat alibi77 quod pro
ductioni naturae et verbi non necessario est alia productio
praesupposita, productioni autem amoris necessario est alia
praesupposita. Filius producitur productione prima, et ideo modo
simili modo productionis naturae et verbi. Spiritus Sanctus
producitur necessario alia productione praesupposita, et ideo
modo simili modo productionis amoris et voluntatis.
72 Quod autem intellectus et voluntas non praesupponantur
distincta secundum rationem ipsis emanationibus, hoc probat
dupliciter. Primo sic.78 Verbum est expressivum omnium quae in
essentia quasi involute continentur. Ergo in Verbo iam producto
intelligit Deus quaecumque distincto intellectu intelligit. Non
ergo potest aliqua actualis distinctio accipi in intellectu divino
quodammodo praecedens productionem Verbi. Antecedens
confirmatur per Augustinum, VI De Trinitate, cap. 2779 ubi dicit
quod 'Verbum est ars Patris plena omni ratione viventium'.
73 Secundo arguitur sic.80 Distinctio secundum rationem non
potest esse nisi per aliquem actum intelligendi. Primus autem
actus intelligendi in Deo est principium emanationis Verbi.
Supposita proprietate relativa, cum Verbum producatur
naturaliter et actu naturali ipsius intellectus, ergo nullo actu
quasi praecedente potest haberi aliqua distinctio rationis ad
intra.
74 Ad secundam rationem81 respondet82 quod quodlibet istorum
quantum ad perfectionem realem quam importat est in Deo sine
Godefridus de Font.. Quodl. VII, q. 5 (PhB III, 298).

Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 1 (Prffe III, 274-5).
August., De Trin. VI, c. 10, n. 11 (CCSL 50, 241; PL 42, 931).
m Godefridus de Font. (PhB III, 275).
81 Cf. supra n. 69.
H2 Godefridus de Font. (PhB III, 275-6).
of the word in our intellect and to the production of the Holy

Spirit the production of love in our will, therefore God
apprehending his essence as a principle producing these
emanations in relationship to the diverse principles from which
such emanations stem in creatures, conceives this essence under
these principles of producing intellect and will.
71 But what is this analogy? He explains elsewhere that a
production of nature and the production of the Word does not
necessarily presuppose any other production, but for love to be
produced, a prior production is necessarily presupposed. The Son
is produced by the first kind of production, and therefore a
production of nature and that of the Word proceed in a similar
manner. The production of the Holy Spirit necessarily
presupposes a prior production [namely, of the Son], and
therefore proceeds in a similar fashion to the way love is
produced and a production of the will occurs.
72 He gives two reasons why these emanations do not
presuppose the intellect and will as conceptually distinct.
Such is his first proof: The Word is expressive of all that is
contained in the essence in a quasi-involute way, so that in the
Word already produced God understands whatever he under
stands by distinct intellection; therefore no actual distinction can
be found in the divine intellect that in any way precedes the
production of the Word. The antecedent is confirmed through
Augustine in chapter 27 of Bk. VI of The Trinity where he says
that the 'Word is the art of the Father full of every living* idea.'
73 Second, he argues in this way. A conceptual distinction can
only come to be through some act of understanding. But the first
act of understanding in God is the principle of the emanation of
the Word. Given a relative property, since the Word may be
produced naturally41 and by a natural* act of the intellect itself,
therefore there is no quasi-prior act that could give rise to any
conceptual distinction internally.
74 To the second argument [n. 69] he responds that each of
these [attributes] so far as any real perfection it imports is
concerned, does exist in God apart from any comparison to what
is outside and thus independently. But if the essence is
41 Naturally, i.e. by a necessary rather than by a free or voluntary action.

25 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I -A
comparatione ad extra et sic independenter. Sed apprehendendo

sic essentiam non apprehendetur sub distinctis rationibus, sed
omnes quae possunt distingui per comparationem ad extra
apprehenduntur tunc ut unitae et indistinctae sub una simplici
ratione infinitatis essentiae divinae.
75 Contra primam83 responsionem arguitur sic. Primo,
quidquid unius rationis exsistens potest esse 'principium quo'
producendi plura supposita in una natura, ipsum non deter-
minatur ex se in ratione principii ad determinatam pluralitatem
producendorum. Ista propositio patet tam in causa aequivoca
quam univoca potente in plura vel simul vel successive. Nunc
autem, per te, essentia omnino unius rationis exsistens antequam
comparetur ad alia extrinseca est principium producendi plura
supposita in natura eadem divina. Ergo ipsa in illo priori non
determinatur ex se ad certam pluralitatem suppositorum
producendorum. Ergo non repugnat sibi, quantum est ex se, esse
'principium quo' producendi plura supposita quam duo. Et si
possibile, ergo necessarium, ergo necesse est plures personas esse
quam tres in divinis.
76 Hic diceretur quod quamvis non repugnat sibi ex se, tamen
repugnat sibi ex relationibus sine quibus non est principium quo.
Non enim potest fundare nisi determinatas relationes producendi
determinatas personas quia istae relationes sunt alterius rationis
et aliquid unum potest determinari ex se ad aliquam pluralitatem
diversorum secundum rationem. Et ideo, licet ex se non
determinetur, tamen determinatur per relationem.
77 Aliter diceretur quod maior est vera quando 'principium quo'
se habet ad productiones plures unius rationis. Quando autem
productiones plures sunt alterius rationis licet producta sint
unius rationis, non habet veritatem, quia ad illas productiones
83 Cf. supra n. 70.

apprehended in this way, it is not perceived under conceptually

distinct notions. Rather all that can be distinguished through
comparison to what is outside is perceived, united and indistinct,
under one simple notion of the divine essence's infinity.
75 [Objections to Godfrey's solution] It is argued thus against
these arguments. Against the first, [n. 70] in this way: any
existing single thing that can be the principle* whereby several
individual subjects are actualized in one nature, is not the sort of
agent that of itself is restricted to producing any definite number
of things. This proposition is evident as regards an equivocal or
uruvocal* cause with power to produce more than one effect
either successively or all at once. But now, according to you,
before being compared to anything beyond itself, the divine
essence, existing exclusively as one simple sort of thing, is a
principle of producing several individual subjects in the same
divine nature. Therefore, initially that essence itself is not limited
to producing only a certain number of subjects. So far as itself is
concerned, therefore, nothing prevents it from being a principle
that produces more than two subjects. And if this is possible, it is
also necessary; hence there must be more than three persons in
what is divine.
76 [Three possible objections] Here it could be objected that
although this is not something repugnant to essence considered
simply in itself nevertheless it is repugnant to it by reason of the
relationships without which it is not a principle whereby
[something is produced]. For [the essence] can be the basis for
only a limited number of relations that produce a limited number
of persons, since these relations are of different sorts, and
something that is simply one can itself be restricted to some
plurality that is conceptually diverse. And therefore, although it
is not of itself delimited, it is still limited through a relation.
77 Or one could object in another way that the major42 is true
when a 'principle whereby' has to do with several productions of
the same kind. But when the several productions are of different
kinds, although their products* are of one kind, the major is not
42 Cf. n. 75: "Any existing single thing that can be the principle whereby
several individual subjects are actualized in one nature, is not the sort of agent
that of itself is restricted to producing any definite number of things."
alterius rationis in determinata pluralitate potest aliquid unum

determinari ex se, et ulterius mediantibus illis ad producta quia
productum non potest produci nisi productione.
78 Diceretur adhuc tertio modo quod personae sunt formaliter
alterius rationis. Quia licet habeant essentiam unius rationis,
tamen constituuntur formaliter relationibus quae sunt alterius
rationis.
79 Sic ergo istae tres responsiones quaerunt quomodo essentia
quae est unius rationis possit determinari ad plura alterius
rationis. Una84 enim responsio dicit ista plura esse relationes in
producentibus. Alia85 dicit ista plura esse ipsas productiones.
Tertia86 dicit ista plura esse relationes personarum productarum.
Quod autem supponitur idem omnino determinari ad certam
pluralitatem eorum quae sunt alterius rationis patet, si oportet
omnem pluralitatem reducere ad unitatem et ab illo uno non sunt
primo infinita.
80 Contra primam responsionem.87 Accipiendo rem strictissime
in divinis prout res relativa dividitur a re absoluta, relationes in
producentibus non sunt realiter distinctae a productionibus
activis, ut suppono ad praesens. Ergo dicere essentiam
determinari ad tot productiones activas per tot relationes alterius
rationis est dicere idem realiter determinare aliquid ad seipsum.
Nec per istas productiones activas determinatur ad tot
productiones passivas quia correlativa sunt omni modo simul
natura88 et per consequens unum non determinat fundamentum
ad reliquum. Praeterea, prima ratio quare aliquid potest
producere est quia habet principium quo productionis. Non enim
B4 Cf. supra n. 76.

Hr> Cf. supra n. 77.
w Cf. supra n. 78.
H7 Cf. supra n. 76.
m Aristot., Praed. c. 7 (76 15).
true, because some one of these could be limited of itself to these

productions of different sorts in a limited plurality, and further,
by means of these [be limited] as to [their] products, for a product
cannot be produced without a production.
78 One could still object, thirdly, that the persons are formally
of different sorts, for although they have one sort of essence,
nevertheless they are formally constituted by different sorts of
relationships.
79 Thus these three responses are seeking to explain how one
simple sort of essence can be limited to producing several things
of different sorts. For one response [n. 76] says that these several
things are relational ways of producing. The other [n. 77] says
these several things are the productions themselves. The third [n.
78] says these several things are the relations of the persons
produced. It is evident, however, that they all presuppose that
something entirely the same is limited to just certain different
sorts of production, if all plurality has to be reduced to one unified
source and its products are not infinite.
80 [Scotus's reply to the objections] Against the first response
[n. 76]. By accepting 'thing' most strictly in the divine so that a
relative thing is set apart from an absolute thing,43 relations in
producing [agents] are not really distinct from active productions,
as I assume for the present. Therefore to say the essence is
restricted to as many active productions as there are different
kinds of relations is to say that the same thing really delimits
something with respect to itself. Nor through these active
productions is it limited to as many passive productions. For
correlatives are in every way simultaneous by nature and as a
consequence one does not determine the foundation for the rest.
Furthermore, the first reason why something can produce is
because it has a principle whereby it can produce. For it is not a
" This is Boethius's definition of 'thing' [res]. He restricts that term

exclusively to substance, quantity,* and quality (the first three of Aristotle's
categories* which are non-relatives); cf. Scotus's Quodl. Q. 3 where he explains
the various equivocal meanings of 'thing': "'Thing' taken in this ... sense,
therefore, means something absolute in contrast to a circumstance or mode which
expresses a way in which one thing is related to another" (n. 3:12, John Duns
Scotus, God and Creatures. The Quodlibetal Questions [Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975], 62).
ipsum principium quod tribuit illam virtutem principio quo, sed

econverso. Ergo quod habens principium quod non possit nisi in
determinatas productiones oportet rationem invenire in principio
quo. Unde est simpliciter possibilitas ad hanc quae est possibilis,
et est simpliciter impossibilitas ad illam quae est omnino
impossibilis. Ergo cum relatio activa nullo modo sit principium
quo nec determinativum eius ut est principium quo, sequitur
quod per rationem relationis nullo modo habebitur per se ratio
possibilitatis ad tertiam personam, nec per se ratio impossibili-
tatis ad quartam personam.
81 Contra secundam89 responsionem sic. Productio non videtur
esse alterius rationis nisi habeat principium alterius rationis vel
terminum formalem quia haec videntur distinguere productiones
formaliter. Nunc autem, per te, principium quo est omnino unius
rationis et terminus formalis similiter, ergo etc.
82 Contra tertiam responsionem90 posset dici quod igneitas ista
per se est determinata ad plures ignes, quia illi ignes quantum ad
proprietates individuales sunt omnino alterius rationis, alia in
numero, licet natura ignis sit in eis unius rationis, et ibi ultima
*) Cf. supra n. 77.

90 Cf. supra n. 78.
'principle which' that gives power to a 'principle whereby,' but

rather the converse is true. Therefore it is necessary to find a
'principle whereby' a 'principle which' can have only limited
productions. Hence there exists an unqualified possibility to
[produce] what is possible, and an unqualified inability to do what
is completely impossible. Since an active relationship is in no way
a 'principle whereby' nor restrictive of such, it follows
consequently that a conceptual relationship in no way explains
per se why a third person is possible or why a fourth person is
impossible.44
81 Against the second response [n. 77] in this way. Production
does not seem to be of another sort unless there is another sort of
principle or formal term, since these seem to be what
distinguishes productions formally. Now, according to you,
however, there is just one sort of principle, and similarly [one]
formal term; therefore etc. 45
82 Against the third response [n. 78] one could say that this
fire-nature per se is delimited to several fires,46 since these fires
as to their individual properties are of completely different sorts,
numerically diverse, although the fire-nature in them is of one
kind.47 And there the ultimate constitutives in their individual
44 Since the divine persons are formally constituted by opposed

relationships, namely, the generator vs. the generated, and the active spiration
(by Father and Son) vs. passive spiration (the Holy Spirit), there is only one
simple absolute entity in God, namely the divine nature or essence which all of
the divine persons share in common. Scotus is arguing that if the divine essence
is both the principle which produces the persons and that whereby they are
produced, something intrinsic to the divine nature itself must explain why more
than one supposit or person exists, and why only a definite number of persons is
possible.
44 If the divine persons are essentially relatives or constituted as pure
relationships, they cannot function as different sorts of principles, and hence do
not explain why the divine essence has two formally distinct types of productions,
one of which presupposes the other.
4,' Scotus's argument from absurdity here is somewhat involved. To claim the
divine essence is limited of itself (per se) to just three really distinct persons,
because each is a different sort of person, though they all have or share the same
essential nature, is as absurd as saying that such is the nature of fire that only a
few individual fires are possible, since each instance is at least individually
different.
47 Scotus presupposes his audience is familiar with his own theory of
haecceity* or individuation, as well as acquainted with Avicenna's observation
constitutiva in esse individuali sunt primo diversa sicut hic, et ita

immo magis hic ubi est una natura in distinctis personaliter
quam ibi ubi est natura in distinctis individualiter.
being48 are primarily diverse,49 as is the case here,50 and so even

more so here,51 where there is one nature in things distinct
that 'quiddity is only quiddity.' Since it is neither one nor many, it has no definite
number. "Hence that equinity is only equinity, for of itself it is neither many nor
one" (Unde ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum, ipsa enim ex se
nec est multa nec unum, Metaph. V, c. 1 [AviL, 228]). Instead of Avicenna's
'equinity' which designates the quiddity or essence of a horse, Scotus uses
'igneity' which is his name for the common nature of fire. Each individual fire, of
course, has its own distinguishing properties, the most basic of which is its
numerical difference or distinct singularity. To that extent each individual's 'this-
ness' (haecceitas from haec = this) is entirely of another sort (omnino alterius
rationis).
iH In the case of two formally identical kinds of fires, the individuating
difference of each twin case is as constitutive of that individual instance as a
specific difference is constitutive of a species or class of identical individuals. In
Aristotelian terminology a difference logically contracts extension of some
broader or more universal notion.
*'J Individuating differences cannot be duplicated or cloned. Each is radically
diverse as to its absolute entity or being, having nothing in common with another
haecceity except the logical way it relates to the respective quiddity or specific
nature, making one this and not that. This raises a question: in what sense can
an haecceity be known as such? As Blane O'Neill and Allan Wolter have noted
elsewhere (see John Duns Scotus, Mary's Architect [Quincy, IL: Franciscan Press,
1993], 28-9), if by "known" we mean "conceptualized," we cannot know any
haecceity as such. "...For all our intellectual concepts are universal, whereas any
given individuating difference is what philosophers call the individual's 'bare
particularity.' Where other individuals are concerned, we know them to be
different, and distinguish one from another, not in terms of their individuating
haecceity, but in terms of what descriptive properties they may have that others
do not. But if haecceity is something positive, it should be knowable to God, at
least, who created it. And there is one instance where each one of us is aware of
individuality, namely, the introspective recognition of our self. T or 'Me' are
proper names we give that self. 'My' is the adjectival word that joins to that bare,
particular, subject-self, whatever I know or can conceive about it. Any true
statement I make about myself, such as 'I exist..' 'I doubt...,' 'I feel...,' or the like,
implies as a pre-condition for its verity, an intuive awareness of my individuality,
my bare particularity. I recognize its identity from day to day. I may lose sight of
it in my absorption in what is about me, for I am object oriented, concerned with
my surroundings. I may blank it from conciousness completely when I fall asleep.
But on awaking I find it has returned, the same T remembered from the time
before I fell asleep, the same T that yesterday was me. All else 'about me' may
have changed, be it the ambient world, or what I see, feel, or introspect about my
self. But my individuality remains undivided in itself, distinct from everything
other than itself. It is that to which the terms T and 'Me' refer."
'>" That is, in the case of the divine persons who are primarily diverse in
reality because of the polar opposition of their constitutive relationships.
*l In a singular created thing, the unique individuating property is
something absolute and is related to the specific nature of that thing, as act is
83 Item secundo sic. Si a est idem b omnino re et ratione,

quidquid convenit a convenit b et econverso, oppositum enim
includit contradictionem. Sed ante omnem respectum essentiae
ad extra intellectus et voluntas sunt omnino idem re et ratione,
per te, ergo in illo priori quidquid convenit uni, et alteri. Sed in
illo priori producuntur personae, per te. Ergo in ista productione
ita est voluntas principium gignendi verbum sicut memoria, et ita
memoria principium spirandi spiritum sanctum sicut voluntas.
Ergo prima persona producta ex productione sua reali non est
proprie verbum quia ratio verbi includit notitiam expressam per
actum memoriae. Unde Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, cap. 36,91
dicit quod "verbum nostrum de nostra scientia nascitur
quemadmodum illud de scientia Patris natum est". Nec ipsa ex
91 August., De Trin. XV, c. 15, n. 24 (CCSL 50A, 497; PL 42, 1077); cf. ibid., c.
14 (CCSL 50A, 496; PL 42, 1076-7).
personally, than there, where there is one nature in things

distinct individually.52
83 Also secondly in this way.53 If a is entirely the same as b
both really and conceptually, whatever pertains to a pertains to b
and vice versa. For the opposite includes a contradiction.54 But
before every relationship of the essence to what is outside it,
intellect and will are entirely the same in reality and
conceptually, according to you,55 therefore in that prior situation
whatever pertains to one pertains to the other. But in that prior
state the persons are produced, according to you. Therefore, in
this production the will is as much a principle of generating the
Word as is the memory,56 and so the memory is as much a
principle of spirating* the Holy Spirit, as is the will. Therefore
the first person produced by his real production is not properly
the Word, because the notion of a word includes knowledge
expressed by an act of the memory.57 Hence Augustine in Bk. XV
of The Trinity, chapter 36 says: "Our word is born from our
knowledge just as that Word was born from the knowledge of the
related to potency. Unlike the specific difference that contracts the generic
nature, the individuating difference contracts the specifically differentiated
nature to just this single instance as an individual. But the unique properties
that really differentiate or individuate the divine persons are pure relationships,
and even more diverse and difficult to understand than Scotus's absolute
differences or haecceities. Rather than actualizing a potentially universal nature
as a really distinct absolute, constituting deity as a 'this,' they share in the same
absolute fully actualized and individuated divine nature, that is already pure act,
according to scholastic theology.
''1 The divine nature according to Scotus has no individuating difference for
it is not potentially universal like fire or equinity, but essentially singular (haec
essentia).
M Namely, in answer to the third response in n. 78.
If they are really and conceptually the same, then (a = b), and if they are
not really or not conceptually the same, then (a * b). The second statement
contradicts the first and is its direct opposite.
M "You" refers to Godfrey, who holds these particular views.
56 According to St. Augustine, it is the Father's intellectual memory that
alone begets the Son, or speaks the Word, and the mutual love of Father and Son
that resides in the will that breathes (spirare) the Holy Spirit (spiratus = breath).
See The Trinity XV, ch. 17, n. 29 (CCSL 50A, 503; PL 42, 1081). See also ibid., ch.
23. n. 43 (CCSL 50A, 520-1; PL 42, 1090).
" Cf. Augustine, The Trinity XV, ch. 21, n. 40 (CCSL 50A, 518; PL 42, 1088);
ibid., ch. 22, n. 42 (CCSL 50A, 519; PL 42, 1089); ibid., ch. 23, n. 42 (CCSL 50A,
520-1; PL 42. 1090).
productione sua reali magis est imago quam Spiritus Sanctus

quia secundum omnes Spiritus Sanctus aeque est similis Patri
sicut Filius et quoad hoc non minus imago. Sed non procedit ut
similis quia non ut notitia a notitia sed ut amor a voluntate.
Similiter Spiritus Sanctus ex processione sua reali non magis erit
donum quam Filius quia ratio doni non competit sibi nisi propter
liberalitatem vel libertatem in suo principio producendi. Et, sicut
iam illatum est, non magis est voluntas principium producendi
ipsum quam memoria ipsa.
84 Ista quae illata sunt videntur contra sanctos esse et
inconvenientia. Unde Augustinus, V De Trinitate, cap. 30,92
assignans primam distinctionem inter Filium et Spiritum
Sanctum quare Spiritus Sanctus non sit Filius dicit quod Spiritus
Sanctus exiit non quomodo natus sed quodmodo datus. Et
Richardus, III De Trinitate,93 diffuse tractat quomodo plenitudo
sapientiae potest esse in una persona, non autem plenitudo
caritatis. Et ideo secunda persona quae producitur per actum
intellectus vel sapientiae producitur ab una, tertia persona quae
producitur per actum voluntatis et caritatis producitur a duabus.
85 Item tertio sic. Productiones Filii et Spiritus Sancti iam
positae in esse non habent discerni in libertate quia et in
creaturis actus voluntarius iam elicitus est quaedam qualitas
naturalis in voluntate sicut intellectio in intellectu. Sed
differentia libertatis quae est hic et ibi est in principiis istorum
actuum. Ergo si est aliqua distinctio in hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus
32 August., De Trin. V, c. 14, n. 15 (CCSL 50, 222; PL 42, 921).

m Richardus de S. Victore, De Trin. III, c. 16 (ed. J. Ribaillier, TPMA VI,
151-2; PL 196, 925-6).
Father." Nor is that which comes from its real production the
Image58 any more than the Holy Spirit, because according to all,
the Holy Spirit is equally similar to the Father as is the Son, and
according to this [opinion] no less an image. But he does not
proceed as similar, because he does not do so as knowledge from
knowledge, but as love from the will. Similarly the Holy Spirit by
his real procession* is no more a 'gift'59 than the Son, because the
notion of 'gift' only pertains to something because of the liberality
or freedom in its principle of production. And, as already has been
inferred, the will is no more a principle of producing it [i.e., the
Holy Spirit] than is the memory itself.
84 These conclusions militate against what Saints60 say and
are unfitting. Hence Augustine in Bk. V of The Trinity, chapter
30, pointing out the first distinction between the Son and the
Holy Spirit, explains why the Holy Spirit is not a son, saying:
"The Holy Spirit comes forth not as something born, but rather as
something given." And Richard of St. Victor in Bk. IIl of The
Trinity treats at length how the fullness of wisdom can be in one
person, but not the fullness of love. And therefore the second
person that is produced by an act of intellect or of wisdom is
produced from one person; the third, which is produced by an act
of the will and out of love, is produced by two persons.
85 Also, thirdly, in this way.61 The productions of the Son and
the Holy Spirit, once given existence, lack any distinction based
on freedom,62 since in creatures as well the voluntary act, once
elicited,63 is a certain quality,* as natural in the will as
intellection in the intellect.64 The difference of liberty which is
here65 and is there,66 is to be found in the principles [or source] of
r* Cf. Augustine, The Trinity VI, ch. 10, n. 11 (CCSL 50, 241; PL 42, 931).
59 Cf. Augustine, The Trinity XV, ch. 18, n. 32 (CCSL 50A, 508; PL 42, 1083).
60 That is the Fathers of the Church.
',1 Against the third response in n. 78.
M That is, that one production is natural, the other production is voluntary
and involves liberty.
1,1 See second note to n. 86 below.
M In creatures both acts in so far as they are accidental qualities that perfect
the intellect and the will represent natural perfections.
w Here, i.e., in the intellectual and voluntary acts of creatures.
'* There, i.e., in the production of the Word by the Father's memory and that
of the Holy Spirit by the love of Father and Son.
libere spiratur et Filius non libere sed naturaliter, oportet hanc

differentiam in principio producendi per se ponere hic et ibi.
Igitur non est idem omni modo indistinctum. Nec valet ista ratio
discerni per relationes quia utrobique relatio aeque naturaliter
respicit relationem oppositam.
86 Rationes94 quibus probat quod distinctio rationis non potest
praecedere Verbi productionem non cogunt. Quod enim dicit95
quod quaecumque Deus intelligit intellectu distincto intelligit
Verbo iam producto videtur esse falsum quia Pater omnem
operationem et productionem secundum omnem modum sibi
possibilem habet a se ut prior est origine Filio, et hoc a se tam
obiective quam elicitive, ita quod sicut Filius non est Patri aliquo
modo principium eliciendi aliquem actum Patris, ita nec est sibi
ratio obiectiva necessario requisita ad aliquem actum eius. Pater
enim tam obiectum quam principium elicitivum omnis operationis
94 Cf. supra n. 72-73.

95 Cf. supra n. 72.
these acts. Therefore, if there is some distinction in the fact that

the Holy Spirit is spirated freely and the Son is not produced
freely but naturally, this difference lies per se in the principle
producing, both here and there. Consequently it67 is not just one
and the same indistinct thing.68 Neither are 'relations' a valid
reason for discernment, because in both cases the relationship is
equally a natural thing with respect to its opposite relationship.69
86 The arguments [in n. 72-73] used to prove that a conceptual
distinction cannot precede the production of the Word are not
cogent. For that, which states [n. 72] that "in the Word already
produced God understands whatever he understands by a distinct
intellection," seems to be false. For, as prior in origin* to the Son,
the Father of himself has every operation and production in every
way it is possible for him to have these. And this he possesses of
himself both objectively and elicitively,70 so that just as the Son is
not in some way a principle the Father requires to elicit an act, so
neither is the Son an objective reason necessarily required for
some act of the Father. For the Father as an elicitive principle
possesses, in himself and of himself, each of his own operations.
Hence if it is possible for the Father to know distinctly these
ideas,*71 or to know his essence under these aspects, 72 then such
K' That is, the principle or divine essence that produces these two distinct
emanations.
m Scotus argues to a formal distinction or non-identity between the divine
intellect and will.
In other words, correlatives are necessarily, not freely or contingently,
interrelated.
70 Webster's dictionary recognizes only the verb form elicit (which means to
draw forth, educe or evoke). For the sake of convenience, in paragraph 85 the
past tense of the verb is used, and here two other grammatical forms, one
adverbial, elicitively (where it has the contextual meaning of "having the ability
or power to elicit an act, an action, an operation or a production") and the
adjectival form elicitive (able to elicit). The meaning of these terms should be
clear to the reader, as they correspond to the two analogous grammatical forms of
evoke in current usage, viz. evocatively and evocative.
" Cf. supra, n. 72 where Godfrey argues: "The Word is expressive of all that
is contained in the essence in a quasi-involute way." This includes God's
archetypal ideas of creatures, as Godfrey's reference to Augustine proves, viz.
The Word is the art of the Father full of every living idea."
72 Godfrey admits this possibility, implicitly at least, since he does not claim
that the production of the Word makes it possible; rather he claims this
production of the Word actualizes this possiblity, something Scotus denies, since
suae habet in se et a se. Ergo si possibile est Patrem nosse

distincte istas rationes sive essentiam sub istis, sic distincte nosse
necessario sibi competit prout est prior origine Filio.
87 Confirmatur hoc per Augustinum, XV De Trinitate, cap.
15:96 'Quaelibet persona sibi meminit, sibi intelligit, sibi diligit'.
Et sicut infert quod si Filius intelligeret Patri, tunc Pater esset
sapiens non de seipso sed de Filio, ita sequitur quod si Pater non
habet in se obiectum omne intellectionis suae de se, non est
sapiens de se sed de Filio quia esse sapientem includit habere in
se obiectum sapientiae. Item cap. 15:97 "Novit omnia Deus
Pater in seipso, novit et in Filio in seipso tamquam seipsum".
Ergo cum ut prior origine Filio novit seipsum, ut sic prior novit
omnia in seipso.
88 Ad rationem eius primam98 pro hac conclusione quod
verbum est expressivum distincte eorum quae quasi involute in
essentia continentur. Et si hoc esset verum, tamen non sequitur
nullam esse intellectionem distinctam ante verbum productum
quia non solum a Patre in se est essentia sed etiam intelligentia
et aeque distinctiva omnium sicut est intelligentia Verbi, immo
H' August., De Trin. XV, c. 7, n. 12 (CCSL 50A, 476-7; PL 42, 1066).

August., De Trin. XV, c. 14, n. 23 (CCSL 50A. 496: PL 42, 1077).
!l8 Cf. supra n. 72.
distinct knowing necessarily pertains to him insofar as he is prior

in origin to the Son.
87 This is confirmed by Augustine in Bk. XV of The Trinity,
chapter 15:73 'Each person remembers for himself, and
understands for himself, and loves for himself.' And just as he
infers that if the Son understood for the Father, then the Father
would not be wise of himself but by reason of the Son. Thus it
would follow that if the Father did not have in himself, and of
himself, every object of his understanding, then he would not be
wise by reason of himself but by reason of his Son.74 For to be wise
includes having in oneself the object of one's wisdom. Also in
chapter 15: "God, the Father, in himself, knows all; and he knows
[all things that are] in his Son, but in himself as himself."
Therefore, since he, as prior in origin to the Son, knows himself,
therefore as prior in this way, he knows all things in himself.
88 As for his first argument [n. 72] for this conclusion that the
Word is expressing distinctly those things which the essence
contains in a quasi-involute way,even if this were true, it would
not follow that there is nothing distinctly understood before the
Word is produced. For it is not only the essence in him that is
from75 the Father, but also the understandingmoreover, the one
that distinguishes everything as well as the understanding of the
Word. Moreover, it is because [something] is distinct in the
understanding of the Father that it is distinctively communicated
Augustine himself makes this abundantly clear again and again in Bk. XV,
chapter 7 of The Trinity, to which Scotus refers in the following paragraph.
n Augustine, The Trinity, XV, ch. 7, n. 12 (CCSL 50A, 476-7; PL 42, 1066).
Scotus summarizes the substance of this long section in the remark that follows
in single quotes. The three key ideas Augustine considers here are memory
(attributed to the Father), understanding (attributed to the Son) and love
(attributed to the Holy Spirit); but lest this attribution be misunderstood and
taken exclusively, consider this remark of Augustine (ibid.): "As the Father
remembers himself and the Son, not by the memory of the Son, but by his own, so
too the Son remembers himself and the Father not by the memory of the Father
but by his own."
74Ci. Augustine, ibid. (CCSL 50A, 475-6; PL 42, 1065).
75 The MSS have "a Patre" (from the Father) as does Alnwick's Additiones
tnugnae. but Henry of Harclay has "in Patre" (in the Father) which is implied,
since he cannot communicate these to the Son unless he has them in himself. See
Summa Fratris Henrici secundum Lecturam Scoti Parisiensem (ed. Klaus
Rodler).
quia distincte sunt in intelligentia patris, ideo sic distincte

communicantur Filio (Mt. 11:[27]): "Omnia mihi tradita sunt a
Patre meo".
89 Quod autem addunt de Augustino quod est ars Patris,
respondeo: sic est ars sicut sapientia Patris. Qualiter autem
intelligendum sit quod sit sapientia Patris Augustinus exponit
VII De Trinitate, cap. 10:" "Ita dicitur Filius sapientia Patris
quomodo dicitur lumen patris, id est quemadmodum lumen de
lumine et utrumque unum lumen, sic sapientia de sapientia et
utraque una sapientia intelligatur". Non est ergo "ars Patris
plena rationum", quasi istae rationes distinctae non sunt in
intelligentia Patris ut Patris, sed ista competunt Filio per
appropriationem propter hoc quod ex vi productionis suae est
notitia declarativa eorum quae habitualiter continentur in
memoria paterna. Intelligentia autem Patris non habet sic
rationem producti, licet ipsa ut improducta distincte in se habeat
rationes omnium cognoscendorum.
90 Ad secundam rationem.i00 Illud quod accipit, quod primus
actus intelligendi in divinis est principium producendi verbum,
est falsum dupliciter. Primo, quia nullus actus proprie est
principium producendi verbum. Secundo, quia non primus actus
intelligendi. Probatio primi. Quia aut ipse intelligit actum
intelligendi esse principium quo producendi verbum, aut
principium quasi actum principiativum sive productivum. Sive
39 August., De Trin. VII, c. 1, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 249; PL 42, 936).

ioo Cf. supra n. 73.
to the Son. Matthew 11: "Everything has been given over to me by

my Father."76
89 But to what they77 add about Augustine,78 that "[the Word]79
is the art of the Father," I respond. He is art in the way that he is
the wisdom of the Father. How one must understand that he is
the wisdom of the Father, however, Augustine explains in Bk. VII
of The Trinity, chapter 10: "The Son is said to be the wisdom of
the Father in the way he is said to be the light of the Father, that
is, 'light from light, and both are one light.' And so wisdom from
wisdom is to be understood as one wisdom." Hence [the Word] is
not the "art of the Father filled with ideas" as if these distinct
ideas are not in the intelligence of the Father as Father. Rather
these pertain to the Son by appropriation,* for this reason: by
virtue of his production this is knowledge that declares what is
habitually contained in the paternal memory. But the
understanding of the Father does not have in this way the formal
aspect of something produced,80 although as not-produced it has
distinctly in itself the ideas of all to be known.
90 To the second argument [n. 73]: its assumption that the first
act of understanding in the divine is a principle of producing the
Word, is doubly false. First, because the principle producing the
Word is not an act, properly speaking.81 Secondly, because it is
not the first act of understanding. Proof of the first.82 For either
he83 thinks the act of understanding is a 'principle whereby' the
Word is produced, or a principle as a quasi-principiative* or
productive act. Whether it be the first or second way, since every
7,; Mt. 11:27.

77 Godfrey and those who accept his opinion.
7H Cf. above, n. 72, and second note to n. 72 (Latin).
79 Cf. first note to n. 72 above (Latin). In this passage Godfrey uses the
expression "the Word is the art of the Father full of all living [reasons]."
H The Latin reads: "Intelligentia autem Patris non habet sic rationem
producti." This seems to refer to the fact that the Father's distinct understanding
of things is not something produced by begetting the Son, and to that extent is
unproduced.
H1 Understanding, of any sort, is considered to be an act of knowing or of
speaking the Word. The divine intellect is the principle whereby God
understands. According to the scholastics it is an active potency; the same is true
of the Father's memory which is the principle of producing or speaking the Word.
M That is, the act of understanding is not itself a productive principle.
m Godfrey of Fontaines.
primo modo sive secundo, cum omne intelligere sit ipsius

intelligentiae, secundum Augustinum, XIV De Trinitate, cap.
15:101 'Dico intelligentiam qua intelligimus', producere autem
verbum et habere principium formale producendi non convenit
intelligentiae sed memoriae, ergo neutro modo est aliquis actus
intelligendi principium. Hoc autem amplius patebit infra ubi
declarabitur quod dicere non est aliquod intelligere, nec etiam
intellectio aliqua est formalis ratio exprimendi verbum.
Secundum patet ex dictis. Quia actum producendi Verbum
praecedit origine intellectio distincta Patris ut Patris.
91 Cum arguit quod naturaliter producitur per actum
intellectus, ergo primo actu intelligendi, non sequitur quia
quorumcumque actuum intellectus est principium, omnium
eorum est principium per modum naturae. Vel potest dici quod
licet iste sit primus actus intellectus productivus, non tamen
primus actus intelligendi, ut est in Patre.
92 Contra responsionem ad secundam.102 Cum dicit quod illud
quod importatur perfectionis per ista est in Deo absque
comparatione ad extra, quaero an illud quod importatur
formaliter per rationem intellectus et illud quod formaliter
importatur per rationem voluntatis sit in Deo absque omni tali
comparatione. Si non, ergo intellectus secundum rationem suam
formalem non est perfectio simpliciter, nec voluntas nec aliquid
aliorum, et sequitur quod non sit nisi unica perfectio simpliciter,
"ll August., De Trin. XIV, c. 7, n. 10 (CCSL 50A, 435; PL 42, 1044).

102 Cf. supra n. 69, 74.
act of thinking pertains to the understanding, according to

Augustine, Bk. XIV of The Trinity, chapter 15 ("I call
understanding' that whereby we are perceiving intellectually"),
but to produce the Word and to have a formal principle of
producing is not something that pertains to understanding but to
memory;84 therefore in neither way is some act of understanding
a principle. This will be made clearer later, where it will be shown
that 'to say' is not the same as 'to understand,' nor is the formal
principle for speaking* the word some intellection.85 The second86
is evident from what has been said. Because the distinct
intellection of the Father as Father precedes in origin the act of
producing the Word.
91 For when he argues that [the Word] is produced naturally
by an act of the intellect, and hence, by the first act of
understanding, this does not follow. For the principle of any act of
the intellect whatsoever, is the sort of principle that acts in the
way nature does.87 Or it could be said that although this is the
first productive act of the intellect, nevertheless it is not the first
act of understanding that is in the Father.
92 Against the response to the second, [n. 69 and 74] when it is
said that 'whatever there is about these88 that implies perfection,
exists in God apart from any comparison to what is outside,' I ask:
Is what the concept of intellect formally imports and that which
the notion of will formally imports something that exists in God
prior to any such comparison? If not, then 'intellect' according to
its formal meaning is not a pure* perfection, nor is 'will' or any of
the other [attributes]. And it follows that there is but one sole
H1 Cf. De Trin. XV, ch. 23, n. 43, where Augustine points out that memory
pertains to the Father, understanding to the Son and love to the Holy Spirit.
Understanding is formed from the memory; "it is a word spoken from the heart
that belongs to no language." Cf. above note four to n. 83.
85 See below, Dist. 27, p. II, q. 1, n. 59fT.
w' Namely, the second reason why Godfrey's assumption is false is that the
production of the Word is not the Father's first act of understanding.
Scotus holds that there are two basic ways a principle can act, either
necessarily as nature or freely as will. A natural principle does not presuppose
any other and acts immediately, whereas a voluntary act presupposes a prior act
on the part of the agent, namely, knowledge. Godfrey, recall, stresses that the
logical distinction between intellect and will in God is that the second principle
presupposes the first.
M Namely, intellect and will in God.
sola scilicet essentia divina. Probatio consequentiae. Quia

simpliciter perfectum non est tale formaliter sed tantum
virtualiter, et ipsum est simpliciter quodlibet quod est melius
ipsum quam non ipsum. Ergo simpliciter melius est esse non
intelligentem formaliter quam intelligentem. Sequitur ergo quod
esse intelligentem formaliter non sit perfectio simpliciter, et sic
de aliis. Consequens est falsum et contra Anselmum, Monologion
15 103 UDi ponit regulam de his quae concedenda sunt proprie de
Deo, quod illud removendum est ab ipso quidquid non menus est
ipsum quam non ipsum. Cuiusmodi sunt plura, secundum eum
ibidem, et Augustinum, XV De Trinitate, cap. 5:104 'Viventia non
viventibus etc. praeferenda iudicamus, ac per hoc, quoniam in
rebus creatis creatorem sine dubitatione praeponimus, oportet
eum et summe vivere et intelligere et esse spiritum
potentissimum, iustissimum', etc. Si concedatur quod intellectus
secundum suam rationem formalem est in Deo absque
comparatione ad extra et voluntas similiter secundum suam
rationem formalem, cum intellectus sit tantum formaliter
intellectus et voluntas formaliter tantum voluntas, sicut dicit
Avicenna, V Metaphysicae,105 "humanitas est tantum humanitas",
sequitur tunc quod absque comparatione ad extra est aliqua
distinctio eorum.
93 Et confirmatur istud. Quia licet aliqua virtualiter contenta
in aliquo non distinguantur quia potentia non distinguit, tamen si
sint in eo formaliter et actualiter, cum actus separet et distinguat,
VII Metaphysicae,106 habebunt aliquam distinctionem. Quod si
aliam ulteriorem habeant ex collatione intellectus ad extra, de
ista non curo. Sufficit quod non sint omnino indistincta re et
ratione absque comparatione ad extra.
10:1 Anselmus, Monologion c. 15 (ed. F.S. Schmitt I, 28; PL 158, 163).

1 August., De Trin. XV, c. 4, n. 6 (CCSL 50A, 467-8; PL 42, 1061).
"1r, Avicenna, Metaph. V, c. 1 (AviL, 228).
106 Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 13 (1039a 7).
pure perfection, namely, the divine essence. Proof of the

implication. For what is simply perfect is not such89 formally but
only virtually, and that is simply whatever it is better to be than
not to be. Therefore it is simply better not to be formally
intelligent than intelligent. It follows, therefore, that to be
formally intelligent is not a pure perfection, and the same with
the other [attributes]. The consequent is false and against what
Anselm says in the Monologion, ch. 15, where he sets down the
rule about these [perfections] which must be conceded to be
properly in God. For whatever is not simply 'better to have than
not to have' must be removed from him. Several things are of this
sort according to him, in the same work, and according to
Augustine, Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 5: "Living, rather than
not living, etc. we judge must be preferred, and because we
without doubt prefer the Creator to created things, he must in the
highest sense live and understand, and be the most powerful
spirit, and most just, etc." If one concedes that the intellect
according to its formal notion is in God apart from any
comparison to what is outside, and likewise the will according to
its formal notion, since intellect is only formally intellect and will
only formally will, as, according to Avicenna, Metaphysics, Bk.
V,90 "humanity is only humanity," it follows then that without any
external comparison there is some distinction between them.
93 And this is confirmed, because although some things
virtually contained in something are not distinguished, for
potency9i does not distinguish, nevertheless if these are formally
and actually in it, since acts are separated and distinguished
according to Bk. VII of the Metaphysics, they have some
distinction. And I am not concerned whether in addition there is
another distinction based upon the intellect by comparing them to
what is outside. It suffices that they are not entirely indistinct in
reality and conceptually without comparing them to what is
outside.92
8!l Namely, intelligent, endowed with free will,* wise, etc.

90 See second note to n. 82.
9i That is, what is only potentially two is not distinguished.
92 Scotus considers them to be formally non-identical a parte rei.
94 Item, ista comparatio ad extra quae est relatio rationis non

facit per se unum conceptum cum ipsa essentia divina quia etiam
relatio realis, de qua magis videretur, non facit per se conceptum
unum cum fundamento. Ergo si totum istud "essentia sub
relatione rationis" dicit per se scibile de Deo, non erit per se
scibile nisi ratione alterius partis, non ratione essentiae, quia
omnino idem conceptus non scitur per se de seipso. Ergo tantum
scietur de Deo ratione relationis rationis. Sed ista non est
perfectio simpliciter quia ista est simul natura cum termino. Ergo
nulla perfectio simpliciter de Deo scietur.
95 Item tertio sic. Comparari ad extra convenit intellectui ut
est intellectus formaliter, et non ut est indistinctus re et ratione
ab essentia, quia tunc essentia compararetur ad extra. Ergo
impossibile est per actum comparandi haberi formalem rationem
intellectus ut intellectus. Consequentia patet quia ratio formalis
potentiae non habetur per actum eius sed econverso magis.
94 Also, this comparison to what is outside, which is a

conceptual relation, does not result in a concept that is one per se
with the divine essence itself. For even a real relation,* of which
more might be expected, does not make for a concept that is per
se one with its foundation. Therefore if this whole 'the essence
conceived of as related' stands for 'scientifically knowable of God
per se,' it will only be per se knowable by reason of the other
term, not by reason of the essence; for one concept that is entirely
the same is not known per se scientifically of itself. Therefore,
scientific knowledge about God is only possible by reason of a
conceptual relation. But a conceptual relation is not a pure
perfection because it is simultaneous by nature with its term.
Therefore no pure perfection will be scientifically known of God.
95 Also thirdly in this way. To be compared to what is outside
is something that pertains to the intellect qua formally intellect,
and not qua really and conceptually indistinct from the essence,
for then it would be the essence that is compared to what is
outside. Therefore it is impossible for the act of comparing to
produce a formal notion of intellect qua intellect [as Godfrey
maintains].93 The implication is evident, because the formal
notion of what is possible [potentia] is not obtained from its
actualization, but rather the converse.94
Cf. above n. 92: "Whatever there is about intellect and will that implies
perfection exists in God apart from any comparison to what is outside." Scotus
argues that this contradicts Godfrey's basic thesis in n. 57, viz. "What the divine
intellect by one simple concept can apprehend actually and distinctly, the
intellect of the pilgrim can conceive by several distinct acts," but only when the
essence is compared to what is outside. For "he postulates that it is impossible for
any intellect divine or otherwise to conceive a simple essence under these distinct
aspects unless it compares it to several other things, or conversely unless several
other things are compared to it" (n. 57). But the act of comparison itself does not
cause what is simply perfection about intelligence, but not about animality, to
exist in God unless the divine essence as such includes intelligence as such but
not animality. Yet God himself perceives actually and distinctly, by his one
simple concept of the essence, intelligence apart from animality; yet both these
are virtually there in the sense that God can create these perfections, but only
intelligence and not animality is there formally
'M That is to say, the idea of what can be or what is possible is not derived
from the fact that it actually exists.
96 Ad rationes quas adducunt pro se, respondeo quod non

cogunt. Ad primam.107 Cum dicit, improbando rationem datam
ubi est tota vis responsionis, quod comparata per intellectum ut
distincta non supponuntur distinctionem habere, haec propositio
est falsa. Probatio. Possibile est intellectum per aliquem actum
comparare aliquid ad aliud primo, intelligendo sic, quod nec ista
prius sint comparata ex natura rei nec per actum priorem
intellectus. Et primum patet quia alioquin nulla possent
comparari per intellectum nisi habentia comparationem realem.
Et secundum patet quia alioquin ante omnem actum intellectus
comparandi praecederet alius, et sic in infinitum. Sed ante illam
comparationem primam non supponitur in comparatis relatio
rationis quia tunc ista non esset prima comparatio eorum
secundum rationem. Ista autem comparatio eorum est secundum
istam relationem rationis. Ergo aliqua comparatio aliquorum ut
mutuo se respicientium secundum habitudinem rationis non
praesupponit in comparatis aliquam relationem rationis quia
omnis differentia rationis proprie loquendo est secundum
relationes rationis. Intellectus non potest causare in rebus
differentias secundum absoluta sed tantum secundum relationes
quas causat in obiecto per actum considerandi.
97 Probationem suam de relativis108 realiter duco ad oppositum
sic. Relationes reales oppositae vel relativa ut relativa non prius
habent differentiam realem quam comparentur ut mutuo se
respicientia realiter quia ipsa comparatio realis eorum est ipsa
realis differentia eorum. Ergo a simili relationes rationis
oppositae vel relativa ut relativa non prius habent differentiam
rationis quam comparentur mutuo secundum rationem. Patet
igitur quod non valet eius probatio de rebus absolutis quia res
absolutae non includunt de se respectum, et ideo possunt habere
differentiam priorem comparatione ipsorum. Sed alia entia
107 Cf. supra n. 60-61.

1oH Cf. supra n. 60.
% To the arguments that are adduced for this [opinion]95 I

reply: they are not cogent.
To the first, [n. 60-61] When it is said, in refutation of the
argument given where it is the total force of the response, that
things compared through the intellect as distinct are not
supposed to have a distinction, this proposition is false. Proof.
It is possible for the intellect through some act to compare one
thing to another thing primarily, by understanding it in such a
way that these are neither compared beforehand from the nature
of a thing nor through a prior act of the intellect. The first is
evident, because otherwise the intellect could only compare
things where a real comparison could be made. And the second is
evident because otherwise before every act of the intellect in
comparing there would be another act that would have preceded
it, and so ad infinitum. But before that first comparison a
conceptual relationship in the things compared is not assumed,
for then this would not be the first comparison of them
conceptually. But this is a comparison of them according to this
conceptual relationship. Therefore some comparison of some
things as mutually related conceptually does not presuppose some
conceptual relationship in the things compared, because every
conceptual difference properly speaking is according to
relationships that are conceptual. The intellect cannot cause in
things absolute differences but only relational ones which it
causes in the object through the act of considering.
97 His proof about real relatives [n. 60] I turn against him in
this way. Real relations that are opposed or relatives qua
relatives do not first have a real difference before they are
compared as mutually regarding one another really, because the
real comparison of them itself is that real difference itself that
they have. Therefore in like manner conceptual relations that are
opposed or related things as related do not first have a conceptual
difference before they are mutually compared conceptually. It is
evident therefore that his proof of absolute things is not valid,
because absolute things do not include of themselves a
relationship, and therefore they can have a difference prior to a
95 These arguments of Godfrey are those directed against Henry of Ghent's

opinion.
rationis inquantum talia entia rationis includunt respectum

rationis, et ideo differentia prima eorum ut sic est comparatio
eorum secundum rationem.
98 Et propterea illa propositio de absolutis rebus109 uni-
versaliter accepta est falsa. Quia licet in multis distinctio
absoluta praecedat relationem realem, non tamen in omnibus
quia non in personis, secundum ipsum et secundum alios
communiter, quia ibi prima differentia est secundum relationes.
Si autem hoc est possibile quod aliqua differentia relativorum sit
prima per relationes reales absque omni distinctione priore,
multo magis est hoc possibile secundum relationes rationis sive in
relativis secundum rationem quorum omnis differentia est
secundum relationem.
99 Item, si maior ista quae iam improbata est110 esset vera,
adhuc non sequitur conclusio. Quia si ista comparatio esset actus
reflexivus secundum relationes rationis prius causatas in obiecto,
possent istae relationes in essentia esse per actum alium rationis
priorem, et tunc non sequitur quod essent in essentia ex natura
rei.
100 Quod etiam addit,111 quod illa sic exsistentia in intellectu
divino moverent intellectum divinum ad comparandum se, falsum
est quia nec relationes reales quae sunt in essentia ex natura rei
movent intellectum divinum ad cognoscendum se, sed sola
essentia divina movet intellectum divinum ad quaecumque
cognoscenda.
101 Ad secundam rationem112 quae communis est quaero, aut
aliqua est distinctio rationis in eadem re cui non concordet
distinctio realis in aliis, aut non. Si non, ergo maior illa absolute
infert istam quod omnis differentia rationis sumitur per
comparationem ad distincta re, et tunc patet quod in maiore
petitur conclusio et est neganda a negante conclusionem. Si sic,
ergo idem potest concipi sub distincta ratione absque omni
comparatione ad plura.
109 Cf. supra n. 61.

1 1 1 Cf. supra n. 60.
comparison of them. But other conceptual things as such include

a conceptual relationship, and therefore the first difference they
have as such is a conceptual comparison of them.
98 Therefore that proposition about absolute things [n. 61]
universally taken is false. Because although in many things an
absolute distinction precedes a real relation, it is not true in all
things because it is not true of [the divine] persons, according to
him and according to others generally, because there the first
difference is according to relations.96 If however it is possible that
some difference of real relatives is first without any prior
distinction, all the more is it possible for this to be the case with
conceptual relatives where every difference is relational.
99 Also if this major which already was disproved [n. 97] were
true, the conclusion would not follow. For if this comparison were
a reflexive act about conceptual relations first caused in the
object, these relations in the essence could be through a prior
conceptual act, and then it would not follow that they are in the
essence from the nature* of the thing.
100 What is also added, [n. 60] that 'these things existing in this
way in the divine intellect would move the divine intellect to
comparison of itself,' is false because neither real relations in the
essence by their real nature move the divine intellect to know
themselves, for only the divine essence moves the divine intellect
to whatever can be known.
101 To the second reason which is commonly held, [n.67] I ask:
either there is some conceptual distinction in the same thing to
which there does not correspond a real distinction in anything
else, or this is not the case. If it is not, then this major absolutely
implies this 'every conceptual distinction is drawn from a
comparison to a really distinct thing,' and then it is evident that
the conclusion is begged in the major and it must be denied by
denying the conclusion. If it is so [viz. that no real distinction
corresponds to the conceptual distinction], therefore the same
thing can be conceived under conceptually distinct aspects
without any comparison to any more things.
% This represents Scotus's own revised view of how the divine persons are
constituted.
102 Item, ad hoc quod obiectum concipiatur sub aliqua ratione

quae non dicit respectum ad aliud non oportet obiectum ipsum
comparari ad aliud. Sed non omnis relatio rationis dicit
respectum obiecti ad aliud extra quia tunc nulla posset esse
distinctio rationis nisi inter distincta realiter, et per consequens
relatio identitatis non esset relatio rationis, ergo etc. Maior patet
quia obiectum cum intellectu sufficit ad omnem conceptum qui
non est comparativus eius ad aliquid extra. Ista ergo ratio
evidentiam habet de intellectu nostro qui non concipit rationes
distinctas in Deo nisi ex distinctis rebus in creaturis, sed non
habet evidentiam de illo intellectu qui potest intelligere obiectum
in se et ex plenitudine virtualitatis eius cognoscere omnes
rationes eius circa ipsum.
103 Ad auctoritatem Averrois responsionem quaere alibi.113
104 Ad exempla quae adducit pro se.114 Ad illud de genere et
differentia ubi natura speciei est simplex, illud simpliciter
manifeste concludit oppositum. Si aliquis esset intellectus qui
cognosceret quiditatem speciei non ex posterioribus, iste
intellectus cognosceret rationem generis et differentiae quae
pertinent ad quiditatem speciei absque omni comparatione ad alia
posteriora quae secundum ordinem conveniunt illi naturae tali;
nam talis intellectus non dependet a posterioribus in cognoscendo
priora. Licet ergo intellectus noster ex quibusdam accidentibus
ordinate convenientibus ipsi speciei concipiat rationem generis et
differentiae, tamen prima distinctio rationis inter conceptum
generis et differentiae non est per comparationem ad illa
posteriora, sicut nec prima cognitio quod quid est est per
comparationem ad accidentia. Istud etiam exemplum nimis
extendit differentiam rationis. Quia ratio generis et differentiae,
licet non distinguantur re in natura simplici, tamen non
Cf. supra n. 63.

Cf. supra n. 64.
102 Also, in order that the object may be conceived under some
aspect which does not assert a relationship to another, it is not
necessary for the object to be compared to another. Not every
conceptual relation, however, implies a relationship of the object
to another outside thing, for then there could only be a conceptual
distinction between things that are really distinct. And
consequently, the relationship of identity* would not be a
conceptual relation, therefore etc. The major is evident, because
the object with the intellect suffices for every concept which is not
based on a comparison of the object to something outside of it.
Therefore this argument has its evidential force regarding our
intellect which does not conceive distinct notions in God except
based on things distinct in creatures, but it has no evidential
force whatsoever regarding that intellect which can know the
object in itself, and from the fullness of what it virtually contains
can know everything about it.
103 To the authority of Averroes look for the reply elsewhere,
[n. 63]
104 To the examples which he adduces for it. [n. 64]
To that about the genus and difference where the nature of
the species is simple, it obviously implies the very opposite. If
there would be some intellect that knew the quiddity of the
species not a posteriori* this intellect would know the idea of the
genus and of the difference which pertain to the quiddity of the
species without any comparison to other posterior things which
fall under such a nature in an orderly way. For such an intellect
would not depend upon what is posterior to know what is prior.
Therefore, although our intellect conceives the notion of the
genus and of the species from certain accidents that appertain in
an orderly way to that species itself, nevertheless the first
conceptual distinction between genus and difference is not
through a comparison to these posterior things, just as the first
knowledge of 'what a thing is' is not based on a comparison to
accidents. Also that example extends the idea of a conceptual
distinction too far. For the notions of genus and difference,
although they are not distinguished in reality where a nature is
simple, at the same time are not distinguished precisely by the
mind, that is by conceptual relationships through which they are
distinguuntur praecise ratione, hoc est relationibus rationis

quibus comparantur ad invicem, quae distinctio proprie dicitur
differentia rationis.
105 Ad aliud exemplum de vero et bono.115 Secundum illam
acceptionem eius verum dicit rationem manifestativi sui ad
intellectum, bonum autem dicit rationem allectivi affectus ad
seipsum. Istae ergo rationes, si distinguerentur per com-
parationem ad extrinseca, distinguerentur primo per respectum
ad intellectum et voluntatem quia illa primo respiciunt. Sed
secundum multos nusquam est differentia intellectus et
voluntatis realis, aut saltem si in creaturis est, in Deo non est, et
ibi essent istae relationes vel rationes obiective. Quia si
intellectus et voluntas distinguuntur, tamen istae rationes sunt
priores naturaliter rationibus intellectus et voluntatis, et
intellectui qui non accipit cognitionem a posterioribus essent istae
rationes prius notae.
106 Ad tertium exemplum de ideis116 patet quod non est ad
propositum quia nec ratio unius ideae potest intelligi sine
respectu ad extra. Quod ergo rationes distinctarum idearum non
possent accipi sine respectu ad extra non est propter
distinctionem rationum sed quia quaelibet idea dicit respectum
ad extra. Per oppositum est hic ubi nulla una ratio dicit
respectum ad extra, et ideo prima distinctio illorum potest haberi
sine tali respectu.
107 Quantum igitur ad istum articulum concedo quod absque
omni comparatione essentiae divinae ad extra potest in Deo
haberi non tantum conceptus quiditativus sive essentiae sub
ratione essentiae, verum etiam alii quasi denominativi, non
tantum personalium et notionalium sed etiam omnium
perfectionum simpliciter. Quarum conceptus distincti non
11r' Cf. supra n. 65.

1 1 Cf. supra n. 66.
compared to one another, which is what a conceptual distinction

is properly said to be.
105 To the other example about the true and the good. [n. 65]
According to what he conceives true to be, it expresses the idea of
manifesting itself to the intellect. But the good implies an
enticing affection for itself. These notions therefore, if they were
distinguished by reason of a comparison to something extrinsic,
would be distinguished primarily by a relationship to the intellect
and will, since they regard these primarily. But according to
many nowhere is the difference between intellect and will a real
distinction, or at least if there is such in creatures, there is no
such difference in God, which is where these relations or notions97
would be objectively. And if the intellect and will are
distinguished, nevertheless these notions [viz. true and good] are
naturally prior to the concepts of intellect and will, and to an
intellect which does not get its knowledge from what is posterior,
these notions would be known beforehand.98
106 Regarding the third example about the ideas [n. 66] it is
evident that it is not relevant to what is proposed, for the very
notion of an idea cannot be understood apart from a relationship
to something outside. Therefore the reason why distinct ideas
could not be without their relationship to something outside is not
because of a conceptual distinction, but because each idea asserts
a relationship to something outside. But the opposite occurs here
where there is nothing implying a relationship to what is outside
and therefore the first distinction of these can be had without
such a relationship.
107 [Scotus's personal view] Therefore so far as this [third]
article is concerned,99 I concede that without comparing the
divine essence in God to anything outside one can have not only a
quidditative concept of the essence qua essence, but also other
quasi-derivative concepts: not only of the personal and notional,*
but also of all pure or unqualified perfections. For these distinct
concepts, no intellectual knowledge comparing something to what
97 Namely, of true and good.

nH This could refer to God, the blessed in heaven or angels.
99 Namely, can God be conceived under several distinct notions distinct from
notion of his essence.
requirunt aliquod intellectum per comparationem ad extra, immo

conceptus includens respectum ad extra non est per se conceptus
perfectionis simpliciter.
[Articulus 4
Quis ordo sit inter illas rationes]
108 Quantum ad quartum articulum principalem dicitur quod

scientia habens Deum pro primo obiecto est scientia specialis et
per consequens habebit subiectum speciale et sub ratione speciali.
Haec autem ratio ponitur ista, scilicet ut est principium nostrae
reparationis et consummatio nostrae glorificationis.117 Pro hac
opinione ponitur ratio talis. Sub illa ratione aliquid est subiectum
in scientia sub qua ratione principaliter intenditur eius cognitio
in illa scientia. Sed ratio praedicta, scilicet ut principium nostrae
reparationis et consummatio nostrae glorificationis, est
huiusmodi, ergo etc.
109 Cum hac opinione concordat illa quae dicit quod Deus sub
ratione boni est primum subiectum in scientia ista.118
Quod sic probatur. Ratio boni est ratio nobilissima. Quia
ratio boni est ratio finis, et ratio finis est ratio nobilissima. Quia
secundum Avicennam VI Metaphysicae:119 'Si de singulis causis
esset scientia, illa de causa finali esset principalior'. Multis aliis
modis possent assignari rationes sub quibus poneretur Deus
primum subiectum ad probandum Deum esse primum subiectum.
110 Contra omnes istas opiniones duplex est via, una probando
istam affirmativam quod Deus sub ratione Deitatis est primum
subiectum huius scientiae, alia probando istam negativam quod
Deus non est subiectum sub aliis rationibus quae assignantur.
111 Primum probatur tripliciter.
Primo sic. Sub illa ratione Deus est subiectum primum
scientiae primae sub qua primo continet virtualiter omnes
veritates scibiles de Deo. Sed huiusmodi est ratio essentiae
117 Cf. Hugo de S. Victore, De sacramentis christianae fidei, prol., c. 2 (PL

176, 183).
liH Henricus Gand., Quodl. I, q. 1 (f. 1A); Summa a. 22, q. 4 (I, f. 133R).
llD Avicenna, Metaph. VI, c. 5 (AviL, 348). Avicenna citatur secundum
Guillelmum de Ware. Sent., prol., q. 5 in corp. (Cod. Florent. nat. A42, f. 5vab).
is outside is required. Indeed a concept that includes a

relationship to what is outside is not the per se concept of a pure
or unqualified perfection.i00
Article Four
What order exists among such concepts?
108 [The opinion of others] As for the fourth main article somei0i
say that the science which has God as its first object is a special
science and hence has a special subject treated under a special
aspect. They propose as subject 'God as the source of our
reparation and the fulfillment of our glorification.' The reason
given for this opinion is that the subject of a science must be
something that primarily inspires one to know about it. But such
is aforesaid reason, namely, the source of our reparation and the
fulfillment of our glorification; therefore etc.
109 In agreement with this opinion is the view that God under
the aspect of the good is the first subject in this science. Proof
that this is so: the notion of the good is the most noble conception.
For the notion of the good is the notion of our raison d'etre, and
that is the noblest conception of all. For according to Avicenna in
Bk. VI of his Metaphysics, 'If there were a science that dealt with
single causes, that about the final cause would be the best.' In
many other ways reasons could be given proving that God under
other aspects should be considered as first subject.
1 10 [Refutation of the opinion of others] There is a double way to
refute all of these opinions: one by proving the affirmative
statement "God under the aspect of deity is the first subject of
this science"; the other by proving this negative statement "God is
not the subject under any of the other aspects adduced."
111 [The positive proof] The first [i.e. the affirmative way] is
proved in triple way.
First in this way. God is the first subject of the first science
under that aspect the notion of which primarily contains virtually
i00 All the perfections of the divine essence are pure or unqualified and exist
there in an infinite degree.
i0i In the Prologue to the Ordinatio (ed. Vat. I, 92-3) Scotus cites a number
of specific cases.
divinae sive Deitatis, ergo etc. Maior patet ex dictis in secundo

articulo.120 Minor patet et probatur sic. Qualis ordo realis esset
inter aliqua si essent distincta realiter, talis est ordo eorum
secundum rationem, ubi sunt distincta secundum rationem.121
Ista probatur. Quia ordo distinctorum secundum rationem non
concluditur nisi ex ordine qui natus esset competere illis
secundum rem si essent distincta realiter. Nunc autem si
intrinseca essent distincta realiter ab essentia divina, omnino
primum esset ipsa divina essentia et reliqua omnia quasi
passiones et accidentia ipsius essentiae. Ergo si est ibi distinctio
rationis, omnino primum erit ipsa essentia sub ratione essentiae.
112 Secundo sic. Cognitio quod quid est est omnino prima, ex
VII Metaphysicae.122 Et sicut absolute cognitio quid est est prior
omni cognitione aliorum, ita in eodem cognitio 'quid est eiusdem'
est cognitio eius prima et omnino perfectissima. Ergo illa est
maxime virtualiter contentiva omnium cognoscibilium de illo
cuius est. Consequentia patet quia continere virtualiter omnia
cognoscibilia convenit perfectiori cognoscibili.
113 Tertio sic. Sub eadem ratione Deus est primum obiectum
intellectus sui et primae scientiae possibilis haberi de ipso. Est
autem primum obiectum intellectus sui sub ratione essentiae,
ergo etc. Maior probatur. Quia est primum obiectum intellectus
sui sub ratione illa sub qua continet virtualiter cognitionem
omnium cognoscibilium de ipso, ideo movet intellectum suum ad
rationem omnium cognoscibilium in illa scientia. Sub illa autem
ratione sub qua continet omnia est primum obiectum primae
l*l Cf. supra n. 15-17.

121 V addit (cf. Add. M.): ubi esse reale tollatur praecise propter esse
diminutum prioris, ut si illud quod est prius habeat esse secundum rationem. Sic
autem non est in proposito, quia essentia divina non habet esse diminutum.
Aristot.. Metaph. VII (Z), c. 1 (1028a 36-6 2).
all the truths that can be scientifically known about God; but the
notion of the divine essence or deity is just this sort of thing;
therefore, etc. The major is evident from what was said in the
second article, [n. 15-17] The minor is evident and is proved in
this way. The type of real order that obtains between things that
are really distinct is the sort of conceptual order that obtains
between these things when they are conceptually distinct.i02 This
is proved: for the order of things conceptually distinct is only
inferred from the order they would be suited by nature to have as
real things if they were really distinct. But now if all that is
intrinsic to divine essence were really distinct from the essence,
the first among them would be the divine essence itself and all
the rest would be quasi-proper attributes and quasi-accidents of
the essence. Therefore, if there is a conceptual distinction there,
what would be absolutely the first is the divine essence itself qua
essence.
112 Second in this way: Cognition of 'what a thing is' is
absolutely first, according to Bk. VII of the Metaphysics. And just
as the knowledge of 'what it is' is absolutely prior to the
knowledge of anything else, so in the same thing knowledge of
what it is in its sameness is the primary and the most perfect
knowledge. Most of all, therefore, it is what virtually contains all
that is able to be known about it. The implication is evident
because to contain virtually all that is able to be known pertains
to what is more perfectly knowable.
113 Third, in this way: under the same notion God is the first
object of his own intellect and of the first science that one can
have of him; but he is the first object of his intellect under the
notion of essence; therefore etc. The major is proved, for he is the
first object of bis intellect under that notion under which he
virtually contains all that is able to be known about him. Hence
he [as the first object] moves his intellect to the notion of all that
is able to be known in that science. For it is under that notion
under which he contains all that he is the first object of the
102 V adds (cf. Add. M.): where real being would be removed precisely on
account of the diminution* of prior being, as when that which is prior receives
conceptual being. But this is not so in the case at hand, for the divine essence has
no diminution of being.
scientiae de ipso. Minor, quamvis possit probari per hoc quod

intellectus divinus intuitive cognoscit et per consequens sub
ratione aliqua quae est in re ex natura rei, tamen supponatur
usque ad tractatum de scientia Dei inferius, distinctione 36 et 35.
114 Ad negativam illam123 quod Deus non sit subiectum in hac
scientia secundum rationes alias quae assignantur arguo
tripliciter. Primo sic. Ratio sub qua aliquid est primum obiectum
in aliqua scientia excedit in perfectione cognoscibilitatis omnia
cognoscibilia in illa scientia. Ratio autem glorificatoris vel
reparatoris vel boni vel cuiuscumque talis non est huiusmodi,
ergo etc. Maior patet. Quia sicut primum obiectum habet primo
continere omnia quae continentur in scientia, ita ratio primi
subiecti debet esse prima ratio continendi et per consequens
perfectior in cognoscibilitate. Minor probatur. Quia relatio
rationis non potest esse perfectior in cognoscibilitate quocumque
ente reali quia nec in entitate est perfectior. Probatur etiam de
bono et aliis rationibus quia quacumque illarum est alia ratio
cognoscibilis perfectior, puta ratio divinae essentiae.
115 Secundo sic. Nihil sub ratione contracta potest esse primum
subiectum primae scientiae possibilis haberi de ipso. Omnes istae
rationes quae assignantur sunt rationes contrahentes ipsum
Deum, ergo etc. Maior probatur ex I Metaphysicae.124 Omni
scientia consideranti aliquid sub ratione contracta est alia prior
considerans illud sub ratione absoluta certior quam sit illa. Quia
sicut dicitur ibi: "Quae est ex paucioribus, certior est ea quae est
ex additione, ut arithmetica geometria".
116 Tertio sic. Nihil potest esse primum subiectum primae
scientiae de ipso sub aliqua ratione quae non facit aliquid unum
per se cum ipso. Sed huiusmodi sunt omnes rationes quae
12:1 Cf. supra n. 110.

Aristot., Metaph. I (A), c. 2 (982a 26-8).
primary science about himself. The minoralthough it could be

proved from the fact that the divine intellect knows intuitively*
and therefore it knows [something] under some really existing
characteristic that stems from the nature of the thingis put off
for treatment later in the tract about God's science in distinction
35 and 36.
114 [The negative proof] As for the negative proof, [n. 110] that
God is not a subject in this science under any of the other aspects
adduced, I argue in a threefold way. First in this way. The notion
under which something is a first object in any science exceeds, in
the perfection of what is able to be known, all other things that
are knowable in that science; but the notion of 'the one who
glorifies,' or 'makes reparation,' or of 'the benevolent,' or any
other such thing is not of this sort; therefore, etc. The major is
evident, for just as the first object has the primary function of
containing all that can be contained in the science, so the notion
of the first subject must be the first reason why it contains what
it does, and consequently is more perfect as to what can be
known. The minor is proved, because a conceptual relation cannot
be more perfect as to what is knowable than any real being,
because it is not more perfect in entity. There is also proof that
the good or other notions [are not the subject of this divine
science] because whatever they may be, there is some notion that
is cognitively more perfect, namely, the notion of the divine
essence.
115 Second, in this way. No restricted notion can be the primary
subject of the first science that one can have about him; but all
these other notions that are assigned are restricted notions about
what God himself is; therefore etc. The major is proved from Bk. I
of the Metaphysics. For every science that considers a thing under
a restricted notion there is another prior sciencemore certain
than the first onethat considers it under some unrestricted
notion. For just as it is said there, "what is based on fewer
principles, is more certain than what is based on additional
principles, e.g. arithmetic [is more exact] than geometry."
1 16 Thirdly in this way: Nothing can be the first subject of the
first science about God under some notion that expresses
something that is not one per se with him; but such are all the
assignantur aliae a ratione Deitatis, ergo etc. Minor patet. Quia

quaelibet talis ratio, si esset realiter distincta, esset realiter
accidens illi cui assignatur prima ratio. Probatio maioris. Aut illa
ratio contingenter inest ipsi subiecto, aut necessario. Si
contingenter, ergo non est ratio aliquid sciendi de subiecto quia
ipsa non est necessario cognoscenda de subiecto. Si necessario,
ergo ipsa est cognoscibilis de subiecto per rationem subiecti, et ita
non est prima ratio virtualiter cognoscendi omnia alia de
subiecto, nec per consequens est prima ratio subiecti in scientia.
117 Quantum igitur ad istum articulumi25 dico quod ordo est
inter rationes sub quibus Deus est conceptibilis, ita quod ratio
essentiae est omnino prima et aliae sequentes rationes sunt
priores aut posteriores secundum quod huic rationi sunt
propinquiores vel ab ipsa remotiores. Qualiter autem iste ordo
propinquitatis sit possibilis patet ex prima rationei26 quae supra
fuit posita contra istam positionem in qua dicebatur quod
quemcumque ordinem realem haberent aliqua distincta realiter,
similem ordinem secundum rationem habent ubi sunt distincta
tantum secundum rationem. Nunc autem, si realiter essent
distincta personalia ab essentialibus, et essentialia inter se
haberent ordinem in consequendo ipsam essentiam, ergo si sint
distincta ratione, habent talem ordinem secundum rationem.
118 Minor probatur. Primo, comparando essentialia sive
perfectiones simpliciter inter se. Si realiter distinguerentur
natura immaterialis perfecta et intellectus perfectus et illud per
quod intellectus habet obiectum proportionatum sibi praesens et
ipse actus intelligendi, et ultra etiam esset alius actus circa
obiectum primarium et alius actus circa obiecta secundaria
virtualiter contenta in obiecto primario, esset inter ista talis ordo
realis quod essentia immaterialis perfecta esset prior realiter
i45 Cf. supra n. 7.

Cf. supra n. 62, 111.
assigned notions other than that of deity; therefore etc. The minor
is evident, for each such notion, if it were really distinct, would be
really an accident of what is assigned as the primary notion.
Proof of the major. Either the other notion is contingently in the
subject itself, or it is there necessarily. If contingently, therefore
it is not the notion that could be known scientifically of the
subject, because it is not known necessarily of the subject. If it is
necessarily in God, therefore it is knowable of the subject by
reason of what the subject means, and thus is not the first notion
of virtually knowing everything else about the subject, and
consequently is not a notion that is the first subject of the science.
117 [How the concepts of God are ordered] As for this article [n.
7] I say that there is an order among notions under which God is
conceivable, such that the notion of the essence is absolutely first
and the rest that follow are either prior or posterior to one
another depending upon whether they are closer to this notion or
more remote from it. But just how this order of propinquity is
possible is evident from the first argument [n. 62, 111] that was
proposed against this position where it was said that whatever
real order things would have that are really distinct, a similar
conceptual order would they have where they are only
conceptually distinct. Now, however, if the personal
characteristics were really distinct from those that are essential,
and the essential attributes would have an order as they follow
from the essence itself, then if these characteristics are
conceptually distinct, they have this conceptual order.
118 The minor is proved,i03 first by comparing essentials or pure
perfections among themselves. Let us suppose that the perfect
immaterial nature, the perfect intellect, that through which the
intellect has a proportionate object present to itself, and the act of
understanding itself were really distinguished. And, besides
these, suppose that there were one act about the primary object
and another about the secondary objects that are virtually
contained in the primary object. Then the following real order
would obtain among them: the perfect immaterial essence would
i03 The minor, viz. "now however, if the personal chacteristics were really
distinct from those that are essential, and the essential attributes would have an
order as they follow from the essence itself."
intellectu perfecto, et intellectus perfectus prior realiter illa

ratione repraesentante obiectum, et ratio ista repraesentans prior
actu intelligendi obiectum, et actus intelligent obiectum
primarium prior realiter actu intelligendi obiectum secundarium.
Et ista propositio esset propter quid: "Habens naturam
immaterialem perfectam habet intellectualitatem perfectam", et
haec esset propter quid: "Intellectuale perfectum potest habere
rationem sibi repraesentantem perfecte obiectum proportiona-
tum", et iterum haec esset propter quid: "Intellectus perfectus
habens obiectum sibi proportionatum perfecte praesens intelligit
nisi impediatur", et haec propter quid: "Intellectus intelligens
obiectum primarium potest intelligere obiectum secundarium
virtualiter contentum in primo", ita quod ex quibuscumque
duabus propositionibus praedictis posset fieri demonstratio
propter quid ad concludendum extremum de extremo.127
120 Consimiliter etiam potest argui ex parte obiectorum quae
respiciunt intellectum et voluntatem, quia est ens immateriale
perfectum, ideo natum est esse obiectum intellectus proportionati
et ulterius movere ipsum ad actum circa ipsum, et ulterius, quia
ad actum circa ipsum, ideo ad actum circa obiectum secundarium
quod virtualiter continetur in ipso.
127 V addit (cf. Add. M.): Consimiliter de natura et voluntate et de actu

volendi primarium obiectum et secundarium. [n. 119] Consimiliter, licet non sit
ita manifestum, potest argui de quibuscumque aliis intrinsecis ipsi Deo, puta si
distinguerentur realiter infinitas, simplicitas, immutabilitas, aeternitas, sive
necessitas essendi. Videtur enim infinitas omnino prima, et quae dicit modum
essentiae, quemadmodum et in creaturis nec sic se habet finitas sicut aliqua
passio addita essentiae, sed dicit gradum intrinsecum vel limitationem naturae
in se. Aliter enim intrinseca est naturae humanae finitas vel limitatio quam
sapientia, immo videtur aliter quam intellectus et voluntas, quia non est
intelligibile aliquid habere aliquam entitatem quin statim illa intrinsece vel sit
finita vel infinita. Hanc infinitatem videtur sequi ordine reali simplicitas, quia
quodlibet quod est infinitum est incomponibile alteri. Hanc simiplicitatem videtur
sequi immutabilitas, quia quod simplex est caret motu, vel corrumpi non potest.
Et ex hac videtur sequi necessitas essendi sive aeternitas, quia excludit omnem
potentialitatem vel possibilitatem.
be really prior to the perfect intellect, and the perfect intellect

really prior to the representation of its object, and this
representation would be [really] prior to the act of understanding
the object, and the act of understanding the primary object would
be really prior to the act of understanding the secondary object.
And this would be a statement of the reasoned* fact: "One having
a perfect immaterial nature has perfect intellectuality." And this
would be a reasoned fact: "what is perfectly intellectual can have
a notion that represents perfectly an object proportionate to
itself." And again this would be a reasoned fact: "A perfect
intellect having an object proportionate to itself perfectly present
understands unless impeded." And this is a reasoned fact: "An
intellect understanding a primary object can understand a
secondary object virtually contained in the primary object," so
that from any two of the aforesaid propositions there could be a
demonstration* of the reasoned fact to conclude one term from
another.104
120 Similarly one could argue on the part of objects that relate
to the intellect and the will. Because [God] is perfect immaterial
being, therefore something suited by nature to be an object of a
proportioned intellect and what is more, to move that intellect to
an act about itself, and further because this is an act about itself,
therefore it can move the intellect to an act about a secondary
object virtually contained in it.
t04 V adds (Cf. Add. Af.): We could argue in a similar way about nature and
will, and about the act of willing the primary and the secondary object, [n. 119]
Similarly, although it is not so manifest, one could argue about whatever other
characteristics intrinsic to Godfor example, infinity, simplicity, immutability,
eternity, or the necessity* of beingwhether they are really distinguished. For it
seems that infinity is undoubtedly primary, and infinity is an [intrinsic] mode of
essence; in the same way, finitude in creatures is not like some attribute added to
the essence, but is an intrinsic grade or limitation of nature in itself. For the
finitude or limitation of human nature is intrinsic in another way than wisdom,
indeed, it is [intrinsic] in another way than the intellect and will, because it is not
thinkable that something should have some entity without it being at once
intrinsically either finite or infinite. This infinity seems to be followed by
simplicity in the real order, because whatever is infinite is incompatible with
another. This simplicity seems to be followed by immutability, because what is
simple cannot be moved or corrupted. And from immutability the necessity of
being, or eternity, seems to follow, because it excludes all potentiality or
possibility.
121 Secundo propositum potest declarari de ordine perfectionum

simpliciter ad actus notionales et proprietates personales. Si ita
different realiter memoria perfecta quae scilicet includit
intellectum et obiectum sibi praesens actus intellectus vel
intelligentiae, et actus exprimendi notitiam declarativam istius
obiecti qui est dicere, et ipsa notitia producta per actum dicendi,
quae dicitur verbum, esset ibi simpliciter ordo realis quod
memoria in actu perfecto esset ibi primum, dicere secundum,
verbum tertium. Et quia memoria est perfecta, ideo est dictiva, et
quia dictiva, ideo verbum producitur.
122 Consimiliter arguitur de voluntate et de spiratione et de
termino spirationis, comparando etiam terminos productionum.
Igitur perfectiones simpliciter praecedunt actus notionales, et ipsi
actus terminos notionalium ad invicem. Quia actus intellectus est
praevius actui voluntatis, ideo dictio est prior spiratione, et ultra,
ideo verbo dicto communicatur principium spirandi in ratione
principii. Nam ut communicatur verbo per generationem non
praeintelligitur habere verbum adaequatum.
123 Ulterius etiam, quia producta ista distincta sunt simpliciter
idem uni et eidem naturae, ideo est inter ista perfecta identitas.
Propter idem etiam quia habent eandem magnitudinem illius
naturae, puta infinitatem, ideo est inter illa perfecta aequalitas.
121 [Essential and Personal Properties] Secondly one can

declare the proposal about the order of simple or unqualified
perfections regarding notional acts and personal properties. If
these differed really: perfect memory,105 which includes the
intellect and the object of the intellectual act presenting itself,
and the act of expressing the declarative* knowledge of this object
which is to speak, and that knowledge produced by the act of
speaking, which is called the Word, there would be there the
simply real order: the memory in a perfect act would be there
first, and to speak second, and the Word third. And because the
memory is perfect therefore it is speaking and because it is
speaking, the Word is produced.
122 Similarly one could argue about the will and about
spiration* and the term of spiration, by comparing also the terms
of producing. Therefore the pure perfections precede the notional
acts and these acts, in their turn, precede the notional terms.
Because the act of the intellect is prior to that of the will,
therefore speaking [the Word] is prior to spirating [the Holy
Spirit] and furthermore, for this reason to the spoken Word the
principle of spirating is communicated in its role as a principle.
For as it is communicated to the Word by generation,* it is not
presupposed to have an adequate word.106
123 [How properties are demonstrated of God] Also further,
because these distinct products107 are simply the same as to their
one and the same nature, therefore there is among them a perfect
identity. Moreover, for the same reason, because they have the
same magnitude* as that nature, such as infinity, there is perfect
"l'' The perfect memory of the Father is what generates the Son or speaks
the Word. Cf. above, n. 83, note four.
10l: Scotus seems to be arguing here that the Father possessed the principle
of spiration by reason of what he is and not because he has spoken the Word.
Possessing the principle himself he can share it with the Word he is generating
by speaking. Although spiration presupposed the generation of the Word, since
the Word shares with the Father active spiration. the communication of active
spiration by generation does not presuppose having an adequate Word, since
having an adequate Word is only presupposed for exercising the principle of
active spiration to produce the Holy Spirit.
107 Product refers to the three divine persons and active spiration (see
Glossary, under "productions"). These are all constituted by their opposite
relationships and not by something absolute. What they have as absolute is the
identical one divine nature and hence they are all one God.
Quia etiam habent proprietates illius naturae easdem, ideo est

inter ista perfecta similitudo. Et quarto est ordo notionalium ad
relationes communes. Et sic patet quod semper per priora
tamquam per causas propter quid possent sciri posteriora. Igitur
est huiusmodi ordo eorum secundum rationem qualis esset si
realiter, ut dictum est, essent inter se distincta.
124 Item, hic secundo arguitur sic. In demonstrationibus quia et
propter quid de eodem videtur esse ordo contrarius. Nam in
demonstratione quia prius concluduntur quae sunt propinquiora
effectui a quo arguitur, ista autem videntur esse remotiora a
causa per se. Econverso autem in demonstratione simpliciter et
propter quid prius concluduntur illa quae sunt propinquiora ipsi
causae, et ultimo concluditur de effectu remoto. Igitur si aliqua
conveniunt alicui causae quae statim possunt concludi ex
effectibus et alia quae non possunt, ista non videntur habere
eundem ordinem nec aeque immediatum ad talem causam. Nunc
autem possunt concludi de eorum effectibus aliqua, sicut patet
XII Metaphysicaei28 et patebit inferius in multis quaestionibus de
Deo, aliqua autem non possunt concludi ex effectibus, sicut
veritates mere theologicae. Igitur et haec et illa secundum
ordinem mere insunt Deo.
125 Et confirmatur ista ratio. Quia non aeque immediate et
absque omni ordine insunt ista alicui subiecto, quae nota sunt de
ipso etiam imperfecte et confuse concepto; et illa quae non
possunt esse nota de ipso nisi concepto eo sub ratione propria
essentiae suae. Aliqua sunt cognoscibilia de Deo confuse cognito
vel concepto sicut potest cognosci ex creaturis, alia non possunt de
Deo cognosci nisi eo distincte cognito sub ratione essentiae
huiusmodi et sub ratione propriae essentiae, igitur etc.
m E.g., Aristot, Metaph. XII (A), c. 7 (1073a 3-12); cf. ibid., c. 8-10.
equality among them. Also because they have the same properties
of that nature, there is a perfect likeness among them. And fourth
there is the order of the notionalsi08 in respect to the common
relations.* And thus it is evident that always through the prior as
through causes of the reasoned fact what is posterior can be
known scientifically. Therefore there is such a conceptual order
among them as there would be a real order if they were really
distinct from one another, as was said.
124 Also here secondly it is argued this way. In demonstrations*
of the simple* fact and the reasoned fact about the same thing
there is an inverse order. For in demonstrations of the simple fact
one infers first those things that are closer to the effect from
which one argues; these, however, seem to be more remote from
the cause itself. Conversely however in a demonstration that is
unqualified and of the reasoned fact, those things are first
inferred which are closer to the cause itself, and lastly inferred
are the remote effects. Therefore, if there pertains to some cause
something that can be inferred immediately from its effect,
whereas another thing cannot be immediately inferred, these two
do not seem to have the same order nor are they equally
immediate to such a cause. Now however some things can be
concluded [about it] from the effects, as is evident from Bk. XII of
the Metaphysics and will be made evident in many questions
about God,i09 but some cannot be inferred from the effects, such
as truths which are exclusively theological. Therefore both sorts
are merely present in God only according to the order.
125 This argument is confirmed, because [the two types of
things] are not equally immediately and without any order
present to some subject: those which are known of it even when it
is conceived imperfectly and in a confused* way; and those which
cannot be known of it except if it is conceived under the proper
concept of its essence. Some things are knowable about God in a
confused way, as it is possible to know from creatures, other
[things] can only be known about God distinctly* under the
i08 The notionals (see Glossary) are proper relations, not common to all three
persons; the latter presuppose the former.
i09 See, e.g., the proofs for the existence and nature of God in Ordinatio I,
dist. 2, q 1 & 3; De primo principio, ch. 3-4.
126 Sed contra ista arguitur. Videtur enim quod ista secunda
ratio129 et prima130 concludunt duo opposita. Nam in prima
deductum est quod essentialia sunt priora personalibus, ista
autem secunda ratio videtur concludere oppositum. Nam per
demonstrationem quia non cognoscimus de Deo notionalia,
cognoscimus tamen essentialia. Essentialia autem cognoscimus
de Deo confuse concepto,131 personalia autem non cognoscimus de
Deo nisi distincte concepto.132 Illud autem est immediatius
causae, quod non potest cognosci per demonstrationem quia,133
quam illud quod potest. Similiter illud videtur prius in Deo quod
competit primo huic essentiae, ut est haec, quam quod competit ei
secundum aliquem conceptum imperfectum.
127 Pro conclusione autem primae rationis134 videtur esse quod
perfectio simpliciter praecedit naturaliter illud quod non est
perfectio simpliciter. Sed proprietates illae sunt perfectiones
simpliciter, unde et quaelibet potest esse formaliter infinita.
Notionalia autem non sunt perfectiones simpliciter quia tunc
quodlibet eorum esset in qualibet persona. Nullum enim eorum,
scilicet notionalium, potest esse formaliter infinitum, ut
probabitur infra.135
128 Modo sic. Illud videtur immediatius naturae divinae quod
consequitur eam secundum se et per consequens ut est in
quolibet, etiam ut abstrahit a qualibet proprietate incom-
mununicabili, quam illud quod convenit ei praecise in uno ut
coniungitur determinatae proprietati incommunicabili. Primo
modo se habent perfectiones essentiales, secundo modo notiones
et proprietates personales.
129 Pro conclusione secundae rationis136 videtur istud, quod
supposita prius sunt in natura quam proprietates. Unde omnino
et immediate videtur se habere natura ad supposita quorum est
quiditas, et quasi accidentaliter se videtur habere natura ad
im Cf. supra n. 123-124.

130 Cf. supra n. 121-122.
l31 Cf. supra n. 125.
i-u Cf. supra n. 125.
131 Cf. supra n. 124.
134 Cf. supra n. 121-122.
13r' Cf. infra Dist. 2, q. 3; Dist. 31, q. 1-3.
notion of such an essence and under the notion of the essence

proper; therefore, etc.
126 [Some clarifications] But it is argued against this, for it
seems that this second reason [n. 123-124] and the first reason [n.
121-122] arrive at two opposite conclusions. For in the first it is
deduced that essentials are prior to personals, whereas the
second argument seems to conclude to the opposite. For through a
demonstration of simple fact we do not know the notionals about
God, nevertheless we know about the essentials. But the
essentials about God are conceived confusedly; [n. 125] the
personals however are not known of God except as distinctly
conceived, [n. 125] But what cannot be known through a
demonstration of the simple fact [n. 124] is more immediate to the
cause, than what can be known in this way. Similarly what seems
prior in God is that which pertains first to this essence qua this
rather than what pertains to it according to some imperfect
concept.
127 But from the conclusion of the first argument [n. 121-122] it
seems that a pure perfection naturally precedes what is not a
pure perfection. But those properties are pure perfections, hence
each can be formally infinite; the distinguishing marks [of a
divine person] however are not pure perfections, because then
each of them would exist in each person; for none of these
distinguishing marks can be formally infinite, as will be proved
later on.
128 Or in this way: what follows the divine nature according to
what it is in itself and consequently as it is in anythingalso as it
abstracts from every incommunicable* propertyseems more
immediate to it, than what is suited to it precisely in one [person]
where it is joined with a limited incommunicable property. The
essential perfections exist in the first way, the distinguishing
characteristics and personal properties [of a divine person] in the
second way.
129 From the conclusion of the second argument [n. 123] it
seems that the supposits [i.e. the persons] are prior in nature
than the properties [of the nature]. Hence it seems the nature is
entirely and immediately related to the supposits whose quiddity
it is, and the nature is quasi-accidentally related to the properties
proprietates tamquam ad quaedam quasi alterius generis. Patet

etiam in creaturis quod prius dictum est, quia species essentialius
respicit individuum quam propriam passionem.
[Solutio propria Scoti]
130 Ad quaestionem patet ex dictis ex quibus potest formari

talis ratio: Illud sub ratione essentiae potest esse primum
obiectum alicuius scientiae cuius essentia est ratio prima
virtualiter continendi veritates necessarias habentes evidentiam
ordinatam. Sed Deus est huiusmodi obiectum, ergo etc. Maior est
patens ex declaratis in secundo et tertio articulo. Minor autem
patet ex dictis in tertio et quarto articulo.
[Ad argumenta principalia]
131 Ad primam rationem principalem137 quando dicitur "Omne

scibile de quocumque subiecto habet per se conceptum alium a
conceptu subiecti" concedo istam maiorem quae declarata est in
corollario primi articuli. Nego autem minorem quae dicit quod
nihil cognoscibile de Deo habet conceptum alium per se a
conceptu Dei.
132 Ad probationem eius dico quod illis pluribus conceptibus
potest correspondere una res extra quae potest in se virtualiter
continere tales plures conceptus et per consequens de ipsa per
intellectum possunt actualiter explicari.
133 Et cum ulterius dicitur138 quod una res habet unum
conceptum adaequatum, concedo unum conceptum quiditativum
qui est eius omnino, id est secundum se. Sed praeter hoc potest
virtualiter continere conceptus plures quasi denominativos, sicut
ipsa essentia ex natura rei virtualiter contineret plures vel
multas proprietates consequentes ipsam si possent distingui
realiter ab ipsa. Igitur essentia ita potest virtualiter continere
plures conceptus quasi conceptus denominativos qui possunt ab
intellectu distingui a conceptu quiditativo, et hoc est praecipue si
Cf. supra n. 1.
13H Cf. supra n. 3.
as to things of a quasi-different kind. What was said earlier is

also evident in creatures, because the species regards the
individual more essentially than it regards its proper attribute.
Scotus's final answer to the Question
130 To the question it is evident from what has been said that
one could formulate an argument of this sort. That whose essence
is the first characteristic that virtually contains necessary truths
having an ordered evidence under the aspect of essence can be
the first object of some science. But God is such an object,
therefore etc. The major is evident from what was declared in the
second and third article. The Minor is clear from what was said in
the third and fourth articles.
Reply to the Initial Arguments
131 To the first initial argument [n. 1] when it is said

"everything knowable of any subject has a per se concept other
than the concept of the subject." I concede this major, which is
stated in the corollary to the first article. But I deny the minor
which says that nothing knowable about God has a concept other
per se than a concept of God.
132 To the proof for this I say that those several concepts can
correspond to one thing extra-mentally which can in itself
virtually contain several concepts of this sort and consequently
the intellect can actually spread them out and relate them to the
thing.
133 And when it is said further [n. 3] that one thing has one
adequate concept, I concede that one concept is quidditative
which expresses what it is absolutely, as it is in itself. But besides
this a thing can virtually contain several concepts that are. as it
were, derivative, just as the essence itself by its nature as a real
thing could virtually contain several or many properties that
follow from it, if they could be distinguished really from it.
Therefore the essence in this fashion can virtually contain several
concepts that are, as it were, derivative, which can be
distinguished from the quidditative concept by the intellect. And
illi conceptus sint tantum distincti secundum relationem rationis

mutuo se respicientes, sicut tactum est in tertio articulo.139
134 Forte posset poni aliqua distinctio maior istorum
conceptuum quam per relationes rationis mutuas, et adhuc
possunt virtualiter contineri in illa essentia et per intellectum
actualiter explicari. Sed de hoc alias dicetur in quaestione de
attributis. Si dicatur quod tunc illi conceptus erunt ficticii et vani,
respondeo quod non sequitur quia omnibus illis conceptibus
correspondet unum obiectum reale et quod in omnibus illis
concipitur, licet sub alia et alia ratione. Nec istae rationes vel
conceptus sunt vani quia continentur in illa divina essentia sub
ipsis. Vel si illi conceptus non distinguantur praecise per
relationes rationis, tunc in omnibus illis concipitur unum
obiectum quasi materiale, sed simul correspondent distincta
obiecta formalia per se terminantia ipsos. Quae tamen obiecta
formalia virtualiter continentur in illo quasi materiali extra.
135 Ad secundam rationem140 quando dicitur "Omne scibile de
aliquo subiecto scitur per medium quod notius inest subiecto
primo quam ipsum scitum", concedo istam maiorem. Et quando
additur in minori quod nihil potest sic cognosci de Deo, nego quia
in quarto articulo oppositum eius declaratur ubi ostensum est
qualiter illa quae conveniunt essentiae divinae habent ordinem
inter se et etiam in conveniendo ipsi essentiae.141 Nec est minus
scientia propter quid suo modo ex ordine istorum secundum
rationem quam esset si essent distincta realiter et haberent
ordinem realem, ut frequenter dictum est, quia scientia propter
quid magis respicit ordinem cognoscibilium in cognoscibilitate
quam in esse et exsistentia extra.
m Cf. supra n. 86-87, 107.

140 Cf. supra n. 4.
141 Cf. supra n. 117ss.
this is especially the case if those concepts are only distinct as

conceptual relations that are correlatives, as was treated in the
third article, [n. 86-87, 107]
134 Perhaps some greater distinction could be made about those
concepts than the one of conceptual correlative notions, and yet
they could be contained virtually in that essence and be actually
explained by the intellect. But more about this will be said in the
question about the attributes.110 If it be said that then these
concepts would be fictitious and vain, I reply that this does not
follow, because to all of these concepts there corresponds one real
object, and that in all of these it is conceived, although under one
or another aspect. Nor are these notions or concepts vain, because
they are contained in that divine essence under these [different
aspects]. Or if these concepts are not distinguished precisely by
conceptual relations, then in all of them one quasi material object
is conceived of, but at the same time distinct formal objects
corresponds to them per se as their referents. But these formal
objects are virtually contained in that quasi material object
outside the mind.
135 To the .second argument, [n. 4] when it says "Every thing
scientifically knowable about any subject is known scientifically
by means of some middle term present in that first subject that is
more knowable than what is known scientifically." I concede this
major. And when it is added in the minor that nothing can be
known in this way about God, I deny this, for in the fourth article
the opposite is made clear where it is shown in what manner
these things that pertain to the divine essence have an order
among themselves, as well as in the way they pertain to the
essence itself, [n. 117ff] Nor is the science to any lesser degree a
knowledge of the reasoned fact because it stems from a
conceptual order they have, than it would be if they were really
distinct and had a real order, as was frequently stated. For a
science of the reasoned fact refers more to the order in which they
can be known than to how they are in their being and extra-
mental existence.
1,0 Scotus alludes here to the formal distinction a parte rei that exists,
among other things, between the attributes of God
136 Ad auctoritatem Augustini142 quando dicit quod "quidquid

intelligibile est atque incommutabile, non est aliud alio verius",
dico quod vult ibi quod tres personae non sunt verius quam una,
et ex hoc infert quod non aliquid magis vel verius est. Et hoc
verum est loquendo de maioritate reali. Tamen in duabus
personis potest intellectus habere plures rationes considerabiles
quam in una persona, et per consequens plures conceptus
formales, licet non realiter plures realitate absoluta, sed bene
plures realitate relativa, et multo plures secundum relationem
rationis, quia proprietas personalis est formaliter intellectualis.
Loquitur ergo de veritate reali quae proportionatur entitati rei
extra, non autem de veritate quae competit alicui secundum esse
rationis sive secundum esse quod habet in intellectu.
137 Ad tertiam rationem143 quando dicitur quod de subiecto
demonstrationis oportet scire quid est, dico quod quid est
limitatum, quale exprimitur per definitionem, non est ipsius Dei,
quia nihil est in ipso limitans vel determinans ipsum esse. Et hoc
modo Avicenna negaret a Deo quid est. Tamen generaliter
loquendo prout quiditas convertitur cum essentia, verissime
quiditas est in Deo sicut essentia, sicut patet ex Augustino, VII
De Trinitate, cap. 32:144 "Essentia vere et proprie dicitur ita ut
solum Deum dici essentiam oporteat. "
138 Quamvis autem de subiecto scientiae philosophicae
aliquotiens praecognoscatur quid est primo modo, scilicet
expressibile per definitionem quale est in creaturis, tamen hoc
non est simpliciter semper necessarium. Quia si ens ponatur
primum subiectum in aliqua scientia, puta in metaphysica, ipsum
tamen ens non habet tale quid. Sed sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid sit
subiectum in aliqua scientia, sive philosophica sive theologica
sicut est in proposito, quod essentia subiecti de se sit ratio
cognoscendi omnia alia de Deo.
142 Cf. supra n. 4.

143 Cf. supra n. 5.
136 To the authority of Augustine [n. 4] when he says that "in

regard to whatever is intelligible and also unchangeable, one
thing is no less true than another," I say that he intended there to
indicate that three persons are not more true than one, and from
this he infers that no one thing is greater or more true. And this
is true, speaking of 'being greater' or 'more' really. But in two
persons the intellect can have more formal aspects it is able to
consider than in one person, and as a consequence more formal
concepts, although they are not really more numerous by virtue of
any absolute reality, but rather by virtue of [some] relative
reality, and much more numerous by virtue of conceptual
relations, because the personal property is formally intellectual.
Therefore it is spoken of a real truth that corresponds to extra-
mental entities, not about the truth which pertains to something
according to a conceptual notion or according to the being it has
in the intellect.
137 To the third argument, [n. 5] when it is said that about the
subject of a demonstration one must know what it is, I say that
the 'what it is' in a limited sense, as what is expressed through
the definition, does not pertain to God in himself, because nothing
in him limits or defines his being. And in this way Avicenna
would deny that God has a quiddity. Nevertheless speaking
generally in so far as quiddity is convertible with essence, it is
true that there is a quiddity in God just as there is an essence, as
is clear from Augustine in Bk. VII of The Trinity, chapter 32:iii
"Essence is what he is truly and properly called, so that only God
should be called essence."
138 Although in a philosophical science it is sometimes known
what the subject is in the first mode* [of per se predication],
namely what is expressible in a definition as is the case with
creatures, however this is simply not always necessary. Because if
'being' [ens] is posited as the first subject in some science, for
instance, metaphysics, 'being' has no such quiddity. It suffices,
however, for something to be a subject of some sciencewhether
philosophical or theological, as is the case in our proposalthat
the essence of the subject of itself be a reason for knowing all
other things about God.
iii Augustine, The Trinity VII, ch. 5 (PL 42, 942).

[Quaestio 2
Utrum veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione deitatis
possint sciri ab intellectu viatoris]
Secundo quaeritur utrum veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub

ratione Deitatis possint sciri ab intellectu viatoris.
139 Quod sic. 1 Ad Cor. 12 Apostolus distinguit donum scientiae
contra donum fidei et alia dona quae ibi enumerantur. Sed qui
habet donum scientiae de divinis ut distinguitur contra donum
fidei scit veritates per se scibiles de Deo sub ratione Deitatis.
Quomodo est possibile viatorem habere donum scientiae ut
distinguitur contra fidem, ergo etc. Minor probatur per
Augustinum, XIV De Trinitate, cap. 4:145 ubi dicit Apostolum
appropriate fuisse locutum de scientia ut distinguitur contra
fidem.
140 Item secundo sic. Scientia est habitus simpliciter perfectior
quocumque habitu cognitivo qui non est scientia, et hoc prout
includit, communiter loquendo de ea, habitum sapientiae. Ergo si
viator non posset habere scientiam de Deo sub ratione Deitatis,
haberet respectu Deitatis aliquem habitum imperfectiorem ipsa
scientia. Quod est falsum, cum sit perfectio portionis superioris,
secundum Augustinum XII De Trinitate,146 quia est circa divina,
ergo etc.
141 Item tertio sic. Lumen naturale sufficit ad habendum
scientiam naturaliter acquisitam de obiecto naturali. Ergo cum
lumen supernaturale non sit imperfectius lumine naturali, poterit
intellectus viatoris in lumine supernaturali habere scientiam de
obiecto supernaturali, ergo etc.
142 Item, ubi est notitia cum certitudine, ibi est maior ratio
scientiae quia certitudo est per se condicio scientiae. Ergo illa
notitia quae est magis certa, magis habet rationem scientiae. Sed
minus contingit aliquem theologum dubitare de aliqua veritate
sibi revelata a Deo quam de veritate apprehensa lumine naturali,
quia ibi contingit intellectum falli iudicando de re apprehensa in
lumine naturali, ergo etc.
145 August., De Trin. XIV, c. 1, n. 3 (CCSL 50A, 423; PL 42, 1037).

""! August., De Trin. XII, c. 7, n. 10 (CCSL 50, 364-5; PL 42, 1003).
Prologue, Question Two 52
Question Two
Can truths that are knowable per se of God as deity be
known by the intellect of the pilgrim?
Secondly it is asked whether truths knowable per se of God under

the aspect of deity can be known by the intellect of one in this life.
139 That they can: In the first epistle to the Corinthiansii2 the
Apostle distinguishes the gift of science from the gift of faith and
other gifts which he acknowledges; but who has the gift of divine
science, as this is distinguished from the gift of faith, knows
truths that are knowable per se of God under the aspect of deity;
therefore it is possible for the pilgrim* to have the gift of science
as distinguished from faith. The minor is proved from Augustine,
The Trinity Bk. XIV, ch. 4 where he says the Apostle appro
priately has been speaking of science as distinguished from faith.
140 Also secondly in this way. Scientific knowledge is a habit
that is simply more perfect than any other cognitive habit that is
not science, and this insofar as this term, commonly speaking,
includes the habit of wisdom. Therefore, if the pilgrim could not
have scientific knowledge of God under the aspect of deity, what
he knew of God as deity would be through a habit less perfect
than this science. This is false, since it is the perfection of the
superior portion [of the mind], according to Augustine in The
Trinity Bk. XII, because it is about the divine; therefore etc.
141 Also, thirdly in this fashion. The natural light [of reason]
suffices to have naturally acquired knowledge of natural objects.
Therefore, since the supernatural light is not less perfect than
natural light, the intellect of the pilgrim enlightened by the
supernatural light could have knowledge of a supernatural object;
therefore etc.
142 Also, where there is knowledge with certainty, there is more
reason for it being called science, because certitude is a condition
for it being science. Therefore, it is the knowledge that is most
certain that has a greater reason for it being called science. But it
is less fitting for a theologian to doubt about some truth revealed
to him by God than to doubt about a truth apprehended by the
I Cor. 12:8.
143 Sed contra. Apostolus 2 Ad Cor. 5: "Dum sumus in corpore,

peregrinamur a domino. Per fidem enim ambulamus et non per
speciem". Glossa:147 "Modo tantum per fidem illuminamur, non
per speciem".
144 Item, impossibile est ex principiis opinatis sequi nisi
conclusionem opinatam, ergo nec ex principiis creditis nisi fidem
vel conclusionem creditam, quia conclusionis certitudo non
excedit certitudinem principiorum, cum eius certitudo sit mediata
ex principiis.
[Opinio Thomae]
145 Hic dicunt quidam148 quod de Deo sub ratione Deitatis

potest a nobis haberi scientia, subalternata tamen scientiae
beatorum. Et ideo non oportet quod principia huius scientiae
sciantur in hac scientia, sed tantum credantur in hac scientia et
sciantur in scientia beatorum.
146 Haec opinio innititur et rationi et uni auctoritati:
Prima ratio est ista. Scientia subalternata inquantum talis
est scientia, sed inquantum subalternata supponit sua principia
in superiori scientia manifesta et declarata et sibi credita. Ergo
non est contra rationem scientiae quod principia sua sibi sint
tantum credita.
147 Item, perspectiva inquantum talis est scientia, et per
spective inquantum talis est sciens. Sed inquantum talis non est
geometer quia supponit principia sua quae in geometria sunt
demonstrata. Ergo potest quis esse perspectivus, licet non sciens
sua principia per demonstrationem.
148 Item per auctoritatem Philosophi VI Ethicorum, cap. 4149 ubi
Philosophus vult quod ad scientiam habendam sufficit quod
principia sint aliqualiter nota. Ubi etiam dicit Commentator quod
principia fiunt nobis nota per inductionem. Ergo non oportet ad
habendam scientiam de aliquo, necessario scire principia per
demonstrationem.
H7 Petrus Lombardus, Collectanea in epistulas Pauli (PL 192, 39).

148 Thomas Aquinas, STh. I, q. 2, a. 2 resp.
149 Aristot., Eth. Nic. VI, c. 6 (11406 34-5).
natural light of the mind, since there the intellect can be deceived
about something grasped by its natural light; therefore etc.
143 But to the contrary: the Apostle in the Second Letter to the
Corinthians 5:ii3 "We know that while we dwell in the body we
are away from the Lord. We walk by faith, not by sight." Glossa:
"Now, however, we are illumined by faith, not by sight."
144 Also it is impossible that from premises based on opinion
any conclusion should follow, other than opinion; therefore
neither can anything other than faith or some conclusion based
on it follow from premises that are believed, because the certitude
of the conclusion does not exceed that begged from premises.
The opinion of Aquinas
145 Here, certain ones say that about God under the aspect of
deity knowledge that is subordinate to the knowledge of the
blessed is possible for us. And therefore, it is not necessary that
the premises of this science be known in the science itself, but
only that they be believed in that science and in the science of the
blessed they are known.
146 This opinion is supported by reason and by one authority.
The first reason is this. A subordinate* science in so far as it is
subordinate is still science; but insofar as it is subordinated, it
finds its principles in a higher science where these are evident
and enunciated and which are here believed. Therefore, it is not
against the idea of science that its principles are only believed.
147 Also, optics insofar as it is such is a [subordinate] science,
and an optician insofar as he is such knows scientifically. But
insofar as he is such he is not a geometrician, because he
presupposes principles of geometry where they are demonstrated.
Therefore one can be an optician, although he does not know his
principles by way of demonstration.
148 Also through the authority of the Philosopher, Ethics VI, ch.
4 where the Philosopher means that to have science it suffices
that the principles are in some way known. Also where the
Commentator says that principles become known to us through
"3 2 Cor. 5:7-8.

149 Contra istam opinionem arguo sic. Iste doctor dicit in uno
loco quod scientia non stat cum fide respectu eiusdem obiecti ita
quod idem obiectum simul et semel non potest esse scitum et
creditum. Sed ista scientia ut subalternata scientiae beatorum
stat cum fide quia de suis principiis non habet nisi fidem. Ergo
non est scientia, quod est contra eum.
150 Item, de Deo non potest esse nisi unica scientia sub ratione
deitatis quae extendit se ad omnia per se scibilia de eo. Ergo nulla
potest esse scientia subalternata. Probatio antecedentis.
Quaecumque continentur virtualiter in aliquo subiecto, primo
pertinent ad illam scientiam quae considerat subiectum illud sub
illa ratione sub qua omnia illa virtualiter continentur. Sed omnia
per se cognoscibilia de Deo continentur in ipso virtualiter sub
ratione deitatis. Ergo de Deo sub illa ratione non est nisi ista
scientia unica. Sed constat quod theologia quam nos habemus non
est de Deo nisi sub ratione deitatis in se; ergo etc.
151 Item, scientia subalternans et subalternata non sunt primo
de eisdem veritatibus praecise nec conclusionibus scitis quia
conclusiones scientiae subalternantis sunt principia subalter-
natae. Sed theologia nostra est primo de eisdem de quibus est
scientia beatorum, licet forte non de omnibus illis. Sed hoc non
facit quod ei subalternetur. Si enim unus sciat decem libros
geometriae et alius quinque, non propter hoc scientia scientis
quinque subalternatur scientiae scientis decem. Similiter est in
proposito, ut quod Deus est trinus et unus, et aliis convenientibus
illi Deitati inquantum Deitas. Ergo haec scientia nostra non est
subalternata scentiae Dei et beatorum.
152 Item, scientia non dependet ab aliquo essentialiter ut a
causa nisi ab obiecto et ab intellectu, vel saltem ab illis quae
habent causalitatem respectu eius essentialiter. Sed notitia beati
quam habet de Deo trino et uno non est causa essentialiter
induction. Therefore, to have science it is not necessary to know

principles through demonstration.
149 Against this opinion I argue in this way. This doctor says in
one place that as regards the same object science does not coexist
with faith, so that the same object cannot be at one and the same
time both scientifically known and believed. But this science as
subordinated to the science of the blessed does coexist with faith,
because so far as its principles are concerned it is had only on
faith. Therefore, it is not sciencewhich goes against what he
says.
150 Also about God there can only be a single science under the
aspect of deity, which extends itself to all that is per se knowable
about him. Therefore, there can be no subordinate science. Proof
of the antecedent. Whatever is contained virtually in any subject
pertains to that science that considers that subject under that
aspect under which all is virtually contained. But everything that
is knowable per se about God is contained virtually under the
aspect of deity. Therefore, about God under this notion [of deity]
there is only that one science. But it is clear that the theology we
have is about God only under the notion of deity in itself;
therefore, etc.
151 Also, the science above and the subordinated science are not
primarily about precisely the same truths and conclusions that
are known, because the conclusions of the higher science are the
principles of the subordinate science. But our theology is
primarily about the same things as is the science of the blessed,
although perhaps not about all of these truths. But this does not
make it subordinate to that blessed science. For if one knows ten
books of geometry and another knows five, this does not make the
science of five subordinate to that of ten. The case here is similar,
as for instance of God being one and being triune, and in other
things that concern this deity qua deity. Therefore, this science of
ours is not subordinate to the science of God and the blessed.
152 Also, one science does not depend essentially upon another
as its cause unless it depends upon it for its object and for its
understanding [of this object], or at least for those things exerting
a causal influence on it essentially. But the knowledge which the
blessed have about God as both triune and one is not essentially a
theologiae nostrae, quia nec potentia intellectiva nostra nec

obiectum cognitum a nobis. Non enim cognosco eius notitiam ut
cognoscam Deum esse trinum. Ergo notitia beati non est aliqua
causa scientiae nostrae de Deo. Et sic scientia nostra non
dependet a scientia beati ut subalternata a subalternanti, et per
consequens non dicitur aliquis scire theologiam quia principia
eius sunt scita a beato. Immo esset simile ac si diceretur "Scio
geometriam, quia credo te sciente geometriam habere geo-
metriam".
153 Item, omnis habens scientiam subalternantem stante illa
potest habere scientiam subalternatam, et econverso, habens
subalternatam potest habere, stante illa, scientiam subal
ternantem. Sed habens scientiam beatorum ut visionem de Deo
non potest habere fidem de Deo nec theologiam nostram. Ergo
haec non subalternatur illi. Prima pars maioris probatur. Quia si
habet subalternantem, habet principia et propter quid scientiae
subalternatae tamquam conclusionum, ergo potest scire ista
propter quid. Secunda pars maioris probatur. Quia sciens
subalternatam scientiam potest naturaliter scire subalternantem,
quia principia subalternantis sunt priora. Et in intelligibilibus
priora et confusa sunt nobis notiora et prius nota: secundum
Avicennam, I Metaphysicae,150 ens est nobis primo notum. In
sensibilibus econverso quia ibi posteriora sunt nobis magis nota.
Ergo habens hanc scientiam subaltearnatam de intelligibili potest
naturaliter habere scientiam subalternantem tamquam priorem
naturaliter. Sed hoc falsum est quia tunc idem esset viator et
comprehensor.
154 Ad rationem primam istius opinionis dico quod scientia
subalternata habet aliqua principia quia ex151 quibus habet
evidentiam per experientiam. Sicut probat perspectivus per
experientiam quia: "Angulus incidentiae et reflexionis sunt
aequales". Et in omnibus de quibus habemus scientiam per
experientiam primo cognoscimus quia quam propter quid. Unde
150 Cf. Avicenna, Metaph. I, c. 5 (AviL, 31-2); cf. Aristot., Physica I, c. 1 (184a
21-2).
151 Melius lege: de quibus.
cause of our theology, because [their knowledge gives us] neither

our intellective power nor the object known to us. For I do not
rely on their knowledge in order to know God to be triune. Hence,
the knowledge of the blessed is not a cause of our science about
God. And thus our science does not depend upon the science of
the blessed as subordinate upon a superior science, and no one is
said to know theology because its principles are known
scientifically by the blessed. Indeed it would be similar if one
were to claim: "I know geometry because I believe that, by virtue
of you knowing geometry, I possess the science of geometry."
153 Also, everyone having the knowledge of the superior science
can know the subordinate science as well, and conversely, one
knowing the subordinate science can have one's knowledge of the
superior science. But one having the knowledge of the blessed as
a vision of God cannot have merely a knowledge of God by faith or
have our theology. Therefore, our theology is not subordinated to
that of the blessed. The first part of the major is proved. For if one
has the superior science, he has principles whereby he can reason
to the conclusions of the subordinate science, and therefore can
know these as reasoned facts. The second part of the major is
proved, because one knowing the subordinate science can
naturally know the superior science, for the principles of the
superior science are prior. And to us it is what is prior and
confused about intelligibles that is more knowable and first
known: according to Avicenna in Bk. I of his Metaphysics, we first
know 'being'. In sense perceptibles the converse is true, because
there the posterior are more known to us. Therefore one who has
the subordinate science about intelligibles can naturally have the
knowledge of the superior science as naturally prior. But this is
false because then the same one could be both a pilgrim and one
who has come to the end [of life's journey].
154 As for the first argument for this opinion I say that the
subordinate science has some principles as simply known [quia]
for which it has evidence from experience. In this way the
optician through experience proves the simple fact: "The angle of
incident and of reflection are equal." And in everything about
which we have experiential science we first know the simple fact
before we know the reasoned fact. Hence many principles are
multa principia sunt nota perspectivo, de quibus tamen nescit

propter quid. Sed si sciantur aliqua alia principia in subalternata
quae non sunt nota per sensum et experientiam, oportet quod
sciat ea reducere in principia scientiae subalternantis propter
quid et demonstrationem, aliter non erit scientia. Illa ergo
scientia quae tantum supponit aliqua principia nec propter quid
nec per experientiam cognoscit illa, non est scientia.
155 Per hoc ad rationem primam.152 Cum dicitur quod sub
alternata inquantum talis est scientia, verum est non quia
tantum credit sua principia, sed quia novit per experientiam vel
quia novit ea reducere ad priora propter quid et demonstrationem
in scientia superiori.
156 Ad secundam153 dico quod licet perspectiva inquantum talis
sit scientia, huic tamen non est scientia nisi cognoscat modo
praedicto.
Et quando dicit quod perspectivus inquantum talis potest
esse non geometer, dicendum quod si non esset geometer, non
esset perfectus perspectivus. Et ideo perfectus perspectivus est
simpliciter sciens, nec distinguitur essentialiter a geometro nisi
ex cognitione quia per sensum et experientiam. Si autem
cognoscit propter quid, est geometer.
157 Ad auctoritatem Philosophi154 dico quod principia dupliciter
possunt esse nota. Uno modo notitia confusa, ut si termini
confuse apprehendantur per sensum et experientiam, et hoc
sufficit ad scientiam terminorum in scientia qualibet speciali, ut
quod linea sit longitudo ignorando utrum quiditas eius sit
substantia, quantitas vel qualitas etc. Alio modo possunt cognosci
notitia distincta sciendo ad quod genus pertinet quiditas eorum,
cum definitiones terminorum distincte cognoscuntur ex evidentia
terminorum, et hoc contingit per scientiam metaphysicalem
dividendo et componendo. Et sic omnes scientiae possunt dici sibi
152 Cf. supra n. 146.

153 Cf. supra n. 147.
ir'4 Cf. supra n. 148.
known by the optician, about which he has no knowledge of why

they are so. But if there were some other principles in the
subordinate science, which are not known through sense
perception and experience, it would be necessary to know how
they go back to principles in the superior science where they are
known as reasoned facts by demonstration; otherwise it [the
subordinate] would not be a science. Therefore that 'science'
which only presupposes some principles, but knows them neither
as reasoned facts nor as facts known through experience, is not a
science.
155 As for the first argument, [n. 146] then, when it is said that
the subordinate science as such is science, this is true not because
it takes its first principles on faith, but because it knows them
from experience or because it knows how they can in fact be
traced back to prior reasoned facts demonstrated in the superior
science.
156 To the second [n. 147] I say that although optics as such is a
science, but to him it is only a science if he knows in the aforesaid
way. And when it is said that the optician as such does not have
to be a geometer, it must be said that if he were not a geometer,
he would not be a perfect optician. And therefore the perfect
optician is one who knows in an unqualified sense, nor is he
distinguished essentially from a geometer except by virtue of
having knowledge of the simple fact through sense perception and
experience. But if he knows this as reasoned fact, he is a
geometrician.
157 To the authority of the Philosopher, [n. 148] I say that
principles can be known in two ways. One is by confused
knowledge,* as when terms are apprehended through the senses
and experience, and this suffices for scientific knowledge of the
terms in any special science, as [in knowing] that a line has
length, while being ignorant of whether its quiddity is substance,
quanity or quality, etc. Another way principles can be known is by
distinct* knowledge, knowing to what category their quiddity
pertains, with definitions of terms known distinctly from the
evidence of the terms themselves, and this happens through the
science of metaphysics through division* and composition.* And
in this way all sciences can be called subordinate, namely to
subalternatae, scilicet metaphysicae. Et ideo habita scientia

metaphysicae perfectius cognoscuntur principia cuiuslibet scien-
tiae quam nata sint cognosci in illa scientia per principia propria.
Et per consequens perfectius habetur quaelibet alia scientia
habita metaphysica.
[Opinio Henrici]
158 Alia opinio est quod a viatore potest haberi scientia de

veritatibus per se scibilibus de Deo sub ratione deitatis, non
tamen in lumine fidei nec gloriae, sed quodam lumine medio.155
Ad hoc adducunt plures auctoritates, maxime tamen illam
Augustini, XIV De Trinitate, cap. 1:156 "Huic scientiae est
tribuendum quo fides saluberrima gignitur, defenditur, nutritur
et roboratur, qua non pollent fideles plurimi, licet ipsa fide
polleant quam plurimi. Aliud enim est scire quid homo credere
debeat, et aliud quemadmodum hoc ipsum opituletur et contra
impios defendatur".
159 Item, Richardus, De Trinitate, libro 4, cap. 4, 157 dicit quod
non solum per fidem, sed rationibus necessariis veritates de Deo,
ut unitas essentiae et trinitas personarum, promittit se
ostensurum.
160 Item, Anselmus, Monologion, 13. cap.,158 dicit quod "duo
opuscula mea", scilicet Monologion et Proslogion, "ad hoc feci ut
certa ratione, non auctoritate, quae ad Deum pertinent mani-
festarem". Quaere in textu.
161 Pro hac opinione sunt duae rationes. Prima est ista.
Cuiuscumque necessarii terminos naturaliter apprehendimus, et
illud possumus naturaliter cognoscere. Sed omnium ne-
cessariorum revelatorum terminos naturaliter cognoscimus, ergo
etc. Probatio maioris. Illa necessaria aut sunt mediata aut
immediata. Si immediata, ergo cognoscuntur terminis cognitis. Si
mediata, ergo cum naturaliter possumus cognoscere extrema,
|r'r' Henricus Gand., Quodl. 12, q. 2 (f. 485r).

ir'0 August., De Trin. XIV, c. 1, n. 3 (CCSL 50A, 424; PL 42, 1037).
157 Richardus de S. Victore, De Trin. I, c. 4 (ed. J. Ribaillier, TPMA VI, 89;
PL 196, 892).
ir'H Anselmus, Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi, c. 6 (ed. F.S. Schmitt II, 20).
metaphysics. And therefore, given the science of metaphysics,

principles of any science whatsoever are known more perfectly
than they are suited by nature to be known in that science
through its own proper principles. And as a consequence, another
science is known more perfectly if one knows metaphysics.
The opinion of Henry of Ghent
158 Another opinion is that a pilgrim can have knowledge of

truths about God that are knowable per se under the aspect of
deity, not however in the light of faith nor of glory, but in a kind
of intermediate light. To this they adduce several authorities,
especially that of Augustine in The Trinity Bk. XIV, ch. 1: "To this
science must be attributed that whereby the most wholesome
faith is begotten, nourished, protected and strengthened. Not
many of the faithful are exceedingly strong in this science,
although very many are exceedingly strong in the faith itself. For
it is one thing to know what a man must believe ... and another
thing to know how this may help the [godly] and how to defend
against the godless."
159 Also, Richard of St. Victor, The Trinity Bk. I, ch. 4 says that
it is not only through faith, but by necessary reasons that he
promises to show truths about God, such as unity of essence and
trinity of persons.
160 Also, Anselm De Incarnatione ch. 13 says: "I have made my
two small treatises," namely the Monologion and Proslogion, "in
order that I might manifest those things which pertain to God,
not by authority, but by certain reason." Look in the text.*
161 For this opinion there are two arguments: The first is this. If
we naturally apprehend the terms of any necessary [proposition]
whatsoever, we can also naturally know the [proposition] itself;
but of all necessary revealed [truths] we naturally know the
terms; therefore etc. Proof of the major. Those necessary [truths]
are either mediate or immediate. If immediate, therefore they are
known once their terms are known. If they are mediate, therefore
when we can naturally know the extremes, we can know the
middle terms between them. By joining the middle term with the
extremes, one either has premises that are mediate or immediate.
possumus cognoscere media inter illa. Coniungendo medium cum

extremis, aut habentur praemissae mediatae aut immediatae. Si
immediatae, ut prius. Si mediatae, procedatur coniungendo
medium cum extremis quousque veniatur tandem ad necessaria
immediata, aut erit processus in infinitum. Minor patet. Quia
habens fidem et haereticus contradicens sibi non contradicunt
sibi invicem de nominibus tantum sed de conceptibus, sicut patet
de theologo et philosopho contradicentibus sibi de isto "Deus est
trinus". Ergo omnem conceptum quem habet unus habet alius,
aliter non disputarent.
162 Item, illud potest sciri a nobis esse possibile de quo scimus
et possumus scire quod ad ipsum non sequitur impossibile. Sed de
omni veritate per se scibili de Deo possumus scire quod ad ipsam
non sequitur impossibile. Quia ex quo huiusmodi complexio est
vera, omnis ratio in contrarium aut peccat in materia aut in
forma. Si in forma, possumus scire quo peccato quia certam artem
habemus de qualibet fallacia. Si in materia, ergo possumus scire
rationem non esse necessariam contra istam, ergo etc.
163 Confirmatur per dictum Philosophi III Metaphysicaei59
dicentis quod veritatis adeptio est solutio dubitatorum. Ergo cum
contingit nos solvere argumenta contra fidem, possibile est nos
scire ea quae per fidem creduntur.
[Argumenta Godefridi contra Henricum]
164 Sed contra hanc opinionem arguitur sic. Inconveniens est

habere habitus nobilissimos et latere nos, ex II Posteriorum.160 Et
haec propositio, licet non sit vera de habitibus infusis et
supernaturalibus quos per nullum actum in nobis experimur,
tamen vera est ut eam capit Philosophus contra Platonem, scilicet
de habitibus qui habent evidentiam ex praesentia obiecti. Unde
impossibile est aliquem habere habitum habentem evidentiam ex
obiecto praesente et quod lateat. Sed unumquemque theologum
1M Aristot., Metaph. III (B), c. 1 (995a 28-30).

Aristot., Anal. Post. II, c. 19 (996 25-30).
If immediate, then one may proceed as before. If they are

mediate, one may procede by joining the middle term with the
extremes until one finally comes to an immediate proposition, or
else there will be an infinite process. The minor is evident, for a
believer and a heretic contradicting him do not contradict one
another about names only, but about concepts, as is evident in the
case of the theologian and the philosopher contradicting one
another about this proposition: "God is triune." Therefore every
concept, which one has the other has as well, otherwise they
would not be disputing.
162 [Second] Also, we can only know something to be possible, if
we know and can know that something impossible doesn't follow
from it. But of all truth that is per se knowable of God we can
know that something impossible doesn't follow from it. For from
the fact that such a proposition is true, every argument to the
contrary either sins by reason of matter or of form. If it sins in
form, then we can know by what particular sin or error, because
we have a certain art whereby a fallacy can be revealed. If it sins
in matter, therefore we can know the argument is not necessarily
[valid] against this [true] statement, therefore, etc.
163 This is confirmed by the statement of the Philosopher in Bk.
III of the Metaphysics saying: "Obtaining the truth is the solution
of doubts." Therefore when it happens that we solve objections
against the faith, it is possible for us to know those truths, which
through faith are believed.
Arguments of Godfrey against Henry
164 But against this opinion it is argued in this fashion. "It is

incongruous to have the most noble habits and that they be
hidden from us," from Bk. II of the Posterior Analytics. And this
proposition, although it is not true of habits infused and
supernatural which we do not experience in ourselves through
any acts, nevertheless is true in the sense in which the
Philosopher makes use of it against Plato, namely about habits
which are evident from the presence of their object. Hence it is
impossible that the habit, of which there is evidence from the
presence of its object, be hidden from someone who has it. But no
latet se habere talem habitum de Deo in tali lumine quia non

potest exire in actum secundum huiusmodi habitum, ergo etc.
Minor probatur tam de actu intrinseco quam extrinseco. De
intrinseco, tum quia non potest aliquis viator huiusmodi principia
considerare clare in aliquo lumine alio a lumine fidei (hoc enim
quantumcumque magnus doctor confitetur in morte quod tantum
articulos fidei credit nec in alio lumine ea videt), tum quia omnis
sciens si reflectatur super suum actum scit se scire, et omnis
credens si reflectatur super actum credendi scit se credere. Sed
nullus scit se scire principia theologiae in tali lumine, ergo etc.
Hoc etiam patet de actu extrinseco. Quia nullus doctor
quantumcumque excellens confitetur se scire huiusmodi princi
pia, nec etiam potest alios docere ea, cum tamen scientis vel
sapientis signum sit posse docere, I Metaphysicae.161
165 Item, fides et scientia de eodem obiecto et in eodem
intellectu sibi repugnant quia aliter idem obiectum eidem
intellectui simul esset clarum et obscurum. Ergo cum fidelis
viator de huiusmodi principiis habeat fidem, nullo modo potest
habere scientiam.
166 Respondetur quod fides est habitus medius inter opinionem
et scientiam, et licet opinio contradicat scientiae, non tamen fides.
167 Contra: tantam impossibilitatem facit una contradictio sicut
multae. Opinio contradicit scientiae dupliciter, tum propter
formidinem, tum propter non evidentiam. Econtra scientia est
certa notitia et de obiecto evidente. Fides autem contradicit
scientiae unica contradictione, quia est cognitio non evidens et
scientia est evidens. Ergo fides et scientia ita sunt
incompossibiles respectu eiusdem obiecti sicut opinio et scientia,
licet non tantis contradictionibus.
168 Confirmatur: quia si aliquis philosophus sciens Deum esse
unum convertatur ad fidem et credat Deum esse unum, non
habebit scientiam de unitate quam prius habuit propter
Aristot., Metaph. I (A), c. 1 (9816 7).

theologian is aware of any such habit about God in an

[intermediate] light, because he is unable to perform any act
according to such a habit; therefore etc. The minor is proved
both about an intrinsic act and about an extrinsic one. About the
intrinsic act, both because no one in this life can consider clearly
such principles in any light other than the light of faith (for any
great doctor confesses on his deathbed that he only believes in the
articles of faith, but does not see them in any other light), and
also because everyone knowing, if he reflects upon his act knows
himself to know, and everyone believing if he reflects upon his act
of belief, knows himself to believe. But no one knows himself to
know principles of theology in such a light; therefore, etc. This
is also evident regarding the extrinsic act. For no doctor, no
matter how excellent confesses that he knows scientifically such
principles, nor can he also teach them, since it is a sign of the one
who knows and is wise that he can teach, according to Bk. I of the
Metaphysics.
165 Also faith and science about the same object and in the same
intellect are repugnant to one another, because otherwise the
same object would be both clear and obscure to the same intellect.
Therefore when a faithful pilgrim would have mere faith in such
principles, in no way could he have scientific knowledge of them.
166 It is objected in response that faith is an intermediary habit
between opinion and scientific knowledge, and although opinion
contradicts science, faith does not.
167 To the contrary: One contradiction creates as much
impossibility as many contradictions. Opinion contradicts science
in two ways, both because of the fear [of error] it produces as well
as its lack of evidence. Science, on the contrary, is certain
knowledge and is about an evident object. Faith, however,
contradicts science only in one way, because it is cognition that is
not evident whereas science is evident. Therefore faith and
science are thus incompatible with regard to the same object just
as opinion and science are, although there are not as many
contradictions [between them].
168 This is confirmed. For if some philosopher, knowing God is
one, is converted to the faith and believes God is one,ii4 he will
lH That is, one personally.

repugnantiam eius ad fidem circa idem obiectum. Vel si fidelis

factus habeat scientiam de unitate Dei, non habebit eiusdem
unitatis fidem propter repugnantiam.
169 Ideo sic arguentes concedunt quod theologia non est proprie
scientia. Non tamen per hoc, ut dicunt, derogatur habitui
theologiae. Quia secundum Philosophum, I Metaphysicae,162 una
scientia est nobilior altera, quia est de nobiliori subiecto, et quia
certior. Cum autem haec sit de Deo ut de nobilissimo subiecto, et
firmissimam adhaesionem habeat, ipsa erit nobilior habitus
quocumque alio, licet proprie non sit scientia sed persuasiones et
probabilitates ad firmiter credendum inducunt.
[Responsio Scoti ad rationes Godefridi contra Henricum]
170 Sed isti nimis vilificant theologos et theologiam. Quia si

aeque nobile obiectum habet theologia et fides, vetula habens
fidem ita firmiter adhaeret articulis fidei sicut theologus. Ergo
solum theologus habet opinionem ultra cognitionem vetulae, quod
est inconveniens. Similiter, quod aliquis doctor propter unam
auctoritatem Averrois in qua deridet christianos de secta eorum,
dimittat aliam opinionem quae innititur forte plus quam 30
auctoritatibus sanctorum, Augustini et aliorum, videtur magis
deridendus quam tenens opinionem priorem.163
162 Aristot., Afetaph. I (A), c. 2 (983a 1-8); Cf. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed.
J. Hamesse, 117).
v addit (cf. Add. M.): Quod autem apostoli vel aliqui alii sancti habuerunt
perfectiorem cognitionem de essentia divina in articulis fidei, quam sit cognitio
fidei, videtur dicere Gregorius 18 Moralium, (Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob
XVIII, c. 54, n. 89 [CCSL 143A, 952; PL 76, 95]) super illo verbo (Iob 28:21):
"Abscondita est", scilicet sapientia Dei, "ab oculis omnium viventium", ubi dicit
sic: "A quibusdam potest adhuc in hac corporali carne viventibus, sed tamen
inaestimabili virtute crescentibus, quodam contemplationis acumine, aeterna Dei
claritas videri. Hoc quoque a beati lob sententia non abhorret, qui ait: abscondita
est, etc., quoniam quilibet sapientiam, quae Deus est, videt, huic vitae funditus
moritur, ne in eius amore teneatur. Nullus quippe eam videt, qui adhuc
carnaliter vivit, quia nemo potest simul amplecti Deum et saeculum". Et post hoc
respondet ad illud quod dicitur Moysi (Ex. 33:20): "Non videbit me homo et vivet",
et ad illud Apostoli (lTim. 6:16): "Qui habitat lucem inaccessibilem, quam nullus
hominum videt, sed nec videre potest"; et ad illud Ioannis, I (Io. 1:18, Ho. 4:12):
"Deum nemo vidit". Exponit sic (ibid., n. 92 [CCSL 143A, 955; PL 76. 95]): "More
suo homines vocans omnes humana sapientes, et qui divina sapiunt super
not have scientific knowledge about such unity [of person] as he

had before, because of its repugnance to faith regarding the same
object. Or if, having become a believer, he were to have science
about God's unity, he would not have faith regarding such unity
because of the repugnance.
169 Also, arguing in this way they concede that theology is not
properly a science. Not however through this, as they say, is the
habit of theology demeaned. Because according to the Philo
sopher, (I Metaphysics): one science is nobler than another,
because it is about a more noble subject and because it is more
certain. But since this is about God as a most noble subject, and
one adheres to it most firmly as a certainty, it will be a habit
nobler than any other, although properly it is not a science, but
probable and persuasive reasons lead one to believe it firmly.
Scotus's reply to the arguments of Godfrey against Henry
170 But these vilify too much theologians and theology. For if
faith and theology have an equally noble object, an old woman
having faith adheres as firmly as a theologian to the articles of
faith. Therefore, all the theologian has in addition to the
knowledge of an old woman is an opinion, which is implausible.
Similarly, one doctor, because of one authoritative statement of
Averroes in which he derides Christians about their sect,
dismisses another opinion that is supported perhaps by more
than thirty authoritative statements of the saints including
Augustine and others. It seems he ought to be derided more than
one holding the former opinion.ii5
i i5 V adds (cf. Add. M.): But the apostles and some other saints had a more
perfect knowledge of the divine essence through the aricles of faith, than is a
knowledge of faith, as Gregory seems to say in his Book of Morals, Bk. 18 on
those words "It is hidden," namely the Wisdom of God, "from the eyes of all the
living." There he says: "By certain ones still living in this bodily flesh, but
nevertheless growing with inestimable virtue, by a certain sharpness of
contemplation, the eternal clarity of God can be seen. This does not disagree with
the words of blessed Job, who says: 'it is hidden,' etc., because whoever sees
wisdom, which is God, dies to this life completely, to avoid being trapped by his
love for it. For no one sees it, who still lives in the flesh, for no one can embrace
both God and the world at the same time." And after that he responds to that,
which is said to Moses: "No one sees me and still lives," and to that of the
171 Verumtamen, quidquid sit de veritate opinionis praedictae,

rationes suae non concludunt necessario. Prima non.164 Concedo
enim quod habens illum habitum experiatur se habere illum et
quod non lateat ipsum qualem habitum habeat, ut sancti patres
apostoli et prophetae et alii sancti qui fuerunt quasi montes in
ecclesia, qui si non fuissent, alii simplices exsistentes in vallibus
cito a fide cecidissent, secundum Augustinum. Unde tales
experiuntur se habere talem habitum tam considerando et
intelligendo se scire illo habitu quam etiam exterius confitendo,
non tamen docendo.
172 Et quod sit possibile declaratur sic. Philippo petenti a
domino quod ostenderet ei Patrem respondit: "Philippe, qui videt
me, videt et Patrem meum", et subiunxit medium demon-
strationis, "quia ego in Patre et Pater in me est". Quia enim ipse
et Pater unum sunt secundum essentiam ac per hoc unus in alio
per circumincessionem, ideo qui videt unam personam videt et
aliam. Christus ergo videns hanc veritatem in verbo docuit, sicut
docuisset Petrus si habuisset eam, proponendo terminos et
complexionem eius. Quod autem alius non docetur, hoc est
propter defectum luminis in intellectu eorum. Licet ergo aliquis
theologus in illo lumine sciat multas veritates per se scibiles de
Deo, non tamen potest eas alios docere propter defectum luminis
intellectus eorum.
173 Ad secundum165 dico quod fides et scientia respectu eius-
dem obiecti non repugnant. Nam aliquis potest esse credens
aliquem articulum per fidem, et post eundem articulum posset
scire per demonstrationem, quia fides non destruit scientiam nec
homines sunt". Verumtamen illud Gregorius prius dixit, asserendo quod (ibid., n.
88 [CCSL 143A, 951; PL 76, 92]) "quamdiu hic mortaliter vivitur, videri per
quasdam imagines Deus potest, sed per ipsam naturae speciem non potest, ut
anima, gratia Spiritus afflata, per figuras quasdam Deum videat, sed ad ipsam
vim eius essentiae non pertingat".
164 Cf. supra n. 164.
105 Cf. supra n. 165.
171 Nevertheless, whatever is to be said about the truth of the

aforesaid opinion, the reasons given are not necessarily
conclusive. The first is not. [n. 164] For I concede that one having
that habit may experience himself as having it and that it may
not be hidden to him, as [it was not hidden to] the holy apostolic
fathers and the prophets and other holy people that were like
mountains in the church, without whom other simple people
existing in the valleys would have quickly lost their faith,
according to Augustine. Hence such experience themselves to
have such a habit both by considering and understanding that
they know by that habit and also exteriorly professing it, not
however by teaching.
172 And that this is possible, one explains in this way. When
Philip asked the Lord to show him the Father, he replied: "Philip,
who sees me, sees also my Father" [John 14:9]. And adds the
means of showing it, "because I am in the Father and the Father
is in me." For, since he and the Father are one according to
essence and through this one in another through circumincession,
therefore whoever sees one person sees the other as well. Christ,
therefore, seeing this truth in the Word had taught, as Peter
would have taught if he had that truth, by proposing terms and
propositions. But that another failed- to be taught, is because of
the lack of light in his intelllect. Therefore, although some
theologian in that light might know many truths that are per se
knowable scientifically about God, he could not teach them to
others, because of the lack of the light in their intellect.
173 To the second, [n. 165] I say that faith and science with
respect to the same object are not repugnant. For someone
believing some article of faith can afterwards know the same
article scientifically through demonstration, because, insofar as
Apostle: "Who dwells in unapproachable light, and whom no human being has
seen or can see": and to that of John 1: "No one has ever seen God." He explains
in the following way: "He is accustomed to call human all who are wise regarding
the human things, and super-human those who are wise regarding the divine."
However, Gregory has said that before, asserting that "as long as this mortal life
continues here, God can [only] be seen through some images: however, he cannot
be [seen) in his true nature, so that the soul, inspired by the grace of the Spirit,
can see God through some sort of images, but cannot grasp the very nature of his
essence."
econverso, inquantum habitus sunt, quin simul possint esse in

anima. Sed non inclinat actualiter credentem in obiectum per
actum suum si habeat scientiam talis obiecti, nec potest exire in
actum credendi si habeat scientiam de tali obiecto, nec econverso,
si exeat in actum credendi per fidem respectu talis obiecti et
simul habeat habitum scientiae respectu talis obiecti, noni66
potest exire in actum sciendi quia actus repugnant, etsi non
habitus, licet uterque habitus quantum est ex parte sui habeat
essentialem inclinationem in actum suum respectu eiusdem
obiecti.
174 Quod autem habitus simul possunt stare in anima respectu
eiusdem obiecti patet. Quia species essentialius respiciunt obiecta
quam habitus cum immediatius gignantur ab eis et etiam quia
species magis repraesentant obiecta quam habitus. Sed species
contrariae possunt simul stare, ergo et habitus contrario modo
inclinantes in idem obiectum. Minor patet X Metaphysicae.i6"
Quia species contrariorum non sunt contrariae, ut species albi et
nigri, licet album et nigrum sint contraria.
175 Item, non video quomodo salvant scientiam alicuius
veritatis animae Christi in verbo et in proprio genere. Nam si
propter hoc non possunt simul stare scientia et fides respectu
eiusdem obiecti quia inclinant sub oppositis rationibus, scilicet
clari et obscuri, cum circa idem obiectum sint etiam istae rationes
incompossibiles, scilicet clarum et minus clarum sicut clarum et
obscurum, sequitur quod in anima Christi respectu eiusdem
obiecti sint visiones incompossibiles, scilicet visio in verbo et visio
in genere proprio. Nec solvit istam instantiam bene quam facit
contra se.
176 Ad confirmationem illami68 quod una contradictio facit
habitus incompossibiles sicut multae etc. respondeo. Opinio non
stat cum fide quia habet obiectum nullo modo certum, et ideo
opinans nihil habet certum. Sciens et credens habent obiectum
'Non' redundanter dictum, cum 'nec' supra sufficiat.

i67 Aristot, Metaph. X (I), c. 7 (10576 4-10).
l" Cf. supra n. 167.
they are habits, faith does not destroy science nor vice versa,
preventing [each other] from being simultaneously in the soul.
But if the believer has scientific knowledge of such an object this
does not incline him to an actual act of belief, nor can he exercise
an act of belief if he has scientific knowledge of such an object;
nor vice versa, if he does express an act of belief with respect to
such an object, and at the same time possesses science as a habit,
can he then express an act of knowing scientifically, because the
acts are repugnant, though their habits are not, despite the fact
that each habit on its own would have an essential inclination to
express its act as regards the same object.
174 That the habits, however, can simultaneously remain in the
soul with respect to the same object is evident. For the mental
images (species) refer more essentially to the objects than do the
habits, since they are more immediately produced by the former
and also because they represent the objects to a greater degree
than the habits do. But contrary mental images can remain
simultaneously, and therefore also the habits that are inclined
towards the same object in contrary ways. The minor is evident
from Bk. X of the Metaphysics. For the mental images of
contraries, such as those of black and white, are themselves not
contraries, although white and black are contraries.
175 Also, I do not see how they preserve science of some truth in
the soul of Christ in the Word and in its proper genus. For if on
this account science and faith cannot coexist simultaneously with
respect to the same object, because they incline under opposite
aspects, namely clearly and obscurelysince as regards the same
object even these are incompatible notions, namely 'clear' and
'less clear,' such as 'clear' and 'obscure'it follows that in the soul
of Christ with respect to the same object there are incompatible
visions, namely vision in the Word and vision in its proper
category. Nor has he solved this objection well when he raised it
against himself.
176 To the confirmation of this [n. 167] that one contradiction
makes the habit just as incompatible as many contradictions, I
respond. Opinion does not coexist with faith, because it has an
object that is in no way certain, and therefore one opining has
nothing certain. One knowing scientifically and one believing
simpliciter certum, et ideo opinio contrariatur vel contra-

dictoriatur utrique. Scientia enim habet obiectum certum et
evidens ex evidentia obiecti, fides habet obiectum sibi certum et
evidens ex auctoritate. Et sic obiectum fidei non est omnino non
evidens, licet sit non evidens ex illo habitu qui est evidens ex
evidentia rei et obiecti, et ita nullo modo contradicunt. Nec etiam
contrariantur nec opponuntur esse ex obiecto evidens et evidens
ex auctoritate, et ideo in argumento est fallacia secundum quid et
simpliciter: obiectum fidei non est evidens ex habitu scientiae,
ergo nullo modo evidens. Est etiam fallacia consequentis per
destructionem singularis: Non est Sortes, ergo non est homo.
177 Ad secundum dicendum quod fides acquisita de aliqua
geometrica conclusione quia non excludit formidinem etiam ex
auctoritate cui innititur nec habet aliquam certitudinem
infallibilem, ideo contradicit scientiae quae est notitia certa
excludens omnem formidinem. Sed fides infusa ex auctoritate
immutabili cui innititur habet certitudinem infallibilem exclu
dens omnem formidinem. Credo enim quod habens fidem infusam
minus dubitaret vel formidaret et citius exponeret se morti ex
certitudine adhaesionis auctoritati traditae in scriptura quam
multi theologi habentes scientiam secundum unam opinionem de
eisdem.
178 Ad tertium169 dicendum quod si simplex primo credat istam
conclusionem "Deus est trinus" vel aliquam aliam veritatem de
Deo et post addiscat illud demonstrare, vel econverso,
philosophus conversus primo sciat aliquid de Deo et postea illud
credat, hoc est satis possibile quia isti habitus non sunt
imcompossibiles in eodem, licet habens utrumque non posset
exire in actum secundum utrumque. Inclinatio tamen essentialis
est in utroque habitu in actum suum, licet non exeat in actum
propter aliquid repugnans aliunde quam ex parte habituum.
Cf. supra n. 168.

have an object that is simply certain, and therefore opinion is

contrary or contradictory to both. For science has an object that is
certain and is evident from the evidence of the object; faith has an
object that is certain to it and is evident from authority. And thus
the object of faith is not completely non-evident, although it is not
evident on account of that habit, which derives evidence from the
thing and the object, and so in no way do the two contradict one
another. Nor do 'to be evident from the object' and 'to be evident
from authority' contradict, or are opposed to one another, and
therefore there is a fallacy of confusing 'in a qualified sense' with
'in an unqualified sense' in the following argument: 'the object of
faith is not evident from the habit of science, therefore it is in no
way evident.' Also it is a fallacy of the consequent through the
destruction of the singular: 'He is not Socrates, therefore he is not
a man.'
177 To the second it must be said that faith* acquired about
some geometrical conclusionbecause it does not exclude fear [of
error], in spite of the authority supporting it, nor does it have
infallible certitudetherefore, contradicts science, which is
certain knowledge that excludes all fear of error. But infused
faith* from an immutable authority has infallible certitude and
excludes all fear [of error]. For I believe that one who has infused
faith would be less inclined to doubt or be in fear of error, and
would more readily expose oneself to death because of the
certitude with which he adheres to the authoritative statements
handed down in scripture than many theologians having
scientific knowledge, according to one opinion about them.
178 To the third [n. 168] it must be said that if a simple person
first believed this conclusion "God is triune," and some other
truth about God, and afterwards learned to demonstrate this, or
vice versa, a convert philosopher first knew something
scientifically about God and afterwards came to believe, this is
quite possible because these habits are not incompatible in
themselves, although one having both habits could not perform
acts according to both [at the same time]. Nevertheless the
essential inclination in both habits is to act, although they may
not go into action because of something that is repugnant by
reason of something other than the habits. Therefore when one
Quando ergo dicit quod fides non potest sequi scientiam, falsum
est quia perinde est ex parte compossibilitatis istorum habituum
quod scientia praecedat fidem vel sequatur.
[Contra opinionem Henrici]
179 Sed contra opinionem istam de lumine170 arguo dupliciter.

Primo sic. In quocumque lumine non habetur distincta notitia
terminorum principii, in eo lumine non potest intelligi distincte
illud principium quia principia cognoscimus inquantum terminos
et distincte si distincte. Sed in isto lumine quod tu ponis non
potest haberi distincta notitia Dei ut est terminus huiusmodi
principii "Deus est trinus" quia impossibile est sic habere
notitiam huiusmodi principii nisi Deus sit in se praesens
intellectui movens ipsum ad talem notitiam, vel in aliquo medio
repraesentativo ipsum sub ratione Deitatis. Sed nihil
repraesentat sic obiectum absens nisi species et phantasma. Non
species, secundum istum, quia negat omnem speciem in
intellectu. Nec phantasma, tum quia non habet phantasma, tum
quia nullum phantasma repraesentat Deum sub ratione Deitatis.
180 Item,171 sciens perfecte in sciendo non dependet ab actu
voluntatis quia necessarium non dependet a contingente. Prius
enim obiectum intellectus necessitat ipsum ad sciendum quam
aliquid velit circa illud. Credens in credendo dependet ab actu
voluntatis quia secundum Augustinum, Super Ioannem:172 'Scire
potest aliquis nolens, credere autem non potest aliquis non
volens', ergo etc.
1711 Cf. supra n. 158.

171 V addit (cf. Add. M.): secundo sic: dicunt sic opinantes quod illa notitia
quae habetur de Deo in illo lumine dependet ex fide et quod fides respectu illius
notitiae se habet ut fundamentum ad aedificium et sicut cibus solidus ad lac,
iuxta verbum Apostoli. Sed contra...
m August.. In Iohannis evangelium tractatus CXXIV, tr. 26, n. 2 (CCSL 36,
260).
says that faith cannot follow scientific knowledge, this is false;

since these habits are compatible, science could just as well
precede or follow faith.
Against the opinion of Henry
179 But against that opinion about the light [n. 158] I argue in a
twofold way. The first is this. In whatever light one does not have
distinct knowledge of the terms of a principle, in that light one
cannot distinctly understand that principle, because principles
are known insofar as their terms are, and they are known
distinctly if their terms are as well. But in this light, which you
postulate, one cannot have distinct knowledge of God insofar as
he is the term of this principle "God is triune." For it is impossible
to have such knowledge of the principle unless God by himself, or
in some medium representative of him under the aspect of deity,
is present to the intellect, moving it to such knowledge. But
nothing so represents an absent object except the species and the
phantasm. Not the species, according to this one, because he
denies every species in the intellect. Nor in the phantasm, both
because this [principle] has no phantasm and because no
phantasm may represent God under the aspect of deity.
180 Also,ii6 one knowing perfectly in knowing is not dependent
upon an act of the will, because the necessary does not depend
upon the contingent. For the object of the intellect necessitates
him to know before he can will something in its regard. The
believer in believing depends upon an act of the will according to
Augustine, Super Ioannem: 'Some one not wanting to, can know,
but no one unwilling can possibly believe'; therefore, etc.
1"' V adds (cf. Add. M.): secondly [it could be put] this way; those who have
this opinion say that this knowledge, which is had about God in that light
depends on faith, and that faith in respect to this knowledge is like a foundation
to the edifice and like solid food to milk, according to the words of the Apostle (cf.
Hebrews 5:12). But to the contrary...
[Tertia opinio]
181 Tertia opinio est quod theologia est scientia in nobis, etiam
quia habet aliquod primum subiectum de quo considerat omnes
passiones eius per rationem talis subiecti.
182 Contra. Scientia causatur per rationem subiecti cognitam ab
intellectu. Nullam talem rationem subiecti cognoscimus quae
includat virtualiter omnia cognita de Deo, ut scilicet quod Deus
est trinus et unus et huiusmodi, ergo etc.
183 Secundo. Contingentia nullum habent subiectum sicut
ponitur subiectum in scientia, quia nulla scientia continet illud
quod est sibi accidentale. Ad istam autem scientiam pertinent
multae veritates accidentales et contingentes, ut Deum incarnari,
esse mortuum etc. quae conveniunt sibi secundum naturam
assumptam. Ergo talia non habent aliquod subiectum primum.
[Solutio ad quaestionem]
184 Respondeo ad quaestionem quod multae veritates per se

scibiles de Deo possunt sciri simpliciter a viatore, non solum a
posteriori sed etiam a priori per rationem Deitatis cognitione
superiori et nobiliori omni cognitione fidei.
185 Primam partem istius dicti probo sic. Quia intellectus
potens intelligere subiectum sub ratione subiecti potest intelligere
principium virtualiter inclusum in subiecto, et ulterius
conclusiones inclusas in principio quia sicut terminus subiecti est
causa principii, et principium est causa conclusionis. Sed
obiectum istius scientiae potest intelligi et cognosci distincte ab
intellectu viatoris cognitione saltem abstractiva, licet non
intuitiva, nam nulla cognitio abstractiva repugnat viatori
inquantum viator. Quia scientia est habitus veridicus et
permansivus, VI Ethicorum,1"3 ergo non respicit obiectum sub illa
ratione sub qua potest mutari stante habitu. Sed si respiceret
obiectum in exsistentia sua, posset mutari stante habitu, ergo
etc.174
i Aristot., Eth. Nic. VI, c. 3 (11396 19-23).

171 V addit (cf. Add. M ): [186] Vel sic: intellectus potens intelligere aliquod
subiectum sub propria ratione subiecti, potest scire veritates per se scibiles de
A Third Opinion
181 A third opinion is that theology is a science in us, also

because it has some first subject, whence it considers all its
attributes through the notion of such a subject.
182 To the contrary: science is caused by the notion of the
subject known by the intellect. No such notion of the subject do
we know which includes virtually everything known of God, as
namely that God is triune and one and such like; therefore, etc.
183 Secondly, contingent [truths] have no subject such as is
posited in a science because no science contains that which is
accidental to it. To this science, however, pertain many accidental
and contingent truths, such as, that God became incarnate, and
has died, etc., which pertain to him according to the nature
assumed. Therefore such truths have no first subject.
Solution to the Question
184 I respond to the question that many truths that are per se
knowable about God can be known simply by the pilgrim, not only
a posteriori but also a priori* under the aspect of deity by a form
of cognition that is superior and more noble than any knowledge
by faith.
185 The first part of this statement I prove in this fashion. For
an intellect able to know the subject under the aspect of subject
can know a principle virtually included in the subject, and further
can know conclusions included in the principle, because as the
term of the subject is the cause of the principle so the principle is
the cause of the conclusion. But the object of this science can be
understood and known distinctly by the intellect of the pilgrim at
least abstractively, although not intuitively. For no abstractive*
cognition is repugnant to the pilgrim qua pilgrim. Because science
is a veridical and persistent habit, according to Bk. VI of the
Ethics, therefore it does not regard the object under that aspect
under which the latter can be changed, with the habit remaining.
But if it were to regard the object in its existential state, the
188 Istam rationem tangit Philosophus VII Metaphysicaei15 ubi

probat quod de sensibilibus non est scientia quia illis abeuntibus
a sensu perit scientia quae est per illum sensum de illis.
189 Contra istam rationem insto sic. Si scientia viatoris habet
Deum pro obiecto sub propria ratione Deitatis, ergo extendit se ad
omnia cognoscibilia de eo, et ita posset esse beatus inquantum
viator. Consequentia patet quia scientia de subiecto extendit se
ad omnia illa ad quae se extendit ratio subiecti.
190 Respondeo. Dico quod ista scientia est de Deo sub ratione
Deitatis propria et concedo quod extendit se ad omnia ad quae se
extendit ratio subiecti inquantum est ex propria et per se ratione
Deo, quia talis intellectus potest intelligere principium complexum talis subiecti,
et sic conclusionem inclusam virtualiter in illo principio. Sed hoc potest
intellectus viatoris; ergo etc. [187] Ad cuius evidentiam, sive ad declarationem
minoris est sciendum, quod duplex est cognitio: quaedam per speciem, quae non
est rei in se praesentis, et haec vocatur cognitio rei abstractiva; alia est cognitio
rei ut habet esse in actuali exsistentia, et haec dicitur intuitiva. Et haec duplex
cognitio potest patere in cognitionibus potentiarum sensitivarum; visus enim
apprehendit visibile, ut exsistit extra actualiter. et huic correspondet cognitio
intuitiva intellectus; phantasia autem, sive imaginativa apprehendit per speciem
ipsum repraesentantem in absentia rei, quamvis non sit sibi praesens in actuali
exsistentia; et huic correspondet cognitio abstractiva intellectus. Tunc
probatur minor sic: omne obiectum scientiae potest cognosci aliqua cognitione
abstractiva distincta, licet non intuitiva; sed Deus est subiectum in aliqua
scientia, ut probatum est in quaestione praecedenti; ergo Deus potest cognosci
aliqua cognitione abstractiva distincte; sed talis cognitio Dei abstractiva non
repugnat viatori. ergo viator potest intelligere divina distincte, licet non intuitive
et clare. Probatio maioris huius prosyllogismi: scientia cum sit habitus
veridicus, non respicit subiectum sub illa ratione sub qua, obiecto mutato, non
potest idem habitus manere; sed si scientia respiceret obiectum sub ratione qua
intuitive cognoscitur, mutato obiecto et non praesente, non maneret idem
habitus. Ergo obiectum cuiuslibet scientiae cognoscitur tantum abstractive et non
intuitive, quantum ex ratione scientiae.
m Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 15 (1040a 1-4).
latter could be changed, while the habit remained; therefore,

etc.117
188 The Philosopher in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics touches on
this reason, where he proves that there is no science about things
perceivable by the senses, because when they pass from
perception the scientific knowledge, which is about them through
his sense awareness, perishes.
189 I raise an impediment to the argument in this way. If the
science of the pilgrim has God for its object under the aspect of
deity, then it extends itself to all that is knowable about him, and
thus a pilgrim as pilgrim could be beatified. The implication is
evident, because a science about the subject extends to all those
things to which the notion of the subject extends.
190 I respond: I say that this science about God under the aspect
of deity is proper, and I concede that it extends itself to all to
117 V adds (cf. Add. M.): [186] Or it could be put in this way: the intellect
capable of understanding some subject under the proper notion of the subject
could know all the truths about God that are per se knowable, because such an
intellect could understand the first principle of such a subject, and in this way
[could understand] a conclusion included virtually in that principle. But this is
possible for the intellect of the pilgrim; therefore, etc. [187] In order to
understand this, or in order to clarify the minor one must know that cognition is
twofold: one through the species, which is not of a thing that is present in itself,
and this is called abstractive cognition of a thing; the other is cognition of a thing
as it has being in its actual existence, and this is called intuitive cognition. And
this twofold cognition can be shown in the cognition of the sensitive faculties; for
vision apprehends the visual as it exists actually outside, and this corresponds to
the intuitive cognition of the intellect; but the phantasy, or the imagination,
apprehends through a species representing the visible in the absence of the thing,
although it is not present to it in its actual existence; and this corresponds to the
abstractive cognition of the intellect. And then one proves the minor in this
way: every' object of a science can be known by some distinct abstractive
cognition, although not intuitively; but God is the subject of some science, as was
proved in the preceding question; therefore, God can be known distinctly by some
abstractive cognition; but such abstractive cognition of God is not repugnant to
the pilgrim, therefore, the pilgrim can know the divine distinctly, although not
intuitively and clearly. Proof of the major of this prosyllogism: science, since it
is a veridical habit, is not related to its subject in the way, in which, with the
change of its object [i.e., when it is no longer present], the same habit could not
remain; however, if science were related to its object in the way, in which
intuitive cognition operates, with the change of its object, when it is no longer
present, the same habit would not remain. Therefore, the object of any science
whatsoever is known only in an abstractive way, and not intuitively, insofar as
science is concerned.
scientiae istius, non limitando nec perstringendo ad certum

gradum. Et ideo ex ratione scientiae in se est quod possit
explicare omnes veritates contentas in subiecto. Sed prout actu
participata ab intellectu viatoris alicuius propter incapacitatem
eius et maxime pro statu isto non est ratio cognoscendi omnia
quae cognosci possunt de Deo.176
193 Contra. Si scientia ista prout est in viatore praescinditur et
limitatur ad duas veritates sciendas de Deo, ergo scientia sub ista
limitatione respicit subiectum praecise correspondens illis
limitationibus et non sub aliis. Consequentia patet quia omne
obiectum correspondet habitui adaequate.
194 Dico quod non sequitur. Quia si binarius habet multas
passiones, ut paritatem et primitatem inter numeros etc., ex
parte binarii non est una passio sine alia nec est ratio praecise ex
parte subiecti unius sine altera quia aeque primo et naturaliter
consequuntur subiectum. Possum tamen ego, quia non habeo
perfectam scientiam de binario, scire unam passionem eius et non
aliam, licet ex parte subiecti sit utraque aequaliter scibilis. Et
eodem modo dicendum est de veritatibus pertinentibus ad
Deitatem inquantum Deitas. Et quando dicis quod obiectum
170 V addit (cf. Add. M.): Immo potest esse in tali intellectu respectu duarum
conclusionum. Unde verum est quod quantum est ex parte sua extendit se ad
omnia, non tamen ut concernit certum gradum in certo intellectu. [191] Dicetur
forte: si scientia intelligendi viatoris respicit tantum duas conclusiones de Deo,
ergo Deus, ut est subiectum illius scientiae in tali intellectu, habebit praecisam
rationem, ut respicit illas conclusiones, (conclusiones post corr.; condiciones MS.)
ergo non erit subiectum illius scientiae sub ratione deitatis. [192] Responsio. Dico
quod non sequitur, quia binarius potest habere plures passiones quae immediate
insunt sibi per rationem binarii; nec sub ratione particulariori est subiectum
respectu unius passionis quam respectu utriusque (utriusque post corr.;
nostrarumque MS). Sic in proposito. Multae sunt veritates quae immediate
insunt Deo per rationem deitatis, nec sub ratione magis praecisa est subiectum
respectu unius quam respectu omnium quae immediate insunt; immo per
rationem deitatis. Et ideo non sequitur, si scientia de Deo in tali intellectu non sit
nisi respectu duarum conclusionum quod oporteat dare rationem aliquam magis
praecisam quam sit ratio deitatis per quam illae insunt.
which the notion of the subject extends insofar as it is from what

is the proper and per se notion of this science, not limiting it or
restricting it to a certain degree. And therefore from the notion of
the science as it is in itself one could explain all truths contained
in the subject. But as for its being really shared by the intellect of
some pilgrim because of his incapacity and most of all for this
[present] state it is not the reason for knowing all that can be
known about God.ii8
193 To the contrary: if this science as it exists in the pilgrim is
cut off and limited to two truths known scientifically about God,
therefore the science under this limitation regards the subject
precisely as corresponding to these limitations and not under
others. The implication is evident because every object
corresponds to a habit adequately.
194 I say this does not follow. Because if a binary had many
attributes, such as parity and a primacy among numbers, etc., on
the part of the binary there is no one attribute without the other,
nor is there a precise notion of one attribute without the other on
the part of the subject, because they all follow from the subject
equally first and naturally. However, because I do not have
perfect knowledge of a binary, I can know one attribute and not
know another, although on the part of the subject they are
equally knowable. And in the same way it must be said of the
truths pertaining to deity qua deity. And when you say that the
i i8 V adds (cf. Add. M ): Indeed, it can be in such an intellect as regards only

two conclusions. Hence, it is true that, so far as it is concerned, it extends itself to
everything, not, however, as it concerns a particular degree in a particular
intellect. [191] It can be said, perhaps: if the pilgrim's science of understanding
regards only two conclusions about God, therefore, God, as the subject of this
science in such an intellect, would have a precise notion, as regards those two
conclusions; therefore, he would not be the subject of that science under the
notion of deity. [192] Reply. I say that it does not follow, because a binary could
have more than one proper attribute that pertains to it immediately in virtue of
its being a binary; nor is it a subject in respect to one proper attribute under a
more particular notion, than regarding both. So it is in the case at hand. There
are many truths that pertain to God immediately by reason of deity, nor is he a
subject with regard to one [of these truths] under a more specific aspect, than
with regard to all those that pertain [to God] immediately, namely, by reason of
deity. And therefore it does not followif the science about God in such an
intellect is only there with regard to two conclusionsthat one would have to
give a more precise reason than that of deity, why they pertain [to God].
aequatur scientiae vel habitui, verum est in gradu perfecto, sed

non prout participatur ab isto quia iste potest explicare aliam
passionem de subiecto et non aliam quia imperfecte percipitur ab
eo.
195 Secundam partem declaro, scilicet quod ista cognitio quam
potest habere viator de Deo sub ratione Deitatis sit perfectior et
certior omni cognitione fidei. Quod probo sic. Quidquid potest
Deus mediante causa secunda effective, potest per se efficienter
sine ea. Sed Deus mediante obiecto potest causare certam
notitiam et certum assensum ita quod voluntas non potest
causare dissensum. Ergo et hoc potest per se sine medio.177
196 Talis non est habitus fidei sicut probatum est supra, ergo
etc. Isto autem habitu illuminati sunt prophetae ita quod non
subfuit voluntati eorum dissentire his quae revelabantur ab eo eis
per istum habitum.178
197 Ex isto infero duas conclusiones. Prima quod in cognitione
Dei sunt quinque gradus. Primus est cognoscere intuitive
veritates scibiles de Deo et distincte per rationem subiecti
intuitive et distincte cogniti,179 et iste gradus non est communiter
possibilis viatori.180 Secundus gradus est cognoscere aliquid
certitudinaliter in aliquo repraesentativo distincte cognito, et iste
gradus est possibilis viatori. Tertius gradus est cognoscere aliquid
cum certitudine ita quod certitudo eius non subest actui
voluntatis, et iste gradus fuit in prophetis. 181 Quartus gradus est
explicite cognoscere ea quae continentur in scriptura quibus piis
177 V addit: Unde Deus potest causare in intellectu viatoris notitiam de

seipso immediate talem qualem esset natum aliquod repraesentativum ipsius
causare sub ratione deitatis.
17,1 V addit: Unde talis notitia dicitur locutio Dei interior, qualis in prophetis,
non tamen clara et intuitiva, et non est immediate evidens ab obiecto.
17n V addit (cf. Add. A/.): Istum modum cognitionis intuitivae semper habuit
Christus de essentia divina sub ratione deitatis...
180 v addit (cf. Add. M ): nisi per specialem revelationem vel raptum.
181 V addit (cf. Add. A/.): Unde iste gradus est obiecti non praesentis
intellectui nec in se nec in aliquo repraesentativo, sed immediate causata a Deo
quae tamen non est evidens ex obiecto.
object is equal to the science or the habit, this is true of the

perfect degree, but not insofar as it is participated by this one,
because this one can explain a different attribute of the subject
and not another one because it is imperfectly perceived by him.
195 I explain the second part, namely that this cognition, which
the pilgrim can have about God under the aspect of deity, is more
perfect and more certain than any cognition based on faith. I
prove it in this way. Whatever God can do effectively by means of
a secondary cause, he can do efficiently without it. But God by
means of an object can cause certain knowledge and a certain
assent so that the will cannot cause any dissent. Therefore he can
also do this without any means.119
196 The habit of faith is not of this sort, as was proved above;
therefore, etc. But the prophets have been illuminated by this
habit, so that it was not in the power of their will to dissent from
those things that were revealed by him [God] to them through
this habit.120
197 From this I infer two conclusions: The first is that the
cognition of God has five degrees. The first is to know intuitively
the truths knowable of God and know them distinctly under the
subject intuitively and distinctly known,121 and this grade is not
commonly possible for the pilgrim.122 The second grade is to
know something certainly in some representation that is
distinctly known, and this grade is possible to a pilgrim. The third
grade is to know something with certitude so that its certitude is
not subject to an act of the will, and this grade was in the
prophets.123 The fourth grade is to know explicitly those things
which are contained in scripture whereby one supports the pious
119 V adds: Hence God could immediately cause in the intellect of the pilgrim
a knowledge of himself, such as could be caused by something representing him
under the aspect of deity.
120 V adds: Hence such knowledge is said to be God speaking interiorly, as in
the case of the prophets, not, however, clear and intuitive knowledge, nor is it
immediately evident from the object.
w V adds (cf. Add. A/.): Christ always had this kind of intuitive cognition of
the divine essence under the aspect of deity...
122 V adds (cf. Add. A/.): except by special revelation or rapture.
123 V adds (cf. Add. M.): Hence, this grade [of knowledge] is not from the
object present to the intellect, neither in itself, nor in something representing it,
but what is not evident from the object is immediately caused by God.
opitulatur auxiliis et contra impios defendatur sciendo dubi-

tationes aliorum solvere et munire bonis rationibus, et iste gradus
est maiorum in ecclesia. Quintus gradus est cognoscere ea quae
sunt necessaria ad salutem, qui est simplicium,182 quia non
possunt omnia contenta in scriptura perscrutari.183
198 Discordo ergo primo a lumine et ab opinione praecedente
quia pono quod non in illo lumine sed per illud lumen tamquam
per quoddam repraesentativum cognosco multa de Deo. Si autem
sic loquatur, quod non videtur quia negat speciem intelligibilem,
concordo cum eo. Si autem loquatur de lumine pro isto quo
aliquid videtur et non pro illo in quo aliquid videtur ut
repraesentante obiectum, nego lumen suum sicut est lumen
solum quo aliquid videtur, non tamen species in quo sicut
repraesentante aliquid videtur.
199 Secundo, quia non concedo istud lumen esse in nobis per
exercitium studii tamquam aliquid naturale sed per infusionem
supernaturaliter tamquam donum intellectus gratum faciens
possidentem.
,H2 V addit (cf. Add. M.): quorum cognitio subest voluntatis actui; et haec est
cognitio habita per fidem...
i8:i v addit (cf. Add. M.): Ex his patet quod in duobus discordo ab opinione
praecedente; primo quia non potest haberi scientia per quodcumque lumen de
Deo, si non sit obiectum in se praesens nec in suo repraesentativo. Si autem
vocas illud lumen rationem repraesentandi, tunc volo, sed in illo lumine non
habetur scientia, sed per aliud lumen. Secundo discordo in alio, quia huiusmodi
scientia de Deo sub ratione deitatis non habetur per studium, sed est donum
gratis datum ad utilitatem Ecclesiae, et scivit Christus, quando fuit utile illud
donum dare et quibus, ut apostolis et prophetis. Ad alia quae adducuntur pro alia
opinione. Ad auctoritatem Augustini dicendum quod illa scientia est distincta
notitia, sed non evidens simpliciter, quia non attingit ad notitiam distinctam
subiecti in se praesentis.
and defends against the impious by knowing how to solve doubts

of others and provide them with good reasons, and this grade is
for the elders in the church. The fifth grade is to know those
things which are necessary for salvation, which is for the simple
folk,i24 because they cannot investigate all that is contained in
Scripture.i25
198 I disagree therefore with the preceding opinion primarily
about the light, because I propose that it is not in that light, but
rather through that light as through a kind of representation that
I know many things about God. But he does not speak in this
way, it seems, because he denies the intelligible species;
otherwise I would agree with him. But if one speaks about that
light as being that by which something is seen and not that in
which, as representing the object, something is seen, I deny this
conception of the light, as it is a lighti26 solely by which
something is seen, and not rather a representative species in
which something is seen.
199 Secondly, because I do not concede that this light is in us as
something natural that is the result of study, but is there through
a supernatural infusion given to the one who possesses it as a free
gift to the intellect.
i14 V adds (cf. Add. M.): whose knowledge is subject to an act of the will, and
this is the knowledge had by faith...
i25 V adds (cf. Add. M.): From what has been said it is evident that I disagree
on two points with the preceding opinion; first, because one cannot have any
science about God through whatsoever light, if he is not an object present in itself
or in something that represents him. But if you imply that that light itself is that
which represents him, I agree, but then one does not have the science in that
light, but rather through another light. Secondly I disagree on another point,
because such a science about God under the aspect of deity is not had through
study, but is rather a free gift given for the utility of the Church, and Christ has
known when it was useful to give that gift and to whom, as to the Apostles and to
the Prophets. To the other arguments, which are adduced for the other opinion:
to the authority of Augustine it must be said that that science is distinct
knowledge, and is not evident in an unqualified manner, because it does not
attain to the distinct knowledge of the subject as present in itself.
i2 That is to say, this is the light of the intellect, and not that of the
illumination of the eternal reasons.
[Ad argumenta Henrici]
200 Ad rationem Augustini184 dico quod scientia vel notitia quae

habetur per exercitium studii est alia a scientia quae habetur per
infusionem tamquam lumen et donum gratis datum intellectui.
Et ideo Augustinus per unum verbum, XV De Trinitate, cap.
ult.185 solvit omnia quae possent adduci pro ista materia: "Cum",
inquit, "orando et bene vivendo inconcusse crediderunt sancti
apostoli",186 etc. Quaere verba ibidem.
201 Ad rationes Richardi187 et Anselmi188 qui promittunt se hoc
ostendere per rationes, non tantum per auctoritates, dicendum
quod non promittunt aliquid quod non possunt solvere, sed sicut
ipsi dicunt dico quod possunt adduci rationes necessariae. Et ipsi
adduxerunt rationes necessarias, sed non evidenter necessarias
ex evidentia obiecti. Non enim omne necessarium est evidens
necessarium ex obiecto.
202 Ad rationem illam189 "Cuiuscumque necessarii terminos
naturaliter cognoscimus" etc. dico quod maior est falsa. Et cum
arguit "Aut est mediata aut immediata" dico quod mediata. Sed
duplex est medium. Unum quod est essentialiter ordinatum inter
extrema ut quod quid est alterius extremi vel passio prior
respectu alterius passionis, et de hoc medio verum est quod qui
cognoscit extrema complexionis potest cognoscere medium inter
illa quia hoc modo medium est ratio uniendi et concludendi unum
de alio quia ratio eius includitur in uno extremo et aliud
extremum sibi per se et primo inest. Aliud est medium contentum
sub extremo uno ut aliquid inferius ad ipsum ad concludendum
passionem de superiori, ut si concluderem aliquod animal esse
risibile per rationem hominis tamquam per medium in tertia
figura, et de tali medio non oportet quod qui cognoscit extrema
complexionis, ut animal et risibile, cognoscat medium sumptum
1* Cf. supra n. 158.

i8,i v addit (cf. Add. M): "...Scripturis Sanctis, tamquam veracissimis
testibus, agant orando et quaerendo et bene vivendo ut intelligant id est ut
quantum potest videri videatur mente quod teneatur fide..."
187 Cf. supra n. 159.
188 Cf. supra n. 160.
189 Cf. supra n. 161
Reply to Henry's arguments
200 To the argument of Augustine [n. 158] I say that science or

knowledge, which is had through study is other than the science
which is had through the infusion of the light and as a gift freely
given to the intellect. And therefore Augustine through those
words in the final chapter of Bk. XV The Trinity solves all that
could be adduced for this matter: "Since by prayer and a well
lived life the Holy Apostles believed unshakably,"i27 etc. Look for
the text there.
201 To the arguments of Richard [n. 159] and Anselm [n. 160]
who promised themselves here to show by reasons and not just
authorities, it must be said that they did not promise something
that they could not explain, but just as they said so I say that
necessary reasons can be adduced. And they have set forth
necessary reasons, but they are not reasons that are necessarily
evident from the evidence of the object. For not every necessary
reason is necessary because it has evidence from the object.
202 As for that argument [n. 161] "If we naturally apprehend
the terms of any necessary [proposition] whatsoever," etc., I say
the major is false. And when it is argued "these are either
mediate or immediate," I say that they are mediate propositions.
But a medium or middle term is twofold. One is essentially
ordered between the extreme terms as the quiddity of the other
extreme or as a prior attribute with respect to the other attribute,
and about this medium it is true that who knows the extremes of
the compositei28 can know the middle term between them,
because it is in this manner that the middle term is the basis for
uniting and concluding one from another, because its meaning is
included in one extreme, and the other extreme is in it primarily
and per se. The other kind of medium is contained under only
one extreme as something [extensionally] inferior to it, and serves
the purpose of concluding that something is a proper attribute of
a superior notion (as [for instance] if I were to conclude that some
i27 V adds (cf. Add. M.): "...in the Sacred Scriptures as the most true
witnesses, they were active in praying and in inquiring and in living a good life in
order that they might understand, i.e., insofar as what they held by faith can be
seen by the mind..."
l2li That is, the syllogistic argument as a whole.
sub uno extremorum nisi cognoscat quod quid est eius. Exemplum
de triangulo et figura: cognosco aliquam figuram esse primam,
cum in figuris essentialiter ordinatis non sit processus in
infinitum, et facio istam complexionem "Aliqua figura est prima"
per rationem primitatis figurae. Sed numquam cognosco hanc
figuram esse primam, posito quod numquam eam viderim, ut
triangulum, nisi per propriam rationem trianguli sicut per
medium sub extremo, ut figura. Ita in proposito, cognosco
naturaliter aliquam essentiam esse primam inter essentias, sed
non cognosco hanc, scilicet essentiam divinam, esse primam cui
tamen primo inest haec passio, nisi per propriam rationem illius
essentiae ut ista est, vel Deitatis ut Deitas est, quod non possum
in vita ista.190
203 Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod non possum solvere ad
hominem ita quod appareat mihi aliqua propositio neganda, licet
possem solvere realiter et ad rationem. Contra. Aut peccat in
materia aut in forma. Si in forma, certum est quod possum
solvere quia tradita est ars ad omnem paralogismum sophisticum
solvendum. Si peccat in materia, ergo praemissa falsa aut apparet
mihi vera sicut conclusa aut sicut immediata. Si ut conclusa,
iterum per syllogismum peccantem in materia vel in forma. Si in
forma, ergo potest solvi ut prius. Si in materia, iterum procedatur
quousque sit status ad aliquam falsam quae non apparet propter
aliam. Ergo ista videbitur de se esse vera, et per consequens error
190 v addit (cf. Add. M.): Et sic cognoscimus de Deo ea quae naturaliter
cognoscimus, ut quod aliquod ens sit primum, non tamen hanc essentiam
deitatis, cui primo inest primitas, sicut cognosco aliquam figuram esse primam,
cum species figurarum sint ordinatae et non procedunt in infinitum: non propter
hoc cognoscerem medium, scilicet triangulum. cui primo inest illa passio, quia est
medium sub extremo et non essentialiter ordinatum inter extrema.
animal is risible through the notion of 'man' as a middle term in

the third figure [of the syllogism]) and of this medium it is not
necessary that, because one knows the extremes of the composite
[argument], such as 'animal' and 'risible,' therefore, one knows
the middle term under one extreme unless he knows just what
that middle term is. But consider this example: 'triangle' and
'figure.' I know some figure is primary, for in figures essentially
ordered there is no infinite progression, and I make this
proposition "Some figure is primary" through the conception of a
primacy in figures. But I never know that this particular figure
[i.e. a triangle] is first, assuming that I have never seen a triangle
to be anything other than a proper instance or example of a
[geometrical] figure. So it is in the case at hand: I know
naturally that some essence is first among essences, but in this
way I do not know that this particular, namely, the divine
essence, is first (to which, nevertheless, this attribute [i.e., 'First']
is present primarily) except through the proper notion of 'that
essence' as it is 'that,' or the notion of divinity as it is 'deity,'
which I am unable to do in this present life.i29
203 To the second, when it is said that I cannot solve the
argument 'ad hominem' so that it might appear to me that some
proposition must be denied, although I can solve it really and
conceptually. To the contrary. Either it sins in matter or in form.
If in form, certainly I can solve it, because the art for solving
every sophistical paralogism has been handed down. If it sins
logically in matter, therefore the false premise either appears to
me as true as a conclusion, or as an immediate proposition. If it is
as conclusion, then it is again through a syllogism sinning in
matter or in form. If in form, then it can be solved as above. If in
matter, again one may proceed until it comes to something false
which does not appear to be such because of something else.
Therefore [if one proceeds in this manner] this will be seen of
m V adds (cf. Add. M.): And in this way we know about God these things,
which we know naturallysuch as, that some being is firstnot, however, this
essence of deity, to which primacy is present primarily, just as I know that some
figure is first, since the species of figures are orderly and do not proceed ad
infinitum; but because of this I would not know exactly what [this] medium is,
namely, a triangle, in which this property primarily inheres, because it falls
under [one] extreme and is not essentially ordered between extremes.
erit inditus lumini naturali quia absque omni discursu statim

inclinat ad aliquam falsam sicut ad per se notam. Secundo,
sequitur quod non potest aliquis esse certus quae sit per se nota
et quae non sit per se nota ex quo alia191 falsa apparet statim per
se nota, et tunc nihil potest sciri. Quia si non potest haberi
certitudo de praemissa quod sit per se vera, nec de conclusione
quod sit per se scita. Concedo ergo quod omne tale argumentum
possum solvere, et mihi sic, quod si nesciam probare hanc esse
falsam, tamen scio eam non esse per se notam. Quia sicut lumen
naturale sufficit ad cognoscendum per se notam ex terminis, ita
sufficit ad cognoscendum istam non esse per se notam quae non
est per se nota. Possum etiam scire eam non esse conclusam ex
alio per se noto quia tunc consequentia deficiet.
204 Tunc ad argumentum.192 Non sequitur "Potest scire
quodcumque impossibile quod infertur non sequi, ergo nullum
impossibile sequi" quia non scitur quin alia impossibilia possent
sequi quorum nullum est illatum. Similiter, dato quod posset
scire quod nullum impossibile manifestius in impossibilitate
sequeretur, non propter hoc sequitur quod sciam illud esse
possibile quia potest esse primum in impossibilitate quod non
sequitur ex aliquo alio impossibili. Primis enim necessariis
opponuntur prima impossibilia.193
Melius lege: aliqua.

192 Cf. supra n. 162.
i83 v addit (cf. Add. M.): Ad secundum dicendum quod non sequitur: scit
solvere omne argumentum factum contra aliquod complexum de Deo, ergo scit
quod nullum impossibile sequitur ad illud, quia licet sciat solvere argumentum
concludens hoc impossibile et illud, quia tamen multa sunt impossibilia, quae sibi
sunt neutra, nescit quod illud impossibile sequatur vel non. quia nescit si sit
impossibile vel necessarium.
itself to be true, and as a consequence the error will be implanted

in one's natural light because without any discourse one would be
immediately inclined to make a false conclusion as self-evident.
Secondly it follows that someone cannot be certain as to which is
per se known and which is not per se known, from which some
falsity would appear as known per se, and then nothing can be
known. For if one cannot have certitude about a premise that it is
true per se, then neither can one have certitude that a conclusion
is per se known scientifically. I concede, therefore, that every
such argument can be solved, and as for me, even if I do not know
how to prove that this is false, nevertheless I know that it is not
per se evident. Because just as the natural light of the intellect
suffices to know propositions that are per se known from their
terms, so too it is sufficient to know what propositions are not
self-evident. Also I can know that something is not a conclusion
from some other per se known truth, because then the implication
is deficient.
204 Then to the argument, [n. 162] It does not follow "One can
know that 'any impossible that is inferred does not follow,'
therefore nothing impossible follows," because it is not known
that no other impossible could followof the ones that have not
been inferred. Similarly, granted that one could know that no
impossible that is more manifest in its impossibility would follow,
this gives no reason to state that I know this to be the case,
because there can be a first in [the sequence of] impossibilities
that does not follow from some other impossible. For the first
impossibles are posited over and against the primary necessary
truths.i30
i30 v adds (cf. Add. A/.): To the second it must be said that it does not follow:
'he knows how to solve every objection against some proposition about God,
therefore, he knows that nothing impossible follows from it.' For, although he
may know how to answer this or that argument that implies that something is
impossible, nevertheless, since there are many impossible cases, which he cannot
classify, he does not know whether that impossible follows or not, because he
does not know if it is impossible or necessary.
205 Ad primum principale194 patet per iam dicta. Concedo enim

quod theologia est distinctum donum a fide, non tamen ita
perfectum quod faciat perfectam notitiam et distinctam ex
evidentia obiecti sicut scientia, est tamen simpliciter perfectior
omni scientia acquisita et omni fide.
206 Ad secundum,195 cum dicitur quod haec esset simpliciter
imperfectior fide, dico quod licet fides acquisita non sit nobilior
omni scientia, tamen fides infusa est simpliciter nobilior habitus
omni habitu acquisito et omni scientia acquisita. Quia in
perfectionibus eiusdem generis illa est simpliciter perfectior ad
quam nulla causalitas creata se extendit sed tantum increata
quam ubi causalitas creata necessario requiritur. Et hoc est quod
dicit Philosophus XI De Animalibus,196 quod parum intelligere de
substantiis separatis et veris excellentibus nobilius est quam
quaecumque cognitio nobis possibilis de inferioribus.
207 Ad tertium197 dicendum quod si per lumen supernaturale
esset obiectum in se praesens movens intellectum ad distinctam
notitiam, tunc quod posset lumen naturale respectu sui obiecti,
hoc posset supernaturale respectu sui obiecti. Sed non est
praesens obiectum intellectui correspondens supernaturali vel
fidei. Dico ergo ad formam argumenti quod non est simile quia
obiectum naturale est in se et distincte praesens,198 et ideo movet
ad notitiam distinctam et evidentem ex evidentia obiecti. Non sic
est de obiecto fidei.
208 Ad quartum199 concedo quod revelatum ut revelatum
maiorem habet certitudinem quam scitum per demonstrationem,
non tamen habet maiorem rationem scientiae, quia non habet
194 Cf. supra n. 139.

195 Cf. supra n. 140.
190 Cf. Aristot., De partibus animalium I, c. 5 [De animalibus XI] (6446 23-
645a10); cf. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. J. Hamesse, 217).
197 Cf. supra n. 141.
108 V. addit: nisi in quibusdam conceptibus abstractis a creaturis.
199 Cf. supra n. 142.
Reply to the initial arguments
205 The reply to the first initial argument [n. 139] is evident
from what has been said. For I concede that theology is a gift
distinct from faith, but not so perfect that it makes for perfect and
distinct knowledge based on the evidence of the object as is the
case with science, and nevertheless it is simply more perfect than
any acquired science and any faith.
206 To the second [n. 140] when it is said that this is simply less
perfect than faith, I say that although acquired faith is not nobler
than all science, nevertheless infused faith is simply a more noble
habit than any acquired habit and any acquired science. Because
in perfections of the same kind that is simply more perfect to
which no created, but only uncreated, causality extends itself,
rather than that where created causality is necessarily required.
And this is what the Philosopher says in Bk. XI De animalibus
that a little understanding of the separate* substances and of
more excellent things is more noble than whatever knowledge is
possible for us to have about inteferior things.
207 To the third [n. 141] It must be said that if it were through
the supernatural light that the object present in itself moved the
intellect to distinct knowledge, then what natural light could do
as regards its object, this the supernatural light could do with
respect to its object. But there is no present object corresponding
to the supernatural intellect or to faith. I say to the form of the
argument that it is not similar, because the natural object is in
itself present distinctlyi3i and it moves to a distinct and evident
knowledge based on the evidence of the object. But this is not the
way it is with the object of faith.
208 To the fourth [n. 142] I concede that the revealed as
revealed has greater certitude than what is known scientifically
by way of demonstration, but it does not have the character of
science, because it does not have such evidence from the object as
the scientifically known does through demonstration, which is
i31 V adds: except in some concepts abstracted from creatures..

tantam evidentiam ex obiecto sicut scitum per demonstrationem,

quod per se requiritur ad rationem scientiae, I Posteriorum.200
[Quaestio 3
Utrum ex puris naturalibus possimus scire
omnes veritates scibiles de Deo]
Quaeritur tertio utrum ex puris naturalibus possimus scire

omnes veritates scibiles de Deo.
209 Videtur quod sic. Quia viator ex naturalibus potest scire
omnem scientiam physicam et metaphysicam, ergo ex naturalibus
potest habere actum metaphysicalem perfectissimum. Cuiusmodi
est felicitas, X Ethicorum,20i ubi vult quod felicitas sit in
perfectissimo actu speculationis veritatis qui est actus sapientiae.
Sed ultra actum felicitatis non est actus perfectior, ergo etc.
210 Praeterea, potens naturaliter scire principia potest scire
conclusiones virtualiter inclusas in eis quia scientia conclusionum
dependet ex intellectu principiorum. Sed naturaliter intelligimus
prima principia in quibus includuntur virtualiter omnes
conclusiones. Quia termini eorum sunt communissimi et sicut
ianua in domo. "Principia autem cognoscimus inquantum
terminos cognoscimus", I Posteriorum 202 igitur etc.
211 Item, sensus ex naturalibus potest attingere ad omnem
sensationem, ergo intellectus ad omnem cognitionem intel-
lectualem. Antecedens patet. Consequentia probatur per
Philosophum, III De Anima:203 "Natura non deficit in necessariis".
Ergo si non deficit in imperfectis, multo minus deficit in perfectis
quia magis esset contra nobilitatem ordinis universi.
^00 Aristot., Anal. Post. I, c. 2 (716 27-9); cf. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. J.
Hamesse. 312). V addit: Ad argumenta in oppositum patet responsio per illa,
quae dicta sunt prius.
Aristot., Eth. Nic. X, c. 7 (1177a 12-9).
201 Aristot., Anal. Post. I, c. 3 (726 20-5); cf. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. J.
Hamesse, 313).
Mi Aristot, De annua III, c. 9 (4326 21-3); cf. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed.
J. Hamesse, 188).
required per se for the notion of science according to Bk. I of the

Posterior Analytics.i22
Question Three
Can we know all the truths knowable about God
from what is purely natural?
It is asked thirdly whether from what is purely natural we can

know all truths knowable about God.
209 It seems we can: For the pilgrim from what is natural can
know all physical and metaphysical science; therefore from what
is natural one can have a most perfect metaphysical act. Such is
happiness (Ethics, Bk. X) where [the Philosopher] wishes to say
that that happiness is in the most perfect act of contemplating
what is true, which is an act of wisdom. But beyond this act of
felicity there is no more perfect act; therefore, etc.
210 Furthermore, one able to naturally know principles can
know the conclusions virtually contained in them, because the
science of conclusions depends upon the understanding of the
principles. But we naturally know first principles in which all
conclusions are included virtually; for their terms are most
common like the door to the house; but we know principles
insofar as we know their terms (Posterior analytics, Bk. I);
therefore, etc.
211 Also, it is natural for sense perception to experience any
sensation whatsoever, therefore the intellect could have any
intellectual cognition. The antecedent is evident; the implication
is proved through the Philosopher, in Bk. IIl of the De anima:
Nature is not wanting in what is necessary. Hence if it is not
deficient in imperfect things, all the less so is it deficient in
perfect things, for this would detract from the nobility of the
universe even more.
i32 V adds: To the arguments to the opposite the reply is evident from what
was said above.
212 Contra. Augustinus, XI De Civitate Dei, cap. 3:204 "Fidem

habemus de his rebus quas ignorare omnino non expedit nec per
nos ipsos iam noscere idonei sumus".
[Ad quaestionem]
213 Hic sunt tria videnda. Primo, an Aristoteles intellexit

metaphysicam esse de Deo sicut de eius primo subiecto. Secundo,
an habens metaphysicam possit scire omnia possibilia sciri de
Deo per istum habitum. Tertio, quod est aliqua notitia nobis
possibilis nobilior omni notitia naturali vel metaphysica.
[Articulus 1]
214 De primo est controversia inter Avicennam et Averroem.

Ponit enim Avicenna quod Deus non est subiectum in
metaphysica sed aliquid aliud, ut ens. Quia nulla scientia probat
suum subiectum esse. Metaphysicus probat Deum et substantias
separatas esse, ergo etc. Averroes reprehendit Avicennam in
commento ultimo, I Physicorum.205 Supposita maiori Avicennae
quod nulla scientia probat suum subiectum esse, quae est
communis utrique, capit quod Deus est subiectum in
metaphysica, et hoc non probatur in metaphysica sed in physica
quia nullum genus substantiarum separatarum potest probari
nisi per motum, quod pertinet ad physicum.
215 Sed Avicenna bene dicit et Averroes valde male. Et accipio
propositionem communem utrique, scilicet quod nulla scientia
probat suum subiectum esse, quae vera est propter primitatem
subiecti ad scientiam.206 Sed maiorem primitatem habet
subiectum respectu scientiae posterioris quam prioris. Ergo si
prior scientia non potest probare suum subiectum esse quod est
*m August., De civ. Dei. XI, c. 3 (CCSL 48, 323; PL 41, 318).

*or, Averroes, Physica I, com. 83 (ed. Iuntina IV, 47va).
toe, y addit (cf. Add. M ): quia si esset posterius, posset ipsum probari esse in
illa scientia in qua habet rationem posterioris et non obiecti adaequati.
Prologue, Question Three 75
212 To the contrary, Augustine in Bk. XI of The City of God,

chapter 3: "We have faith about those things that we cannot
afford ignoring completely, and yet of ourselves are at the present
moment unable to know."
Division of the Question
213 Here there are three things to investigate. First, did

Aristotle consider metaphysics to be about God as its first
subject? Secondly, can a metaphysician know all that it is possible
to know about God through this habit? Third, can we have some
knowledge that is more noble than all natural or metaphysical
knowledge?
Article One
Is God the first subject of metaphysics for Aristotle?
214 In regard to the first point there is a controversy between

Avicenna and Averroes. For Avicenna claims that not God, but
something else such as being, is the subject of metaphysics. For
no science proves the existence of its own subject, yet the
metaphysician proves that God and separate substances exist;
therefore, etc. In his final comment on the Bk. I of the Physics,
Averroes attacks Avicenna, using the same major premise,
admitted by both, that no science proves the existence of its
subject. God is the subject of metaphysics; but his existence is not
proved there but in physics, for it is only by means of motion that
any sort of pure spirit can be proved to exist, and motion pertains
to the science of physics.
215 Avicenna has spoken well, however, and Averroes very
badly, and against him I use the basic proposition which they
both hold, namely, "No science proves the existence of its subject."
This is true because of the priority that a subject has with respect
to the science.i33 But a subject enjoys a greater priority over a
lower science than over its own, higher science. If the highest
science, therefore, cannot establish the existence of its subject,
iM v adds (cf. Add. M.): because if it were posterior, it could be proved to be

in that science, in which it is subordinate, and not the adequate object.
subiectum primum, multo magis nec scientia posterior. Ergo si

metaphysica non potest probare Deum esse, multo magis nec
physica. Probatio minoris. Quia duplicem primitatem habet
subiectum prioris scientiae ad posteriorem respectu scientiae
prioris.
216 Item, si Deum esse est demonstratum in physica et
suppositum tamquam subiectum in metaphysica, ergo conclusio
in physica est simpliciter principium in metaphysica quia
principium in scientia est ex subiecto eius, et per consequens
physica erit simpliciter prior metaphysica. Quae omnia sunt
absurda.
217 Item, ex omni proprietate manifesta in effectu potest
concludi causam esse quia, si talis proprietas non possit esse nisi
solum a tali causa. Sed non solum huiusmodi proprietates quae
considerantur in physica, ut motum esse, manifeste concludunt
esse causam moventem, sed etiam proprietates consideratae in
metaphysica, ut ens posterius, ens potentiale, ens finitum, prout
sunt in effectu concludunt de causa primitatem simpliciter,
actualitatem et infinitatem et huiusmodi ex quibus potest
demonstrari esse de primo ente potius quam ex ratione motus.
[Opinio Scoti]
218 Dico ergo ad quaestionem quantum pertinet ad istum

articulum quod Deus non est subiectum in metaphysica quia, ut
supra probatum est in prima quaestione,207 de Deo tamquam de
primo subiecto tantum potest esse una scientia quae non est
metaphysica. Quod probo sic. De omni subiecto scientiae
subalternatae praecognoscitur ex sensibus an est vel si est, ut
patet de subiecto perspectivae. Licet enim linea visualis quae est
subiectum in perspectiva possit demonstrari tamquam conclusio
geometriae, tamen si est subiectum alicuius scientiae
subalternatae, de eo oportet statim esse notum si est sine
ulteriori inquisitione ex sensu vel experientia, scilicet quod sibi
non repugnat esse. Sicut enim principia statim sciuntur
apprehensis terminis, cum subiectum sit causa principii et per
207 Cf. supra n. 110-116.

which is first or highest, still less can an inferior science do so.

Therefore, if metaphysics cannot prove the existence of God,
much less can physics. The minor premise is proved because of
the double primacy that the subject of a higher science has in
regard to a lower science, given its relationship to a prior science.
216 Also, if God's existence is something demonstrated in
physics and presupposed in metaphysics as a subject, thento
put it simplya conclusion in physics is the starting point in
metaphysics, for any science starts with its subject. Hence,
physics will be prior to metaphysicsall of which is absurd.
217 Also, if any property can exist only in virtue of such and
such a cause, from every such property that appears in an effect
we can infer the existence of its cause. Now it is not just such
properties of the effect considered in physicssuch as that
something is movedthat lead one to conclude the existence of a
moving cause, but the same is true of properties considered in
metaphysics. If an effect represents something posterior, possible,
or finite, such properties imply that their cause enjoys an
unqualified primacy, actuality, infinity, and the like. It is from
properties of this sort rather than from the nature of motion that
the existence of a first being can be demonstrated.
Scotus's opinion
218 So far as this question is concerned, then, I say that God is

not the subject of metaphysics, for as we proved earlier in the
first question, [n. 110-116] there can be but one science about God
as first subject, and this is not metaphysics. And I prove this in
the following way. The senses tell us first whether or not any
subject of a subordinate science exists, as is clear in the case of
optics. For although a visible line, which is the subject of optics,
could be demonstrated in geometry, nevertheless if it is the
subject of some subordinate science, one needs to be able to know
immediately, without any further experience or investigation by
the senses, whether or not it exists, namely, that there is nothing
incompatible about its existence. Just as principles are grasped
immediately once the terms are apprehended, since the subject is
the cause of the principle, and, as a consequence, is prior to it in
consequens prius eo in entitate et cognoscibilitate, oportet ipsum

esse statim si est notum ex sensibus. Sed nulla ratio propria
conceptibilis de Deo potest statim esse nobis nota si est. Ergo
nulla notitia acquisita naturaliter a nobis potest esse propria Deo.
Minor patet. Quia prima ratio propria de Deo quam nos
concipimus est quod sit primum ens. Sed primum ens non est
primo notum ex sensibus, sed oportet prius concipere
possibilitatem unionis terminorum, et antequam sciamus hanc
compositionem esse possibilem oportet quod aliquod ens
demonstretur esse primum. Concedo ergo cum Avicenna quod
Deus non est subiectum in metaphysica. Nec obviat dictum
Averrois I Physicorum,20S nec illud I Metaphysicae209 quod
metaphysica est circa causas altissimas quia loquitur sicut
consuevit loqui I Priorum,210 cum dicit: "Primum oportet dicere
circa quid et de quo, quoniam circa demonstrationem et de
disciplina demonstrativa, id est de universali scientia demon-
strandi". Unde "circa" notat proprie circumstantiam causae finalis
sicut "de" circumstantiam causae materialis. Unde metaphysica
est circa causas altissimas finaliter ad quas terminatur ipsius
speculatio.
[Articulus 2
Utrum per metaphysicam possimus scire omnia
nobis possibilia cognosci de Deo]
219 Secundo, supposito quod metaphysica non sit de Deo ut de

subiecto, est ulterior dubitatio utrum per metaphysicam possimus
scire omnia nobis possibilia cognosci de Deo.
220 Et diceret Aristoteles et alii philosophi quod sic quia notum
erat apud eos sicut principium quod omni potentiae passivae
naturali correspondet alia activa naturalis, alioquin potentia
208 Cf. supra n. 214; cf. Aristot., Anal. Post. I, c. 1 (71a 10-2); ibid., c. 10 (76a
31-6). Cf. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. J. Hamesse, 311): "Dupliciter aliqua
necessaria est praecognoscere, scilicet quia est et quis est"; "Unde iterum
habemus quod in qualibet scientia oportet praesupponere subjectum esse et quid
significet ipsum".
20ll Aristot., Metaph. I (A), c. 1 (9816 27-9); cf. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed.
J. Hamesse, 115): "Sapientia est scientia primarum et altissimarum causarum".
21" Aristot., Anal. Priora I, c. 1 (24a 10-2).
entity and knowability, so too the existence of the subject must be

known immediately from the senses. But we do not immediately
know whether any proper conceivable notion about God exists.
Therefore no knowledge acquired naturally in this life represents
any characteristic of God that is proper to him. The minor
premise is evident, for the first proper notion we have about God
is that he is the first being. "First being," however, is not
something initially known from the senses, for we must first
ascertain that the combination of these two terms makes sense.
Before we can know that this combination represents something
possible, we need to demonstrate that some being is first. Hence I
concede with Avicenna that God is not the subject of metaphysics.
Nor is this contradicted by the dictum of Averroes [about prior
knowledge of the existence of the subject] (from the Physics, Bk.
I), nor by the statement that metaphysics is concerned with the
highest causes (from Metaphysics, Bk. I). For the Philosopher
speaks there as he did in Bk. I of the Prior Analytics where he
says: "First we need to determine what this is concerned with and
is about, for it is concerned with demonstration and is about the
demonstrative branch of learning, i.e., it is about the general
science of demonstrating." Hence "concerned with" denotes
properly the circumstance of the final cause, just as "made from"
[denotes] the circumstance of the material cause. Consequently,
metaphysics is concerned with the highest causes as its goal and
ends with the theoretical knowledge of them.
Article Two
Can a metaphysician as such know every possible truth
about God?
219 Secondly, granted that metaphysics is not about God as its

subject, there is a further doubt whether by means of metaphysics
we can know all that is possible to know about God.
220 And Aristotle and other philosophers would say that we can,
for they regarded as a principle that to every natural passive
potency there corresponded another natural potency that is
active; otherwise the passive potency would seem to be in vain if
it could not be reduced to act through something natural. But the
passiva videtur esse frustra nisi per aliquid in natura posset

reduci in actum. Sed intellectus possibilis est potentia passiva
respectu quorumcumque intelligibilium quia naturaliter appetit
cognitionem Dei et omnium cognoscibilium, naturaliter etiam
perficitur per quamcumque intellectionem. Ergo cuiuslibet
intellectionis est receptivus.
221 Contra istud arguo et facio maiorem trimembrem. Omnis
cognitio nostra naturalis quam habemus de Deo est causata in
nobis per effectum aequivocum. Item, omnis cognitio nostra de
Deo naturalis est indistincta. Item est obscura, quod patet quia
non est de obiecto evidente intellectui secundum exsistentiam
intellectualem.
222 Ex prima propositione arguo sic. Omnis cognitio nostra
naturaliter habita de Deo causata in nobis per effectum
aequivocum est imperfecta. Sed possibilis est nobis aliqua alia
cognitio Dei intuitiva quae est eius ut praesentialiter exsistit.
Ergo ex puris naturalibus non possumus devenire ad omnem
cognitionem de Deo nobis possibilem. Probatio minoris. Omnis
potentia habens aliquod obiectum primum commune ad multa
habet contentum quodlibet sub ipso pro per se obiecto eius
quantum est ex natura potentiae. Non enim esset aliter obiectum
adaequatum potentiae si aliquid contineretur sub obiecto quod
non respiceretur per se a potentia, sed aliquid inferius primo
obiecto esset sibi adaequatum. Intellectus noster habet ens pro
primo obiecto communi et indifferenti ad Deum et ad creaturas
vel univoce vel saltem analogice. Ergo Deus sub ratione Deitatis
est per se contentum sub ente, ergo per se obiectum intellectus
nostri. Nobiliorem ergo et perfectiorem cognitionem possumus
habere de Deo quam in effectu, scilicet in exsistentia eius actuali.
223 Item, desiderium naturale est in cognoscente effectum
cognoscere causam et in cognoscente effectum distincte
cognoscere causam distincte. Sed tale desiderium non quiescit
cognoscendo tantum Deum in effectu aequivoco, sicut quilibet
experitur in se. Ergo cum desiderium naturale non sit ad
impossibile, sequitur quod possibile sit nobis cognoscere Deum
aliter quam in effectu, scilicet in sua exsistentia actuali. Hoc
possible intellect is a passive potency with respect to all

intelligibles, since it naturally desires knowledge of God and of all
knowables and is also naturally perfected by any intellection, and
therefore it can receive any intellection whatsoever.
221 I argue against this and I make a three-member major
premise. Every natural cognition that we have about God is
caused in us by an equivocal* effect. Also, every natural cognition
of ours about God is indistinct. Also, it is obscure, which is
evident, because it is not about an object evident to the intellect
in its intelligible existence.
222 From the first proposition, I argue in this way. Every
cognition of ours about God that we have naturally and that is
caused in us through an equivocal effect is imperfect. But it is
possible for usi34 to have some other cognition of God that is
intuitive, which is of him as existing and present [to us].
Therefore from our purely natural endowment we are not able to
arrive at all knowledge of God that is possible for us. Proof of
the minor. Every potency having something common to many as
its first object regards anything contained under it as its per se
object insofar as its nature as a potency goes. For otherwise that
object would be inadequate to that potency if something contained
under it were not regarded per se by the potency; rather
something inferior to that first object would be that potency's
adequate object. Our intellect's first object, 'being,' is indifferent
and common, either univocally or at least analogously, to God and
creatures. Therefore God, viewed as deity, is contained per se
under 'being,' and therefore God is per se an object of our
intellect. Hence we can have a more noble and therefore more
perfect cognition of God than knowledge derived from some effect,
namely, [we can know him] in his actual existence.
223 Also, there is a natural desire in one knowing an effect to
know the cause, and in knowing the effect distinctly to know the
cause distinctly. But such a desire is not quieted by only knowing
God in an equivocal effect, as each one experiences in himself.
Therefore since there is no natural desire for the impossible, it
follows that it is possible for us to know God otherwise than in an
effect, namely, to know him in his actual existence. This
i34 It is possible for us supernaturally, but not from what is purely natural.
argumentum est Philosophi, II Metaphysicae,211 ubi probat quod

non est processus in infinitum in causis, nec in efficiente nec in
finali, quia tunc non contingeret aliquid scire. Ergo ad perfectam
notitiam de re necesse est scire omnes causas eius et distincte
quia agens a proposito agit propter finem, distincte etiam quia
non distincte cognosceret causatum si sufficeret confusa cognitio
causarum.
224 Ex secunda propositione arguo sic. Si cognitio perfectissima
nobis possibilis de Deo est cognitio eius indistincta, cum ergo in
quolibet obiecto creato perciperemus illud obiectum ut Deum
indistincte, sequeretur quod in illo possemus perfecte quietari.
Sed consequens est falsum quia nihil finitum potest nos satiare,
sicut probatur in sequenti quaestione, ergo etc. Probatio
consequentiae. In cognitione perfectissima de Deo est perfecta
quietatio. Ergo si ista esset indistincta, in creatura esset quies et
beatitudo, quod est falsum.
225 Item, ex tertia propositione arguitur sic. Quod est
perfectionis in potentia inferiori non repugnat potentiae superiori
eiusdem generis. Sed perfectionis est in potentia inferiori
sensitiva apprehensiva cognoscere suum obiectum clare et
intuitive in exsistentia eius, sicut patet de visu. Ergo hoc non
repugnat intellectui respectu sui obiecti per se. Cuiusmodi est
Deus, ut ostensum est. Ergo cognitio eius obscura non est
perfectissima nobis possibilis de eo.
[Articulus 3
Utrum possimus habere cognitionem de Deo perfectiorem
quam ex naturalibus]
226 Ex hoc patet tertius articulus quod aliqua est cognitio nobis
possibilis de Deo etiam pro statu isto perfectior ista quam
possumus habere ex naturalibus. Cuius ratio est quia possibile
est nobis distincte cognoscere finem humanorum actuum. Tunc
arguo, aut possumus cognoscere et scire Deum per rationem
211 Aristot., Metaph. II (a), c. 2 (994a 1-11).

argument is taken from the Philosopher in Bk. II of the

Metaphysics where he proves that there is no infinite regress in
causesneither in efficient causes nor in final causesbecause
then nothing could be known scientifically. Therefore for perfect
knowledge of a thing it is necessary to know all of its causes (for
an agent according to what we propose acts for the sake of an
end) and also know them distinctly (for, if confused knowledge of
a cause sufficed, one would also not know distinctly what is
caused).
224 From the second proposition I argue in this way. If the most
perfect cognition about God that we could have were an indistinct
knowledge of him, therefore, since any created object whatsoever
we could perceive indistinctly as God, it would follow that we
could be perfectly satisfied in it. But the consequent is false,
because nothing finite can satisfy us, as will be proved in the
following question; therefore etc. Proof of the implication. The
most perfect knowledge about God produces perfect satisfaction.
Therefore, if this were indistinct knowledge, satisfaction and
beatitude could be found in a creature; which is false.
225 Also, from the third proposition it is argued in this way.
What is a matter of perfection in an inferior potency is not
repugnant to a superior potency of the same sort; in an inferior
sensitive apprehensive potency, however, to know its object
clearly and intuitively in its existence is a matter of perfection, as
is evident in the case of vision; therefore this is not repugnant to
the intellect as regards a per se object. God is such an object, as
has been shown. Therefore obscure knowledge is not the most
perfect knowledge we can have of him.
Article Three
Can we have some knowledge of God that is more noble
than any natural or metaphysical knowledge?
226 From this the third article is evident, viz. we can have some
knowledge of God that is even more perfect than what natural
sources can give us and we can have it in our present state [as
pilgrims]. The proof for this is that it is possible for us to know
distinctly the goal of human actions. Then I argue, either we can
naturalem in se distincte et clare, videndo eum esse finem

actuum meorum, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum quod pro nunc
est aliqua cognitio necessaria quae non est naturalis. Si non, ergo
ratione naturali possum scire quod intellectus et ratio naturalis
deficit in aliquo quod est necessarium nobis cognoscere. Patet ex
inclinatione naturali in idem. Eodem modo potest argui de causa
efficiente.
[Responsio ad quaestionem]
227 Ex dictis patet responsio ad quaestionem quod aliquae

veritates possunt de Deo a nobis sciri naturaliter et aliquae non.
Nam quaecumque ex his quae in effectibus sunt nota de Deo
possunt sciri a nobis per demonstrationem quia et a posteriori,
scilicet per effectum. Sed multa sunt talia quae possunt esse nota
de Deo ex effectibus, ut patet ex scientiis philosophorum. Multae
etiam sunt veritates scibiles de Deo quas non possumus
cognoscere de Deo ratione naturali. Quia quaecumque in causa
non possunt sciri ex his quae sunt nota in effectu, non possunt a
nobis sciri ratione naturali. Multae sunt veritates scibiles de Deo
quae sunt huiusmodi, ut trinitas personarum et unitas essentiae
et huiusmodi articuli pertinentes ad Deitatem, ergo etc.
Supernaturaliter tamen possumus, ut ostensum est.
228 Ad primum212 principale dico quod felicitas quae est finis

speculationis metaphysicae est felicitas secundum quid tantum et
ficta quae ordinatur ad visionem essentiae divinae sicut ad
felicitatem simpliciter.
229 Ad aliud213 dicendum secundum magnum doctorem quod
principia trahuntur a sensibilibus, unde sapiunt naturam
sensibilium, et ideo non possunt applicari ad insensibilia. Dico
*ls Cf. supra n. 209.

213 Cf. supra n. 210.
know God scientifically in himself distinctly and clearly through

natural reason, seeing him to be the goal of my actions, or we
cannot know this. If I can know this [through natural reason],
then I have what I propose, [namely] that for our present pilgrim
state we need some knowledge that is not natural [but
supernatural]. If we cannot know this, natural reason [at least]
can make known to us that our intellect and natural reason itself
is deficient in something I need to know. This is evident from the
natural inclination we have for such knowledge. In the same way
I can argue about the efficient cause.
Reply to the question
227 From what has been said the response to the question is
clear, [namely] some truths about God can be known naturally
and some cannot. For whatever we can know of God from his
effects, we know by a demonstration of the simple fact and know
this a posteriori, namely, from an effect; many such truths
however can be known about God from his effects, as is evident
from the scientific knowledge of philosophers. There are also
many truths we can know about God that cannot be known by
natural reason. For whatever we know about regarding a cause
that cannot be inferred from its effects, cannot be known by
natural reason. Many truths of this kind can be known about
God, such as the trinity of persons and unity of essence and such
articles [of faith] as pertain to deity; therefore etc.
Supernaturally, however, we can know these, as has been shown.
228 To the first main argument [n. 209] I say that the happiness
which is the purpose of metaphysical speculation is felicity only in
a qualified sense and not genuine happiness, being ordered to a
vision of the divine essence that is simply unqualified happiness.
229 To the other [n. 210] it must be said according to the great
teacheri35 that principles are drawn from sensibles, hence they
i35 This seems to be a reference to Aristotle, since the argument is based

exclusively on his theory of how to acquire knowledge.
quod hoc non valet. Quia licet trahantur a sensibilibus, tamen

scitur quod verum est in omnibus tam sensibilibus quam
insensibilibus et est universalissime notum. Et ideo aliter dicunt
alii quod ista principia non possunt applicari nisi mediantibus
minoribus propositionibus quae non sunt nobis notae. Sed et hoc
non valet quia prima sunt communissima et accipiuntur
verissime de quolibet. Et ideo dico quod possunt sciri omnes
conclusiones sequentes, sed non sequuntur nisi praedicantes
condiciones universalissimas. Praedicatum enim principii potest
sciri de subiecto, non aliud praedicatum speciale.
230 Et ideo dicendum quod non sequitur "Contingit cognoscere
prima principia naturaliter, ergo et omnes conclusiones inclusas
in eis". Non sequitur quia ex talibus maioribus et minoribus
sumptis sub non sequuntur conclusiones de praedicatis
specialibus sed tantum conclusiones quae praedicant conceptus
communissimos, ut ex ista maiore "impossibile est idem esse et
non esse", "angelus est aliquid" non sequitur nisi esse vel non esse
de angelo, et non probatur aliquid speciale ut immaterialitas vel
aliquid huiusmodi nisi per quod quid est proprium ipsi angelo
quia quod quid est eius est medium demonstrandi de eo
immaterialitatem et omnes passiones eius. Licet ergo principium
primum includat virtute omnes conclusiones quae praedicant
conceptus communes, non tamen alias quae praedicant conceptus
speciales nisi per quod quid est sumpti sub subiecto principii
communissimi. Et ideo tale quid oportet esse notum antequam
sciantur speciales conclusiones de eo.
231 Ad tertium2i4 dico negando consequentiam quod maioris
perfectionis est creatura capax quam ista ad quam habet virtutem
activam. Capax enim est entitatis suae summa creatura ex quo
est quoddam ens, et tamen respectu suae entitatis nullam habet
causalitatem activam.
2U Cf. supra n. 211.

make known the nature of sensibles, and therefore they cannot be

applied to insensibles. I say that this is not valid. Because
although they are drawn from sense perceptibles, nevertheless
this is known to be true of all things, both sensibles and
insensibles, and have the most universal application. And
therefore others put it in a different way saying that these
principles can only be applied by means of minor propositions,
which are not known to us. But this is not valid either, because
first principles are most common and are accepted as being most
true by anyone. And therefore I say that we can know all the
following conclusions, but they follow only by predicating the
most universal conditions. For it is the predicate of a principle
that can be known scientifically of the subject, and not another
special predicate.
230 And therefore it must be said that this does not follow: "One
knows first principles naturally, therefore one also knows all the
conclusions included in them." It does not follow because what
follows from such majors and the minors taken beneath them is
not conclusions about what is most specific, but only conclusions,
which predicate most common concepts, as from this major "it is
impossible for the same thing to both be and not be," "an angel is
something" does not follow unless 'to be and not to be' is about an
angel, and something specificsuch as immateriality or some
thing of this sortis not proved, except through the quiddity
proper to the angel, because its quiddity is the means of
demonstrating about it immateriality and all its attributes.
Therefore, although the first principle includes virtually all
conclusions that predicate common concepts, it does not include
others, which predicate specific concepts, except through the
quiddity subsumed under the subject of the most common
principle. And therefore such a quiddity must be known before
the specific conclusions are known of it.
231 To the third [n. 211] I reply by denying the implication that
a creature is able to have a greater perfection than what can be
had from an active [natural] potency. For the highest creature is
capable of its entity from which it is a certain being, and
nevertheless with respect to its entity it has no active causality.
232 Ad probationem consequentiae dico quod imperfectionis est

in potentiis sensitivis quod per agens naturale possunt totam
perfectionem suam acquirere, est enim ita parva respectu
perfectionis potentiae intellectivae quod ad eam se extendit
causalitas creata sufficienter. Sed non sic est de intellectu et
voluntate quae ordinantur ad maiorem perfectionem quam possit
haberi ex causis naturalibus. Nec in hoc vilifico naturam sed
dignifico eam. Quia quidquid tu ponis, et ego, et amplius aliquid
quia omnem perfectionem quam tu ponis quod possit acquirere ex
naturalibus et ultra cognitionem Dei in speciali ad quam nulla
creatura causaliter active se extendit, ergo etc.
[Quaestiunculae]
233 Ex praedictis patet quid et quantum possumus cognoscere

de Deo quoniam triplex cognitio de Deo haberi potest, et patet ad
quae se extendit theologia et quid sit sciendum de ea. Ex prima
quaestione potest haberi quid sit theologia in se, ex secunda
qualem theologiam et cognitionem possumus habere de Deo per
specialem actionem eius, ex tertia quaestione quid per rationem
naturalem et actionem naturalem possumus de Deo cognoscere.
PI
234 Si ergo quaeratur utrum ista scientia quae est de Deo sub
ratione Deitatis sit de omnibus per se scibilibus de eo patet quod
232 To the proof of the implication I say that it is a matter of

imperfection in sensitive potencies that through a natural agent
they can acquire their total perfection, for it is so small compared
to the perfection of an intellective potency, that the created
causality extends itself to it sufficiently; but it is not so about the
intellect and the will, which are ordered to a perfection which is
greater than the one that can be had from natural causes. In this
I do not vilify nature but rather dignify it; for whatever you
postulate, I do as well, but also something over and above,
because [I posit] all perfection that can be acquired by natural
causes, which you posit, and, above that, the cognition of God in
particular, to which no creature extends itself in a causally active
way. Therefore, etc.
A few brief questions
233 From what has been said it is evident just what and how
much we can know about God, seeing that there can be a
threefold cognition about Godi36 and it is evident to what theology
covers and what can be known about it. From the first question
one can glean what theology is in itself, from the second what sort
of theology and cognition we can have about God through his
special action, and from the third, what we can know about God
through natural reason and natural action.
I.
234 If therefore it is asked: Is this science about God qua deity

about everything knowable per se of him? it is clear that it is,
for the notion of deity contains virtually all the principles; and the
i36 This might be a reference to the conclusions drawn from his threefold
major premise in n. 221, but more probably seems to refer to the threefold
argument from efficient, final and formal causality (cf. below, n. 251), which leads
to Scotus's threefold argument for God's existence based on the essential orders
of efficiency, finality and eminence. The order of eminence is based on the fact
that forms are hierarchically ordered. As he writes in the Ordinatio I, dist. 2, n.
64: "Some preeminent nature is simply first as regards perfection. This is clear,
since there is an essential order among essences, for, according to Aristotle,
Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, ([H] c. 3 [10436 33]) forms behave in the same way as
numbers."
sic quia ratio Deitatis includit virtualiter omnia principia et

principia omnes conclusiones continent de eo scibiles per
rationem subiecti.
235 Si obiciatur quod aliquae veritates scibiles pertinent ad
metaphysicam, respondeo: Omnis veritas pertinet simpliciter ad
illam scientiam in qua scitur propter quid, ad illam autem in qua
tantum scitur quia pertinet tantum secundum quid. Exemplum:
Conclusio ista quod terra sit rotunda probatur propter quid in
scientia naturali et quia tantum in scientia astrologiae. Et ideo
quod terra sit rotunda est simpliciter conclusio physica et
secundum quid astrologica. Sic in proposito, omnes veritates per
se scibiles de Deo propter quid sciuntur in ista scientia, quae est
de Deo secundum se et secundum propriam rationem Deitatis,
quae est ratio et medium ad concludendum quamlibet veritatem
conclusam de eo in metaphysica, quia non nisi ex effectibus
communibus probat eas de Deo et a posteriori et non per rationem
subiecti, quia subiectum secundum propriam rationem eius est
sibi ignotum; et ideo est theologia tantum secundum quid quia
veritates de Deo probat tantum secundum quid, quia scilicet et a
posteriori.
236 Sed forte dicetur: Metaphysica est scientia simpliciter, ergo
simpliciter considerat veritates probatas de Deo, ergo simpliciter
pertinent ad considerationem eius, et non tantum secundum quid.
237 Respondeo: Metaphysica quatenus considerat aliquid vel
aliquas veritates scibiles de Deo est simpliciter scientia quia. Et
talis scientia est secundum quid propter quid, et ideo ad
metaphysicam secundum quid pertinent huiusmodi veritates de
Deo.
PL]
238 Ulterius si etiam quaeratur utrum theologia sit una scientia

dico quod sic quia est unius subiecti sub ratione una, scilicet sub
principles contain all those conclusions that are knowable about

him by using the notion of its subject.i37
235 If it be objected that some knowable truths pertain to
metaphysics, I reply: "Every truth pertains simply to that science
wherein it is known as a reasoned fact, but to that science
wherein it is known only as a simple fact it pertains only in a
qualified sense." For example: this conclusion "the earth is round"
is proved as a reasoned fact in physics and only as a simple fact in
astronomy; and therefore "the earth is round" is in an unqualified
sense a conclusion of physics and only in a qualified sense a
conclusion in astronomy. So it is in the case at hand. All truths
that are per se knowable about God are known as reasoned facts
in this science [of theology], which is about God in himself and
under the proper notion of deity, which is the notion and middle
term for concluding any truth inferred about him in metaphysics.
For it is only from common effects and a posteriori that it [i.e.
metaphysics] proves those truths about God, and not through the
notion of [God as] its subject. For that subject according to its
proper notion is not known to it, and therefore metaphysics is
only a 'theology' in a qualified sense, because it is only in a
qualified sense that truths about God are proved there, namely,
'as a simple fact' and a posteriori.
236 But perhaps you will say: "Metaphysics is a science in an
unqualified sense and it simply considers truths that are proved
about God; therefore these truths pertain to a consideration of
him purely and simply, and not just in a qualified sense."
237 I respond. "Metaphysics in so far as it considers some
knowable truths, or anything, about God is simply a science of the
simple fact. As such, it is not simply a science about the reasoned
fact and therefore such truths about God pertain to metaphysics
only in a qualified sense."
II.
238 If it be asked further: Is theology one single science? - I say

that it is, because it is about one subject and under one notion,
l37 Namely, as the middle term of its demonstative syllogisms.

ratione Deitatis, et ex unitate subiecti sortitur scientia suam

unitatem in quo virtualiter continentur omnia principia et omnes
conclusiones istius scientiae. Et non dicitur una a conclusionibus
istius scientiae quia tunc quaelibet scientia esset simpliciter
plures, cum plures possint sciri de quolibet subiecto. Omnia etiam
principia istius ultimo resolvuntur in rationem Deitatis.
[HI]
239 Ulterius si quaeratur an sit maxime una patet quod sic quia
subiectum eius est maxime unum. Nam subiectum scientiarum
philosophicarum est tantum unum secundum rationem et
apprehensionem intellectus, subiectum autem huius est maxime
singulare, immo est ipsa singularitas ut haec deitas ut haec, vel
haec essentia ut haec.
240 Ex hoc apparet falsitas illius opinionis quae dicit quod haec
scientia est tam speculativa quam practica et per consequens duo
habitus. Et est ratio secundum eos. Quia haec scientia considerat
ita operabilia ac si de illis solum esset et ita de speculabilibus
sicut si non esset de operabilibus. Sed nulla scientia est sic de
operabilibus nisi practica nec sic de speculabilibus nisi
speculativa. Ergo haec scientia est uterque habitus.
241 Sed contra. Cum omnis scientia sit una ab unitate subiecti
in quod omnia principia istius scientiae resolvuntur et non ab
unitate conclusionum, haec erit maxime una, sicut prius
probatum est.
242 Item, in omnibus essentialiter ordinatis, et habentibus
unitatem, necesse est stare ad aliquid simpliciter primum in
unitate, ergo et in scientiarum unitate oportet stare ad aliquam
scientiam primo unam et maxime unam. Si ergo haec non sit talis
quae est de Deo secundum rationem formalem eius, nulla erit
namely, under that of deity. And from the unity of its subject the
science about that subject obtains its unity, [for it is a subject] in
which all principles and all conclusions of this science are
virtually contained. A science is not said to be one because it
draws but one conclusion,i38 for then any science would be simply
multiplex, since several [conclusions] could be scientifically
known about each subject. Also, all principles of this science are
ultimately reduced virtually to the notion of deity.
III.
239 And if it is asked further: Is theology maximally one? it is

evident that it is, because its subject is maximally one. For the
subject of the philosophical sciences is one only in the way the
intellect conceives and apprehends it. The subject of this science,
however, is maximally singular; indeed it is singularity* itself,
such as 'this deity as just this' or 'this essence as just this.'
240 This shows the falsity of that opinion, which claims this
science, is both speculative and practical, and hence is two habits.
The reason they give for this, is because this science considers
practicables as though these were its chief concern, and it
considers speculative things as though it had no interest in
practicables; no science behaves this way about practicables
unless it is a practical science, nor does any science behave this
way about speculatives unless it is a speculative science; hence
this science has both habits.
241 To the contrary. Every science derives its unity not from any
unity of its conclusion, but from the unity of its subject, to which
all the principles of the science are virtually reduced; hence this
science is maximally one, as was proved before.
242 Also, in everything essentially ordered and having unity,
there must be something that is simply first in unity; therefore
also where there is a unity among several sciences, it is necessary
to go back to some science that is primarily one and maximally
one. If this science about God qua deity is not the sort of science
[that is primarily and maximally one], then none will be first,
l:lH That is, because only one conclusion is demonstrated in that science.
prima, quod est inconveniens. Nec unitas luminis fidei in quo

cognoscuntur principia eius, secundum eos, sufficit ad talem
unitatem quia sic omnes scientiae philosophicae essent una
scientia propter unitatem luminis naturalis in quo principia
cuiuslibet scientiae cognoscuntur.
243 Item, habitus non habens evidentiam ex obiecto non
distinguitur ex distinctione obiecti. Sed theologia est huiusmodi
habitus, secundum eos. Ergo non distinguitur in habitum
practicum et speculativum propter obiectum operabile et
speculabile de quibus ponunt ipsam esse. Maior probatur. Quia
si habitus non habens evidentiam ex obiecto distingueretur
secundum distinctionem obiecti, ergo cum fides sit huiusmodi
habitus, ipsa distingueretur secundum distinctionem credibilium,
et cum sint 12 articuli credendi, essent 12 fides.
244 Aliqui etiam articuli sunt necessarii et alii contingentes,
quae ambo non videntur respici ab aliqua scientia una
essentialiter. Ad rationem eorum dicendum quod ponentes eam
speculativam dicerent quod non determinat de practicis nec
agibilibus propter se, sed propter speculari quatenus ad istam
cognitionem practicam sequitur cognitio speculativa. Similiter
econverso, ponentes earn esse practicam, quod magis videtur,
dicerent quod non considerat speculabilia nisi propter praxim
inquantum scilicet per speculationem diriguntur in praxim et in
operationem. Exemplum: Haec est practica: "Talis debet sanari
tali infirmitate sic". Sed haec conclusio sequitur ex principio
simpliciter practico, scilicet quod talis infirmitas contingit ex
habundantia colerae. Ita est in proposito. Sicut enim haec
conclusio est practica "Deus est diligendus", ita sequitur quod215
ex praemissa practica "Deus fecit caelum et terram" ex qua
sequitur quod maxime debes eum diligere, ita quod speculatio
semper ordinatur ad praxim in operationibus.
*" Hoc quod potius omittendum est.

which is incongruous. Neither does the unity of the light of faith

in which theology's principles are known, suffice to produce such
unity according to those,i39 because in this way all the
philosophical sciences would be one science because of the unity
of the light of natural reason in which the principles of any
science are known.
243 Also, a habit not having evidence from its object is not
distinguished on account of a distinction in the object. But
theology is such a habit, according to those. Therefore it is not
distinguished into a practical and a speculative habit because of
an object about which one can be both speculative and practical:
the two aspects, about which they assume this science to be.
The major is proved, because if a habit that does not derive its
evidence from the object were to be distinguished on the basis of
its object, then since faith is such a habit, it would be
distinguished on the basis of what is credible and, since there are
twelve articles of belief, there would be twelve faiths.
244 Also some articles are necessary and others are contingent,
both of which do not seem to be regarded by a science that is
essentially one. To this reason of theirs it must be said that those
who postulate it to be speculative, would say that it is not limited
of itself to just practice or to works that can be performed. But
insofar as speculation could follow from practical knowledge, [it
could be called speculative]. Similarly, on the other hand, those
who postulate it is practical, which it seems more to be, say that it
only considers speculative things for the sake of praxis insofar as
through speculation they are directed to praxis and operation. For
example: this is practical "One has to be healed of such a sickness
in this fashion." But this conclusion follows from some practical
principle in an unqualified sense, namely that such an infirmity
happens from an abundance of bile. And so it is in the case at
hand. For just as this conclusion is practical: "God must be loved,"
so it follows from this practical premise: "God made the heavens
and the earth." From which it follows that you ought to love him
most of all, so that speculation is always ordered to some
operation.
l39 That is, those who hold theology to be maximally one.

[IV.]
245 Ulterius si quaeratur an theologia sit distincta a scientiis

philosophicis patet quod sic quia habet aliud subiectum formale
quia subiectum eius est singulare, subiectum vero aliarum
scientiarum est aliquod universale. Hoc etiam patet discurrendo.
Quia si physica est de mobili, haec non est illa quia Deus non est
mutabilis. Si geometria est de quanto, Deus non est sic quantus.
Nec est metaphysica ut prius probatum est, ergo nulla scientia
philosophicarum .
[V.]
246 Si quaeratur an sit prior aliis scientiis patet quod sic. Quia
cum sit duplex prioritas in scientiis, I Posteriorum,2i6 scilicet
nobilitatis subiecti et certitudinis notitiae, et haec utroque modo
sit certissima, tum quia subiectum eius est nobilissimum sub
ratione nobilissima, scilicet Deitatis, tum quia eius principia sunt
certissima quae includuntur in subiecto certissimo quia sim-
plicissimo.
[VI.]
247 Si quaeratur an sit subalternata alicui alteri scientiae dico

quod non quia scientia subalternata accipit sua principia ut sibi
evidentia propter quid a scientia superiori, scilicet subalternante,
nec cognoscit ea nisi quia sunt ut per experientiam aut quia
reducuntur in principia superioris scientiae. Hoc non contingit in
hac scientia quia nullum aliud subiectum potest virtualiter
includere hoc subiectum, sed potius econverso.
248 Contra. Si subiectum est sub subiecto, et scientia sub
scientia. Sed Deus continetur sub ente de quo ut subiecto est
metaphysica. Ergo haec scientia est sub metaphysica. Dicendum
quod subalternatio non attenditur secundum superius et inferius
vel secundum universale et minus universale quia scientia
2i6 Aristot., Anal. Post. I. c. 2 (716 33-72a 1); cf. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis
(ed. J. Hamesse, 312).
IV.
245 And if it is asked further: Is theology distinct from the

philosophical sciences? it is evident that it is, for it has another
formal subject, because its subject is singular; the subjects of the
other sciences are all universal. This is also evident inductively.
For if physics is about the mobile, this is not that, because God is
not mobile. If geometry is about the quantified, God is not in this
way quantified. Nor is it metaphysics as was proven earlier,
therefore it is none of the philosophical sciences.
V.
246 And if it is asked further: Is it prior to the other sciences? it

is evident that it is. For since there is a twofold primacy in
sciences, according to Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics, namely
nobility of subject and certitude of the knowledge, this [science] in
both of these ways is most certainly prior, both because its subject
is the noblest under the most noble notion, namely deity, and
because its principles, which are included in the most certain
subject because it is most simple, are most certain.
VI.
247 And if it be asked: Is it subordinated to any other science? I

say that it is not, because a subordinate science receives its
principles from a higher science, namely that to which it is
subordinate, where they are evident as reasoned facts. Neither
does it know these principles unless it be from experience or
because they are traced back to the principles of a superior
science. But this does not happen in this science [of theology],
because there is no other subject that can virtually include this
subject, but rather the converse is the case.
248 To the contrary. If the subject is under a subject, then the
science is subordinate to another science. But God is contained
under being which is the subject of metaphysics. Therefore this
science is under metaphysics. It must be said that subordination
is not determined on the basis of what is superior or inferior,
subalternata est de ente per accidens, ut de linea visuali est

perspectiva, non autem de eo quod per se et essentialiter
continetur sub superiori, scilicet linea. Nam si linea haberet
species, esset eadem scientia quia de genere et specie non est nisi
una scientia. Quamdiu enim proceditur in conceptibus per se, ex
ratione proprii subiecti possunt sumi principia ad concludendum
passiones de inferioribus. Sed ens per accidens, licet sit notum
per sensum et similiter principia eius, tamen non possunt sciri
propter quid nisi per rationem utriusque partis vel alterius quae
pertinent ad scientiam superiorem, sicut principia lineae visualis
non possunt sciri propter quid nisi per rationem lineae et
visualitatis.
[VII.]
249 Si quaeratur an haec scientia subalternet sibi alias scientias

dico quod non. Nam aliae scientiae resolvunt suas conclusiones in
sua principia immediata quae primo sunt vera de eis, et si nihil
aliud esset.
250 Unus tamen doctor dicit quod sic, quod non credo esse
verum quia illae scientiae non resolvunt conclusiones suas in alia
principia priora quae, si tantum essent, omnibus aliis
circumscriptis nihil minus sufficerent ad veritates conclusionum
omnium eliciendas. Sed circumscriptis omnibus aliis conclusiones
omnium aliarum scientiarum resolvuntur in sua principia et
ulterius in rationem subiecti. Vel si, per impossibile, Deus non
esset et quod triangulus esset, adhuc habere tres resolveretur in
naturam trianguli. Unde, licet huiusmodi subiecta secundum esse
eorum sint a Deo, non tamen per rationem Dei includunt
virtualiter suas passiones, et ideo theologia non dicit propter quid
respectu aliarum.
universal or less universal, because a subordinate science is about

being incidentally, just as optics is about visual line, but it is not
about that which is contained per se and essentially under
something superior, namely, line. For if line were to have species,
it would [still] be the same science because about the genus and
the species there is only one science. For as long as one continues
reasoning in per se concepts, principles for concluding attributes
would be taken from what is inferior, based on the proper notion
of the subject. But accidental being, as well as its principles,
although they are known from the sense, nevertheless cannot be
known as reasoned facts except through the notions of both parts
or of one of the parts that pertain to the superior science, just as
the principles of a visual line cannot be known as reasoned facts
except through the notions of line and visibility.
VII.
249 And if it be asked: Does this science subordinate to itself

other sciences? I say that it does not. For the other sciences trace
back their conclusions to their immediate principles, which
primarily are true of them, as if there were nothing else.
250 One doctor however says that theology does subordinate,
which I do not believe to be true. Indeed, those sciences do not
trace back their conclusions to some prior principles, such that (if
only they existed) they would still be sufficient to elicit the truth
of all their conclusions, even if all others were written off. At the
same time, even if all others are written off, the conclusions of all
the other sciences [by themselves] are traced back to their own
principles and further to the notion of the subject. And if, to
assume the impossible, God did not exist and a triangle did, it
would still be the case that having three angles is traced back to
the nature of the triangle. Hence, although such subjects
according to their being are from God, nevertheless it is not
through the notion of God that they include virtually their
attributes, and therefore theology does not assert the reasoned
fact with respect to other things.
[VIII.]
251 Si autem quaeratur utrum theologia sit de omnibus dico

quod sic quantum ad aliquas relationes reales quas habent omnia
ad Deum et econverso Deus ad omnia secundum relationem
rationis, ut sunt relationes eminentiae et excedentiae secundum
triplicem rationem causae efficientis, formalis et finalis, quae
fundantur in Deo secundum rationem ut terminat relationes
excessus ex parte causae effectus, scilicet exemplati et finiti.
VIII.
251 And if it is asked: Is theology about all things? I say that it is

insofar as all things have some real relationships to God, and God
in turn has a conceptual relationship to all things; such are the
relations of eminence and excess as regards the triple notion of
cause, efficient, formal and final, which relations have their basis
in God conceptually, who is the term of the relations of excess
that stem from the effect of a cause, namely being modeled on an
exemplar* and directed to an end.
[Distinctio 1
Pars I de obiecto fruitionis
Quaestio unica
Utrum per se obiectum fruitionis sit ultimus finis]
1 Circa distinctionem primam quaeritur primo de frui in

comparatione ad obiectum suum: utrum per se obiectum fruiti
onis sit ultimus finis.
Videtur quod non:

Ad Galatas 5: Fructus autem Spiritus gaudium, pax, caritas,
etc., ubi dicit Ambrosius quod ista appellat Apostolus fructus quia
propter se appetenda sunt; et sunt plura, ergo plura propter se
appetenda; et quod est per se appetendum, illo est per se
fruendum; ergo etc.
2 Praeterea, confirmatur hoc de caritate, quia bono per
essentiam est fruendum; caritas est huiusmodi, quia est bonum
non per accidens; quia si sic, de illo esset quaerendum: aut est
bonum per essentiam aut per accidens. Aut igitur erit processus
in infinitum, aut stabitur quod caritas sit bonum per essentiam et
sic ea fruendum.
3 Item, capacitas naturae finitae est finita; ergo potest satiari
aliquo finito. Antecedens patet. Cum natura rationalis sit finita,
eius capacitas erit finita. Consequentia probatur: quia finitum
potest adaequari finito; sed satiatio non est nisi quaedam
adaequatio, et obiectum potest adaequari capacitati potentiae;
ergo etc.
4 Item, firmius assentit et adhaeret intellectus vero creato
quam increato, quia isti per evidentiam, illi non. Ergo voluntas
magis adhaerebit bono creato quam increato, et per consequens
magis fruetur.
89
Distinction 1
Part I: The object of fruition
Sole Question
Is the ultimate end the per se object of fruition?
1 In regard to the first distinction the first question asked

about fruition or enjoyment compared to its object is whether it is
the ultimate end that is the per se object of fruition.
Arguments Pro and Con
Apparently it is not:
"The fruit of the Spirit is joy, peace, charity," etc. according
to ch. 5 from Paul's letter to the Galatians. Ambrose says here
that the Apostle calls these things fruit because they must be
sought for their own sake; and there are many, hence several
things must be sought for their own sake, and what is sought for
its own sake is what must be enjoyed per se [as ultimate object].
Therefore, etc.
2 Furthermore, this is confirmed in regard to charity, for what
must be enjoyed per se and essentially is the good; charity is
such, because it is not an incidental good, for if it were, one must
question whether it is a good essentially or only accidentally. And
therefore there will be an infinite process or it will be established
that charity is a good by reason of its essence and thus it must be
enjoyed. Therefore, etc.
3 Also, a finite nature* has a finite capacity; therefore it can
be satisfied by something finite. The antecedent is evident. Since
a rational nature is finite, its capacity will be finite. The
implication* is proved, because something finite can be adequate
for what is finite; but to be satisfied is nothing other than a
certain type of adequacy, and the object can be adequate for a
finite potency;* therefore etc.
4 The intellect will assent to and adhere more firmly to
created, rather than uncreated truth, since the former will be
evident to it whereas the latter will not. Therefore the will* will
adhere more to created good than to uncreated, and, as a
consequence, will enjoy it more.
89
5 Contra:
Augustinus, I De doctrina christiana cap. I,i sicut patet in
littera.2
[I. Ad quaestionem]
6 Ut habeatur materia de fruitione, hic est primo distin-

guendum de fruitione, secundo de obiecto fruitionis; tertio expono
unum verbum quod ponitur in quaestione.
[A. Art. 1: De fruitione]
7 Quantum ad primum dico quod fruitio potest dupliciter

accipi: vel pro fruitione in communi et absolute, vel ordinata.
Probatio divisionis: quia quaecumque potentia potest agere vel
frui inordinate, abstrahit ab actione vel a fruitione ordinata; sed
voluntas potest inordinate velle frui, secundum Augustinum 83
Quaestionum 30 quaestione,3 igitur etc.
[B. De obiecto fruitionis]
8 Si ergo quaeratur de fruitione ordinata, dico quod solo fine

ultimo est per se fruendum, sicut per se obiecto fruitionis. Quod
ostendo dupliciter: primo, quia sicut electio ordinata est quae
habet circumstantias rectas et consonas rectae rationi, sic fruitio
est ordinata quae habet circumstantias consonas ultimo fini. Illud
ergo est obiectum suum quod est obiectum fruitionis
circumstantionatae; hoc autem est Deus, qui est finis ultimus, et
est debito modo proportionatus et circumstantionatus.
Probatio: quia potentia quae respicit aliquod obiectum commune
non quietatur nisi in eo in quo ratio illius communis perfectissime
reperitur; sed potentia quae est voluntas fruens respicit omne
bonum sive bonum universale; ergo non potest quietari nisi in eo
i August., De doctrina Christ. I, c. 5, n. 5 (CCSL 32, 9; PL 34, 21).

1 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, dist. 1, c. 2 (SB IV, 56).
l August., De diversis qq. 83, q. 30 (CCSL 44A, 38; PL 40, 19).
Dist. 1, Part I, Sole Question 90
5 To the contrary is Augustine, in Bk. I On Christian

Doctrine, chapter 1, as is clear from the introductory* citations [to
this distinction].
I. To the question
6 To have some material [for discussing] fruition or

enjoyment, one must first distinguish the sort of enjoyment or
fruition we are talking about; secondly what its object is, and
thirdly I will explain one word that is put into this question.
Article One
Two sorts of fruition
7 As for the first I say that fruition can be taken in a twofold

sense. Either the word is taken in general and absolutely, or it
refers to what is orderly.* Proof of the division: Since any potency
or power can act or enjoy inordinately, it can withdraw from the
orderly action or fruition; but the will can will to enjoy something
inordinately, according to Augustine in Eighty-three Questions,
question 30; therefore etc.
Article Two
The object of fruition
8 If one is asking about orderly enjoyment, therefore, I say

that only the ultimate end must be enjoyed for its own sake as its
object per se. I show this to be the case in two ways: first, since an
orderly choice is that which has the right circumstances that are
consonant with right reason, it follows that enjoyment is orderly
if it has circumstances consonant with one's ultimate end. Hence
its object is that object of enjoyment that is appropriate in all its
circumstances. That object is God who is the ultimate end, and is
appropriate in all his circumstances and appropriately
proportionate. Proof: For a potency, which regards some common
object, is not satisfied unless there is found in that object that
which is most perfectly its raison d'etre; but the potency that is
the will that enjoys is concerned with every good or good in
ubi finis ultimus invenitur, qui habet rationem omnis boni; quia
finis et bonum idem, ergo ultimus finis est omne bonum.
Probatio maioris: quia in omnibus aliis bonis ab illo communi est
suum obiectum deminute sive sumitur ratio obiecti deminute.
Quod patet: si visus aspiceret aliquod luminosum, non quietatur
in eo secundum rationem nisi tantum in lumine.
9 Secundo, quia quod inclinatur per se ad aliqua plura, non
quietatur in aliquo nisi tantum in illo quod continet virtualiter
omnia illa plura, sive illo modo quo potest illa continere.
Exemplum de materia, quae inclinatur ad plures formas; et ideo
non quietatur nisi in illa forma quae continet virtualiter omnes
formas; unde haec est causa incorruptibilitatis caeli. Sed voluntas
inclinatur ad multa bona; ergo non quietatur nisi tantum in illo
quod est continens omnia bona, quod non potest esse aliud nisi
finis ultimus; et si deficeret unum bonum fini ultimo, non perfecte
quiesceret. Sic ergo patet quod est obiectum fruitionis ordinatae.
[C. Art. 3: De fruitione in communi]
10 Si vero quaeratur de fruitione in communi, dico quod potest

esse obiectum eius quodcumque bonum vel apparens bonum, sive
sit bonum quod appareat esse finis ultimus. Quod apparens
bonum, probatur quia si ratio erronea proponat aliquid pro fine
ultimo, puta voluptatem, voluntas potest illud appetere propter
se, et sic illo frui.
11 Secundo ostendo quod potest quietari sub fine praestituto a
voluntate, ita quod bonum erit obiectum eius sub ratione
praestituti licet non sit finis in se, sed secundum quod voluntas
praestituit sibi illud bonum pro fine; dato quod non sit apparens
bonum, ut si intellectus ostendat voluntati aliquod bonum, etiam
dato quod ostendatur sibi a ratione non errante, potest voluntas
illud sibi praestituere ut finem. Quod sic patet: illud in cuius
general; therefore it cannot be satisfied except in that which

represents its ultimate end, which has the aspect of everything
good; for the end and the good are the same thing, therefore the
ultimate end is every good. Proof of the major: in every good other
than this most perfect or common good the object is diminished or
notion of the object is taken incompletely. This is evident: if one's
vision were focused on some luminous object, it would have no
reason to find satisfaction in it, but only in light [itself].
9 Secondly, since what is inclined per se to a multiplicity of
things,* does not come to rest except in what contains virtually*
every one of these in the manner it can do so. Take the example of
matter, which is inclined to receive a plurality of forms, and
therefore does not come to rest save in that form which virtually
contains all the others; this is the reason why the heavenly bodies
are incorruptible. The will, however, is inclined to many goods;
therefore it cannot come to rest unless it be in that which
contains all good, and that cannot be anything other than the
ultimate end, and if one good were missing from the ultimate end,
it would not be perfectly at rest. Thus it is clear, therefore, what
the object of orderly enjoyment is.
Article Three
Fruition or enjoyment in general
10 If one were to inquire about enjoyment in general, I say that

its object can be any real or apparent good, or one that only seems
to be the ultimate good. Proof that this is true of what appears to
be good is the fact that if erroneous reason can propose something
as the ultimate end, for example, pleasure, the will can seek it for
its own sake and thus enjoy it.
11 Secondly, I show that one can be satisfied with some end set
before that individual by the will, so that the good, under the
aspect presented, will be that one's object, even though it is not
the end in itself but is only something set before it by the will as
an end. Indeed, given that something is [a real, and] not just an
apparent good, for instance if the intellect shows the will
something that is good, and granted that it is not in error, the will
can set it up as an end for itself. Evidence of this: if an act is in
potestate est actus et modus agendi est in virtute illius; sed in

potestate voluntatis est velle quodcumque bonum vel hoc bonum;
ergo potest voluntas sibi pro fine illud praestituere, sive referre in
finem vel non referre.
12 Quomodo autem ultimus finis est obiectum per se fruitionis,
est intelligendum quod ratio finis non est ratio principalis et
formalis actus fruitionis, sed est condicio sive ratio obiectum
ipsum concomitans. Quod patet, quia nulla relatio rationis est per
se ratio ipsius obiecti beatifici ut beatificum est; sed relatio finis
est relatio rationis ad creaturas; ergo non erit per se formalis
ratio obiecti beatifici, quia nullum tale est obiectum per se.
13 Similiter patet hoc de fine praestituto a voluntate, quia ratio
obiecti praecedit actum et finem; talis enim finis necessario
sequitur, eo quod voluntas appetens illud propter se tribuit sibi
rationem finis.
[II. Ad argumenta principalia]
14 Ad primum4 principale de auctoritate Ambrosii, dicendum

quod illa sunt appetenda, et appetuntur propter se formaliter,
non autem finaliter.
15 Et ad confirmationem de caritate quod est bonum per
essentiam, dicendum quod 'per essentiam' dividitur contra 'per
accidens' uno modo, ut 'homo per essentiam est animal' contra
istam 'homo per accidens est albus'. Secundo 'per essentiam'
dividitur contra 'per participationem', ita quod ens per
participationem excludit omnem rationem causae tam efficientis
quam formalis, sive exemplaris et finalis a se, eo quod habet
rationem effectus secundum quamlibet istarum trium causarum.
4 Cf. supra n. 1.
the power of something, then the manner of acting is also in its

power. [But where the will is concerned,] any good whatsoever or
this particular good is in the power of the will; therefore the will
can set it up for itself as an end or can refer it or not refer it to an
end.
12 How the ultimate end is the per se object of fruition,
however, must be understood in such a way that the aspect of end
is not the principal and formal* act of enjoyment, but rather a
characteristic that accompanies the object itself. This is evident,
because no conceptual relationship is the per se reason the
beatific vision itself is beatific. But the relation of being an end is
a conceptual relationship to creatures; therefore it will not be per
se the formal reason why an object is beatific because no such
[relationship] can be the object per se.
13 Likewise this is also applicable to what was said about an
end set up by the will, because the aspect of being an object
precedes the act and the end; for such an end necessarily follows
from the fact that the will, seeking some thing for its own sake,
gives to it the aspect of being an end.
14 To the first initial argument [n. 1] about the authority of

Ambrose it must be said that these [virtues] must be sought and
sought formally for their own sake, but not finally [or as an
ultimate end].
15 To the confirmation about charity that it is a good by reason
of its essence it must be said that in one sense 'through or by
reason of its essence' is contrasted with 'by reason of what is
accidental,' as 'man is by reason of his essence an animal' in
contrast to 'man is white by reason of what is accidental.' In a
second sense, 'by reason of its essence' is contrasted with 'by
participation' so that a being through participation excludes from
itself every aspect of cause, not only efficient, but also formal or
exemplar, and final, in so far as it has the aspect of being an
effect according to any one of these three causes. But a being
through or by reason of its essence in the second sense includes
this triple aspect of [being a] cause, as "God is good by reason of
Sed ens per essentiam secundo modo dicto includit hanc triplicem
rationem causae, ut 'Deus est bonus per essentiam'. Sed caritas
est bonum per essentiam primo modo, non secundo; et ideo primo
bono non est fruendum, sed secundo.
16 Ad secundum5 dicendum quod capacitas finita potentiae non
potest satiari obiecto finito, nec quietatur in eo. Et quando dicitur
quod 'finitum potest adaequari finito', dicendum quod dupliciter
potest aliquid adaequari alteri: vel in entitate, ut albedo albedini,
vel in proportione, ut materia formae; et prima est inter similia in
natura; secunda inter dissimilia. Unde inter similia non est
aequalitas proportionis. Sic igitur in proposito, capacitas
potentiae finitae licet adaequatur finito in entitate, non tamen in
proportione, et ideo oportet quod excedat illud finitum in entitate;
hoc autem solum est infinitum, quare in solo tali potest quietari
potentia finita. Quod declaro: quantumcumque ens ad finem
accipiatur cum omnibus suis condicionibus, necesse est tales
rationes sive relationes rationis fundari in aliquo finito, quia
accipiuntur ex parte ipsius finiti; sed ex parte finis illud finitum
necessario fundatur super infinitum; unde talis habitudo, quae
est beatorum ad finem beatificum, ex una parte fundatur in finito
et ex parte termini fundatur in infinito.
17 Ad aliud6 dicendum quod consequentia non valet, quando
dicitur quod intellectus firmius assentit bono creato, ergo
voluntas. Quod patet, quia assensus intellectus non est in
potestate eius, sed est ex evidentia obiecti, cui necessario habet
assentire vel adhaerere per actum intellectionis magis quam
obiecto non evidenti. Sed assensus voluntatis est in potestate
eius, et potest assentire magis bono minus noto et evidenti quam
magis evidenti, licet teneatur plus tendere in maius bonum.
5 Cf. supra n. 3.
6 Cf. supra n. 4.
his essence." But charity is a good by reason of its essence in the

first, but not in the second way. And therefore it is the essential
good in the second, not in the first sense that must be enjoyed.
16 To the second argument [n. 3] it must be said that the finite

capacity of a potency cannot be satisfied by a finite object, nor can
it come to rest in such. And when it is said that 'something finite
can be adequate to the finite' it must be said that in a twofold
sense something can be adequate to another; either in entity, as
white to whiteness, or in proportion, as matter to form, and the
first is between things similar in nature, the second between
things that are dissimilar. Hence between similar things there is
no equality of proportion. Thus it is the case in our proposal. The
capacity of a finite potency, although adequate to something finite
in entity, is not however adequate to it proportionally, and
therefore it is necessary that [the end] exceed that finite in entity.
But only the infinite is this sort of thing, because only in such can
a finite potency be satisfied. Which I explain: no matter how great
a being is accepted with all its conditions as the end, it is
necessary that such conceptual relations be founded in something
finite, because they are accepted on the part of the finite itself;
but on the part of the end that finite is necessarily founded upon
the infinite. Hence such a relationship as that of the blessed to
the beatific end, is based on the one hand on the finite, and on the
part of the term is founded in the infinite.
17 To the other [n. 4] it must be said that the implication is

invalid when it is said that the intellect assents more firmly to
the created good [than to the uncreated, and] therefore the will
does the same. This is evident, because the assent of the intellect
is not in its own power but is necessarily controlled by the
evidence of the object. It must assent or adhere through an act of
understanding to what is evident to a greater degree than it does
to what is not evident. The assent of the will, on the contrary, is
in its power, and it can assent to a greater good that is less well
known than to one that is more evident, although it is bound to
tend to a greater extent to a greater good.
[Pars II de frui in se
Quaestio 1
Utrum fine ultimo apprehenso necesse sit frui voluntatem]
18 Utrum fine ultimo apprehenso necesse sit frui voluntatem.
Videtur quod sic:

Augustinus IV De doctrina Christiana,1 ubi recitat de
quodam mimo, dicit quod "omnes volunt sibi beatitudinem
propter se non propter aliud". Si ergo ultimus finis sit
apprehensus, necessario omnes volunt beatitudinem.
19 Item, Avicenna VIII Metaphysicae suae:8 "Delectatio est
coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti"; sed finis ultimus est
summe necessario conveniens voluntati, ergo ibi est summa
delectatio, quae est idem quod fruitio sive beatitudo.
20 Item, sicut agens approximatum passo necessario movet
realiter, ita finis approximatus sive apprehensus movet
necessario metaphorice. Ergo si finis ultimus ab intellectu
apprehensus movet voluntatem, necessario fruetur illo.
21 Item, omne mobile supponit aliquid immobile; sed omnes
alii actus voluntatis qui non sunt de fine ultimo sunt varii et
mutabiles; ergo solus ille qui est circa finem est immutabilis, et
sic necessarius.
22 In oppositum arguitur: Psalmus: Superbia eorum qui te
oderunt ascendit semper.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
23 Haec quaestio dupliciter potest intelligi: vel de fine ultimo

apprehenso obscure, vel apprehenso clare; et utroque modo potest
7 Potius August., De Trin. XIII, c. 3-4, n. 6-7 (CCSL 50A, 387-9; PL 42, 1017-
8); cf. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, dist. 1, c. 3, n. 7 (SB IV, 59).
H Avicenna, Metaph. VIII, c. 7 (AviL, 432).
Dist. 1, Part II, Question One 94
Part II: Fruition itself

Question One
Must the will necessarily enjoy the ultimate end
once it is apprehended?
18 Once the ultimate end is perceived must the will necessarily

enjoy it?
It seems that it must:

Augustine in Bk. IV of Christian Doctrine, where he tells a
story about a certain actor, says, "All want happiness for its own
sake and not for the sake of anything else." Therefore, if the
ultimate end is apprehended, it is [also] necessary that all wish
happiness [to be present then].
19 Also, Avicenna in Bk. VIII of his Metaphysics: "Delight is
the joining of what is suitable to what it is suited." But the
ultimate end is the highest object that is necessarily suited to the
will; therefore the supreme delight is to be found there, which is
the same thing as enjoyment or beatitude.
20 Also, just as the agent, when it touches the patient,* must
really move it, so too the end when it is reached or apprehended
must necessarily move metaphorically. Therefore, if the ultimate
end apprehended by the intellect necessarily moves the will, the
will must necessarily enjoy it.
21 Also, every mobile presupposes something immobile; but all
other acts of the will, which are not directed to the ultimate end,
are varied and changeable; therefore only that act which is
directed to the end is unchangeable, and thus is necessary.
22 It is argued to the contrary in the Psalms [74:23]: "The

uproar of those who rebel against you is unceasing."
To the question
23 This question can be understood in two ways: either about

the ultimate end perceived obscurely or perceived clearly. And of
intelligi dupliciter: vel in universali vel in particulari. Si obscure

et in particulari sub ratione termini; et universali sub ratione
unius. Si autem intelligatur de fine clare viso, hoc est dupliciter:
vel comparando ad voluntatem caritate elevatam sive habitu
supernaturali informatam, vel ad voluntatem nudam et non
elevatam.
[A. Art. 1: De fine ultimo apprehenso obscure

in universali
1. Opinio Henrici Gandavensis]
24 Quando ergo quaeritur de primo, an Deo apprehenso

obscure in universali necesse sit voluntatem frui, dicunt aliqui
quod sic. Quod probant tribus rationibus. Primo sic: quod sicut
est principium in speculabilibus, sic finis in operabilibus et
agibilibus; sed de necessitate intellectus assentit primis principiis
speculabilibus; ergo et voluntas ultimo fini.
25 Secundo sic: voluntas vult necessario illud cuius partici-
patione vult quidquid vult, quia ipsum est maius omni alio
appetibili; sed omne aliud ab ultimo bono, quod est bonum per
essentiam, est quaedam participatio summi boni, secundum
Augustinum, VIII De Trinitate, cap. 5;9 ergo etc.
26 Tertio sic: voluntas non potest aliquid non velle vel respue-
re, nisi illud ubi est aliqua malitia vel defectus boni vel in re vel
in cognitione; sed de fine ultimo sic apprehenso non potest concipi
nec malitia nec defectus boni nec in se nec in cognitione; ergo etc.
[2. Contra opinionem Henrici]
27 Sed hanc opinionem non intelligo, quia quidquid necessario

quiescit in aliquo sibi praesente, necessario tenet illud sibi
praesens si potest. Exemplum de gravi respectu centri. Si igitur
0 August., De Trin. VIII, c. 3, n. 5 (CCSL 50, 273; PL 42, 950).

both ways it can be understood in a twofold way; universally or in

particular. If it is only understood obscurely and as a particular
[good], it is apprehended as a term [that is, as a particular object
of the will] and [if known only] in general it is under one aspect
[i.e., of a real or apparent good]. If however it is grasped clearly as
an end, this can occur in two ways: either in relationship to the
will elevated by the supernatural virtue of charity, or as seen in
an unelevated and purely natural* way.
Article One
The ultimate end perceived obscurely and in general
24 When asked whether the will must necessarily enjoy God,

apprehended obscurely and in general, some say: "Yes, it must!"
and give three reasons why. First: just as the principle*
functions in regard to theoretical or speculative things, so the end
functions in regard to what must be done; but the intellect
assents of necessity* to first theoretical principles, therefore the
will assents necessarily in regard to the ultimate end.
25 Second: the will necessarily wills that in virtue of which it
wills whatever it wills, for that is more attractive than any other
thing that can be wanted. But every other good is a participation
in the highest good, which is good by reason of its essence,
according to Augustine in Bk. VIII of The Trinity, chapter 5;
therefore, etc.
26 Third: only where in reality or in what is known of it there
is something bad, or a defect of goodness, can the will not will or
reject anything. But the ultimate end thus apprehended [viz. in
an obscure and general way], cannot be conceived as lacking any
goodness or being bad; therefore, etc.
27 I do not understand this opinion, because whatever

necessarily is put at rest by the presence of something,
necessarily keeps it present to itself. Take for instance, the way
something heavy seeks the center [of the earth]. When located
grave necessario quiescit in centro, praesente eo necessario tenet

istam praesentiam quantum potest, et facit sibi illud praesens si
potest.
28 Hoc etiam patet in appetitu sensitivo, quia de necessitate
tenet se in appetibili nisi voluntas averteret; sed voluntas
imperando potest ut intellectus maneat in consideratione illius
finis; ergo si voluntas necessario quiescit in illo fine, tunc
voluntas non posset se avertere ab illo, quod est falsum, quia sic
potest ab illo sicut ab aliis, ex natura suae libertatis, alias nihil
libertatis haberet super intellectum; ergo etc.
29 Item, quod necessario quiescit in aliquo sibi praesente, hoc
non est nisi propter convenientiam naturalem illorum; ergo
eodem modo erit causa tensionis; sed convenientia naturalis non
est inter voluntatem et finem ultimum apprehensum univer-
saliter.
30 Item, quodcumque activum non impeditum necessario agit;
et si impeditur, necessario amovet impedimentum si potest: ut
lapis si movetur deorsum et invenit trabem, frangit si potest, ut
tendat ad centrum. Sed voluntas, ut dicis, non impedita neces
sario vult finem; impeditur autem per hoc quod non considerat
intellectus ut potest; ergo hoc impedimentum necessario amovet,
et per consequens tenet eum necessario quando actu considerat,
quod falsum est, quia contrarium experimur eo quod potest
avertere se ab illo.
31 Item, ab eodem habet aliquid agere et necessario agere; si
igitur voluntas est principium eliciendi volitionem, quod isti
concedunt, necessitas erit in voluntate. Modo sic, in agentibus
essentialiter ordinatis si agens principale necessario agit,
necessitat omne secundarium agens in suo ordine, ut si manus
trahit, etc. Sed agens proximum immediate voluntati est intel
lectus; et voluntas, ut dicis, necessario agit: ergo et intellectus in
considerando agit necessario.10
10 V addit (cf. Add. M.): ...et semper stabit in consideratione finis ultimi,
quod est falsum. [32] Confirmatur hoc: quamvis enim agens naturale agat per
multas dispositiones praevias, quae possunt impediri, si tamen in ultimo instanti
agat necessario, dicetur agens naturale ex necessitate. Ergo quamvis fruitionem
ultimi finis praecedant aliquae actiones, ut ostensio et apprehensio obiecti, et
istae sunt impedibiles per intellectum, si tamen istis positis voluntas necessario
fruitur fine ultimo, dicetur absolute necessario velle. [33] Unde ista quaestio
there, it necessarily remains there if possible, and keeps that

place if it can.
28 This is also the case with the sense appetite, because of
necessity it holds on to what is attractive unless the will turns it
away. But the will can command the intellect to keep thinking of
the end; therefore if the will necessarily rests in this, then it
cannot turn away from [thinking of] it, which is false. For the will
has the power to turn from this just as from others by reason of
its liberty. Otherwise it would have no freedom to direct the
mind; therefore etc.
29 Also, whatever rests in the presence of anything, does so
only because it has a natural affinity for such things. Hence, this
is what the cause of this bond will be. But there is no natural [or
necessary] affinity of the will for the ultimate end perceived only
in general [i.e., as some sort of good].
30 Also, any active agent acts necessarily if not impeded, and if
it is impeded, it removes the impediment if it can do so. Thus a
boulder if it is falling and strikes a beam, breaks it if it can, and
continues to fall toward the center [of the earth]. But the will
you sayif not impeded, necessarily seeks the end. Now if the
intellect is not considering the end when it could do so, this
constitutes an impediment. The will therefore must necessarily
remove the impediment, and as a consequence make the intellect
think about the endwhich is false. For we experience the very
opposite to be the case, since our will can turn itself away from it.
31 Also, the basis for acting necessarily, is rooted in the nature
of the agent. Hence, if the will is the principle of eliciting volition,
which these individuals concede to be the case, then necessity will
reside in the will. Now in essentially ordered agents, if the
principal agent acts necessarily, it necessitates every secondary
agent in an orderly way, for instance if it moves the hand, and so
forth. But the proximate agent immediately adjacent to the will is
the intellect; and the will, you claim, acts necessarily. Therefore,
the intellect in its thinking [activity] must also act necessarily.i
i V adds (cf. Add. M): ...and will always remain thinking of the ultimate
end, which is false. [32] This is confirmed: for, despite the fact, that a natural
agent may act through many preceding dispositions that can be impeded,
nevertheless, if in the final moment it should act necessarily, it will be classified
as a natural agent [acting] out of necessity. Therefore, although some actions,
[3. Responsio ad primum articulum]
35 Dico ergo de hoc articulo quod sicut voluntas apprehenso

aliquo bono particulari potest illud velle et non velle, et aliquid
circa eum, et circa omne obiectum praesentatum, sic similiter et
de fine ultimo sibi praesentato potest hoc imperare intellectui ut
se avertat vel convertat. Stante etiam intellectu, potest voluntas
elicere aliquid vel refugere, eo quod in potestate voluntatis est
suspendere actus potentiarum inferiorum; et suum actum etiam
potest suspendere, secundum Augustinum, I Retractationum cap.
24. 11 Nec video, quantumcumque variae actiones praecedant
ultimam in agentibus naturalibus; et licet non possit agere nisi
multis praeviis, tamen in illo instanti in quo immediate inducit
formam, necessario agit, et primo fuit ratio movens necessario
omnes praevias actiones. Sic similiter est in proposito: si voluntas
in illo instanti quo habet finem sibi praesentatum necessario
elicit circa ipsum actum volitionis, ergo illa necessitas est
intrinseca voluntati, et per consequens movet ad omnia
necessario, quod est absonum.
potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo de fine ultimo obscure cognito, alio modo de
clare et intuitive viso; et utrumque dupliciter: vel in universali vel in particulari.
Et similiter de obiecto clare viso dupliciter: vel per comparationem ad voluntatem
elevatam caritate, vel non elevatam, sed in puris naturalibus sibi dimissam. [34]
Et cum quattuor sint articuli in ista quaestione. nullo istorum fruitur voluntas
necessario fine ultimo, etiam per caritatem elevata. Nec est necessitas fruendi ex
parte Dei, cum possit agere ad claram visionem, nec agendo ad posterius, scilicet
ad fruitionem. Nec est necessitas ex parte voluntatis creatae, quin possit videre
intellectus et non fruetur voluntas.
11 August., Retractat. I, c. 24 (CCSL 57, 72-3; PL 32, 623).
Scotus's answer to the first article
35 I say therefore to this article that just as the will,

apprehending some particular good, can will or not will it, and
[can do] something about it, and about every object presented to
it, so also it can behave this way where the ultimate end is
concerned. When confronted with this [obscurely and in general]
it can command the intellect to avert its gaze or turn towards it.
Also given understanding, the will is able to choose something or
refuse it, based on the fact that it can suspend the acts of a lesser
power, and it can also suspend its own act, according to
Augustine in Bk. I of his Retractions, chap. 24. Nor do I see it, no
matter what sort of various actions may precede the last in
agents that act naturally [or involuntarily]. Although the last
cannot occur unless many previous actions precede it,
nevertheless in that instant in which it immediately induces a
form, [a natural agent] acts necessarily, and it was primarily the
reason why the other actions had to be performed. This is also
what occurs in the case in hand. If the will in that instant in
which it has the end presented to it, necessarily elicits an act of
volition in its regard, therefore that necessity will be an intrinsic
characteristic of the will, and as a consequence, it will be moved
to will everything necessarily, which is unheard of.
such as the demonstration and the apprehension of the object, may precede the
enjoyment of the ultimate end, and these (actions] can be impeded by the
intellect, nevertheless, if, after positing these [actions] the will necessarily enjoys
the ultimate end, it will be considered to will out of absolute necessity. [33]
Whence this question can be understood in a twofold way: in one way, concerning
the ultimate end cognized obscurely, in another way, concerning [the ultimate
end] seen clearly and intuitively; and both of these, [again,] in a twofold way:
either universally or in particular. And similarly regarding the object that is
clearly seen, [it can be understood] in a twofold way: either in connection to the
will elevated through charity, or [the one that is] not elevated, but left to itself [to
remain immersed] in mere natural things. [34] And, although there are four
articles in this question, according to none of them the will necessarily enjoys the
ultimate end, even when it is elevated through charity. Nor is there a necessity to
enjoy on the part of God, since he is capable of acting towards a clear vision,
without acting towards what comes after, namely towards enjoyment. Nor is
there a necessity on the part of the created will to enjoy, [even] in the case when
the intellect is able to see.
36 Dico ergo quod voluntas viatoris omnem volitionem libere

elicit, et non necessario. Nisi enim nos haberemus illam
promptitudinem voluntatis, quam vocat Anselmus12 'affectionem
commodi', non concluderemus ex hoc necessitatem in actu
volitionis. Nunc autem talis promptitudo vel habilitas non potest
dici necessitas; ergo etc.
[4. Ad argumenta principalia primi articuli]
37 Ad primum 13 dicendum quod de principiis in speculabilibus

et de fine in practicis est similitudo quoad duo: primo quoad
ordinem verorum et bonorum inter se, secundo quoad ordinem
ipsorum ad potentias ordinate operantes. Quantum ad primum,
sicut vera habent ordinem essentialem inter se, scilicet
participatione unius primi veri, II Metaphysicae,14 sic et bona; et
eodem modo quoad potentias, quia sicut potentia intellectiva
ordinate intelligit mota a principiis speculabilibus, sic et voluntas
ordinate mota a finibus.
38 Sed in hoc est dissimilitudo quia intellectus, quantum est de
se, ordinate agit semper, ita quod non potest intellectus non
intelligere principium quod habet primam veritatem; sed licet
finis ultimus habeat summam bonitatem, voluntas tamen potest
eam non velle, quia non necessario tendit in ultimum finem.
39 Ad secundum15 dicendum quod maior est falsa, quia
neutrum vult necessario; et dato quod esset verum, cum dicis in
minori quod voluntas vult omnia 'participatione primi boni', aut
hoc intelligis de participatione ratione causae efficientis, et tunc
falsa est et nihil est ad propositum. Sic enim oculus meus
necessario videret Deum. Si ratione obiecti voliti et causae finalis
12 Anselmus, De casu diaboli c. 4 (ed. F.S. Schmitt I, 241; PL 158, 332-3).

13 Cf. supra n. 24.
" Aristot., Metaph. II (a), c. 1 (9936 25-30).
,r' Cf. supra n. 25.
36 I say therefore that the will of a pilgrim* freely elicits every

volition and it does not do so of necessity. For were it not for that
promptness in the will, which Anselm calls the 'attraction for
what is advantageous,' we would not have concluded that there is
any necessity in the act of volition. As it stands, however, such
promptness or ability cannot be called necessity; therefore etc.
To the arguments for Henry's opinion
37 To the first [n. 24] it must be said that there is a twofold

similarity between theoretical principles and the way the end
functions in practical matters. The first is in regard to the order
that exists among truths on the one hand and goods on the other.
The second is in regard to the order of those things to the powers,
which act in an orderly way to attain them. As for the first, just
as truths have an essential* order among themselves, namely by
participation in the first truth [i.e., the first principle or axiom in
virtue of which they are true] according to Bk. II of the
Metaphysics, so also this is true of good. The same can be said in
regard to the potencies or powers. For just as the intellective
potency understands in an orderly way when moved by
theoretical principles, so the will is moved in an orderly way by
its ends.
38 But there is also a lack of similarity. For the intellect, so far
as it is concerned, always acts in an orderly way, so that it cannot
fail to understand a first principle in which truth primarily
resides [i.e., it cannot be thought of except as something that is
true]. But although the ultimate end has the highest goodness,
nevertheless the will can fail to will it, because it does not tend
necessarily to the ultimate end.
39 To the second [n. 25] it must be said that the major is false,
because it wills neither [the good nor the highest good]
necessarily, and given the truth of what you say in the minor
about the will willing all things by way of participation in the first
good, if you understand this participation to pertain to the will as
an efficient cause, then it is simply false and does nothing to
bolster your proposal. For if this were so, my eye would
necessarily see God. Even if one were to grant that [this
isto enim modo esset danda et tunc similiter est falsa, quia
tunc semper esset actualis relatio. Et cum tu probas 'sunt
participatione bonum', dico quod aequivocatio est de partici-
patione, scilicet effective, et sic verum est; vel formaliter, et sic
non est verum.
40 Ad tertium16 dicendum quod falsum assumit eo quod
voluntas quidquid vult, sive bonum ut est obiectum in communi
sive quodcumque bonum in particulari, non vult illud necessario
sed contingenter. Probabile tamen est quod ubi non inveniret
defectum aliquem boni non posset illud nolle qui est actus
contrarius ipsi velle, et est actus positivus; sed non ex hoc
sequitur: 'ergo necessario vult illud', vel 'non potest non velle
illud'.
[B. Art. 2: De fine apprehenso in particulari et obscure]
41 De secundo articulo, scilicet de fine apprehenso in parti

culari et obscure, puta apprehendendo hunc finem esse Deum, vel
aliquid aliud ut voluptatem dicunt quod non necessario
fertur voluntas in Deum sic apprehensum, sed ponunt exemplum
de peccantibus ex certa malitia. Sed videtur mihi quod contra-
dicunt sibi, male sequentes sua principia. Dicunt enim quod 'sicut
principium in speculabilibus, sic finis in agibilibus', etc. Tunc
arguo sic: sicut apprehendens ultimum finem confuse et in
universali invenit bonum ibi cuius participatione omnia sunt
bona, et de vero similiter et hoc sub ratione speculabilis, sic
apprehendens finem in particulari invenit ibi omne bonum sub
ratione agibilis et diligibilis.
42 Item, ratio boni a quo sunt omnia bona per participationem
magis convenit fini in particulari quam in universali, eo quod
primum bonum est mensura omnium bonorum, sicut primum
verum omnium verorum; sed mensurare magis convenit parti
culari quam universali; ergo etc.
16 Cf. supra n. 26.

participation in the first good refers to] the reason why [every]
object is willed and to the final cause, this is likewise false. For
then this actual relationship would always exist. And when you
prove 'they are good by participation,' I say that 'by participation'
is used equivocally, namely, effectively, in which case this is true,
or formally, in which case it is not true.
40 To the third [n. 26] it must be said that it is based on a false
assumption, for whatever the will wills it wills contingently and
not necessarily, whether the object be good in general or a
particular good. However, it is probably true that where no defect
of goodness can be found, the will is unable to elicit an act of
rejection, which is an act that is contrary to willing it, and is a
positive act. But from this it does not follow that "therefore it
necessarily wills it" or "it is unable not to will it."
Article Two
The end perceived obscurely and in particular
41 As for the second article, namely about the end perceived in

particular and obscurely, for example by apprehending this end to
be God, or something elsesuch as pleasurethey admit that the
will is not necessarily carried away to will 'God' apprehended in
this way, but rather point to the example of sinners who act out of
a certain malice. But it seems to me that they contradict
themselves, by badly following their principles. For they say that
'as the principle is in theoretical matters, so the end is in practical
things.' etc. Then I argue in this way. Just as one apprehending
the ultimate end only confusedly* and in general finds the 'Good'
there whose sharing of itself is the reason all things are good,
even as this is true of the 'True' in regard to all theoretical truths,
so also one apprehending the end in particular, finds there in
each good an aspect of what can be wanted and is lovable.
42 Also, the characteristic of goodness of which all goods have a
share pertains more to the end perceived as a particular than it
does when it is conceived only as a universal. The fact is that the
first Good is the measure of all goods, just as the first Truth is
that of all truths, but the idea of a 'measure' pertains more to a
particular object than it does to a universal; therefore, etc.
[C. Art. 3: De fine apprehenso sub habitu caritatis]
43 De tertio articulo, scilicet de fine apprehenso sub habitu

elevante, scilicet caritatis, dicunt quod voluntas necessario vult et
fruitur eo. Cuius ratio est, quia ibi videt omne bonum, et ibi
invenitur ratio omnis boni et nulla ratio mali. Et loquitur de
visione practica, scilicet sub ratione boni et diligibilis. Et addunt
quod Deus non posset hanc visionem practicam separare a
fruitione divina.
44 Sed contra: quando principium elicitivum non necessario
elicit, habens illud non necessario agit; sed huiusmodi principium
elicitivum est voluntas. Quod patet, quia ille qui habet maiorem
caritatem in via, sive ut viator exsistens, non necessario agit; nec
voluntas talis est principium necessario eliciendi talem actum,
sed contingenter; alias naturaliter moveretur et non libere.
45 Item, diversa approximatio agentis ad passum non facit in
actione necessitatem, sed mutat gradum forte, quantum ad inten-
sionem et remissionem. Sed caritas viatoris et comprehensoris
non differt nisi in gradu intensiori et remissiori, nec est
diversitas realis, sed tantum diversa agentis approximatio. Ergo
sicut in viatore non fuit necessitas in eliciendo actum, sic nec in
voluntate caritate elevante.
46 Item, necessitas agendi non potest esse nisi per aliquam
condicionem primi agentis intrinsecam; sed voluntas est primum
principium agendi et eliciendi actum in isto toto, scilicet in anima
elevata per caritatem, quae nullam habet necessitatis condi
cionem de se, sed mere libertatis; ergo nihil extrinsecum dabit
sibi quod sit principium necessarium, sive necessario eliciat
actum suum. Et quod addunti7 quod Deus non potest separare
hanc visionem a fruitione, contra: quia quaecumque essentiae
i7 Cf. supra n. 43.

Article Three
The end perceived under the virtue of charity
43 As for the third article, namely, about the end apprehended

under a virtue that elevates the will, namely charity, they say
that the will necessarily wills and enjoys it. The reason for this is
because there all good is seen and there is found every aspect of
good and no characteristic of anything bad. And they are
speaking of actual vision, namely under the aspect of what is good
and lovable. And they add that God cannot separate that actual
vision from divine enjoyment or fruition.
44 To the contrary: when an elicitive principle does not
necessarily elicit, what possesses such does not necessarily act;
but such an elicitive principle is the will. This is evident because
he, who has the greater charity while still on the way to the
ultimate end, or existing as a pilgrim, does not act necessarily.
Neither is the will of such a person* a principle that necessarily
evokes such an act. Rather it does so contingently. Otherwise it
would move naturally [i.e., necessarily by reason of its nature]
and not freely.
45 Also, a fundamentally different way in which an agent can
be in contact with what it acts upon does not make its action by
that fact necessary, but it changes perhaps to a greater or lesser
degree. Charity in a pilgrim and in one in possession of the
ultimate end is only different in degree, one being more intense,
the other less so. Nor is this a real diversity, but only in the
degree of nearness of the agent [to its ultimate end]. Therefore,
just as in the wayfarer there was no necessity in evoking the act,
so neither is there in the will elevated by charity.
46 Also, the need to act can only exist by reason of some
intrinsic condition that exists in the primary agent. The will
however is the primary agent eliciting the act in this whole
namely, in a soul elevated by charitywhich of itself does not
have any condition of necessity, but is free. Hence nothing
extrinsic to [the primary agent] will make it a necessary
principle, or force it to elicit its act. And regarding what is added
[n. 43] about 'God cannot separate this [beatific] vision from
fruition [or enjoyment],' quite the contrary. Any [non-relational
absolutae habentes ordinem essentialem inter se possunt ab

invicem separari; sed visio et fruitio sunt absolutae essentiae, et
operationes reales duarum potentiarum; ergo etc.
47 Dicunt ad hoc quod verum est quod possunt ab invicem
separari, nisi dependerent a tertio; sed utraque operatio dependet
immediate formaliter ab obiecto beatifico; ergo etc. Contra hoc:
quidquid est prius alio, potest separari ab illo; sed visio est
praevia fruitioni, nec necessario dependet a tertio; quod patet,
quia sicut prima causa nihil absolute necessario causat, sic nec
necessario causat effectum causae secundae; et sic voluntas
elevata per habitum caritatis, exsistente intellectu sub actu
visionis, potest suspendi ab actu fruitionis, sicut patet si Deus
causaret primo solem in se lucentem et suspenderet actum
illuminationis vel calefactionis.
48 Quantum igitur ad illum articulum dico loquendo de
visione clara et voluntate per habitum elevata non est necesse
frui nec ex parte obiecti beatifici nec ex parte voluntatis
habituatae caritate creata. Si dicas quod si voluntas non fruitur
necessario, non erit secura de sua beatitudine, dicendum quod
non est ibi repugnantia aliqua. Sicut enim sperans non sperat a
se sed ab alio, sic illa tentio et securitas est a Deo et non ab
intrinseco, et ideo non valet.
[D. Art. 4: De voluntate non elevata per habitum

caritatis
1. Responsio]
49 De quarto et ultimo articulo, scilicet de voluntate non

elevata per habitum, dicunt quod non potest sequi fruitio in
voluntate, quia agere supernaturale praesupponit esse super
or] absolute essences having an essential order can be separated

from one another. But vision and its enjoyment are such absolute
essences, because they are real operations of two [different]
powers; therefore etc.
47 They say to this that it is true that they could be separated
from one another if they were not both dependent upon a third
thing. But both are dependent immediately and formally* upon
the beatific object; therefore etc. To the contrary: whatever is
prior to another can be separated from it. But vision is a necessa
ry precondition to fruition; neither does it necessarily depend
upon a third. This is evident, because just as the first cause does
not cause anything with absolute necessity, so neither does it ne
cessarily cause the effect of a secondary cause. And thus the will
elevated through the habit* of charity, given the existence of the
act of vision in the intellect, can suspend eliciting the act of enjoy
ment, as is evident if God were to cause primarily the Sun that is
lucent in itself and suspend its act of enlightening or heating.
48 So far as this article is concerned, I declarespeaking of
clear vision [intuitive* knowledge] and a will elevated by the
virtue [of charity]there is no necessity imposed to enjoy the
beatific object that stems either from that object itself or from the
will endowed with created charity. If you say that if the will does
not enjoy necessarily, it will not be in secure possession of
beatitude, it must be said that there is no inconsistency there. For
just as one who is hoping does not hope by virtue of himself but
rather by virtue of something else [namely, God-given theological
virtues of faith and hope], so too this 'holding fast to' and security
is from God and not from something intrinsic [to the will] and,
therefore, this argument is not valid.
Article Four
The will as unelevated by the virtue of charity
Response
49 As for the fourth and final article, namely, about the will not
elevated by a habit, they say that fruition cannot follow in the
will, because to act supernaturally presupposes some superna
tural being; but the will as uninformed has no supernatural
naturale; sed voluntas non informata non habet esse super

naturale; ergo etc. Tunc etiam si posset frui, esset beata sine
caritate.
50 Sed hoc non intelligo, quantum ad hunc articulum, quia
illud quo aliquid potest simpliciter agere est potentia; sed
caritate, per te, potest aliquid simpliciter agere et impossibilitas
est ex carentia eius; ergo est potentia, vel aliquid potentiae, quod
est falsum.
51 Item, si circa obiectum minus approximatum potest esse
forma principium eliciendi actum vel agendi, multo magis circa
maxime approximatum; sed voluntas, per te in primo articulo,
poterat actum elicere necessario et naturaliter obiecto non
praesente; obiecto ergo praesente poterit absque habitu
informante et elevante.
52 Dicendum igitur quod si intellectus videret clare et intuitive
obiectum beatificum, voluntas nuda in puris naturalibus posset
frui.
[2. Ad argumenta articuli quarti]
53 Ad argumentum primum,18 quando dicunt quod agere

supernaturale praesupponit esse supernaturale, concedo. Et
quando addis quod talis actus elicitus a voluntate nuda esset
supernaturalis, nego; immo esset ex natura voluntatis, quae est
talis quod potest in omne volibile sive bonum elicere velle. Et
quando addis: 'ergo sine caritate posset esse beata', dicendum
quod non valet consequentia 'potest frui sine caritate, ergo potest
esse beata'. Quod patet, quia secundum Augustinum, V De
Trinitate in fine:19 Beatus est cui nihil deest; 'qui habet quidquid
vult, et nihil mali vult'; sed haec voluntas non haberet quidquid
ordinate posset velle, quia posset et deberet velle habere
caritatem ad hoc quod sit beatus.
54 Sic igitur quantum ad praedictos articulos quod apprehenso
ultimo fine, non necessario voluntas elicit actum volendi circa
illum.
,K Cf. supra n. 49.

19 August., De Trin. XIII, c. 5, n. 8 (CCSL 50A. 393; PL 42, 1020).
being; therefore, etc. Then also if it could enjoy, it would be

beatified without charity.
50 But I do not understand this, so far as this article is
concerned, because that by which something can act in an
unqualified sense is a potency; but by charity, according to you,
something can act in an unqualified sense and the impossibility is
from a lack of it; therefore it is a potency or something of a
potency, which is false.
51 Also, if in regard to an object less proximate a form could be
a principle of eliciting an act or of acting, all the more so in regard
to something maximally nearby; but the will, according to you in
the first article, could act to elicit necessarily and naturally when
the object is not present; therefore when the object is present it
will be able to do so without any informing or elevating habit.
52 It must be said therefore, that if the intellect were to see
clearly and intuitively* the beatific object, the bare will with what
is purely natural to it could have an act of enjoyment.
To the arguments for the fourth article
53 To the first argument [n. 49] when they say that to act
supernaturally presupposes some supernatural being, I concede
this. And when you add that such an elicited act of the bare will
would be supernatural, I deny this; indeed it would be from the
nature of the will, which is such that it could elicit an act of
willing in regard to any thing that can be willed or any good. And
when you add: "therefore without charity it could be beatified," it
must be said that the following is not a valid inference: "it can
enjoy without charity, therefore it can be beatified." This is
evident, because according to Augustine in Bk. V of The Trinity,
"Blessed is he to whom nothing is wanting, who has all that he
wills, and wills nothing wrongly"; but this will would not have
whatever it could will in an orderly way, because it could and
would will to have charity for this reason, that he would be
beatified.
54 And so far as the aforesaid articles, it is as follows: when I
apprehend the ultimate end, the will does not necessarily elicit an
act of willing in its regard.
55 Ad primum principale20 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur

de illo mimo, et dicit quod si dixisset: "Omnes vultis beati-
tudinem", etiam verum dixisset, et tamen certum est quod non
omnes qui fuerunt ad spectaculum habuerunt actum elicitum de
beatitudine; et ideo intentio Augustini est de volitione habituali,
quae includitur in illa 'affectione commodi', quae est quaedam
inclinatio et pronitas voluntatis ad beatitudinem, non necessitas.
Vel aliter dicendum quod omnes volunt beatitudinem sibi, et
hoc concupiscendo, sed non propter hoc necessario fruuntur.
56 Ad illud Avicennae21 dicendum quod aliquid est conveniens
dupliciter: vel actualiter vel aptitudinaliter; si autem aptitudi-
naliter, tunc quidquid est conveniens alicui aptitudinaliter,
coniungitur ei aptitudinaliter. Si sit conveniens ei actualiter,
coniungitur ei actualiter si sit potentia non libera, et sic delectatio
est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti; sed voluntas potest
facere quod non erit conveniens actualiter, et sic non sequitur
delectatio, nec per consequens fruitio.
57 Ad tertium22 dicendum quod istae condiciones, scilicet
moventis metaphorice et effective, destruunt necessitatem, sicut
finis movet voluntatem metaphorice, sed non necessario; 'movens
autem effective necessario movet' verum est in naturalibus ubi
est efficiens movens; et finis necessario movet metaphorice; sed in
potentia libera, scilicet in voluntate, non est efficiens movens nisi
contingenter; ergo nec finis nisi contingenter movet et meta
phorice.
58 Ad quartum23 dicendum quod reducuntur ad aliquod
immobile, scilicet ad potentiam operantem vel operativam, sed
non ad aliquem actum immobilem sive immutabilem vel neces-
sarium.
20 Cf. supra n. 18.

21 Cf. supra n. 19.
22 Cf. supra n. 20.
a Cf. supra n. 21.
55 To the first [n. 18] argument at the beginning, it must be

said that Augustine speaks about that actor, and says that [even]
if he had said: "You all will happiness," still he would have stated
something true, and nevertheless it is certain that not all who
were at the show would have had an elicited act of beatitude, [as
though each actually would have been thinking about beatitude].
And therefore the intention of Augustine is about habitual
volition, which is included in that 'attraction to what is
advantageous,' which is a certain inclination towards, or
penchant for, beatitude, rather than any necessity to have it. Or
otherwise it must be said that all will happiness for themselves,
and this with a concupiscent will but not because of this do they
enjoy [it].
56 To that of Avicenna [n. 19] it must be said that something is
suitable in one of two ways: either actually or aptitudinally. If it
is aptitudinally, then whatever is suited to something by way of
an aptitude it has for the thing in question, is only joined to it qua
having a capacity to receive the thing in question. But if it is
suitable to it only as actually present, then if the power or
potency is not free, it has to be joined to it, and in this way delight
consists in the joining of what is suitable to what is suited to it.
But the will can make what is not actually suitable [an end] and
thus delight does not follow [as a consequence of its attainment],
nor does fruition [or ultimate fulfillment].
57 To the third [n. 20] it must be said that these conditions,
namely of moving metaphorically and effectively, destroy
necessity, as the end moves the will metaphorically, but not
necessarily. That 'what moves effectively, however, moves
necessarily,' is true in regard to natural things where [an
involuntary] efficient cause does the moving, and in this case the
end has to move in a metaphorical sense. But in a potency that is
free, namely the will, the end only moves the efficient cause
contingently. Therefore, the end moves it only contingently and
metaphorically.
58 To the fourth, [n. 21] it must be said that [mobiles] are
traced back to what is immobile, namely to an operating potency
[Quaestio 2
Utrum frui sit idem delectationi vel dilectioni]
Utrum frui sit idem delectationi vel dilectioni.
59 Videtur quod sic:

Quia secundum Augustinum, X De Trinitate:24 "Fruimur
cognitis in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit", sicut patet in
littera; sed sic definiretur male frui si delectatio esset passio
consequens dilectionem vel fruitionem, quia posterius non ponitur
in definitione prioris, nec passio in definitione subiecti.
60 Contra:
Voluntas actu amandi elicito fruitur Deo; aut ergo propter se
aut propter aliud. Non propter aliud, quia tunc uteretur Deo et
esset perversa; si propter se amat Deum, ergo fruitur eo actu
elicito. Delectatio non est actus elicitus, sed decor et pulchritudo
actus, sicut decor se habet ad iuvenem; ergo etc.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
61 Respondeo. Hic sunt duo videnda: primo de actu fruitionis in

se, quomodo se habet ad delectationem et e converso utrum
sint idem vel non; secundo, dato quod non sint idem, quomodo
differunt utrum scilicet fruitio significet tantum actum
elicitum a voluntate, vel tantum delectationem vel utrumque
simul.
August., De Trin. X, c. 10. n. 13 (CCSL 50, 327; PL 42, 981).

or something operative, but not to some immobile or immutable

or necessary act.
Question Two
Is fruition the same as enjoyment or love?
Is fruition the same as enjoyment (delectatio) or love (dilectio)?
59 It seems that it is:

For according to Augustine in Bk. X of The Trinity: "We
enjoy those things that are known in which the delighted will
comes to rest," as is evident in the initial texts cited. But it would
be a bad definition of fruition if enjoyment were [only] a proper
attribute that followed love or fruition, because what is posterior
is not placed in the definition of what is prior, nor is a proper
attribute put into the definition of the subject [of that attribute].
60 To the contrary:
The will enjoys (fruitur) God in an elicited act of loving;
therefore either he is loved for his own sake or for some other
reason. Now he is not loved for any reason other than himself,
because then he would be only used, and it would be perverse; if
God is loved for his own sake, therefore he will be enjoyed by an
elicited act. But delight is not an elicited act [itself], but is a kind
of decor or beauty of an act, just as beauty is an attribute of a
youth.
To the question
61 I reply: Here there are two things to investigate: First is the

act of fruition in itself, how it is related to delight or enjoyment,
and how enjoyment is related to fruition: are they the same thing
or not? And given that the two are not the same, how do they
differ: is fruition only the elicited act of the will, or is it only the
delight or is it a combination of both together?
[A. Art. 1: Relatio inter fruitionem et delectationem

1. Opinio aliorum]
62 De primo dicit unus magister quod delectatio et dilectio sive

fruitio, sumendo fruitionem pro actu elicito voluntatis, sunt idem
realiter, sed differunt tantum secundum rationem.
63 Primum ostenditur quadrupliciter. Primo sic: unius et
eiusdem potentiae circa unum et idem obiectum unus est actus;
quia actus distinctio non est nisi a potentia vel obiecto ut a causis;
sed eadem est potentia et idem obiectum respectu utrorumque;
patet de voluntate et de Deo; ergo etc.
64 Item, secundo sic: ad idem non sequitur immediate nisi
idem; sed ad idem obiectum, habito obiecto, sequitur dilectio et
delectatio; ergo sunt idem.
65 Item, quorum opposita sunt eadem, ipsa sunt eadem; sed
oppositum dilectionis et delectationis, ut odium et tristitia, sunt
eadem; ergo etc. Minor patet, quia utrumque importat quandam
inquietationem.
66 Item, quarto sic: quae habent eosdem effectus et eadem
consequentia sunt eadem; sed ista sunt huiusmodi, quia utrum
que habet perficere operationem intellectus, ergo etc.
67 Secundum declaratur quod scilicet tantum differunt
secundum rationem, et hoc ostenditur dupliciter. Primo, quia
dilectio intelligitur ut est a potentia in obiectum; sed delectatio e
converso; idem tamen re, quia idem est actus activi et passivi, III
Physicorum:25 actio et passio sunt idem secundum rem, licet
differant secundum rationem.
68 Secundo ostendo, quod differunt, quia delectatio importat
quietationem quae est privatio motus; dilectio dicit unionem et
privationem inquietationis; hae autem privationes tantum
differunt secundum rationem.
Aristot., Physica III, c. 1 (201a 24-5).

Dist. 1, Part II, Question Two 105
Article One
The relation between fruition and enjoyment
The opinion of others
62 One master says about the first, that enjoyment, love or

fruition, taking fruition for an act of the will, are the same thing
really, but they differ only conceptually.
63 He shows this is so in four ways: first, one and the same
potency has one act that has to do with one and the same object,
for a distinction of acts stems either from their potency or from
their object as their causes; but the potency is the same and the
object is the same for both [fruition and enjoyment]; it is evident
of the will and of God; therefore etc.
64 Also, secondly in this way: only the same immediately
follows the same; but both love and enjoyment follow the same
object, granted we have it; therefore they are the same.
65 Also, those things are the same whose opposites are the
same; but the opposites of love and enjoyment, such as hatred
and sorrow, are the same; therefore, etc. The minor is evident,
because both imply a certain uneasiness or disquiet.
66 Also, fourthly, in this way: those things that have the same
effects and the same consequence are the same; but these are
things of this sort, because both tend to perfect the action of the
intellect; therefore, etc.
67 The second is shown to be the case, namely, that they only
differ conceptually, in two ways. First because love is understood
to move from the potency to the object, and enjoyment to move
from the object to the potency. They are the same however,
because it is the same act viewed actively and passively,
according to Bk. IIl of the Physics. Action and being acted upon is
one and the same thing; they differ only conceptually.
68 I show secondly, that they differ [conceptually], because
enjoyment implies quiet, which is the privation of movement; love
implies union and a privation of disquiet; but these two privations
differ only conceptually.
[2. Contra opinionem aliorum]
69 Contra istam opinionem habeo aliquas rationes, nec video

quod quattuor rationes iam factae multum debeant movere
aliquem et arguo contra eam, accipiendo eandem maiorem quam
accipiunt contra eos. 'Illa sunt eadem quorum opposita sunt
eadem'; et quorum opposita non sunt eadem, nec illa sunt eadem.
Sed opposita dilectionis et delectationis non sunt idem, ergo nec
ipsa. Minor patet, eo quod odium est quoddam nolle, eo quod
odire aliquid est illud nolle esse; nolle autem non requirit
obiectum apprehendi sub ratione exsistentis, quia antequam
obiectum exsistat, potest voluntas nolle illud et prohibere ne fiat.
Tristitia autem requirit obiectum apprehendi sub ratione
exsistentis, quia nunquam contristor nisi est nolitum quod timeo
ut26 eveniat, secundum Augustinum, XIV De Trinitate cap. 10:27
"Tristitia est de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt". Non igitur
sunt idem realiter odium et tristitia, nec per consequens opposita,
scilicet, dilectio et delectatio.
70 Praeterea, nolle intensissimum potest praecedere eventum
noliti et eius exsistentiam. Ponatur ergo nolitum in esse, voluntas
non habet nolle intensius modo quam prius, quia prius habuit
intensissimum; non ergo est voluntas mutata de non velle in
nolle, et tamen modo ex eventu noliti tristatur, scilicet ex eius
exsistentia; ergo non per aliquod nolle differunt, ergo realiter.
Maior probatur, quia sicut in potestate voluntatis est nolle, ita et
modus et intensio actionis.
71 Item, voluntas omnem actum suum elicit voluntarie, ita
quod si reflectatur super ipsum actum, placet sibi, ut nolle se
nolle placet sibi sicut velle se velle; sed nullus voluntarie
20 Rectius: ne eveniat.
27 Potius cf. August., De civ. Dei XIV, c. 7-8 (CCSL 48, 423; PL 41, 410).
Refutation of this opinion of others
69 Against this opinion I give some reasons of my own; neither

do I see that the four arguments in its favor just given do much to
convince anyone; and I argue against these, taking the same
major which they use against them [as part of the argument],
namely 'They are the same whose opposites are the same'; and
things whose opposites are not the same, are not the same. But
the opposites of love and enjoyment are not the same; therefore
neither is love and enjoyment. The minor is evident, because
hatred is a certain 'willing not,' for the reason that 'to hate
something' is to wish for it not to exist. But 'willing not' does not
require that the object be apprehended under the aspect of
existence, because before some object exists, the will can will that
it not exist and can keep it from happening. Sorrow, however,
requires that the object be apprehended under the aspect of
existing, because I am never sad unless I fear that what I wish
not to be is likely to happen, according to Augustine in Bk. XIV of
The Trinity, chapter 10: "Sorrow is about those things we wish
wouldn't happen." Hence hatred and sorrow are not really the
same, nor are their opposites consequently, namely love and
enjoyment.
70 Furthermore, the most intense 'willing not' can precede the
existence of the event we don't want to happen. Therefore, given
the existence of what we don't want, the will's willing for it not to
be there may not be as intense at this point as it was before,
because what it had earlier was most intense. So the will is not
turned from 'not willing' to 'willing not' and nevertheless now it is
sad about the very existence of the event it wishes not to have
happened; therefore it is not through some [conceptual variation
of] 'willing not' that [hatred and sadness, and therefore love and
enjoyment] differ; therefore they differ in reality. The major is
proved, because just as 'willing not' is in the power of the will, so
also the manner and intensity of the action [of 'willing not'].
71 Also, the will voluntarily elicits every one of its acts, so that
if it were to reflect upon its act, it would be pleased; for if it 'wills
not,' it is pleased to 'will not,' just as if it wills, it is pleased
tristatur; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: nullus complacet sibi in

tristando, cum tristitia sit simpliciter quaedam displicentia ipsi
voluntati, quam voluntas non potest prohibere ne fiat.
72 Item, in Deo et in beatis est nolle, quia sicut per velle est
causa promotiva boni, ita per nolle est causa impeditiva mali; sed
Deus nec angeli beati possunt tristari. Vel sic: Deus habet nolle
intensissimum impeditivum cuiuslibet mali, quod est materia
tristitiae et cuiuslibet tristitiae ne fiat; ergo etc. Probatio
minoris: quia passio opposita, scilicet delectari, continue et
perpetuo sibi inest.
73 Item, delectatio est per se obiectum alicuius fruitionis vel
dilectionis, cuius dilectionis ipsa dilectio non potest esse
obiectum; ergo ipsa differunt realiter. Antecendens probo per
rationem et auctoritatem Augustini, IX De Trinitate cap. ultimo:28
"Desiderium inhiantis fit amor fruentis". Sed non oportet
voluntatem reflectere super actum suum quando desiderat
delectari in suo delectabili praesente sibi; ergo absente delectabili
voluntas non solum desiderat ipsum delectabile, sed etiam
delectari in illo delectabili. Ergo delectatio potest esse obiectum
ipsius desiderii, per te, sed non actus dilectionis vel fruitionis.
Dilectio autem non sic potest esse obiectum dilectionis, nisi
reflectendo se primo super potentiam et obiectum, et deinde super
actum. Patet igitur consequentia, quia sicut illi actus non sunt
idem realiter qui non habent idem obiectum realiter, ita nec ista
sunt idem realiter quorum unum est per se obiectum alicuius
actus et alius non. Sic est hic; ergo etc.
74 Secundo, ostendo per rationem sic: angelus malus potest
summe diligere se, nam secundum Augustinum, XIV De
Trinitate,29 cap. ultimo: "duo amores fecerunt duas civitates; amor
sui usque ad contemptum Dei et amor Dei usque ad contemptum
sui"; sed angelus malus non potest summe delectari, quia
vehemens tristitia quam habet excludit ab eo omnem
delectationem; ergo etc. Minor patet, quia tristitia vehemens
* Rectius: August., De Trin. XV, c. 26, n. 47 (CCSL 50A, 527; PL 42, 1094);
cf. ibid., IX, c. 12, n. 18 (CCSL 50, 310; PL 42, 972).
Rectius: August., De civ. Dei XIV, c. 28 (CCSL 48, 451, PL 41, 436).
to will; nothing voluntarily makes it sad; therefore etc. Proof of

the minor: no one is pleased by sadness, for sadness is simply a
certain displeasure on the part of the will itself, which the will
could not prevent happening.
72 Also, in God and in the blessed there is nolition, for just as
to will is the cause that promotes the good, so not to will is the
cause that impedes evil; but neither God nor the beatified angel
can be sad. Or it could be put this way: God has the most
intense will to impede any evil whatsoever that would be matter
for grief, so that no sadness could occur; therefore, etc. Proof of
the minor: the opposite attribute, namely, to be delighted, is
continually and perpetually present to him.
73 Also, delight is per se the object of some fruition, or love,
which cannot have love itself as its object; therefore, they are
really different. I prove the antecedent by argument and by the
authority of Augustine, in Bk. IX of The Trinity, the last chapter:
"Desire in seeking now becomes love enjoying." But it is not
necessary for the will to turn itself to its own act when it desires
to be delighted in what is able to give it delight by its presence;
indeed, in the absence of what delights it the will not only desires
what delights it, but also the delight itself in that which delights
it. Therefore delight itself can be an object of desire, according to
you, but not the act of love or fruition. For love can not be an
object of love in this way except by turning itself primarily to the
faculty and the object and [only] then to the act. This implication
is evident, therefore, because just as those acts are not the same
in reality, which do not have the same object in reality, so neither
are those acts really the same of which one is the per se object of
some act whereas the other is not. But that is the case here;
therefore, etc.
74 Secondly, I show this by an argument in this way. A bad
angel can love itself in the highest degree, for according to
Augustine in Bk. XIV of The City of God, the last chapter: "Two
loves created two cities, the love of self to the contempt of God,
and the love of God to the contempt of self." But the bad angel
cannot be delighted to the highest degree, because vehement grief
he has excludes all enjoyment from him; therefore, etc. The minor
is evident, because vehement grief bans all and every delight, not
excludit omnem delectationem sive quamcumque, non solum

contrariam, sed etiam contingentem, ex II Ethicorum.30
75 Item, aliquis potest habere dilectionem intensiorem, et
minorem delectationem. Patet in devotis, qui ferventer diligunt et
tamen nullam sentiunt delectationem, vel modicam, de quo
multum dolent; non ergo qui intensius diligit, intensius
delectatur. Patet etiam hoc in actu fortitudinis, qui est ex
dilectione magna, et tamen est sine delectatione parvissima, II
Ethicorum.31
76 Quod autem dicunt dilectionem et delectationem secundum
rationem tantum differre, modo primo falsum est; immo ista
differentia est realis, quia dilectio a voluntate elicitur realiter et
non tantum significatur per modum procedentis a voluntate, quia
voluntas est causa realis eius; delectatio autem est ab obiecto
delectabili realiter et ita, quod sicut obiectum sensibile est causa
delectationis in appetitu sensitivo, ita et obiectum intelligibile in
appetitu intellectivo.
77 Secundo, non intelligo differentiam secundum rationem
modo secundo, nam dilectio et delectatio non sunt formaliter
privationes; nec etiam unio, quae est per se habitudo inter
extrema unita, dicit privationem, sed veram positionem; aliter
enim unio beati ad Deum esset privatio formaliter.
78 Similiter unio agentis ad passum causat actionem realiter,
non sic privatio. Similiter unio materiae ad formam est
compositum, et non-unita non est compositum; haec ergo est non
solum privatio, quia beata visio esset privatio (actio esset privatio,
compositum etiam esset privatio) et quia ex privatione formaliter
sequeretur aliquid simpliciter positivum. Differunt igitur re
dilectio et delectatio, quia sunt effectus diversae rei et ab
agentibus omnino diversis, ut a potentia et ab obiecto.
:l Cf. Aristot., Eth. Nic. II. c. 8 (11086 14-5, 25-30).

31 Aristot., Eth. Nic. III, c. 7 (11156 7-13).
only its [direct] opposite, but also [any] associated, according to

Bk. II of the Ethics.
75 Also, someone can have a more intense love and less delight,
as is evident in devout persons, who fervently love and
nevertheless experience no delight, or moderate delight, which
saddens them a great deal; therefore it is not the one who loves
most that experiences the greatest delight. For it is evident in
acts of fortitude, which is based on the greatest love, and
nevertheless is without the smallest delight, Bk. II of the Ethics.
76 But they say that love and delight differ only conceptually,
which is false in the first mode* [of perseity*]; indeed this
difference is real because love is elicited really by the will and
does not merely signify the manner of proceeding from the will,
because the will is a real cause of it; but delight stems from the
object that is really delightful, in such a way that, just as the
sensible object is a cause of enjoyment in the sensitive appetite,
so the intelligible object is in the intellective appetite.
77 Secondly, I do no understand the conceptual difference in
the second mode* [of perseity], for love and delight are not
formally privations; nor also the union, which is a per se
relationship between the terms united, asserts a privation, but a
true placement; for otherwise the union of the blessed with God
would be formally a privation.
78 Similarly the union of the agent with the patient causes
action in reality, unlike a privation. Similarly the union of matter
to form is a composite and matter not united is not a composite;
therefore this is not just a privation, because the beatific vision
would be a privation (and action would be a privation; also the
composite would be a privation), and because from a privation
something simply positive would formally follow. Therefore love
and delight differ in reality, because they are the effects of
different things and result from completely different agents, one
from a potency, and the other from the object.
[B. Art. 2: Quomodo differunt fruitio et delectatio?]
79 De secundo, utrum fruitio significet actum elicitum tantum

vel tantum delectationem consequentem vel utrumque simul, est
controversia de significato huius nominis; et hoc est propter
magnam connexionem dilectionis et delectationis. Inseparabiliter
enim concomitantur dilectio et delectatio actum fruitionis, quia si
illa bona et ista bona, et e converso.
80 Quaedam tamen auctoritates videntur dicere quod frui sit
tantum elicitus actus, scilicet diligere, aliquae autem quod sit
delectatio tantum, et aliquae quod utrumque. Quod significet
actum elicitum, scilicet dilectionis, videtur dicere Augustinus, I
De doctrina Christiana:32 "Frui est amore inhaerere alicui propter
se"; quae adhaesio est in corporibus, ex vi scilicet motiva, quae
applicat se appetibili sive rei amatae et sic est actus elicitus.
81 Quod sit idem quod delectatio videtur dicere Augustinus, De
Trinitate:33 "Frui est plenum gaudium", etc.; sed gaudium est
quaedam passio consequens actum elicitum et sic delectatio.
Quod sit idem quod utrumque simul, Augustinus X De Trinitate.34
"Fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit", ubi
exprimitur utrumque.
82 Si ergo volumus dicere quod significet unum tantum vel
actum elicitum, auctoritates sunt glossandae quae exprimunt
utrumque, dicendo quod loquuntur de fruitione quantum ad eius
totalitatem vel concomitantiam. Si non vult glossare, dicendum
tunc quod frui est aequivocum, cuius nomen unum sed res diversa
est et non una, sicut 'Ilias'35 est nomen unum, res tamen significat
diversas.
August., De doctr. Christ. I, c. 4, n. 4 (CCSL 32, 8; PL 34, 20).

a August., De Trin. I, c. 8, n. 18 (CCSL 50, 52; PL 42, 832).
m August., De Trin. X, c. 10, n. 13 (CCSL 50, 327; PL 42. 981).
35 Cf. Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 4 (1030a 7-10); idem, Metaph. VIII (H), c. 6
(1045a 13-4); cf. Duns Scotus, Praedic. q. 8, n. 14: "Dicendum quod si contingat
subiectum et accidens unico actu intelligere, et composite ex eis unum nomen
imponere, sicut toti historiae Troianae hoc nomen 'Ilias', illud nomen non
significat utrumque sub propria ratione".
Dist. l, Part II, Question Two 109
Article Two
How do fruition and delight differ?
79 About the second question (whether fruition signifies only

an elicited act or is only the delight that follows, or is it a
combination of both) there is a controversy about the meaning of
this noun; and this is because of the close connection between love
and delight. For the act of fruition is inseparably associated with
love and delight, because if that is good, then this is also good,
and vice versa.
80 Certain authorities seem to say that to enjoy is only an
elicited act, namely of love; some however say that it is only
delight, and other that it is both. That it indicates an elicited act,
namely of love, is what Augustine seems to say in On Christian
Doctrine I: "To enjoy is to inhere in someone by love for his own
sake," which adherence is in the body, and from a force, namely
that motivates, which applies itself to what is desirable or the
thing loved, and thus it is an elicited act.
81 Augustine also seems to say that it is the same thing in The
Trinity: "Fruition is the fullness of joy," etc. but joy is a certain
attribute following the elicited act, and in this way is delight.
That it is the same as both together, Augustine, Bk. X of The
Trinity: "We enjoy the things that we know, when the will rests
by delighting in them for their own sake," where he describes
both.
82 If then we wish to say that fruition signifies only one or the
elicited act, the authoritative statements that express both need
to be glossed, by saying that they speak about fruition insofar as
its totality or what accompanies it goes. If one does not wish to
gloss, then it must be said that fruition is an equivocal term,
whose name is one but means diverse things and not just one,
just as "Iliad" is one name, but signifies diverse things.
[II. Ad argumenta pro opinione aliorum]
83 Ad primum argumentum36 illius opinionis respondeo quod

maior est falsa, nisi loquendo de actu proprie, ut scilicet frui est
actus elicitus a potentia. In proposito autem alter est actus
elicitus a potentia, scilicet dilectio, alter est passio causata ab
obiecto, scilicet delectatio.
84 Ad secundum37 dico quod licet sensationem posset sequi
immediate delectatio sensibilis, et forte illa sola, ita quod nullus
actus sit elicitus a potentia, tamen in voluntate dilectio
immediatius sequitur apprehensionem, et mediante illa delec
tatio.
85 Ad tertium38 concedo maiorem negando minorem, quia
opposita dilectionis et delectationis sunt diversa realiter, sicut
superius multipliciter est probatum.
86 Ad quartum39 dico quod non eodem modo perficiunt
operationem dilectio et delectatio, quia delectatio est quasi
perfectio accidentalis ipsius operationis, sicut pulchritudo
iuventutis, X Ethicorum;40 dilectio autem est quasi actus
imperativus vel coniungens parentem cum prole.
[III. Ad argumenta principalia]
87 Ad rationes pro. et contra principales patet per distinctionem

fruitionis secundum triplicem opinionem iam dictam, secundum
quod praecise significat actum, vel passionem consequentem, vel
utrumque ut dictum est.
[Pars III
Quaestio 1
Utrum Deus fruatur]
Quantum ad fruentem, potest hic quaeri utrum Deus

fruatur.
1,1 Cf. supra u. 63.

37 Cf. supra n. 64.
38 Cf. supra n. 65.
30 Cf. supra n. 66.
40 Aristot., Eth. Nic. X, c. 4 (11746 31-3).
Dist. 1, Part II, Question Two no
To the arguments for the other opinion
83 To the first argument [n. 63] for that opinion, I respond that
the major is false, unless one is speaking about the act properly,
namely that to enjoy is an elicited act of a potency. In what they
propose, however, one is an elicited act of a potency, namely love,
whereas the other is a proper attribute caused by the object,
namely, delight.
84 To the second [n. 64] I say that although sensible delight,
and perhaps that alone, can follow sensation immediately, so that
no act is elicited by a potency, nevertheless in the will it is love
that follows apprehension more immediately, and delight only
follows through the mediation of love.
85 To the third [n. 65] I concede the major and deny the minor,
because the opposites of love and delight are really diverse, as
was proved many times above.
86 To the fourth [n. 66] I say that love and delight do not
perfect an operation [of the intellect] in the same way, because
delight is, as it were, an accidental perfection of this operation, as
beauty is to youth, according to Bk. X of the Ethics; love, however,
is, as it were, a mandatory act, e.g., one joining the parent with
the child.
To the initial arguments
87 How to answer to the initial arguments pro and con is clear

from what has already been said of distinct meanings of 'fruition'
according to the threefold opinion about it: depending upon
whether it precisely signifies an act, a consequent attribute, or
both, as was said.
Part III: About fruition

Question One
Has God fruition?
In regard to fruition one can ask here whether God has

fruition.
88 Videtur quod non:

Quia non habet aliquid pro fine; ergo nec aliquid fruibile; et
sic non potest frui.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum viator fruatur]
Utrum viator fruatur.

89 Videtur quod non:
Quia fruitio non est alterius, sed est alicuius propter se; sed
nullus actus viatoris est propter se, cum sit actus desiderii, qui
est actus concupiscentiae; ergo etc.
90 Contra:
Viator amore inhaeret Deo propter se; sed hoc est frui
secundum Augustinum,41 ut supra; ergo etc.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum peccator fruatur]
Quaeritur utrum peccator fruatur.

91 Et videtur quod non:
Quia fruitio est quaedam quies; sed peccator non quietatur,
quia innititur mobili; ergo etc.
92 Contra:
Augustinus 83 Quaestionum, 30 q.:42 Omnis perversitas
quae vitium nominatur est "uti fruendis, et frui utendis".
[I. Ad quaestiones]
93 Ad ista tria simul respondeo per unum exemplum in

corporibus.
Primum quietativum est centrum in corporibus, quae nata
sunt quietari, in quo tripliciter quietantur: [a] unum necessario,
per se, et primo, et immobiliter, et se toto, scilicet terra; [b] et
41 Cf. supra Dist. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 73.

August., De diversis qq. 83, q. 30 (CCSL 44A, 38: PL 40, 19).
Dist. 1, Part III, Questions One-Three i11
88 It seems he does not, since he does not have something as

an [ultimate] end, therefore there is nothing he can delight in
possessing, and hence he cannot have fruition or enjoyment.
Question Two
Does the pilgrim in this life have fruition?
One can also ask whether the pilgrim in this life has fruition.
89 It seems he does not, since fruition is not for the sake of
something else, but is something one possesses for its own sake.
But no act of the pilgrim is for its own sake, since it is an act of
desire, which is an act of concupiscence; therefore etc.
90 To the contrary: through love the pilgrim inheres in God for
his own sake. But this is fruition, according to Augustine in the
text cited above.
Question Three
Does the sinner have fruition?
One can also ask whether a sinner has fruition.

91 It seems he does not, since fruition is a kind of quiet rest,
but the sinner is not at rest, because he is at work striving for
something.
92 To the contrary: Augustine in his Eighty Three Questions,
question 30 says: 'Every perversity which is called vice is
"enjoying for its own sake what is to be used [only as a means to
an end"]-'
Reply to the questions
93 To these three questions one can reply by way of an example

about corporeal bodies.
The center is the primary location where corporeal bodies
are suited by nature to be perfectly at rest, in a threefold way.
There must be (a) something that is primarily and per se,
completely and immovably at rest, namely the earth; and (b)
something that can be immovably at rest of itself, but not
aliquod immobiliter per se, sed non primo sed in quantum est
aliquid totius, sicut partes terrae intrinsecae, ut mineralia, quae
sunt quaedam partes intrinsecae; [c] tertio aliquod quietatur per
se et simpliciter, sed non primo, nec immobiliter, sicut grave
adhaerens superficiei terrae quod non quietatur primo, quia
est ut pars, nec immobiliter, quia in superficie continetur, sed
tamen per se, quia per gravitatem; [d] quarto aliquid quiescit non
simpliciter, nec primo, nec per se, nec immobiliter, sed quiescit
respectu alicuius, ut homo in navi exsistens, et haec est quies
secundum quid, tamen non immobiliter, quia in comparatione ad
navem quae non uniformiter se habet ad centrum.
94 Ad propositum ergo, primum centrum omnium intelligi-
bilium est Deus, qui est ultimus terminus omnium motuum in
spiritibus, secundum definitionem Tullii:43 "Deus est sphaera
intelligibilis cuius centrum ubique et circumferentia nusquam".
Pondus autem quo aliquid movetur ad illud centrum est amor
secundum Augustinum.44 Illud quod quiescit in isto centro primo
modo, simpliciter, et primo immobiliter, est voluntas divina; unde
in isto fine et termino motus omnium spirituum est voluntas
divina, quae est coniuncta huic bono non per habitum vel per
actum vel per participationem sed per essentiam.
95 Secundo quiescit in hoc centro voluntas beatorum, quasi
subintrans beneplacitum divinae voluntatis per amorem quasi
partes intraneae.
96 Tertio voluntas viatoris simpliciter, quia eodem immobili
obiecto cum beato innititur per se per caritatem, non tamen
primo, nec immobiliter. In hoc enim est differentia inter ista et
gravia, quia gravitas non corrumpitur quando non quiescit in
centro, sed caritas viatoris corrumpitur quando non quiescit in
Deo; sed quia movetur ad aliud, corrumpitur statim.
1:1 Sententia Hermae Trisinegisto communiter attributa: cf. Liber 24

philosopkorum, Pars I, Sent. 2 (ed. F. Hundry, CCCM 143A, 7 [cf. 37]); cf.
Thomas Eboracensis, Sapientiale I, 18 (CCCM 143A, 90-4). De attribution
Ciceroni cf. Thomas Ebor., ibid., p. 91. ubi De nat. deorum 2.18.47 citat. Cf.
Bonaventura, Itinerarium c. 5, n. 7.
44 August., Conf. XIII, c. 9, n. 10 (CCSL 27, 246; PL 32, 849).
Dist. 1, Part III, Questions One-Three 112
primarily, but in so far as it is an [integral] part of some whole, as

are the interior parts of the earth, such as the minerals which are
certain bodily parts of the earth; and (c) and thirdly, something
which is just at rest but not primarily, or per se or immovably,
just as the heavy adheres to the surface of the earthwhich is
not quieted primarily because it is as a part; nor immovably,
because it is located on the surface; but it is moved, however, per
se, because it is moved through gravity; (d) fourthly, something is
not simply at rest, neither primarily, nor per se, nor immovably,
but is simply at rest with respect to something, such as a human
being or passenger at rest in a moving boat. And this is being at
rest in a qualified sense, but not immovably so, because the
passenger is at rest only in comparison to the boat, which is not
static with respect to the center [of the earth].
94 As for the case proposed, therefore, the primary center of all
intelligible beings is God, who is the ultimate term of all activity
in spirits, according to that definition of Cicero: "God is an
intelligible sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference
nowhere." The mass or weight by which something is moved to
this center is love [a/nor] according to Augustine. That which
rests immovably in that center primarily and in an unqualified
way is the divine will, hence, in this end and term of the motion of
all spirits is the divine will, which is joined to this good not by
way of any act, participation, or habitual tendency [habitus], but
by its very essence.
95 Secondly, at rest in this center is the will of those beatified,
whose will through love has stolen, by divine benevolence, into
the center as a quasi-inner part.
96 Thirdly, the will of the pilgrim [rests in this center] in an
unqualified way, because by reason of charitable love [caritas] it
is united per se to the same immobile object, to which the blessed
in heaven are joined, but not primarily or immovably. But the
difference between these heavy things and beings [joined by love]
is that weight is not corrupted when a body is not at rest in the
center, whereas the charitable love of the pilgrim perishes, when
that person is not at rest in God, and even more so when it
becomes centered on another thing [as one's ultimate end].
97 Quarto, nec per se, nec primo, nec immutabiliter, nec

simpliciter, sed secundum quid quiescit, ut peccator qui non
innititur nec adhaeret Deo, nec immediate nec mediate, sed
quiescit in quantum voluntas ita intenso actu quietat se quantum
potest, sed non per se, quia non caritate, nec immobiliter, quia
continue elongatur a centro, scilicet a Deo.
98 Ad primum45 dicendum quod ratio finis non est per se ratio

obiecti fruibilis. Ratio enim fruibilis est ratio absoluta, ut in alia
quaestione dictum est, quod obiectum fruitionis est essentia
absoluta in qua fundatur ratio finis in comparatione ad extra; et
ideo ratio finis est ratio vel relatio rationis; et ideo licet Deus non
sit finis suae voluntatis, non propter hoc sequitur quod non
fruatur; habet enim rationem absolutam per se obiecti fruibilis.
99 Ad secundum46, quando dicitur quod omnis actus viatoris est
actus desiderii, dico quod propositio est falsa, immo habet actum
amicitiae quo vult sibi beatitudinem suam, sicut actus desiderii
est actus concupiscentiae.
100 Ad tertium,47 quando dicitur quod peccator non quietatur,
verum est simpliciter, quia una condicio deficit sibi scilicet ex
4fi Cf. supra n. 88.

46 Cf. supra n. 89.
47 Cf. supra n. 91.
97 A fourth way [of relating to the center] is to lean or rest

upon it neither per se, nor primarily, nor immovably, nor simply,
but only in a qualified manner, like a sinful man who does not
lean on God or adhere either immediately or mediately to him,
but rests content, to the extent that the will is able to calm itself
by an act as intense as possible [for it], though [his will] is not at
rest per se. For it is not drawn by charity,2 neither is the sinner's
will immovably at rest, because it is continually withdrawn from
its center, namely God.
98 To the first, [n. 88] it must be said that the aspect of being
an 'end'3 is not the per se characteristic of an object of fruition.
For this is an absolute [or non-relative] characteristic. As was
pointed out in another question, the object of fruition is the
absolute essence in which is based the characteristic of being an
end with respect to what is outside it [viz. created beings]. And
therefore the aspect of 'being an end' is a conceptual relation and
therefore, although God is not the 'end' of his will, it does not
follow from this that he has no fruition. For [God] has something
absolute that can be enjoyed for its own sake.
99 To the second, [n. 89] when it is said that every act of the
pilgrim is an act of desire, I say that this statement is false.
Indeed the pilgrim has an act of friendship or benevolent love by
which he wills his happiness [as an objective value in] itself, just
as the act of desiring it [as a good for himself] is an act of
concupiscent love.
100 To the third, [n. 91] when it is said that the sinner is not at
rest, this is true in a simple or unqualified sense, because one
condition is lacking for him, namely on the part of the object. For
2 Charity (caritas) as he explains elsewhere is a theological virtue,

supernaturally infused by God, that reinforces the free will's* natural ability to
what is good for its intrinsic value, and hence God above all is a rational being's
ultimate good.
:i Here 'end' (or finis) has the technical Aristotelian meaning of a final cause
that moves one to attain some good or perfection the agent does not already
possess.
parte obiecti quod non quietat, sed secundum quid quietat,

scilicet ex actu voluntatis in se. Et haec sufficiunt quoad tres
quaestiones.
it does not put him at rest, but calms him only in a qualified
sense, namely through an act of the will in itself.
And these remarks suffice so far as these three questions
are concerned.
[Distinctio 2
Pars I de exsistentia Dei eiusque unitate]
1 Circa distinctionem secundam primo quaerantur quaesti-

ones de esse Dei, secundo de unitate eius, tertio de Trinitate
personarum.
2 Circa esse Dei propono tres quaestiones. Prima est utrum sit
aliquod ens primum simpliciter in universitate entium; secunda
utrum primitas simpliciter possit competere entibus alterius
rationis; tertia utrum sit aliquod ens simpliciter et actu infinitum.
[Quaestio 1
Utrum sit aliquod ens primum simpliciter]
3 Circa primum arguitur quod non sit aliquod ens simpliciter

primum, quia entia se habent sicut numeri, VIII Metaphysicae;1
sed nullus numerus est simpliciter primus in perfectione; ergo nec
aliquid est simpliciter primum in entitate. Minor probatur sic:
omne totum est perfectius sua parte; ergo si esset aliquis
numerus simpliciter primus, iste numerus esset maximus, quia
esset quasi totum respectu praecedentium omnium, quia
contineret omnes alios, sicut ternarius binarium, et sic de aliis
ascendendo. Sed hoc est falsum quia tunc non procederetur in
infinitum in numeris secundum divisionem continui in infinitum,
quod est contra Philosophum, III Physicorum.2
4 Contra:
II Metaphysicae,3 est primum efficiens; ergo primum actuale, quia
nihil agit nisi secundum quod est in actu; ergo erit primum in
entitate et perfectione.
5 Item, ibidem: est primus finis; ergo primum in bonitate, et
sic in perfectione et entitate.
i Aristot., Metaph. VIII (H), c. 3 (10436 33).

* Aristot., Physica III, c. 7 (2076 15-6).
:l Aristot., Metaph. II (a), c. 2 (994a 1-8).
115
Distinction 2
Part I: On the existence and unicity of Godi
1 In regard to distinction two I ask: (1) about the existence of

God, (2) about his unicity, (3) about the Trinity of Persons.*
2 Regarding the existence of God I propose three questions.
First, in the world of beings is there some being that is first in an
unqualified sense? Second, could several different sorts of being
possess such primacy? Third, is some being actually infinite in an
unqualified sense?
Question One
Is there some being that is first in an unqualified sense?
3 As for the first question it is argued that there is no being

that is simply first, because beings are related to one another like
numbers, according to Bk. VIII of the Metaphysics. Now no
number is simply first in perfection. Therefore, nothing is simply
first in entity. The minor is proved as follows. Every whole is
more perfect than a part of it; therefore if there were some
number that was simply first, this number would be the greatest,
because it would be the quasi-whole of all the numbers that
preceded it, since it would contain all the others the way two is
contained in three, and so on with the other numbers of
increasing magnitude. But this is false, for if there were a
greatest number, one could not proceed to infinity in numbers by
dividing the continuum indefinitely, which is contrary to what the
Philosopher says in Bk. IIl of the Physics.
4 To the contrary: According to Bk. II of the Metaphysics,
there is a first efficient cause, and therefore a being that is first in
actuality because nothing acts unless it actually exists.
Consequently, something is first in entity and perfection.
5 Also, in the same work there is said to be a primary end,
and therefore something first in goodness and hence in entity and
perfection as well.
i Re. Dist. 2, p. 1 and 2 see also: A. Wolter, M. McCord Adams, "Duns

Scotus's Parisian Proof for the Existence of God," Franciscan Studies 42 (1982):
248-321.
115
[Quaestio 2
Utrum primitas possit competere entibus alterius rationis]
6 Secundo quaeritur utrum primitas simpliciter possit com

petere entibus alterius rationis.
Videtur quod sic:
Quia posterioritas essentialis convenit entibus alterius
rationis. Patet in omni genere, ut in passionibus respectu
subiectorum suorum; ergo et primitas. Probatio consequentiae:
quia correlativa commultiplicantur.
7 Contra: omnis multitudo reducitur ad aliquod unum sive ad
unitatem; ergo multitudo essentiarum ad unitatem essentiae.
Consequentia patet, quia inter essentias est ordo essentialis; sed
in essentialiter ordinatis est aliquid simpliciter primum, licet non
in his quae sunt eiusdem rationis, ut in individuis eiusdem
speciei et in ordinatis accidentaliter.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum sit aliquod ens simpliciter et actu infinitum]
8 Iuxta hoc quaeritur utrum sit aliquod ens simpliciter et actu

infinitum. De hoc dicetur post.
[Ad quaestiones]
9 Quantum ad quaestiones istas, primo ostendo quis sit ordo

inter illas, secundo quomodo una dependet ab alia.
10 Quantum ad primum dico quod, ut dictum est prius, de Deo
secundum nullum conceptum nobis possibilem de eo in via est per
se notum de eo esse demonstratione propter quid, quia medium
ad demonstrandum de eo esse est nobis ignotum, scilicet essentia
Dei ut haec vel deitas sub ratione deitatis; et ideo haec propositio
"Deus est" non est per se nota nec nobis nota propter quid, nec est
desperatum a nobis cognosci. Ergo demonstratione quia tantum
Dist. 2, Part I, Questions One-Three 116
Question Two
Can such primacy pertain to different sorts of being?
6 Second it is asked whether primacy in an unqualified sense

pertains to beings of different sorts.
It seems that it could: For essential* posteriority pertains to
beings of different sorts. This is evident in the case of every
genus, as it is in the case of attributes with regard to their
respective subjects. But if there are several sorts of posteriority,
then there are also several kinds of primacy. Proof of the
implication:* correlatives are multiplied in pairs.
7 On the contrary: every multitude upon analysis implies a
unit or something unique. Therefore, the multitude of essences
implies that one is unique. The implication is evident, because an
essential* order exists among essences, and where things* are
essentially ordered there is something that is simply first. This is
not the case, however, where the many are of the same sort, as
with individuals of the same species and with things ordered only
accidentally.
Question Three
Is there some being that is simply and actually infinite?
8 In this connection another question is raised that will be

discussed later. Is there some being that is simply and actually
infinite?
To the questions
9 As for these questions, I show first how they are ordered

and secondly how one depends upon the other.
10 As for the first, I say as I did before about God, that
according to no concept of him that we have in this life is his
existence known per se by a demonstration* of the reasoned* fact.
Because the middle term needed to demonstrate this, namely
God's essence as just "this" or deity qua deity, is unknown to us.
And therefore, for us this proposition "God exists" is neither self-
evident nor known as a reasoned fact. But we need not despair of
potest a nobis cognosci modo, ut medium sumitur ab effectu.

Immediatius autem sunt nobis notae proprietates respectivae in
causa quam proprietates absolutae, quia secundum proprietates
respectivas dicimus eum respicere omnem effectum ut secundum
proprietates causalitatis et productibilitatis; et ideo ex huiusmodi
proprietatibus primo propositum est ostendendum.
[Responsio ad primam quaestionem]
11 Respondeo ergo ad primam quaestionem quod est aliquod

primum simpliciter omni primitate quae non includit aliquam
imperfectionem, cuius est primitas materiae vel formae respectu
compositi; pars enim semper est imperfectior toto et tamen prior;
pars enim participat entitatem totius et non est ipsum totum.
Aliae enim sunt primitates quae non includunt aliquam
imperfectionem, ut primitas eminentiae et triplicis causalis
independentiae, scilicet efficientis, formalis vel exemplaris, et
finalis. Primitas autem eminentiae non est primitas causalitatis;
non enim ex hoc quod unum ens praeeminet alteri, est causa
illius. Nam primum in quolibet genere praeeminet alteri
posteriori illius generis, et tamen non est causa illius. Primitas
etiam exemplaris non distinguitur a primitate efficientiae, quia
primum exemplans alia in esse intelligibili, non est nisi primum
efficiens per intellectum; et sicut naturale efficiens non
distinguitur contra efficiens, immo continetur sub eo, sic nec
exemplaris distinguitur ab efficiente. Sunt ergo duae causalitates
contra se distinctae, scilicet causae efficientis et finalis. Et istae
primitates omnes, quae attribuimus Deo, nullam includunt
imperfectionem.
knowing it altogether. Consequently, at present we can know it

only by a demonstration* of the simple* fact, where the middle
term of the demonstration is taken from what God effects. For
relative* properties in a cause are known more immediately than
absolute properties, because we say that he relates to every effect
in virtue of the relational properties of causality and
producibility. And therefore it is on the basis of these properties
that we must first establish our proposed thesis.
Reply to the first question
11 I reply then to the initial question that there is some being

that is simply first in every way that does not include some
imperfection like that of the primacies of matter or form with
respect to their composite, for a part [like matter and form],
although prior, is nevertheless always less perfect than the whole,
since the part shares the entity of the whole and yet is not the
whole itself. But there are other ways of being first that do not
include any imperfection, such as the primacy of excellence and of
causal independence in a threefold sense, namely of having no
efficient cause, no formal or exemplar cause, and no final cause.
Now the primacy of excellence is not a primacy of causality, for it
does not follow that, if one being is more perfect than another, it
is also the cause of that other. For the most eminent [species] in
any genus excels each less eminent [species], and yet is not its
cause. Note also that the primacy of exemplarity is not
distinguished from that of efficiency, for the first to model
another in thought is nothing other than a first efficient cause
endowed with an intellect. Now just as a natural* efficient cause
is not distinguished from efficient causeindeed it is a
subdivision thereofso neither is the exemplar cause. Hence,
there are only two sorts of causality that are distinct from each
other, namely what pertains to an efficient cause and final cause
respectively. And each primacy we attribute to God includes no
imperfection.
[Quod Deus sit primum primitate efficientis]
12 Quod autem Deus sit primum omnium ista primitate probo:

et primo de primitate efficientiae sic:
Aliquod ens est effectum, quia productum; aut igitur
producitur a se, vel a nihilo vel ab alio. Non a nihilo, quia nihil
nullius est causa; nec a se, quia nihil est quod seipsum gignat vel
producat, I De Trmitate, capitulo nono.4 Ergo ab alio. Si ab alio,
ergo illud producitur a nihilo vel a se vel ab alio, et sic procedetur
in infinitum. Ergo oportet stare ad aliquid non productum, nec
virtute alterius producens sed virtute propria; et hoc voco
primum.
13 [Duae instantiae] Contra istam rationem insto dupliciter:
Primo, quia non est inconveniens procedere in infinitum in
productionibus eiusdem rationis, secundum philosophos ut
quod filius iste sit ab isto patre et iste ab alio, et sic in infinitum.
Ignis etiam ab igne potest esse in infinitum.
14 Item, omnis demonstratio non demonstrans quia sed propter
quid est ex necessariis; haec non est ex necessariis sed ex
rationibus producentis et producti, quae sunt termini contin-
gentes; ergo non demonstrans.
15 [Solutio primae instantiae] Excludo primam consequentiam:
dico quod non est processus in infinitum in essentialiter ordinatis;
nec umquam philosophi in talibus concesserunt infinitatem, licet
in accidentaliter ordinatis hoc concesserint, ut patet per
Avicennam,5 VI Metaphysicae, capitulo quinto.
16 Ad hoc autem demonstrandum praemitto unum, scilicet
quod non est idem loqui de causis per se et per accidens, et de
causis essentialiter et accidentaliter ordinatis. Nam in primo est
tantum comparatio unius ad unum, scilicet causae ad effectum, et
est causa per se quando aliquid secundum naturam propriam et
non secundum aliquid sibi accidens causat, ut subiectum est per
4 Rectius: August., De Trin. I, c. 1, n. 1 (CCSL 50, 28; PL 42,

820).
5 Avicenna, Metaph. VI, c. 5 (AviL, 334); cf. ibid., c. 2 (AviL,
303): "Causas enim non essentiales vel non propinquas non nego
procedere in infinitum; immo facio debere hoc".
That God is first as an effective agent
12 I prove that God is first of all by each such primacy, and

begin with the primacy of efficiency in this way. Some being is an
effect, because it is produced. Now either nothing produces it, or
it produces itself, or it is produced by another. It is not produced
by nothing, for nothing is the cause of nothing. Neither does it
produce itself, for, according to Bk. I, chapter nine of Augustine's
The Trinity, "nothing begets itself." Therefore it is produced by
another. If by another, then this other is produced by nothing, by
itself or by anotherand so the process would continue
indefinitely. Consequently, one must stop with something not
produced, but which produces by its own power and not in virtue
of any other, and this I call the first.
13 [Two objections] I raise two objections to this reasoning.
First, because it is not incongruous that productions* of the same
sort should continue indefinitely, according to the philosophers.
Thus this son is from that father, and the latter from another
father, and so ad infinitum. Fire too can come from fire
indefinitely.
14 There is also this objection. Every demonstration not
demonstrating the simple fact, but the reason for the fact, begins
with something necessary. But this argument does not, for it uses
the notions of producer and produced, which are contingent
terms; hence the argument does not demonstrate.
15 [Solution to the first objection] I refute the first objection. In
things essentially ordered, I declare, there is no progression to
infinity, nor do any philosophers admit such, though they do
concede this where accidentally ordered things are concerned, as
is clear from Avicenna's Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, chapter 5.
16 To demonstrate this, however, I introduce one prefatory
remark, namely, to speak of per se and per accidens causes* is not
the same as speaking of essentially ordered and accidentally
ordered causes.* For in the first case there is a one-to-one
comparison, namely of a cause to its effect. And we have a per se
cause when something causes in virtue of its proper nature* and
not something incidental to it. Thus a subject is the per se cause
of its proper attribute; and there are many other instances, such
se causa suae passionis, et in multis aliis, ut album disgregat et

aedificator aedificat; sed causa per accidens est e converso, ut
Policletus aedificat.
17 In secundo autem est comparatio duarum causarum inter se
in quantum ab eis est aliquod tertium ut causatum, et tunc
different causae per se sive essentialiter ordinatae a causis
accidentaliter ordinatis tripliciter, ex qua triplici differentia
habebitur triplex demonstratio ad probandum aliquid simpliciter
primum efficiens.
18 Prima differentia est quod in causis per se et essentialiter
ordinatis causa secunda, in quantum causat, dependet a prima; in
accidentaliter ordinatis non sic dependet in causando licet in esse
vel in aliquo alio dependeat. Filius enim licet secundum esse
dependeat a patre, non tamen in causando, quia patre mortuo
potest agere sicut ipso vivo.
19 Secunda differentia est quia in per se et essentialiter
ordinatis est causalitas alterius rationis et alterius ordinis, quia
superior causa est perfectior eo quod eius virtute causat causa
secunda; sed non sic est in accidentaliter ordinatis, quia ita potest
filius generare sicut pater, nec dependet in causando nisi a causa
eiusdem rationis, non a causa perfectiori.
20 Tertia differentia est quia omnes causae per se et
essentialiter ordinatae simul necessario requiruntur ad causan-
dum effectum; quia, si non, aliqua causalitas essentialis et per se
deesset effectui; sed talis simultas non requiritur in accidentaliter
ordinatis, sed successive una post aliam.
21 Ex prima differentia arguo sic: in causis essentialiter
ordinatis, ubi ponit adversarius infinitatem, secunda in quantum
causat dependet a prima. Si ergo essent causae infinitae ita quod
quaelibet alia non solum quaelibet posterior dependet a sua
proxima priori, esset6 universitas causatorum ab alia causa priori,
6 Esset scripsimus: set (sed) onines codd.

as when something white expands [the diaphanous medium] or a

builder builds. But the converse is true of a per accidens cause,
such as Polycletus building.
17 In the second case, however, there is a comparison of two
causes with each other insofar as some third thing is caused by
them. And then it turns out that per se or essentially ordered
causes differ from those accidentally ordered in three ways. And
this triple difference provides a threefold demonstration for
proving something is a first efficient cause in an unqualified
sense.
18 The first difference is that with causes that are essentially
ordered, the second cause depends upon the first insofar as
causing is concerned, whereas in accidentally ordered causes the
second does not depend upon the first in this way, though it may
be dependent on the first for its existence or in some other
respect. For though a son depends upon his father for his
existence, he does not depend upon him in causing, since with his
father dead he can act as effectively as when his father was alive.
19 There is a second difference, since the causality of per se
and essentially ordered causes is of different sorts and is ordered
[to the effect] in different ways. For the superior cause is more
perfect inasmuch as the second cause causes in virtue of it. But
this is not so with accidentally ordered causes, for a son can
procreate just as a father can, neither does he depend in this
except upon a cause of the same sort rather than upon a more
perfect cause.
20 There is a third difference, because all the per se and
essentially ordered causes are needed simultaneously to cause the
effect; were this not so, some per se and essential causality would
be wanting for the effect. But such simultaneity is not required
where accidentally ordered causes are concerned, for they
exercise their causality successively, one after the other.
21 From the first difference I argue in this way. In essentially
ordered causes, where our adversary postulates an infinity, each
second cause insofar as it is causing depends upon a first.
Therefore, if there were an infinity of causessuch that each one
of them, not just each posterior cause, depended upon its
immediate prior causethen the whole collection of what is
non ab aliqua causa quae est aliquid istius universitatis, quia

tunc esset aliqua causa sui. Tota enim universitas dependentium
dependet et non ab aliquo illius universitatis, quia quilibet
dependet; ergo ab aliquo quod non est aliquid illius universitatis,
et hoc voco primum efficiens. Si igitur sunt infinitae, adhuc
dependent ab aliqua, quae non est illius infinitatis.
22 Ex secunda differentia arguo sic: si causae essentialiter
ordinatae sint alterius ordinis, semper causa superior est
perfectior; ergo causa in infinitum superior erit in infinitum
perfectior. Si igitur sunt infinitae tales, erunt infinitae causae
perfectae. Sed nulla talis simpliciter perfecta causat virtute
alterius; ergo non sunt essentialiter ordinatae. Dato enim quod
causaret virtute alterius, non esset simpliciter suprema et
perfecta.
23 Ex tertia differentia arguo sic: si causae ordinatae essen
tialiter in infinitum concurrant ad productionem alicuius effectus,
et ex ista differentia omnes causae essentialiter sint simul,
sequitur quod infinita actu sunt simul ad causandum hunc
effectum, quod non conceditur ab aliquo philosopho.
24 [Argumenta persuasiva] Ad hoc etiam adducuntur duae
aliae persuasiones. Prima talis: si sit processus in infinitum in
causis essentialiter ordinatis, omnes erunt causatae, ergo ab
aliqua causa; et si illa non sit prima, omnes erunt aequaliter
mediae causae, nam non ponitur alia prima respectu cuius alia
possit dici propinquior vel remotior alia; et sic est verum quod
tenet ratio Philosophi, II Metaphysicae,1 et est eadem ratio
virtualiter cum illa quae accepta est ex prima differentia.
25 Secunda ratio est ista: esse effectivum nullam
imperfectionem includit; sed quod nihil imperfectionis includit,
potest poni inter entia sine imperfectione. Sed si nulla causa est
7 Aristot, Metaph. II (a), c. 2 (994a 17-9).

caused would depend upon some other prior cause that is not a
part of that collection, for then something would be a cause of
itself. For the whole collection of dependents depends, but not
upon something that is part of that collection, because everything
there is dependent. Consequently it depends upon something that
is not part of that totality. And this I call the first efficient.
Hence, even if there is an infinity of causes, they still depend
upon something that is not a part of that infinity.
22 From the second difference I argue in this fashion. If all
essentially ordered causes are of a different orders, [because they
are of different orders] the higher will always be more perfect.
Therefore a cause that is infinitely superior will be infinitely more
perfect. Hence if there is an infinity of such, there will be infinite
causes that are simply perfect. But no cause that is simply perfect
causes in virtue of another; therefore if there is an infinity of
causes, then these are not essentially ordered, for if you grant
they cause in virtue of another, none would be simply supreme
nor perfect.
23 From the third argument I argue thus. If an infinity of
essentially ordered causes would concur in the production of some
effect andby virtue of this third differenceall such must act at
once, it would follow that an actual infinity is simultaneously
causing this effectsomething no philosopher admits.
24 [Two persuasive reasons] Two other persuasive arguments
are adduced to prove this [primacy of efficiency], the first of which
is this. If in essentially ordered causes, the process went on to
infinity, each would be caused, and hence by some cause. If this
were not a first cause, then all would be equally intermediate
causes, for there would be no first with reference to which one
could be said to be more proximate or remote than another. And
hence the argument given by the Philosopher in Bk. II of the
Metaphysics would hold good. This is virtually the same as the
argument derived from the first difference.
25 The second reason is this. To be an efficient cause does not
imply any imperfection. But what includes no imperfection can be
assumed to exist without imperfection in some being. But if no
cause exists that is not itself dependent upon something prior,
then [no cause] exists in any being without imperfection. [Since
sine dependentia ad aliquid prius, in nullo est sine imperfectione;

ergo effectibilitas potest inesse alicui naturae, et illa natura est
simpliciter prima. Ergo effectibilitas simpliciter prima est
possibilis et, si potest esse et non ab aliquo alio, ergo a se.
26 Sed dices quod istae rationes non concludunt nisi
supponendo ordinem essentialem causarum. Sed negabitur tibi
ordo essentialis, et dicetur quod omne quod producitur,
producitur sufficienter a causa particulari eiusdem rationis sicut
a causa totali, ut filius a patre, et sic in infinitum.
27 Contra: hoc productum aut producitur a causa alterius
ordinis, et sequitur ordo essentialis, aut a causa eiusdem rationis,
et tunc fuit possibile produci a causa a qua producitur, et ista ab
alia et illa ab alia a qua producitur fuit possibilis produci, et sic in
infinitum. Semper enim natura habebit eundem modum essendi
in quolibet eiusdem rationis, ita quod, si unum fuit productibile,
et quodlibet in infinitum successive. Sed nulla successio potest in
infinitum continuari nisi in virtute alicuius permanentis in
infinitum cum tota successione illa, eo quod nulla difformitas
perpetuatur nisi in virtute alicuius uniformis quod non est aliquid
illius successionis, quia nulla pars successionis potest permanere
cum tota successione, eo quod tunc non esset pars eius. Ergo est
aliquid essentialiter prius tota successione, cum tota successio
dependeat ad ipsum. Omne ergo quod dependet a causa
accidentaliter ordinata, dependet essentialius a causa per se et
essentialiter ordinata. Immo negato ordine essentiali negabitur
ordo accidentalis, quia accidentia non habent ordinem nisi
mediante fixo et permanente, et per consequens nec multitu-
dinem in infinitum. Et sic exclusa est prima instantia, scilicet
quod non est procedere in infinitum in accidentaliter ordinatis
nisi fuerit status in essentialiter ordinatis.
this negates our initial assumption], it follows [from that

assumption] that effectibility could exist in some nature that is
simply first. Therefore, effectibility that is first in an unqualified
sense is possible, and if it can exist and yet not be from another,
then it [can exist] of itself.
26 You may object that these reasons are valid only if one
assumes an essential order among the causes,* something you
will deny and admit instead that everything produced is
adequately accounted for by some particular cause of the same
sort as its total cause, like a son produced by a father, and so ad
infinitum.
27 To the contrary: Either this product* is produced by a cause
of some other order, and then it follows that an essential order
does exist, or else the product is caused by something of the same
sort. But then it would be something possible to be produced by
the cause which produces it, and that cause too would be
something possible to be produced by some other cause, which in
turn was something possible to be produced by something else,
and so ad infinitum. For in anything of the same sort, its nature
would have the same way of being, so that if one were something
able to be produced, then all would be such successively* ad
infinitum. But no succession can continue indefinitely except in
virtue of something permanent* that is coextensive with the
succession as a whole. For no change in form is perpetuated save
in virtue of something uniform which is not a part of the
succession itself, since no part can persist throughout the entire
succession [that involves change], and still be a part of it.
Therefore, there is something that is essentially prior to the
whole succession, since the latter depends upon it. Hence
everything that depends upon an accidentally ordered cause, also
dependsin a more essential wayupon a per se and essentially
ordered cause. Indeed, if this essential order were denied, the
accidental order will also be denied, because the accidentals have
no order and as a consequence no infinite procession except in
relation to something fixed and permanent. And in this way the
first objection is refuted, namely by stating that there will be no
infinite process of accidentally ordered causes unless one comes to
a rest in the essential order.
28 [Solutio secundae instantiae] Ad secundam instantiam quae

dicit quod non demonstro, quia procedo ex contingentibus, cum
dico: aliqua natura est producta vel effecta, ergo aliquid est
producens vel efficiens, etc., respondeo quod in demonstratione
quia possum accipere praemissam de inesse vel de possibili. Si
accipitur de inesse, est demonstratio contingens et non ex
necessariis; ut cum dico: "Aliquid est productum, ergo aliquid est
producens"; ostensum enim est ad sensum. Si autem accipiatur
praemissa pro possibile esse sic: "Aliqua natura est possibilis fieri,
sive effectibilis vel productibilis, ergo aliqua natura est effectiva
vel productiva", est demonstratio ex necessariis. Nam antecedens
est necessarium et consequens similiter, quia aliquod subiectum
est mutabile et aliquod entium est possibile distinguendo
possibile contra necessarium.
29 Et concludit probatio istis rationibus8 de esse quiditativo vel
de esse possibili sic: "Aliquid potest fieri, ergo aliquid est
productivum et causativum eius; et si aliquid simpliciter primum
effectivum, erit actu exsistens". Probo sic: cuius rationi repugnat
esse ab alio, illud si potest esse, potest esse a se; sed rationi primi
simpliciter effectivi repugnat esse ab alio, quia non est effectum
vel productum ab alio, nec virtute alicuius alterius est pro
ductivum vel effectivum vel producens; et potest esse; ergo est. Si
enim potest esse, aut ergo a se, vel ab alio; non ab alio, quia
ponitur primum; si a se, habetur propositum, quia si potest esse,
est. Ergo concludo quod in causis efficientibus est dare
essentialem ordinem et per consequens aliquod efficiens primum
simpliciter.
H In nonnullis codd. rebus pro rationibus legitur.

28 [Solution to the second objection] The second objection

claims that I have no demonstration when I argue: "Some nature
is produced or effected, hence something is producing or effecting
it," etc., since I start out with contingent terms. To this I reply: in
a demonstration of the simple fact [such as from effect to cause] I
can take as a premise a statement of what exists or of what is
only possible. If I take only the assertoric statement of what
exists, my demonstration will be contingent and not based on
necessary terms. Such would be the case, if I say: "Something is
being produced, therefore something is producing it," for this is
something sense perception reveals. But if the premise is taken
from what is possible, then the demonstration begins with what is
necessary, in this way: "It is possible that some nature come to be,
i.e., it is effectible or producible; hence some nature is able to
effect or produce it." For here the antecedent, and the consequent
as well, are necessary, because some being is mutable and among
beings something is possible, where "possible" is contrasted with
"necessary."
29 And the proof concludes by [adducing] the following reasons
about essential or possible being, in this fashion. "Something can
come to be, therefore something can produce or cause it." But if
something can cause effectively in a simple or unqualified sense,
then it will be actually existing. This I prove as follows. If it is
repugnant to the very notion of something that it be from
another, then if it can exist, it can exist of itself. But to stem from
another is repugnant to the very notion of an efficient agent that
is first in an unqualified sense, since it is not an effect or product
of another. Nor is it productive or effective or producing in virtue
of something else. Furthermore, it can exist. Therefore it actually
does exist. For if it can exist, then either it is of itself or from
another. Now it is not from another, because it is assumed to be
first. If it is of itself, we have what we set out to prove, since if it
can exist, it does exist. Therefore, I conclude that in efficient
causes an essential order must be admitted and consequently
some efficient cause that is simply first.
[Quod Deus sit primum primitate eminentiae]
30 Ex isto secundo infero quod est aliquod ens simpliciter in

eminentia, quia in ordine essentiali causarum essentialium
semper est causa aequivoca respectu sui effectus, quia est alterius
ordinis ab effectu. Causa autem aequivoca semper est nobilior suo
effectu, cum non potest esse aeque perfectum nec minus
perfectum; sic enim dicerem quod omnia alia perfecta corpora
possent produci a musca, quia per te non requiritur in causa
aequivoca maior perfectio quam in eius effectu.
[Quod Deus est primum primitate finalitatis]
31 Ex hoc etiam sequitur tertio si est aliquod primum

efficiens quod est aliquis primus finis non ordinabilis ad alium
finem nec virtute alterius finitivum, quia omne per se agens et
efficiens agit propter finem habetur hoc ex II Physicorum9 et
prius efficiens propter priorem finem, ergo primum efficiens
propter ultimum finem; sed propter nihil aliud a se principaliter
agit et ultimate, ergo propter se sicut propter finem. Et sic
sequitur quod primum efficiens erit ultimus finis, sive primus. Si
enim ageret per se propter finem alium a se, tunc aliquid esset
nobilius primo efficiente, quia finis, qui est aliquid remotum ab
agente intendente finem, est nobilius eo.
[Quod Deus est primum exemplans]
32 Quarto et ultimo dico quod primum efficiens est primum

exemplans respectu effectibilium, quia, ut prius dictum est,
primum efficiens agit propter finem per se, nam omne per se
agens agit propter finem, etiam agens per naturam, de quo minus
0 Aristot., Physica II, c. 5 (1966 17-22).

That God is first in excellence
30 From this I infer secondly that some being is simply

unexcelled. For in an essential order of essential or per se causes,
a cause is always equivocal* with respect to its effect, since it is of
a different order than the latter. An equivocal cause, however, is
always nobler than its effect, sinceas equivocalit can be
neither less perfect nor only equal in perfection with its effect.
For this would be equivalent to saying that every other more
perfect organism could be produced by a fly, sinceaccording to
youno greater perfection is required of an equivocal cause than
exists in its effect.
That among final causes God is also first
31 From this a third point also follows. If something is first as

an efficient agent, then something also exists that is first as an
end, i.e. something that cannot exist or function as final cause
only in virtue of some other end. Every per se agent or efficient
cause acts for the sake of some end. This we glean from Bk. II of
the Physics. Now a prior efficient agent acts for the sake of some
prior end, therefore, the first efficient agent acts for the sake of
the final end. But such an agent never acts principally or
ultimately for anything other than itself. Hence, it acts for the
sake of itself as end. Thus it follows that the first efficient agent
will also be the ultimate or first end. For were an agent to act for
the sake of some end other than itself, then something would be
more noble than the first efficient agent, because anything that is
removed or distinct from an agent intending the end, is more
noble than that agent.
That God is the first exemplar cause
32 Fourth, and finally, I say that the first efficient agent also
functions as first exemplar cause of all that can be effected,
because, as was stated earlier, the first efficient acts for an end
per se, for every per se agent acts for an end. Even one that acts
by nature, acts for some end, where the teleology is less obvious,
videtur, II Physicorum.i0 Vel ergo propter finem quem cognoscit,
vel in quem a cognoscente dirigitur. Non secundo modo, quia
primum efficiens non potest ab alio dirigi vel ordinari. Ergo
propter finem quem cognoscit. Sed agens per cognitionem ordinat
effectum in finem cognitum, sed hoc non est aliud quam effectum
exemplari. Sed non ordinat rem in aliquem finem secundarium
cognitum alium a se, quia tunc non esset primus finis, ut dictum
est; ergo ordinat in se exemplando tamquam in finem ultimatum
immediate. Et sic sequitur quod est primum exemplans.
[Ad argumentum principale]
33 Ad rationem in oppositumii de similitudine numerorum et

entium dico quod licet ordo essentiarum in multis assimiletur
ordini numerorum in dependendo in communi, ut sicut omnia
entia dependent ad primum ens, et ita omnes numeri ad primum
numerum, non tamen tenet similitudo dependentiae in speciali,
sed modo contrario, quia numeri posteriores dependent a priori
sicut ab imperfectiori, quia prior numerus est pars numeri
posterioris, et pars imperfectior suo toto. Sicut ergo totum
dependet a parte ut ab imperfectiori, sic maior numerus a minori.
In entibus autem e converso, sive ordinatis essentialiter sive
accidentaliter, quia ens imperfectius non est pars entis
perfectioris nec ens perfectius est aliquod totum aggregatum ex
entibus imperfectioribus, sed est quoddam totum continens
virtualiter et essentialiter perfectiones omnium entium
imperfectorum et praehabens omnia eminenter. Similiter omnia
entia citra primum dependent ad primum ut ad simpliciter
perfectius, quia ipsamet eminentius sunt in primo quam in
ili Aristot., Physica II, c. 8 (1986 10-1996 33).

i i Cf. supra n. 3.
according to Bk. II of the Physics. Now either the first agent acts
for an end it is aware of or else it is directed to its end by one who
is aware of it. But it is not in the second manner, for a first
efficient cause cannot be directed or ordered by another. Hence it
acts for the sake of some end it has in mind. Now an agent that
acts knowingly, orders its effect to the end it has mind; but this is
nothing else than to function as exemplar cause of that effect.
Such an agent, however, does not order a thing to some known
secondary end distinct from itself, for then it would not be the
first end we claimed it to be. Therefore, in modeling the thing in
mind it immediately orders it to itself as ultimate end. And thus
it follows that first efficient agent plays primary role as
exemplar.*
To the argument at the beginning
33 To the argument [n. 3] for the opposite view based on the

similarity of beings and numbers, I admit that the order of
dependence of essences in many general respects is like the order
of numbers. For instance, all beings depend upon a first being
just as all numbers depend upon the first. But the similarity does
not hold as to the special way each depends. Quite the contrary.
The later numbers depend upon the first number as upon that
which is less perfect, because the prior number is a part of the
later number, and a part is always less perfect than the whole.
Hence the dependence of a larger number upon a smaller number
is like that of a whole upon its parts. The very opposite is true of
beings, whether they are essentially or accidentally ordered, for
the less perfect being is not a part of the more perfect being nor
does the more perfect represent a whole that is the aggregate of
the less perfect. It is rather the sort of whole that contains
virtually* and essentially the perfections of all less perfect beings,
prepossessing them in a more excellent way. Also, whereas all
beings except the first depend upon the first as upon what is more
perfect in an unqualified sense, because they are in it in a more
excellent way than they exist in themselves, all the later numbers
depend upon the first as upon something less perfect than
seipsis; et omnes numeri posteriores dependent ad primum ut ad

aliquid imperfectius. Non est ergo simile de essentiis et de
numeris.
34 Aliter potest dici, quod in numeris est devenire ad
maximum et perfectissimum, et iste est in intellectu divino, qui
numerus est infinitus secundum Augustinum, XII De Trinitate,
cap. 18:12 "Infinitas numeri, licet infinitorum numerorum non sit
numerus, non tamen ill! est incomprehensibilis cuius
intelligentiae non est numerus".
[Responsio ad secundam quaestionem]
35 Ad secundam quaestionem qua quaeritur utrum primitas

simpliciter posset competere entibus alterius rationis, respondeo:
ista quaestio videtur habere duplicem intellectum: unum
comparando primitatem ad primitatem, ut primitatem eminen-
tiae ad efficientiae vel finis, quae sunt alterius rationis; sed iste
intellectus non est ad propositum, quia probatum est prius quod
cui competit primitas rationis unius, et alia alterius rationis, quia
nulla istarum concludit aliquam imperfectionem. Est igitur idem
primum efficiens, primum exemplans, primum eminens et
primum finiens, sive primus finis.
36 Alius intellectus quaestionis est an omnes illae quattuor
possint competere essentiis alterius rationis, et respondeo quod
non, quod probo: loquamur modo exempli gratia de primitate
efficientiae. Si duae essentiae alterius rationis possent esse
primae efficientes simpliciter, aut ergo respectu eorumdem
effectuum vel effectibilium posteriorum, vel respectu aliorum.
Non possunt esse causae primae efficientes respectu eiusdem
effectus, quia eiusdem causati non possunt esse plures causae
totales eiusdem generis vel ordinis; ergo multo minus possunt
esse duae causae efficientes totaliter, quia istae non essent
eiusdem generis et ordinis, et neutra dependeret ab altera in
causando aliquem effectum.
37 Probatio assumpti, scilicet quod respectu eiusdem causati
non possunt esse duae causae totales. Sint a et 6 duae causae
totales efficientes respectu eiusdem effectus. Ex quo ergo a est
12 August., De civ. Dei XII, c. 19 (CCSL 48, 375; PL 41, 368).

themselves. Therefore, there is no complete likeness between

beings and numbers.
34 Another answer that could be given is that with numbers
one arrives at a greatest or most perfect "number," and this is in
the divine intellect, which is an infinite number, according to
Augustine, De Trinitate XII, chapter 18. "The infinity of numbers,
though there be no 'number' for numbers that are infinite,
nevertheless is not incomprehensible to him whose intelligence is
not bounded by number."
Reply to the second question
35 The second question asked whether this primacy in an

unqualified sense could pertain to beings of different sorts. To
this I reply: the question, it seems, could be understood in two
ways. One would be to compare one primacy with another, for
example that of eminence with that of efficiency or that of final
cause, which are primacies of different sorts. But this sense of the
question is not relevant to what we have in mind. For it was
proved earlier that the subject to which one sort of primacy
pertains also has the other sorts, since none of these ways [of
being first] imply any imperfection. The first efficient cause is the
same being as the first exemplar cause, and is also the most
excellent and is the first end or final cause as well.
36 Another sense of the question is whether all four of these
ways of being first could pertain to different sorts of essences, and
to this I reply that they could not. I give a proof for this. Take for
example the primacy of efficiency. If two essences of different
sorts could both be first efficient causes in an unqualified sense, it
would be either with respect to the same actual or possible
effects, or with respect to different effects. Now both could not be
first efficient causes of the same effect. For if the same effect
cannot have several total causes of the same kind or order, much
less could it have two total efficient causes, since they would not
be of the same kind or order, nor would one depend upon the
other in causing some effect.
37 Proof of the assumption, namely that the same effect cannot
have two total causes. Let a and b be two total efficient causes of
totalis causa alicuius effectus, posito a sufficienter ponitur

effectus, quia effectus non dependet nisi a causa eius totali; et ita,
circumscripto b, potest iste effectus sufficienter poni ab a. Sed
secundum te b est totalis causa illius effectus; ergo aliquid erit
totalis causa alicuius, quo non posito non minus esset effectus et a
quo effectus non dependeret. Consequens est impossibile. Ergo
oportet dare quod sint duae causae totales respectu diversorum
effectuum. Sed hoc similiter est impossibile, quia aut sunt
diversorum effectuum eiusdem speciei, aut alterius speciei; non
eiusdem speciei, quia ista possunt esse a causa eiusdem speciei,
nec requirunt causas distinctas specie; nec secundo modo, quia si
illi effectus sunt diversae speciei, ergo habent ordinem
essentialem, quia species universi sunt sicut numeri. Ergo et
omnia quae habent ordinem essentialem reducuntur ad unum
principium a quo dependent, quod est quadruplici primitate
primum, sicut ostensum est in praecedente quaestione.
38 Item, hoc probatur per rationes Philosophi XII Meta-
physicae:13 si sunt prima entia alterius rationis habentia sub se
diversas coordinationes, ita quod coordinata ad unum primum
non haberent ordinem ad coordinata in alia coordinatione ad
aliud primum, tolleretur natura boni ab universo, quae natura
boni consistit in ordine partium universi ad invicem et ad
primum. Unde ponentes plura principia prima alterius coor-
dinationis "inconnexam faciunt universi substantiam", sicut dicit
ibidem Philosophus.
39 Item, tertio hoc probatur specialiter de primitate
eminentiae, nam sicut in omni genere est stare ad aliquam unam
naturam quae est mensura omnium posteriorum in illo genere,
ita in genere totius entis necesse est stare ad aliquam naturam
1:1 Aristot., Metaph. XII (A), c. 8 (1074a 31-7).

the same effect. Then from the fact that a is the total cause of
some effect, it follows that, if a is given, this suffices to place the
effect in existence, because the effect only depends on its total
cause. Thus, even if b were written off completely, the same effect
could exist because a would suffice to accomplish it. But according
to you, b is the total cause of this effect; therefore something will
be the total cause of a thing, and nevertheless its absence would
not prevent the effect from existing, since the effect does not
depend upon it for its existence. But the consequent is impossible.
Therefore, the two total causes must be causes of diverse effects.
But this too is impossible, because either these diverse effects are
of the same species or of different species. Now they are not of the
same species, because these can stem from a cause of the same
species and do not require causes that are specifically different.
But nor do these diverse effects belong to different species, for if
they did, an essential order would exist among them, since all the
species in their totality are like numbers. And then it would
follow that all these things which have an essential order would
be traced back to one principle* from which they depend. And
thisas we showed in the previous questionwould be our
principle that is first by a quadruple primacy.
38 The reasoning of the Philosopher in Bk. XII of the
Metaphysics provides another proof of this. If each of two
different sorts of first beings has under it its own group of ordered
effects, so that [the effects] ordered to one first being are not
coordinated with the other group ordered to the other first being,
the goodness of the universe would be destroyed. For what makes
the universe good is the orderly way in which all its constituent
parts depend on each other, as well as upon one being that is
first. Hence, those who postulate several first principles, each
with its distinct coordinate group of effects, "dismember the fabric
of the universe," as the Philosopher says in that same book.
39 Also, there is a third proof that refers in particular to the
primacy of excellence, for just as in every category we end with
some one nature that is the measure of all the others in that
category, so in the category of the whole of being it is necessary to
end with some nature that is first in an unqualified sense and is
simpliciter primam quae est ratio et mensura omnium entium, ut

patet ex X MetaphysicaeM
40 Ex dictis sequuntur duo corollaria: unum quod primum
efficiens non tantum est primum secundum quid respectu
omnium effectibilium unius coordinationis, sed etiam est primum
respectu omnium effectibilium et etiam primum eminens et
primum finis. Unde sequitur quod aliquod ens simpliciter primum
est unius rationis, ex quo patet necessitas istius quaestionis, nam
ex rationibus praecedentis quaestionis non est probatum nisi
aliquod primum unius coordinationis. Posset enim aliquis dicere
aliam coordinationem esse habentem suum primum efficiens et
sua effectibilia. Unde cum arguitur in praecedente quaestione
quod hoc productum producitur ab aliquo et non in infinitum,
ergo est stare ad aliquod primum, diceret aliquis quod hoc est
verum ad primum illius coordinationis, ut ad solem; sed praeter
ista sunt alia productibilia alterius rationis, quae non habent
suum primum utpote lunam. Ideo necesse fuit postea quaerere,
an possint esse duo prima alterius rationis, et probare quod est
tantum unum ens simpliciter primum unius rationis, quod
pertinet ad istam quaestionem. An autem tale sit aut unum
numero vel plura, pertinet ad quaestionem sequentem de unitate
Dei.
41 Secundum corollarium est quod cum ista primitas tantum
convenit uni essentiae, nihil faciens unum per accidens cum ista
essentia requiritur ad primitatem istius essentiae, quia si
requiretur, tunc ista primitas non convenit tantum uni essentiae,
sed cuidam aggregato ex duabus essentiis, et tunc nihil unum
esset primum. Et ex hoc sequitur quod nihil potest sibi accidere
quod pertinet ad istam primitatem. Et ulterius, cum intellectio
distincta omnium causabilium pertineat ad primitatem
exemplantis omnia, et efficientis omnia per cognitionem, sequitur
quod intellectio illa primi non potest esse accidens illi essentiae;
ergo intellectio primi est sua essentia. Similiter, cum volitio
i4 Aristot, Metaph. X (I), c. 1 (10526 17-8)

the measure of all beings, as is evident from Bk. X of the

Metaphysics.
40 Two corollaries follow from what has been said. One is that
the first efficient agent is not only first in a qualified sense, i.e.,
with respect to all that can be effected in one coordination, but it
is also first with respect to everything whatsoever that can be
effected and is also the first in excellence and is the first end.
Hence it follows that there is but one kind of being that is simply
first. From this we see why this question was necessary, since the
arguments of the previous question only establish the fact that
there is something first with respect to one coordination, for one
could say the other coordination has its own first efficient cause
and what it can effect. Hence, when we argued in the preceding
question that this product is produced by something and, since
the productive process cannot be infinite, one must end with
something first, someone could object that this is true only of
what is first in this coordination, for instance the Sun, but besides
this there are other things of a different sort that could be
produced which would not have this as their first cause, for
example, the Moon. Therefore it was necessary to ask further
whether there could be two such firsts of different sorts. Proving
that there is but one kind of being that is first in an unqualified
sense was the task of this question. Whether such is one or
several in number pertains to a later question about the unicity of
God.
41 The second corollary is that inasmuch as this primacy
belongs to but one sort of essence, nothing that constitutes
something only accidentally one with it is required for this
essence to be first. For if it were, then this primacy would not
pertain to but one essence, but rather to a certain aggregate of
two essences, and then no one thing would be first. From this it
follows that nothing pertaining to this primacy can be connected
to it only accidentally. And what is more, since to be the first
exemplar cause of all things and the sort of efficient cause that
knows what it is doing requires that it has a distinct
understanding of all possible effects, it follows that this
knowledge of the first being is one with its essence. Similarly
since the volition of all that can be directed to an end pertains to
omnium finibilium pertineat ad aliquid primum Aniens omnia,

sequitur quod volitio omnium non sit accidens primo fini.
[Ad rationem in oppositum]
42 Ad rationem in oppositum,15 cum arguitur: sunt plura

posteriora, ergo plura prima, dico quod non valet consequentia
quia resolvendo a posterioribus ad priora semper reducitur a
multitudine ad unitatem, quia aliter magis non reducerentur ad
unum quam e converso.
43 Ad probationem, cum dicitur quod relativa commultipli-
cantur, verum est secundum relationes, et non secundum
absoluta vel supposita quae praecedunt ipsas relationes, et quot
sunt filiationes tot paternitates, et e converso in relationibus
mutuis; sed non oportet tot esse supposita absoluta quot
paternitates quae fundantur in absolutis. Et ideo concedo quod
quot sunt posterioritates in entibus, tot sunt primitates in Deo,
sed non tot essentiae primae et absolutae, in quibus fundantur
istae primitates.
[Responsio ad tertiam quaestionem]
44 Tertio quaeritur, utrum ens simpliciter primum respectu

omnium posteriorum sit actu infinitum intensive.
Videtur quod non,
Nam causa activa infinitae virtutis nihil sibi repugnans
compatitur in effectu; sed primum efficiens repugnantia sui
effectus compatitur. Maior patet: si aliquod efficiens sit virtutis
infinitae activae, ergo destruet omne sibi repugnans. Minor
probatur, quia mala fiunt in effectu, malitia autem repugnat
divinae bonitati. Ergo si esset infinitae virtutis nihil mali esset in
universo. Maior probatur, quia si summum contrarium esset
infinitum, nihil sibi contrarium esset in natura; si igitur primum
bonum sit infinitum, nullum malum erit in universo.
15 Cf. supra n. 6.
what is the end of all, it follows that this volition of all things is
not an accident of the first end.
To the argument for the opposite opinion
42 As to the argument [n. 6] for the opposite, when they argue:

"If there are several sorts of posteriority, then there are several
kinds of primacy," the inference is invalid. For in tracing back
what is posterior to what is prior, we find that multitude always
goes back to unity. Otherwise, the many things that are posterior
would be no more traced back to one, than vice versa.
43 As for the proof, when it is said that "correlatives are
multiplied in pairs," this is true so far as relationships go, but it
does not hold for absolutes or the individual subjects which these
relationships presuppose. Thus there are as many instances of
paternity as there are of filiation and vice versa, where these are
mutual relationships. But it is not necessary that these many
paternal relationships be rooted in as many absolute subjects [or
fathers]. And therefore, I concede that there are as many
primacies in God as there are posteriorities in things, but not that
there are that many first and absolute essences in which these
primacies are rooted.
Reply to the third question
44 Thirdly, it is asked: Is a being that is simply first with

regard to all posterior things actually infinite intensively?
It seems not: For an active cause of infinite power allows
nothing incompatible with it to exist actually; but the first
efficient cause allows many things opposed to it to exist actually.
The major is evident. If some efficient agent possessed an active
power that was infinite, it would destroy everything opposed to it.
The minor is proved, because evils have existed; and evil is
opposed to divine goodness. Therefore, if the first efficient cause
were of infinite power, nothing that was evil would exist in the
universe. The major is proved, for if the highest of contraries were
infinite, nothing contrary to it would exist in nature; if the first
good then were infinite, no evil would exist in the universe.
45 Respondetur, quod maior est vera de contrariis formaliter;

sed nullum malum contrariatur Deo formaliter. Sed contra hoc:
quia si sol esset virtualiter et infinite calidus, nihil relinqueret
frigidum in universo, sicut nec si esset formaliter calidus. Si
igitur Deus virtualiter contrariatur malo, si infinitae virtutis,
nihil relinqueret malum in universo vel repugnans suo effectui.
46 Item, quod ita est hic quod non alibi, est finitum respectu
ubi; ergo quod ita est haec essentia quod non est illa, est finitum
secundum essentiam. Sed divina essentia ita est haec quod non
est illa; ergo etc.
47 Item, VIII Physicorum:16 virtus infinita si esset, moveret in
non tempore; nulla virtus potest movere in non tempore; ergo
nulla virtus est infinita.
48 Contra:
Psalmus:17 "Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis, et magni-
tudinis eius non est finis".
49 Item, per rationem probatur, VIII Physicorum,16 primum
movens esse potentiae infinitae, quia moveret motu infinito. Sed
haec conclusio non potest intelligi de infinitate durationis, quia
propter infinitatem potentiae probat quod non est in
magnitudine; magnitudini autem secundum eum non repugnat
quin in ea sit potentia infinita secundum durationem, sicut ponit
de caelo.
50 Hoc idem vult Damascenus,19 libro primo, cap. 4: "Est,
inquit, pelagus infinitae substantiae".
[Ad quaestionem]
51 In ista quaestione omnes tenent eandem conclusionem,

scilicet quod Deus est infinitus non secundum durationem
tantum, sed etiam intensive. Primo ergo ponenda est significatio
nominis. Voco autem hic infinitum quod quodcumque ens finitum
l Aristot., Physica VIII, c. 10 (266a 24-2666 6).

17 Ps. 47:2; 144:3.
1H Aristot., Physica VIII, c. 10 (266a 10-24; 2666 6-20; 2676 17-
26).
10 Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 9 [I, c. 9] (ed. Buytaert, 49; PG 94,
835).
45 To this it is countered that the major is true only of things

that are formally* contrary, but no evil is formally contrary to
God. But this evasion will not do, for if the sun were infinitely hot
virtually, nothing cold would remain in the universe any more
than if it were formally hot. If then God were virtually contrary to
evil, and were of infinite virtue or power, nothing evil would
remain in the universe nor would anything opposed to him be
found in what he effects
46 Also, what is here in such a way as to be nowhere else is
finite as to its location; therefore whatever is just this and not
that essence, is finite as to essence. But the divine essence is just
this essence and not that. Therefore, et cetera.
47 Also, according to Bk. VIII of the Physics, if an infinite
power were to exist, it would move instantaneously; but no power
can move instantaneously; therefore, no power is infinite.
48 To the contrary: Psalm [47:2]: "Great is the Lord and highly
to be praised, and of his greatness there is no end."
49 Also, Physics VIII gives a proof from reason. The first mover
is of infinite power because it moves with an infinite motion. But
this conclusion cannot refer [only] to a durational infinity,
because on the basis of the infinity of the power, [Aristotle] proves
that [the first mover] is not in a magnitude:* something that,
according to him, is not incompatible with a power that is infinite
durationally, such as he attributes to the heavens.
50 Damascene also maintains this in De fide orthodoxa, Bk. I,
chapter four: "God," he says, "is a sea of infinite substance."
To the question
51 In this question, all hold the same conclusion, namely that

God is infinite not only in duration but also intensively.
datum vel possibile dari excedit secundum omnem determinatam

proportionem, acceptam vel acceptibilem. Quod autem intel-
lexerint sic philosophi, patet I Physicorum,20 ubi primo principio
attribuit infinitatem.
52 [Opinio Thomae] Haec autem ab aliquibus sic declaratur:
materia determinatur et finitatur per formam, sicut potentia per
actum et perfectionem et esse formale eius; et e converso, forma
per materiam finitur, sicut actus per potentiam. Forma ergo quae
non est nata esse in materia est infinita. Cum ergo esse sit
formalissimum, et Deus sit ex se esse et in se subsistens, Deus
erit infinitus.
53 Contra: si quilibet actus non receptus in materia ex boc
habeat infinitatem perfectam, et essentia angeli sit huiusmodi
actus, sequitur quod angelus sit infinitum perfectione.
54 Responsio: quod infinitum potest intelligi dupliciter; vel ad
superius vel ad inferius. Infinitum ad inferius dicitur cuius actus
vel forma non recipitur in materia, et isto modo concedo angelum
infinitum esse ad inferius. Sed infinitum ad superius est cuius
esse non est participatum ab alio; et sic solus Deus est infinitus.
Angelus autem, quia recipit esse a superiori agente participative,
ideo est finitus ad superius.
55 Contra: licet verum sit quod omne causatum est finitum,
formalis tamen ratio finiti non est ad suam causam sive in
relatione ad causam, sed inest sibi intrinsece, ut in se
consideratur; sicut per se et formaliter ratio infiniti non est in
comparatione ad suum effectum, sed intrinsecus gradus essentiae
illius, et si numquam esset effectus. Ergo formalis ratio finitatis
angeli essentiae non est in respectu ad suam causam qua
participat esse.
20 Cf. Aristot., Physica III, c. 6 (207a 7-8).

Therefore, we must first set forth the meaning of the word. Now
what I call "infinite" here is what exceeds any actual or possible
finite being to a degree beyond any determinate measure you
take or could take. That the philosophers understood it in this
sense is clear from Bk. I of the Physics, which attributes infinity
to the first principle.
The view of Thomas Aquinas
52 But some explain this as follows. Matter is specified and

limited by form, just as potency* is by its act,* perfection and
formal* being; conversely, form is limited by matter as act is by
potency. Therefore, a form that is not suited by nature to be in
matter is infinite. Since existence or being is the most formal of
all, and God is of himself existence and subsists in himself, God is
infinite.
53 To the contrary: if any act not received into matter would
thereby possess perfect infinity, and the essence of an angel is
this sort of act, it follows that an angel would be infinite in
perfection.
54 [Thomas] replies that "infinite" can be understood in two
ways, with respect either to what is above or to what is below.
Anything whose act or form is not received into matter we call
"infinite" with respect to what is below. And in this way I concede
that an angel is infinite with respect to what is below. But
"infinite" with respect to what is above designates that whose
existence is not shared by another, and in this way God alone is
infinite. Since the angel, however, receives shared existence from
a higher agent, it is finite with respect to what is above.
55 To the contrary: Although it is true that everything caused
is finite, nevertheless the reason for its being finite does not lie in
this respect or relationship to its cause but rather in something
intrinsic to itself considered as such, just as the per se and formal
reason why something is infinite is not its relationship to its
effect. Rather it is something intrinsic to its essence, a measure of
being it would possess even if it never had an effect. Therefore,
the formal reason for the finitude of an angel does not consist in a
relationship to the cause that gives it shared existence.
56 Praeterea, esse est posterius essentia in quolibet alio a

primo, cum sit accidens commune, secundum eos; in isto ergo
priori in quo intelligitur essentia sine esse, videtur essentia esse
infinita secundum se intensive, et per consequens numquam
poterit finitari. Cuius probatio est, quia quaelibet entitas habet
intrinsecum gradum suae perfectionis, in quo est finitum vel
infinitum, si potest esse infinitum, et non per aliquod accidens
sibi.
57 Breviter ergo dico unam propositionem notandam: quod
quaelibet essentia absoluta finita in se, est finita ut
praeintelligitur omni comparatione sui ad quamcumque aliam
essentiam, et prius in se finitur quam ad aliud finiatur. Unde
argumentum eorum peccat secundum consequens: "Forma finitur
ad materiam, igitur si non, illa est infinita", quia procedunt ab
aliquo habente aliquas vel plures causas veritatis ad unam: forma
enim finitur, id est, terminatur ad materiam, et forma etiam
finitur in se antequam ad illam, quia est talis natura in entibus
prior quam uniatur materiae, quia omnis compositio
praesupponit extrema compositionis. Faciunt enim sophisma, III
Physicorum:21 "Corpus finitur ad corpus, ergo si non finitur ad
illum, est infinitum". Non sequitur 'ergo octavum caelum erit
infinitum actu', hoc enim falsum est. Sicut enim corpus finitur
suis propriis terminis antequam ad aliquid aliud finiatur, sicut
patet de caelo octavo, quia illud non finitur ad corpus, sic forma
finitur sua propria natura antequam ad materiam; immo
numquam ad materiam cum materia nihil sit aliud a forma per
eos et finitas rei non sit simpliciter privatio, cum sit intrinsecus
gradus cuiuslibet, nisi dicant omnia intrinseca esse privationes.
58 Praeterea, ratio ponitur talis ad probandum Dei infinitatem.
Virtus quae potest super extrema distantia in infinitum, est
infinita; sed virtus divina est huiusmodi: sic patet in creatione ubi
Cf. Aristot., Physica III, c. 4 (2036 20-2).

56 Furthermore, existence is posterior to essence in every being

except the first, since it is a common accident, according to those
who hold this view. Hence, in that logically prior instant in which
essence is thought of abstractly without existence, it seems to be
intensively infinite in itself, and consequently could never have
been limited. Proof of this: every entity has its intrinsic grade of
perfection in which it is either finite or infiniteif it can be
infiniteand it has this not by reason of anything accidental to it.
57 Putting it briefly then, I say there is one principle to keep in
mind. Each absolute essence that is finite in itself is thought of as
finite prior to any relation it may have to any other essence and is
first finite in itself before it is finite in relationship to anything
else. Hence, those who argue: "Form is limited in relationship to
matter, therefore if a form is not limited in relationship to matter,
that form is infinite," sin logically by drawing this conclusion. For
they argue for a consequent that has several reasons that could
make it true by adducing only one of these. Indeed, form is finite,
i.e., limited in relationship to matter, but form is also finite in
itself prior to its relationship to matter, because it is this sort of
nature or thing even before it is united to matter, since every
composition presupposes the things of which it is composed. They
commit the sophism mentioned in Bk. IIl of the Physics. "A body
is limited by a body, therefore if it is not limited by such, it is
infinite." It does not follow 'therefore the eighth heaven will be
actually infinite,' for this is false. For just as a body is finite or
limited by its own boundaries before it is bounded by anything
else (for instance the eighth heaven is not limited by some body
bounding it), so form is limited by its own nature before it is
limited in its relationship to matter. Indeed form is never limited
by matter, becauseaccording to those who hold this opinion
matter is nothing apart from form, and the finitude of a thing is
not simply a privation, since it is the intrinsic degree of
anythingunless you say that all intrinsic things are privations.
58 Furthermore, [Thomas] gives a reason of this sort to prove
God's infinity. A power over extremes infinitely distant is infinite,
but the divine power is such as is clear in creation where the
extremes, namely something and nothing, are infinitely distant.
extrema distant in infinitum, scilicet aliquid et nihil; ergo quando

facit de nihilo aliquid, habet actionem infinitam.
59 Et si dicatur quod minor est credita tantum, et ideo non
demonstrat, quia demonstratio non est ex creditis, respondetur
quod licet minor fuerit credita de creatione qua in ordine reali
non esse praecedit esse duratione, ita quod esse duratione
sequatur non esse, tamen de creatione qua in ordine naturae esse
sequitur non esse est sufficienter demonstrata. Et isto modo
loquitur Avicenna de creatione, VI Metaphysicae22 quia si est
unum primum effectivum, quodlibet aliud ab eo totum esse suum
capit ab eo, aliter secundum aliquid eius non dependeret ab eo,
nec esset unum tantum primum effectivum; sed quod sic capit
totum esse suum ab aliquo, ita quod per naturam suam habet
esse post non esse, creatur; ergo etc.
60 Contra, probo quod ista consequentia non valeat, quia
quando inter aliqua extrema non est distantia media, sicut est in
continuo, cuius extrema sunt duo puncta, sed ipsa dicuntur
praecise distare ratione extremorum inter se, tanta est distantia
quantum est extremum maius, vel excedens. Exemplum: Deus
distat in infinitum a creatura, etiam suprema possibili, non
propter aliquam distantiam mediam inter extrema, sed tantum
propter infinitatem alterius extremi. Sed inter ens et nihil non est
distantia media, quia sunt contradictoria, et contradictio est
oppositio immediata, I Posteriorum;23 nec extrema istius distantia
sunt infinita, patet; ergo quod non est inter ista distantia infinita.
61 Item, quod potest totaliter super terminum ad quem, potest
super transitum a termino a quo ad terminum ad quem, aliter
enim non posset super terminum ad quem. Sed terminus ad quem
huiusmodi transitus est aliquid finitum; ergo posse super talem
terminum non concludit virtutem activam infinitam demon
strative.
22 Avicenna, Metaph. VI, c. 2 (AviL, 304).

2:1 Aristot., Anal. post. I, c. 2 (72a 12-3).
Therefore, when it makes something from nothing, its action is

infinite.
59 And if one claims the minor is only believed and therefore is
not demonstrative, because a demonstration does not proceed
from what is believed, it is replied as follows. The minor is
[merely] believed if "creation" means creation in the order of
reality, when non-existence precedes [real] existence
durationally, so that existence might follow non-existence
durationally. But if "creation" means that in the order of nature
existence follows non-existence, then the minor is sufficiently
demonstrated. And it is in this sense that Avicenna speaks of
creation in Bk. VI of the Metaphysics, because if there is but one
first effective agent, then every other thing whatsoever gets its
whole existence from it. Otherwise something it has would not be
dependent upon this agent; neither would this be the only first
efficient agent. But what gets its whole existence from another in
such a way that by its own nature it only has existence after non
existence, is created; therefore, et cetera.
60 Against that, I prove that this inference is invalid, because
when two extremes are not separated by an intermediary
distance (such as [exists] in a continuum where the extremes are
two points), but the very difference between the two is called
"distance," then the distance is the measure in which one is
greater or exceeds the other. For example, God is infinitely
distant from a creature, even the greatest possible creature, not
because of some intermediate distance between the two extremes,
but [only] because of the infinity of the other extreme. Now
between being and nothing there is no intervening distance
because they are contradictories andaccording to Bk. I of the
Posterior Analyticscontradiction is an immediate opposition.
And it is clear that neither of the extremes of this "distance" are
infinite, hence there is no infinite distance between them.
61 Also, whatever has complete power over the terminus* ad
quem, has power over the transition from the terminus* a quo to
the terminus ad quem; otherwise it would not have power over
the ad quem term. But the ad quem term of such a transition is
something finite. Therefore, power over such a term does not
imply demonstratively that this creative power is infinite.
62 Quod autem dicitur quod sunt contradictoria quae distant in

infinitum, patet quod verum est, id est indeterminate. Quia sicut
non est aliqua ita parva distantia quae non sufficiat ad
contradictionem eo quod in minimo deficiens statim est sub
affirmatione (et impossibile est quod24 illud quod recedit ab uno
contradictoriorum quin eo ipso intret aliud, patet hoc de
disparatis) et in minimo excedens statim est sub negatione ita
nulla est ita magna, etiam si esset maior maxima possibili esse,
quin ad illam contradictio se extenderet. Est ergo eorum distantia
infinita, id est indeterminata ad quamcumque magnam vel
parvam. Ex tali infinita distantia et indeterminata non sequitur
ergo consequens de virtute infinita intensive, sicut nec sequitur
ad minimam distantiam, in qua salvatur sic infinita distantia, id
est indeterminata; et quod non sequitur ad antecedens, nec ad
consequens. Contradictio igitur est maxima distantia et oppositio
privative et indeterminate; sed contrarietas est maxima oppositio
positive et maxima distantia, sicut patet X Metaphysicae.25
[Opinio propria Scoti]
63 Teneo autem conclusionem cum aliis, et ostendo propositum,

scilicet infinitatem eius actualem, ex quadruplici primitate
praemissa.
64 [Prima via] Ex primitate efficientiae probo sic: primum
efficiens movet tempore infinito, VIII Physicorum26 ergo habet
virtutem infinitam et est infinitum movens. Sed dices quod
antecedens falsum est. Respondeo: Antecedens est necessarium
de possibili, licet non de inesse. Si enim causa potest causare,
potest causare effectum; licet non causet, non propter hoc minus
perfectior, quia habet virtutem causativam; ergo aeque sequitur
perfectio virtutis.
Pro 'quod illud ... quin ... intret' lege: 'quin illud ... intret'.
25 Aristot., Metaph. X (I), c. 4 (1055a 9-10; 1055a 38-6 4).
*i Aristot.. Physica VIII, c. 10 (266a 10-24; 2666 6-20; 2676 17-
26).
62 But when it is said that contradictories are infinitely

distant, this is obviously true if "infinite" is understood in the
sense of "indeterminate" [or lacking precise limits]. For just as, on
the one hand, there is no distance so small that it does not suffice
for a contradictionfor to depart the least [from one
contradictory] is to affirm [the other] (and you cannot draw clear
of one without by that very fact falling into the other, which is
obviously the case with disparates) and the slightest excess
results immediately in a negation [of the other] so too, on the
other hand, there is no distance so great, even the greatest
possible, that is not covered by a contradiction. Between
[contradictories] then the distance in terms of howsoever great or
small is infinite, i.e., indeterminate. But from this sort of
"infinite" or indeterminate distance the consequent about
intensively infinite power does not follow, just as it does not
follow from the minimal distance in which this sense of "infinite,"
i.e., indeterminate, is [still] preserved. Contradiction then
represents the maximal distance or opposition in a privative or
indeterminate sense, whereas contrariety represents the maximal
distance or opposition in a positive sense, as is clear from Bk. X of
the Metaphysics.
Scotus's own opinion
63 I hold this conclusion along with the others and I establish

my thesis about God's actual infinity on the basis of his aforesaid
fourfold primacy.
64 [The first way] I prove it from the primacy of efficiency in
this way. The first efficient cause moves for an infinite time,
according to Bk. VIII of the Physics; therefore it has infinite
power and is an infinite mover. You may object, however, that the
antecedent is false. I respond: the antecedent is necessary as
regards what is possible, though not as regards the actual. For if
a cause is able to cause, then it can cause an effect even though it
does not actually do so, and it is not less perfect on this score, for
it still possesses the causal power. Hence the perfection of such
power follows equally from the possible as from the actual.
65 Consequentia probatur sic: causa habens a se in virtute sua

activa effectum infinitum est infinita; sed causa potens movere
motu infinito habet a se in virtute sua activa effectum infinitum;
ergo etc. Minor est plana. Maior probatur: quia omnis effectus
vel est formaliter in causa vel eminentius, sive eminentius est in
causa quam in se, vel saltem aeque nobiliter; ergo effectus qui
natus est esse infinitus in se formaliter, erit in sua causa
formaliter infinitus eodem modo vel eminentius; sed non est ibi
formaliter et eodem modo, quia tunc successive essent omnes in
infinitum in causa, sicut successive omnes sunt in effectu; ergo
virtualiter et modo eminentiori, et per consequens simul et per
consequens infinita intensive.
66 Secundo probatur eadem consequentia sic: agens qui potest
ex se in motum infinitum, potest in effectus infinitos productibiles
per motum; primum est huiusmodi, ut probabitur, et quantum est
ex parte sui, simul potest in omnes; sed quod potest a se in
effectus infinitos est infinitum intensive; ergo etc. Probatio
minoris: quia si sit perfectionis in eo posse in unum effectum,
posse in plures effectus est maioris perfectionis; ergo posse in
infinitos arguit virtutem infinitam et potentiam infinitam
intensive.
67 Item, causa quae potest simul quantum est ex se in infinitos
effectus, est infinita intensive; sed si primum movens formaliter
haberet causalitates omnium causarum secundarum, quantum
est ex se posset in effectus infinitos simul, sicut si illae
causalitates essent simul; ergo si primum movens causalitates
omnium causarum haberet formaliter, esset infinitum; sed
primum nunc perfectius continet causalitates omnium causarum
quam si haberet simul formaliter causalitates omnium, quia
eminentius nunc omnes continet; ergo nunc est virtualiter
infinitum. Probatio maioris: ubicumque pluralitas includit
65 The validity of the implication is proved in this fashion. A

cause having of itself by virtue of its active power an infinite
effect is itself infinite. But a cause that is able to move by a
movement that is infinite has of itself by virtue of its active power
an infinite effect. Therefore, etc. The minor is clear. The major
is proved because every effect is in its cause either formally or in
a more excellent way, in other words it is present there in a more
excellent way than in itself, or at least in an equally noble way.
Therefore an effect which is apt by nature to be formally infinite
in itself will be formally infinite in its cause either in the same
way or in a more excellent fashion. Now it is not there formally or
in the same way, for then all the effects would be there as an
infinite succession just as they exist in actuality. Therefore, they
are there only virtually and in a more excellent way, and hence
simultaneously, and as a consequence the power [that can
produce them] is intensively infinite.
66 This same implication is proved in a second way. An agent
which of itself has the power of infinite motion, has power over
the infinity of effects that can be produced by motion. But the
first is this sort of agent, as will be proved. And, so far as it is
concerned, it possesses this power over them all simultaneously.
But whatever has power of itself over an infinity of effects is
intensively infinite. Therefore, et cetera. Proof of the minor:
because if it is a matter of perfection in it to be able to produce
one effect, it is a matter of greater perfection to be able to produce
many effects; therefore, the ability to produce infinite effects
argues to intensively infinite power and an infinite potency.
67 Also, a cause which simultaneously on its part can produce
an infinity* of effects is intensively infinite.* But if the first
moving cause would have the causalities of all secondary causes
formally, then so far as it goes, it would have power
simultaneously over an infinity of effects, just as it would if these
causalities existed simultaneously. Therefore, if the first moving
cause possessed formally the causality of all causes, it would be
infinite. But the first cause now possesses even more perfectly the
causalities of all causes than it would if simultaneously it had
them all formally, for now it contains all in a more excellent
manner. Therefore, it is now virtually infinite. Proof of the
maiorem perfectionem quam paucitas, ibi infinitas concludit

infinitam perfectionem, ut patet etiam in pluralitate aliquorum
eiusdem speciei: si facere decem sit maioris perfectionis quam
facere quinque, facere infinita est infinitae perfectionis; ergo cum
posse in plures effectus simul sit maioris perfectionis quam posse
in pauciores, posse in infinitos effectus simul est posse in
infinitum intensive.
68 Quarto probatur eadem consequentia sic: causa efficiens
prior cui secunda causa nihil addit perfectionis in agendo est
virtutis infinitae intensive, quia si esset virtutis finitae in agendo,
secunda causa adderet sibi aliquam perfectionem, sicut sol, non
potens immediate producere entia perfectiora nisi mediantibus
secundis agentibus, quae addunt perfectionem soli, est virtutis
finitae. Sed primum efficiens est huiusmodi, cui nullum agens
addit aliquid perfectionis. Probo, quia quando causa secunda
addit perfectionem in agendo, quanto plures causae secundae
concurrunt cum prima causa, tanto effectus est perfectior; ergo si
prima causa perfectius ageret cum causa secunda quam per se,
quanto plures causae secundae concurrerent, tanto effectus eius
esset perfectior, quod falsum est, quia primus effectus qui
immediatius causatur ab eo est perfectior quam remotior.
69 [Secunda via] Ex secunda via, scilicet ex primitate
exemplantis, arguitur sic: intellectio infinitorum distincte est
infinita, quia intellectio plurium est perfectior quam paucorum;
ergo infinitorum infinita. Sed intellectio primi exemplantis est
infinitorum distincte, quia est omnium factorum et possibilium
fieri; sed cum intellectio sua sit sua essentia, ergo sua essentia
erit infinita. Ex hoc infero quod erit actu infinita, quia
quaecumque sunt infinita in accipiendo alterum post alterum, ubi
sunt simul actu, sunt actu infinita, quia si sunt finita in
major: wherever plurality implies greater perfection than paucity,

there an infinity implies infinite perfection, as is clear also in the
case of a plurality of things of the same species. If making ten
would be a matter of greater perfection than making five, then
making an infinity would be a matter of infinite perfection.
Therefore, since to have simultaneously a capacity for several
effects is of greater perfection than to have a capacity for fewer
effects, then the simultaneous capacity for an infinity of effects is
a capacity that is intensively infinite.
68 The same implication is proved fourthly in this way. A prior
efficient cause to which a second cause adds nothing of perfection
in acting, is of intensively infinite power. For if it were only of
finite power in acting, the secondary cause would add something
of perfection to its causation, as happens in the case of the Sun.*
Being unable immediately to produce the higher forms of life
without the help of secondary agents that add to its perfection,
the Sun is of finite power. The first efficient cause, however, is
such that secondary causes can add nothing to the perfection of
its causation. I prove this, for when secondary causes add to the
perfection of the causation, the more numerous secondary
concurrent causes there are, the more perfect is their effect.
Therefore, if the first cause acted more perfectly with the second
cause than when acting alone, the more numerous secondary
causes would concur, the more perfect would its effect bewhich
is false, because the first effect caused by it more immediately
[e.g. a pure spirit or something of this sort] is more perfect than
the more remote effect [e.g. a material organism].
69 [The second way] The argument from the second way,
namely from the primacy of exemplarity, goes like this. To know
an infinity of things distinctly is an infinite intellection, because
the intellection of several things is more perfect than the
apprehension of only a few; therefore knowing an infinity is an
infinite intellection. But the intellection of the first exemplar
cause is a distinct grasp of an infinity of things, because it has to
do with all that is made or can come to be. But since its
intellection is its essence, therefore its essence will be infinite as
well. And from this I infer that the first exemplar cause will be
actually infinite, for whenever one thing after another totals up to
accipiendo, ergo accipiendo alterum post alterum tandem erit

status et ita non sunt infinita in accipiendo successive hoc post
hoc. Sed factibilia sunt infinita in potentia accipiendo alterum
post alterum successive; ergo ubi simul sunt, sunt actu infinita.
Sunt autem simul in cognitione divina a qua omnia factibilia et
exemplabilia exemplantur; ergo etc.
70 Item, quod nihil addit in cognoscibilitate, nec in entitate, II
Metaphysicae;21 sed omne exemplabile nihil addit primo
exemplanti in cognoscibilitate, ergo nec in entitate, quia si sic non
posset ita perfecte cognosci per solam essentiam primi
exemplantis sicut si ipsummet concurreret in movendo
intellectum divinum. Exemplum: si nigredo aliquid addit in
cognoscibilitate coloris ipsi albedini, non potest ita perfecte
cognosci nigredo per albedinem sicut si ipsamet concurreret ad
sui cognitionem. Nunc autem per solam essentiam divinam et non
per aliquid additum cognoscitur distincte quidquid ab eo
cognoscitur, ex corollario primo quaestionis praecedentis.
71 [Tertia via] Ex tertia via, scilicet eminentiae arguitur sic:
eminentissimo aliquid repugnat esse eminentius; sed finito non
repugnat aliquid esse eminentius eo; ergo primum eminens est
infinitum. Probatio minoris: infinitum non repugnat enti; quia si
sic, hoc est vel quia suum oppositum per se includitur in conceptu
essentiali entis, quod non convenit, quia tunc non posset intelligi
ens nisi intelligatur finitum, vel quia eius oppositum est passio
convertibilis cum ente; nec hoc convenit, quia cognito subiecto
statim passio eius fit in intellectu nota; sed cognito ente, non
statim occurit intellectui finitas; ergo, etc.
Cf. Aristot.. Metaph. II (a), c 1 (9936 27-31)

an infinity, then if all are actual simultaneously they are actually

infinite. If one thing after another only added up to something
finite, then taking one item after another, one would eventually
come to an end, and thus the items taken successively would not
be infinite. But the things that can be made one after another are
potentially infinite; therefore, where they occur all at once they
are actually infinite. Now they do occur simultaneously in the
divine cognition where all things that can be made or modeled are
exemplified; therefore, et cetera.
70 Likewise, that which adds nothing to the ability to cognize,
cannot add to entity, according to Bk. II of the Metaphysics. But
nothing that can be modeled adds anything to the ability of the
first exemplar cause to cognize, hence it adds nothing to it in
entity, for if it did, then [this modeled thing] could not be known
as perfectly solely through the essence of the first exemplar cause
as it could if the modeled thing itself were to concur [with the
essence] in moving the divine intellect. For example, if blackness
adds something to whiteness insofar as color-knowledge is
concerned, then blackness could not be known as perfectly
through whiteness [alone] as it could if blackness itself concurred
[with whiteness] in the acquisition of the knowledge of itself.
Now, however, according to the first corollary of the preceding
question, the divine essence knows distinctly whatever it knows
solely by reason of itself and not in virtue of anything added to it.
71 [The third way] The argument from the third way, namely
from the primacy of excellence, proceeds in this fashion. It is
impossible that anything should excel what is most excellent. But
it is not impossible that something should excel what is finite.
Therefore, the most excellent is not finite but infinite. Proof of the
minor: to be infinite is not repugnant to being, for if it were, this
would be because its opposite [i.e., to be finite] is either [1] per se
included in the essential concept of being, which is not a
convenient solution, because then one could not grasp the notion
of being unless one conceived of it as finite, or is [2] a coextensive
attribute of being. But this also is not a happy solution, because
once a subject is known, immediately its proper attribute would
come to mind; but finitude does not immediately come to mind
once being is known. Therefore, et cetera.
72 Aliter etiam probatur eadem minor: potentiae sensitivae

quae sunt minus cognitivae quam intellectus statim percipiunt
disconvenientiam in suo obiecto; patet de auditu respectu soni
discovenientis. Ergo si infinitum repugnat enti statim intellectus
istam discovenientiam et repugnantiam percipiet; et tunc non
posset apprehendere ens infinitum pro obiecto sicut nec
repugnantia, ut hominem esse irrationalem, potest habere pro
obiecto, quia obiectum includit repugnantiam cuius oppositum
quilibet experitur, quia numquam quietatur in ente finito.
73 Hoc autem probatur per rationem Anselmi:28 quo maius
cogitari non potest, est infinitum, ergo infinitum est. Minor
probata est supra. Probatio maioris: illud dicitur cogitari quod
potest intelligi sine contradictione; unde quod homo sit
irrationalis est incogitabile. Unde sicut in rebus nihil est unum
nisi sit simplex vel compositum ex potentia et actu, ita et in
conceptibus. Contradictoria autem nihil faciunt unum nec
simplex nec compositum; ergo non erit unus conceptus cogitabilis.
Redeo ergo ad propositum et arguo quod summum cogitabile est,
quia summum cogitabile est cogitabile sine contradictione; sed
tale possibile est in effectu, ergo potest cogitari in effectu esse.
Sed non erit in effectu quod sit ab alio, quia adhuc maius cogitari
potest, scilicet quod est a se. Si potest cogitari esse a se, ergo
summum cogitabile necessario est a se. Sed quo maius cogitari
non potest, est infinitum actu, ut supra probatum est; ergo est
aliquid actu infinitum. Et sic intelligo auctoritatem Anselmi,
quando dicit quod Deus est quo maius cogitari non potest.
74 Sed contra hoc dicitur, scilicet, quod contradictoria possunt
cogitari et impossibilia, ut chimera vel mons aureus, et tamen
non sunt possibilia fieri vel esse in effectu.
28 Anselmus, Proslogion c. 5 (ed. F.S. Schmitt I, 103-4; PL 158,

229).
72 The same minor is proved in another way. The sense

faculties which are less perfect cognitive powers than the intellect
immediately perceive any lack of harmony in their object, as ie
clear from the case of auditory perception of dissonance.
Therefore, if "infinite" were repugnant to "being," the intellect
would immediately perceive this repugnance and lack of harmony
and then, because of the repugnance, it could not grasp "infinite
being" as its objectjust as it could not have something
contradictory, like "man is irrational," as its object. But everyone
experiences the opposite, since the intellect never rests with finite
being.
73 This is also proved by Anselm's argument: "That is infinite
than which nothing greater can be thought; therefore the infinite
exists." The minor [i.e., that the most excellent, or that than
which nothing greater can be thought, exists] was proved above.
Proof of the major. By definition what can be thought of is what
can be understood without contradiction. Hence, that man [i.e. a
rational animal] is irrational, is something inconceivable. Just as
in the real order nothing is one unless it is simple or composed of
potency and act, so too with concepts. But contradictories do not
form anything one, neither simple nor composite. Therefore, they
will not form one conceivable concept. I return then to my original
proposal and argue that the highest thing one can think of exists,
because the highest thing one can think of is conceivable without
contradiction, but it is possible for such to exist in actuality,
therefore it can be thought to exist in actuality. Now it cannot
exist in actuality if it is from another, because one could still
think of something greater, namely something that exists of itself.
If it can be conceived to exist of itself, then the highest thing one
can think of exists necessarily of itself. But, as was proved above,
a thing greater than which nothing can be thought is actually
infinite, therefore there is something actually infinite. And it is in
this way that I understand Anselm's statement when he says that
God is that greater than which nothing can be thought.
74 But against this it is objected that contradictories as well as
absurdities, like a chimera or gold mountain, can be thought of,
Respondeo: si idem cogitabile esset in intellectu et in effectu,

non propter hoc esset magis cogitabile intensive, licet esset
cogitabile pluribus modis; sic ex parte ista si iste intellectus quo
cogito montem aureum, etc. Sed si aliquid summum cogitabile est
in intellectu, sequitur: ergo potest esse in effectu, et si potest esse,
est, quia si non, non est summum cogitabile.
75 [Quarta via] Ex quarta via, scilicet ex primitate finis,
arguitur sic: sicut intellectus potest intelligere maximum verum
et citra non quietatur in aliquo vero cognito, sic voluntas potest
appetere maximum et ultimum bonum sed quiquid est citra illud
non est maximum bonum, sed est finitum; ergo ratio ultimi
quietativi non est nisi in infinito bono.
[Ad rationes in oppositum]
76 Ad primam rationem,29 quando dicitur quod causa activa

infinitae virtutis nihil repugnans secum compatitur in effectu,
dico quod verum est de necessario agente. Sed de agente
voluntario non est verum; tunc enim potest causare aliquid vel
non causare. Permittit tamen malum in effectu quia non causat
ista secundum ultimum de potentia sive possibilitatem ultima
causa non dat sibi ultimam.
2!l Cf. supra n. 44.

and yet cannot come to be or actually exist.2 I reply: if the same

conceivable thing would be in the mind and in the world of actual
existence, it would not on that account be conceivable with any
more intensity, although it would be conceivable [extensively] in
several ways [viz. abstractly and intuitively,* for what can exist
can be intuited]. And this applies to things we can think of like a
gold mountain, [or a chimera, etc., which will not be distinguished
from others through a reference to actual existence, but already
conceptually, as contradictory and incompatible with existence].3
But if something that is the highest thing conceivable is in the
intellect, it follows that it could exist in actuality, and if it could
exist, it does exist, for if it were unable to exist, it would not be
the highest thing conceivable.
75 [The fourth way] The argument from the fourth way,
namely from the primacy of the end, is constructed in this
manner. Just as the intellect can understand the maximal truth
and will not rest in any truth short of this, so also the will* can
seek the maximal and ultimate good. But anything short of this is
not the maximal good, but is finite. Therefore, the ultimate
satisfaction of the will lies only in a good that is infinite.
To the arguments for the opposite opinion
76 To the first reason [n. 44], when it is said that an active

cause of infinite power would tolerate nothing incompatible with
it to exist in reality, I say this is true where the agent acts
necessarily. But it is not true of a voluntary agent; for such can
cause something or not cause it. The ultimate cause permits evil
to exist, however, because it does not employ its causal power to
the utmost or do all it possibly could do.
2 Here Scotus approaches the main objection against the Anselmian proof:
since one can think of what does not exist, how can having a concept of something
prove its existence? According to Scotus, the actual existence of a thing conceived
does does not add anything to its concept (does not make it more "intensive").
Therefore, the distinction must lie within the concept itself: i.e., like with the
Stoic icaTaX.!yrciia| avtaoia, it should be possible to tell, from a particular clarity
and consistency of a concept, whether the thing it represents is able to exist, or
even whether it exists or not.
3 See above note to this paragraph.
77 Contra: tunc philosophi qui posuerunt primam causam

agere de necessitate naturae, non posuissent malum.
Respondeo: secundum philosophos qui sic ponerent, non
esset possibile aliquod malum accidere in universo ut monstrum,
quando pro illo tunc posset oppositum bonum causari ab omnibus
causis. Probo per exemplum: Deus movet caelum naturaliter,
et hanc stellam, et omnes causas usque ad proximam alternantem
matricem ad formandum foetum; tunc in illo instanti, si posset
fieri oppositum foetus, scilicet monstrum, quaero per quem
efficientem. Detur illa. Tunc enim illa causa efficiens potest non
movere et per consequens causa superior et sic usque ad primam;
de necessitate igitur sequitur malitia sive monstruositas in
effectu. Si igitur causae efficientes in una coordinatione
necessario agunt, et causae efficientes impedientes necessario
agunt impediendo; unde aequali necessitate qua sol agit ad
disgregandum, agit Saturnus ad condensandum. Cum igitur
omnis defectus materiae reducatur ad causas efficientes quae
sunt defectuosae in virtute, si quaelibet causa efficiens agit
necessario, tunc nihil defectus vel malitiae vel monstruositatis
erit in natura quin necessario accidat.
78 Tunc igitur dico ad argumentum quod si Deus non
permitteret in natura nisi quod est summum calidum, nihil esset
in universo frigidum, et hoc est ex necessitate agentis naturalis;
sed quando est agens libere, non sequitur, ut dictum est, vel
quando est agens cuius actio impediri potest et effectus eius
impeditur, et sic in natura est vitium et defectus.
79 Ad aliud30 dicendum est quod est argumentum sophisticum,
quia in omnibus illis illud quod demonstratur in antecedente,
scilicet nunc, vel hic vel huius, est finitum, et tunc consequentia
bona; si infinitum, non tenet consequentia, sed petis
conclusionem in principio, ut si terra esset infinita et aliquod
corpus esset ibi, et arguatur "Hoc corpus est in hoc ubi, ergo est
finitum", ratio non valet, quia hoc ubi est infinitum, et ideo debes
30 Cf. supra n. 46.

77 To the contrary: then the philosophers who assumed the

first cause acted by a necessity* of its nature, would not have
admitted evil exists. I reply: according to the philosophers who
would make such an assumption, something evil in the world, like
a monster, would not be possible [only] in the case when, instead
of it, all the causes operative at that given moment could produce
the opposite good. I prove this by an example. God naturally
moves the heavens, this star, and all the causes including the
proximate cause which alters the womb to form the foetus. If the
opposite of this foetus, namely a monster, were [only] possible at
that moment, I ask: By what efficient cause [could it become a
monster, rather than a foetus]? A particular cause is given. But
then that efficient cause is able [to act or] not to act [in its natural
way] and hence the higher cause is able not to act and so on,
including the first cause; hence the evil or monstrosity in the
effect followed of necessity. If the efficient causes in one order act
necessarily, then the efficient causes that impede their effects
also act of necessity. With equal necessity, then, Saturn acts to
condense what the Sun necessarily dissipates. Therefore, since
every defect of nature is traceable to efficient causes that are
defective in power, if every efficient cause acts necessarily, then
nothing defective, evil or monstrous will occur in nature without
it happening necessarily.
78 To the argument then I say that if God did not permit
anything in nature except the highest heat, nothing in the
universe would be frigidand this because of the necessity that
characterizes the action of a natural agent. But, as has been said,
this does not follow when the agent is free or when there is an
agent whose action can be impeded and whose effect is prevented.
And so defect and vice occur in nature.
79 To the other [n. 46] it must be said that the argument is
sophistical, because in all those instances, what is demonstrated
in the antecedent, namely the "now" or the "here" or the "this
sort," is finiteand then the inference is valid. If it is infinite,
then the inference does not hold, but you beg the conclusion at
the outset. Suppose the earth were infinite and some body were
located there; if one argued "This body is here, therefore it is
finite," the argument would not hold, because the "here" was
probare quod hoc ubi sit finitum et ita est hic de essentia, quae
est ita haec quod non illa. Probes primo quod etiam in quantum
haec sit finita, et quia hoc supponis, ideo petis in principio
conclusionem.
80 Ad aliud,31 quando dicitur quod potentia infinita moveret in
non tempore, dicendum quod non intendit Philosophus de
potentia extra magnitudinem, sed in magnitudine et de hoc est
impossibile, et contradictio implicatur, scilicet quod moveat in
non tempore, sed et quod potentia infinita in magnitudine
moveret tempore infinito, et sic contradictoria. Et quare? Quia in
antecedente includuntur contradictoria, scilicet quia ponit
potentiam infinitam in magnitudine. Tenet autem consequentia
ex hoc quod infinita agentia necessitate naturali movebunt in non
tempore, et sic ex una contradictione concludit Philosophus duas
contradictiones. Quod enim est in magnitudine, est sicut virtus
extensa per accidens; et si potentia infinita est in magnitudine,
sequitur quod movebit successive, quia distantia partium mobilis
est causa propria motus et successionis sive motus in tempore,
quia illa potentia non est in magnitudine sicut anima in corpore,
sed moveret in corpore. Arguit igitur Philosophus sicut ex
contradictoriis contradictoria. Sed ad hoc respondet ibidem32
Averroes ex hoc quod ponit agens primum mediatum et
immediatum, sed probatur alias quod, si haberet medium, adhuc
moveret de necessitate naturae. Argumentum igitur habet
difficultatem contra philosophos qui ponunt quod de necessitate
moveret. Secundum nos autem sive ponatur infinitum in
magnitudine sive non, non oportet quod moveat in tempore
infinito. Et sic patet ad quaestionem.
:" Cf. supra n. 47.

12 Averroes, Metaph. XII, com. 41 (ed. Iuntina VIII, 324vb-
325rb).
infinite. Hence you must prove this "here" is finite. And so too
with this essence which is so "this" that it is not "that." First
prove that qua "this" it is also finite. Because you presuppose this,
you beg your conclusion at the outset.
80 To the other [n. 47] when it is said that an infinite potency
would not move instantaneously, it must be said that the
Philosopher did not have in mind a power beyond magnitude, but
one in magnitude, and for this it is impossible and implies a
contradiction, namely that it would not move in time but
instantaneously, and yet as an infinite power in magnitude it
would move in time, [although] infinitely, and thus there are two
contradictory notions. And why? Because the antecedent includes
contradictory notions, namely it assumes an infinite power in
magnitude. But from this follows the implication that infinite
agents acting by natural necessity would [at the same time] move
instantaneously, and thus from one contradiction the Philosopher
infers two contradictions. But [in fact] what happens to be in
magnitude is like a power extended accidentally; and if the
infinite power happens to be in magnitude, then it follows that it
will move successively, because the distance between the parts of
the mobile is the proper cause of the motion and of the succession
or motion in time, for that potency is not in magnitude, like the
soul in the body; yet it would move in a body. Hence the
Philosopher argued to contradictories from contradictories. But to
this Averroes replies in his comment [41 on Bk. XII of the
Metaphysics] that the first agent acts both mediately and
immediately. I prove elsewhere, however, that even if it did use
an intermediary it would still move with a necessity of nature.
Therefore, the argument presents a difficulty for philosophers
who postulate that the first cause moves necessarily. For us,
however, whether one postulates something infinite in magnitude
or not, there is no need to assume an infinite temporal movement.
And so the answer to the question is clear.
[Pars II
Quaestio unica
De unitate Dei]
81 Secunda parte principali huius distinctions secundae, quae

est de unitate Dei, quaerendum est unum tantum: utrum primum
ens sit tantum unicum numero.
Videtur quod non:
Ad Corinthios I, 5 cap.:33 "Etsi sint qui dicuntur dii sive in
caelo sive in terra, siquidem sunt dii multi et domini multi".
82 Item, omne ens per participationem reducitur ad ens per
essentiam; sed plura sunt entia per participationem; ergo et plura
per essentiam.
83 Item, quidquid simpliciter est melius, ponendum est in Deo
melius esse quam non esse; sed meliora sunt plura bona in natura
divina paucioribus, quia infinita.
84 Item, Deus est; ergo dii sunt. Probatio consequentiae:
singulare et plurale idem significant; igitur idem praedicatum
proportionaliter intellectui includunt per se. Si igitur Deus
intelligitur singulariter esse, et dii.
85 Contra: Deuter. 6:34 "Dominus Deus tuus unus est", etc.
[Ad quaestionem
Rationes aliorum]
86 Hic sunt rationes antiquorum quibus probant quod non sunt

nec possunt esse plures dii. Et prima ratio sumitur ex simplicitate
divina: Si enim essent plures dii, differrent in aliquo et in aliquo
convenirent, et sic haec duo distincta facerent aliquam
compositionem in Deo. Istam rationem tangit Damascenus, cap.
535 libri primi, et Philosophus XII Metaphysicae,36 ubi dicit quod
non sunt plures dii, quia non habent materiam. Sed aliqui male
intelligunt Philosophum. Per quiditatem enim intelligit formam
et per suppositum materiam, ita quod quidquid est extra
1:1 Cf. I Cor. 8:5.

14 Cf. Deut. 6:4.
35 Damasc., De fide, orthod. c. 5 [I, c. 5] (ed. Buytaert, 22-3; PG
94. 802).
36 Aristot.. Metaph. XII (A), c. 8 (1074a 31-7).
Dist. 2, Part II, Sole Question 141
Part II: Sole Question

Is there numerically but one first being?
81 The second main part of this second distinction which is

about the unicity of God poses but one question. Is there
numerically but one first being?
It seems not: According to Corinthians I, [8:5]: "There are
so-called gods in the heavens and on earththere are to be sure
many such 'gods' and 'lords."'
82 Also, every being by participation is traced back to some
being that is such by its essence; but as there are multiple beings
by participation, so too there are multiple that are such by their
essence.
83 Also, as regards anything that is simply better, one must
assume that it is better for it to exist than not to exist in God. But
in the case of the divine nature, more numerous goods are better
than fewer, because the goods there are infinite.
84 Also, God exists, therefore gods exist. Proof of the
implication. Singular and plural signify the same; therefore, they
include per se the same predicate in proportion to their meaning.
If then God is understood to exist in the singular, then also gods
in the plural.
85 On the contrary: Deuteronomy 6:[4]: "The Lord, thy God is
one.
To the question
Arguments of others
86 These are the proofs older authors gave to prove that there
neither are nor can be several gods. And the first reason is taken
from divine simplicity. For if there were several gods, they would
differ in something and agree in other respects, and thus these
two distinct aspects would make for some composition in God.
Damascene cites this reason in [De fide orthodoxa] Bk. I, chapter
5 and the Philosopher uses it in Bk. XII of the Metaphysics, where
he says that there are not several gods because they lack matter.
But some have misunderstood the Philosopher on this score. For
"form" for him means "quiddity" and "matter" means "individual
rationem quiditatis est materiale et de ratione suppositi;

quaelibet autem quiditas simplex est ex se haec, i.e. suppositum,
et quia divina essentia est simplex, nihil est extra quiditatem
suam vel extra rationem propriae quiditatis.
87 Alia est ratio Damasceni et Magistri37 de unitate regiminis:
si enim plures essent dii, frustra essent, quia unus sufficeret. Et
confirmatur XII Metaphysicae38 et IV Politicorum:39 principatus
monarchicus, etc. Et istae rationes sunt quaedam persuasiones.
88 Alia est ratio aliquorum quae sumitur ab unitate et
pluralitate, quia omnis unitas prima est respectu pluralitatis; sed
si essent plures, ut duo dii, essent aequales, et unus non esset
prius altero, etc. Hanc rationem tangit Damascenus, libro I,
cap. 5,40 et est quasi eadem ratio et includit illam quam facit
Avicenna,41 de necesse esse.
89 [Contra] Ad istas rationes respondetur quod non conclu-
dunt; prima non, quia eodem modo arguitur de angelis, quia
quiditas eorum simplex et forma sine materia secundum aliquos.
90 Ad secundam potest dici quod unus non sufficeret.
91 Ad tertiam dicunt quod non intelligitur de unitate et
pluralitate numerali quae est in eadem specie plura enim
individua non ordinantur inter se sicut prius et posterius, sed de
unitate et pluralitate in specie, quia species se habent sicut
numeri.
[Rationes ipsius Scoti]
92 [Ex parte intellectus] Et credo quod conclusio ista potest

demonstrari, scilicet quod sit unicum ens primum unitate
numerali, et primo ex parte intellectus. Probatum enim est quod
primum efficiens est primum exemplans, quia distincte
intelligens omnia et infinita intelligibilia, et intellectus et
17 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I. d. 3, c. 3 (SB IV, 76).

38 Aristot., Metaph. XII (A), c. 10 (1076a 4).
:,0 Aristot., Politico IV, c. 2 (1289a 40-6 1); c. I (1292a 13-4); cf.
Eth. Nic. VIII, c. 10 (1060a 31-5).
40 Cf. supra n. 86.
41 Avicenna, Metaph. I, c. 6 (AviL, 43-6).
subject," so that anything beyond the quidditative nature is called

"material" and pertains to the notion of the individual subject.
But every simple quiddity* is of itself a "this" or individual
subject, and because the divine essence is simple, nothing is there
that is other than its quiddity or lies outside the notion of what
properly makes it what it is.
87 Another proof is that of Damascene and the Master [Peter
Lombard] about the need for "one ruler." For if there were several
gods, this would be in vain, since one would suffice. And this is
confirmed by what is said of monarchical rule, etc. in Bk. XII of
the Metaphysics and Bk. IV of the Politics. And these reasons are
persuasive arguments.
88 Another reason some give is taken from the idea of unity
and plurality, because with respect to plurality unity is always
first. But if there were several, say two gods, they would be equal
and one would not be prior to the other. And so on. Damascene
also treats of this reason in Bk. I, chapter 5 and it is, as it were,
the same point Avicenna makes about "necessary existence."
89 [To the contrary] These arguments, it is claimed, are not
conclusive. The first is not because one argues in the same way
about the angels, since their quiddity is simple, and according to
some, is form without matter.
90 To the second one could say that one ruler does not suffice.
91 To the third, they object that what is said does not refer to
numerical unity and plurality where all are of the same species.
For a plurality of individuals are not ordered among themselves
as prior and posterior. The reference is rather to the unity and
plurality of species, because species are related to one another as
numbers.
Scotus's own arguments
92 [From the nature of God's intellect] I believe this conclusion

can be demonstrated, namely that there is a unique first being
that is one numerically, and the first proof is derived from the
intellect. For it has been proven that the first efficient cause is
also the first exemplar cause. Inasmuch as it knows distinctly all
things and an infinity of intelligibles, both its intellect and what
intellectum in ipso sunt infinita. Sicut intellectus finitus potest

intelligere omne finitum intellectum, sic intellectus infinitus
potest intelligere quodcumque intelligibile perfectissime. Si igitur
sunt duo primi intellectus infiniti a et b, sequitur quod a intelliget
b perfectissime; ergo a per essentiam suam intelliget b vel per
essentiam ipsius b vel per essentiam ipsius a. Si per essentiam b,
tunc intellectus a dependet a b, quia actus differens ab obiecto
dependet ab eo, et per consequens si intellectio a dependet a b, et
essentia ab essentia; et sic a non est Deus. Si per essentiam a
intelligit b, hoc est dupliciter: vel per communem rationem
quiditatis a et b, et hoc non potest esse, quia intelligens praecise
aliquod per simile, non intelligit illud in se perfectissime; vel in se
intelligit b, et hoc non est ita, quia una essentia non potest esse
ratio perfectissime intelligendi aliam, eo quod quaelibet in se est
intelligibilis per essentiam suam. Praeterea, una non includit
aliam virtualiter in se, quia si o includeret virtualiter in se
essentiam b, tunc b non esset Deus. Sic igitur haec intellectio
duorum non posset esse nisi per rationem universalis et
communis essentiae, et sic imperfecte.
93 Dices quod per rationem deitatis a intelligit b. Contra:
ista ratio est universalis; ergo imperfecta cognitio.
94 Praeterea, unica intellectio non potest habere plura obiecta
adaequata; sed a habet pro obiecto adaequato essentiam suam;
ergo non habet essentiam b pro obiecto adaequato.
95 [Ex parte voluntatis] Item, ex parte voluntatis: voluntas
enim infinita est recta, ergo diligit omne diligibile quantum ipsum
diligibile est; sed a et b est infinite diligibilis; ergo a diligit b
infinite. Sed quod hoc sit impossibile, probo.
Omnis voluntas naturalis plus diligit bonum sui suppositi
quam alterius cuius nihil est, nec pars nec aliquid tale; sed a nihil
is known to it are infinite. Now just as a finite intellect can

understand every finite thing known, so an infinite intellect can
understand any intelligible most perfectly. If then there were two
first infinite intellects, say a and 6, it would follow that a would
understand b most perfectly. Therefore, a would understand b
through its essenceeither through the essence of b itself or
through the essence of a itself. If it were through the essence of b,
then a would depend upon b, because an act different from its
object depends upon it, and hence if as intellection depends upon
b, then its essence also depends upon the other's essence, and
thus a is not God. If a understands b through its own essence,
this would occur in one of two ways: either [1] by virtue of the
common character of the quiddity of a and 6, and this could not
be, because to understand something just through some similarity
is not to understand that thing perfectly in itself; or [2] it
understands b in itself, and this is not so either, because one
essence cannot be the reason for understanding the other
perfectly, because each in itself is intelligible through its own
essence. Furthermore, one does not include the other virtually in
itself, because if a in itself were to include virtually the essence of
b, then b would not be God. And so this intellection of the two
could only be through some common and universal notion, and
thus it would be imperfect.
93 You may say that a understands b through the aspect of
deity. To the contrary: this notion is universal; therefore the
cognition is imperfect.
94 Furthermore, one intellection could not have several
adequate objects; but a has its own essence as its adequate object;
therefore it does not have b's essence as its adequate object.
95 [From the nature of God's will] Also, there is a proof from
the will. For an infinite will is upright, therefore it loves every
lovable object to the extent it is lovable. But o and b are each
infinitely lovable; therefore, o loves b infinitely. But I prove this is
impossible. Every natural* will loves its own individual good
more than that of another, of which it is neither a part nor any
such thing. But a is not something of b itself; therefore, its
upright will conformable to what is natural, loves a more than b,
est ipsius b; ergo voluntas recta conformis naturali plus diligit a

quam b, quia plus diligibile, et per consequens non diligit b
infinite.
96 Item, a aut fruitur b aut utitur; si utitur, est voluntas
perversa; si fruitur, ergo erit beatus in b et beatus in a; ergo bis
beatus in obiectis adaequatis. Probatio: si fruitur b, igitur
circumscripto a, nihilominus erit beatus se circumscripto; ergo
non in se erit beatus, quod est impossible; erit enim beatus et
non beatus.
97 [Ex ratione primitatis] Item, ex ratione primitatis probo sic.
Unum omnino unius rationis se habens ad plura unius rationis
non determinatur ad illam pluralitatem, sive ad determinationem
certam illorum; nec est instantia in natura respectu suppositorum
nec in causa respectu causatorum nisi instes in proposito. Sed
deitas est una unius rationis, et per te se habet ad plura
unius rationis supposita, ergo ex se non determinatur ad certam
pluralitatem singularium, nec potest determinari ad unum,42 quia
repugnat primo; ergo deitas est in suppositis infinitis.
98 Ista ratio fundatur in hoc quod primitas de se est
determinata.43 Si dicas quod non concludit, quia pari ratione
deitas non erit in tribus personis, responsio distinctione quinta.
42 Ad unum: aliunde Ord., Add. M.

u Determinata: indeterminata in uno cod. (T).
Dist. 2, Part II, sole Question 144
because it is more lovableand consequently it does not love b

infinitely.
96 Also, a either enjoys b for its own sake or uses it. If a uses it,
then as will is perverse; if it enjoys b for its own sake, then as
capacity for happiness* will be satisfied fully by b and also fully
satisfied by [its enjoying] itself. Therefore, a will is beatified twice
in adequate objects [each of which satisfies exhaustively its
capacity for happiness]. Proof: if a enjoys b for its own sake, then
even if enjoying itself is excluded, a would be perfectly happy;
therefore, it will not be made happy by itselfwhich is
impossible.4 For then it will be both made happy [by b] and not
made happy [by itself].
97 [From the nature of God's primacy]5 I prove unicity also
from the primacy in this way. One thing of only one sort is not
related to others of one sort in such a way that it is limited to just
this plurality or to a certain number of such things. Indeed, there
is nothing in the nature itself which requires that there be just so
many individuals, nor anything in a cause that says that there
must be only so many things caused, unless you insist on what we
seek to prove [viz. that the nature is such that it is found in but
one individual]. But deity is one thing of one sort, and according
to you is related to more than one individual of one sort.
Therefore, deity of itself is not limited to any fixed number of
individuals nor can it be restricted by anything else,6 for this
would be repugnant to it as first; therefore deity exists in an
infinity of individual subjects.
98 This argument is based on the question whether primacy by
its very nature has to be somehow restricted.7 And if you object
that this does not follow because it would rule out the possibility
i Since one of the adequate objects required to complete its happiness is

missing.
5 Here, instead of proving that something infinite (intellect, will, etc.) is one,
Scotus seems to be proving, reversing the order, that primacy (= being one)
implies infinity or not being limited.
'' Reading aliunde (found in Ord. and Add. M.) instead of ad unum or ad
unam in the MSS.
7 The translation tries to accommodate both the reading determinate found
in four MSS and the reading indeterminata (which fits the sense better) found
only in one.
99 [Ex necesse esse] Similiter probari potest propositum de

necesse esse sicut Avicenna probat, et de voluntate.
100 [Ex omnipotentia] De omnipotentia autem probat Richardus
I De Trinitate, cap. 17:44 Facile efficere poterit, quisquis
omnipotens fuerit, quod omne aliud nihil possit. Si ergo sunt
plures omnipotentes, quilibet potest facere omnipotentes alios
nihil potentes et eos destruere. Sed insto, quia omnipotentia non
respicit nisi obiecta possibilia: sed si alius Deus sit omnipotens,
non esset possibile, eo quod est necesse esse. Responsio:
concedo in isto intellectu sicut, si Pater non faceret Filium, tamen
faceret eum omnipotentem, destrueret omnia producta ab illo
omnipotente, quia sicut suo velle potest omnia velle et ea
producere, ita suo velle potest impedire omnia volita a se et ab
alio. Et hoc intendit Richardus. Unde dicit omnipotentem facere
non ut non sit, sed ut nihil possit.
101 Sed dices quod concordarent ambo in voluntate et sic quod
vellet unus, et alter. Contra: sicut voluntas unius contingenter
se haberet ad omnia, sic et voluntas alterius; nec voluntas unius
potest determinari a voluntate alterius, quia tunc nullus esset
deus.
102 Item, pono quod concordent; tunc arguo sic: unus
omnipotens volens possibile esse producit illud in esse ut causa
totalis, et alius omnipotens volens illud possibile esse, producit
illud in esse ut causa totalis; sed impossible est plures causas
totales esse respectu eiusdem effectus; ergo impossibile est plures
omnipotentes esse. Sed haec ratio non est evidenter necessaria,
quia omnipotentia in Deo non est evidenter scita, sed credita; et
licet aliqui ponerent Deum infinitum intensive, non tamen
44 Richardus de S. Victore, De Trin. I, c. 25 (ed. Ribaillier. TPMA VI, 105-6;

PL 196, 902).
of deity being shared by three persons, look up what I have said

in distinction five.
99 [From the nature of "necessary existence"] Our thesis can be
proved from the nature of "necessary existence," as Avicenna
does, in a way similar to the proof from the nature of the will.
100 [From the nature of omnipotence] Richard [of St. Victor] in
chapter 17 of The Trinity, however, uses a proof from
omnipotence. Anyone who would have been omnipotent could
easily bring it about that every other agent could do nothing, and
therefore, if there were several omnipotent beings, each could
destroy the other "omnipotents" and render them incapable of
doing anything. One can raise the objection that omnipotence
only has to do with possible objects. If another God were
omnipotent, however, that God would not be just possible but a
necessary being. Reply: I concede, in the sense that the Father
may not have produced the Son, but made him omnipotent.
[However, if this were the case,] he could still destroy all that was
produced by the other omnipotent. For just as by his volition he
could will all things and produce them, so too he could impede all
things willed by himself and by another. And this is what Richard
had in mind. Hence he does not say that each omnipotent makes
the other non-existent, but impotent.
101 But you may say that both could agree voluntarily and thus
what one wills the other does also. To the contrary: just as the
will of one is related to all things contingently, so too is the will of
the other. Neither one's will can be determined by the other,
because then neither would be God.
102 Also, let me assume they do agree, then I argue this way.
One omnipotent by willing some possible produces it in existence
as its total cause and the other omnipotent by willing the same
thing produces it in existence as its total cause. But it is
impossible that there be more than one total cause with respect to
the same effect. Therefore, it is impossible that more than one
omnipotent exists. This is not an evidently necessary argument,
however, because omnipotence in God is not something known
evidently but is something believed. And although some assumed
that God is intensively infinite, they did not think that he was
omnipotentem respectu omnium non includentium contradictio-

nem, sicut nos intelligimus omnipotentem.
103 Ad primum45 dicendum quod idola nuncupative sunt dii, sed

Apostolus subdit statim: nobis autem unus Deus, scilicet sufficit.
104 Ad secundum46 dicendum quod haec propositio "Ens per
participationem reducitur ad ens per essentiam" non est prima,
sed haec: "Omne imperfectum ex se reducitur ad perfectum", ex
qua sequitur alia, quod "Ens per participationem reducitur ad ens
per essentiam, quod est perfectum". Ut ergo vere possit sequi
conclusio, debet sic distingui: aliqua sunt imperfecta perfectione
simpliciter, ut imperfecta quae sunt infra aliquod genus; et illa
reducuntur ad perfectum illius perfectionis quae potest esse in
illo genere; et imperfecta alterius generis ad perfectum alterius eo
modo, quod in quolibet genere est dare unum quod est mensura
omnium in illo, ut diminutum verum ad perfectum in veritate, et
diminutum bonum ad perfectum in bonitate. Alia sunt imperfecta
perfectione limitata, et ista non reducuntur ad perfectum finitae
rationis, quae est infra genus, quia hoc repugnat perfectioni
limitatae, sed reducuntur ad perfectum alterius generis, in quo
sunt eminenter ista imperfecta perfectione limitata; non autem
ad ideam, quae est ratio relationis et perfectionis limitatae in
quantum huius, sed ad primum ens, unum et perfectissimum per
essentiam, quod est pelagus omnium perfectionum.
105 Ad aliud,47 quando dicitur quod plura bona sunt meliora
paucioribus et quaecumque sunt plura in natura divina essent
meliora paucioribus, quia essent ibi plura infinita in quantum
essent in natura divina. Probatio: quia nihil est possibile esse in
Deo quin sit infinitum et necesse esse. Respondeo quod si istud
4r' Cf. supra n. 81.

10 Cf. supra n. 82.
17 Cf. supra n. 83.
omnipotent with regard to whatever does not include a

contradiction, as we understand omnipotence.
103 To the first [n. 81] one must say that idols are gods only in
name and the Apostle immediately adds: 'Tet for us there is only
one God," namely one suffices.
104 To the second, [n. 82] one must point out that this
proposition "Every being by participation is traced back to some
being that is such by its essence" is not a primary truth, like this
truth: "Everything imperfect is traced back to something that is
perfect," from which this other proposition follows: "Every being
by participation is traced back to some perfect being that is such
by its essence." For the conclusion to truly follow, therefore, one
must distinguish it in this way. Sometimes a pure* perfection
characteristic of a class of things is possessed imperfectly by some
in that class and one is led back to something that possesses it
perfectly. Similarly, with the pure perfection characteristic of
another class (so that in any class one must allow for something
one that is the measure of all others in that class), e.g., what is
true in a lesser sense goes back to what is perfectly true and what
is good in a lesser sense to what is perfectly good. As regards a
class characterized by some perfection that is itself limited,
however, the imperfect instances are not traced back to
something perfect within that class, for this is not possible where
the perfection itself is limited. Rather those that possess the
limited perfection imperfectly lead us back to something perfect
in a different class which possesses their limited perfection in a
more excellent way. And this is not just the archetypal idea,
relational and of limited perfection, but it is the first being which
is one and most perfect in its essence and is a sea of all perfection.
105 To the argument [n. 83] when they claim that more goods
are better than fewer goods, and that in the divine nature
whatever would be more numerous would be better than what
would be fewer, because in the divine nature there would be an
infinite profusion of such goods. Proof: nothing can exist in God
that is not infinite and does not exist there necessarily. To this I
potest implicare positionem possibilem, tunc maior, scilicet quod

illud quod est simpliciter melius est ponendum in divinis, est vera
et minor falsa, quando dicit quod plura bona infinita in natura
divina sunt meliora paucioribus. Si autem in maiori dicant
implicationem incompossibilis, tunc maior falsa et minor vera,
sed hoc non est nisi ex implicatione incompossibilis.
106 Ad quartum48 dicendum negando consequentiam. Et quando
dicit quod plurale et singulare idem significant, dicendum quod
numerus non est talis modus significandi grammaticus sicut alii,
quia alii modi praecise non requirunt quod aliquid sit in re; unde
intellectus possit moveri ad concipiendum, quamvis illud
motivum non sit aliquid in re; masculinitas enim non requirit
aliquid in re masculini, sed aliquid correspondens masculinitati
(scilicet 'potentia activa', vel aliquid huiusmodi). Non est sic de
numero, quia requirit aliquid realiter in re diversum; unde
sequitur: "Res sunt, ergo plures sunt". Unde haec dictio "dii"
includit contradictoria, quia res repugnat significato, et per
consequens modus significandi numeri pluralis modo significandi
numeri singularis. Ad formam ergo argumenti: Deus est, ergo
dii sunt, nego consequentiam. Ad probationem dicendum quod
idem includunt sub oppositis modis.
48 Cf. supra n. 84.

reply that if "it is better for it to exist" is taken in the sense of

possibility, then the major is true, namely that in the divine one
must assume the existence of what is simply better, but then the
minor premise is false. However, if this expression in the major
implies incompatibility, then the major is false and the minor
true. But this is the case only because one assumes the
existence of incompatible notions.
106 As for the fourth argument [n. 84], one must deny the
validity of the inference. And when it is said that the singular and
plural signify the same thing, one must point out that number is
not like other grammatical modes of signification, for other modes
do not require something precise in the thing. Hence, the intellect
could be moved to conceive the way it does even though it is not
moved by something [precise] in the thing. For a noun to be
masculine, for instance, it is not necessary that the thing be
masculine, but only that something resembling masculinity be
there, namely some active potency or some such thing.8 It is not
that way with number, because this requires some real difference.
Hence, this follows: "Things exist, therefore several exist." The
expression "gods," then, includes contradictory notions, because
reality is opposed to what this expression signifies, and
consequently the plural mode of signification is opposed to the
singular mode of signification. As to the form of the argument,
"God is, therefore gods exist," I deny the validity of the
implication. As for the proof, one must say the same thing is
included but under opposite modes.
H Scotus's explanation of masculinitas is non-sensical (the term potentia

activa itself, which is feminine, refutes it); nor is his example of grammatical
gender particularly illustrative, but his main point is valid: e.g., changing
grammatical case only indicates a change in relationship, while the real referent
of the word remains unchanged. At the same time, changing grammatical
number requires the actual existence of a single or of multiple referents.
[Pars III de personis et productionibus in Deo

Quaestio 1
Utrum personae divinae repugnet
quaecumque productio intrinseca realis]
107 Circa tertiam partem secundae distinctionis quaero de

Trinitate personarum, et quia via ad notitiam de ea habendam est
per productiones, ideo quaero primo utrum personae divinae
repugnet quaecumque productio intrinseca realis.
Et videtur quod sic:

Quia nullum productum est ex se necessarium; quidquid
subsistit in essentia divina est ex se necessarium; ergo nihil ibi
subsistens in essentia divina est productum.
Maior probatur: quia omne productum includit possibilita-
tem ad produci, alioquin impossibile fuit produci; sed omnis
possibilitas repugnat necessario ex se; ergo etc.
108 Secundo probatur eadem maior sic: nihil simul est
necessarium ex se et ab alio; sed quod est productum, si est
necessarium, est necessarium ab alio; ergo non a se. Maior patet:
si est necessarium a se, est necessarium omni alio circumscripto;
si autem est necessarium ab alio, non est necessarium illo
circumscripto; ergo si est productum, est necessarium et non
necessarium.
109 Tertio probatur eadem maior sic: omne productum est
posterius aliquo modo producente, quia non potest intelligi
productio sine aliquo ordine. In illo igitur priori in quo intelligitur
producens, non intelligitur productum, quia tunc non esset prius.
Ergo intelligitur in illo priori productum non esse et in signo
posteriori intelligitur esse. Ergo mutatio de non-esse eius ad esse.
Dist. 2, Part III, Question One 148
Part III: On the Trinity of Persons
Question One
Is any intrinsic real production repugnant
to the divine persons?
107 In regard to the third part of the second distinction I ask

about the Trinity of Persons, and because the way to have
knowledge about it is through productions, therefore I ask first
whether any intrinsic real production is repugnant to the divine
persons.
It seems that it is: for no product is of itself necessary; whatever

subsists in the divine essence is of itself necessary; therefore
nothing subsisting there in the divine essence is produced. The
major is proved, because every product includes the possibility of
being produced, otherwise it would be impossible to produce it;
but all possibility is repugnant to what is of itself necessary;
therefore etc.
108 Secondly the same major is proved in this fashion: nothing
is at the same time necessary of itself and from another; but what
is produced, if it is necessary, is necessary from another; therefore
it is not of itself. The major is evident: if it is necessary of itself, it
is necessary apart from anything else; but if it is necessary from
another, it is not necessary apart from it; therefore if it is
produced, it is both necessary and not necessary.
109 Third, the same major is proved in another way: every
product is posterior in some way to what is producing it, because
one cannot conceive of production without any order. In that
logically prior instant, then, in which one thinks of the producer,
one is not yet thinking of the product, because otherwise that
instant would not be logically prior. Therefore, in that logically
prior instant the product is not existing and in a posterior logical
instant it is understood to be existing. Therefore there is a
mutation from non-being to being.
110 Item, quarto probatur maior sic: si est productum, ergo

dependens. Consequens falsum est, ergo et antecedens. Probatio
consequentiae: quia si nullo modo dependet productum a
producente, igitur uterque ex aequo haberet naturam et ita non
magis praeexigeret productum producens quam e converso.
111 Contra est Magister in littera et in Psalmo49: Dominus dixit

ad me: Filius metis es tu, ego hodie genui te. Alias auctoritates
quaere in littera.
[I. Ad primam quaestionem]
112 In ista quaestione, conclusio est certa apud theologos omnes.

Veritas tamen conclusionis a diversis diversimode suadetur.
[A. Opiniones aliorum

1. Opinio prima]
113 Aliqui50 persuadent hoc per talem rationem, quasi demons-

trent: prima persona in divinis est relata, ergo constituitur per
relationem ad secundam. Nam si non constitueretur per
relationem ad secundam personam, accideret sibi relatio illa et
esset quasi adventitia personae iam constitutae, quod est
inconveniens. Si constituatur per relationem, ergo non est nisi
relatione originis; ergo oportet in divinis ponere plura supposita
quorum unum sit ab alio per originem.
114 Item, arguunt sic: virtus summe activa summe se
communicat vel diffundit; sed non se diffundit summe nisi
producendo summe, et hoc est alteram personam.
49 Ps. 2:7; cf. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 2, c. 4, n. 8 (SB IV, 66).

r'0 Henricus Gand., Quodl. VI, q. 1 in corp. (f. 215vQ-216rV); Summa a. 53, q.
8 in corp. (II, 71N); q. 9 (II, 72C); a. 54, q. 3 in corp. (II, 790).
110 Also, fourthly, the major is proved in this way: if it is a

product, therefore it is depending. The consequent is false,
therefore the antecedent is also false. Proof of the inference: for if
the product depended in no way upon the producer, therefore
both would be equally in possession of their nature and thus the
product would no more require as a precondition the producer
than vice versa.
111 To the contrary is what the Master* says in the text* and in
the Psalms [2:7]: "The Lord said to me: you are my Son, and today
I have begotten you." For other authoritative statements look in
the preliminary texts.
To the first question
112 In this question, the conclusion is certain as all theologians

agree. But different ones offer different ways in which one can be
persuaded of its truth.

The first opinion
113 Some use this persuasive argument, as if they were

demonstrating it. The first person in the divine is related;
therefore he is constituted by a relationship to the second person.
For if he were not constituted by a relationship to that person, the
relationship would be something accidental to him and would be
quasi-adventitious, which is incongruous. If he is constituted by a
relation, then it is none other than a relationship of one's origin;*
therefore in the divine they postulate several subjects of which
one is from the other as regards his origin.
114 Also, they argue in this way: the highest active power tends
to communicate or diffuse itself in the highest way; but one
cannot diffuse or spread oneself out in the highest way except by
way of producing in the highest way, and this results in another
person being produced.
[2. Opinio secunda]
115 Item, alii51 persuadent sic: bonum est sui communicativum;

ergo summum bonum summe sui communicativum; nonnisi ad
intra, quia nihil ad extra potest esse summum.
116 Item, per rationem perfecti: perfectum potest sibi producere
simile, ex I Metaphysicae52 et IV Meteorologicorum.53 Ergo
primum agens, quod est perfectissimum, potest producere sibi
simile. Sed perfectius agens est quod potest producere sibi simile
univoce quam aequivoce, quia productio aequivoca est imperfecta;
ergo etc.
[B. Contra istas opiniones]
117 Istae rationes non declarant propositum per manifestius

neque fideli neque infideli. Prima ratio non, quia quando accipit
quod prima persona est relata, si vult persuadere infideli, accipit
quod est minus notum principali proposito, quia minus notum est
personam per se subsistentem per relationem constitui quam
productionem esse in divinis, quia si aliqua persona per se
subsistens sciatur producta, non tamen per relationem, sed magis
videretur sibi per absolutum. Si etiam vult persuadere fideli,
adhuc procedit ex minus noto, quia quod persona aliqua
producatur in divinis est expressus articulus fidei. Non autem est
ita expressus articulus fidei quod constituatur per relationem.
Nec valet consequentia, quia communis spiratio est relatio et non
est constitutiva.
118 Quod etiam ultra arguit quod distinctio est per relationem,
ergo per relationes originis, hoc non est statim evidens ex fide,
sicut est conclusio quam intendit ostendere. Nec consequentia
valet, quia relationes communes non sunt originis.
51 Bonaventura, Sent. I, d. 2, a. un., q. 2, arg. 1 (I, 53a); Richardus de

Mediavilla, Sent. I, d. 2, a. 2, q. 1 in corp. (I, 34a).
52 Cf. Aristot., Metaph. I (A), c. 1 (9816 7).
r,:l Aristot., Meteor. IV, c. 3 (380a 12-15).
The second opinion
115 Also, others offer this persuasive argument: what is good

tends to communicate itself; therefore the highest good tends to
do so in the highest possible way; but this can only be an internal
communication, for nothing can communicate itself to something
outside in the highest way.
116 Also, in virtue of being perfect, what is perfect can produce
something like itself, from Bk. I of the Metaphysics and Bk. IV of
Meteorology. Therefore, the first agent, that is most perfect, can
produce something like itself. But a more perfect agent is one that
produces something univocally similar to itself rather than
something equivocal, because an equivocal production is
imperfect; therefore etc.
Against these opinions
117 These reasons do not show what they propose to show in a

more manifest fashion, whether it be to a believer or an infidel.
The first argument does not, because to start with the fact that
the first person is a relative entity, when you wish to persuade an
infidel, means to start with something less well known than what
is principally proposed, because it is less well known that a
person who subsists in himself is constituted by a pure
relationship than that a production exists in the divine, because if
some person who subsists in himself is known to be produced, it
would seem to happen not by a relationship, but rather by
something absolute. If one wished to convince a believer, one
would still be proceeding from what is less known to what is more
known, because that any person in the divine is produced is an
express article of faith, but that it is constituted through a
relation is not so expressly an article of faith. Neither does the
inference hold good, because the common spiration* [of the Holy
Spirit shared by Father and Son] is itself a relationship and it
does not constitute [a distinct fourth person].
118 As to his further argument that 'the distinction is through a
relationship; therefore this relationship* is one of origin,'*this
is not something as immediately evident from faith, as is the
1 19 Et cum arguit secundo quod summum bonum est summe sui

diffusivum, responsio esset quod maior est vera, si summa
diffusio est possibilis. Non est autem ostensum quod possibile sit
aliquid54 summe diffundere se sive communicare se alteri in
unitate naturae; ergo etc.
120 Per idem patet ad tertium. Oporteret enim probare quod
communicatio eiusdem rei vel naturae esset possibilis, quia ad
impossible includens contradictionem non est potentia, et per
consequens nec communicatio bonitatis summae, ut dicit
adversarius.
121 Per idem patet ad quartum, cum dicitur quod perfectum
natum est producere summum sibi simile: verum est ita summum
sibi simile sicut potest produci; sed non summe univoce, quia tunc
posset producere alium Deum. Oporteret ergo probare quod
supponit, scilicet quod simile univoce summum esset producibile.
Sed hoc est impossibile, quia tunc possunt esse plures dii, ut
ostensum est praecedenti quaestione de unitate Dei.
[II. Responsio Scoti]
122 Ostendo ergo propositum tali ratione: suppositum quod-

cumque habens principium productivum sufficiens et principium
formale, a se potest producere suppositum vel productum
adaequatum illi principio, id est suppositum perfectissimum quod
potest produci tali principio; non autem productum adaequatum
in natura, quia tunc esset petitio, sed productum adaequatum
virtuti activae producentis. Sicut sol, cum producit animatum
perfectissimum, dicitur producere effectum adaequatum, non in
Aliquid: melius lege alicui, sice ut aliquid ... diffundat.

conclusion itself that he intended to prove. Neither is the

inference valid, because common relationships* are not those of
origin.*
1 19 And when he argues secondly that the highest good tends to
spread or diffuse itself in the highest way, the reply would be that
the major is true, if this highest form of diffusion were possible.
But it has not been shown that it is possible for something to
diffuse or communicate itself to another by sharing with the other
his own individual nature; therefore, etc.
120 And for the same reason the third point is clear. For one
would have to prove that a communication of the same thing or
nature would be possible, because the 'impossible' that includes a
contradiction has no potential; and as a consequence an
adversary would say, neither is communication of the highest
good a possibility.
121 Also, for the same reason the fourth point is evident when it
is said that what is perfect is suited by nature to produce what is
most similar to itself, it is true [that it can produce] something as
similar to it as can be produced; but the highest similarity is
[still] not univocal,* because it cannot produce another God.
Therefore it is necessary to prove what is presupposed, namely,
that what is univocally similar to the highest degree can be
produced. But this is impossible, because then there could be
several gods, as was shown in the previous question about the
unity of God.
Scotus's reply
122 Therefore I demonstrate the proposal by this sort of

argument: whatever individual subject or supposit* that has a
sufficient productive principle and a formal principle, can of itself
produce a supposit or a product adequate to the principle in
question, that is, the most perfect supposit that could be produced
by such a principle. However, it is not a product adequate in
nature, because then that would be begging the question, but a
product adequate to the active power of the one producing. E.g.,
the Sun, when it produces the most perfect animated being, is
said to produce an adequate effect, not adequate as to its nature,
natura sed virtuti eius activae. Haec est minor 'aliquod suppo
sition divinum habet memoriam perfectam quae est principium
producendi notitiam genitam a se'; ergo etc.
123 Maior probatur, quia quod habens principium producendi
non potest producere secundum illud principium: aut hoc est quia
imperfecte habet illud principium, ut calidum imperfectum
habens imperfecte calorem non est sufficiens ad calefaciendum
secundum illum; aut quia praeintelligitur habere productionem
adaequatam illi principio, sicut est de Filio in divinis. Quia licet
habeat principium generandi ut memoriam perfectam, non tamen
potest generare, quia illud principium praeintelligitur in Patre
habere productionem adaequatam. Primum excluditur si sit
principium sufficiens; secundum similiter excluditur quia illud
principium habet a se.
124 Minor patet quantum ad primam partem, quia nisi aliqua
persona in divinis haberet memoriam perfectam a se, esset
processus in infinitum.
125 Alia pars minoris, scilicet quod memoria perfecta in
supposito habente eam a se sit principium producendi notitiam
genitam, probatur: quia omnis memoria creata, unde memoria,
non unde creata, nec unde limitata, est principium producendi
notitiam genitam, quia nulla imperfectio est ratio agendi, et ideo
est perfectum principium producendi notitiam genitam
correspondentem sibi. Et hoc convenit sibi ex perfectione sua
naturali; ergo et hoc convenit sibi perfectissime ubi est memoria
perfectissima et perfectissime. Sic est in supposito Patris increato;
ergo etc.
but rather as to its active power. This is the minor premise: 'some
divine supposit has a perfect memory,* which is the principle for
producing knowledge as something begotten of itself ; therefore
etc.
123 The major is proved, because the situation when something
that has a principle of producing cannot produce according to that
principle occurs: either [i] because it has that principle
imperfectly, as, e.g., an object deficient in heat that has imperfect
warmth, is not sufficient for heating with it; or else [ii] because a
production that is adequate to the [producing] principle is
[already] presupposed, as is the case with the Son in the divine.
Because although the Son has a principle of generation,* such as
a perfect memory, nevertheless he cannot generate, because that
principle is [already] understood beforehand to have an adequate
production in the Father. The first is excluded if the principle is
sufficient; the second is also excluded, because [the Father] has
this principle of himself [i.e., no prior adequate production is
presupposed] .
124 The minor is evident as regards the first part, because
unless in the divine some person of himself would have a perfect
memory, there would be a process ad infinitum.
125 The other part of the minor, namely, that perfect memory in
a supposit that has it of itself, is a principle of producing
conceived knowledge,9 is proved: since every created memoryas
memory, not as created, nor as limitedis a principle of
producing conceived knowledge, [and] because no imperfection is
a reason for acting, therefore it is a perfect principle producing
conceived knowledge corresponding to itself. And this pertains to
it by reason of its natural perfection; therefore it pertains to it
most perfectly where there is the most perfect memory that
functions most perfectly. But such is [the case] in the uncreated
supposit of the Father; therefore, etc.
n The very term concept can be seen in terms of an idea as a child conceived
by the mind. Memory's ability to recall what it knows stresses this aspect of the
mind, as opposed to the intellect, which rather implies that the mind is
conceiving because something from the outside is informing it, that is,
transferring the form of the object as an impression on the intellect qua matter.
[A. Quattuor instantiae

contra responsionem supra dictam]
126 Sed huic rationi insto quadrupliciter ut amplius declaretur.

Dicetur tibi primo ad minorem quod verum est quod memoria
creata, unde creata, non est principium producendi notitiam
genitam, sed ut memoria habens tamen unitatem univocationis
secundum eius rationem formalem; memoria vero creata non est
univoca memoriae divinae nec e converso, sed tantum analoga.
127 Ex hoc infero propositum sic: cuilibet habenti unitatem
analogiae, si convenit sibi esse principium perfectum agendi
posteriori multo perfectius, et illi cui primo et perfectissime
convenit ad quod cetera reducuntur. Ut si calefacere convenit igni
et soli analogice, quia calorem habent analogice, si calor in igne
potest esse principium calefaciendi, multo magis et calor in sole si
haberet calorem. Similiter, si verum creatum sit sui
declarativum, et verum increatum, II Metaphysicae.55 Si igitur
convenit memoriae creatae, unde memoria, esse principium
producendi notitiam genitam ex perfectione sua, multo magis
memoriae increatae perfectissimae ad quam memoria creata
attribuitur.56
128 Secundo rationi primae insto sic: memoria solum est
principium productivum notitiae genitae quando intellectus
potest recipere intellectionem vel notitiam genitam aliam a se
tanquam perfectionem suam, ut in nobis. Sed sic non est in Deo,
quia intellectus divinus non potest gignere aliam notitiam a se et
illam ut suam perfectionem recipere, cum sit infinitus et infinite
perfectus. Ergo ibi memoria non erit principium productivum.
129 Tertio insto sic: nihil debet in divinis poni superfluum; in
nobis ponitur memoria productiva notitiae ut per eam
" Aristot., Metaph. II (a), c. 1 (9936 23-8).

M Attribuitur: melius lege reducitur.
Four objections to the aforesaid response
126 But to this argument I raise a fourfold objection, so that this

may serve to explain it more fully. You would first object to the
minor premise, that it is true that created memory, as created, is
not a principle of producing conceived knowledge, but rather as a
memory having unity of univocation according to its formal
notion;i0 however, created memory is not a univocal likeness to
the divine memory, but only analogous to it.
127 On this account I present what is proposed in this way.
Regarding anything having unity of analogy, if it is suited to it to
be a perfect principle of acting, that is much more perfect than
what is posterior [i.e., in the order of perfection], then [all the
more so] it is suited to what is primary and most perfect [in the
hierarchical order], to which all the others [in that order] are
traced back. E.g., given that the ability to heat is suited both to
fire and to the sun analogically, because they both possess heat in
an analogical way, if the heat in [elementary] fire can be the
principle of heating, much more so the heat in the sun, if it were
to have heat. Likewise, if created truth tends to manifest itself,
then uncreated truth does so as well, according to Bk. II of the
Metaphysics. If therefore it is suited to created memory qua
memory to be a principle of producing conceived knowledge by
reason of its perfection, all the more so to the uncreated and most
perfect memory, to which created memory is traced back.
128 I object to the first proof secondly in this way: memory is a
productive principle of conceived knowledge only when the
intellect can receive intellection or conceived knowledge other
than itself as its perfection, as in us. But such is not the case in
God, because the divine intellect cannot generate knowledge that
is other than itself, receiving it as its perfection, since it is infinite
and infinitely perfect. Therefore memory will not be a productive
principle there.
129 I object thirdly in this fashion: nothing must be posited in
the divine that is superfluous; in us memory that is productive of
i0 That is to say, when something is recalled from memory it presumably is

something stored there potentially, and potency and its actualization are
identical in form, according to Aristotle.
perficiamur. Hoc non convenit intellectui divino, quia non

formaliter perficitur per genitam notitiam, sed per notitiam
ingenitam essentialem eandem sibi.
130 Ex secunda instantia infero propositum sic: quandocumque
in aliquo concurrunt duo, unum per se et reliquum per accidens,
scilicet ratio agendi et patiendi, ubi illud quod est ratio agendi est
per se, non minus est ratio agendi; patet II Physicorum51 de
medico sanante se, si separaretur medicina ab infirmitate,
nihilominus erit medicina ratio sanandi. Igitur si separentur ista
ab invicem in intellectu quocumque, remanente eo quod erat per
se ratio principii productivi, adhuc erit ratio producendi,
quantumcumque non sit ibi potentialitas passiva. Exemplum
huius potest esse: si intellectui nostro esset concreata vel
connaturalis notitia sui sive consubstantialis, secundum quod
quidam intelligunt Augustinum de notitia abdita, XIV De
Trinitate, cap. 7. 58 Tunc licet intellectus non posset habere
notitiam genitam qua cognoscit se, quia cognoscit per notitiam
concreatam, secundum istos, si tamen potest habere aliud
obiectum actu intelligibile sibi praesens, potest aliam notitiam
gignere in passo approximato si quod tale sit vel per se
stantem si habeat talem virtutem ad producendum aliquid per se
stans. Ergo ab intellectu divino, et nostro similiter, circumscripta
ratione receptivi notitiae, si remaneat in eo ratio productivi
notitiae, et hoc per se stantis, poterit talis notitia gigni licet non
recipiatur in intellectu qui est principium gignendi.
131 Tertia etiam instantia concludit propositum: in omni ordine
agentium, praecipue ibi ubi principium activum non dicit de se
aliquid imperfectum, status est ad aliquod principium simpliciter
perfectum quod agit ex plenitudine perfectionis suae. Sed
r'7 Aristot., Physica II, c. 1 (1926 23-7).

M August., De Trin. XIV, c. 7, n. 9 (CCSL 50A. 433; PL 42, 1043).
knowledge is posited in order that through it we may be

perfected. This does not apply to the divine intellect, because it is
not formally perfected by the conceived knowledge, but by
essential knowledge that is not begotten, which knowledge is the
same as itself.
130 On account of the second objection I present what is
proposed in this way: whenever two things concur in some
thingone per se and the other incidentally, namely, the basis
for acting and being receptive to impressionswhere that which
is the reason for acting is per se [and not incidental], it is no less
the basis for acting; this is evident from Bk. II of the Physics,
about the physician who heals himself: if medical skill were
separated from sickness [as a passive principle], it would be no
less the reason for healing. Therefore if one were to separate
these [i.e., memory and conceived knowledge] from each other in
any intellect whatsoever in such a way that that which was per se
the basis of a productive principle would remain, it would still be
the basis of productivity, no matter how much passive
potentiality were lacking. An example of this could be if
knowledge of itself was innate to, or created with our intellect
and consubstantial with it, which is how certain ones understand
what Augustine says about hidden knowledge, in Bk. XIV of The
Trinity, chapter 7. Then, although the intellect could not possess
conceived knowledge, by which it knew itselfbecause, according
to those, it knows through innate knowledgebut if nevertheless
it had another object that was actually intelligible and present to
it, it could generate knowledge in some other nearby patient*if
such existedor cause this conceived knowledge to stand on its
own, if it had such power to produce something that stands on its
own. Therefore, if one removes the aspect of received knowledge
from the divine intellect, and likewise from ours, given that the
characteristic of productive knowledge were to remain in it,
moreover, retaining its per se status, such knowledge could be
conceived, despite the fact that it may not be received in the
intellect which is the principle of its conception.
131 Also the third objection leads to the conclusion we propose
[in the following manner]. Every order of agents, especially where
the active principle does not imply of itself any imperfection,
intellectus est tale principium et voluntas similiter. Ergo in isto

genere necesse est stare ad aliquod principium simpliciter
perfectum. Sed nullum est agens simpliciter perfectum
cuiusmodi est agens ex libertate secundum Avicennam VIII
Metaphysicae, cap. ultimo,59 quod exspectat perfici per suam
operationem, quia nullum agens liberaliter agit quod exspectat
perfici sua actione. Sicut in actibus humanis non dicitur liberalis
qui exspectat retributionem. Ergo intellectus perfectus, habens
obiectum intelligibile actu sibi praesens sive memoria perfecta,
non recipit nec perficitur notitia quam producit. Et cum arguitur:
'aliter erit frustra', non sequitur. Nam productum est summe
bonum per se stans ex plenitudine perfectionis ipsius producentis.
Non autem est productum, ut per ipsum producens perficiatur.
132 Quarta instantia est ista, et est secundum intentionem
philosophorum magis sic: memoria in quocumque vel est realiter
productiva notitiae genitae ut in nobis, vel quasi-productiva ut in
Deo, quia ibi intelligitur intellectio sua actualis quasi notitia
genita. Tunc arguo: productivum habens productum adaequatum
non potest aliud producere. Ergo cum totum istud 'intellectus
habens actu obiectum intelligibile sibi praesens', vel memoria,
habeat in intellectu paterno notitiam ingenitam quasi-productam
sibi adaequatam aliquo modo secundum rationem intelligendi
posteriorem tali memoria vel praesentia obiecti, videtur quod
nullam virtutem aliam habeat ulterius ad producendum notitiam
distinctam genitam aliam ab ista.
133 Istam instantiam duco ad oppositum, quia si potentia vel
intellectus habens obiectum actu intelligibile sibi praesens, vel
memoria in Patre habeat ibi notitiam actualem Patris quasi-
M Avicenna, Metaph. VIII, c. 7 (AviL, 429s).

comes to a stop in some simply perfect agent, which acts because

of the plenitude of its perfection. But the intellect is such a
principle11 and the will is likewise. Therefore in this class of
things it is necessary to come to some principle that is simply
perfect in an unqualified sense. But, according to Avicenna in his
Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, the last chapter,12 no agent is simply
perfectsuch is the one that acts freelyif it expects to be
perfected by its operation, because no agent acts freely if it looks
forward to being perfected by its action. Just as in human actions
one is not considered to be liberal that expects some return.
Therefore the perfect intellect or a perfect memory, having an
intelligible object actually present to it, does not receive anything,
nor is it perfected by the knowledge which it produces. And if it is
argued "Otherwise it will be in vain," this does not follow. For the
product is the highest good standing per se from the plenitude of
perfection of its producer. But it is not produced, in order that the
producer be perfected through it.
132 The fourth objection is the following, and it is based more on
the intention of the philosophers in this way: memory in anything
either is really productive of conceived knowledge as it is in us, or
quasi-productive as it is in God, because there one understands
his actual knowledge as if it were conceived knowledge. Then I
argue: what is productive, once it has an adequate product,
cannot produce another. Therefore, when either the 'intellect
having an actual and intelligible object present to it,' or the
memory in the paternal intellect has unbegotten knowledge
produced, as it were, as adequate to itself in some way, according
to the notion of understanding that is posterior to such a memory
or presence of an object, it seems it would have no further power
of producing distinct conceived knowledge, other than this.
133 This objection I draw to an opposite conclusion, because if
the potency or intellect (having an intelligible object present to
itself actually) or the memory in the Father would have there
actual knowledge of the Father as quasi-produced, nevertheless it
" I.e., the one that does not of itself imply any limitation or imperfection.
n Avicenna implies that such an agent acts necessarily and not freely and by
so acting acquires some perfection it did not possess before.
productam, non tamen habet illa notitiam actualem in Patre vere

et realiter productam. Nulli autem principio productivo ex se
tollitur producere ut est in aliquo, nisi intelligatur produxisse
aliqua productione adaequata virtuti talis principii productivi, et
ideo quantumcumque ut in Patre habeat quasi-productum, adhuc
potest habere vere productum. Sed cum habuerit vere et realiter
productum adaequatum sibi, non potest in aliud productum.
[B. Ad rationes in oppositum]
134 Ad rationes in oppositum. Ad primum60 de possibili

respondeo: hoc nomen 'potentia' multos decipit et multipliciter
sumitur quod decipit ignorantes. Dicitur enim multipliciter, sicut
patet per suum oppositum iuxta considerationem Philosophi V
Metaphysicae.61
135 Potentia enim uno modo opponitur impossibili, et sic
possibile convenit cuilibet enti quia tam Deo quam creaturae, tam
habentibus esse essentiae quam exsistentiae, tam conceptibus
simplicibus quam compositis, ubi non est repugnantia, ut cum
dico 'homo irrationalis', vel ubi extrema non repugnat sicut hic
'homo non est animal'. Et de isto conceditur quod 'omne
productum est possibile' quia termini non repugnant. Et sic
concedo quod 'Verbum potest esse' et 'Pater potest esse' quia non
est impossibile eos esse.
136 Alio modo accipitur 'potentia' prout opponitur necesse esse,
et hoc modo possibile est contingens ad utrumlibet. Et de isto
possibili non tenet consequentia 'si est productum, ergo est
possibile', quia personae divinae sunt necessariae et non
contingentes. Sed oppositum sequitur, scilicet quod productum
non sit possibile hoc modo sed necessarium.
137 Tertio modo 'potentia' opponitur actui. Et isto modo illud
quod nihil est dicitur possibile esse, et sic est differentia entis, et
no Cf. supra n. 107.

01 Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 12 (1019a 15-1020a 5).
does not have actual knowledge in the Father truly and really
produced. But no principle productive by itself is deprived, as it is
in something else, of production, unless it be understood to have
produced by some production adequate to the power of such a
productive principle. Therefore, no matter to what extent it would
have a quasi-product, as in the Father, it still can have a true
product. But when it would have truly and really produced
something adequate to itself, it cannot have another [adequate]
product.
134 To the reasons for the opposite. To the first [n. 107] about
the possible I respond: this term 'potency' deceives many and is
taken in several senses that deceive the ignorant. For it is
predicated in several ways as is evident through its opposites
according to the consideration of the Philosopher in the
Metaphysics.
135 For in one way potency is opposed to the impossible, and
thus possible pertains to everything to which 'being' does, because
it pertains both to God and to creatures, and to things having the
being of essence as well as the being of existence, both to simple
concepts as well as those that are composed, where there is no
repugnance (such as there is when I say 'irrational man') or
where some terms are not repugnant (as they are here: 'man is
not an animal'). And about this it is conceded that 'every product
is possible,' because the terms are not repugnant. And in this
sense I concede 'The Word* can be' and 'The Father can be,'
because it is not impossible for these to exist.
136 In another way 'potency' is taken as opposed to 'necessary
being,' and in this way possible' is contingent in respect to either
one. And regarding this possible the inference does not hold 'If
something is produced, therefore it is possible,' because the divine
persons are necessary, and not contingent. But the opposite
follows, namely that the product is not possible in this sense, but
necessary.
137 In a third way 'potency' is opposed to act. And in this way
that which is nothing [i.e., what does not exist] is said to be
sic non tenet consequentia, quia ista potentia dicit simpliciter

imperfectionem eo quod dividitur contra actum. Et omnis persona
producta est purus actus.
138 Quarto modo accipitur 'potentia' ut relative dicitur ad
potentem, ut aliquis dicitur potens potentia activa vel factiva vel
productiva; et sic correspondenter dicitur aliquid possibile,
agibile, factibile vel producibile. Et sic loquendo de possibili vel de
potentia, prout relative accipitur ad potentem, non acceperunt
eam philosophi communius quam pro potentia causativa vel
effectiva quam dixerunt esse respectu alterius in essentia et
natura, quia est principium transmutandi aliud in quantum
aliud. Et non acceperunt eam pro potentia productiva quae potest
esse eiusdem in quantum idem. Et isto modo prout potentia vel
possibile dicitur ad potentem, contrahendo ad causationem vel
efficientiam proprie, sic non est Verbum in divinis possibile
passivum produci. Sed quia secundum veritatem potentia
productiva est in plus quam effectiva, ideo accipiendo possibile ut
refertur ad potentem potentia productiva, bene sequitur 'si est
productum, ergo est possibile', id est potest esse terminus
productionis.
139 Ad secundum62 dicendum quod idem est necessarium a se
formaliter et non necessarium a se, sed ab alio vel originaliter; et
ista non contradicunt.
6* Cf. supra n. 108.

possible being, and in this sense it [i.e., potency] is a variation of

'being,' and so the inference [if something is produced, therefore it
is possible] does not hold, because this potency asserts
unqualified imperfection, in as much as it is distinguished from
act. And every person produced is pure act.
138 A fourth way is understanding 'potency' as relative to what
is potent, as someone is said to be potent by reason of potency,
being able to act, or to make,13 or to produce. And correspondingly
something can be possible, able to be done, able to be made or
produced. And speaking in this way about the 'possible' or
'potency', meaning 'relative to what is potent,' philosophers do not
accept this to be a greater level of commonness than in a
causative or efficient potency, which, they say, one can have
regarding something 'other' in essence or nature, because [such
potency] is defined as the principle of transmuting another
insofar as it is other [i.e., an essence or nature that is really
distinct from the nature of the producer] . And they do not accept
that this [type of 'potency' reaches the level of] a productive
potency, which can be in respect to the same thing qua same. And
in this way, insofar as 'potency' or 'possible' means 'relative to
what is potent,' defining what is causative or efficient [in it] in a
proper sense, the Word in the divine is not something passive
with a potential to be produced. But because in truth the
productive potency is capable of more than the effective one,
therefore by taking 'possible' as referring to what is potent by
reason of a productive potency, it does follow logically, that 'if it is
produced, therefore it is possible,' that is, it can be a term of a
production.
139 To the second [n. 108] it must be said that the same thing
can be both necessary of itself in a formal sense and not necessary
of itself (in a sense of being from another or by reason of origin);
and these do not contradict one another.
11 'Able to make' and 'able to be produced' indicate indifferently a real

opposition, whether it be between cause and effect, or between correlatives,
where both as is the case with the divine persons constituted exclusively by the
opposition of relationships, may share the same one absolute nature. In the case
of generation, as in the case of causation, the action is identified with the product
according to the Aristotelian axiom: "Actio est in passo."
140 Ad probationem, quando dicitur quod illud quod est

necessarium a se, est necessarium omni alio circumscripta,
dicendum quod aliquid potest circumscribi cuius circumscriptio
est incompossibilis in esse quia habent eandem entitatem. Et
'quod circumscribatur secundum esse' et 'quod non habeat suum
esse', includit contradictionem. Aliquid autem potest circumscribi
cuius circumscriptio non includit contradictionem. Quando igitur
dicitur in prima propositione 'necessarium a se circumscripta
quocumque alio' addo 'cuius circumscriptio non includit
impossibilia vel contradictoria'; tale non potest non esse. Sed
minor 'quod est necessarium ab alio, circumscripta alio, potest
non esse', hoc est falsum, quia includit contradictionem eo quod
illud aliud non dicit aliam entitatem, ut dictum est.
141 Ad tertium63 dico igitur de illo priori, quod in illo 'intelligitur
illud quod est producens, et productum non intelligitur esse', hoc
est verum, 'ergo intelligitur non esse', hoc est falsum. Exemplum:
non est idem intelligere animal absque rationali, et intelligere
ipsum non esse rationale compositive, et non intelligere eum
rationale abstractive. Unde iste est ordo in intellectu: primo non
intelligere esse, secundo intelligere esse; sed in re nullus est ordo.
142 Sed contra: oportet in illo priori non intelligere illud esse,
quia in illo priori non habet esse, alias haberet prioritatem
essendi cum illo primo. Responsio: non intelligitur in illo priori
non-esse absolute, sed non-esse in priori originis, id est, non-esse
a se. Et sic etiam intelligitur esse in illo priori absolute quando
63 Cf supra n. 109.
140 As to the proof, when it is said that that which is 'necessary

of itself, is necessary apart from anything else,' it must be said
that (1) something can be written off, whose removal makes being
impossible, because both [the thing and what is written off] have
the same entity. And 'being written off according to being', just as
'not having one's own being,' includes a contradiction. But (2)
something can be written off whose removal does not include a
contradiction. When therefore it is said in the first proposition
'necessary of itself apart from anything else' I add 'whose removal
does not include what is impossible or contradictory'; such thing
cannot not exist. But [what] the minor [implies, namely] "what is
necessary from another, apart from the other has a potential not
to be" is false, because it includes a contradiction, since the 'other'
in this case does not refer to another entity,i4 as was said.
141 To the third [n. 109] I say, therefore, about that prior
instant, that in itthis is true'the producer is understood, and
the product is not thought of as existing'; [but to conclude from
this] 'therefore, the [product] is understood not to exist' is false.
For example: it is not the same thing 'to conceive animal without
rational,' and 'to conceive animal as non-rational' in the sense of
composition,* or 'not to conceive animal as rational' in the sense
of abstraction; hence there is an order in what is thought: first,
not to think of [something] as existing, and, second, to understand
it to exist. But in a thing there is no order.
142 To the contrary however. It is necessary in that logically
prior instant 'not to think that it exists,' precisely because in that
prior logical instant it has no existence, otherwise it would have
the priority of existing together with the first. I reply: in that
prior instant it is not thought of as 'non-existing' absolutely, but
as 'non-existing from the point of view of the priority* of origin,'
i.e., 'non-existing of itself.' And hence it is also thought of as
'existing' absolutely in that prior logical instant, [even] when [the
first] is logically prior,i5 but when it is thought of as being
M That is to say, we are not talking about two opposed absolute beings or
natures, but about two correlatives or relationships which are equally necessary
and are as logicians express it 'simul natura.'
Ir> ...which it is eternally. For the generation is eternal and is always
existing.
illud prius est; sed in posteriori originis intelligitur productum

esse, quia est ab alio. Vel potest sic dici quod veram
abstractionem commutat in falsam, quia in illo priori intelligitur
prius producens quam productum, non tamen in illo priori
quando producens producit intelligitur productum non esse.
Intellectus enim hoc sic abstrahendo, non est tunc abstractivus
tantum, sed etiam divisivus eorum quae sunt in re. Sicut non
sequitur 'animal illud quod est in homine intelligitur non
intellecto rationali, ergo intelligitur non esse rationale'.
Abstractionem igitur considerationis unius sine alio commutas in
abstractionem realem unius ab alio, quod est inconveniens, quia
non est idem ordo in re et in intellectu.
143 Ad quartum64 dico quod aeque primo habent essentiam

'primitate opposita dependentiae', sed non sequitur 'aeque
independenter vel aeque primo habent eam'. Ergo aeque est Pater
a Filio sicut e converso. Vel sic: non oportet productum
dependere, quia dependentia est in diversitate essentiae;
productio autem hoc non includit.
144 Ad probationem: ergo aeque primo erit in utroque.

Responsio: verum est, 'aeque primo primitate opposita
dependentiae'. Sed dicis quod non valet responsio, quia sic
praeexigitur in illo priori esse in utroque, scilicet in producente et
producto. Dico Filium esse necessarium, quia independenter
M Cf. supra n. 110.

posterior in origin it is understood as 'being produced,' for it is

from another.16 Or one could express it this way: true
abstraction becomes false, because in that logically prior instant
the producer is thought of as prior [in origin] to the product, not
however in that logically prior moment when the producer
produces is the product thought of as not existing.17 For the
intellect, by abstracting in this fashion, is not then only
abstractive,* but also divisive of those things that are in reality.
Just as this does not follow: "That animal which is in man is
understood without understanding rational, therefore it is
understood to be non-rational." Therefore you commute the
abstraction characteristic of considering one without the other
into a real abstraction of one from the other, which is
incongruous, because the order in a real thing and in the intellect
is not the same.
143 To the fourth [n. 110] I say that both have the nature
'equally first18 by a primacy opposed to dependence,'19 but it does
not follow that they have it 'equally independently' or 'equally
first.' Therefore the Father implies the Son, as much as the Son
implies the Father.20 Or one could say it is not necessary for the
product to depend,' because dependence exists only where there is
a diversity of essence; production however does not include this.
144 As to the proof "therefore the [nature] will be equally first in
both"the reply: it is true "it is equally first by a primacy
opposed to dependence." But you may say that this reply is not
valid, because in this way [or case] existence is prerequired in
that first [logical instant] in both, namely in the producer and in
the product. I say that the Son is necessary, because he
16 That is to say, it does not exist of itself but because it is being constantly
and eternally generated.
17 For the generation is eternal and always both producer and product
actually exist.
18 First = "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and
the Word was God," i.e., there was not first and second in the real order of their
existence as God.
19 Both enjoy the characteristic of being the 'first or primary being' for this is
characteristic of what is essential to all three persons and equally so. This
excludes dependence upon any other absolute entity, i.e., one that exists
substantially as independent of any other.
20 Correlatives are 'simul natura.'
est eo quod eadem entitate formaliter est. Sed secundum

praedicta aliquid potest esse necessarium formaliter, sed tamen
dependenter propter ordinem originis. Necessarium enim
formaliter et non necessarium originaliter non sunt opposita, ut
dictum est supra.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum in natura divina possint esse
plures productiones intrinsecae]
145 Utrum in natura divina possint esse plures productiones

intrinsecae.
Videtur quod non: Commentator VIII Physicorum, com-

mento 48:65 In una natura non potest esse nisi unus modus
communicandi, cuius probatio est per duas rationes ibidem.
Prima est quia propriae formae correspondet propria materia, et
agenti particulari propria, agenti universali vel aequivoco alia
materia convenit; ergo diversis productionibus diversas esse
formas.
146 Item, si eidem specie convenit diverso modo produci, ergo
ista convenientia talium productionum erit aequivoca, et sic talis
productio vel erit ex necessitate quod non est dare quia tunc
produceret univoce, nec in pluribus per eandem rationem ergo
erit ut raro et per consequens a casu; omnis enim productio vel
est a natura vel a casu, II Physicorum;66 sed casualia non sunt in
determinata specie entium, ibidem; ergo etc.
147 Item, quod non sint tantum duae productiones in divinis;
quia natura et intellectus, II Physicorum 61 distinguuntur
tanquam diversa principia activa, et utriusque ratio vere
invenitur in Deo, quia neutrum includit imperfectionem ad intra,
quia neutrum est productivum ad extra, ergo praeter
productionem voluntatis erunt aliae duae productiones intra.
65 Averroes, Physica VIII, com. 46 (ed. Iuntina IV, 387rE-vH).

M Aristot., Physica II, c. 1 (1926 78); c. 4 (1956 30-1).
67 E.g., cf. ibid., c. 8 (199a 10-33).
independently exists, since he exists formally by virtue of the

same entity [i.e., that is necessary]. But according to what was
said before something can be formally necessary, but nevertheless
dependent on account of order of origin. For "formally necessary"
and not necessary by origin [that is, not having necessity of itself
but from another] are not opposed, as was said above.
Question Two
Can there be several intrinsic productions
in the divine nature?
145 Can there be several intrinsic productions in the divine

nature?
It seems not:
The Commentator in Bk. VIII of the Physics, comment 48:
"In one nature there can be but one way of communicating," in
proof of which he gives two arguments. The first is that a proper
matter corresponds to a proper form, and to a proper agent its
proper [matter, while] to a universal or equivocal agent some
other matter is suitable; therefore to diverse productions
correspond diverse forms.
146 Also, if it were appropriate to the same in species to be
produced in diverse ways, the agreement of such productions will
be equivocal, and in this way such a production will either be of
necessitybut this cannot be because then it would produce
univocally, nor can it be in most cases, for the same reasonor,
logically, it will be as it were rarely and consequently a chance
event; for every production is either by nature or by chance,
according to Bk. II of the Physics; but chance things are not in a
determinate species of being, ibid.; therefore, etc.
147 Also, that there would not be only two productions in the
divine; because nature and intellect, Bk. II of the Physics, are
distinguished as diverse active principles, and the reason for both
would truly be found in God, because neither includes
imperfection within, for neither is productive outside, therefore
besides the production of the will there would be two other
productions within.
148 Contra: Illa principia producendi et sola illa quae non

includunt imperfectionem, sunt ponenda in divinis; sed intel
lects et voluntas solum sunt huiusmodi principia; ergo etc.
[I. Status quaestionis

A. Art. 1: Opinio Henrici Gandavensis
1. Expositio opinionis]
149 Responsio: conclusio istius quaestionis omnibus theologis est

certa, sed circa declarationem eius dicit unus magister68 sic, et est
ratio talis. Actus notionales fundantur super essentiales
immanentes, et adaequatur unus notionalis alii essentiali et alius
alii; ergo tot sunt notionales quot essentiales et immanentes; sed
non sunt nisi duo essentiales, scilicet intelligere et velle, ergo etc.
Modus fundandi eorum est quia in quocumque habent esse
intellectus et voluntas, propter separationem eorum a materia
possunt se convertere super se, intelligendo se et actus et obiecta
sua, quia sunt substantiae immateriales et multa talia.
150 Secundum quod dicunt, est quod quodammodo uniformiter
convenit intellectui et voluntati, quia utraque potentia per
actualitatem suam aequaliter convertit se ex parte obiectorum,
quia intellectus ut nudus convertit se super intellectum formatum
notitia simplici; voluntas autem convertit se ad hoc obiectum
amore simplici.
151 Sed quomodo differenter conveniat utrique conversio ista?
Dicunt quod intellectus ut nudus convertendo se super
intellectum formatum se habet sicut passivum formatur ab activo
suo. Et ista declaratio per impressionem est expressio notitiae
declarativae, id est, Verbi. Sed voluntas ut nuda convertendo se
non formatur a voluntate simplici sed convertitur ad volitionem
M Henricus Gand., Quodl. VI, q. 1 in corp. (f. 216X-Y); Summa a. 54, q. 8 in

corp. 01 101D); cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 2, nn. 271-81 (II, 287-94).
Dist. 2, Part III, Question Two 161
148 To the contrary: those principles of production and only

those which do not include imperfection, must be postulated in
the divine, but only the intellect and will are principles of this
sort; therefore etc.
To the question
Article One
Explanation of the opinion
149 Response: the conclusion of this question is certain for all

theologians, but one master explains it this way, and gives this
sort of reason. Notional* acts are founded upon immanent
essential acts,* and one notional is adequate to one essential and
another is adequate to another; therefore there are as many
notional as essential and immanent actions; but there are only
two essentials, namely, to understand and to will; therefore, etc.
The way of establishing these is because in whatever it is that
they have existence, intellect and will because of their separation
from matter can reflect upon themselves, by understanding
themselves and their action and their object, because they are
immaterial substances and perform many such things.
150 According to what they say, there is something that to a
certain degree is appropriate to both the intellect and will alike,
because both potencies alike through their actualization reflect
upon themselves as regards their objects, because the bare
intellect itself reflects upon an understanding formed by simple
knowledge; but the will itself reflects upon this object through
simple love.
151 But how different would the two reflections be? They say
that the intellect as bare, by converting itself upon the formed
understanding, is in the same state as is something passive that
is formed by its corresponding active potency. And this becoming
clear through impression is an expression of clarifying knowledge,
that is, the Word. But the bare will itself by reflecting is not
formed by simple will, but turns to a simple volition as to its
simplicem tanquam ad suum passivum de quo excutit et exprimit

et exsufflat amorem incentivum. Vel in hoc potest esse secunda
differentia quod intellectus nudus est passivus et voluntas nuda
est activa. Alia est differentia, quia intellectus formatur
imprimendo, sed voluntas exsufflando, non imprimendo.
152 In ordine ergo intellectus assignat quattuor gradus, ita quod
in primo instanti naturae tantum est intellectus et intelligibile; in
secundo, obiecto sibi praesente imprimit notitiam simplicem, et
talis impressio notitiae facit intellectum naturam et per
consequens fecundum ad producendum; tertio, intellectus nudus
ex actualitate sua active convertit se ad intelligendum totum ut
obiectum suum ut sit fecundus; quarto, ab ipso obiecto tanquam
activo in intellectum nudum sic conversum imprimitur notitia
declarativa, quae dicitur verbum et exprimitur de notitia simplici.
Sed differentia est in hoc quantum ad voluntatem, quia voluntas
in primo instanti tantum est voluntas; secundo, apprehenso bono,
facit volentem se, sed tunc non est fecunda. Tertio convertit se ad
totum ut intellectus, et quarto exprimit.
153 Iste doctor dicit tria in quibus discordo. Primo quia dicit
quod Verbum divinum generatur per impressionem, et hoc
dimitto usque ad quintam distinctionem.69 Secundo dicit quod
Verbum generatur per intellectum conversum sive ut convertitur.
Tertio dicit quod notitia essentialis est notitia formalis
declarativa Verbi.
154 Contra secundum arguo quod Verbum non gignatur per
conversionem intellectus, quia conversio per te est aliqua actio;
sed actiones sunt suppositorum; ergo convertere non competit
alicui nisi in supposito.
155 Quaero: cuius suppositi est intellectus ille ut convertitur?
Non secundae personae, scilicet Filii. Si enim esset secundae
ra Cf. infra. Dist. 5, p. 2. q. un. nn. 47-93.

patient, out of which it shakes off and squeezes out and breathes
out incentive love. Or there can be a second difference in the fact
that the bare intellect is passive and the bare will is active.
Another difference is that the intellection is formed by being
impressed whereas the will is [formed] by blowing out, not by
being impressed.
152 Therefore in the ordering of the intellect he assigns four
grades, so that in the first instant* of nature there is only the
intellect and the intelligible; in the second, the object presenting
itself impresses simple knowledge, and such an impression of
knowledge makes the intellect a nature and as a consequence
makes it fecund and able to produce; in the third instant, the bare
intellect in its actualization actively turns itself to understanding
the whole compound [intellect/object] as its object in order to be
fecund; in the fourth instant declarative* knowledge, which is
called the Word and is derived from simple knowledge, is
stamped by the object as active into the bare intellect reflecting in
this way. But there is a difference in this from the will, because
the will in the first instance is only will, in the second, after the
good is apprehended, it makes itself willed, but at this point it is
not fecund; in the third instant it reflects upon the whole like the
intellect, and in the fourth instant it breathes out.
Refutation of Henry's opinion
153 This doctor says three things I disagree with. First, because
he says that the divine Word is generated through an impression,
and this I put off discussing until the fifth distinction. Secondly
he says that the Word is generated by the intellect reflecting or
turning upon itself. Third he says that essential knowledge is the
formal declarative knowledge of the Word.
154 Against the second point, I argue that the Word is not
begotten through a reflection of the intellect, because a reflection
according to you is some action; but actions are ascribed to the
supposit [or person]; therefore this reflection does not belong to
anything unless it is something in the supposit.
155 I ask: to which supposit does the reflecting intellect belong?
Not to the second person, namely the Son. For if it did belong to
personae, et conversio per te praecedit expressionem Verbi, ergo

ante gignitionem Verbi habemus duas personas et post alias duas.
156 Si autem intellectus ut convertitur est primae personae,
tunc arguo sic: cuiuscumque personae est intellectus ut
convertitur super obiectum, eius est ut recipiat notitiam
declarativam; sed primae personae est ut convertitur super
obiectum; huius ergo primae personae est ut recipiat notitiam
declarativam.
157 Probatio maioris: Philosophus IX Metaphysicae10 super illud
"Quando est aliquid in potentia et quando non" dicit quod tunc est
aliquid in potentia propinqua quando nihil oportet addi nec minui
ad hoc quod inducatur actus, etc.; tunc sic: obiecto proportionate
et sufficiente praesente et approximato potentiae, sive patiente
sibi correspondente, id est, disposito et proportionate, de
necessitate sequitur actio absque mutatione passi ad hoc quod
recipiat actum. Sed intellectus non conversus est tale passum
respectu huius obiecti summe proportionatum et approximatum,
et activum est praesens. Ergo absque mutatione esse personalis
habebit idem esse ut recipiat notitiam declarativam; ergo notitia
declarativa formaliter est in Patre.
158 Secundo, contra hoc: quod haec conversio non sit necessaria.
Intellectus enim cum obiecto intelligibili actu sibi praesente, id
est memoria, est principium producendi per modum naturae;
probatum est in quaestione praecedenti. Sed tale non requirit
actum conversivum sui vel alterius antequam exeat in actum, eo
quod memoria perfecta est sufficiens principium gignendi per
modum principii naturae. Ergo non requiritur aliqua conversio.
159 Item, non intelligo quid est dictum 'per conversionem', si
nihil intelligitur esse per conversionem, quod non esset si
conversio non intelligeretur. Quaero et dico quod non, quia
circumscripta conversione, intelligo in divinis quidquid potest
intelligi. Per conversionem enim non intelligitur praesentia
70 Aristot., Metaph. IX (0), c. 5 (10476 35-1048a 1); ibid., c. 7 (1049a 10-2).

the second person, and the reflection according to you precedes

the expression of the Word, therefore before the Word is begotten
we have two persons and afterwards another two.
156 If however the intellect as it reflects belongs to the first
person, then I argue in this way. To whatever person the intellect
belongs as it is reflecting upon an object, this one is receiving
declarative knowledge; but it belongs to the first person as it is
reflecting upon an object; therefore it is the first person that is
receiving declarative knowledge.
157 Proof of the major: the Philosopher in Bk. IX of the
Metaphysics, reflecting on the statement "sometimes a thing is in
potency and sometimes it is not," says that something is in
proximate potency* when nothing has to be added nor taken
away to impel it to act, etc. Then [I argue] in this way: when a
proportionate and sufficient object is present and nearby the
potency, or a patient corresponds to it, that is, as disposed and
proportionate, action of necessity follows, without any change in
the patient required in order to receive the act. But the intellect,
when it is not turned, is such a patient, in the highest way
proportionate and proximate as regards this object, and the active
[agent] is present. Therefore without any change in the personal
being the same being will be receiving declarative knowledge; and
therefore the declarative knowledge will be formally in the
Father.
158 Second, against this point, i.e., that this conversion is not
necessary. For the intellect with the intelligible object present,
i.e., memory, is the principle of producing after the manner of
nature; this has been proved in the preceding question. But such
does not require an act of reflection upon itself or another before
it goes into action, for the fact that the memory is perfect suffices
for it to be a principle of begetting after the manner of nature [i.e.
necessarily and not freely]. Therefore no reflection is needed.
159 Also, I do not understand what "through reflection" means,
if nothing is understood to occur through reflection that would
not occur if reflection did not take place. I ask and say that
nothing is [understood], because reflection having been written
off, I understood regarding the divine whatever can be
understood. For the presence of the object is not understood
obiecti, quia illa est ante omnem conversionem, sicut patet. Nec
perfectio potentiae quia nec potentia dictativa nec cognitiva
perfectior est per conversionem. Nec per conversionem est ibi
determinatio, quia ista haberetur mere naturaliter.
160 Item, quid intelligis per conversionem ex virtute activa? Aut
est actio productiva, et hoc falsum est, quia nihil per eam
producitur. Vel actio vitalis, et hoc non intelligo, quia non est
actio quae est intellectio, quia illa praecedit cum sit notitia
simplex. Nec intelligo sine notitia declarativa, quia illa sequitur.
Unde videtur mihi dictum illud de conversione nimis
metaphoricum, et abducit a veritate.
[B. Art. 2: Notitia essentialis in Patre non est ratio

gignendi Verbum]
161 De secundo articulo: quod intelligentia71 sive notitia

essentialis in Patre non est ratio formalis gignendi Verbum sive
ratio declarativa. Probatio: quia Verbum non gignitur per actum
intelligentiae sed memoriae, sicut dicit Augustinus XV De
Trinitate, cap. 14 in fine:72 "Quomodo inquit Verbum Patris
scientia de scientia", etc.; scientia, secundum eum, nunquam est
nisi in memoria, ergo licet in Patre sit memoria, intelligentia et
voluntas, secundum Augustinum I libro De Trinitate cap. 17,73
tamen omnis intellectio actualis Patris est per intelligentiam;
ergo nulla actio productiva Verbi in Patre est per suam
intelligentiam, et sic per consequens actualis intellectio Patris
non est principium producendi Verbum.
162 Item, si sit ibi aliquod Verbum productum per istam
notitiam, erunt ibi duo verba, ita quod oportet quod sit ibi aliud
Verbum prius productum. Probatio consequentiae: Verbum
71 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. I, d. 2, n. 291 01, 299-300).

72 August., De Trin. XV, c. 15, n 24 (CCSL 50A, 498; PL 42, 1078).
7:1 Cf. August., De Trin., multis locis.
through reflection, because that [presence] is prior to any

reflection, as is evident. Nor does it mean the perfection of the
potency, because neither a potency of speaking nor a cognitive
potency becomes more perfect through reflection. Nor is there,
through reflection, [some kind of] demarcation, because this
would be there purely by reason of its nature.
160 Also, what do you understand through reflection that has to
do with an active power? Either it is the productive action, and
this is false, because nothing is produced through it. Or it refers
to vital action, and this I do not understand, because it is not the
same action as intellection, since the latter precedes, for it is
simple knowledge. Nor do I understand it without [the presence
of] declarative knowledge, because that follows. Hence it seems to
me that this talk about reflection is too metaphorical and leads
one away from the truth of the matter.
Article Two
Essential knowledge in the Father is not what generates
the Word.
161 As for the second article: that intelligence or essential

knowledge in the Father is not the formal reason for generating
the Word or a declarative reason. Proof: because the Word is not
generated through an act of understanding, but an act of memory,
as Augustine declares in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 14 at the
end: "How, he asks, is the Word of the Father knowledge from
knowledge," etc.; knowledge according to him is always only in
the memory, therefore although in the Father there is memory,
understanding and will, according to Augustine in Bk. I of The
Trinity, chapter 17, nevertheless all actual knowledge of the
Father is through understanding; therefore no action productive
of the Word in the Father is through his understanding, and thus
as a consequence actual understanding of the Father is not a
principle of producing the Word.
162 Also, if there some Word is produced through this
knowledge, there will be two words, so that it would be necessary
that there be another Word produced before. Proof of the
implication: The Word most expressly manifests that object,
expressissime declarat illud obiectum quod est principium

immediatissimum exprimendi ipsum; sed antequam intelligatur
illa notitia simplex et actualis quae est principium, per te, ante
praecedit essentia quae praecedit intelligentiam illam quam tu
ponis principium; illa autem essentia nata est declarare et est
principium exprimendi sufficiens sua ratione formali; ergo erit ibi
unum Verbum productum ab ipsa essentia declarativa et aliud ab
actuali notitia.
163 Item, si intellectio actualis Patris esset genita realiter.
essentia divina esset ratio formalis gignendi eam. Probatio: tunc,
secundum eos, sic actualis notitia essentiae non potest esse
formaliter alterius rationis per hoc quod est genita vel non-genita,
quia tunc deitas esset alterius rationis per hoc quod est
communicata vel non-communicata; sed declaratum est quod
actualis notitia in Patre, si esset genita, haberet essentiam
tanquam principium formale; ergo in Filio, ubi est genita et
eiusdem rationis, habebit essentiam pro principio formali; non
ergo habet intellectum vel notitiam simplicem.
164 Si obiciatur per Augustinum, XV De Trinitate, cap. 12,74
quod visio est de visione etc., dico quod exponit se ibi dicens quod
"simillima <enim visio cogitationis> visioni scientiae" gignitur;
igitur "visio cognitionis de visione scientiae", id est de visione
quae est scientia. Sed quomodo de scientia gignitur, id est, de
actu primo in quo relucet obiectum intelligibile actualiter et
continet ipsum? Non enim est ista scientia habitus, sed obiectum
praesens actu primo, vel in se vel in specie.
165 Dico ergo quod ordo est inter intellectionem actualem Patris
et declarativam sive gignitionem Filii, non quidem ordo
producentis et producti, sed productorum ad idem. Prius enim
agens agit in propinquum quam in remotum naturaliter, licet
simul, ut sol illuminat totum caelum vel aerem in instanti et
74 August., De Trin. XV, c. 11, n. 20 (CCSL 50A, 488; PL 42, 1072); c. 12, n.
22 (CCSL 50A, 493-4; PL 42, 1075).
which is the most immediate principle expressing it. However,

prior to understanding that simple and actual knowledgewhich
is, according to you, the principle [of producing the Word]comes
the essence, which precedes that knowledge or understanding,
which you postulate as the principle [of producing the Word]. But
that essence is suited to manifest and is a sufficient principle of
expression according to its formal notion; therefore there will be
one Word produced by that declarative essence and another by
the actual knowledge.
163 Also, if the actual intellection of the Father were really
generated, the divine essence would be the formal reason for
generating it. Proof: according to those, the actual knowledge of
the essence cannot be formally of another sort depending on
whether it is generated or not generated, because then the deity
would be of another sort depending on whether it is
communicated or not communicated; but it has been manifested
that the actual knowledge in the Father, if it were generated,
would have the essence as its formal principle; therefore in the
Son, where it is generated and of the same sort, it would have the
essence as its formal principle: therefore not an intellect or simple
knowledge.
164 If it be objected that, according to Augustine in Bk. XV,
chapter 12 of The Trinity, vision is from vision, etc., I say that he
explains himself here saying that '[the vision of cognition]
becomes most similar to the vision of knowledge,' therefore, "the
vision of cognition [is] from the vision of knowledge," that is, from
the vision that is knowledge. But how is it generated from
knowledge, that is, from the primary act, in which the intelligible
object shines forth actually and which contains it? For this
knowledge is not [an intellectual] habit,* but the object present in
primary act, either in itself or specifically.
165 I say therefore that there is an order between the actual
intellection or understanding of the Father and that which is
declarative or generative of the Son, not indeed an order of the
producer to the product, but such as exists between products. For
the agent naturally acts first on what is nearby before it acts on
what is remote, although both [actions] occur at once, as the Sun
illumines the entire heavens and the air immediately and in an
immediate, ita quod inter partem priorem et posteriorem non est

ordo causae et causati, sed ordo tantum effectuum, quamvis idem
sit agens in duobus quorum unum est propinquius et aliud
remotius. Sic est in proposito. Essentia divina cum intellectu, id
est memoria, est ratio formalis, et primum est; secundo est
intellectio actualis Patris ab eo, quasi immediatius causata.
Tertio, post sequitur productio Filii non causata ab intellectione
actuali, sed ambo a memoria; sed Verbum mediatius quam notitia
actualis. Unde notitia actualis Patris causatur ita distincta in
intellectu Patris sicut in Filio, et quodammodo prior est ipsa
notitia genita quae est in Filio, quia prius aliquid perficitur
principio in se quam producat aliquid perfectum quasi extra, et
hoc erit in aliquo ordine quo immediatius est in Patre quam in
Filio, eo modo quo dictum est.
166 Ad quaestionem igitur dico quod quaestio potest dupliciter

intelligi. Primo, an tantum sint duae productiones distinctae
secundum rationes suas formales. Secundo, an in divinis sint
tantum duae productiones eiusdem rationis formaliter distinctae
secundum numerum, ut individua eiusdem speciei quae differunt
secundum numerum et tamen habent eandem rationem
formalem. Et quia quaestio sequens erit de secundo membro, ideo
secundum primum intellectum respondeo ad quaestionem. Et dico
quod tantum sunt duae productiones in divinis alterius rationis
distinctae secundum rationes earum formales. Et primo ostendo
quod duae sunt productiones; secundo quod tantum duae.
167 Primo ostendo sic: ubicumque sunt principia productiva
alterius rationis, eis possunt competere principiationes alterius
rationis, quia non est maior unitas in productionibus quam in
instant, so that between the prior and the posterior part there is
no order of cause and caused, but an order that exists between
effects, although the agent is the same for both cases where one is
closer and the other more remote. So it is in the case at hand. The
divine essence with the intellectual knowledge, that is the
memory, is the formal reason, and is the first thing; the second
thing is the actual understanding of the Father produced by it,
which understanding is, as it were, the more immediate thing
that is caused. Third, the production of the Son occurs afterwards,
not being caused by the actual intellection or understanding, but
by the memory, just as the other, except that [in the case of] the
Word [it happens] in a more mediate way than [with] the actual
knowledge. Hence the actual knowledge of the Father is caused
just as distinctly in the intellect of the Father as in the Son, but
in a certain measure it is prior to that knowledge that is
generated, which is in the Son, because something is first
perfected by the principle in itself before it produces something
perfect that is as, it were, outside, and this will come about in
some orderly way by which it is more immediately in the Father
than in the Son, in the way that has been stated.
The reply of Scotus
166 To the question therefore I say that it can be understood in

two ways. First, whether there are only two productions, distinct
according to their formal notions. Secondly, whether in the divine
there are only two productions formally of the same kind that are
numerically distinct, as individuals of the same species, which
differ in number and nevertheless formally are of the same sort.
And because the second interpretation will be covered in the
following question, therefore I respond to this question [here]
understanding it in the first way. And I say that there are only
two productions in the divine that are of different sorts, distinct
according to their formal notions. And first I show that there are
two productions; and then that there are only two [of them].
167 I show the first in this way: wherever there are productive
principles of different sorts, different principiations* can be
attributed to them, because there is no greater unity in
principiis productivis; sed in divinis manent duo principia

distincta secundum suas rationes formales principiandi, quia
sicut memoria perfecta in aliquo supposito est principium
perfectum producendi in aliquo naturaliter notitiam sibi
adaequatam, ita voluntas amorem sibi adaequatum libere, scilicet
infinitum amorem et per consequens ad intra, quia ad extra non
potest esse infinitum productum nec virtuti agentis adaequatum;
ergo eis correspondebunt distinctae principiationes sive
productiones formaliter distinctae.
168 Secundo probo quod sunt tantum duae sic: quia omnis
pluralitas reducenda est ad unitatem vel ad paucitatem tantam
ad quantam potest reduci, ergo et multitudo principiandi ad
unam rationem principiandi vel ad tantam paucitatem quantum
possibile est. Sed non potest reduci ad unam rationem
principiandi tantum, quia tunc illud principium simul
principiaret aliquid principiationibus oppositis; sed probatum est
prius quod in divinis manent duae rationes principiandi
formaliter distinctae et per oppositum contra se divisae, ut
voluntatis et memoriae, quia opposite modo principiant, scilicet
per modum naturae et voluntatis liberae. Ergo fiet reductio ad
tantam unitatem quantam possibile est. Possibile autem est ut
fiat reductio ad duas rationes principiandi. Omnes enim rationes
principiandi unius coordinationis, scilicet per modum naturae
quae determinatur ad unum, vel voluntatis quae est oppositorum,
reducuntur ad primum illius coordinationis quod est memoria et
voluntas. Ergo sunt tantum duae formales rationes principiandi
alterius rationis et per consequens tantum duae productiones.
169 Sed contra istam deductionem probo quod rationes

principiandi possent reduci ad unam primam. Nam omnes
perfectiones in divinis reducuntur ad essentiam ut ad fundamen-
tum et pelagus infinitum omnium perfectionum in divinis; sed
sicut aliquid se habet in entitate et in actualitate, et sicut in
productions than there is in their respective productive

principles; in the divine, however, there remain two formally*
distinct sorts of principles, because just as the perfect memory in
some individual subject is a perfect principle of producing
naturally2i adequate knowledge in someone, so the will [is a
perfect principle of producing in someone] freely an adequate
love, namely love that is infinite and as a consequence produced
internally, because externally it could not produce infinite love
nor would the love produced be adequate to the productive power.
Therefore to these will correspond distinct principiations or
formally distinct productions.
168 Secondly, I prove that there are only two in this way: for all
plurality must be led back to unity or to as few as it can be.
Therefore, a multitude of [ways of] principiating* must be led
back to one kind of principiating or to as few as is possible. But
they cannot be reduced to one kind of principiation, because then
that principle would be principiating by opposite kinds of
principiation: it was proved before that in the divine there remain
two types of principiatingbelonging to the will and memory
that are formally distinct and are opposed to one another as
diverse, because of the opposite ways in which they principiate,*
namely, by the [necessary] way that nature acts and by the way
of free will.* Therefore, there will be a reduction to such [level of]
unity as is possible. It is possible, however, that the reduction be
to the two sorts of principiating. For all the notions of
principiating of one hierarchical order, e.g., [formed] after the
manner of nature which is determined to just one, or after the
manner of the will, which [can be inclined] to opposites, are
reduced to the first in each of these hierarchical orders, which are
[in this case] memory and will. Therefore there will be only two
formal ways of principiating of different sorts, and as a
consequence there will be only two productions.
169 But against this deduction I prove that the principiating
notions could be reduced to a single one as first. For all
perfections in the divine are reduced to the essence as to their
basis and an infinite sea of all perfections in the divine; but as
something has entity, also actuality, and as [it has] actuality, also
2i That is, necessarily and not freely.

actualitate et in actione et in ratione agendi vel activitate

unumquodque enim agit in quantum est in actu; omnis autem
entitas et actualitas maxime reducuntur ad essentiam unam et
maxime actum; ergo et omnes rationes principiandi et agendi
reducuntur ad illam ut ad primam rationem agendi.
170 Item, in creaturis nulla proprietas naturae est principium
communicandi naturam; aliter enim imperfectius esset prin
cipium communicandi perfectius; ergo similiter in divinis nulla
proprietas naturae illius erit principium communicandi essen
tiam; ergo essentia ut essentia est talis ratio communicandi.
171 Item, contra illud quod dicitur quod rationes principiandi
per modum naturae reducuntur ad primum illius coordinationis,
concedo. Et cum dicis quod primum talis coordinationis est
memoria ut memoria, nego; sed essentia in quantum essentia,
quia essentia, si principiat, principiat per modum naturae. Potest
autem principiare in quantum essentia, quia sicut est primum
declarabile, ita est primum expressivum et declarativum suae
declarationis, hoc autem est commune omnibus declarabilibus.
172 Ad primum75 concedo quod proprietates in divinis sunt
distinctae ab essentia et quodammodo posteriores ea, et
reducuntur ad eam ut ad priorem in entitate et actualitate; non
tamen sequitur ut ad eam sicut ad aliquid prius in ratione
principiandi reducantur. Quia in creaturis, etsi sit idem
principium essendi et agendi, prius tamen est principium essendi
quam agendi, quia esse praecedit agere. Ergo idem, ut principium
agendi, reducitur ad se ipsum ut principium essendi sicut ad
prius secundum rationem. Non tamen sequitur ex hoc quod
reducatur ad aliquid prius in ratione agendi. Sic in proposito
concedo quod reducantur omnes proprietates ad essentiam, et
omnes rationes agendi et principiandi ad eam ut ad rationem
essendi, sed non ut ad primam rationem agendi, quia illae
praedictae sunt primae rationes principiandi. Et alius est ordo in

action and the basis for acting, or activity, for every single thing
that acts, does so insofar as it is actual. But every entity and
actuality is most of all reduced to the one essence and to what is
maximally act; therefore also any basis for principiating and
acting is reduced to this as to the first basis of acting.
170 Also in creatures no property of nature is a principle for
communicating a nature; for otherwise the most imperfect agent
would be a principle for communicating what is more perfect;
therefore likewise in the divine no property of its nature will be a
principle of communicating the essence; therefore the essence qua
essence will be the reason why it is communicated.
171 Also, regarding that statement that the reasons for
principiating after the manner of nature are reduced to the first
of this order, I concede. But when you name memory qua memory
as what is first in such an order, I deny that; rather it is the
essence qua essence, because the essence, if it functions as a
principle, does so after the manner of nature. But it can function
as a principle insofar as it is an essence, because just as it is the
first thing that is able to be manifested, so it is also the first that
is expressive and declarative of what it manifests, but this is
common to all that is able to be manifested.
172 To the first [n. 169] I concede that properties in the divine
are distinct from the essence and to some extent posterior to it,
and are reduced to it as to what is prior in entity and actuality;
but it does not follow that they are reduced to it as to something
prior under the aspect of principiating. For in creatures, although
the principle of being and of acting is the same thing,
nevertheless the principle of being is prior to that of acting,
because 'to be' precedes 'to act.' Therefore the same thing qua a
principle of acting is reduced to itself qua a principle of being as
to what is first conceptually. But it does not follow from this that
it is reduced to something prior under the aspect of acting. So in
the case at hand I concede that all these properties are traced
back to the essence, and that every reason for acting and
principiating is reduced to it so far as their being is concerned but
not as regards their acting, because the aforesaid are
[themselves] primary reasons for functioning as principles. And
the order in principiating and the order of being or existing is not
essendo et alius in principiando. Essentia igitur divina habet

primitatem istam ad intellectum et voluntatem, sicut essentia ad
potentias et sicut ratio essendi ad rationem agendi.
173 Ad secundum:76 si accidens in creaturis esset immediatum
principium agendi et communicandi naturam, sicut quidam
dicunt, tunc minor est falsa. Si autem non est ita, sed substantia
est principium agendi, dicendum quod in creaturis proprietas ideo
non est principium communicandi naturam, quia est imperfectior
et distincta realiter a natura communicata; nec natura dat
proprietati rationem agendi. In proposito autem proprietas divina
aeque perfectum esse habet cum divina natura vel essentia, et
aeque perfecte rationem communicandi naturam, sicut si natura
communicaret et ipsa non esset.
174 Sed contra: in creaturis voluntas et intellectus sunt idem

cum essentia animae et non accidentia superaddita, secundum
unam opinionem, et tamen non sunt principia communicandi
naturam. Ergo similiter in divinis de proprietatibus respectu
divinae essentiae. Responsio: supposito quod sint idem cum
essentia animae in essendo, non tamen sunt aeque perfectae in
operando. Unde essentia non dat eis perfectam rationem
principiandi, quia actio et operatio earum est accidentalis eo quod
est operatio immanens, et ideo actio earum non terminatur ad
naturam communicatam. Sed oppositum huius est in proposito.
Nam proprietates divinae sunt aeque perfectae in essendo et
operando vel producendo cum essentia, et productiones earum
sunt eis consubstantiales, et ideo possunt terminum perfectum
aeque communicare.
175 Ad tertium77 dico quod essentia ut essentia non distinguitur

a memoria in ratione principiandi, sed essentia est aliquid
inclusum in memoria. Sicut illi de alia opinione dicunt quod
notitia simplex est pars exprimentis et formalis ratio exprimendi
notitiam declarativam, ita essentia est aliquid memoriae
Cf. supra n. 170.

the same. Therefore the divine essence has this [sort of] primacy
with respect to the intellect and will: [namely,] that of an essence
to it potentialities and that of the reason for being to the reason
for acting.
173 To the second [n. 170] if an accident in creatures would be
immediately the principle of acting and of communicating the
nature, as certain ones claim, then the minor is false. If however
it is not so, but substance is the principle of acting, then it must
be said that in creatures a property is not a principle for
communicating a nature, because it is less perfect and really
distinct from the nature communicated; neither does nature give
to the property the aspect of acting. However, in the case at hand
the divine property has being that is as perfect as the one of the
divine nature or essence, and an ability of communicating nature
that is as perfect as in the case if the nature [itself]
communicated and [the divine property] did not exist.
174 But to the contrary: in creatures the will and intellect are
the same thing as the essence of the soul and are not added as
accidents, according to one opinion, and nevertheless they are not
principles for communicating the nature. Therefore it is the same
way in the divine regarding the properties with respect to the
divine essence. Reply: granted that they are the same as the
essence of the soul so far as being or existing goes, they are still
not equally perfect in operating. Hence the essence did not give to
them a perfect basis for principiating, because their action and
operation is accidental by reason of the fact that it is an
immanent operation, and therefore their action does not result in
communicating a nature. But in the case at hand the opposite
occurs. For the divine properties are as perfect in being and in
operating or producing as the essence, and their productions are
of the same substance as they, and therefore they can have
equally perfect terms in communicating.
175 To the third [n. 171] I say that the essence qua essence is
not distinguished from the memory as a reason for principiating,
but the essence is something included in the memory. Just as
those of the other opinion say that simple knowledge is a part of
what is doing the expressing and is the formal reason for
producing the declarative knowledge, so the essence is something
paternae, quia est primum declarabile, et ideo est expressissima

notitiae declarativae tanquam principium formale exprimendi.
Unde essentia ut essentia vel est memoria vel aliquid memoriae,
quia voco 'memoriam' intellectum habentem essentiam ut
obiectum actu intelligibile sibi praesens. Unde essentia, ut
distinguitur a memoria, nullam actionem habet. Nam uni-
versaliter omnis naturae intellectualis prima operatio est eius ut
habet memoriam, quia prima operatio talis naturae est
intelligere, quod certum est gigni a memoria. Quod autem
essentia concurrat ad rationem completam memoriae patet, et
non solus intellectus infinitus, quia aliter Verbum divinum aeque
esset verbum lapidis sicut Verbum essentiae divinae, eo quod
intellectus infinitus infinite intelligit lapidem sicut essentiam
suam. Et ideo si solus intellectus suus formaliter, non includendo
essentiam divinam secundum rationem eius formalem, esset tota
memoria, Verbum divinum ex vi processionis suae ita esset
verbum lapidis sicut essentiae divinae, quod falsum est, quia
Verbum divinum est primum declarativum essentiae eius, non
lapidis.
[III. Ad rationes principales]
176 Ad rationes principales. Ad primam78 rationem

Commentatoris dicendum quod tantum negat contra Avicennam
de animalibus perfectis ut de homine,79 quia ista quae maiorem
perfectionem requirunt in causa quam perfectionem in causa
aequivoca, cuiusmodi sunt perfecta generata, ista non possunt
produci sine alia causa, scilicet particulari. Quia tamen rationes
suae probant tam de perfecto quam de imperfecto, ideo dictum
Avicennae verum est et secundum philosophiam, et dictum

7il Avicenna, De nat. animal. XV, c. 1 (OPh, 59rb-va); cf. Ord. I, dist. 2, n.
327.
of the paternal memory, because it is the first thing able to be

manifested and therefore, as the formal principle of expression, is
in the highest degree expressive of declarative knowledge. Hence
the essence as essence is either the memory or something of the
memory, because I call 'memory' the intellect having the essence
as object, actually intelligible and present to it. Hence the
essence, as distinguished from the memory, has no action. For
universally every first operation of an intellectual nature is of it
as that which has memory, because the first operation of such a
nature is to understand, which is certain to be begotten from
memory. But that it is the essence, and not the infinite intellect
alone, that is needed for the complete notion of memory is
evident, because otherwise the divine Word would be equally a
word of a stone as it is a Word of the divine essence, for the
infinite intellect just as infinitely understands a stone as it
understands its own essence. And therefore if its intellect alone
would be formally the entire memory, not including the divine
essence according to its formal aspect, the divine Word, as it
proceeded, would be as much a word of a stone as it would be of
the divine essence; which is false, because the divine Word is the
first manifestation of its essence and not of a stone.
176 To the arguments at the beginning. To the first reason of the

Commentator [n. 145] it must be said that he only denies this [as
regards human generation, because he is arguing] against what
Avicenna said of perfect animals such as man,22 because those
that require perfection in the cause that is greater than the
perfection found in an equivocal causesuch as perfect generated
beingscannot be produced without some other, i.e., particular
cause. But because these arguments of his prove as much about
perfect as about imperfect, therefore the dictum of Avicenna is
true and in accord with philosophy, as the dictum of the
22 Avicenna assumed that man could be generated equivocally in De nat.

animal. XV, c. 1.
Commentatoris est contra Augustinum, III De Trinitate, cap. 9, 80

genitum aequivoce etc.
177 Et si dicatur quod unus generatus per putrefactionem non

generat univoce, tamen de plantis non potest hoc negari. Similiter
patet hoc in inanimatis: ignis enim generatus motu excussionis de
lapide vel ex reflexione radiorum solis aequivoce generatur,
tamen ignis generatus univoce generat ignem. Patet etiam hoc in
animatis, quia generata aequivoce generant sibi similia sive
univoce. Quod patet ex figura membrorum et ex motu et ex
organis sive instrumentis ad motum et ex obiectis sive corruptivis
sive salvativis, quae omnia concludunt unitatem speciei.
178 Ad rationem igitur Commentatoris, qui videtur ignorasse
distinctionem materiae, I Physicorum81 et V Metaphysicae82 ubi
dicitur quod materia est ex quo fit aliquid cum insit, quando dicit
quod forma determinata requirit materiam determinatam, et
forma eiusdem speciei materiam eiusdem speciei, verum est de
materia quam perficit. Sed tunc minor est falsa, quia ista materia
in fine generationis aequivocae sive per putrefactionem, est
eiusdem rationis cum materia univoce generatorum.
179 Ad probationem dico quod aequivocatio est ibi de materia, id
est, de opposito vel composite corrupto. Licet igitur generetur ex
aere et ex aqua materia, non tamen propter hoc aequivoce est
ignis, secundum Aristotelem VII Metaphysicae,83 ubi dicit quod in
80 August., De Trin. III, c. 8, n. 13 (CCSL 50, 139-40; PL 42, 875-6).

81 Aristot. Physica I, c. 9 (192a 31-2).
82 Aristot. Metaph. V (A), c. 2 (1013a 24-5).
8:1 Aristot, Metaph. VII (Z), c. 7 (1032a 11-2).
Commentator is against what Augustine says in Bk. IIl, chapter 9

of The Trinity23 about being equivocally generated, etc.
177 And if one says that one generated by putrefaction does not
generate univocally, nevertheless about plants this cannot be
stated. Similarly this is evident regarding inanimate things, for
fire generated by striking the stone or from the reflection of rays
of the Sun is generated equivocally, but the generated fire
generates fire univocally. There is also evidence of this in animate
things, because what is generated equivocally generates
univocally things similar to it. This is evident from the shape of
limbs, and from the way they move, and from organs or
instruments of motion, as well as from objects, whether harmful
or beneficial [to animals so produced], which all infer a unity of
species.
178 As for the argument of the Commentatorwho seems to be
ignorant of the definition of matter in Physics I and Metaphysics
V where it is said that matter is that from which something comes
to be when it is in itwhen he says that the determinate form
requires determinate matter and a form of the same species
[requires] the matter of the same species, this is true about
matter which it perfects. But then the minor is false, because the
matter formed as a result of equivocal generation, or through
putrefaction, is of the same sort as the matter in things univocally
generated.
179 As a proof I say that an equivocation is there about matter,
that is, about one side of, or a partial composite.24 Therefore
although matter may be generated from air and from water, this
does not result in fire being equivocal, according to Bk. VII of the
Metaphysics, where he says that in artificial things the same can
23 Augustine, The Trinity III, c, 8 n. 13: "Because it was through the [wicked
angels] that the magicians made frogs and serpents when opposing the servants
of God, for they themselves did not create them. For certain seeds of all the
things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion lie hidden in the
corporeal elements of this world... For unless there was some such power in these
elements things would not be born so frequently from the earth which have not
been sowed there, nor would so many animals be born whether on land or in the
sea, without any previously commingling of male and female, and yet they
develop and by copulating bring forth others, even though they themselves have
been born without any copulation of parents."
M A free rendering of an obscure phrasing.
artificialibus eadem possunt generari ab arte et sine arte; sic in

naturalibus quaedam possunt generari univoce per propagati-
onem et aequivoce per putrefactionem secundum quod in materia
est possibilis induci talis dispositio ad talem formam, quae est
similis in specie, inducendam.
180 Ad secundum84 dico quod effectus productus secundum istas
condiciones, ut in pluribus vel raro, potest comparari ad duas
causas, univocam et aequivocam, ut musca ad muscam et ad
solem. Vel potest idem effectus cum suo opposite, id est cum sua
non generatione, comparari ad eandem causam ut ad solem. Si
primo modo inquiratur an musca generata generetur necessario,
aut ut in pluribus aut raro vel in minori parte, a musca generante
vel a sole, dicendum quod nec a sole nec a musca necessario,
necessitate absoluta, quia omne agens naturale potest impediri
respectu productionis sui effectus. Sed dico quod ut in pluribus
producitur per propagationem univoce, et in minori parte sive
raro per putrefactionem et aequivoce, quia frequentius musca vel
mus propagat muscam vel murem quam sol ea generet per
putrefactionem. Sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur 'ergo sol producit
ista a casu, quia non ut in pluribus': sicut mus propagans,
praesente materia debita, virtute seminali eius in maiori parte
producit murem, ita certe et necessario sol in materia disposita et
proportionata actioni suae producit tale animal per
putrefactionem. Unde non ex hoc dicitur aliquid 'raro, id est, a
casu' produci, quia rarius producitur ab una causa quam ab alia,
vel quia raro et in minori parte producitur. Tunc enim diceretur
magis sol eclipsari a casu quam quod lapis cadens frangat caput
quia frequentius accidit lapidi cadere et laedere caput quam
eclipsari. Non ergo sequitur 'aliquid raro producitur a sua causa,
ergo a casu'. Si tamen talis effectus rarus, posita causa,
certitudinaliter eveniat licet raro ponatur talis causa.
w Cf. supra n. 146.

be generated by art and without art. So too in natural things

certain things can be generated univocally through propagation
and equivocally through putrefaction, according to which it is
possible to induce in matter a disposition to a certain form that is
similar [to the other] in species.
180 To the second [n. 146] I say that an effect produced
according to these conditions, either in most cases or rarely, can
be traced back to two causes, one univocal, the other equivocal, as
the fly to a fly or to the sun. Or the same effect with its opposite,
that is, with its non-generation, can be compared to the same
cause, such as to the Sun. If in the first case it is asked whether
the fly generated is generated necessarily by the fly or by the
Sun, either in most cases or rarely and to a lesser extent, it must
be said that neither by the Sun nor by the fly is it necessary, by
any absolute necessity, because every natural agent can be
impeded as regards the production of its effect. But I say that,
just as in most cases it is produced by univocal propagation, so
also in a few cases or rarely by putrefaction and equivocally,
because more frequently a fly or a mouse propagates a fly or a
mouse than the Sun generates one through putrefaction. But
nevertheless from this it does not follow "therefore the Sun
produces it by chance, because it does not [produce it] in most
cases." Just as in most cases a propagating mouse, given the
appropriate matter, produces a mouse by its seminal power, in
the same way the Sun certainly and necessarily produces such an
animal by putrefaction in suitable matter that is disposed
towards its action. Hence this does not mean that something is
produced 'rarely, that is, by chance,' because things are more
rarely produced by one cause than by another or because [some
things] are produced only rarely and in a few cases. For then it
could be said that the eclipse of the Sun is more by chance than a
falling stone cracking the head, because falling stones hurt the
head more frequently than eclipses occur. Therefore it does not
follow "something is rarely produced by its cause, therefore it is
produced by chance." But if such an effect is rare, granted the
cause is posited, the event will [still] take place with certainty,
although such a cause is posited rarely.
181 Si autem effectus cum suo opposito comparetur ad eandem

causam, et quaeratur an mus vel musca frequentius producatur a
sole, posita actione eius circa materiam debitam, quam suum
oppositum, dico quod frequentius generatur mus vel musca,
posita actione solis circa materiam debitam quam non generatur.
Nam sicut naturale agens per propagationem, si producat
monstrum, a casu illud producit, sic si sol respectu materiae
muris debitae non producat murem, a casu est. Unde aliquid
dicitur produci a casu ab aliqua causa si, frequenter posita causa,
effectus non eveniat, ut ad fossionem terrae frequenter non
accidit inventio thesauri.
182 Ad tertium dico quod memoria potest comparari sive
intellectus ad actum suum elicitum vel ad actus aliarum
potentiarum quorum est directivum sive ad actus aliorum quos
dirigit: sicut patet in artificialibus et in agibilibus in quibus non
solum intellectus proprium actum elicit, sed sicut regula actus
aliorum dirigit. Si modo primo accipiatur memoria, sic non
distinguitur in principiatione a natura, eo quod intellectus vel
memoria mere naturaliter elicit actum intellectionis sive
cognitionis. Si enim intellectus haberet apud se unde posset
producere opposita, adhuc actio respectu unius esset mere
naturalis. Si secundo modo, quia non dirigit nisi concurrente alia
potentia, scilicet libertate voluntatis determinante, sicut scientia
secundum Commentatorem, IX Metaphysicae85 non determinatur
nisi concurrente alia potentia, id est, prohaeresi, et sic memoria
se habet ad opposita et non est naturalis. Sed talis memoria non
est principium productivum in divinis ad intra, sed principium
liberum producendi creaturas tantum, sive res extra. Primo
autem modo, scilicet per modum naturae, est principium
producendi Verbum in divinis, qui modus competit memoriae
respectu notitiae genitae.
Hr> Averroes, Metaph. IX, com. 3-4 (ed. Iuntina VIII, 228v-229r).
181 If however the effect with its opposite is compared to the

same cause and it is asked whether the fly or mouse is produced
more frequently by the Sun, if it acts on suitable matter, than its
opposite [i.e., not produced], I say that under these conditions
more frequently is the mouse or fly generated than not. For just
as a natural agent, if through propagation it produces a monster,
produces it by chance, in the same way, if the Sun, acting on the
matter suitable for a mouse, does not produce a mouse, it is by
chance. Hence something is said to be produced by chance by
some cause if the cause is there frequently and the effect does not
occur, as frequently digging in the earth does not guarantee the
finding of a treasure.
182 To the third [n. 147] I say that memory or intellect can be
compared either to its elicited act or to the acts of other powers,
which it guides, or to the acts of other [things], which it directs.
This is evident in artificial things and in things that can be done,
in which not only does the intellect elicit its own act, but as a rule
directs the acts of other powers. If memory is taken in the first
way, then it is not distinguished in principiation from nature,
because the intellect or the memory elicits an act of intellection or
cognition purely naturally. For if the intellect were to have within
itself the ability to produce the opposite, still its action with
respect to one would be merely natural. If in the second way,
because it only directs in concurrence with another potency,
namely with the freedom of the will as determinative, as science
according the Commentator in Bk. IX of the Metaphysics is only
determined with the concurrence of another potency, that is,
through choice, then memory has itself [effecting] the opposite
and it is not natural. But a memory of this sort in the divine is
not a productive principle internally, but a free principle that
only produces creatures or external things. In the first way,
however, namely after the manner of nature, it is a principle of
producing the Word in the divine, which is a mode that suits the
memory as regards the knowledge generated.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum in Deo possint esse plures productiones
intrinsecae eiusdem rationis]
183 Utrum in Deo possint esse plures productiones intrinsecae

eiusdem rationis.
Quod sic videtur:

Idem principium in creaturis potest esse sufficiens
principium respectu plurium productionum eiusdem rationis.
Patet de calore respectu plurium calefactionum. Ergo multo
magis idem principium infinitum potest habere plures produc
tiones eiusdem rationis.
184 Contra:
Productio adaequata suo principio productivo est tantum
una numero; sed sic est in divinis, quia quaelibet productio est
infinita sicut et principium productivum; ergo quaelibet productio
in divinis est una numero, et sic non possunt esse plures eiusdem
rationis.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
185 Ista quaestio, licet secundum processum Magistri habeat

locum suum distinctione 7 III libri,86 ubi quaeritur an sint vel
possint esse in divinis plures filii, quia tamen praecedentia non
essent sufficienter declarata sine ista, ideo hic propono eam. Ad
quam dicunt omnes quod non.
[A. Rationes Henrici Gandavensis earumque

refutationes]
186 Et ratio aliquorum ad hoc declarandum est ista: fecunditas

unius rationis totaliter exhausta per unam productionem in
aliquo principio productivo non extendit se ad aliam
productionem nec ad alium terminum productionis quam ad
terminum productionis quae exhauriebat totam perfectionem
m Petrus Lombardus, Sent. lll, d. 7, c. 1, n. 10 (SB V, 62).

Dist. 2, Part III, Question Three 174
Question Three
Could there be more than one internal production
of the same sort in God?
183 Could there be several internal productions of the same kind

in God?
It seems that there can be.
The same principle in creatures is sufficient for several
productions of the same kind, as is evident about heat with
regard to several heatings. Therefore all the more can the same
infinite principle have several productions of the same kind.
184 To the contrary.
A production adequate to the productive principle is only
one in number; so it is in the divine, because each production is as
infinite as the productive principle; therefore each production in
the divine is one in number, and thus there cannot be several of
the same sort.
To the question
185 According to the way the Master proceeds, the place for this
question is in distinction 7 of the third book, where it is asked
whether there are or could be several sons in the divine, but
because the preceding would not be sufficiently made clear
without this, therefore I raise the question here. To which all
[theologians] say: No!
Henry of Ghent's reasons and their refutation
186 And the reason some give for this is set forth in this way.
The fecundity of one sort, totally exhausted through the one
production in some productive principle, does not extend to
another production nor to any term of the production, other than
the term that has exhausted the entire perfection of the
productivi principii. Talis est quaecumque productio ad intra in

divinis quia est infinita; ergo etc.
187 Contra: haec ratio non valet, quia omnes transferentes
secundum aliquam similitudinem transferunt. Illud autem
vocabulum 'exhauriri' accipitur a corporalibus ubi aliquid dicitur
exhauriri ab alio quando extrahitur ab alio et non manet in eo,
sicut quando aqua exhauritur de puteo et non manet in eo, dicitur
exhauriri. Sic non potest intelligi in divinis quod fecunditas
alicuius principii productivi sit totaliter exhausta. Ergo si
similitudo sit in aliquo vera, hoc est quia principium productivum
habens unam productionem non manet fecundum vel
productivum respectu alterius actus, sed tunc nihil probat quia
petitur conclusio in praemissa.
188 Alia ratio ponitur talis: productio habens terminum
adaequatum et semper stans, non compatitur secum aliam
eiusdem rationis; sed talis est quaelibet productio ad intra in
divinis; ergo etc.
189 Sed nec ista ratio multum valet, quia aut intelligunt
maiorem de adaequatione intensiva vel extensiva. Si de
extensiva, tunc petitur in minori, scilicet quod quaelibet in divinis
productio sit ad tot extensa per adaequationem ad quot potest
extendi. Si de intensiva, tunc propositio ista iam non est plana,
scilicet quod productio habens terminum adaequatum non
compatitur secum aliam eiusdem rationis, nisi quia ista productio
respectu termini semper stat.
190 Sed si per impossibile cessaret, posset principium in aliam
productionem eiusdem rationis, et per consequens principium
productivum quantum est ex se posset in aliam productionem
eiusdem rationis. Et tunc arguo: principium productivum habens
unam productionem adaequatam, si, quantum ex se est, potest in
aliam productionem eiusdem rationis, necessario exit in actum
respectu illius productionis, si illa alia sit ita necessaria sicut ista
in quam ponitur exire, quia non est maior ratio quare exit in
unam quam in aliam quantum est ex parte sui. Sed secundum
productive principle. Such is the case with any internal

productions in the divine, because it is infinite; therefore etc.
187 On the contrary: this argument is not valid, because all
figurative expressions transfer their meaning on the basis of some
similarity. This verbal expression 'to be exhausted,' however, is
taken from corporeal things where something is said to be
exhausted by another when all is drawn out of it by the other and
nothing remains in it, as when water is drawn out of a well and
nothing remains in it, the well is said to be exhausted. But this
understanding cannot hold in the divine, i.e., that the fecundity of
some productive principle is totally exhausted. Therefore, if the
similarity is in some sense true, it is because the productive
principle having only one production does not remain fecund or
productive with regard to another act, but then nothing is really
proved because the conclusion is begged in the premise.
188 Another reason given is this: a production having an
adequate term and always remaining is not allowed to have with
it another of the same sort; but such is each internal production
in the divine; therefore, etc.
189 But neither is this argument of much value, because they
understand the major either in the sense of intensive, or in the
sense of extensive adequacy. If it is about extensive adequacy,
then the minor begs the question, namely that in the divine each
production adequately extends to just so many as it is able to. If it
is about intensive adequacy, then this propositionnamely, that
a production having an adequate term is not permitted to have
another production of the same sort along with itis only clear if
this production always remains as regards its term.
190 But if, to assume the impossible, it would cease, the
principle would be capable of another production of the same sort,
and as a consequence the productive principle so far as itself is
concerned could have another production of the same sort. And
then I argue: a productive principle having one adequate
production, if, in so far as itself goes, it can have another
production of the same sort, necessarily acts with respect to that
production, if that other is as necessary as this, which it has
produced, because there is no greater reason why it produced one
rather than the other so far as itself is concerned. But according
praedictam rationem, principium productivum potest in

productionem aliam ab illa in quam exivit quantum est ex parte
sui, et ita est ista necessaria sicut illa in quam exivit. Ergo
necessario exit vel potest exire in utramque productionem
eiusdem rationis. Confirmatur per exemplum: si enim sol
semper staret in illuminatione una sibi adaequata; et quia ista
cessante potest in aliam, ideo dum causat unam illuminatione m,
quantum est ex se, potest in aliam. Et si alia illuminatio est ita
necessaria sicut prima, aeque posset, quantum est ex parte sui, in
utramque. Sic ergo est in proposito.
191 Nec ergo adaequatio intensiva nec extensiva nec etiam
permanentia aeterna alicuius productionis nec fecunditas
exhausta concludunt in divinis impossibilitatem plurium
productionum eiusdem rationis. Debet enim concludi non solum
quod semper stante una non posset in aliam, sed quod quocumque
posito vel remoto non posset in aliam, ita quod si haec non esset
adhuc non posset in aliam.
[B. Opinio Scoti]
192 Ideo dico ad quaestionem quod tantum est una productio

numero unius rationis in divinis, ita quod si ponatur per
impossible vel incompossibile quod haec productio non esset, non
posset in aliam productionem illud principium productivum.
Huius ratio est quia quidquid est in divinis, est de se hoc et ideo
nihil in divinis potest plurificari quod sit unius rationis.
193 Arguitur ergo sic: quidquid est de se hoc, impossible est
quod plurificetur, sed quidquid est in divinis unius rationis est de
se hoc; igitur etc. Maior est evidens, quia quod non potest ab alio
determinari, vel est de se unum, vel in quantum est ex se potest
esse in infinitis.
194 Minor probatur, quia si aliquid in divinis non sit de se hoc,
ergo de se potest esse in pluribus. Sed quod potest distingui in
to the aforesaid reason, a productive principle could on its part

have resulted in a production other than that, in which it actually
resulted. Therefore, it necessarily results in, or could result in
either production of the same sort. This is confirmed by an
example: for even though the Sun always remained in one
illumination adequate to itself, stillbecause in the case if that
ceased it would be able to shine again, while causing one
brilliant light it could cause another so far as itself is concerned.
And if the other illumination would be just as necessary as the
first, it could equally, so far as itself is concerned, shine with
either light. It is so in the case at hand.
191 Therefore, none [of these things] in the divineintensive or
extensive adequacy, or even eternal permanency of some
production, or the exhausted fecunditywould imply the
impossibility of several productions of the same sort. For one
would have to conclude not only that if one always remained, it
would not be capable of another, but that, no matter whether any
one whatsoever was posited or removed, it would not be capable
of another, so that, if this one ceased to exist, it still would not be
capable of another.
The opinion of Scotus
192 Therefore, I say to this question that there is numerically

only one production of the same sort in the divine, so that were
one to assume the impossible or incompatible, i.e., that this
production ceased to exist, there could not be another production
by this productive principle. The reason for this is that because
whatever is in the divine is of itself just a 'this'; therefore, nothing
in the divine can be multiplied that is of one sort.
193 Then it is argued in this way. Whatever is of itself just a
'this' cannot possibly be multiplied, but whatever exists in the
divine that is of one sort, is of itself just 'this'; therefore, etc. The
major is evident, because what cannot be determined by another,
is either of itself just one, or insofar as it is of itself, is able to be
in an infinite number of things.
194 The minor is proved, because if something in the divine
were not just a 'this,' then it could be of itself in many. But what
plura, non determinat certum numerum in quot sit. Ergo aliquid

in divinis potest esse in infinitis nisi aliunde determinetur.
Oportet ergo ponere in divinis quo determinetur ad plura unius
rationis et de illo quaerendum est: aut illud determinans est
aliquid unius rationis, aut alterius rationis et alterius. Si primo
modo: aut illud determinans est de se hoc, aut plurificabile. Si est
de se hoc, eadem ratione standum fuit in primo et habetur
propositum. Si sit plurificabile, ergo, cum quantum ex se est non
determinetur ad certum numerum, potest esse in infinitis et
proceditur in infinitum. Oportet ergo dicere quod determinetur ad
plura unius rationis per aliqua alterius et alterius rationis. Et
tunc quaero de uno illorum: aut est de se hoc, aut non. Si non,
ergo potest esse in infinitis quantum est de se nisi determinetur
aliunde. Si est de se hoc, pari ratione standum fuit in primo. Sic
ergo dico quod ratio in divinis, quare non possunt esse plures
productiones unius rationis, est quia quaelibet productio divina
de se est hoc, et omnia alia quae sunt ibi.
[II. Ad argumentum principale]
195 Ad rationem in contrarium87 dicendum quod in creaturis

eiusdem principii productivi possunt esse plures productiones
unius rationis, quia nullum productum in creaturis est de se hoc.
Et ideo nec aliqua productio terminata ad tale productum vel tale
principiatum est de se hoc, quia sic principiatio et productio illius
producti essent de se haec. Sic autem est in proposito ubi
productum est de se hoc, et ideo principiatio vel productio erit de
H7 Cf. supra n. 184.

can be spread out into many, does not determine a specific

number of beings in which it can exist. Therefore, something in
the divine can be in an infinity of things unless it is otherwise
determined. It is necessary therefore to assume in the divine
something by which it is determined to several of one sort,
concerning which one must ask: either this determining agent is
something of one kind, or it is of one sort and another [i.e., two]. If
the first is the case then either that determinant is of itself just a
'this' or it can be multiplied. If it is of itself just 'this,' then for the
same reason one could stop with the first way and what I propose
is granted. If it can be multiplied, then, since so far as itself is
concerned it is not determined to any certain [finite] number, it
can be in infinite things and goes on ad infinitum. Therefore one
would have to say that it is determined to several things of one
sort through something of one and another sort [i.e., of two sorts].
And then I ask about one of these: either it is of itself just a 'this'
or else it is not. If not, therefore it can be in an infinity so far as
itself is concerned, unless it is determined from somewhere else.
If it is of itself just this individual, for the same reason one could
stop with the first way. This is why I say that the reason that in
the divine there cannot be several productions of the same sort is
that each divine production is of itself individual, as well as
everything else that is to be found there.
To the initial argument
195 To the argument in the beginning to the contrary [n. 184]

one must say that in creatures there can be several productions of
one sort by the same productive principle, because no product in
creatures is of itself individual. And therefore nor is any
production limited to just such a product, or something resulting
from a principle, just 'this' of itself, because in this way the
production of this product, as well as the function of acting as a
principle, would be just 'this' of itself. But it is this way in our
proposal where the product is of itself just 'this,' and therefore the
production or the function of acting as a principle is of itself just
'this.' For the unity is greater or at least as great in the
productive principle as it is in the product and the same holds for
se haec, quia maior est unitas vel saltem tanta in principio

productivo sicut in producto et principiato sive in termino.
[Quaestio 4
Utrum sint tantum tres personae in natura divina]
196 Utrum sint tantum tres personae in natura divina.

Videtur quod non:
"Quaecumque uni et eidem simpliciter sunt eadem, inter se
sunt simpliciter eadem";88 personae divinae sunt huiusmodi, ergo
etc. { Maior probatur quia alias omnis forma syllogistica
pervertitur quae concludit ex unitate unam de alia eo quod idem
medio.}89
197 Item, quod tantum duae, probatio: quia aequalis dignitas est
esse a se et ab alio in divinis; ergo cum esse a se tantum
conveniat uni, et ab alio esse tantum uni conveniet.
198 Item, quod sint quattuor personae, probatur: relationes
oppositae commultiplicantur; ergo spirationi passivae et
generationi passivae correspondentes erunt duae oppositae
constituentes sicut istae constituunt.
199 Contra:
I loan. 5[, 7]: Tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo, Pater
et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
200 Quae hic dicta sunt a philosophis vel ab haereticis sunt

sophismata et possunt solvi naturali ratione, ut illud quod dicit
Commentator XII Metaphysicae, com. 6390 ubi allegatur quod
attributis,91 et huiusmodi alia quae adducunt.
201 Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo. Ostendo primo quid sit
tenendum pro veritate; secundo ostendam modum quo veritas
ista sit declaranda.
HH Euclides, Elementa I (ed. H.L.L. Busard, 33).

B,l Textus intra in uno tantum codice continetur, sed ad n. 225 (q.v.)
necessarius videtur.
90 Non invenimus.
91 Quod attributis: sic omnes paene codd., cum bene interpretari non possit.
what is functioning as a principle in respect to what results

therefrom.
Question Four
Can there be but three persons in the divine?
196 Can there be only three persons in the divine?

It seems not to be the case: "All things whatsoever that are
identical to one and the same thing are identical to each other."
The divine persons are such; therefore etc. { The major is
proved: because otherwise every form of the syllogism is
perverted, which concludes from the unity [of the middle term]
that one is identical with the other because they have the same
middle term.}25
197 Also, proof that they are only two: to be of oneself and from
another in the divine has equal dignity; therefore since to be of
itself pertains to but one person, then to be from another also will
pertain to just one person.
198 Also, proof that there would be four persons. Opposite
relationships are mutually multiplied; therefore corresponding to
passive spiration and to passive generation are two opposite
persons constituted as these two [viz. Son and Holy Spirit] are [by
opposite relationships].
199 To the contrary I John 5[:7]: "There are three that testify in
heaven, Father, Son and Holy Spirit."
To the question
200 What has been said by the philosophers or heretics here are
sophisms and can be solved by natural reason, as what the
Commentator discusses in Bk. XII of the Metaphysics, comment
63 where he speaks about various allegations and such other
things as they bring up.
201 Therefore, I reply to the question. I show first what must be
held as the truth; second, I show the way to clarify this truth.
25 This text seems to be needed for n. 225; see note to the Latin.
[A. Art. 1: Pro veritate quid sit tenendum]
202 Circa primum ad probandum conclusionem esse veram,

ostendo primo quod duae personae sint productae. Tertio,92 quod
tantum duae sint productae. Primum probo sic: duae sunt
productiones intrinsecae in divinis; sed utraque productione
producitur aliqua persona distincta a producente, quia "nihil est
quod se ipsum gignat vel producat ut sit". Non sunt autem
distincta essentialiter, quia eadem sunt essentialiter. Ergo sunt
distincta personaliter, quia sunt productiones perfectae, et
tantum unica persona unica productione. Ergo tantum sunt duae
personae productae. Nec potest esse nisi una productio unius
rationis, quia principio productivo unius rationis non
correspondet nisi una productio unius rationis. Sed in divinis sunt
tantum duo principia productiva, intellectus et voluntas, ut
ostensum est prius, et utrumque est tantum unius rationis in se,
et productio utrique correspondens erit unius rationis. Sed non
possunt esse productiones plures unius rationis, ut ostensum est
supra; ergo etc. Et sic tantum duo termini producti.
203 Sed dices: una et eadem persona potest produci utraque

productione. Contra: impossible est eandem personam duabus
productionibus totalibus et perfectis accipere esse, quia si hac
productione accipit esse, totaliter et perfecte est, circumscripta
omni alia. Et si accipit esse alia productione totaliter et perfecte,
non est sine ea; ergo simul est et non est; hoc est impossibile.
204 Tertio ostendo quod sit aliqua persona non producta per
eandem rationem qua probatur quod sit aliquod ens primum.
Cum enim sit aliqua persona producta, non producit se nec
producitur a nihilo, ergo producitur ab alia, et non est processus
in infinitum. Ergo est aliqua persona omnino non producta et
prima, sicut probatum fuit in quaestione de productione rerum ad
extra in quibus est aliquod primum in entibus ex ordine
92 Tertio: sic codd.

Dist. 2, Part III, Question Four 179
Article One
What must be held as true?
202 As for the first, to prove the conclusion is true, I show first
that two persons are produced. Third,26 I show that only two
persons are produced. The first I prove in this way. There are two
intrinsic productions in the divine, but each production produces
one person distinct from the one producing, since there is nothing
that begets itself or produces itself; however, they are not distinct
essentially, because they are the same essentially; therefore they
are distinct personally, because they are perfect productions, and
only a single person is produced by a single production. Therefore,
there are only two persons produced. Moreover, there can be only
one production of the same sort, because only one production of
the same sort corresponds to a productive principle of the same
sort. But in the divine there are only two productive principles,
intellect and will, as was shown earlier: each is only one sort of
thing in itself, and the production that corresponds to each is only
one sort of thing in itself. But there cannot be several productions
of one sort, as has been shown above, therefore, etc. And in this
way there are only two terms produced.
203 But you may object that the same person could be produced
by each production. To the contrary. It is impossible that it is
the same person that receives being by two total and perfect
productions, because if it receives being by this production, it
totally and perfectly exists apart from any other production. And
if it receives being from another production perfectly and totally,
it does not exist without that [other production]; therefore it both
is and is not, which is impossible.
204 Thirdly I show that there is some person that is not
produced: by the same argument by which it is proved that some
being is first. For since some person is produced, that person
neither produced itself nor was it produced from nothing;
therefore it is produced by another and there is no process ad
infinitum. Then there is some person that is in no way produced
and is first, as was proved in the question about the production of
things externally in which there is some first entity among beings
26 "Third": thus MSS.

causarum. Sic similiter est hic in ordine productionis et originis

ad intra. Omnium enim inferiorum secundorum necesse est esse
aliquod primum sive ab aliquo primo, in quaestione de primitate
supra.
[1. Opinio Henrici Gandavensis

a. Expositio opinionis]
205 Quarto, quod illa persona non producta sit tantum unica;
probat quidam doctor quod unitas innascibilis sive personae a se
probatur sicut unitas Dei sive sicut Deus est unus. Et confirmatur
hoc per Hilarium, De synodis,93 qui dicit quod qui ponit duos
innascibiles ponit duos deos. In littera vide auctoritatem.94
206 Praeterea, probat hoc idem per rationem, quia si sunt plura
a se, hoc erit vel absolute plura vel relative; non absolute, quia
non est nisi una natura; si relative, ergo vel dicuntur mutuo
relative inter se vel non mutuo. Si mutuo, hoc falsum est, quia
nulla esset ibi oppositio relativa, quia nulla ratio originis vel
productionis inter ea. Si autem sint plura relative dicta non
mutuo, hoc est dupliciter: vel ad alia priora secundum se quibus
ista sunt posteriora, et sic ista non erunt prima a se. Vel per
respectum ad alia eis posteriora, et hoc est impossibile, quia non
distinguerent tales relationes illas duas personas a se, sicut nec
Pater nec Spiritus Sanctus distinguuntur relatione posteriori ad
Patrem et Spiritum Sanctum. Ratio enim distinguens vel
distinctiva necessario prior est distincto.
M Hilarius, De synodo n. 59-60 (PL 10. 521).

l11 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 31, c. 2, n. 8 (SB IV, 228).
from the order that exists in causes. It is similar here in the order
of productions and of origins internally. For of all lesser
secondary entities there has to be some entity that is first or is
itself from something that is first, [as was proved] in the question
about the primacy above.

205 Fourth, that there is only one person that is not produced; a
certain doctor proves that the unity of being unbegotten or of a
person being only from himself (a se) is proved, just as the unity
of God or that God is one [is proved]. And this is confirmed by
Hilary in De synodis, who says that he who posits two
unbegottens posits two gods. See the authoritative citation in the
text [of Peter Lombard].
206 Furthermore, he proves the same through [an argument
from] reason, because if there are several that are not from
another this will be either from what is absolutely several or
relatively such; it is not from what is absolutely several, because
there is only one nature; if it is relatively several, therefore either
they are asserted mutually of one another or not mutually. If
mutually, this is false, because there is no relative opposition
there, since there is no [possibility] that each originated from, or
was produced by, the other. If, however, they are said to be
relatively several, but not mutually, this is twofold: either in
relation to something by itself prior [to them], to which they are
posteriorand in this way they will not be first of themselvesor
in relation to something posterior to them; and this is impossible,
because such relations would not distinguish those two persons
from each other, just as neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit are
distinguished by a relation posterior to the Father and Holy
Spirit. For the distinguishing reason is necessarily prior to the
distinction.
[b. Contra opinionem Henrici]
207 Sed contra hoc arguo, scilicet quod istae rationes non
declarant propositum, quia unitas Dei probatur ex perfectionibus
simpliciter convenientibus Deo et essentiae divinae. Sed
paternitas nullam perfectionem dicit, sed proprietatem relativam.
Ergo ex unitate Dei non potest argui primitas personae Patris
sive unitas primae personae in divinis.
208 Item, unitas ostensa de Deo est indivisibilitatis et simplici-
tatis; unitas autem personae est unitas solitudinis; ergo cum
unitate indivisibilitatis sive simplicitatis stat communicabilitas,
et sic ad unitatem personae innascibilis oportet probare unitatem
solitudinis et incommunicabilitatis.
209 Ad dictum Hilarii,95 dico quod verum est de facto quod qui
concedit duos innascibiles, et duos deos; sed ostensa unitate
divinae essentiae non propter hoc ostenditur unitas personae
primae sive innascibilis.
210 Ad rationem,96 quando dicitur quod si sunt supposita
relativa dicuntur mutuo inter se vel non, dico quod mutuo
relative dicuntur inter se, non tamen sequitur 'ergo dicuntur
mutuo relatione originis', quia tunc esset petitio principii. Idem
enim est dicere quod duo dicantur mutuo relatione originis inter
se, et quod non sint ambo a se vel primo, eo quod una ab altera
produceretur.
211 Item, si detur alia propositio, scilicet quod non dicantur
mutuo relative inter se, non sequitur quin possint esse duae
personae a se relationibus constitutae. Ad probationem de
spiratione,97 non est simile, quia Spiritus Sanctus est spiratus
passive a duobus ita active. Hic ponerentur duae proprietates.
212 Istam ergo conclusionem persuadeo sic: quidquid in divinis
est unius rationis est de se hoc, quia da quod non, sed quod sit
indifferens ad plura quantum est de se, nec determinat sibi
certum numerum suppositorum; potest quantum ex se est esse in
lir' Cf. supra n. 205.

lMi Cf. supra n. 206.
Against the opinion of Henry of Ghent
207 But against this I argue, namely that these reasons do not
explain the case at hand, because the unity of God is proved from
the unqualified perfections that pertain to God or the divine
essence. But paternity does not assert any perfection, but rather a
relative property. Therefore from the unity of God one cannot
argue to a primacy of the person of the Father or to a unity of the
first person in the divine.
208 Also, the unity shown about God is that of indivisibility and
simplicity, but the unity of the person is a unity of solitude;
therefore, the unity of indivisibility or simplicity is consistent
with communicability, and one has to prove the unity of solitude
and incommunicability as regards the unity of the first person,
who is not begotten.
209 As for the dictum of Hilary [n. 205] I say that it is factually
true that one who concedes two unbegottens, also concedes there
are two gods. But given the unity of the divine essence, this does
not show that the first person is unique or not begotten.
210 To the argument from reason, [n. 206] when it is said that if
there are relative supposits they are asserted mutually of
themselves or not, I say that they are asserted mutually of one
another; but it does not follow 'therefore they are said to originate
mutually,' for this begs the question. For it is the same thing to
say 'a mutual relationship of origin exists between them' and
both are not absolute or first,' because one [proposition] implies
the other.
211 Also if the other proposition is given, namely that they are
not asserted as mutually related between each other, it does not
follow that there could not be two persons by themselves
constituted by relations. To the proof about spiration,* [n. 206] it
is not similar, because the Holy Spirit is spirated* passively from
two that spirate actively. Here two properties would be posited.
212 This conclusion, therefore, I argue persuasively in this way:
whatever in the divine is of one sort is of itself just 'this,' because
given that it is not, but that it is indifferent to several so far as
itself is concerned, nor is it determined of itself to any certain
number of supposits, it can be of itself in an infinite number if it
infinitis nisi aliunde determinetur. Et si est necesse esse, in

infinitis est. Et ideo ponitur tantum una persona producta unius
rationis. Ergo cum persona non producta sit unius rationis et non
eiusdem rationis cum persona producta, sequitur quod sit tantum
una et de se haec. Et ex hoc infero quod cum sint tantum duae
personae productae et una non producta, sequitur quod sint
tantum tres personae in natura divina.
[B. Art. 2: Quomodo Veritas ista sit declaranda]
213 Quantum ad secundum principale, quomodo possumus

praedictam veritatem intelligere sine contradictione, scilicet
Trinitatem personarum cum unitate essentiae, declaro quadru-
pliciter.
214 Primo ex communicabilitate naturae in creaturis, ubi
perfectionis est quod natura potest pluribus suppositis
communicari, sed quod non possit eis communicare sine sui
divisione, hoc est imperfectionis in ea. Auferendo igitur quod est
imperfectionis in creatura, et attribuendo Deo quod est
perfectionis, erit natura divina pluribus suppositis indivisibiliter
communicata, supposito prius quod natura posset quantum est ex
se esse in pluribus suppositis et communicari eis per identitatem.
215 Declaro sic. Communicabile alicui dicitur dupliciter: uno
modo per identitatem, ita quod illud cui communicatur sit ipsum
ut universale communicatur singulari. Secundo modo per
informationem, ita quod ipsum cui communicatur sit in ipso non
ipsum, ut forma communicatur materiae ita quod materia est
actu ens per formam. Natura autem quaecumque quantum est ex
se, est communicabilis utroque modo pluribus suppositis, quorum
quodlibet sit ipsum, et etiam ut quo, tanquam forma, quo
suppositum vel singulare sit ens quiditative.
216 Facio igitur breviter talem rationem: natura quaecumque
est communicabilis per identitatem pluribus; ergo et natura
divina, quia hoc convenit naturae creatae ex perfectione sua. Sed
is not otherwise determined. And if it were necessary being, it

would actually be in an infinite number. And therefore only one
person is posited that is of the same sort. Therefore since the
person not produced is of one sort, but not of the same sort as the
person produced, it follows that there is only one, moreover, such
that it is of itself just 'this.' And from this I infer that since there
are only two persons produced and one not produced, it follows
that there are only three persons in the divine nature.
Article Two
How this truth can be explained.
213 As for the second main point, how the aforesaid truth can be
understood without contradiction, namely a Trinity of persons
with a unity of essence, I explain in four ways.
214 First from the communicability of nature in creatures where
it is a matter of perfection that nature can be communicated to
several supposits. But that it cannot be communicated to them
without division, this is a matter of imperfection. Therefore, by
taking away what is a matter of imperfection in creatures and by
attributing to God what is a matter of perfection, there will be a
divine nature indivisibly communicated to several supposits,
supposing first that the nature, insofar as itself is concerned, can
be in several supposits and be communicated to them by way of
identity.*
215 I explain it in this way: 'communicable* to something' is said
in two ways: in one way through identity, so that that to which it
is communicated becomes it, as the universal is communicated to
the singular. The second way is through an informing so that that
to which it is communicated is in it, but not it, as form is
communicated to matter so that matter is a being in act through
form. But any nature whatsoever inasmuch as it is of itself, is in
both ways communicable to several supposits, each of which is it,
and also, as it were, [informed] by it, as by a form, by which a
supposit or a singular is quidditatively a being.
216 Therefore, briefly I make this argument: any nature
whatever is communicable to several through identity; therefore
also the divine nature, because this pertains to a created nature
natura divina non est divisibilis, ut patet ex quaestione de unitate

Dei. Ergo communicabilis sine sui divisione.
217 Secundo hoc idem declaro ex ratione incommunicabilis
suppositi qui non dicit imperfectionem simpliciter, quia perfectio
simpliciter non determinat sibi rationem suppositi, quia tunc non
esset ipsum melius in quolibet quam non ipsum. Suppositum
enim de se non includit de se perfectionem simpliciter in ista
essentia, quia perfectio simpliciter non convenit nisi quiditati,
alias deesset aliqua perfectio simpliciter humanitati in Christo.
Ergo non oportet quod ratio suppositi in ista natura includat per
identitatem omnem rationem entis. Ergo cum ratione suppositi in
ista natura potest stare alia ratio distincta in alio supposito ut
distincta.
218 Tertio hoc idem declaratur ex ratione infinitatis divinae. Et
pono exemplum familiarius de anima intellectiva quae tota est in
toto et tota in qualibet parte, ita quod in anima perfectionis est
quod sine sui divisione det esse totale pluribus partibus corporis,
eo quod tota in toto etc. Et in hoc excedit omnes formas
materiales quae certam partem corporis perficiunt.
219 Tria autem sunt imperfectionis in anima intellectiva prout
perficit corpus. Primo quod dat esse per informationem materiae;
secundum quod non dat totale esse corpori, sed esse partiale ut
esse intellectum; tertium quod plures partes eiusdem totius quas
perficit, sunt distinctae realiter eo quod non dat partibus
distinctis alicuius tertii esse. Ergo ablatis istis imperfectionibus,
reservando quod est perfectionis in ea, possibile est manuduci in
aliam essentiam quae det esse totale, non per informationem,
pluribus distinctis quae non sunt partes alicuius totius et quae
as a matter of its perfection. But the divine nature is not divisible,

as is evident from the question about the unity of God. Therefore,
it is communicable without its division.
217 Secondly, I explain the same from the notion of an
incommunicable* supposit, which does not assert unqualified
imperfection, because unqualified perfection does not determine
for itself the notion of the supposit, because then it would not be
better for it to be in something than not to be in it.27 For the
supposit itself does not include of itself unqualified perfection in
this essence, because unqualified perfection pertains only to a
quiddity; otherwise some unqualified perfection would be wanting
to the humanity of Christ. Hence, it is not necessary that the
notion of a supposit in this nature include through identity every
notion of being. Therefore, together with the notion of a supposit
in this nature another distinct notion can coexist, as distinct, in
another supposit.
218 Thirdly, this same is explained from the notion of divine
infinity. And I provide a more familiar example of the intellective
soul, which is wholly in the whole and wholly in each part, so that
in the soul what is a matter of perfection is the fact that without
division it gives total being to the several parts of the body, so
that it is whole in the whole, etc. And in this way it exceeds all
the material forms, which perfect certain parts of the body.
219 But there are three elements of imperfection in the
intellective soul as it perfects the body. First is that it gives being
through an informing of the matter; the second that it does not
give total being, but partial being to the body, such as 'intellectual
being'; thirdly, that the several parts of the same whole, which it
perfects, are really distinct [parts of this whole], in that it does
not give being to the distinct parts of something third. Therefore,
taking away these imperfections and preserving what is of
perfection in it, it is possible to think of another essence that,
without informing, would give total being to several distinct
things that are not part of some whole and which would be
a Anselm's definition of a simple or unqualified perfection is such that in

anything possessing it, it would be better to have it than not to have it (quidquid
melius est esse quam non esse; Proslogion c. 5). Scotus shortens the definition to
'better it than not it.'
erunt per se subsistentes. Et sic potest intelligi una essentia

numero esse in tribus personis.
220 Quarto declaratur hoc ex ratione perfectionis simpliciter sic:
perfectio simpliciter in quolibet supposito est quae melior ipsa
quam non ipsa. Sed quod determinatur ex se ad unum
suppositum non primum unius naturae non potest esse melius
cuilibet cum hoc supposito quam non ipsum. Ergo non est
perfectionis etc.
221 Probatio maioris. Sed quare dixi in maiori 'in quolibet
supposito'? Quia perfectio carnis non est melior omni supposito,
ergo natura debet suppositum determinare. Sed quomodo est
'melior quam non ipsa', id est, quolibet cum ipsa incompossibili?
Quia negatio eiusdem de se est melior incompossibili sibi.
222 Probatio minoris: quia aliquid si in natura aliqua
determinetur ex se ad unum certum suppositum, est de se
incompossibile cuilibet supposito absoluto. Sed tale non est melius
quam non ipsum, nec est natura melior cum ipso quam non ipso.
Ergo non dicit aliquid perfectionis in natura et per consequens
non repugnat rationi suae, scilicet cuilibet essentiae, esse in
pluribus. Ergo quidquid est in Deo quiditative non determinatur
ad unum suppositum.
223 Ex his quattuor declarationibus possumus manuduci ad
intelligendum unitatem essentiae divinae cum personarum
Trinitate.
[II. Ad rationes principales]
224 Ad primam98 rationem dicendum quod nunquam ex

identitate duorum in tertio concluditur identitas illorum inter se,
nisi talis identitas ad tertium sit qualem concludis extremi de
extremo, et tunc non sequitur inconveniens.
225 Ad probationem qualiter est identitas essentiae in persona,
dico quod est eadem identitate personae. Ipsa autem essentia non
est eadem in se identitate subsistentiae sed identitate esse vel
9H Cf. supra n. 196.

subsisting per se. And in this way one can understand how the
essence that is one in number can be in three persons.
220 Fourth, this is explained from the notion of unqualified
perfection in this way. Unqualified perfection in any supposit is
whatever is 'better it than not it.' But what is determined of itself
to one supposit (that is not the first) of one nature, cannot be
'better it than not it' as regards any other thing whatsoever that
has this supposit. Therefore, it is not a matter of perfection, etc.
221 Proof of the major. But the reason why I have said in the
major 'in any supposit,' is because the perfection of flesh is not
better in every supposit, therefore the nature must have
something to do with delimiting the supposit. But how is 'it better
than not it' in anything incompatible with it? Indeed, its negation
or absence is by itself better in what is incompatible with it.
222 Proof of the minor: if in some nature something is
determined of itself to one certain supposit, it is of itself
incompatible with any absolute supposit. But such is not 'better it
than not it' nor is nature better with it than not it. Therefore, it
does not assert something of perfection in the nature. As a
consequence, it is not repugnant to its notion, and hence to any
essence, to be in several. Therefore, whatever is in God
quidditatively is not delimited to one supposit.
223 From these four explanations we can be led to an
understanding of the unity of the divine essence with the Trinity
of the persons.
To the initial arguments
224 To the first argument [n. 196], it must be said that never
from the identity of two to a third is the identity of them among
themselves inferred, unless the identity to a third is of such a sort
as exists in the case of the extremes, and then incongruity does
not follow.
225 To the proof: as to the way the identity of the essence is in
the person, I say that the essence is the same thing as the person
by identity.28 But the essence itself is not the same in itself by
reason of an identity of subsistence* but by an identity of being or
28 I.e., the person is identified with the essence, not vice versa.
essentiae vel ad se esse. Et sic sequitur identitas extremorum vel

personarum, non tamen identitas subsistentiae sicut non fuit in
medio extremorum, scilicet in essentia quae est media respectu
personarum. Quaelibet autem persona habet unitatem subsis
tentiae in se et identitatem essentiae inter se; 'ergo habent
identitatem subsistentiae inter se' non sequitur. Variatur enim
medium sicut si diceres 'essentia est Pater, essentia est Filius,
ergo Filius est Pater' non sequitur quia concludis Filium esse
Patrem, non identitate essentiae sed subsistentiae. Medium
autem non erat idem cum extremis, in identitite essentiae, et sic
variatur medium cum extremis in hoc sophismate 'essentia enim
in Patre est eadem subsistentiae Patris, et essentia in Filio eadem
subsistentiae Filii' et ideo non sequitur.
226 Ad secundum" quando dicitur quod esse a se tantum
convenit uni personae, igitur esse ab alio tantum conveniet alteri
quia sunt aequales dignitate si sic tantum sunt duae personae in
divinis, respondeo quod est figura dictionis, quia non sequitur 'est
aeque nobilis vel aequalis dignitatis cum alio, ergo est tantum
hoc'. Commutatur enim quale in hoc aliquid. Non enim ex
nobilitate vel dignitate est quod plurificetur principium vel ens
etiam ab alio, sed hoc est ex natura principiorum.
227 Ad tertium100 dicendum quod non sequitur quod sint
quattuor personae quia relationes commultiplicantur. Non enim
est verum quod commultiplicentur nisi quoad relationes, non
quantum ad supposita vel absoluta. Non est simile quod si duae
relationes producti, scilicet generatio passiva Filii et spiratio
passiva Spiritus Sancti quae sunt distinctae relationes in se, non
possunt esse in uno et eodem supposito sive in eadem persona,
quod101 propter hoc duae relationes distinctae producentis non

100 Cf. supra n. 198.
101 Quod superfluum. Lege: ...quod, si ... non possunt propter hoc ... non
possunt...
of essence or of being as an absolute (ad se). And in this way the

identity of the extremes or persons follows, not however an
identity of subsistence as it was not the middle term of the
extremes, namely in the essence which is the medium as regards
the persons. But each person has a unity of subsistence in itself
and [the persons] share an identical essence among themselves;
[however] 'therefore they have an identity of subsistence among
themselves1 does not follow. For the medium is varied, just as, if
you were to say 'the essence is Father, the essence is Son,
therefore the Son is the Father,' this does not follow because the
conclusion that the Son is the Father follows not from an identity
of essence but of subsistence. The medium, however, was not of
the same sort as the extremes, in respect to the identity of
essence, and thus the medium and the extremes are of different
kinds in this sophistical argument 'for the essence in the Father
is the same as the subsistence of the Father, and the essence in
the Son is the same as the subsistence of the Son' and therefore it
does not follow.
226 To the second [n. 197] when it is said that to be of itself only
pertains to one person, therefore to be from another only pertains
to another, because if in this way there are only two persons in
the divine, they are of equal dignity, I respond that it is a fallacy
of a figure of speech, because it does not follow 'it is equally noble
or equal in dignity with another, therefore, it is only this [that is
equally noble].' For one changes 'of this sort' into 'this something.'
For it is not from nobility or dignity that the principle or being is
multiplied by another, but this is from the nature of the
principles.
227 To the third [n. 198] it must be said that it does not follow
that there are four persons because the relations are mutually
multiplied. For it is not true that they are mutually multiplied,
except insofar as relations are concerned, not as regards the
supposits or absolutes. [And] one cannot draw parallels [in such
cases, e.g., saying that] because two relations of the product,
namely the passive generation of the Son and the passive
spiration of the Holy Spirit, which are distinct relationships in
themselves, cannot be in one and the same supposit or in the
same person, on this account neither can two distinct relations of
possunt esse in eadem persona, scilicet generatio et spiratio

activa in Patre.
producing be in the same person, namely generation and active

spiration in the Father.
[Distinctio 3
Quaestio 1
Utrum Deus sit naturaliter cognoscibilis
ab intellectu viatoris]
1 Circa distinctionem tertiam quaeritur primo utrum Deus sit

naturaliter cognoscibilis ab intellectu viatoris.
Videtur quod non:

III De anima:1 sicut sensibilia ad sensum, sic phantasmata
ad intellectum; sed sensus non sentit nisi sensibilia; ergo nec
intellectus nisi phantasiabile; Deus autem non habet phantasma
nec aliquid phantasiabile; ergo non potest cognosci ab intellectu
viatoris.
2 Item, Philosophus II Metaphysicae:2 sicut se habet oculus
noctuae ad lucem solis, ita intellectus noster ad ea quae sunt
manifestissima in natura, quae sunt prima principia sive
substantiae separatae, secundum Commentatorem; sed noctua
non potest intueri solem; ergo nec intellectus viatoris cognoscere
primam causam sive Deum nec aliqua alia a sensibilibus vel
propria phantasmata habentibus.
3 Item, infinitum secundum quod tale est incognitum, I
Physicorum,3 et II Metaphysicae:4 infinita non contingit
intelligere; ergo infinitum intensivum nec extensivum contingit
intelligere; sed Deus est infinitus; ergo etc.
4 Contra:
Philosophus VI Metaphysicae5 dicit quod metaphysica est
theologia et circa divina principaliter; in consideratione etiam
divinorum consistit felicitas, X Ethicorum.6
i Aristot., De anima III, c. 7 (431a 14-5).

2 Aristot., Metaph. II (a), c. 1 (9936 9-11).
i Aristot., Physica I, c. 4 (1876 7-8).
4 Aristot., Metaph. II (a), c. 2 (9946 22-3).
r' Aristot., Metaph. VI (E), c. 1 (1026a 19-23).
!i Aristot., Eth. Nic. X, c. 7 (1177a 12-7).
187
Distinction 3
Question One
Is God naturally knowable by the intellect of a pilgrim*?
1 As regards distinction three the first question asked is

whether God is naturally knowable by the intellect of a pilgrim.
It seems not. According to Bk. IIl On the Soul, as sense
perceptibles are to the senses, so sense images are to the intellect;
but the senses only perceive what is sensible; therefore the
intellect only knows what can be imagined; but God has no sense
image nor can God be imagined; therefore he cannot be known by
the intellect of a pilgrim.
2 Also, according to the Philosopher in Bk. II of the
Metaphysics, as the eye of the owl is blinded by the light of the
sun, so is our intellect blind to what is most manifest in nature,
namely the first principles* or separate* substances, according to
the Commentator. But owls cannot see the sun; therefore, neither
can the mind of the pilgrim know the first cause or God, nor
anything other than what is sensible or has a sense image of its
own.
3 Also the infinite as such is unknowable according to Physics
I and infinites cannot be intellectually grasped according to
Metaphysics II; therefore what is either intensively or extensively
infinite cannot be intellectually grasped; but God is infinite;
therefore, etc.
4 To the contrary: the Philosopher in Metaphysics VI, says

that metaphysics is a theology and is mainly about the divine;
also according to Ethics X, happiness consists in a consideration
of the divine.
187
[I. Status quaestionis]
5 Circa istam quaestionem, primo excludam distinctiones

inutiles; secundo opiniones aliquas et eas reprobabo, tertio solvam
quaestionem.
[A. Art. 1: Excludit distinctiones inutiles]
6 In ista quaestione primo excludo distinctiones aliquorum

inutiles. Quaedam distinctio est quod Deus potest cognosci
privative vel negative.
7 Contra: quia aut concipitur praecise illa negatio in se aut ut
dicta de aliquo positivo; non primo modo, quia sic non plus
cognosceretur Deus quam chimaera: sic nullo modo Deus
cognoscitur. Si secundo modo, quia de illo nos quaerimus, oportet
quod sit aliquid positive notum de Deo.
8 Ex isto ergo sequitur corollarium, quia licet via remotionis
sit utilis ad cognoscendum, tamen oportet habere aliquid
positivum in fine deductionis ad quod statur.
9 Item, negatio non cognoscitur nisi per affirmationem, IV
Metaphysicae1 et II Perihermenias;8 nulla enim propositio
negativa est prima, quia non cognosco aliquid removeri ab isto,
nisi quia prius praedicatur vel cognoscitur aliquid de eo, id est de
subiecto cui repugnat illud remotum. Ergo si aliquid de Deo
negative praedicatur vel cognoscitur, oportet quod hoc sit ratione
alicuius positivi; ergo cognoscitur aliquid positivum.
10 Item, negationes non summe amamus, quia non est ibi
praecise ratio amabilis; sed Deum summe amamus; ergo hoc erit
ratione alicuius positivi.
11 Nec in ista quaestione oportet distinguere de 'quid est' et si
est'; nec de 'si est vel quia est in intellectu' et 'in re', sive ut est
quaestio de veritate propositionis vel ut est quaestio de esse Dei,
quia idem sunt.
7 Aristot., Metaph. IV (T), c. 4 (1008a 15-8).

* Aristot., De interpr. c. 14 (246 1-7).
Dist. 3, Question One 188
The Division of the Question
5 In regard to this question I first exclude useless distinctions;

second, I cite certain opinions that I disagree with; third I give my
answer to the question.
Article 1: Some useless distinctions
6 In this question I first discard useless distinctions that some

make. One such is that God can [only] be known in a privative
way or negatively.
7 On the contrary, either it is conceived precisely as a
negation or it is conceived as negating something positive. It is
impossible to conceive God in the first way, because one would no
more have knowledge of God than of a chimera; and thus God
would not be known as such. If one conceives God negatively in
the second way, since this is what we are asking about, it is
necessary that there be something positively known about God.
8 Hence, a corollary follows from this, for even though
discarding the irrelevant is a useful way of knowing, nevertheless
one has to have something positive in the end of one's deduction.
9 Also, a negation is only known by denying some affirmation,
according to Metaphysics VI and On Interpretation II. For no
negation is simply first, since I cannot know what must be denied
about anything unless I first know something asserted about that
subject that is inconsistent with it [and further] denied. Therefore
if something is denied of God, it must be because of something
positive; therefore something positive is known about him.
10 In addition, we cannot love negations most of all, because
there is nothing lovable there; but we love God most of all;
therefore it will be because of something positively known about
him.
11 Nor must one in this question distinguish between what he
is' and 'if he is,' or between 'if he is or that he is conceptually' or
'really,' or whether the question is about the truth of a proposition
or is a question of about the existence of God, because they are
the same.
12 Sed contra: si est quaestio utrum Deus sit de esse

propositionis sive de esse Dei, quod idem est secundum me, ergo
oportet cognoscere extrema, et si debeo cognoscere esse de Deo vel
hoc modo vel illo, oportet me habere aliquem conceptum de eo de
quo quaero si est, quare in hoc nulla est distinctio.
13 Nec distinguendum est de scire naturali et supernaturali.
Nec de cognitione Dei in creatura vel in se, quia aliud est
principium a quo incipit discursus et aliud in quo statur; si ergo
in cognitione Dei statur in creatura, non est aliud principium
discursus et cognitum post discursum et per consequens nullam
habeo cognitionem de Deo. Si autem post discursum sto in
cognitione Dei, habeo propositum.
14 Est ergo mens quaestionis utrum aliquem conceptum
simplicem possit intellectus viatoris naturaliter habere de Deo, in
quo conceptu simplici cognoscitur Deus, qui sit proprius
conceptus Dei.
[B. Art. 2: Opiniones aliorum

1. Opinio Thomae
15 Et ad hoc, ut circa secundum principale, dicunt quidam9

quod obiectum intellectus coniuncti est quiditas rei materialis
propter proportionem intellectus ad obiectum.
16 Triplex autem est potentia cognitiva, secundum doctorem
istum:10 quaedam omnino materialis et materialiter operans, ut
potentiae sensitivae; quaedam omnino immaterialis, ut potentia
angeli; quaedam medio modo se habens, cuius obiectum est
quiditas omnino materialis. Et in hoc differt a potentia superiori
cuius obiectum est quiditas omnino immaterialis; sed in hoc
conveniunt quod potentiae superiores cognitivae et mediae sunt
immateriales in se, in quo differunt a potentia omnino materiali.
3 Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 84, a. 7 in corp.

10 Ibid., q. 85, a. 1 in corp.
12 Against [all such distinctions]. For if the question whether

God exists is about the being of a proposition or about the being of
Godwhich I hold to be the samethen it is necessary to know
the terms [of the proposition], and if I have to know the being of
God in this way or that way, I have to have some concept about
him of which I ask: Does such exist? For that reason, there is no
need for a distinction here.
13 Nor must one distinguish between natural* and super
natural knowledge, [for we are only interested in the former]; nor
must one distinguish knowing God in a creature from knowing
him in himself. For the starting point in which one begins the
argument is different from that in which it ends; hence if the
knowledge of God ends up with a creature, there is no difference
between the beginning and end of the argument and as a
consequence I have no knowledge of God. If however after
reasoning, I end up with knowledge of God, I have what I
propose.
14 Hence, the sense of the question is whether the intellect of
the pilgrim can naturally have some simple concept about God, in
which simple concept God is known, and which is a proper
concept of God.
Article Two: The opinion of others
The Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

Exposition of the opinion
15 As regards the second main point, certain ones say that the
object of an embodied intellect is the quiddity* of a material
thing* because the intellect is proportioned to its object.
16 The cognitive power is threefold, according to this teacher;
one is completely material and operates in a material way, such
are the sensitive powers; another is completely immaterial, as the
angel's power; another is intermediate, whose object is the
quiddity that is entirely material. And in this way it differs from
the higher power whose object is entirely immaterial; but they
agree in this that the higher cognitive power and that which is
intermediate are in themselves immaterial, and on this count
Cum igitur Deus secundum aliquem conceptum proprium non

cadat sub aspectu istius potentiae mediae, ergo non poterit
concipi Deus secundum aliquem conceptum simplicem et
proprium ab intellectu viatoris, eo quod secundum eum potentia
cognitiva non extendit se nisi ad illud quod cadit sub per se
obiecto eius; Deus non est huiusmodi; ergo nihil proprium
concipimus de Deo.
[b. Improbatio opinionis Thomae]
17 Contra istam opinionem arguo: licet conclusio in se sit

tolerabilis, sed deductio de proportione non; quia si ratio eorum
concludat generaliter, aeque concludit de intellectu coniuncto in
patria sicut hic, quia ibi anima coniungetur cum corpore: ergo ibi
non habebimus conceptum proprium de Deo, quia intellectus erit
ibi sicut hic materialiter operans.
18 Item, impossibile est potentiam per quemcumque habitum
per se et perfecte operari circa non suum obiectum, patet de visu
et auditu; ergo impossibile est intellectum per quemcumque
habitum intelligere substantias immateriales, quia non contine-
ntur sub quiditate materiali.
19 Sed dices quod ratio procedit ex creditis et non ratione

naturali, quia creditum est nos beatificari in substantiis immate-
rialibus.
20 Contra: probo per rationem naturalem. Nulla potentia
cognitiva potest cognoscere aliquid sub ratione universaliori
quam sit ratio sui primi obiecti, quia tunc illa ratio primi obiecti
non esset sibi adaequata. Patet etiam in exemplo: visus non
cognoscit aliquid sub ratione communiori quam sit ratio coloris
vel lucis; sed intellectus noster naturaliter cognoscit aliquid sub
ratione universaliori quam sit ratio imaginabilis, quia cognoscit
aliquid sub ratione entis, alioquin metaphysica non esset scientia
intellectui nostro scibilis naturaliter, quod falsum est, quia licet
consideret de substantiis sensibilibus tamen abstrahit ab eis in
quantum sunt sensibilia; considerat autem de separatis a materia
secundum esse.
they differ from a completely material potency.* Since God

according to some proper concept does not fall under the scope of
this intermediate power, therefore God could not be conceived
according to some simple and proper concept by the intellect of
the pilgrim, inasmuch as the cognitive power, according to him,
extends only to that which falls under its object per se; God is not
this sort of thing, therefore we conceive nothing proper about
God.
Refutation of the opinion
17 Against this opinion I argue: although the conclusion is in

itself tolerable, the deduction based on proportionality is not, for
if the argument of these held generally, it would apply to the
embodied intellect in heaven as it does here, for there the soul
will be joined to the body: therefore there will be no proper
concept of God there, because there it will be operating materially
as it does here.
18 Also, it is impossible that any potency by means of any
habit* should operate per se and perfectly regarding what is not
its object. This is evident from the seeing and hearing; therefore it
is impossible for the intellect through whatever habit [it will have
in heaven] to know immaterial substance, because these are not
contained under 'material quiddity.'
19 But you may say that the argument is based on what is
believed and not upon natural reason, because it is believed that
we shall be beatified in immaterial substances.
20 On the contrary: I prove this by natural reason. No cognitive
power can know something under a more general notion than
that of its primary object, because then that primary object would
be inadequate. An example also makes this clear: vision does not
know of anything that is more general than the notion of color or
light; our intellect, however, naturally knows something under a
more universal aspect than the notion of what is imaginable,
because it knows something under the aspect of being; otherwise
metaphysics would not be a science our intellect could know
naturally, which is false, because although its thinking concerns
sensible substances, nevertheless it abstracts from them in so far
21 Ad probationem sive congruentiam illorum de proportione

quam adducunt, dico quod non oportet quod proportio inter aliqua
sit talis quod habeant similem modum essendi inter se, immo eo
magis quod sunt dissimilia proportionantur, ut materia et forma,
unum potentiale ad aliud actuale, et totum et pars, sicut
perfectum et imperfectum, et inter causam et effectum, et
huiusmodi. Nunc autem potentia non se habet ad obiectum sicut
mobile ad motum, secundum unam opinionem, vel sicut termi-
nans ad terminum, non sicut actum ad alium.
22 Et quando dicis de intellectu coniuncto quod habet idem
obiectum quiditatem materialem, ergo separatus quiditatem
immaterialem, respondeo quod non oportet quod quiditasii angeli
sive intellectus angeli sit quiditas immaterialis eo quod essentia
angeli non sufficit ad cognoscendum distincte quiditatem
materialem; nulla enim potentia cognoscit per essentiam suam
aliquid nisi si sit perfecta et omnino idem cum essentia ut in Deo.
Unde sicut quiditates sensibiles vel materiales non sunt in
essentia angeli secundum essentiam propriam, sic nec secundum
cognoscibilitatem. Hic est ergo proportio inter potentiam et
obiectum, quod obiectum sit terminativum operationis vel
motivum, et potentia sit mobilis ab obiecto. Tale non est tantum
quiditas materialis respectu intellectus, sed etiam quiditas
immaterialis, ut dictum est, sicut oculus mobilis a colore vel
luminoso: non oportet quod sit proportio talis quod unus oculus
sit cognoscens colorem corporalem et alius oculus in specie vel
numero sit cognoscens colorem incorporalem. Haec ergo opinio
nimis parum tribuit intellectui nostro.
i i Lege: quiditas ut obiectum angeli; cf. lectio B. quiditas obiectalis angeli.

as they are sensible; but its consideration is about what is

separated from matter according to its being.
21 As for the proof based on the congruity of the
proportionality which they adduce, I say that it is not necessary
that the proportionality between some things be such that they
both have the same mode of being among themselves; indeed the
proportionality is more likely between dissimilar things, as with
matter and form, one being potential, the other actual, or like the
whole and part, as perfect and imperfect; and as is the case with
cause and effect and such. Now, however, the potency is not
related to the object as the mobile to the moved, according to one
opinion, or as the terminating to the terminus, and not as the act
with respect to the other.
22 And when you say that if the embodied intellect has
material quiddity as its object, therefore the intellect apart from
the body has immaterial quiddity [as its object], I respond that it
is not necessary that the quiddity [known]i to an angel or the
intellect of the angel be exclusively immaterial quiddity [simply]
because the essence of the angel is insufficient for knowing a
material quiddity distinctly; for no potency knows through its
essence, unless it is perfect and completely the same as its
essence, as in God. Indeed, just as sensible and material
quiddities are not in the essence of the angel according to their
proper essence, so neither are they according to cognoscibility.
But in our case2 [one speaks of] the proportionality between
potency and object, [namely] that the object is the term and
motive force of the operation and the potency is mobile with
respect to the object. Such is not only the material quiddity with
respect to the intellect, but also immaterial quiddity, as was said,
just as the eye is moved by color or the luminous: it is not
necessary that the proportionality be such that one eye would
know corporeal color and another that differs in number or
species would know incorporeal color. Therefore, this opinion
attributes too little to our intellect.
i See note to the Latin text.

1 Although the transition from the previous sentence to this one is not
clearly articulated, the main idea of this paragraph is that the human intellect by
its nature is not limited to material things: otherwise, the beatific vision would be
impossible.
[2. Opinio Henrici Gandavensis

23 Alia est opinio12 quae nimis tribuit intellectui nostro de

cognitione Dei, ponens quod naturaliter possumus habere
aliquem conceptum de Deo proprium per creaturas; sed distinguit
ex parte obiecti cognoscibilis, quia aliquid potest cognosci
dupliciter: per se et per accidens, in universali et in particulari.
Distinguit etiam ex parte cognitionis sic: quod quaedam est
cognitio naturalis et quaedam rationalis.
24 Cognitionem naturalem vocat cognitionem habitualem, qua
intellectus habens obiectum sibi praesens potest actualiter
cognoscere; sed rationalis dicitur, quando actu et perfecte
cognoscit.
25 Per accidens non potest Deus a nobis cognosci, quia nihil est
sibi accidens; sed Deus cognoscitur quasi per accidens, quia
attributa sunt circa divinam naturam, secundum Damascenum.13
Nec in universali secundum praedicationem, quia quiditas Dei est
singularis sive singularitas quaedam, sed in universali quod
tantum analogice sibi est commune et creaturis, quasi tamen
unum concipitur per similitudinem conceptuum, licet sint diversi
conceptus.
26 In particulari autem non cognoscitur ex creaturis, quia
creatura est peregrina eius similitudo, quia tantum conformis ei
vel assimilata quoad aliqua attributa, quae non sunt ista natura
in particulari. Sed cum nihil ducat in cognitionem alterius nisi
per rationem similis, sequitur quod creatura non ducit in
cognitionem Dei in particulari.
27 In universali ergo cognoscitur Deus tripliciter secundum
istum; generaliter, generalius et generalissime; sed generalissime
habet tres gradus et sic ponit quinque gradus cognitionis Dei in
nobis. Primo ergo cognoscitur Deus imperfectissime quocumque
ente cognito, in quantum quodlibet ens est quoddam vestigium
creatoris. Secundo per abstractionem, reliquendo singularitatem
et stando in entitate quasi analogice dicta de Deo et creaturis, et
illud est indeterminabile privative. Tertio per abstractionem ab
12 Henricus Gand . Sun11na a. 24. q. 6 in corp. (I, 141N-142V).

" Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 4 [I, c. 4] (ed. Buytaert, 19; PG 94, 799).

23 Another opinion attributes too much to our intellect

regarding the knowledge of God, claiming that we can naturally
have some concept proper to God through creatures; but he
distinguishes on the part of the object knowable, because
something can be known in two ways: either per se or through
accidents, or in general vs. in particular. He also distinguishes on
the part of the knower in this way: some knowledge is natural,
whereas some is rational.
24 He gives the name natural' to habitual knowledge, by which
the intellect having the object present to itself can know it
actually; but he calls knowledge rational, when [the intellect]
knows perfectly and in act.
25 We cannot know God through accidents, because nothing is
accidental to him; but God can be known, as it were, accidentally
because there are attributes about the divine nature, according to
Damascene. Neither can he be known in general according to
predication, because the quiddity of God is singular or is a certain
singularity,* but in general, what is only analogically common to
him and creatures is conceived as though it were one because of
the similarity of the concepts, although they are diverse concepts.
26 In particular, however, God is not known from creatures,
because the creature is a foreign likeness of him, for it is only
conformed to him or like him insofar as some attributes are
concerned and they do not constitute this particular nature* as
such. However, since nothing leads to the knowledge of another
save by reason of their similarity, it follows that the creature does
not lead one to knowledge of God in particular.
27 In a general way therefore God is known in three ways
according to this teacher; generally, more generally, and most
generally; but the most general has three degrees and thus gives
rise to five degrees in which God can be known by us. In the first
way God is known most imperfectly in whatever being is known,
insofar as a being is a certain vestige of its creator. In the second
grade by abstraction, leaving behind singularity and ending with
an entity analogically predicable of God and creatures, and that is
illo indeterminabili privative, indeterminatum vel indetermina-

bile negative, scilicet intelligendo ens vel bonum in se subsistens,
quod est ens per essentiam et non participationem etc. Quarto
ulterius concipiendo Deum sub generalibus attributis, tamen cum
quadam praeeminentia. Quinto concipiendo unum simplicissi-
mum attributum ad quod omnia reducuntur, ut sub esse etc.
Primam cognitionem de Deo quam habemus ex intentionibus
entis vocant naturalem et habet tres gradus iam dictos.
[b. Contra opinionem Henrici]
28 Contra istam opinionem quoad articulum qui dicit quod

nihil est commune Deo et creaturis univoce, arguo sic: omnis
intellectus certus de uno conceptu et dubius de duobus habet
conceptum de quo est certus, alium ab illis de quibus est dubius:
subiectum includit hoc praedicatum; aliter etiam de eodem esset
certus et non certus. Sed intellectus viatoris est certus de Deo
quod est ens, dubitando an sit ens creatum vel increatum et
salvatur univoce in utroque; ergo conceptus entis est alter ab
utroque et salvatur in utroque, ergo et conceptus univocus.
Certum est enim quod ex conceptu dubio quidam posuerunt
Deum esse solem etc.; non tamen dubitabant quin Deus esset ens;
ergo etc.
29 Sed dices quod intellectus non habet conceptum entis

tanquam unum de quo est certus, sed duos, qui duo propter
proximitatem, convenientiam et analogiam eorum ad invicem
videntur esse unus.
30 Contra: impossibile est concipere aliqua quae habent analo
giam et ordinem ad invicem, nisi prius natura praecognoscantur
illa ut distincta. Si ergo ens conceptum de Deo et creatura habet
duos conceptus habentes ordinem et analogiam, oportet quod
in a privative way indeterminable. In the third grade by

abstraction from that in a privative way indeterminable and
ending with the negatively indeterminate or indeterminable,
namely by thinking of being or the good as subsisting in itself,
which is being essentially and not by participation, etc. The
fourth degree goes further by conceiving God under general
attributes, but with a special preeminence. The fifth degree by
conceiving one most simple attribute to which all others are
reduced, as under 'to be' etc. The first cognition about God that
we have from the intentions* of being is called natural and have
the three grades already mentioned.
Refutation of Henry's Opinion
28 Against this opinion as regard the article, which says that

nothing is common to God and creatures univocally, I argue in
this way. Every intellect that is certain about one concept and
dubious about two,3 has the concept about which it is certain as
other than that about which it is dubious: the subject includes
this predicate; were it otherwise, one would be certain and
uncertain about the same thing. But the intellect of the pilgrim is
certain that God is a being, doubting whether it be a created
being or uncreated, and the being is saved univocally in both;
therefore the concept of being is other than both and is preserved
in both; therefore it is a univocal concept. For it is certain that
some having a dubious concept assumed God to be the sun, and
the like, and nevertheless they did not doubt that God was a
being, therefore etc.
29 But you claim that the intellect does not have the concept of
being as one about which it is certain, but two, which two because
of their likeness and closeness to one another, as well as their
analogical character, seem to be one.
30 To the contrary: it is impossible to conceive some things,
which have an analogical character and order to one another,
unless one first knows these by nature as distinct. If then being
conceived of God and of a creaturehad two concepts having an
3 Cf. the reading de diversis ("about other (concepts]") in the Ordinatio,

instead of the present de duobus.
prius cognoscam Deum in se et creaturam in se et per consequens

novi quod iste conceptus non est ille quam quod iste non
attribuatur alteri, quia prius est unumquodque in se intelligi et
cognosci quam alteri comparetur. Maior probatur: quia sicut
habentium ordinem essentialem et realem, unum realiter
praesupponit aliud, ita et habentium ordinem in cognosci, unum
in illo ordine praesupponit aliud.
31 Confirmatur ratio illa, quia illi duo conceptus entis qui
conveniunt Deo et creaturis non minus differunt quam conceptus
duorum individuorum in eadem specie; sed habens conceptus
duos duorum individuorum in eadem specie, ex conceptu unius
individui non facit conceptum alterius; ergo nec ex conceptu
creaturae potest facere conceptum proprium Deo.
32 Item, intellectus habens conceptum proprium de aliquo
obiecto potest illum distinguere a conceptu cuiuscumque alterius
obiecti, quia intellectus concipiens aliquod obiectum secundum
conceptum sibi proprium, concipit ipsum secundum conceptum
incompossibilem cuicumque alteri obiecto, ex quo est isti proprius;
sed per conceptum entis quem habet intellectus noster de Deo
non possumus ipsum distinguere a quolibet non ipso, ut ipsi
concedunt; ergo conceptus entis dictus de Deo non est sibi
proprius, sed communis univoce sibi et creaturae.
33 Item, illud ad quod conceptus creaturae attribuitur est
simpliciter perfectius; ergo si propter attributionem conceptus
creaturae ad Deum potest conceptus creaturae facere proprium
conceptum de Deo, in quo intellectus in fine attributionis stet,
sequitur quod conceptus Dei sic generatus in nobis sit perfectior
conceptu creaturae. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia impossibile est
quodcumque obiectum facere in intellectu nostro conceptum
perfectiorem suo proprio conceptu quiditativo, sicut impossibile
est quodcumque ens facere aliud ens nobilius eo, et praecipue ut
tota causa eius, quia causa aequivoca naturaliter agens non
potest effectum perfectiorem producere suo proprio effectu sibi
simillimo et suae virtuti adaequato. Ergo cum obiectum sit
order and analogy, I would first have to know God in himself and
the creature in itself, and as a consequence I would know that
this concept is not that before [knowing that] this would not be
attributed to the other, because one must first know something in
itself before one can compare it to another. The major is
proved; because just as in things having an essential* and real
order one thing really presupposes the other, so in things having
an order in knowing one thing presupposes the other in that
order.
31 This argument is confirmed because those two concepts of
being which pertain to God and to creatures differ no less than
the concepts of two individuals in the same species; but having
two concepts of two individuals in the same species, one does not
form the second concept from the first; therefore neither can one
form a concept proper to God from a concept of a creature.
32 Also the intellect having a concept proper to some object can
distinguish it from the concept of any other object, because the
intellect conceiving some object according to the concept proper to
it, conceives it according to a concept incompatible with any other
object: this is why it is proper to it; but through the concept of
being which our intellect has of God, we cannot distinguish him
from anything which is not him, as they themselves concede;
therefore the concept of being affirmed of God is not proper to
him, but univocally common to him and to a creature.
33 Also that to which the concept of a creature is applied [i.e.,
God] is simply more perfect; therefore if because of the
application of the concept of the creature to God, the concept of
the creature could form a proper concept of God which the
intellect obtains at the end of the application, it would follow that
the concept of God thus generated in us would be more perfect
than the concept of a creature. But this is impossible, because it is
impossible that any object whatsoever should make a more
perfect concept than the quidditative concept proper to itself, just
as it is impossible for any being to make another being that is
more noble than itself, and especially acting as the total cause of
it, because an equivocal* cause acting naturally cannot produce a
more perfect effect than that which is proper and most like itself
and is equal to the power it has. Therefore since the object is an
aequivoca causa respectu sui conceptus proprii quiditativi, non

potest conceptum perfectiorem alterius obiecti in intellectu nostro
gignere.
34 Item, visio Dei, secundum aliquem certum gradum et
finitum distat a conceptu illo proprio de Deo qui ponitur gigni in
intellectu ab obiecto create, cum visio sit creatura et actus finitus
et limitatus; si ergo albedo potest facere in intellectu nostro
conceptum proprium de Deo, fiat alia creatura a nobis
cognoscibilis naturaliter quae tantum distet ab albedine in
entitate sicut distat visio Dei ab ipso conceptu proprio de Deo qui
habetur et imprimitur ex creatura in cognoscibilitate; ergo illa
creatura imprimeret intellectui nostro visionem Dei; quod est
impossibile, quia tunc esset naturaliter beatus.
35 Ultimo hoc probatur per auctoritates sanctorum: Augustini
XV De Trinitate, cap. 314 et Anselmi, libro De libertate arbitrii,15
ubi probat definitionem liberi arbitrii per hoc quod est posse
peccare, quia non convenit Deo nec beatis. Cum igitur definitio
indicat quiditatem ergo aliquis conceptus quiditativus est
communis Deo et creaturae sicut conceptus liberi arbitrii et
huiusmodi.
36 Item, Augustinus XV De Trinitate, cap. 3, 16 probat Deum
omnipotentem, vivum, immortalem; inquit: "Praeferimus morta-
libus et non vivis" etc. Unde quia ista sunt meliora in creaturis,
scilicet viva non-vivis et immortalia mortalibus, ideo arguit et
concludit Augustinus esse vera de Deo; et si ista non essent in
Deo et in creaturis eiusdem rationis, non esset argumentum ad
propositum.
37 Item, removere imperfectionem creaturarum deveniendo ad
perfectionem est aliquis modus cognoscendi Deum; ergo si
perfectio quam nos acquirimus per cognitionem de Deo non est
eiusdem rationis cum perfectionibus creaturarum, ergo in fine
nullam habebimus scientiam de Deo nec erit habitudo essentialis
creaturae ad creatorem.
14 Cf. infra n. 36.

ir' Anselmus, De libertate arbitrii c. 1 (ed. F.S. Schmitt I, 207; PL 158, 489).
equivocal cause with respect to its proper quidditative concept, it

cannot beget a more perfect concept of another object in our
intellect.
34 Also, the vision of God is distant from that concept that is
proper to Godwhich is assumed to be generated in the intellect
by a created object[only] to some certain and finite degree, since
the vision itself is a creature and is a finite and limited act; if
therefore whiteness could produce in our intellect a concept
proper to God, there would be another creature naturally
knowable by us, which would be to the same degree distant from
the whiteness in being, to which degree the vision of God is
distant in cognoscibility from the concept proper to God, which is
impressed from a creature;4 therefore that [another] creature
would impress on our intellect a vision of God; but that is
impossible, because then [someone] would be naturally beatified.
35 Finally this is proved from the authority of the saints:
Augustine in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 3, and Anselm, in the
book On Free Choice where he proves the definition of free choice
through the ability to sin, because it does not pertain to God nor
to the blessed. Therefore since the definition indicates the
quiddity, therefore some quidditative concept is common to God
and creature, such as the concept of free choice and the like.
36 Also, Augustine in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 3 proves
that God is omnipotent, living, immortal. He says: "We prefer
these to mortal and non-living things," etc. Hence because these
are better in creatures, namely, living than non-living and
immortal than mortal, therefore Augustine argues and concludes
that they are true of God, and if they were not in God and in
creature according to the same meaning, the argument would not
be relevant.
37 Also, removing the imperfection of creatures [and as a
result] coming to perfection is one way of knowing God; therefore
if the perfection which we acquire through the cognition of God is
not of the same meaning as the perfections of creatures, therefore
in the end we have no knowledge of God nor will there be an
essential relationship of the creature to the creator.
In this case, from whiteness.

38 Magistri etiam et tractantes de Deo sive de his quae

cognoscuntur de Deo et creaturis univocationem concedunt in
doctrina, sicut patet, licet voce contradicant.
39 Item, hoc videtur esse intentio Philosophi II Metaphysicae:17
verissima principia, etc.
40 Ad illud quod non sit conceptus univocus quia Deus est
quaedam singularitas, dicendum quod a Socrate, licet sit
singularis, sunt abstrahibiles plures conceptus, licet Socrates non
abstrahatur ab hoc Socrate; nec Deus ab hoc Deo, tamen aliquis
communis conceptus potest abstrahi a Deo et creaturis.
[C. Art. 3. Responsio Scoti]
41 Dico ergo ad quaestionem quod in intellectu creaturae et

viatoris est possibilis haberi conceptus proprius de Deo, quia
talem posset Deus creare in nobis sive in intellectu nostro
infundendo lumen proportionale, ut dictum est in secunda
quaestione huius primi, quem tamen non posset intellectus
viatoris naturaliter ex creaturis acquirere et ideo non est Deus a
nobis naturaliter cognoscibilis secundum aliam cognitionem sibi
propriam et definitivam sed tantum secundum aliquem
communem conceptum quem extrahimus ex creaturis.
42 Quod declaratur sic: quadrupliciter contingit aliquid
cognosci, uno modo secundum rationem suam propriam
definitivam quae indicat suam propriam quiditatem, ut homo
quando cognoscitur secundum propriam rationem humanitatis;
alio modo quasi in universali ut in conceptu communi sibi et aliis,
ut quando homo cognoscitur esse animal; tertio modo per
accidens, ut quando cognoscitur hominem18 esse album; quarto in
respectu ad aliud, ut cum dicitur 'homo est nobilissimus
animalium'.
43 Sic potest Deus cognosci quadrupliciter: uno modo
secundum suam rationem quiditativam ut secundum rationem
deitatis, et isto modo non est naturaliter cognoscibilis a nobis,
quia licet Deus posset creare in intellectu nostro reprae-
sentativum sui sub ratione deitatis, non tamen potest hoc aliqua
17 Aristot., Metaph. II (a), c. 1 (9936 10-1)

1B Rectius: homo esse albus
38 The masters also in treating of God or of those things that

are known about God and creatures concede univocation5 in their
teaching, as is evident, even if they deny it verbally.
39 Also, it seems to be the intention of the Philosopher in Bk. II
of the Metaphysics: principles are most true, etc.
40 To the claim that it is not a univocal concept, because God is
a certain singularity, it must be said that from Socrates, although
he is singular, several concepts can be abstracted, although
Socrates does not abstract from this Socrates; nor does God
[abstract] from this God, nevertheless some common concept can
be abstracted from God and creatures.
Article Three: The reply of Scotus
41 Therefore I say to the question that in the intellect of a

creature and pilgrim it is possible to have a concept proper to
God, because God could create such in us or in our intellect by
infusing a proportional light, as was said in the second question of
this first book, which the intellect of the pilgrim could not acquire
naturally from creatures and therefore God is not naturally
knowable to us according to another sort of knowledge that is
proper and definitive, but only according to some common concept
which we draw from creatures.
42 That is made clear in this way: there are four ways in which
something can be known: one way is according to a notion that is
proper and definitive, which indicates its proper quiddity, as man
when he is known according to the proper notion of humanity;
another way is as a universal, as in a concept common to himself
and others, e.g., when man is known to be an animal; the third
way is adventitiously (per accidens), as when man is known to be
white; a fourth way is in relationship to another, as when it is
said 'man is the noblest of animals.'
43 Thus God can be known in four ways: one way is according
to his quidditative meaning, as is the case when he is known
according to the notion of deity, and in this way he is not
naturally knowable by us, for although God could create in our
intellect a representation of himself under the aspect of deity, no
That is, the state of being univocal or unambiguous.

creatura causare repraesentativum tale, quia sicut argutum est

prius, impossible est aliquod obiectum causare in nobis perfectius
repraesentativum suo proprio representative quo repraesentat se
ipsum.
44 Contra, secundum haec dicta videtur quod de Deo non

potest a nobis naturaliter haberi aliquis conceptus sibi proprius.
45 Responsio: dico quod loquendo de conceptu simpliciter
simplici non resolubili in diversos conceptus non possumus
habere de eo conceptum proprium, quin omnis talis a creatura
abstractus sit sibi et creaturae univoce communis. Sed quia
stando in tali conceptu non possumus distinguere ipsum a non
ipso, per proprium conceptum possemus eum sic distinguere, sed
talem conceptum simpliciter simplicem et communem contingit
per alium conceptum vel per alios conceptus simpliciter
simplices communes sibi et creaturis priorem19 determinare et
sic fiet sibi proprius, ita quod nulli creaturae communis, licet a
creaturis abstrahantur conceptus huiusmodi.
46 Exemplum: ens est conceptus simpliciter simplex dictus de
Deo et creatura; iste conceptus, determinatus per aliquem
conceptum alium aeque communem, ut bonitatem, actualitatem,
et necesse esse simul et coniunctim, fit proprius Deo et nulli
creaturae conveniens, ut ens, bonum, actus purus et necesse esse
est Deus; et iste est magis proprius ad quem possumus attingere
in vita ista, nullum tamen definitivum conceptum vel exprimens
quiditatem istam deitatis, ut deitas est, possumus naturaliter
habere in vita ista, quia secundum Philosophum II Posteriorum,20
licet quaelibet pars definitionis sit in plus quam definitum, totum
tamen sive partes simul sumptae sunt in aeque.
47 Ad primum argumentum principale21 dicendum quod vera

est auctoritas quando dicitur 'sicut sensibilia ad sensum sic
phantasmata ad intellectum', quoad primam motionem, sed non
10 Priorem: sic codd.; melius: prius.

20 Aristot., Anal. Post. II, c. 13 (96a 32-4).
21 Cf. supra n. 1.
creature could cause such a representation. For, as was argued

earlier, it is impossible that some object cause in us a more
perfect representation than what is properly representative of
itself.
44 To the contrary: according to this statement it would seem
that naturally we could not have any concept proper to God.
45 Response: I admit that, if we are speaking of a concept that
is absolutely simple, and cannot be split up into diverse concepts,
we cannot have a proper concept of God without every concept of
this sort abstracted from a creature being univocally common to
himself and the creature. But since we cannot distinguish him
from what is not him if we remain with such a concept, we must
be able to distinguish him through a concept that is proper, but
this takes place only after another conceptor other concepts
that are unqualifiedly simple and common to him and creatures
first qualifies such a simply* simple common concept and thus it
becomes proper to God, so that it is not common to any creature,
although such concepts are all abstracted from creatures.
46 For example: 'being' is a simply simple concept affirmed of
God and a creature; this concept, qualified by means of some
other equally common concept, such as goodness, actuality, and
necessary existence simultaneously joined to it, is proper to God
and inapplicable to any creature: e.g., 'a being that is good, pure
act and has necessary existence' is God. And this is just about as
proper a concept as we can have of him in this life, for we cannot
in this life have naturally any definitive concept, which is
expressive of this quiddity that is deity, as deity. For according to
the Philosopher in Bk. II of Posterior Analytics, although each
part of the definition is more than what is defined, nevertheless
the parts taken together are equal to it.
47 To the first argument [n. 1] at the beginning it must be said

that the authoritative statement is true when it is said 'as sense
perceptibles are to the senses, so the sense images are to the
intellect' as regards that, which first moves it. But it is not true of
the operation which follows this, because the sense is not able to
quoad operationem sequentem illam, quia sensus non est

abstractivus sicut intellectus, quia cognoscendo albedinem potest
ab eo abstrahere conceptum entis et in illo intelliget commune
aliquid Deo et creaturae. Et si addat sibi aliud abstractum, ut
summum ens vel aliquid huiusmodi, habebit conceptum proprium
Dei ex coniunctione conceptuum simplicium.
48 Hoc etiam patet in exemplo: si cognoscam pentagonum et
alias figuras sub propriis rationibus suis, non tamen cognosco
triangulum, possum a pentagono et aliis figuris abstrahere
conceptum communem figurae qui licet sit abstractus a
pentagono ita tamen convenit triangulo sicut pentagono a quo
abstrahebatur et ex ordine figurarum abstraham22 a figuris
primitatem et ex coniunctione primitatis cum figura concludam
de triangulo ipsam esse figuram primam quia isti conceptus,
scilicet primitatis et figurae, licet in se sint communes, simul
tamen iuncti constituunt naturam trianguli et nullius alterius
figurae ipsius tamen trianguli rationem definitivam et
propriam quiditatem non indicat, quia illam oportet inquirere per
definitionem trianguli.
49 Ita est in proposito. Cognitio vero Dei qua cognoscitur per
viam causalitatis et eminentiae in respectu ad creaturas non
potest esse propria eius cognitio nec est prima nobis possibilis,
quia prius necesse est cognoscere absolutum cui convenit talis
respectus quam respectum, ut prius oportet cognoscere Deum
esse tale ens cui convenit respectus causalitatis vel eminentiae,
quam cognoscere istum respectum in eo. Nec cognitio per accidens
est prima nobis naturaliter possibilis, quia cognitio accidentis
supponit cognitionem substrati ipsi accidenti vel quasi-accidenti.
Unde cognitio Dei sub ratione bonitatis, veritatis et huiusmodi,
non est eius prima cognitio nobis naturaliter possibilis, quia isti
conceptus sunt quasi-accidentales, eo quod non naturam, sed
quae circa naturam Dei sunt, significant, secundum
Damascenum; et ideo naturaliter praecognoscitur illud cui istae
Lege: si abstraham.
abstract as the intellect is, for the latter in knowing whiteness

can abstract the concept of 'being' from it and in it one knows
something common to God and to a creature. And if one adds to
this another abstract notion, such as 'the highest being' or
something of this sort, one will have a concept proper to God from
the combination of simple concepts.
48 This is also evident from an example: If I know a pentagon
and other figures through conceptions that are proper to them,
but do not know a triangle, I can abstract from a pentagon and
from other figures the common concept of 'figure,' which,
although it is abstracted from a pentagon, nevertheless pertains
to a triangle to the same extent that it does to the pentagon from
which it was abstracted. And if from the order that exists among
figures I abstract the notion of first' and from the combination of
'first' and 'figure' I conclude about a triangle that 'this is the first
figure'because these concepts, namely, of 'first' and 'figure,'
though in themselves both are common notions, nevertheless
joined together constitute the nature of a triangle and no other
figurestill this does not indicate the definitive and proper
quiddity of a triangle, for one has to find that through the
definition of a triangle.
49 And so it is in the case at hand. However, the knowledge of
God, which one knows by way of causality and eminence with
reference to creatures, cannot be proper knowledge of him.
Neither is such the first thing that we are able to know [about
God], because it is first necessary to know what the absolute is to
which these relationships pertain before one knows what the
relationship is. Thus it is first necessary to know that God is the
sort of being to which the relationships of causality and eminence
pertain before one knows that they do pertain to him. Neither is
accidental knowledge the first that is naturally possible for us,
because the knowledge of what is accidental presupposes the
substrate that underlies the accident or quasi-accident. Hence the
knowledge of God under the aspect of goodness, of truth and the
like is not the first knowledge of him that is naturally possible for
us to have, because these concepts are quasi-accidental, to the
extent that they do not signify, according to Damascene, the
nature but what is 'about the nature.' And, therefore, that, to
proprietates quasi-accidentales conveniunt, sed non illud secun

dum propriam rationem eius et quiditativam. Ergo relinquitur
quod secundum rationem communem, acceptam quidem a
creaturis, et sibi quodammodo ut dictum est propriam, in
quantum conceptus de se communes simul iuncti illi naturae
tantum conveniant.
50 Ad illud23 quando dicitur de oculo noctuae, etc., multae sunt
hic solutiones, et illa Commentatoris parum vel nihil valet; sed
exemplum est verum de cognitione possibili oculo corporali; non
enim habet nisi cognitionem intuitivam et sic est simile ad
propositum de oculo et intellectu. Sicut oculus enim nycticoracis
non potest solem cognoscere intuitive, sic nec intellectus noster
potest Deum videre naturaliter intuitive.
51 Ad aliud24 quando dicitur quod infinitum est incognitum
sive ignotum in quantum huiusmodi, dicendum quod infinitum
cuius ratio est in potentia absolute est ignotum et non
cognoscibile secundum rationem vel modum suae infinitatis ab
aliquo intellectu etiam divino, scilicet accipiendo alterum post
alterum; istud tamen infinitum non sub ratione infinitatis vel
secundum modum in semper accipiendo, sed quasi omnia simul
accipiendo sic cognoscitur ab intellectu infinito; Deus autem non
est huiusmodi infinitum, sed in actu, et ideo habet rationem
cognoscibilis etiam a nobis.
52 Ad auctoritatem Philosophi de II Metaphysicae,25 quod non
est processus in cognoscendo unum post aliud in infinitum, dico
quod Philosophus probat ibi quod processus in causis non est in
infinitum, accipiendo unam post alteram et hoc non potest
intellectus cognoscere in infinitum, et cum tu probas quod propter
proportionem entium vel mobilium ad infinitum motorem, dico
quod infinitum habet proportionem motivi ad mobile secundum
cognitionem finitam.
2:i Cf. supra n. 2.

24 Cf. supra n. 3.
25 Cf. supra n. 3.
which these quasi-accidental properties belong, is naturally

presupposed, but not [known] according to its proper quidditative
conception. Therefore we are left with that common notion, taken
indeed from creatures, andas was saidsomehow proper to
him, insofar as concepts, of themselves common but
simultaneously combined, agree only with that nature.
50 To that [argument in n. 2] when it is said that 'the eye of an
owl, etc.' there are many solutions, and that given by the
Commentator is of the least or no value whatsoever. But the
example is true so far as what the eye of a body can know. For it
has only intuitive* knowledge, and thus the analogy is relevant
regarding the eye and the intellect. For just as the eye of the owl
cannot know the Sun intuitively, so neither can our intellect
naturally intuitively see God.
51 To the other [n. 3], when it is said that the infinite is not
known or is unknown as such, it must be said that the infinite
whose notion consists absolutely of nothing but potency is
unknown and not able to be known according to the way and
manner of its infinity by any intellect, even one that is divine,
namely, by receiving one [part] after another. However, such
infinitenot under the notion of inifinity, or in the manner of
receiving [part by part] continuously, but, as it were, by receiving
simultaneously all [in its entirety]in this way is known by the
infinite intellect. God however is not infinite in this way, but in
actuality, and therefore he has a knowable aspect also for us.
52 To the authoritative statement of the Philosopher in Bk. II
of the Metaphysics, [n. 3] that there is no process ad infinitum in
knowing one thing after another, I say that the Philosopher
proves there that it is a process in the order of causes, taking one
after another, that is not ad infinitum, and the intellect cannot
know something in this way ad infinitum, and when you use as a
proof the proportionality of beings or mobiles to an infinite mover,
I say that the infinite has a proportionality of the mover to the
mobile according to knowledge that is finite.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum]
53 Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.
Videtur quod sic:

Illud quo maius cogitari non potest est per se notum; sed
Deus est huiusmodi, secundum Anselmum;26 ergo etc. Probatio
maioris, quia oppositum praedicati repugnat subiecto.
54 Item, veritatem esse est per se notum, IV Metaphysicae;21
Deus est veritas; ergo haec est per se nota 'Deus est'.
55 Item, propositiones habentes evidentiam ex entitate
terminorum secundum quid, scilicet ex hoc quod sunt in
intellectu, habent necessariam veritatem et per se notam; ergo
multo magis propositiones habentes evidentiam ex entitate
simpliciter, sicut Deum esse; huiusmodi sunt per se notae.
56 Contra:
Dixit insipiens in corde suo 'Non est Deus'.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
57 Responsio: hic primo ostendo quid est propositio per se nota,

scilicet quae est quae habet evidentem veritatem ex suis terminis
ut sui sunt; unde in propositione per se nota non excluditur
terminorum notitia, quia nulla propositio est nota sine cognitione
terminorum; sed in ratione causae vel veritatis evidentis istius
propositionis per se notae excluditur quaecumque alia veritas
complexa.
58 Illa est igitur nota per se quae non habet evidentiam ex
altera propositione notiori in veritate, sed ex suis terminis
intrinsecis ut sui sunt.
59 Et dico 'ut sui sunt' vel conceptus confusi ut confusi sunt vel
distincti ut distincti sunt. Non enim sunt idem termini definitio et
definitum, quia definitum prius notum est quam definitio, eo
* Anselmus, Proslogion, c. 5 (ed. F.S. Schmitt I, 104; PL 158, 229).

Cf. Aristot.. Metaph. IV (f), c. 4 (10066 8-10).
Dist. 3, Question Two 200
Question Two
Is God's existence known per se?
53 Is it self-evident that God exists?

It seems that it is:
That greater than which nothing can be conceived is known
of itself; but God is such according to Anselm; therefore etc.
Proof of the major: because the opposite of the predicate is
repugnant to the subject.
54 Also, it is known per se that truth exists, Bk. IV of the
Metaphysics. God is truth; therefore this is known per se: 'God
exists.'
55 Also, propositions having evidence from the existence of the
terms in a qualified sense, namely from the fact that they exist in
the intellect, have truth that is necessary and known per se;
therefore all the more so propositions that have evidence by
reason of existence in an unqualified sense, such as "that God
exists," are known per se.
56 To the contrary: The fool says in his heart There is no God. *
To the Question
57 Response: Here I show first what a self-evident or per se

proposition is, namely that which has evidence from its terms as
they stand;7 hence in a proposition that is per se known,
knowledge of the terms is not excluded, since no proposition is
known without knowledge of its terms; but what is excluded as a
cause or as evidence of its truth is any other complex* or
propositional truth.
58 Hence what is known per se does not derive its evidence
from another proposition that is better known as a truth, but is
known by reason of its intrinsic terms as they stand.
59 And I say 'as they stand' meaning 'indistinct or confused*
concepts as indistinct,' or 'distinct as distinct.' For the definition
and the defined are not the same terms, because the defined is
known before the definition, because the indistinct and confused
6 Psalm. 13:1 or 52:1.

7 Or 'as such,' 'in their present function': see below, n. 59 for clarification.
quod confusum et confusa sunt prius nota, I Physicorum;26 unde

nomen definiti importat rem in intellectu modo confuso et
conceptu confuso; sed per definitionem importatur conceptus
distinctus circa eandem rem; et ideo aliquid potest esse per se
notum secundum unum terminum, scilicet secundum definitum
quod non erit notum secundum definitionem.
60 Item, definitio est medium in demonstratione et definitum
erit conclusum, et ideo dixi 'ut sui sunt', scilicet confuse, si sunt
concepti confuse, et distincte, si sunt concepti distincte. Unde
definitio ut est medium non est ut sic declarativum vel magis
evidens quoad nos quam subiectum definitum; sed propositio
maior vel minor est magis evidens conclusione.
61 Distinctio autem non est ad propositum qua dicitur quod
propositio potest esse nota per se vel per se noscibilis; sufficit
enim quod sit per se noscibilis ex terminis quantum est de se,
licet non actualiter cognoscatur.
62 Similiter de noto quoad nos et in se, quia sufficit quod
propositio sit de se nota, si sit intellectus cognoscens, evidentia
enim patet ex habitudine terminorum. Exemplum de syllogismo
qui nullo indiget ut appareat necessarius, I Priorum.29 Haec
autem evidentia est ex habitudine principiorum sive propo-
sitionum ad conclusionem quae est necessitas habitudinis, et sic
in propositione per se nota est evidentia et quaedam habitudo
terminorum.
63 Quando ergo quaeritur de ista propositione 'Deus est' an sit
per se nota, intelligendo de Deo in se et de esse Dei in se, dico
quod propositio est per se nota intellectui habenti distinctam
notitiam terminorum et ita nota sicut ista 'omne totum est maius
sua parte'.
64 Sed si intelligas 'an sit per se nota ex his quae concipimus de
Deo ex creaturis', non est propositio per se nota; sic enim nec
Deus nec esse est a nobis cognoscibile, secundum quod tales
conceptus abstrahantur de Deo ex creaturis, immo est propositio
demonstrabilis. Quidquid enim convenit alicui primo et per se
Aristot. Physica I, c. 1 (184a 21-2).

Aristot., Anal. Priora I, c. 1 (2466 22-4).
things are known first, according to Bk. I of the Physics; hence

the name of the defined implies that the thing in the intellect is
present in a vague manner and by an indistinct concept; but the
definition implies the distinct concept of the same thing; and
therefore something can be known per se according to one term,
namely the defined which will not be known by way of definition.
60 Also, the definition is a middle term in a demonstration, and
the defined will be in the conclusion, and therefore I have said 'as
they stand,' namely indistinctly, if they are conceived indistinctly,
and distinctly if they are conceived distinctly. Hence the
definition as middle term is not as manifest or more evident so far
as we go than the defined subject; but the major or minor
proposition is more evident than the conclusion.
61 But the distinction where it is said that the proposition can
be known per se or knowable per se does not apply to the case at
hand; for it suffices that it be knowable from its terms insofar as
it is of itself, although it may not be actually known.
62 It is the same as regards something knowable to us and in
itself, for it suffices that the proposition be of itself knowable, if
the intellect were only aware of it; for the evidence is there from
the relationship of the terms. An example is the syllogism, which
needs nothing to appear [logically] necessary, according to Bk. I of
the Prior Analytics. But this evidence is from the relationships of
principles or propositions to the conclusion, which is a necessity*
of relationship, and thus in a proposition that is known per se the
evidence is a certain relationship of terms.
63 When therefore it is asked of this proposition 'God exists'
whether it is known per se, understanding it of God in himself
and of the existence of God in it, I say that the proposition is
known per se to an intellect having distinct* knowledge of the
terms and it is known just as [clearly] as this one: 'Every whole is
greater than its part.'
64 But if you mean 'Is [God's existence] known per se from
those things that we conceive of him from creatures?' this is not a
per se known proposition; for in this way neither God nor that he
exists is knowable by us according to such concepts of God as we
abstract from creatures, rather the proposition is one that can be
demonstrated. For whatever pertains to something primarily and
potest esse medium ad demonstrandum propter quid de omni eo

quod est sub eo, sive per rationem eius potest demonstrari
propter quid et de superiori particulariter et de particulari
universaliter. Exemplum de triangulo cui convenit primo et per se
habere tres, ita quod per naturam trianguli et quiditatem eius
possum demonstrare particulariter de figura habere tres et
universaliter de isoscele et de omni contento sub triangulo. Cum
ergo esse primo et per se conveniat huic essentiae, ergo per
conceptum eius possum demonstrare esse de omni creatura
tanquam ex per se nota in se; sed quia nobis non est illud notum
esse divinum in se, ideo potest demonstrari de Deo demonstra-
tione quia, et hoc per esse quod concipimus ex creaturis. Quod
probo: quia quemcumque conceptum habemus proprium de Deo,
ut summum ens vel bonum vel aliquid tale, primo concipimus
extrema antequam formemus propositionem, et in illo priori
composita propositione, propositio non est per se nota.
65 Item, nullum conceptum simpliciter simplicem habemus de
Deo, ut probatum est prius; ergo omnes conceptus de Deo sunt
resolubiles, sed nihil resolubile est per se notum, quia conceptus
resolubilis non potest cognosci nisi prius cognoscantur per se
partes illius conceptus coniungi, et sic quaecumque propositio est
resolubilis nisi coniungi tales terminos sit per se notum. Unde
sicut quaecumque ratio de se falsa de nulla est vera, sic
quaecumque propositio quae de se est resolubilis, de nullo est per
se nota ex terminis, quia habens conceptus non simplices.
[A. Instantiae quaedam]
66 Ex his excludo quasdam instantias quibus probatur Deum

esse per se notum sic: actu operans esse est per se notum; Deus
est huiusmodi; vel da oppositum. Similiter, veritatem esse est
per se can be a middle term for demonstrating the reason why

anything that falls under it is a fact, whether the demonstration
can give the reason why a broader term applies to a particular
case, or why a particular term has a universal application. Take a
triangle for example: it pertains to it primarily to have three
angles and it has such per se, therefore through the nature and
quiddity of a triangle I can demonstrate that that particular
figure has three such angles and that universally an isosceles
[triangle] has them and all that is contained under 'triangle.'
Hence since being primarily and per se pertains to this
[particular] essence, therefore through its concept I can
demonstrate being or existence (esse) of every creature as known
per se in itself; but because this divine being is not known to us in
itself, therefore it [i.e., being or existence] can be demonstrated of
God by a demonstration* of simple* fact, and this through the
being or existence we conceive from creatures. Which I prove:
because whatever proper concept we might have about God, such
as 'highest being' or 'good' or some such thing, we first conceive
the terms before we form the proposition, and in that [instant,]
prior to the composition of the proposition, the proposition is not
known per se.
65 Likewise, we do not have an unqualifiedly simple concept of
God as was proved earlier, therefore all concepts of God are
separable [into component parts], but nothing that can be
separated in this way is known per se. For concepts with
separable parts cannot be known unless one first knows per se
that the parts of these concept are joined, and so any proposition
whatsoever is separable unless one knows per se that such terms
are joined. Hence just as any notion that is false in itself is not
true of anything, so any proposition which of itself can be
separated, is not known of anything per se from its terms,
because of having concepts that are not simple.
Certain Objections
66 From these I exclude certain objections which prove that

God's existence is per se known in this way: the fact that what is
actually operating exists is known per se; God is such; or prove
verum et per se notum; Deus est veritas; ergo etc. Similiter,

ens summum summe est cognoscibile et per se notum; Deus est
huiusmodi etc. Item, necesse esse est per se notum; Deus est
huiusmodi.
[B. Solutiones instantiarum]
67 Respondeo: si esset propositio per se nota, oportet primo

cognoscere conceptum subiecti per se notum et coniunctionem
subiecti et praedicati esse notam in entitate. Sic ergo oportet quod
conceptus terminorum sint per se noti; sed isti non sunt noti per
se, sed probati et demonstrati, eo quod non sunt conceptus
simplices.
68 Ad primum,30 dico quod propositio maior est per se vera, sed
non est per se nota. Ad probationem, dico quod non est per se
notum quod praedicatum repugnat evidenter subiecto; unde licet
repugnet, non tamen evidenter repugnat.
69 Ad illud quando dicitur ens summum esse est per se notum,
dico quod iste conceptus entis summi est resolubilis, et ideo
oportet ipsum esse unicum in re in extremis antequam
concludatur de hoc ente summo, scilicet de Deo.
70 Ad aliud31 quando dicitur quod veritatem esse est per se
notum, concedo: 'ergo Deum esse per se notum', fallacia
consequentis. Non enim sequitur 'aliquid est notum per se de
superiori; ergo est per se notum de inferiori'; Deus autem in
minori assumitur hic sub veritate.
71 Ad probationem dico quod non sequitur ex suo opposite: ergo
verum est veritatem non esse; sed bene sequitur sic: non verum
est veritatem esse. Ulterius ergo si non est verum veritatem esse,
aut intelligis de veritate in re vel in intellectu, et tunc oportet
aliquid esse in re correspondens veritati propositionis vel aliquid
M Cf. supra n. 53.

11 Cf. supra n. 54.
the opposite. Likewise, that truth exists is true and known per
se; God is truth, therefore etc. Likewise, the highest being is
able to be known in the highest way and is known per se; God is
such; therefore etc. Also, what exists necessarily is known per
se; God is such.
Answer to the Objections
67 I respond: if it were a per se known proposition, it would be

necessary that the concept of subject be known per se, and the
connection of the subject and predicate would be known to be
there.8 In this way then the concepts of the terms are known per
se; but these are not known per se; but these [need to be] proved
and demonstrated, inasmuch as they are not simple concepts.
68 To the first, [n. 53] I say that the major proposition is true
per se, but it is not known per se. As for the proof, I say that it is
not known per se that the predicate is clearly repugnant to the
subject; therefore, although it is repugnant, it is not evidently
repugnant.
69 As to when it is said that the highest being is known per se
to exist, I say that this concept of the highest being is separable
[into parts] and therefore it must be known that the parts refer to
one thing in reality before one may reach any conclusion about
this highest thing, namely, about God.
70 To the other [n. 54] when it is said it is known per se that
truth exists, I concede: [but to infer from this] 'therefore, God is
known per se' is a fallacy of consequent. For it does not follow
'something is known per se about a higher [concept], therefore it
is known about what falls under it'; but here in the minor God is
assumed to come under truth.
71 As for the proof, I say that from its opposite, this does not
follow, 'hence it is true that truth does not exist,' but what does
follow in this way is 'it is not true that truth exists.' Furthermore,
if it is not true, then, that truth exists, either you understand this
of truth in reality or truth in the intellect, and then it is necessary
that something exist in reality that corresponds to the truth of
8 The Latin has in entitate ('in entity'), but entitas means the relation
according to which it can be said of a thing that it is there or it exists.
in intellectu; sed hoc destruitur per praecedentem propositionem,

scilicet quando dicitur Veritas non est'.
72 Ad illud quod dicitur32 de necesse, dico quod non sequitur, si
est necesse esse quod sit notum esse, quia omnes propositiones de
primo modo dicendi per se sunt magis necessariae quam de
secundo, non tamen sunt magis notae, sive quod sint per se notae,
quia nulla est per se nota nisi resolvendo terminos in suas
definitiones, quae est magis in se notus conceptus quam
conceptus nominis; sed nobis magis notus confusus, I
Physicorum.33 Unde talis conceptus evidenter ostendit unionem
sui et habitudinem ad entitatem, quando scilicet termini
concipiuntur secundum quid et confuse, ut in toto et in parte,
unde statim notum est per se quod omne totum maius est sua
parte. Sed non sic est de terminis compositis simpliciter et
distincte; licet sint magis necessariae, non tamen magis nobis
notae.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum vestigium Trinitatis sit in qualibet creatura]
73 Utrum vestigium Trinitatis sit in qualibet creatura.
Videtur quod non:

Effectus non repraesentat suam causam nisi secundum quod
est ab ea. Omnis autem creatura est a Deo in quantum unus, non
M Cf. supra n. 55.

Cf. supra n. 59.
the proposition, or that there is something in the intellect. But

this is denied by the proposition that precedes, namely when it is
said 'there is no truth.'
72 To what is said [n. 55] about 'exists necessarily,' I say that it
does not follow, if something 'exists necessarily,' that this is
known [per se] to exist. For all propositions in the first mode* of
necessary predication* are more necessary than those in the
second mode,* but they are not more readily known, or known per
se. For nothing is known per se except by resolving the terms into
their definitions, [a definition]9 being a concept better known in
itself than the concept of the name. But for us, a confused concept
is better known, according to Bk. I of the Physics. Hence a concept
evidently displays its unity and the relationship or aptitude to
what exists [ad entitatem], when it is of such a kind that the
terms are conceived in a qualified sense and confusedly, as in a
whole and in part; hence it is immediately known per se that any
whole is greater than its part. But this is not the way composite
terms [are conceived] ; although they are more necessary, they are
not better known to us.
Question Three
Is there a vestige of the Trinity in every creature?
73 In every creature is there a vestige of the Trinity?
It seems not:
An effect represents its cause only according to the way in
which it stems from it. But every creature is from God insofar as
9 The Latin has quae which appears to refer back to 'definitions,' but the
verb indicates that the subject is singular, namely, a definition. The definition,
used as the middle term, is better known than what is simply named, viz. the
subject.
in quantum trinus, quia omnis actio ad extra est essentialis

conveniens tribus personis. Ergo effectus repraesentat Deum in
quantum unus, non est in quantum trinus.
74 Contra:
Augustinus VI De Trinitate, cap. ultimo,34 ubi dicit quod
numerus, species et ordo in omni re creata invenitur in quibus
prima origo pulchritudinis praesentatur.
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio aliorum]
75 Aliqui dicunt quod vestigium et imago differunt in hoc quod

vestigium repraesentat aliquid confuse et imperfecte ut sub
ratione speciei, imago vero distincte et perfecte sub ratione
individui.
[B. Contra opinionem aliorum]
76 Contra: licet imago et vestigium differant in hoc quod imago

repraesentat aliquid perfecte et vestigium imperfecte, hoc tamen
non est secundum rationem speciei et individui, sed secundum
rationem totius quantitativi et partis, quia quod est vestigium
totius est imago partis; nam si totum imprimeretur in aliquo
super quo fit transitus, esset imago totius et non solum partis; et
ideo quando solum remanet impressio partis, est quaedam imago
partis et vestigium totius.
77 Praeterea ad hoc arguitur: si non esset nisi unum animal
possibile in universo, adhuc posset distingui in eo ratio imaginis
et vestigii, non tamen secundum rationem speciei et individui; ita
enim distincte repraesentat vestigium partem sicut imago totum.
M August., De Trin. VI, c. 10, n. 12 (CCSL 50, 242; PL. 42, 932).
Dist. 3, Question Three 205
he is one, not insofar as he is triune, because every outward

action is essential, i.e., pertaining to all three persons.*10
Therefore the effect represents God as one and not as triune.
74 On the contrary:
Augustine in Bk. VI of the Trinity, the last chapter, says that
every created thing has number, form, and order, which are the
primary origins of beauty.
To the Question
75 Some say that a vestige and an image differ in this that a

vestige represents something confusedly and imperfectly, under
the aspect of a species, whereas an image represents it perfectly
under the aspect of an individual.
Refutation of the opinion of others
76 To the contrary: although image and vestige differ in this

that an image represents something perfectly and a vestige does
so imperfectly, this difference is not one of species and individual,
but rather one of a quantitative whole and a part, because what is
a vestige of a whole is an image of a part. For if a whole were to
be impressed in something, in respect to which this process [of
impression] happens, it would be an image of the whole and not
only of a part; and therefore, when only an impression of a part
remains, one has an image of a part and a vestige of the whole.
77 Furthermore it is argued regarding this: if only one animal
were possible in the universe, one could still distinguish in it the
notion of a vestige and an image, but not according to the
difference between a species and an individual. For a vestige
represents a part just as distinctly as an image represents a
whole.
10 That is, it stems from the essence the three persons share in common.
[II. Opinio Scoti]
78 Dico ergo quod vestigium est expressa similitudo partis,

scilicet secundum figuram et quantitatem, et sic arguitive et
imperfecte repraesentat totum, ut si aliqua pars imaginis esset
abscissa, adhuc repraesentat totum, licet imperfecte.
79 Secundo est videndum in quo consistit ratio vestigii et dico
quod creatura non potest distincte repraesentare Trinitatem, sed
quaecumque in creaturis per modum similitudinis et proportionis
repraesentant appropriabilia tribus personis includunt rationem
vestigii: per modum similitudinis, ut bonitas bonitatem, et veritas
veritatem, et unitas unitatem; per modum proportionis, ut
limitatum illimitatum, dependens independens, possibile necesse
esse.
80 Patet in prima assignatione 'numerus, species et ordo': duo
prima repraesentant per modum similitudinis et tertium per
modum proportionis. Numerus vel unitas est appropriabilis Patri,
species Filio, quia species et pulchritudo est ex coniunctione
multorum convenientium ad invicem, ut patet in corporibus, et
ita non potest ita convenienter Patri attribui sicut Filio, qui primo
est decor Patris. Ordo significat bonitatem per modum
proportionis creaturae limitatae ad Spiritum Sanctum cui
attribuitur bonitas et commensuratio cuiuslibet rei ordinatae.
81 Et licet vestigium in creatura repraesentet appropriabilia
personis divinis, non tamen in quantum sunt appropriata, quia
tunc deducerent35 in cognitionem illorum prius quibus ista
appropriantur et sic in notititam Trinitatis personarum; sed
repraesentat appropriabilia, id est illa quae nata sunt appropriari
tribus personis, et illa absolute possumus cognoscere, ut
potentiam, sapientiam, et bonitatem vel iustitiam et huiusmodi.
82 Quomodo autem repraesentant ista sub ratione partis? Dico
quod quaecumque perfectio appropriabilis ex ratione sui statim
determinat quod est in aliquo supposito per se subsistente, et sic
,r, Sic codd.; lege: deduceret.

The opinion of Scotus
78 I say therefore that a vestige is an express likeness of a part,

namely, according to figure and quantity,* and so arguably and
imperfectly it represents the whole, so that if some part of the
image were cut off, it would still represent the whole, although
imperfectly.
79 Secondly one must investigate what the notion of a vestige
consists in and I say that a creature cannot distinctly represent
the Trinity, but whatever it is in creatures that represents what
can be properly attributed to the three persons by way of likeness
or correspondence, has the character of a vestige: by way of
likeness, as goodness [represents] goodness, truthtruth, and
unityunity; by way of correspondence, as limited [represents]
unlimited, dependentindependent, possiblenecessary being.
80 It is evident in the first attribution: number,
beauty/shapeliness (species), and order. The first two represent as
a likeness, and the third as a correspondence. Number and unity
can be attributed to the Father, beauty to the Son, because
beauty and shapeliness come from a combination of many things
that agree with one another, as is evident in bodies, and it cannot
be as conveniently attributed to the Father as to the Son, who is
primarily the beauty of the Father. Order signifies goodness
through a limited creature's correspondence to the Holy Spirit, to
whom the goodness and commensurateness of any well ordered
thing is attributed.
81 And although a vestige in a creature represents what can be
attributed to the divine persons, however [it does so] not insofar
as they are actually attributed, for then it would lead to the
knowledge of those prior ones to whom they are attributed and
thus to a knowledge of the persons of the Trinity. Rather it
represents what can be attributed, i.e., those things that are
suited by nature to be attributed to the three persons, and those
things we can know absolutely, such as potency, wisdom, and
goodness or justice, and the like.
82 But how do these represent as parts? I say that any
perfection whatsoever that is able to be attributed, by reason of
what it is at once determines that it is in some person or subject
Trinitas est quasi quoddam totum habens partes et perfectio

praesentabilis vel appropriabilis quasi pars est et quaedam unitas
illius ternarii, et secundum hoc habet rationem partis et non
ducit in cognitionem alterius.
[III. Ad argumentum principale]
83 Per hoc patet ad rationem in oppositum quod non sequitur:

creatura ducit in cognitionem Dei in quantum unus, ergo non est
vestigium Trinitatis', quia vestigium non ducit perfecte in
cognitionem vestigiati, sed in cognitionem alicuius appropriabilis
vestigiato.
[Quaestio 4
Utrum memoria habeat speciem intelligibilem distinctam]
84 Utrum in parte intellectiva proprie sumpta sit memoria

habens speciem intelligibilem realiter distinctam ab actu
intelligendi et praeviam actui intellectus.
Quod non videtur:

Quia omnis species repraesentat obiectum sub ratione sub
qua natum est imprimere eam; sed obiectum non est natum
imprimere speciem nisi sub ratione singularis et obiectum
intelligibile sive intellectus est sub ratione universalis; ergo
intellectus nullam potest recipere speciem intelligibilem ab
obiecto immediate. Maior est plana, quia si obiectum imprimit
speciem non sub ratione qua natum est imprimere eam, tunc
imprimit aliud quam speciem. Minor patet, quia actiones sunt
singularium.
subsisting per se, and thus the Trinity is a certain quasi-whole

having parts, and a perfection that can be presented or ascribed is
a quasi-part and a certain unit of this triad, and according to this
it has the character of a part and does not lead to the knowledge
of another.
To the initial argument
83 Through this it is evident to the argument for the opposite

that it does not follow 'a creature leads to the knowledge of God
insofar as he is one, therefore it is not a vestige of the Trinity,'
because a vestige does not lead perfectly to a knowledge of that of
which it is a vestige, but to the knowledge of something that can
be appropriate to that of which it is a vestige.
Question Four
Does memory* have a distinct intelligible* species?11
84 In the intellective part taken properly is there a memory

that has an intelligible species, the latter being really distinct
from the act of understanding and prior to the act of the intellect?
It seems there is not:

For every species/form represents the object under the
aspect under which the latter is suited by nature to impress the
species. However, the object is not suited by nature to impress the
species, except under the aspect of a singular, and the intelligible
object or what is understood has the character of a universal;
therefore the intellect cannot receive any intelligible species from
the object directly. The major [premise] is clear, because if the
object does not impress the species under the aspect under which
it is suited by nature to impress it, then it impresses something
other than its species. The minor is evident, because actions are
all singulars.
11 "Intelligible species" in this case is a misnomer: it should read "intelligible

form," in the sense of the Greek nop*ti, as is clear from the context and references
to Aristotle's De anima (also see Glossary). The term has been retained since the
expression has already become common in scholarly literature in its current
form.
85 Item, praesentia obiecti respectu potentiae est causa speciei

in potentia et non e converso; ergo non per speciem ut per causam
obiectum est praesens potentiae.
86 Praeterea, si esset species intelligibilis in intellectu,
informaret eum sicut accidens subiectum suum; ergo intellectus
patietur ab obiecto passione reali, non igitur passione
intentionali, et sic sequitur quod intelligere non est motus rei ad
animam.
87 Item, si potest esse una species intelligibilis in intellectu, et
plures; sed quaelibet species naturaliter repraesentat suum
obiectum; ergo qua ratione una species movet ad suum actum
intellectionis, et omnes vel nulla; non omnes, quia tunc omnes
intellectiones essent simul; ergo nulla movebit, et sic per
consequens species non est ponenda in intellectu ad
repraesentandum obiectum nec ad movendum intellectum, nec ut
necessaria ad actum intellectionis.
88 Contra:
Intellectus quandoque est in potentia essentiali ante
addiscere et quandoque in potentia accidentali ante intelligere, II
De anima et III,36 et VIII Physicorum;31 ergo aliter se habet
quando est in potentia accidentali quam ante quando est in
potentia essentiali, obiectum autem non se habet aliter sed eodem
modo. Si igitur intellectus se habet aliter ut est in potentia
accidentali, ergo est mutatus; sed omnis mutatio terminatur ad
aliquam formam; ergo aliqua forma praecedit actum intellectionis
et illam voco speciem.

A. Opinio Gandavensis et Godefridi]
89 Hic est una opinio in qua concordant duo doctores, licet in

aliis sibi saepius contradicant. Negant enim omnem speciem
impressam ponendo tantum actum intelligendi imprimi ab
obiecto in phantasmate, et habent auctoritates pro se et rationes.
M Aristot., De anima II, c. 5 (417a 21-6 2); ibid. III, c. 4 (1296 5-10).
17 Aristot., Physica VIII, c. 4 (2556 1-5).
Dist. 3, Question Four 208
85 Also, the presence of the object with respect to the potency is

the cause of the species in the potency and not vice versa;
therefore it is not through the species as a cause that the object is
present in the potency.
86 Also, if the intelligible species were [already] in the intellect,
it would inform it as an accident informs its subject; therefore the
intellect will receive a real imprint from this object, and therefore
not a conceptual one, and thus it would follow that understanding
is not a movement of a real thing towards the soul.
87 Also, if one intelligible species can be in the intellect, also
several can; but each species naturally represents its object; for
the same reason, therefore, that one species moves [the intellect]
to its act of understanding, all do or none does; not all, because
then all intellections would occur together; therefore none will
move, an thus as a consequence species should not be postulated
in the intellect to represent the object nor to move the intellect,
nor as something necessary for the act of intellection.
88 To the contrary:
The intellect is at times in essential potency before
acquiring knowledge and at other times in accidental* potency*
before [actually] understanding, according to Bk. II and III of the
De anima, and Bk. VIII of the Physics; therefore, when it is in
accidental potency it is in a different state than before when it is
in essential potency, but the object known is not in a different
state but in the same in both cases. Therefore, if the intellect is in
a different state as it is in accidental potency, it undergoes a
change; but every change ends with some form; therefore some
form precedes the act of intellection, and that I call a species.
Status of the Question

The opinion of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines
89 Here there is one opinion in which two doctors agree,

although in other matters they contradict one another. For they
deny any imprinted [but not actualized] species, postulating that
only the act of understanding itself is imprinted by the object in
the sense imagination, and they have reasons and authoritative
statements for this. The Philosopher in Bk. IIl of De anima
Philosophus III De anima36 commendat antiquos qui posuerunt

animam esse locum specierum, non totam, sed intellectivam
tantum. Certum autem est quod Philosophus ponit species in aliis
potentiis animae subiective, solum autem intellectum dicit locum
specierum. Ergo non sunt in eo subiective sive impressive, sed
obiective tantum et expressive et in hoc differt ab aliis potentiis.
90 Praeterea, Augustinus III De Trinitate, cap. 839 et
ubicumque loquitur de ista materia, dicit productionem Verbi sive
ipsum Verbum non gigni a specie, sed de scientia quae manet in
anima.
91 Item, ostendit40 per rationem quod non sit species in
intellectu. Cuius deductio talis est: sensus non habet sensationem
obiecti, nisi propter duo: vel quia organum est eiusdem
dispositionis cum medio, et sic si medium recipit speciem, et
organum; vel quia species est proxima dispositio recipiendi
actum. Et neutrum est hic, scilicet in intellectu. Non primum,
patet, quia non habet organum; nec secundum, quia intellectus de
se dispositus est nec requirit proximam dispositionem, id est
medium. Unde in toto illo processu ab obiecto usque ad
intellectum, agens non abstrahit speciem a specie sive a
phantasmate, sed abstrahit obiectum ab obiecto. Sed quid est hoc,
nisi per hoc quod est praesens phantasmati, licet alio et alio
modo.
92 Alius doctor41 adducit rationem et ponit deductionem de
organo. Ratio istius est talis: ad quod aliquid est primo et per se
in potentia, illud et non aliud recipitur ab agente proportionali
sibi; sed virtus cognitiva est in potentia per se et primo respectu
propriae cognitionis; ergo ab obiecto proportionate recipit
cognitionem et non speciem.
93 Confirmat hoc per Augustinum, IV De Trinitate, cap.42 ubi
dicit quod forma sive species impressa visui visio est, et sic
38 Aristot., De anima III, c. 4 (429a 27-8).

:,0 August., De Trin. XV, c. 11. n. 20 (CCSL 50A, 488; PL 42, 1072).
40 Henricus Gand., Quodl. V, q. 14 in corp. (f. 176K).
41 Godefridus de Font., Quodl. IX, q. 19 in corp. (PhB IV, 271, 273, 275).
Rectius: August., De Trin. XI, c. 2, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 335; PL 42, 985).
commends the ancients who assume the soul to be the location of

the species: not the entire soul, but the intellective part. It is
certain, however, that the Philosopher posits the species in a
subdued state (subjective) in other potencies of the soul, but only
the intellect is called the location of the species. Therefore they
are not in it in a subdued or imprinted state, but only as objects
and expressly, and in this intellect is unlike other potencies.
90 Furthermore, Augustine in Bk. IIl of the Trinity, chapter 8,
and wherever he speaks of this matter, says the production* of
the word, or the word himself, is not born of a species, but of
knowledge which remains in the soul.
91 Also, he [i.e. Henry] shows by rational argument that there
is no species in the intellect, deducing this in the following way:
the sense only has a sensation of the object because of two things:
either because the organ is disposed in the same way as the
medium, and so if the medium receives the species, the organ
does also; or because the species is a proximate disposition
towards receiving the act. Neither of these occurs here, namely,
in the intellect. It is evident the first does not, because the
intellect has no organ; neither does the second, because the
intellect of itself is disposed [to receive its act] and requires no
proximate disposition or means [that enables the intellect to
receive its act]. Hence in the entire process from the object up to
understanding [it], the agent abstracts no species from a species
[in the senses] or from the imagination, but abstracts the object
from the object [itself]. But this can only be because [that object]
is present to the sense imagination, although it is there in some
other way.
92 The other doctor [i.e. Godfrey of Fontaines] adduces this
reason and postulates this inference about what is in the organ.
He gives this sort of reason: what is received from a moving agent
proportionate to something is only that, regarding which this
something is primarily and per se in potency, and nothing else;
but the cognitive power is in potency primarily and per se as
regards its proper cognition; therefore from a proportionate object
[as a mover] it receives cognition and not an [intelligible] species.
93 He confirms this by a reference to Augustine, Bk. IV of the
Trinity, in the chapter where he says that the form or species
species non potest esse in potentia spirituali quae differat ab actu

suo, licet sit in organis potentiarum sensitivarum. Sequitur ergo
quod intellectus non habet speciem intelligibilem praeviam actui
intellectionis.
[B. Contra opiniones Henrici et Godefridi]
94 Sed non intelligo istam conclusionem et contra eam arguo

quadrupliciter, supponendo quod universale possit a nobis
intelligi intellectione abstractiva, quod omnes concedunt. Si
autem singulare possit intelligi et esse primum obiectum
intellectus, non curo modo.
95 Tunc arguo sic: intellectus potest habere obiectum actu

universale perfects sibi praesens antequam vel prius naturaliter
quam intelligat: ergo habet speciem obiecti in intellectu et non
solum in phantasmate priusquam intelligat.
96 Antecedens patet: quia sicut obiectum, ita per se condicio
obiecti intellectus cuiusmodi est universalitas praecedit actum
intellectus.
97 Consequentiam probo sic: species eadem et eiusdem rationis
non est per se repraesentativa obiecti sub oppositis rationibus
repraesentabilis; ratio universalis et ratio singularis sunt
oppositae rationes in cognoscibili et repraesentabili; ergo nulla
eadem species et unius rationis potest esse repraesentativa
alicuius obiecti sub ratione universalis et singularis. Species in
phantasmate repraesentat obiectum singulare sub ratione
singularis; ergo non potest repraesentare sub ratione universalis
idem obiectum. Maior probatur, quia species sub illa ratione
qua repraesentat obiectum mensuratur ab obiecto; sed idem non
potest mensurari duabus mensuris oppositis nec e converso, tunc
impressed upon the faculty of seeing is vision, and in a spiritual

potency there cannot be any species that is different from its act,
although [such a different species] can be in the organ of a
sensitive potency. It follows therefore that the intellect has no
intelligible species prior to its act of understanding.
Against the opinion of Henry and Godfrey
94 But I do not understand this conclusion and argue against it

in four ways, by assuming that the universal can be known by us
by abstractive* intellection, which all concede. Whether the
singular could be known and be the first object of the intellect,
however, I do not care at this point.
Reply of Scotus
95 Then I argue in this way: the intellect can naturally have a

universal object in actuality that is perfectly present to it before it
may understand: therefore it has a species of the object in the
intellect and not only in the sense imagination before it may
understand.
96 The antecedent is evident, because just as the object [is
naturally prior to the act], so also a [proper or] per se condition of
the object of the intellect, such as universality, precedes the act of
the intellect.
97 I prove that the implication* holds in this way: the same
species whose nature remains the same cannot per se represent
the object under opposite ways in which it can be represented; 'as
a universal' and 'as a singular' are opposed ways the object can be
represented or known; therefore no one and the same species
having but one way can be representative of some object under
the aspect of a universal and as a singular as well. The species in
the sense imagination represents the object as singular; therefore,
it cannot represent the same object as a universal. The major
is proved, because the species, under the aspect according to
which it represents the object, is measured by the object; but the
same thing cannot be measured by two opposite measures, nor
conversely, for then the same thing would be asserted twice,
enim idem bis diceretur, secundum Philosophum, V

Metaphysicae;43 ergo eadem species non potest repraesentare duo
opposita obiecta nec idem obiectum sub oppositis rationibus
obiectivis.
98 Dicetur quod non est inconveniens eandem speciem
representare diversa et opposita repraesentabilia in alio et alio
lumine, ut patet de noctilucentibus qui in alio et alio lumine
repraesentantur colorata et lucida. Sic in proposito per lumen
intellectus agentis et phantasiae eadem species potest reprae
sentare opposita in obiecto.
99 Contra, lumen non repraesentat, sed est in quo
repraesentativum repraesentat, quia lumen in medio est eiusdem
rationis sive videam album sive nigrum, quia ratio distinguit
essentialiter repraesentativum a repraesentativo; altera tamen
est species et repraesentativum albi et nigri. Et per consequens
distinctio luminis non causat distinctam rationem repraesentati-
vi, sed manente eadem natura repraesentativi semper
repraesentat idem repraesentabile et eiusdem rationis, non ergo
sub diversis rationibus.
100 Confirmatur ratio, quia repraesentativum in lumine
perfectiori non repraesentat aliud, sed repraesentat idem clarius
quam in lumine imperfectiori. Patet de specie albi et nigri in
lumine solis et lunae. Ergo licet species in organo phantastico in
lumine intellectus agentis clarius repraesentet singulare ut
intellectus possit illud intelligere, quam in lumine proprio,
nunquam tamen repraesentat obiectum universale sub ratione
universalis per quodcumque lumen.
101 Exemplum eorum de noctilucentibus non valet, sed
concludit oppositum. Nam quaero: an eodem repraesentativo
repraesententur illa diversimode de die et de nocte, an alio et alio
repraesentativo. Non eodem, quia tunc illa repraesentantur de
die sicut de nocte, quia repraesentativum prius est aliquid in se
M Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 15 (1021a 31-6 3).

according to the Philosopher in Bk. V of the Metaphysics.

Therefore, the same species cannot represent two opposite objects
nor the same object under opposed aspects.
98 It must be stated that it is not incongruous that the same
species may represent diverse and opposed features under one or
another type of light, as is evident from fluorescent things, which
under one or another type of light appear as either colored or
lucid. So it is in what we propose: through the light of the agent*
intellect and of the imagination the same species can represent
opposed aspects in the object.
99 To the contrary, light does not represent, but is that in
which what is representative, actually does represent. Indeed,
light in the medium is of the same sort whether I see white or
black, because it is reason that distinguishes essentially [one]
representative from another representative, for the species, or
what is representative of what is white is other than that which is
representative of what is black. As a consequence the distinction
of light does not cause the distinction of what is representative;
but, the nature of what is representative remaining the same, it
always represents the same thing that it is able to represent, and
does so under the same aspect, not under diverse aspects.
100 This reason is confirmed, because what is representative
does not represent another thing under a more perfect light, but
rather represents the same thing more clearly than it does in a
less perfect light. This is evidently the case with white and black
in the light of the sun and in the light of the moon. Therefore,
although the species in the organ of the imagination more clearly
represents the singularso that the intellect could know itin
the light of the agent intellect, than it does in its own proper
light, nevertheless it never represents the universal object under
a universal aspect under any light whatsoever.
101 The example of those fluorescent things is not valid, but
rather leads to the opposite conclusion. For I ask: is it the same
representative that represents those things differently by day and
by night, or are they represented by two different ones? Not by
the same, because then they would be represented by day in the
same way as they are by night, because what is representative is
something in itself prior to its representing in this or that sort of
quam in tali vel tali lumine repraesentet. Si alio et alio

repraesentativo repraesentat44 diversa illa in noctilucentibus,
habetur propositum, sive sit idem lumen sive diversum.
102 Nec exemplum est ad propositum, sed ad oppositum, tum
quia vel sunt duae qualitates sensibiles in noctilucentibus, scilicet
lux et color, quare altera multiplicat se sensibiliter et
repraesentat rem illam in luce maiori et altera in minori, utraque
tamen multiplicat se et repraesentat rem in utroque lumine, sed
efficacius movens et repraesentans percipitur et minus efficaciter
repraesentans non percipitur exemplum de stellis, quae ita
multiplicant radios suos de die sicut de nocte, licet propter maius
lumen non appareant , vel si est una qualitas sensibilis in tali
corpore, ipsa virtualiter continet duo repraesentativa. Color enim
quodammodo continet lucem cum sit lux in corpore terminato, et
ideo in alio et alio lumine causat diversa repraesentativa: aliud in
maiori lumine, scilicet de die, et aliud in minori, scilicet de nocte.
Et ita semper stat quod non est idem repraesentativum obiecti
sub diversa ratione repraesentabilis, quantumcumque aliud et
aliud lumen concurrat. Vel si est unum formaliter, diversum
tamen virtualiter, quia continet virtualiter diversa et ideo potest
causare diversa repraesentativa, scilicet lucem et colorem in alio
et alio lumine.
103 Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte intellectus agentis. Intel
lects agens, secundum Philosophum, III De anima,45 est potentia
mere activa tum quia est quo est omnia facere, tum quia
comparatur ad possibilem ut ars ad naturam; ergo potest habere
actionem realem. Omnis actionis realis oportet aliquid dare ter-
minum realem; iste terminus realis non recipitur in phantasmate,
quia quidquid est ibi est extensum et improportionale ad
movendum intellectum possibilem; nec etiam intellectus agens
causat aliquid in phantasmatibus, quia non est suum passivum,
secundum praedictas auctoritates, nec terminus recipitur in
H Repraesentat: sic codd.; melius lege: repraesentantur.

4r> Aristot., De anima III, c. 5 (430a 15).
light. If it is by different representatives that diverse states are

represented in fluorescent things, what we propose it granted,
whether the light be the same or diverse.
102 Neither is the example given relevant to what we propose,
but the opposite holds. First, because either [1] there are two
sensible qualities, namely light and color, in fluorescent things, so
that one of them multiplies itself sensibly and represents the
thing in a greater light and the other in a lesser one, while at the
same time either multiplies itself and represents the thing in
either light, but the one that is moving and representing more
efficaciously is perceived and the one that is representing less
efficaciously is not perceivedas is evident in the case of the
stars, which multiply their rays during the day just as much as
during the night, although because of the greater light they are
not visible, or [2] if there is but one sensible quality in such a
body, it virtually* contains two representatives. For color in some
way contains light since it is light in a body qua term,12 and
therefore in one or another light it causes diverse
representations: one in the greater light, namely, during the day,
and another in the lesser light, namely, during the night. And in
this way it is always the case that the representative of the object
under diverse aspects of what can be represented is not the same,
no matter how much this and another light concur. Or, if
something is one formally,* it is still diverse virtually, because it
contains virtually diverse things, and therefore can cause diverse
representatives, namely, light and color in one or another light.
103 The second reason is taken from the agent intellect.
According to the Philosopher in Bk. IIl of De anima, the agent
intellect is a purely active potency: both because it is making all
things, and also because it is related to the possible* intellect as
art is to nature; therefore it can have a real action. Every real
action requires that something be given as its real term; this real
term is not received in the sense imagination, because whatever
is there has extension and is not proportioned to move the
possible intellect; nor does the agent intellect cause anything in
the sense images, because this is not its passive correspondent,
according to the aforesaid authorities; neither is the term
12 A translation ad sensum: the Latin in corpore terminate is ambiguous.

intellectu agente, quia nullius est receptivus. Ergo tantum

recipitur in intellectu possibili. Ergo illud primo causatum non
potest poni actus intelligendi, quia primus terminus actionis
intellectus agentis est facere universale in actu de universali in
potentia et de nullo deservit intellectus agens, quia secundum
Commentatorem,46 III De anima, si essentiae rerum essent
abstractae et actu universales, sicut posuit Plato, non
indigeremus secundum ipsum intellectu agente; sed universale in
actu praecedit actum intelligendi, quia est per se condicio obiecti
quod naturaliter praecedit actum.
104 Dicetur quod terminus actionis intellectus agentis est

obiectum universale sub ratione universalis lucens in phan-
tasmate.
105 Contra: universale obiectum sub ratione universalis non
habet nisi esse deminutum ut cognitum, quemadmodum Hercules
in statua non habet esse nisi deminutum, quia repraesentatum in
imagine; sed si aliquod esse reale habet, hoc est in quantum est in
aliquo ut repraesentante ipsum sub illa ratione, ita scilicet quod
intellectus agens facit aliquid repraesentativum universalis de eo
quod fuit repraesentativum singularis. Ergo cum terminus
actionis realis non sit obiectum habens esse deminutum, ut esse
cognitum vel repraesentatum vel cognitum47 sed aliquid reale,
sequitur quod realis actio intellectus agentis terminatur ad
realem formam in exsistentia qua formaliter repraesentat
universale ut universale, quam formam realem concomitatur
terminus intentionalis ut obiectum universale secundum esse
repraesentatum quod habet in specie.
106 Item, tertio sic: universalius secundum totam indifferentiam
suam non potest intelligi nec repraesentari in repraesentativo
minus universalis, sed species phantastica est per se et primo
repraesentativa individui ut est hoc; ergo in illa non potest
repraesentari universale secundum totam indifferentiam quam
habet ad sua individua omnia. Maior probatur: quia nunquam
cognoscitur magis universale secundum totam indifferentiam
suam, nisi quando cognoscitur ut unum cognoscibile omnibus suis
40 Averroes, De anima III, com. 18 (ed. F.S. Crawford, CCAA 6.1, 440).
47 Vel cognitum: sic. codd. redundanter.
received in the agent intellect, because [the agent intellect] is not

receptive of anything. Hence it is only received in the possible
intellect. Therefore, what is first caused cannot be assumed to be
the act of understanding, because the first term of the agent
intellect's action is to make the potential universal actual, and
the agent intellect is in no respect subservient,13 for according to
the Commentator in Bk. IIl of De anima, if the essences of things
were abstracted and actually universal, as Plato assumed, we
would not need an agent intellect; but the universal in act
precedes the act of understanding, because it is a per se condition
of the object that naturally precedes the act.
104 It is said that the term of the action of the agent intellect is
the universal object qua universal shining in the phantasm.*
105 To the contrary: the universal qua universal is only a
diminished* being as something known, just as Hercules has only
diminished being in a statue, because he is represented in an
image. But if [something] has some real being, this is insofar as it
is in something representing it under that aspect, namely, so that
the agent intellect makes something representative of the
universal from that which was representing it as singular.
Therefore since the term of the real action is not an object that
has diminished being, such as known or represented being, but
has real being, it follows that the real action of the agent intellect
terminates in a real existing form by virtue of which it formally
represents the universal as universal. An intentional* termas a
universal object according to the represented being it has in the
speciesaccompanies this real form.
106 Also, thirdly in this way: the more universal according to its
complete indifference [towards individuals] cannot be understood
nor represented in a representative of something less universal;
but the sense imagined species is primarily and per se
representative of the individual as such; therefore it cannot
represent the universal in itself according to the complete
indifference the latter has toward all its individuals. The major
is proved, because never is the more universal known according
to its complete indifference except when it is known as something
" In the sense of assisting with something that is already happening.

inferioribus, sed impossibile est quod ut habet esse in uno

singulari quod48 cognoscatur ut idem omnibus aliis singularibus
inferioribus, sed praecise illi singulari in quo est. Ergo in
repraesentativo unius singularis non cognoscitur universale
secundum totam indifferentiam suam. Potest autem intellectus
sic intelligere universale secundum totam indifferentiam suam;
aliter enim non essent praedicata universalia nec definitiones nec
species nec genera nec aliquid huiusmodi praecise. Ergo non
concipitur universale in phantasmate; phantasma enim non est
nisi ipsius singularis proprie, et hoc est in quantum singulare
speciei specialissimae, maxime si phantasma sit impressum ab
aliquod debite approximate.
107 Item, quarto sic: aut intellectus prout distinguitur contra
partem sensitivam potest habere obiectum sibi praesens propria
praesentialitate, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum, quia obiectum
non est sibi praesens in cognitione abstractiva ante actum
elicitum, nisi per aliquod repraesentativum quod voco speciem. Si
non, ergo non potest habere aliquam operationem sibi propriam
sine parte sensitiva et per consequens nec esse sine ea, secundum
argumentum Philosophi III De anima: si intellectus non potest
habere operationem sibi propriam, non potest separari, unde non
concederet intellectum separari a corpore sicut perpetuum a
corruptibili, nisi posset habere operationem sibi propriam in qua
non dependeret a parte sensitiva.
108 Dico igitur ad quaestionem quod oportet ponere in intellectu
ut habeat rationem memoriae: speciem intelligibilem repraesen-
tantem universale ut universale, priorem naturaliter actu
intelligendi. Et huiusmodi necessitas est duplex: una ex
condicione per se obiecti quae est universalitas et quae, ut per se
ratio obiecti, semper praecedit actum, quod non esset nisi species
esset impressa in intellectu sicut concludunt tres primae rationes.
Alia est condicio et dignitas potentiae superioris ne ipsa
Quod, superfine dictum.

knowable that is common to all its inferiors,14 but it is impossible

that, as it has being in one singular, it be known as identical with
all other singulars below it, except precisely with that singular in
which it is. Therefore in the representative of one singular the
universal is not known according to its total indifference.
However, the intellect can understand the universal in this
fashion according to its complete indifference, for otherwise there
would be no universal predicates, nor would there be definitions,
species, or genera, nor something precisely of this sort. Therefore
the universal is not cognized in the sense imagination, for this is
properly [knowledge] of the singular itself and this insofar as it is
a singular of the most particular species, most of all if the sense
imagination is impressed by something that suits it properly.
107 Also fourthly in this way: either the intellect as
distinguished from the sensitive part [of the soul] can have an
object present before it independently, or it cannot have such. If it
can, I have what I propose, because the object is not present to it
in abstractive cognition before the act is elicited, except through
some representative that I call a species. Therefore if it cannot
have such, then it can have no operation proper to itself without
the sensitive part and as a consequence neither can it exist
without that [part], according to the argument of the Philosopher
in Bk. IIl of De anima: if the intellect cannot have an operation
proper to itself, then it cannot be separated, hence he would not
concede that the intellect could be separated from the body, as the
perpetual from the corruptible, unless it could have an operation
proper to itself for which it would not be dependent upon the
sensitive part.
108 I say therefore to the question that one must postulate the
intellect as possessing a memory: [i.e.,] intelligible species
representing the universal as universal, that is naturally prior to
the act of understanding. And the need for such is twofold: one
from the condition of the object per se which is universality and
which, as a per se feature of the object, always precedes the act,
which can only be if the species were impressed in the intellect as
the first three reasons imply. The other is the condition and
H Inferiors = all things less extensive such as are the individuals falling
under a species.
vilificetur nimium, nisi manifeste appareat aliquid repugnans;

maxime autem vilificaretur si non posset habere suum obiectum
sibi praesens, nisi praesentia mendicata a potentiis inferioribus,
quibus est ex ratione potentiae coniuncta accidentaliter, et tamen
quod aliae potentiae inferiores possent habere sua obiecta propria
praesentialitate non mendicata; et hoc concludit quarta ratio.
109 Memoria autem potest accipi tripliciter vel intellectus sub
ratione memoriae: uno modo ut est conservativa specierum
praeteritarum ut praeterita sunt, et isto modo loquitur
Philosophus in De memoria et reminiscentia,49 et de ista etiam
aliquid tangetur inferius. Alio modo ut est conservativa
specierum repraesentantium obiecta in se, sive sint realiter sive
non; et hoc modo loquimur hic de memoria; et dico quod sic, tum
propter universalitatem, tum propter dignitatem potentiae. Tertio
modo prout habet aliquod principium eliciendi notitiam actualem,
quod tamen non manet sine actu secundo, quomodo ponit
Avicenna50 speciem in intellectu nostro, et de ista dicetur in
quaestione sequenti.
110 Haec quae supra probavi videtur esse expressa intentio
Philosophi, III De anima,5i ubi dicit quod anima est quodammodo
omnia intelligibilia per intellectum, sicut sensibilia per sensum;
quod non potest intelligi per habitum, quia habitus non est
similitudo repraesentativa obiecti, quia sequitur actum aliquis
habitus.
111 Et confirmatur hoc, quia habitus scientiae per quem
reducitur intellectus de potentia essentiali ad potentiam
accidentalem respectu actuum de quibus loquitur Philosophus II
De anima52 et VIII Physicorum,53 necessario praecedit actum
intelligendi. Scientia autem quae habitus est sequitur actum,
quia generatur ex actibus. Unde ista scientia quae reducit
intellectum de potentia essentiali ad potentiam accidentalem est
species, quae species vere est habitus, quia nata radicari et
firmari in intellectu; sed tamen non omnis habitus est species,
quia habitus accidentaliter radicatus et firmatus non est species
49 Aristot., De memoria et reminiscentia, c. 1 (4496 24-5).

M Avicenna, De anima pars 5, c. 6 (AviL, 143-6).
r>1 Aristot., De anima III, c. 8 (4316 22).
M Aristot., De anima II, c. 5 (417a 21-6 2).
Aristot.. Physica VIII, c. 4 (2556 1-5).
dignity of the superior potency lest it be too vilified, unless

something appeared clearly to be repugnant to it; but it would be
vilified in the highest degree if it could not have its own object
present to it, unless it were acquired by begging from inferior
potencies, to which it is accidentally joined as a potency, while at
the same time the other inferior potencies could have their own
objects present without begging, and this the fourth reason
proves.
109 But memory, or the intellect functioning as memory, can be
taken in three ways: in one way as conserving the species of the
past things as past, and the Philosopher speaks of this in De
memoria et reminiscentia, and something will be said about this
later. In another way as conserving the species representing the
objects in themselves, whether they really exist or not; and in this
way we speak of memory here, and I say that this is so, both
because of their universality and because of the dignity of the
potency. A third way is insofar as [the memory] has some
principle whereby it elicits actual knowledge, which, however,
does not stay there without a second act.* Avicenna posits how
[such a] species is in our intellect, and this will be discussed in
the following question.
110 That which I have proved above seems to be the express
intent of the Philosopher in Bk. IIl of De anima, where he says
that the soul is in some measure all that are intelligible through
the intellect, as the sense is all that can be known through sense
perception; which cannot be understood through a habit, because
a habit is not a likeness representative of the object, for a habit
follows some act.
111 And this is confirmed because the habit of knowledge
through which the intellect is reduced from essential potency to
accidental potency with respect to the acts, about which the
Philosopher speaks in Bk. II of the De anima and Bk. VIII of the
Physics, necessarily precedes the act of understanding.
Knowledge, however, which is a habit, follows the act, because it
is generated from acts. Hence this science which reduces the
intellect from essential to accidental potency is a species, which
species truly is habit, because it is suited to be rooted and made
firm in the intellect; but nevertheless not every habit is a species,
quae praecedit actum nata firmari, quia ista postea firmantur per
actum.
112 Item, secundum istos,54 non videretur aliquis habitus esse
ponendus in intellectu nostro, sed tantum in virtute phantastica,
quia secundum quemcumque modum essendi est obiectum in
aliqua potentia, secundum eundem modum essendi sunt omnia
quae continentur virtualiter in illo obiecto. Ergo si obiectum
universale non esset per suum repraesentativum in intellectu,
sed in virtute phantastica, omnia explicanda et explicabilia de
isto obiecto essent ibidem, et ita non esset nisi habitus
phantasticus, praecipue si phantastica ordinate concurrerent,
explicans omnes veritates scibiles de illo obiecto, et omnis scientia
esset in phantasia et perfectio eius et non esset perfectio
intellectus, quod est contra Philosophum; et sic cum species illa in
phantasia contineat virtute actum intellectus, ergo actus ille erit
in phantasia.
113 Item, Augustinus XIII De Trinitate, cap. 4, 6 et 15,55
investigat Trinitatem ubi dicit quod impossibile est accipere
imaginem Trinitatis ex anima nostra vel in mente, nisi per hoc
quod aliquid est in memoria ex quo imprimitur aliud.
114 Tunc arguo sic: si in mente est aliquid parens Verbi, oportet
quod hoc sit per aliquid intrinsecum sive exsistens in memoria;
sed non est parens Verbi nisi memoria habeat obiectum menti
intra se praesens; alias non esset parens. Ergo cum obiectum non
sit in memoria quantitative et realiter, nec phantasma, necessario
erit parens per speciem intelligibilem.
115 Sed dices quod propter lumen intellectus agentis in

phantasmate possunt omnia fieri in intellectu et memoria quae
fiunt per speciem intelligibilem quam tu ponis et salvatur
praesentia obiecti in quantum actum intelligo universale; nulla
igitur est necessitas ponendi speciem.
M Scilicet, Henricus Gand., QuodI. V, q. 25 in corp. (f. 204K).

55 Cf. August., De Trin. XII, c. 2, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 356-7; PL 42. 999); ibid..
XIV, c. 3, n. 5 (CCSL 50A. 426; PL 42, 1039): ibid., c. 6, n. 8 (CCSL 50A. 432; PL
42, 1042).
because a habit accidentally rooted and made firm is not the

species that precedes the act and is suited by nature to be made
firm, for those are made firm through an act afterwards.
112 Also according to those, it does not seem that some habit
must be postulated in our intellect, but only in the imaginative
power, because all things that are contained virtually in an object
[that is] in some potency have the same mode of being as that
object has [in that potency]. Therefore if the universal object were
not in the intellect through what is representative of it, but in the
imaginative power, all that must be explained and can be
explained about this object would [also] be there, and thus it
would only be an imaginative habitespecially if imaginative
things concurred in a well ordered wayexplaining all truths
that can be known about this object, and all knowledge would be
in the sense imagination, as well as its perfection, and it would
not be a perfection of the intellect, which is against what the
Philosopher says; and thus, since that species in the sense
imagination would contain virtually the act of the intellect,
therefore that act will be in the sense imagination.
113 Also, Augustine in Bk. XIII of the Trinity, chapters 4, 6 and
15, investigates the Trinity where he says that it is impossible to
accept the image of the Trinity from our soul or in the mind,
except through [an assumption] that something is in the memory
from which another is impressed.
114 Then I argue in this way: if in the mind something is a
parent of the Word,* it is necessary that this be through
something intrinsic or existing in the memory; but unless the
memory would have an object of the mind within itself it would
not be a parent. Therefore, since the object is not in the memory
quantitatively or really, nor [is there] a sensible image, it will
necessarily be a parent through an intelligible species.
115 But you may say that because of the light of the agent
intellect in the sense imagination, all things can come to be in the
intellect and memory which come to be through an intelligible
species, which you posit, and the presence of the object is saved
insofar as I understand the act as a universal; therefore there is
no necessity to posit a species.
116 Respondeo quod non sunt ponenda plura ubi sufficit unum;
necessitas autem ponendi speciem intelligibilem est duplex:
prima est propter intellectum universalis ut universale est, quia
si non est species, non plus relucet obiectum universale in
phantasmate quam in pede, nec plus intelligit intellectus in
phantasia quam in alia parte, quia ibi non est magis
repraesentativum obiecti universalis quam alibi. Alia necessitas
ponendi speciem intelligibilem est propter praesentiam obiecti in
intellectu, quam habet ex nobilitate potentiae et naturae suae;
natura enim superior vel potentia non dependet ab inferiori, et
ideo oportet quod habeat praesentiam sui obiecti, sive suum
obiectum intrinsece, quod non potest esse nisi per speciem.
117 Ad primum argumentum56 dico quod concluderet si Deus

imprimeret, et concludit contra omnem opinionem. Respondeo
ergo quod species repraesentat obiectum sub ratione formali sub
qua obiectum imprimit, etiam si ab alio imprimeretur, et hoc est
sub ratione quiditatis, quae est ratio agendi; singularitas autem
non est ratio agendi, sed agentis sive modi agendi. Ulterius dico
quod quando species imprimitur ab aliquo sicut a causa totali,
illud quod est ratio imprimendi est etiam ratio repraesentantis;
quando autem non imprimitur nisi a particulari causa, tunc
potest repraesentare condicionem agentis sub opposito modo. Sic
M Cf. supra n. 84.

116 I reply that several things must not be postulated where one
suffices; but the necessity of assuming an intelligible species is
twofold: the first is on account of understanding the universal as
universal, for if no species exists, the universal object will shine
forth in the sense imagination no more than it will in the foot, nor
will the intellect understand in the sense imagination any more
than in another part, because no more is there a representative of
the universal object there than elsewhere. The other necessity for
postulating the intelligible species is because of the presence of
the object in the intellect, which it has because of the nobility of
the potency and its [own] nature. For the superior nature or
potency does not depend upon the inferior one, and therefore it is
necessary that it have the presence of its object or have it
internally, which it can only have through a species.
To the InitiaI Arguments
117 To the first argument [n. 84] I say that it would have held
good [even] if God were to make the impression, and it is againt
any [existing] opinion. I reply therefore that the species
represents the object under its formal* aspect under which the
object impresses, even if it were impressed by another
[individual], and this formal aspect is its quiddity [or essence],
which is its basis for acting. Singularity however, is not the
source of its acting; rather it is [a condition] of the agent or its
manner of acting. Furthermore, I say that when the species is
impressed by something as a total cause, that which is the
[causal]15 aspect under which it was impressed is also the
[conditional] aspect of the one making the representation.
However, when it is impressed only by what is a partial cause,16
then it can represent the condition of the agent17 under an
opposite mode. Such is the case here, because the intelligible
15 As the text of the Ordinatio makes clear, the distinction Scotus is making
here is between a cause, and what is only a sine qua non condition. The nature or
quiddity of the individual, not its individuality, is the cause or basis of its acting
in the specific way it does.
16 The object is only a partial cause; to act it requires the co-causality of the
intellect.
17 Namely, its singularity, rather than its quiddity or nature.
est hic, quia species intelligibilis repraesentabit quiditatem

obiecti sub ratione istius singularis et illius, et non erit ratio
agendi, quia non est species repraesentans quiditatem obiecti
universalis.
118 Ad aliud57 dicendum quod aequivocatio est de prae-
sentialitate; quaedam enim est praesentialitas realis obiecti et
potentiae, sive activi ad passivum; et alia est praesentialitas
obiecti cognoscibilis, et haec non requirit praesentiam obiecti
realem, sed bene requirit aliquid in quo obiectum relucet. Dico
ergo quod praesentia obiecti realis est causa realis speciei et in
illa est obiectum praesens. Unde in prima praesentia obiectum
est causa efficiens, sed in secunda praesentia est speciei
praesentia formalis. Species enim est talis naturae quod in ea est
praesens obiectum cognoscibiliter, non effective vel realiter, sed
per modum relucentis.
119 Ad tertium,58 quando dicitur quod intellectus patietur
passione reali, dico quod intellectus patitur duplici passione, sicut
potentia organica vel sensus organicus. Primo realiter recipiendo
speciem, licet non sit realis sicut passio materiae, et hac
praemissa, sequitur passio cognoscibilis sive intentionalis qua
patitur ab obiecto in specie intentionaliter, et ideo intelligere est
motus ad animam, quia ab obiecto ut in specie. Prima ergo passio
est in intellectu per speciem praesentem receptam in intellectu,
secunda est ab obiecto ut in specie relucente.
120 Ad quartum,59 quando dicitur quod si sunt plures species
intelligibiles, quaelibet movebit ad propriam intellectionem, dico
quod concludit contra omnem opinionem. Dicit enim Augustinus
XIV De Trinitate, cap. 6,60 quod multa novit memoria de quibus
non cogitat homo. Unde hoc dictum non quaerit nisi difficultatem
antiquam, scilicet quare hoc primo intelligitur et non illud.
Quando dicitur quod omnes species movebunt simul vel nulla,
57 Cf. supra n. 85.

5tl Cf. supra n. 86.
53 Cf. supra n. 87.
lio August., De Trin. XIV, c. 6, n. 8 (CCSL 50A. 432; PL 42, 1042).
species would represent the quiddity of the object under the

aspect of this or that singular, and will not be the causal basis of
acting, since it is not the species representing the quiddity of the
universal object.
118 To the other [n. 85] it must be said that 'being present' is
equivocal; for there is a 'being present' of the real object and
potency, or when something active [is present] in respect to what
is passive; and there is another 'being present' of the object that
can be known, and this does not require any real presence of the
object, but it does indeed require something in which the object
shines forth. I say, therefore, that the presence of a real object is
the real cause of a species and in that species the object is
present. Hence in the first [type of] presence it is the object that is
the efficient cause, but in the second [type of] presence, it is the
species that is formally present. For the species is of such a
nature that in it the object is present as something able to be
known, not as something real or effective, but in a way that it
shines forth.
119 To the third [n. 86], when it is said that the intellect would
receive a real impression, I say that the intellect, just as an
organic potency, or as a sense organ, is the recipient of a twofold
impression. In the first way it really receives a species, although
it is not real in the sense of a material imprint; and when this is
given, there follows an intentional imprint of what can be known,
when [the intellect] reacts to the object in the species in an
intentional way, and therefore, to understand is a movement to
the soul, because it is from the object as it exists in the species.
Therefore the first impression occurs in the intellect through the
presence of the species it has received; the second is from the
object as its shines forth in the species.
120 To the fourth, [n. 87] when it is said that if there are several
intelligible species, each will move to an intellection proper to
itself, I say that that implies something that militates against any
opinion. For Augustine says in Bk. XIV of the Trinity, chapter 6,
that man has many memories he is not actually thinking about.
This statement, therefore, only raises the old question, namely,
why does this memory, and not that, first come to mind. When it
is claimed that either all species together or no species will move,
respondeo ergo quod in principio sensibilia occurrunt sensui

diversa diversis vel diversa uni inter quae semper est iste ordo,
quod unum illorum movet efficacissime et movet efficacissime
illam potentiam quam movet, et efficacius illam quam aliam;
motus autem efficacissimus est phantasiae. Receptis igitur multis
phantasmatibus, tunc post dormitionem esset iste ordo, si
intellectus non habeat habitum, quod phantasma efficacissimum
primum movet nec est in potestate nostra sive in potestate
recipientis illud phantasma; huic autem phantasiae efficaciter
motae per phantasma obiecti efficacissimi coagit intellectus agens
et immutat intellectum possibilem ad usum speciei corres-
pondentis, abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem, et sic sequitur
necessario prima intellectio sive unus actus necessitatis et, illo
habito, potest voluntas6i servare illam speciem vel non uti ea, vel
potest converti ad alia et si voluntas non esset semper
efficacissima, prius moveret.
121 Ad probationem, quando dicitur 'vel omnes movebunt simul
vel nulla', dico quod quaelibet movet aequaliter et
proportionaliter, id est aequalitate proportionali, non tamen
aequaliter quaelibet movet simpliciter, et dico proportionaliter,
quia sicut parvus calor ad parvam calefactionem, ita magnus
proportionaliter ad magnam calefactionem; sed calor licet sit
aequalis proportionaliter et calefactio, non tamen aequalis in
perfectione. Et sic est in proposito, quia unicum tantum
simpliciter et perfecte movet, licet alia moveant ex natura sua
proportionaliter.
122 Ad argumentum de loco,62 scilicet quod intellectus est locus
specierum, dico quod loci est conservare, et aliter intellectus
salvat species quam sensus. Illa ergo potentia debet dici locus
proprie cuius est salvare speciem, sed nulla potentia organica est
conservativa specierum nec salvans, quia species possunt
corrumpi vel ex indispositione organi vel ex actione contrarii.
i Add. vel non omnes codd., sed expunctum in uno, quod ad sensum melius
videtur.
M Cf. supra n. 89.
I respond, therefore, that in the beginning diverse perceptible

things occur to diverse senses or to one sense, among which there
is always this order, that one of them moves more efficaciously
and moves most effectively that potency which it moves, and
more effectively this than another. However, the movement that
is most efficacious is that of the sense imagination. Therefore,
after many sense images are received, this order would remain
after sleepingif the intellect does not have a [contrary] habit
that the most efficacious sense image would move first, nor is the
sense image in our power or in the power of the one receiving it.
But the agent intellect acts together with this sense imagination
moved efficaciously by the image of the most efficacious object,
and prepares the possible intellect to use the corresponding
species by abstracting the intelligible species, and so the first act
of understanding follows necessarily, i.e., there is one necessary
act, and subsequently the will* can either make use of it or not, or
it can be turned to another and if the will would not always be
most efficacious, [that species] would move first.
121 As for the proof [n. 87], when it is said that 'either all will
move together or none will,' I say that each will move equally and
proportionately, that is, with proportional equality; each,
however, will not move equally in an unqualified sense. And I say
that it will move in proportion [to its own capacity], in the sense
that just as a little heat will heat a little, so proportionately a
great heat will heat greatly. But [these two instances of] heat and
heating, although [in both cases they have an] equal [opportunity
to act] in proportion [to their capacity], are not equal in
perfection. And so it is in what we propose, because only one
moves simply and perfectly, although others may move in
proportion to their nature.
122 To the argument about the location, namely that the
intellect is the location of the species, [n. 89] I say that [the role]
of the place* is to conserve the species and the intellect does this
otherwise than the sense. Therefore, that potency must be called
the location properly, whose task it is to save the species, but no
organic potency is saving or conserving the species, because the
species can be corrupted, either because the organ is indisposed
or because of some contrary influence. Hence the Philosopher in
Unde Philosophus, libro De memoria et reminiscentia,63 dicit quod

senex et pueri sunt male reminiscitivi, quia organum in eis est
indispositum, in intellectu autem neutrum est.
123 Ad illud64 quod dicit de Augustino65 quod verbum gignitur
non de specie, sed de scientia, dicendum quod in multis locis
accipit scientiam pro specie intelligibili, vel pro scientia ut
includit speciem; unde exponit illud 'formata cogitatio a
scientia',66 id est a re quam scimus, et sic formatur ab illo in quo
obiectum scitum est praesens in memoria; hoc autem est species;
ergo formatur species in intellectu. Item, XIII De Trinitate in
fine,67 verbum est simillimum rei notae de qua gignitur.
124 Ad deductionem de organo,68 scilicet quod species non est in
sensu nisi quia organum est eiusdem dispositionis cum medio
etc., dico quod propter neutram rationem praecise species est in
sensu; non propter primam, quia (Philosophus, I De anima)69
forma non est propter materiam sed e converso. Dispositio igitur
organi non est nisi propter dispositionem istius formae quae est
in organo. Nec propter secundam rationem, scilicet ratione
operationis perfectae, quia illa quae sunt sparsim in sensu
propter suam imperfectionem, possunt esse in intellectu et modo
perfectiori et sine organo. Natura ergo dedit organum sensui ut
posset operari circa obiecta corporalia quod potest intellectus sine
omni organo.
125 Ad rationem alterius magistri,70 dicendum quod aliquid
potest esse in potentia et in ordine primo ad duas formas, tamen
secundum diversas primitates. Quaedam enim est primitas
perfectionis, et quaedam originis sive generationis. Potentia ergo
intellectiva respectu obiecti est in potentia primo ad cognitionem
primitate perfectionis et est in potentia primo ad speciem
primitate originis vel generationis.
6:1 Aristot., De memoria et reminiscentia. c. 2 (4536 4-7).

M Cf. supra n. 90.
65 August., De Trin. XV, c. 10, n. 19 (CCSL 50A. 486; PL 42, 1071).
" Ibid.
Ibid., c. 12, n. 22 (CCSL 50A, 493; PL 42, 1075).
Cf. supra n. 91.
Ii0 Cf. Aristot., De anima I, c. 5 (4106 10-5; 4116 5-10).
70 Cf. supra n. 92.
the book De memoria et reminiscentia, says that the very old and
infants recall badly, because their organs are indisposed; in the
intellect, however, there is neither.18
123 As for what is said of Augustine that the word is born not of
the species, but of the knowledge itself, [n. 90] it must be said
that in many places he takes knowledge in the sense of the
intelligible species, or for knowledge as including the species.
Hence he explains that 'thinking is formed from knowledge,' that
is, from something we know, and thus it is formed from that, in
which the object known is present as memorized. But this is the
species; therefore species is formed in the intellect. The same is
found in Bk. XIII of The Trinity, at the end, that the word is most
like the thing known from which it is begotten.
124 As for what is deduced about the organ [n. 91], namely that
the species is only in the senses, because the organ is disposed in
the same way as the medium, etc., I say that it is because of
neither reason that the species is in the senses. Not because of
the first, since the Philosopher in Bk. I of De anima, says the
form exists not because of the matter, but vice versa. Therefore
the disposition of the organ exists only because of the disposition
of this form, which is in the organ. Neither is it because of the
second reason, namely, by reason of the perfect operation,
because those things that are scattered in the sense because of its
imperfection, could be in the intellect in a more perfect manner
and without an organ. Therefore nature gives an organ to the
sense so that it could operate in regard to corporeal objects, which
the intellect could without an organ.
125 To the reason of the other master [n. 92], it must be said
that something could be primarily in potency as regards two
forms, nevertheless according to different primacies. One is a
primacy of perfection, and another of origin or generation.*
Therefore, the intellective potency with respect to the object is
primarily in potency as regards cognition by a primacy of
perfection, and it is primarily in potency as regards the species by
a primacy of origin* and generation.
18 Namely, neither corruption nor indisposition.

[Quaestio 5
Utrum memoria conservet speciem
cessante actu intelligendi]
126 Utrum memoria intellectiva sit conservativa speciei

intelligibilis cessante actu intelligendi.
Videtur quod non:
Quia si conservaret unam speciem, pari ratione et aliam
speciem alterius obiecti et sic multas simul; consequens est
falsum, ergo antecedens. Probatio falsitatis consequentis, quia
species non est nisi quaedam configuratio intelligibilis in
intellectu; sed in corporibus impossibile est idem corpus
configurari diversis figuris; ergo et intellectum impossibile est
configurari simul diversis obiectis per diversas species; et haec
ratio Algazelis.
127 Item, omnis qualitas disponens intellectum ad operandum
vel operationem mansivam in eo est habitus intellectus; sed
species est qualitas quaedam disponens intellectum ad
operationem; ergo si est mansiva post actum intelligendi, sequitur
quod erit habitus. Sed hoc est falsum, quia species intelligibilis
praecedit actum naturaliter, habitus sequitur actum, cum
generetur ex actibus; ergo etc.
128 Contra:
Intellectus est in potentia accidentali quando non consi-
derat; sed non est in potentia accidentali nisi quando habet
speciem intelligibilem; patet ex Philosopho, II et III De animai1 et
VIII Physicorum.i2
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio Thomae
129 Hic est una opinio quae imponitur Avicennae, VI

Naturalium, parte quinta, cap. 6,73 quod ipse senserit speciem
7i Cf. supra n. 88.

w Cf. supra n. 88.
13 Avicenna, De anima pars 5, c. 6 (AviL, 146-7).
Dist. 3, Question Five 221
Question Five
Does the intellective memory conserve the species19 when
the act of understanding ceases?
126 Does the intellective memory conserve the intelligible

species when the act of understanding ceases?
It seems not:
For if it were to conserve one species, by the same token it
would conserve another species of another object, and thus many
at the same time; the consequence is false, therefore the
antecedent is also. Proof of the falsity of the implication, since
the species is only a certain intelligible configuration in the
intellect; but in bodies it is impossible that the same body be
configured simultaneously by diverse figures; therefore it is also
impossible that the intellect be configured simultaneously by
diverse objects by means of diverse species; and this is the
argument of Algazel.
127 Also, every quality* disposing the intellect for continuous
acting or operation in it is a habit of the intellect; but a species is
a certain quality of the intellect disposing it for operation;
therefore if it is residing there after the act of understanding, it
follows that it will be a habit. But this is false, because the
intelligible species naturally precedes the act, [and] the habit
follows the act, since it is generated by acts; therefore, etc.
128 To the contrary:

The intellect is in accidental potency when it is not
considering; but it is in accidental potency only when it has an
intelligible species; this is evident from what the Philosopher says
in Bk. II and III of De anima and Bk. VIII of the Physics.
To the Question
The opinion of Thomas Aquinas
129 Here there is one opinion attributed to Avicenna (De anima,

or Bk. VI Naturalium), part 5, chapter 6, namely, that he feels
10 Re. the meaning of species here see the first note to the previous question.
intelligibilem non habere esse mansivum in anima post actualem

considerationem. Et dicunt ipsum hoc probare per hoc quod in
organo sensus, quia non est virtus cognitiva, potest esse species
repraesentativa obiecti, licet non sit intelligibiliter, sed
sensibiliter; sed in intellectu, ex quo est virtus naturaliter
cognitiva, non erit aliqua species repraesentans obiectum nisi
ipsum obiectum sit ibi intelligibiliter et secundum actualem
intellectionem.
130 Hanc ergo rationem dicunt ipsum innuere cap. 5 post
medium,74 cum dicit: 'Impossibile est formam esse in anima in
effectu perfecte et non intelligi ab ea in effectu perfecte; sensus
enim, de hoc quod eam intelligit, non est nisi quia forma exsistit
in ea, unde impossibile est corpus esse thesaurum eius et
impossibile est essentiam animae esse thesaurum eius'. Et
sequitur: 'formas autem memoratas et formatas esse in aliquo
non est sensus eas apprehendere, sicut formas sensibiles esse in
aliquo non est sensus sensibilium. Unde corpora in quibus sunt
formae sensibilium non sunt apprehensiva; apprehensionem vero
secundum quod est virtus apprehendentis necesse est fieri ab eo
in quo solet ipsa imprimi aliquo modo impressionis'. Haec
Avicenna.
131 Quomodo ergo se habet intellectus ad species intelligibiles?
Dicunt ipsum velle quod sicut intellectus per conversionem ad
substantiam separatam quam ponit intellectum agentem habet
novos actus intelligendi, ita et novas species intelligibiles
respectu illorum impressas actuum, ita quod semper oportet
intellectum converti ad istam intelligentiam a qua emanat species
intelligibilis ad hoc ut habeat novum actum, qua informatus
intelligat, sicut ponit Plato scientiam fluere in intellectu nostro ab
idea separata.
132 Et si dicas quod impossibile est salvare per istam viam

habitum scientiae in anima, nam habitus scientiae est mansivus
quo habens illum potest illo uti cum voluerit, II De anima,15 sed
in omni actu intellectus si oporteret converti intellectum ad
substantiam separatam, non contingeret uti habitu ut vellemus
74 Rectius: ibid., c. 6 (AviL, 147).

75 Aristot., De anima II, c. 5 (417a 27-8).
that the intelligible species has no continuous existence in the

soul after actual consideration. And they say that he proves this
from the fact that in the organ of the sense, since it is not a
cognitive power, there can be a species representative of the
object, although it is not [there] in an intelligible way, but
sensibly. In the intellect, however, since it is a cognitive power
naturally, there will only be some species representing the object
if the object itself is there in an intelligible way and according to
an actual intellection.
130 He hints at this reason, they say, in chapter 5, after the
middle, when he says: "It is impossible that the form be in the
soul perfectly in actuality and not be understood by it to be such;
for the only interpretation, due to the fact that [the soul]
understands it [i.e., the form], is that the form exists in it, hence
it is impossible that a body be a storehouse [of forms] and also
that the essence of the soul be their repository." And this follows:
"But for remembered and organized forms to be in something
does not mean to be apprehended, just as 'sensible forms being in
something' is not the same as sensation. Hence, bodies in which
there are sensible forms are not comprehending; comprehension,
however, insofar as it is a power of the one apprehending, must
necessarily come about from the situation in which [the form]
itself is impressed in some way." So much for Avicenna.
131 How, then, does the intellect relate to the intelligible
species? They say he has in mind that, just as the intellect, by
turning to the separate substance which he posits as the agent
intellect, receives new acts of understanding, so also [it receives]
new intelligible species impressed in connection with those acts,
so that it is always necessary that the intellect be turned towards
that intelligence,* from which the intelligible species emanate in
order that [the intellect] might have a new act, so that informed
by this [species], it may understand, just as Plato assumes that
knowledge flows into our intellect from the immaterial ideas.*
132 And if you object that in this way it is impossible to preserve
a habit of knowledge in the soulfor, according to Bk. II of the De
anima, a habit of knowledge continues to reside there, and one
who has it can use it when he wishes, but if in every act of the
intellect it were necessary for it to turn to the separate substance,
sine tali conversione, respondit pro Avicenna quod ex frequenti

conversione ad substantiam separatam vel intelligentiam
generatur in intellectu quaedam habilitas convertendi se ad illam
et illa habilitas est habitus scientiae, nam ista habilitate acquisita
potest intellectus intelligere cum voluerit, quia per talem
habilitatem potest intellectus sine difficultate convertere se ad
intelligentiam cum voluerit et per consequens intelligere. Ubi
dicit Avicenna, ubi supra,76 quod "discere non est nisi acquirere
perfectam aptitudinem coniungendi se cum intelligentia". Et
sequitur:77 "si autem avertitur a primo fiunt ipsae formae in
potentia, sed potentia proxima; ergo primum discere est, sicut
curatio oculi qui, factus sanus, aspicit aliquid unde sumat
aliquam formam; cum autem avertitur ab illo, fit illud sibi in
potentia proxima effectui... Cum enim dicitur Plato esse sciens
intelligibilia, huius est sensus ut, cum voluerit, revocet formas ad
mentem suam; cuius etiam sensus est ut, cum voluerit, possit
coniungi intelligentiae agenti, ita ut ab ea in ipsum formetur
ipsum intellectum".
133 Sed utrum hoc senserit Avicenna quod sibi imponit iste
doctor qui tamen habet totam scientiam suam ab eo, est dubium,
quia ponit in anima species subsistere et ipsam animam perficere,
quae continet ea sicut locus locata; unde ait ubi supra post
principium capituli: 'concedo formas rerum in anima subsistere
decorantes et nobilitantes eam quarum quasi locus est anima
mediante intellectu materiali'.78 Quid planius proposito? Et
statim post in eodem capitulo79 dicit quod non habens
responsionem ordinatam statim eorum quae praescivit certus est
se posse respondere ordinate; quod non esset nisi haberet
notitiam terminorum habitualem ex quibus format rectam
rationem, unde dicit sic: "Cum aliquod dubium a te quaeritur de
his quae iam scivisti, si tu haesitas respondere in illa hora, certus
70 Avicenna, De anima pars 5, c. 6 (AviL, 148).

77 Ibid (AviL, 149-50).
Ibid. (AviL, 137).
79 Ibid. (AviL, 140).
we could not use the habit as we wished without such a

conversionhe replies for Avicenna. From frequent conversion to
the separate substance or intelligence a kind of tendency is
generated in the intellect to turn itself towards that, and this
tendency is the habit of knowledge, for, having acquired this
tendency, the intellect can understand when it wishes, for
through such tendency the intellect can turn itself towards the
Intelligence without difficulty when it wishes to do so and as a
consequence it can understand. Where Avicenna says, in the
same place, that "to learn is only to acquire a perfect aptitude to
join oneself with an Intelligence." And it follows: "if [the intellect],
however, turns away from the first [principle], the forms
themselves come to be in potency, but in proximate potency;*
therefore to learn for the first time is like a healing of the eye,
which, when it becomes healthy, looks at something from which it
derives some form. But when it turns away from this, it comes to
be in it in potency proximate to the effect... For when it is said
that Plato is knowing what is intelligible, this means that, if he
wishes, he can recall to his mind the forms. The meaning of this is
that when he wishes, he can be joined to the agent intelligence so
that from it intellectual knowledge itself will be formed in him."
133 But whether Avicenna held this, as this teacher implies
who, nevertheless, has all his knowledge from him, is doubtful,
because he [i.e. Avicenna] assumes that species subsist in the soul
and perfect the soul itself, which contains those as the place
contains what is in it. Hence he says, in the same place as above,
after the beginning of the chapter: 'I concede the forms of things
subsist in the soul decorating it and making it noble, the soul
being their quasi-location by means of the material intellect.'
What is more evident than this proposal? And immediately
afterwards, in the same chapter, he says that the person who is
unable to reply at once in an orderly way regarding those things
he knew of before is [still] certain that he could respond
appropriately. This could only be the case if he had habitual
knowledge of the terms from which he formed the correct answer.
Hence he puts it this way: "When something doubtful is asked of
you regarding the things that you have already learned, if you
hesitate to respond in that hour, you are nevertheless certain that
tamen verissime te postea respondere quamvis non sit apud te

adhuc ordinata responsio nec adhuc incipis praeordinare in
anima tua [nisi respondendo]80 responsum quod provenit ex ista
certitudine sciendi illud quam habes ante distinctionem et
ordinem eius".
134 Item, ubi supra, capitulo 5, 81 dicit quod cum imaginatio
repraesentat aliquam formam intellectui et intellectus excipit ex
illa intentionem, si post repraesentaverit sibi aliam eiusdem
speciei quae non est nisi numero alia, iam non excipiet ex ea
intellectus aliam formam praeter quam acceperat. Concedit ergo
speciem intelligibilem abstrahi a specie imaginabili, et etiam eam
manere post illam abstractionem, et ideo non potest abstrahi ab
alio individuo eiusdem speciei occurrente.
135 Item, parte quarta, cap. 1,82 vult quod intellectus habeat
thesaurum specierum; unde dicit quod thesaurus intellectus est
memoria quae retinet intentionem.
136 Potest ergo dictum Avicennae sic salvari dicendo quod ponit
duplicem conversionem: unam ad ista sensibilia a quibus
abstrahit intelligibiles species quae manent cessante intellectione
actuali, quarum quaelibet, licet sit singularis in comparatione ad
animam in qua est, est tamen universalis respectu singularium
sensibilium, sicut dicit Avicenna V Metaphysicae83 et VI
Naturalium, parte quarta, cap. 6, 84 quod intellectus maxime per
species receptas a sensibilibus potest procedere ab ignotis nobis
ad nota; et post: quia ipsius intellectus est respectio ad
thesaurum specierum. Videtur ergo ponere species mansivas in
intellectu per respectum ad sensibilia a quibus abstrahuntur, et
ideo non frustra unitur anima intellectiva corpori, sicut quidem
arguunt contra Avicennam, cum decoretur speciebus
subsistentibus in ea abstractis a sensibilibus.
137 Aliam vero conversionem ponit Avicenna ipsius intellectus
ad intelligentiam separatam, ad quam conversam85 fluunt in ipso
intellectu ab ipsa species intelligibiles quas ponit non manere,
80 Nisi respondendo: add. ad sensum de ed. cit.

H1 Ibid., c. 5 (AviL. 129-31).
82 Ibid., pars 4, c. 1 (AviL, 9).
M Avicenna, Metaph. V, c. 1 (AviL, 238).
84 Rectius: Avicenna, De anima pars 5, c. 6; cf. supra n.129.
85 Melius lege: ad quam [sc. intellectu] converse.
you [will] reply most truly afterwards, although now you do not
have an appropriate reply, nor as yet do you begin in your soul to
order [the data], except by giving a reply that proceeds from this
certainty of knowing something: a certainty that you have prior to
arrangement and order."
134 Also, in chapter 5, as above, he says that when the
imagination represents some form to the intellect and the
intellect extracts an intention* from it, if afterwards it has
represented to it another form of the same species which is only
numerically other, the intellect will not extract from it another
form at this point, besides that which it has accepted. Therefore
he concedes that an intelligible species is abstracted from the
imaginable species, and also that it remains there after its
abstraction, and therefore it cannot be abstracted from another
individual of the same species that is appearing.
135 Also, in part four, chapter 1, he wants to say that the
intellect should have a storehouse of the species; hence he says
that the storehouse of intellect is the memory, which retains the
intention.
136 Therefore, the dictum of Avicenna can be saved in this way
by saying that he postulates a twofold conversion. One is to those
sensibles from which it abstracts the intelligible species which
remains after the actual understanding ceases, of which each,
although it is singular in comparison to the soul in which it is, is
nevertheless universal with respect to the singular sensible, as
Avicenna says in Bk. V of his Metaphysics and Bk. VI of his
Naturalia [or De anima], part four, chapter 6, that the intellect
can proceed from what is unknown to us to what is known most of
all through the species received from sense perception. And
afterwards [he says] that the intellect itself looks to the
storehouse of the species. Therefore, it seems that he posits
species that remain in the intellect, in comparison to the sensibles
from which they are abstracted, and therefore it is not in vain
that the intellective soul is united to the body, as certain ones
argue against Avicenna, since it is adorned with subsistent
species in it that are abstracted from sensibles.
137 The other conversion that Avicenna posits is that of the
intellect itself to the separate Intelligence. When turned towards
nisi dum actu convertitur ad ipsam, quia, secundum eum, illa

intelligentia est naturaliter activa; et ideo quandocumque anima
se convertit ad ipsam ut recipiat tales species intelligentia
necessitate naturali causat tales species, quae non manent in
intellectu nisi ad praesentiam intelligentiae causantis, quia non
causat nisi dum anima actualiter se convertit ad eam, et ideo cum
avertitur ab ea et cessat actus intelligendi, cessat huiusmodi
species in intellectu.
138 Et istum duplicem modum intelligendi in intellectu ponunt
ipsi qui multum nituntur ipsum Avicennam improbare in hac
parte. Ponunt enim quod intellectus coniunctus intelligit per
conversionem ad ista inferiora sensibilia, a quibus recipit species;
sed separatus intelligit per conversionem ad superiora a quibus
recipit species intelligibiles.
[2. Improbatio conclusionis Thomae]
139 Sed contra istam conclusionem, sive intelligat Avicenna

sicut sibi imponitur sive non, arguo contra eam, nam si species
intelligibilis non manet in intellectu cessante actu intelligendi,
sive illa intelligentia sit naturaliter agens sive non, semper
sequitur quod intellectus quando non intelligit, sit in potentia
essentiali ad intelligendum eo quod semper est in potentia
essentiali ad intelligendum quousque forma intelligibilis sibi
imprimatur, sicut unumquodque est in potentia essentiali ad
actum secundum quando caret actu primo.
140 Item, secundo sic: nihil prius actione magis requirit
actionem quam principium formale agendi, quia omne aliud
minus habet ordinem essentialem ad ipsam quam principium; sed
principium tale non necessario requirit actionem, sed potest
it, the intellect has those intelligible species flow into it from this
[Intelligence] that remain only as long as the intellect is actually
turned toward it. For according to him, that Intelligence is
naturally active. Therefore, whenever the soul turns toward it to
receive such species, the Intelligence by a natural necessity
causes such species. However, they do not remain in the intellect
except in the presence of the Intelligence causing them, because it
only causes while the soul actually turns itself toward it, and
therefore, when it is turned away from [the Intelligence] and the
act of understanding ceases, such species also cease to remain in
the intellect.
138 And this twofold mode of understanding in the intellect is
put forward by those [masters], who put forth great efforts to
condemn Avicenna himself on that matter. For they postulate
that the conjoined intellect understands through turning towards
these inferior sensibles, from which it receives the species. But
the separate [intellect] understands by turning to things above
from which it receives the intelligible species.
Refuting the conclusion of Thomas
139 But I argue against this conclusion, whether Avicenna holds

the opinion that is imputed to him or not; for if the intelligible
species does not remain in the intellect after the act of
understanding ceases, whether this Intelligence is acting
naturally or not, it always follows that the intellect when it is not
understanding, is in essential potency to understanding, because
it is always in essential potency to understand until the time
when the intelligible form is impressed on it, as every single thing
is in essential potency towards its second act, when it lacks
primary act.20
140 Also, secondly in this way: nothing prior to action requires
action more than the formal principle of action, because every
other thing has less of an essential* order in respect to [action]
than does a principle. But such a principle does not necessarily
require action, but can exist in what is active when the action
2n In this context "second act" refers to the act that makes the potentially
intelligible actually intelligible.
inesse activo cessante actione, quia omnia principia activa

naturaliter sunt impedibilia et possunt esse sine actione quando
impediuntur. Ergo nihil aliud necessario requirit actionem in ipso
activo; ergo sive species sit formale principium actus intelligendi
sive non, poterit esse in intelligente sine actione.
141 Item tertio sic: omne prius potest stare et exsistere realiter
in actu sine posteriori, nisi sit necessaria causa vel includat talem
causam necessariam respectu illius posterioris. Hoc enim addo
propter necessariam forte causalitatem subiecti respectu suae
passionis. Sed ipsa species non est necessaria causa nec includens
talem causam respectu actus intelligendi, licet ponatur causa eius
naturalis, nam omnis causa naturalis est impedibilis et cum haec
est naturaliter prior actu intelligendi, sicut probatum est prius,
sequitur quod possit esse in intellectu sine actuali intellectione.
142 Et confirmatur ista ratio, quia principium formale
intelligendi, sive sit habitus sive species, est liberum per
participationem, quia intelligimus cum volumus, II De anima,86
sed liberum per participationem potest impediri a libero per
essentiam; aliter enim non esset liberum per participationem;
ergo etc.
143 Item quarto sic: quidquid perfectionis ponitur in potentia
inferiori debet poni eminentius in potentia superiori; sed
perfectionis est in imaginativa et in aliis potentiis sensitivis
magis quod possint habere sua obiecta praesentia sibi in aliquo
repraesentativo, quando non actu operatur, quia in quocumque
non dependere est perfectionis; habere autem obiectum praesens
quando non operatur est aliquo modo non dependere; ergo
intellectus, quando non intelligit, potest habere aliquo modo
obiectum sibi praesens, scilicet in specie.
m Aristot , De annua II, 5 (<117o 27-8).

ceases. For all naturally active principles can be impeded and can
exist without acting when they are impeded. Therefore nothing
other is necessarily required for action in what is active itself;
therefore whether the species is the formal principle of an act of
understanding or not, it could be in an intelligent thing without
action.
141 Also thirdly in this way: everything prior can stand and
exist really in actuality without what is posterior, unless it be a
necessary cause or include such a necessary cause as regards
what is posterior. For I add this because of necessary causality
perchance of the subject with respect to a proper attribute. But
the species itself is not a necessary cause nor does it include such
a cause with respect to the act of understanding, even though its
natural cause may be posited, for every natural cause can be
impeded and since this is naturally prior to the act of
understanding, as was proved earlier, it follows that it could be in
the intellect without any actual understanding.
142 And this reason is confirmed, because the formal principle of
understanding, be it habit or species, is free by participation,
because we understand when we wish to do so, according to Bk. II
of the De anima, but what is free by participation can be impeded
by what is free by its essence; for otherwise it would not be free
by participation; therefore etc.
143 Also fourthly in this way: whatever of perfection is
postulated in an inferior potency should be postulated to a higher
degree in what is a higher potency. But it is rather a matter of
perfection in the imaginationas well as in other sense
potenciesthat it could have its object present to itself in
something representative, when not actually operating, because
not to be dependent in some aspect is a matter of perfection. But
to have an object present when something is not operating is in
some way not to depend; therefore the intellect, when it is not
understanding, can have in some way an object present to it,
namely in a species.
[B. Alia ratio Thomae pro opinione sua

1. Exponitur ratio]
144 Rationem autem pro hoc assignant aliqui talem; receptum

est in recipiente per modum recipientis; quanto igitur receptivum
est nobilius et entitatis superioris, tanto nobilius et firmius
recipiet. Potentia intellectiva est nobilior potentiis sensitivis quae
conservant species quando non sunt in actu secundo, ergo multo
fortius intellectus conservat species intelligibiles quando non actu
intelligit.
[2. Contra rationem Thomae]
145 Sed ista congruentia non concludit. Licet enim potentia

intellectiva sit nobilior quam sensitiva, non tamen oportet quod
firmius recipiatur species in intellectu quam in sensu. Si enim
receptum sequitur naturam recipientis quantum ad condicionem
recipientis generalem, ut puta quod species recepta in intellectu
habeat esse nobilius quam in sensu, non tamen oportet sequi
naturam recipientis quantum ad condicionem eius specialem; sic
enim species in intellectu esset intellectus et forma recepta in
materia esset naturaliter materia vel potentia, quod est
impossibile. Ita est in proposito: etsi species habeat esse nobilius
in intellectu quam in sensu, non tamen oportet quod quantum ad
firmitatem sit nobilius quam in sensu.
146 Concedo ergo quod species manet in intellectu cessante eius
operatione actuali, quia sicut in intellectu est prius naturaliter
species quam actus eius secundus elicitus, ita potest esse sine illo,
cum manifesta necessitas hoc non requirit.
147 Confirmatur autem hoc sic: intellectus in quantum intel
lectus potest esse sapiens prout distinguitur contra phantasiam;
sed cum nullus sit sapiens nisi habeat obiectum sibi praesens,
quia aliter de nullo esset sapiens, sequitur quod intellectus habet
Another argument of Thomas

Explanation of the argument
144 But some assign for this [opinion] an argument of this sort.
The manner in which something is received in the recipient is in
accord with the nature of the recipient. Therefore, the more noble
and superior is the nature of the recipient, the more nobly and
firmly it receives. The intellective potency is more noble than the
sense potencies which conserve the species when they are not in
secondary act,21 therefore the intellect conserves the intelligible
species much more firmly when it is not actually thinking.
Against Thomas's argument
145 But this [law of] correspondence does not follow logically.
For although the intellective potency is nobler than the sense
potency, it is not necessary that the species be received in the
intellect more firmly than in the sense. For if what is received
follows the nature of the recipient as regards its general
condition, for instance, as when the species received in the
intellect would have to be nobler than in the sense, it would not
necessarily follow the nature of the recipient as regards its special
condition. For in this way the species in the intellect would
understand, and the form received in matter would be naturally
matter or potency, which is impossible. And so it is in what we
propose: although the species would be nobler in the intellect
than in the sense, it would not be nobler as to firmness than in
the sense.
146 I concede, therefore, that the species remains in the intellect
when its actual operation ceases, because just as in the intellect
the species is naturally prior to its second or elicited act, it can be
[in the intellect] without that [elicited act], since no manifest
necessity requires this.
147 But this is confirmed in this way: the intellect qua intellect
can be wise in contradistinction to the sense imagination; but
since nothing is wise unless it has an object present to it, because
otherwise it would not be wise as regards anything, it follows that
21 I.e., when actually acting.

obiectum sibi praesens propria praesentialitate, ut distinguitur a

phantasmate; ergo non solum habet speciem sibi praesentem in
phantasmate sed in se.
148 Sed tunc est una difficultas; si species manet in intellectu

quando non intelligit et alia ab ista quae est in phantasmate,
quare oportet ipsum in omni intellectione convertere ad
phantasmata? Non videtur hoc esse necessarium, nam praesente
activo et passivo potest sequi actio sufficienter, cum ab aliis non
dependeat. Experimur autem quod oportet convertere ad
phantasmata ad hoc ut intelligamus, quia aliter possemus
intelligere organo phantasiae indisposito et ita nulla laesio organi
impediret intellectum ab intellectione, cuius oppositum apparet
in freneticis et lunaticis vel infirmis. Hoc etiam dicit Philosophus,
III De anima,61 quod speculamur quidquid est in phantasmatibus.
Item ibidem, quod nihil intelligimus sine phantasmate. Item
ibidem, quod sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ita phantasmata ad
intellectum; sed in sensitivis est necessaria conversio ad
sensibilia; ergo in intellectu ad phantasmata.
[C. Alia ratio Thomae

1. Expositio rationis]
149 Hic dicit doctor qui prius quod necessaria est conversio ad
phantasmata propter hanc rationem, quia obiectum intellectus
nostri est quiditas rei materialis; de ratione autem huius
quiditatis est exsistere in aliquo individuo, si perfecte exsistat;
igitur ad hoc quod complete intelligatur oportet quod cognoscatur
in singulari. Hoc autem est in phantasmate; quia nullibi potest
perfectius singulariter exsistere vel cognosci.
[2. Contra rationem Thomae]
150 Contra istam rationem arguitur sic: intellectus noster aut

primo intelligit universale ut universale, aut primo singulare; non
singulare, cum secundum eos non primo intelligatur, sed tantum
per reflexionem; ergo etc. Scilicet intelligit universale secundum
H7 Aristot., De anima III, c. 7 (431a 15 20).

the intellect has an object present to itself in is own presence, as

distinguished from the sense image; therefore not only does it
have the species present in the sense image, but in itself.
148 But now there is one difficulty; if the species remains in the
intellect when it is not thinking and is different from that which
is in the sense image, why is it necessary that in every act of
intellection it must turn to the sense images? This does not seem
to be necessary, for action follows sufficiently from both the active
and passive presence, since it does not depend on other things.
But we experience that one must turn to the sense images in
order to think, because otherwise we could think when the organ
of the sense imagination is indisposed, and thus no injury of the
organ would have impeded the intellect from thinking, the
opposite of which is apparent in those who are frenzied, crazy or
sick. The Philosopher also says this in Bk. III of De anima that we
contemplate whatever is in the sense images. Also, ibid., that
we understand nothing without sense imagination. Also, ibid.,
that just as sensibles are to the sense, so the sense images are to
the intellect; but in the sense faculties a turning to the sensibles
is necessary; therefore, also in the intellect is turning to the sense
images [necessary].
Another argument of Thomas

Explanation of the argument
149 Here the same doctor says that a turning to the sense
images is necessary for this reason, because the object of our
intellect is the quiddity of a material thing; but this quiddity
exists in some individual, if it exists perfectly; therefore, for one
to think of it fully, it is necessary to know it as an individual. But
this is in the sense imagination, because nowhere else can it exist,
or be known, more perfectly as a singular.
Against the argument of Thomas
150 Against this reason, it is argued in this way: our intellect

either first knows the universal as universal, or first as singular;
not as singular, however, sinceaccording to thoseit is not first
totam indifferentiam suam ad omnia sua singularia; sed

impossibile est intellectum intelligere universale secundum totam
indifferentiam suam prout ipsum exsistit in uno singulari, vel
prout intelligitur in uno singulari, quia sic tantum est ipsum
singulare, nec habet indifferentiam ad omnia singularia, ut
dictum est prius, ergo etc.
151 Item, si de ratione quiditatis materialis sit necessario
exsistere in singulari ad hoc ut perfecte cognoscatur, sequitur
quod angelus non poterit intelligere quiditatem alicuius rei
materialis nisi secundum quod est in singulari, quia impossibile
est aliquid intelligere perfecte nisi intelligendo quod est de
perfecta ratione eius; quod est falsum.
152 Item, si de ratione quiditatis materialis sit exsistere in
materia singulari et suo individuo, eadem ratione de natura
quiditatis angelicae est quod exsistat in suo individuo, quia omnis
quiditas aequalem habet habitudinem ad suum suppositum vel
individuum, et per consequens non posset cognoscere essentiam
suam sub ratione universalis, sed tantum secundum quod est in
suo individuo: quod est falsum et contra eos. Unde minor rationis
eorum est falsa; licet enim quiditas rei materialis non sit nisi in
aliquo singulari, ad hoc quod conclusio cognoscatur, non oportet
quod exsistat in aliquo singulari; intellectus enim qui est
abstractivus potest intelligere quiditatem non intelligendo eam in
aliquo singulari.
[II. Opinio Scoti]
153 Dico ergo quantum ad istum articulum quod duplex est

conversio et necessitas conversionis ad phantasmata. Nam uno
modo est idem quod conformis operatio istarum potentiarum ad
invicem, intellectus scilicet et phantasiae, circa idem obiectum;
nam quodcumque universale intelligimus, eiusdem universalis
singulare phantasiamur eodem tempore. Et nihil intelligimus nisi
cuius singulare simul phantasiamur propter conformitatem
istarum potentiarum in operando, propter quam aliqui non
distinguentes credunt se intelligere cum phantasiantur, et ideo
known [this way], but only by way of reflection; therefore etc.

That is to say, one understands the universal according to its
complete indifference to all of its singulars, but it is impossible
that the intellect understand the universal according to its total
indifference insofar as it exists in one singular, or as it is
understood in one singular, because in this way it is only the
singular itself; neither does it have any indifference to all
singulars, as was said earlier; therefore, etc.
151 Also, if being material quiddity meant to exist necessarily in
the singular in order that it may be known perfectly, it would
follow that an angel could think of the quiddity of any material
thing only in the singular, because it is not possible to think of
something perfectly, except by thinking [of it] under its perfect
notion [i.e., one that includes all aspects of its being], which is
false.
152 Also, if being material quiddity meant to exist in singular
matter and as an individual, by the same token the nature of
angelic quiddity would be to exist in its individual, because all
quiddity has an equal relationship to its supposit* or individual,
and as a consequence the [angel] could not know its essence
under the aspect of a universal, but only according to the way it is
in its individual, which is false and against what they hold. Hence
their minor reason is false, for although the quiddity of a material
thing is only in some singular, it is not necessary for it to exist in
some singular in order that the conclusion may be known; for the
intellect, which is able to abstract, can know the quiddity without
thinking of it as in some singular.
The Opinion of Scotus
153 Hence I say to this article that there is a twofold conversion

and a [twofold] need to turn to the sense images. For in one way it
is the same as to say that the operation of the intellect and the
sense imagination conform to one another with respect to the
same object; for whatever universal we think of, we imagine the
singular of that same universal. And we only think of that whose
singular is imagined at the same time because of the conformity
of these potencies in operating: for which reason some, not
impedita phantasia ab operatione sua et facta laesione in organo

phantasiae, intellectus impeditur a sua operatione, sicut est de
phantasia respectu sensus communis et respectu potentiarum
inferiorum. Nam impedito sensu communi a sua operatione,
quocumque modo phantasiabitur, phantasia nec sensus
communis iudicabit de obiectis sensuum diversorum, si illi sensus
impediantur totaliter ab operationibus suis; et hoc totum est
propter conformitatem potentiarum istarum in agendo.
154 Sed non solum est ista conversio ad phantasmata, sed est
alia conversio intellectus ad phantasmata, eo quod non fit
abstractio speciei intelligibilis a phantasmate nisi phantasia
phantasiante, quia intellectus agens non abstrahit speciem a
phantasmate nisi phantasia exsistente in actu suo, et non
convertitur intellectus ad phantasmata sicut ad suum obiectum
quia tunc obiectum intellectus non esset universale nec sicut
ad aliquid repraesentativum sui obiecti, quia habet obiectum
propria praesentialitate sibi conveniente, sed convertitur ad illud
sicut passivum ad activum a quo recipit suam perfectionem. Si
enim intellectus de novo recipit speciem per abstractionem a
phantasmate, tunc convertitur ad phantasma sicut passivum ad
activum. Si vero intellectus habet speciem, tunc phantasma coagit
ad intensionem illius speciei, et sic intellectus convertit se ad
phantasma non sicut ad activum suae speciei, sed sicut ad
intendens suam speciem. Hoc quilibet experitur in se, nam facta
aequali intellectione et aequaliter voluntate copulante, virtute
phantastica fatigata in organo, minus perfecte et intense intelligo,
et quanto magis phantasiamur aliquod singulare alicuius
universalis, dummodo virtus phantastica non fatigetur, tanto
clarius et perfectius intelligo.
155 Istis igitur duobus modis oportet intellectum converti ad
phantasmata ad hoc ut intelligat; uno modo ad illud cui
distinguishing, believe that they think when they are imagining.

And therefore [when] the sense imagination is impeded from its
operation and there is an injury to the organ of the imagination,
the intellect is impeded in its operation, just as is the sense
imagination with respect to the common sense22 and with respect
to the inferior potencies. For when the common sense is impeded
in its operation, howsoever one will be fantasizing, neither the
imagination nor the common sense will judge about the objects of
the diverse senses, if they are impeded totally from their
operations. And all this is because of the conformity of these
potencies in acting.
154 But not only is there this conversion to the sense images,
but there is another conversion of the intellect to the sense
images, for the reason that there is no abstraction of the
intelligible species from the imagination unless it is fantasizing,
because the agent intellect does not abstract the species from the
imagination unless a sense image is there actually. And the
intellect is not turned to the sense image as to its objectbecause
then the object of the intellect would not be a universalnor as to
something representative of its object, for it has its object in its
proper presence appropriate to it, but it is turned to it as what is
passive to what is active, from which it receives its perfection. For
if the intellect newly receives the species through abstraction
from the sense image, then it is turned to the imagination as
what is passive to what is active. But if the intellect has the
species, then the imagination co-acts to intensify this species, and
so the intellect turns itself to the imagination not as to what is an
agent as regards its species, but as to that which intensifies its
species. This indeed we experience in ourselves, for when the
ability and willingness to think is as [strong as] before, but there
is fatigue in the organ of the imagination, we think less perfectly
and intensely. And the more intensely we imagine the singular of
some universal, provided the imagination is not fatigued, the
more clearly and perfectly do we understand.
155 In these two ways, therefore, the intellect needs to turn to
the sense images to understand: one way [it turns] as to that to
w "Common sense" in the Aristotelian understanding, e.g., perception of

shape or number, as opposed to particular senses.
conformiter operatur; secundo modo sicut passivum convertitur

ad activum partiale, et hoc quando non habet speciem; vel si
habet speciem, tunc convertitur ad ipsum sicut ad illud a quo
recipit intensionem suae speciei. Non solum enim frigidum quod
patitur a calido convertitur ad calidum, sed etiam minus calidum
convertitur ad magis calidum a quo intenditur.
156 Sed dices quod intellectus intelligendo semper convertit se

ad phantasmata et tunc species intelligibilis intenditur; ergo
species intelligibilis in omni actu intelligendi intenditur, et per
consequens actus intelligendi, cum in omni intellectione sit
conversio ad phantasmata, sicut dictum est. Quod non videtur
verum, quia non semper perfectius intelligit idem obiectum eo
quod primus actus intelligendi potest esse perfectior quam omnes
sequentes.
157 Responsio: si forma imperfectior adveniat perfectiori vel in
aequali gradu, non augmentat ipsum, ut minus calidum
adveniens maiori calido non augmentat ipsum; et ita non oportet
quod species intelligibilis semper intendatur per conversionem
eius ad phantasmata, nec etiam actus sequens. Tunc enim gradus
adveniens non intendit priorem nisi sit intensior in se quam ille
cui advenit. Iste enim gradus intendit et augmentat speciem qui
est intensissimus et qui virtualiter continet habitum et habitum
perfectum habet generare, etiam posito quod esset sine aliis
gradibus deminutis.
Sed quae est ista? Responsio: illa quae est cum maiori
conatu et maiori intensione voluntatis copulante, tunc enim
possibile est quod intellectus decies convertat se ad phantasmata,
licet species eius, nec etiam actus aliqualiter intendatur.
[HI. Ad arguments principalia]
158 Ad primum88 dico quod Augustinus XIV De Trinitate, cap.

689 vult quod plures species possunt esse in intellectu, ut patet ibi
de perito litterarum.
m Cf. supra n. 126.

*l August., De Trin. XIV, c. 6, n. 8 (CCSL 50A. 432; PL 42, 1042).
which it needs to be conformed in order to operate; the second

way it turns as something passive to what is partially active. And
this is so, when it has no [intelligible] species; or if it does have
such, then it turns to it as to what can intensify its species. For
not only does something frigid, when exposed to heat, turn warm,
but also what is warm, when turned to what is hotter, becomes
warmer.
156 But you may say that the intellect, when it thinks,
invariably turns itself to the sense images and then the
intelligible species is intensified; therefore the intelligible species
is intensified in every act of thinking, and as a consequence
[every] act of thinking [is also intensified], since in every
intellection there is a turning to sense images, as was said.
However, this does not seem to be true, for the same object is not
always understood most perfectly, because the first act of
understanding can be more perfect than all that follow.
157 Reply: if a less perfect or an equal form comes near a more
perfect one, the latter may not be intensified: for instance, if what
is less hot draws near what is warmer, it does not make the latter
any hotter. And so it is not necessary that the intelligible species
be always intensified by turning to the sense images, nor is this
so with the act that follows. For then the added degree does not
intensify the prior unless it is more intense in itself than that
which comes near it. For the degree that intensifies and
augments the species is that which is most intense and which
virtually contains the habit and can generate the perfect habit,
even if it should lack the other lesser degrees.
But what [sort of situation] is this? Reply: it is that which
[is combined] with greater effort and more intense willing, for
then it is possible that the intellect turns ten times to the sense
images, although neither its species, nor its act is in some
measure intensified.
158 To the first [n. 126] I declare that Augustine in Bk. XIV of
the Trinity, chapter 6, wants to say that several species can be in
the intellect, as is evident in the case of one skilled in letters.
159 Ad probationem, dicendum quod aliqua repugnant in esse

naturae quae non repugnant in esse cognoscibilitatis, unde plures
species contrariorum possunt esse in intellectu, secundum
Philosophum VI Metaphysicae,90 quae ibi non sunt contrariae,
licet in re repugnent; et ideo licet repugnet eidem corpori
pluralitas configurationis diversis figuris in esse naturae, non
tamen repugnat intellectui secundum esse cognoscibile pluribus
obiectis per plures species configurari. Unde universaliter talis
repugnantia quae est in esse reali tollitur, non quae in esse
intelligibili.
160 Ad secundum91 dico quod species intelligibilis vere potest
dici habitus, si ad rationem habitus sufficiat quod sit qualitas
mansiva in intellectu; non tamen est scientia, quia non omnis
habitus in intellectu est scientia; species enim reducens
intellectum de potentia essentiali ad actum primum nata est
disponere intellectum ad operationem intellectus et per ipsam
operationem firmari intellectum, quia operatio elicita ab
intellectu derelinquit quandam habilitatem in anima et alia aliam
quae potest dici habitus, sed non habitus scientiae. Et ideo omnis
species est habitus, sed non e converso, quia habitus potest
multipliciter per actus augeri, si non sit perfectus; species autem
est habitus in intellectu qui abstrahitur a specie in phantasmate,
nata firmari in ea in intellectu ex se, etsi nulla operatio sequatur.
90 Rectius: Aristot., Metaph. IX (0), c. 2 (1016b 5-25).

159 To the proof, it must be said that some things that cannot
co-exist in nature, can be thought of without repugnance; hence
several contrary species can be in the intellect, according to the
Philosopher in Bk. VI of the Metaphysics, which are not contrary
there, although in reality they are opposed to one another. And
therefore, although in the realm of nature more than one
configuration of shape is repugnant in the same body, it is not
repugnant to the intellect, in the knowable realm, to be
configured in different ways by several objects. Hence, generally
such repugnance is avoided in real existence, not in intelligible
being.
160 To the second [n. 127] I say that the intelligible species truly
can be called a habit, if it is sufficient for the nature of a habit
that it be a quality that continues to exist in the intellect;
however, it is not a science,23 because not every habit in the
intellect is a science; for the species, reducing the intellect from
essential potency24 to first act,25 is suited by nature to dispose the
intellect to the operation of thinking, and to make it firm through
its operation. For an operation elicited from the intellect leaves
behind it a certain ability in the soul and another [operation]
leaves another behind that can be called a habit, but not a habit
of a science. And therefore every species is a habit, but not vice
versa, because a habit can be strengthened many times through
an act, if it is not perfect. A species, however, is a habit in the
intellect, which is abstracted from a species in the imagination,
that of itself is suited by nature to be made firm in the intellect,
even if no operation follows.
2:1 A science is a demonstrated conclusion or body of such conclusions.

'M A thing is in essential potency if it is non-existent, but able to receive
existence by passing from non-being to being (which is first act).
2ri First act = to be or exist in potency; second act = to operate or function.
[Quaestio 6
Utrum in intellectu nostro sit aliqua notitia
actualiter genita]
161 Utrum in intellectu nostro sit aliqua notitia actualiter

genita.
Videtur quod non:

Actionis non est actio nec passionis est passio neque ut
subiecti neque ut termini, ex V Physicorum?2 sed notitia actualis
est actio vel passio; ergo ipsius non erit actio neque passio, et per
consequens non est genita. Minor patet multipliciter: primo,
quia intellectio est actus secundus et omnis actus secundus est
actio vel passio; ergo etc.
162 Item, nullum ens consistit in fieri nisi actio vel passio, quia
omne aliud ens ab actione vel passione potest habere esse
mansivum; sed intellectio semper est in fieri; ergo etc.
163 Item, tertio sic: I Ethicorum93 et IX Metaphysicae 94
distinguitur actio in immanentem et in transeuntem exterius;
actio igitur immanens est species actionis; sed intellectio est actio
immanens, secundum Philosophum ubi prius; ergo etc.
164 Item, Augustinus, VIII Super Genesim:95 aer non est factus
lucidus, sed fit lucidus, quia si esset factus lucidus, remaneret
lucidus, absente corpore luminoso illuminante. A simili in
proposito arguitur: intellectus non est factus cognoscens, sed fit
cognoscens, quia si esset factus cognoscens, remaneret cognoscens
absente obiecto, quod est impossibile. Est igitur intellectio in fieri,
et per consequens est actio vel passio.
165 Item, Philosophus VII Metaphysicae.96 forma non fit neque
generatur, quia tunc ex parte sui fieret; omne enim quod fit vel
generatur fit ex aliquo ut parte sui praeexsistente; notitia est
forma; ergo non est genita.
Aristot., Physica V, c. 2 (2256 15-30).

l Aristot., Eth. Nic. I, c. 1 (1094a 3-6).
w Aristot., Metaph. IX (0), c. 8 (1050a 21-61).
nr' August., De Genesi ad litt. XII, VIII, c. 12, n. 26 (CSEL 28-1, 250; PL 34,
383).
Aristot., Metaph. VII, c. 8 (10336 15-20).
Dist. 3, Question Six 233
Question Six
Is there some actually generated knowledge
in our intellect ?
161 In our intellect is some knowledge actually generated?

It seems not:
Action does not result in action, nor passion*26 in passion,
neither as a subject nor as a term, according to Bk. V of the
Physics; but actual knowledge is action or passion; therefore there
will be no action or passion resulting from it, and as a
consequence [in our intellect knowledge] is not generated. The
minor in many ways is evident: first, because intellection is a
secondary act, and every such act is either action or passion:
therefore, etc.
162 Also, no being consists in a process unless it is action or
passion, because every thing other than action and passion can
have continued being; but intellection is always in a process of
becoming; therefore, etc.
163 Also, thirdly in this way: Bk. I of the Ethics and Bk. IX of
the Metaphysics, distinguishes action into immanent and the one
taking place externally; immanent action* therefore is a species
of action; but intellection is an immanent action, according to the
Philosopher, as above; therefore etc.
164 Also, according to Augustine, in Bk. VIII Super Genesim, air
is not made lucid, but becomes lucid, because if it were made
lucid, it would remain such, [even] in the absence of a luminous
body. In a similar fashion we argue in what we propose that the
intellect is not made to know, but it becomes knowing, for if it
were made knowing, it would remain so in the absence of the
object, which is impossible. Therefore, intellection is a process of
becoming, and consequently is action or passion.
165 Also, according to the Philosopher, in Bk. VII of the
Metaphysics, form is not a process of becoming, neither is it
generated, because then it would be coming to be from its part;
for everything that is a process or is generated comes to be from
2K As one of the ten categories of Aristotle, 'passion,' contrasted with action,

has the meaning of 'being acted upon' or 'being the recipient of an action.'
166 Contra:
Augustinus IX De Trinitate, ultimo:97 "Liquido tenendum est
quod omnis res quam novimus congenerat in nobis notitiam sui; a
cognoscente enim et cognito paritur notitia".
167 Item, II De Trinitate, cap. 2:98 ex visibili et vidente gignitur
visio. Item, V De Trinitate, cap. 10:99 "Formata cogitatio ab ea re
quam scimus verbum est".
168 Circa solutionem huius quaestionis tria sunt videnda:

primo, quae sit entitas intellectionis; secundo, si aliqua possit
esse mutatio ad entitatem talem; tertio, si talis entitas posset
produci, et hoc tertium sequitur ex secundo.
[A. Art. 1: Quae sit entitas intelIectionis]
169 De primo patet per divisionem quod intellectio vel notitia

genita non est substantia, quia nulla operatio in creatura est
substantia, cum possit adesse et abesse sine sui subiecti
corruptione. Nec est quantitas: patet quia non continua, quae
tantum est in corporalibus; nec discreta, quia illa non est nisi
inter plura quae faciunt numerum. Nec est habitus, nec positio,
nec ubi, nec quando, quia ista praedicata dicunt habitudines ad
corpora vel sunt passiones corporum. Nec relatio, nec passio, nec
actio, quia operatio est ultima perfectio naturae absolutae
operantis, ut patet ex I et IV Ethicorum100 et IX Metaphysicae;m
97 August. De Trin. IX, c. 12, n. 18 (CCSL 50, 309; PL 42, 970).

Rectius: August. De Trin. XI, c. 2, n. 3 (CCSL 50, 336; PL 42, 986).
Rectius: August., De Trin. XV, c. 10, n. 19 (CCSL 50A, 486; PL 42, 1071).
" Aristot., Eth. Nic. I, c. 1 (1094a 3-6).
" Aristot., Metaph. IX (0), c. 8 (1050a 21-6 1).
something as its preexisting part; knowledge is a form; therefore

it is not generated.
Augustine, in Bk. IX of the Trinity, last chapter: "We must
hold fast to this principle that everything which we know begets
knowledge of itself within us at the same time. For knowledge is
born, both from the one who knows and the object that is known."
167 Also, Bk. II of the Trinity, chapter 2: Vision is born from the
visible and the viewer. Also, Bk. V of the Trinity, chapter 10:
"Knowledge formed by the thing we know as the word."
168 Regarding the solution of this question there are three

things to investigate: first, what is this entity called 'intellection';
second, if anything could be a change towards such an entity;
third, if such an entity could be produced, and this third follows
from what is said of the second.
Article 1: What sort of entity is intellection?
169 About the first part, it is evident from division27 that

intellection or generated knowledge is not a substance, because
no operation in a creature is a substance, since it could be present
or absent without any corruption* of its subject. Neither is it
quantity, as is evident because it is not continuous [quantity],
which is only in corporeal things; neither is it discrete [quantity],
because that is only between several things that constitute
number. Nor is it a habit, nor position, nor whereabouts, nor
when, because these predicates refer to relationships to bodies or
are proper attributes of bodies. Neither is it a relation, nor action
nor passion,28 because operation is the ultimate perfection of an
absolute29 functioning nature, as is evident from Bk. I and Bk. IV
of the Ethics, and Bk. IX of the Metaphysics. No relation, no
11 The method of division considers each of the ten Aristotelian categories

under which the subject being considered might fall.
28 Passion is contrasted with action; it is 'being acted on.'
29 Absolute = something that is not a relation.
nulla relatio, nulla actio de genere actionis, nulla passio de genere

passionis est huiusmodi perfectio naturae absolutae operantis. De
relatione patet quod non est ultima perfectio hominis vel naturae
absolutae operantis, licet forte ultima perfectio talis denominetur
a relatione secundario vel per accidens. Nec etiam actio est ultima
perfectio hominis, quia actio non est ipsius agentis nisi ad
terminum, nec agens perficitur in se a sua actione absolute, sed in
respectu ad terminum. Nec passio est ultima perfectio, quia est
ad recipiendum aliquid ulterius; ergo non est ultimum, et sic
nullum istorum est operatic
170 Item, hoc specialiter videtur de relatione, quia secundum
Augustinum, VII De Trinitate, 2:m "omne quod relative dicitur
est aliquid, excepta relatione"; sed intellectio et omnis operatio est
ad aliquid; ergo etc. Minor patet per Philosophum, V
Metaphysicae,103 dicentem operationem dici relative ad obiectum,
ut mensuratum ad mensuram, quia obiectum est mensura
operationis; unde si scientia dicatur ad aliquid, multo magis
operatio et actus scientiae quae immediatius respiciunt obiectum
quam habitus; immo habitus non respicit obiectum nisi mediante
actu. Relinquitur ergo quod operatio non est sola relatio, sed
aliquid praeter ipsam.
171 Item, de actione et passione probatur idem: nam actio et
passio necessario sunt alicuius termini accipientis esse per
actionem vel passionem; quia non est intelligibile quod sit
calefactio et quod nullius ulterioris termini, scilicet quod nihil
accipiat calorem per eam; sed operationes sunt termini ultimi
quibus nihil ulterius accipit esse, quia sunt fines, I Ethicorum104
1, August., De Trin. VII, c. 1, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 247; PL 42, 935).

103 Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 15 (10206 30-2).
1W Aristot., Eth. Nic. I, c. 1 (1094a 3-6).
action in the category of action, no passion in the category of

passion is such a perfection of an absolute functioning nature.
This is evident of relation, because this is not the ultimate
perfection of a human being or of an absolute functioning nature,
although perhaps such an ultimate perfection may be named
after a relation in a secondary or accidental way. Also no action is
an ultimate perfection of a human being, because the action does
not belong to the agent itself except in respect to the term.30
Neither is the agent perfected absolutely in itself by its action;
rather [the perfecting] is with respect to its term. Neither is
passion [or being acted upon] the ultimate perfection, because it
is oriented to receiving something further, and hence is not final.
And hence operation falls in none of these [categories].31
170 Also, this seems to be the case, speaking particularly about
relation, because according to Augustine, in Bk. VII of the
Trinity, chapter 2: "Everything spoken of relatively, is also
something, even if the relationship is excluded"; but intellection
and every operation is in regard to something; therefore, etc.
The minor is evident, from the Philosopher, Bk. V of the
Metaphysics, declaring that operation is spoken of relatively as
regards the object, such as 'measured' to the measure, because
the object is the measure of the operation. Hence if knowledge
were spoken of relatively, all the more so would 'operation' and
the 'act of knowing,' which regards the object more immediately
than does habitual [knowledge]; moreover, a habit only regards
the object by means of its act. It remains therefore, that an
operation is not only a relation, but also something more than
that.
171 Also, the same thing is proved as regards action and
passion: for action and passion necessarily pertain to some term
that receives existence through the action or passion; because it is
not understandable that there be heat and no further term,
namely, nothing that is heated through it; but operations are
ultimate terms by which nothing further receives being, because
30 According to the axiom actio est in passo, the action occurs in the patient*
or recipient of the action, and perfects the latter, not the agent.
31 Hence it pertains to the only category that remains, namely that of
'quality.' See n. 175 infra.
et IX Metaphysicae.105 Obiectum vero operationis ad quod

terminatur operatio non accipit esse per eam, sed praesupponitur
operationi, quia sunt fines operantis, ut dictum est; ergo etc.
172 Sed dices quod habitus accipit esse per operationem, quia
generatur ex operationibus; ergo videtur esse terminus
operationum. Respondeo: argumentum est in oppositum;
operatio est principium generandi habitum et formale principium,
quia virtualiter habet perfectionem habitus secundum aliquem
gradum primo, et postea intendit ipsum, quia ex eodem generatur
habitus et intenditur, II Ethicorum.106 Sed impossibile est
actionem vel passionem esse formale principium agendi, quia non
sunt formae activae. Ergo impossibile est actionem vel passionem
esse operationem.
173 Per hoc patet ad instantiam illam: impossibile est intelligere
actionem sine termino actionis, quia quod sit actio et nihil fiat
includit contradictionem; sed intellectio potest esse et intelligi
sine hoc quod habitus generetur ex ea vel augmentetur, quia
posito in operante actu intensissimo vel habitu intensissimo, non
intenditur habitus ex talibus operationibus; ergo nec generatur
novus ex talibus. Patet in beatis, ubi est operatio perfectissima
sine generatione alicuius habitus et sine eiusdem habitus
augmentatione .
174 Operatio ergo aliquando et non semper habet habitum: non
pro termino ad quem terminatur essentialiter sicut actio, sed
sicut ad terminum qui sequitur accidentaliter, quia non semper
sicut una forma sequitur aliam, et non sicut terminus sequitur
actionem vel productionem.
im Aristot., Metaph. IX (0), c. 8 (1050a 21-6 1).

10,i Aristot., Eth. Nic. II, c. 1 (1103a 14-5).
they are ends, according to Bk. I of the Ethics and Bk. IX of the
Metaphysics. The object32 of the operation, however, with which
the operation ends, does not receive being through it, but its
being is presupposed for the operation, because [operations] are
ends of the one operating, as has been said; therefore, etc.
172 But you may say that a habit receives existence through
operation, because it is generated from operations; therefore it
seems to be the term of operations. I respond: the argument
leads to the opposite [conclusion]; operation is both a principle of
generating a habit and its formal principle, because at first it has
the perfection of the habit virtually according to some degree,33
and afterwards intensifies it, because a habit is generated and
intensified from the same [source], according to Bk. II of the
Ethics. But it is impossible that action and passion be formal
principles of acting, because they are not active forms. Therefore
it is impossible that action or passion be an operation.
173 From this the answer to that objection is clear: it is
impossible to understand action without a term of the action,
because it is a contradiction that an action occurs and nothing
comes to be. But an intellection can occur and be understood
without any habit being generated or strengthened by it. For
when the one operating already has the most intense act or the
strongest habit, no habit is strengthened from such operations;
therefore neither is a new [habit] generated from such. This is
evident in the case of the blessed [in heaven], where there is the
most perfect operation without any generation of a habit and
without any augmentation of a habit.34
174 Sometimes, though not always, an operation has a habit not
as a term in which it ends essentially, as does an action, but as
[being] towards a term that incidentally follows, because it is not
always [the case here] as with one form following another, nor as
with a term following an action or a production.
i2 Namely, what is known.

That is to say, once the operation is performed, it leaves behind a trace
that makes the next repetition of the action easier. Repeated actions intensify the
habit.
M Scotus, unlike Ockham, for example, believes that a quality cannot be
indefinitely increased the way a quantity can. In heaven, repeated acts of
knowing and loving, for example, do not augment the quality.
175 Restat ergo necessario concedere quod istae operationes sint

qualitates, cum non sint nihil nec in aliquo genere, sicut superius
est probatum. Sed non sunt de secunda specie qualitatis, quia non
sunt naturalis potentia vel impotentia; nec de tertia vel quarta
specie, quia istae tantum conveniunt corporalibus. Patet de
passione et passibili qualitate in tertia specie et formis sive
figuris corporum quae sunt in quarta specie.
176 Relinquitur ergo quod operationes sunt in prima specie
qualitatis, et universaliter omnis perfectio naturae spiritualis, si
non sit substantia eius sive sit in fieri, sive sit permanens et in
facto esse est in prima specie qualitatis.
[B. Art. 2: an possit esse mutatio ad intellectionem]
177 Quantum ad secundum articulum, qui est utrum ad talem

operationem posset esse mutatio, dico quod sic, eo quod potest
esse terminus per se alicuius mutationis, quod patet ex
definitione eius, quod est mutari, V Physicorum,101 quia quod
aliter se habet nunc quam prius per se mutatur ad illud per quod
modo se habet aliter quam prius. Sed intellectus per actum
intelligendi et voluntas per actum volendi quando intellectus
intelligit et voluntas vult aliter se habent quam prius, quia
neutra potentia fuit sub actu suo secundario; ergo per istos actus
secundos utraque potentia mutatur et per consequens mutatio est
per se ad huiusmodi operationes.
[C. Art. 3: Si entitas intellectionis posset produci

1. Responsio Scoti]
178 Quantum ad tertium articulum: utrum operatio possit esse

terminus per se productionis, respondeo quod secundum
intentionem Philosophi, V et VII Metaphysicae,m totum
107 Rectius: Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 14 (10206 9-10).

10B Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 16 (10216 12-3); ibid., VII (Z), c. 8 (10336 1-18).
175 It remains therefore to concede necessarily that these

operations are qualities, since they are not nothing nor fall in any
other category, as was proved above. But they are not the second
species of quality,35 since they are not a natural potency or
impotency, nor are they in the third or fourth species, because
these only pertain to corporeal things. This is clear as regards
passion and a passive quality in the third species, and as regards
forms or figures of bodies, in the fourth species.
176 It remains, therefore, that operations are in the first species
of quality, and universally every perfection of a spiritual nature,
if it is not its substancewhether it is in a process, or something
permanent* and in stable beingis in the first species of quality.
Article 2: Can some change lead to intellection?
177 As for the second article, which is whether some change or

alteration can occur towards such an operation, I say that there
can be a change, inasmuch as intellection can be the per se term
of some alteration, which is evident from its definition, that is, to
be changed, according to Bk. V of the [Meta]physics. For what
now is otherwise than it was before, is changed per se as to what
now makes it different from what it was before. But the intellect
through the act of understanding when it understands, and the
will through the act of willing when it wills, are otherwise than
before, because neither potency was under its secondary act.36
Therefore both potencies are changed through their second act,
and as a consequence, there is a per se mutation towards such
operations.
Article 3: Can the entity of intellection be produced?
178 [The reply of Scotus] As to the third article: whether the

operation could be the per se term of production, I reply that
according to the intention of the Philosopher in Bk. V and Bk. VII
35 According to Aristotle there are four species of qualities (cf. Metaphysics V

[A], ch. 14).
M Keep in mind that the primary act of a potency or power is to exist, and its
secondary act is to function or operate.
compositum generatur per se et producitur, et non solum

compositum per se generatur in genere substantiae et non pars,
sed etiam in omnibus generibus accidentium, quia ratio
Philosophi communis est ad omne quod generatur, cuiuscumque
generis fuerit, scilicet ista: omne quod generatur ex aliquo quod
praeexsistit generationi tanquam ex parte sui, generatur ut
materia; nulla forma est huiusmodi; ergo nulla forma per se
generatur. Non ergo operatio intellectus per se generatur cum sit
quaedam forma, et ita non potest esse terminus alicuius
productionis vel generationis.
[2. Opinio aliorum]
179 Sed propter dictum Philosophi dicentis quod totum

compositum per se generatur tam in substantiis quam in
accidentibus, assumpserunt sibi aliqui opinionem quod formae
aliorum generum a substantia habent propriam potentiam sui
generis, et sic compositum in genere accidentis per se sit ex
potentia sui generis praeexsistente, sicut compositum ex genere
substantiae, ex potentia sui praeexsistente.
[3. Contra hanc interpretationem]
180 Sed istud est contra intentionem Philosophi. Dicit enim

Philosophus VIII Metaphysicae,109 quod accidentia non habent
materiam ex qua fiant, sed solum in qua fiant ut subiectum.
181 Item, VII Metaphysicae110 exemplificans de composito
accidentis quod generatur, dicit quod lignum album generatur et
non album tantum.
10S Aristot., Metaph. VIII (H), c. 4 (10446 7-10).

1 10 Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 9 (10346 10-5).
of the Metaphysics, the whole composite is generated and

produced per se, and not just the composite in the category of
substance, and not a part. But [this occurs] also in all the
categories* of accidents, for the following reasoning of the
Philosopher applies to all that is generated, of whatever category
it will be: everything that is generated from something that
existed before the generation as from a part of it, is generated as
matter.37 No form is such; therefore no form per se is generated.
Therefore, the operation of the intellect is not generated per se,
since it is a certain form, and thus it cannot be the term of some
production or generation.
179 [The opinion of others] But because of the dictum of the
Philosopher declaring that the whole composite per se is
generated both as to substance and as to accidents, some
postulate for themselves the opinion that the forms of categories
other than substance have proper potencies of their own kind,
and thus a composite in the category of accident per se,38 would
be from a preexisting potency of it own kind,39 just as a composite
of substance [is] from its preexisting potency.
Against this interpretation
180 But this is against the intention of the Philosopher. For the
Philosopher says in Bk. VIII of the Metaphysics, that accidents do
not have matter from which they come, but only that in which
they come to be, such as subject.
181 Also, in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics, in exemplifying the
composite of an accident that is generated, he says that white
wood is generated and not the 'white' alone.
:l7 Matter is understood here in the general sense of that, from which
something new is formed and remains in the final product. Thus substance that
undergoes an accidental change is matter in this sense, since it remains identical
essentially and is only incidentally changed by acquiring an new quality.
38 That is a composite of substance and an accidental perfection, such as the
intellectual soul and the quality of actually knowing.
:l9 Unlike Aquinas, Scotus does not consider the intellect (an active potency)
to be an accident of the soul, but something only formally or conceptually distinct
from the essence of the soul.
182 Item, XII Metaphysicae,111 exemplificans de tribus

principiis, scilicet potentiali, formali et privatione generis
accidentis, ponit aerem, tenebram112 et lucem. Aer autem non est
potentia intrinseca de genere accidentis, et tamen Philosophus
ponit illum pro principio accidentali.
183 Non ergo generatio accidentalis habet potentiale de genere
accidentis ex quo compositum accidentale per se generetur. Nam
cum omne quod per se generatur, generetur ex aliquo sui quod
praeexsistit, tale autem potentiale non invenitur in genere
accidentis, nisi ponas illud potentiale manere sub duabus formis
contrariis, sequitur quod compositum de genere accidentis, quod
est ens per accidens, solum generetur generatione accidentali et
per consequens intellectus noscens vel Socrates noscens
generatur generatione accidentali vel productione, ita quod
primus terminus istius productionis accidentalis est hoc
compositum: intellectus cognoscens vel Socrates cognoscens.
184 Si tamen loquamur de formali termino productionis, sic
notitia actualis vel intellectio potest per se produci, sicut forma
substantialis quae est terminus formalis generationis aliquo modo
per se generatur, totum autem compositum in quolibet sic per se
et primo generatur.
185 [Instantiae] Sed contra praedicta iam potest sic argui:

productio terminatur ad ens; quod per se non est ens, non est
terminus per se productionis; sed totum compositum ex subiecto
et accidente non est per se ens, sed ens per accidens; ergo nec tale
totum potest per se produci. Erit igitur compositum per se de
genere accidentis.
186 Item, secundo sic: mutatio accidentalis est per se in aliquo
genere; non est per se in genere sui subiecti quod est substantia;
ergo est in genere termini formalis. Illa ergo forma erit per se
terminus mutationis, igitur et productionis. Quod enim potest
esse terminus mutationis per se, et productionis.
187 [Solutiones instantiarum] Ad primum istorum,113
dicendum quod unumquodque quod est aliquid secundum quid
111 Aristot., Metaph. XII (A), c. 4 (10706 19-21).

Sic!
"3 Cf. supra n. 185.
182 Also, in Bk. XII of the Metaphysics, in exemplifying three

principles, namely potential, formal, and privation of a genus of
accident, he posits air, darkness and light. Air, however, is not an
intrinsic potency in an accidental genus, and nevertheless the
Philosopher posits this for an accidental principle.
183 Therefore, accidental generation has no 'potential' in a
genus of accident, from which the accidental composite would be
generated per se. For since everything that is generated per se, is
generated from something of itself that preexisted, but such a
potential is not found in the genus of accident unless you
postulate that that 'potential' remains under two contrary forms,
it follows that a composite in a genus of accident, which is a being
accidentally, is only generated by accidental generation. As a
consequence, the intellect knowing, or Socrates knowing, is
generated by accidental generation or production, so that the first
term of this accidental production is this composite, 'the intellect
knowing,' or 'Socrates knowing.'
184 But if we are speaking of the formal term of production,
such actual knowledge or intellection can be produced per se, just
as a substantial form, which is the formal term of generation, is
generated in some way per se; the total composite, however, in
anything is thus generated per se and primarily.
185 [Objections] But against the aforesaid already it can be
argued in this way: production ends up with a being; what is not
a being per se, is not a term of a per se production; but the entire
composite of subject and accident is not a being per se, but a
being accidentally; therefore neither can such a whole be
produced per se. Therefore, it will be a composite per se in a
genus of accident.
186 Also, secondly in this way: an accidental mutation is per se
in some genus; it is not per se in the genus of its subject which is
a substance; therefore it is in a genus of a formal term. That form,
therefore, will be a per se term of a mutation, and therefore also
of a production. For what can be a term of a mutation per se, can
be one of a production as well.
187 [Solution of these objections] To the first of these [n. 185],
it must be said that whatever is something in a qualified sense, is
that 'in a qualified sense' simply, although it is not that simply in
simpliciter est illud secundum quid, licet simpliciter non sit illud
simpliciter, sicut homo mortuus est homo secundum quid
simpliciter. In generationibus autem accidentium simpliciter est
generatio secundum quid et non generatio simpliciter. Patet ex V
Physicorum,114 et ideo generatio formae accidentalis simpliciter
est generatio secundum quid, et quod generatur tali generatione
est ens simpliciter secundum quid.
188 Ad formam argumenti: nam tale totum quod est ens per
accidens non per se producitur, quia non est ens per se, sicut
substantia vel compositum in genere substantiae per se
producitur, quia est ens per se. Sicut tamen est ens secundum
quid, ita producitur secundum quid, et sicut ens per se unum in
genere substantiae per se producitur et simpliciter, ita hoc ens
per accidens per se producitur simpliciter secundum quid.
189 Ad secundum,115 dico quod illa mutatio est per se in uno
genere, scilicet in genere formae accidentalis, et concedo quod per
se terminus istius mutationis sit forma. Sed ex hoc non sequitur
quod sit per se terminus productionis, quia mutatio est per se
actus mutabilis, et ideo mutatio per se terminatur ad illud
secundum quod mutabile mutatur, et hoc est forma. Sed quia
terminus productionis totaliter accipit esse, ideo productio non
terminatur per se nisi ad ens per se; et ideo non sequitur est per
se terminus mutationis, ergo est per se terminus productionis'.
Hoc autem magis patebit distinctione quinta ubi ponetur
differentia inter mutationem et productionem et quomodo in
divinis per se ponitur et conceditur productio, sed non mutatio.
190 Ex praedictis sequitur corollarium de his quae dicuntur de
actibus essentialibus et notionalibus in divinis, quod scilicet actus
essentiales non sunt actus productivi nec principia formalia
producendi, ut intelligere et velle, et ideo per huiusmodi actus
non producuntur personae in divinis, sed per actus notionales, qui
m Aristot., Physica V, c 1 (224a 21-5).

"r'Cf. supra n. 186.
an unqualified sense, e.g., a 'dead man' is simply a man in a

qualified sense. In the generation of accidents, however, there is
[precisely such] a generation simply in a qualified sense and not
in an unqualified sense. This is evident from Bk. V of the Physics,
and therefore the generation of an accidental form is simply a
generation in a qualified sense, and what is generated in such a
generation is simply a being in a qualified sense.
188 As to the form of the argument: for such a whole, which is a
being accidentally, is not produced per se, because it is not a
being per se just as a substance, or composite in the category of
substance, is produced per se, because it is a being per se.
Nevertheless, as it is a being in a qualified sense, in this way it is
produced in a qualified sense, and just as a being per se one in
the category of substance is produced per se and in an unqualified
sense, so this accidental being is simply produced per se in a
qualified sense.
189 To the second, [n. 186] I say that this mutation is per se in
one category, namely in the category of an accidental form, and I
concede that the per se term of this mutation is a form. But from
this it does not follow that it is the per se term of a production.
For a mutation is per se an act of the mutable, and therefore a
mutation per se terminates in that, according to which the
mutable is changed, and this is a form. But because the term of
production receives existence as a whole, therefore the production
only terminates per se with a being per se; and therefore it does
not follow 'it is a per se term of a mutation, therefore it is a per se
term of a production.' But this will become clearer in distinction
five where a difference between a mutation and a production will
be postulated, as well as how in the divine a production per se is
postulated and conceded, but no mutation.
190 From the aforesaid a corollary follows about those things
that are said about essential and notional*40 acts in the divine,
namely that essential acts are not productive acts nor formal
principles of production, as to understand and to will, and
therefore through acts of this sort the persons in the divine are
not produced, but rather through notional acts, which are 'to
i0 Notional acts are those associated with one or two divine persons;
essential acts are attributed to all three persons
sunt 'dicere' et 'spirare' quae se habent in divinis sicut elicere in

nobis. Unde intelligere et velle et huiusmodi actus essentiales
sunt actus operativi et non productivi.
191 Ad primum116 dicendum quod minor est falsa, ut

praeostensum est. Propter tamen solutiones dubitationum,
sciendum est quod tres sunt condiciones vel proprietates actionis
de genere actionis. Una est quod ipsa actio semper est in fieri;
secunda, quod ipsa semper aliquid habet pro termino circa quem
est ut subiectum vel obiectum; tertia, quod semper habet
terminum ad quem est et non solum terminum circa quem sit, ita
quod, illo termino ad quem est circumscripto, impossible est
actionem esse ut formam quae accipit esse per eam et ad quam
necessario terminatur. In prima condicione convenit cum actione
forma aliqua absoluta, ut lux quae tantum habet esse in fieri ad
praesentiam corporis luminosi, et sic dicit Augustinus quod aer fit
lucidus et non est factus lucidus. Differt autem ab ea in secunda
et tertia condicione, quia lux non habet terminum ut obiectum
circa quod est nec terminum ad quem est alium a se, sicut habet
actio de genere actionis. In secunda autem et prima condicione
convenit operatio cum actione de genere actionis, quia tam
intelligere quam velle habent esse in fieri et sunt necessario circa
aliquod obiectum ut quasi circa terminum; sed differunt ab
actione de genere actionis in tertia condicione, quia istae
operationes non habent terminum ad quem vel ad quos sunt, quia
sunt fines; nec est terminus aliquis alius ab operationibus, I
Ethicorum111 et IX Metaphysicae,118 sicut est de actione in genere
actionis, ubi necessario est aliquis terminus alius ab actione tali,
116 Cf. supra n. 161.

117 Aristot., Eth. Nic. I, c. 1 (1094a 3-6).
"H Aristot., Metaph. IX (0), c. 8 (1050a 21-6 1).
speak*'41 and 'to spirate*,' which exist in the divine in the manner
that 'to elicit' does in us. Hence to understand and to will and
such essential acts are operative acts and not productive acts.
To the Initial Arguments
191 To the first [n. 161] it must be said that the minor is false,
as has been shown. But on account of the solution of the doubts, it
must be known that there are three conditions or properties of
action in the category of action. One is that the action itself is
always in a state of becoming; second, that it is always about
some term, such as a subject or object; the third, that it always
has a term at which [it ends], and not only a term it is about, such
that, if this term 'at which' is eliminated, it is impossible for the
action to exist as a form which receives being through it and at
which it necessarily terminates. As to the first condition, some
absolute form agrees with an action, such as light, which only has
action when it comes into the presence of a luminous body, and so
Augustine says that air becomes lucid and is not made lucid.
However, it differs from [an action] as to the second and third
conditions, because light has no term as an object, which it is
about, nor any term at which it ends that is other than itself, as
does an action in the category of action. As to the second and first
condition, however, an operation agrees with action in the
category of action, because both understanding and willing have
existence in coming to be and are necessarily about some object,
such asas it wereabout a term.42 But they differ from an
action in the category of action as to the third condition, because
these operations do not have a term or terms where they end,
because they [themselves] are ends. Neither is there some term
other than the operations, according to Bk. I of the Ethics, and
Bk. IX of the Metaphysics, as there is about action in the category
of action, where necessarily there is some term other than such
41 Scotus uses the term 'dicere' or 'to speak' to refer to the process whereby
the Father begets the Son as his Word.
n Since the term of an intellection or volition has only an intelligible being
(esse intelligibile) as an object of thought, and no real existence, Scotus uses
'quasi' to qualify the sense in which it is 'about something' that one is thinking or
willing.
quia tales actiones sunt universaliter viae ad aliam formam, et

impossibile est intelligere viam sine termino sicut relationem sine
termino. Habitus autem qui sequitur operationem, non sequitur
eam ut terminus ad quem terminatur operatio, quia operatio est
forma et qualitas absoluta in se terminata, ut dictum est; sed
habitus sequitur operationem ut una forma sequitur aliam ut
calor lucem calefactivam.
192 Dico ergo ad probationem primam119 illius minoris quod non
omnis actus secundus est actio de genere actionis nec etiam
passio de genere passionis. Alii sunt actus qui sunt perfectiones
agentis, ut operationes quae sunt fines, ut intelligere et velle. Eo
enim ipso quo sunt perfectiones agentis ultimae, sunt actus
secundi et non primi, et eo ipso quod producuntur, non sunt
actiones de genere actionis, sed termini actionum praecedentium.
193 Ad aliud120 cum dicitur quod nihil est in fieri nisi actio vel
passio, dicendum quod hoc est falsum; non enim hoc facit aliquid
esse de genere actionis. Patet de luce, et omnis forte creatura
respectu agentis primi est in fieri; sed de hoc in principio II libri.
194 Et quando dicitur quod omne aliud ens ab actione et

passione habet esse permanens, et cum operatio, per te, non sit
actio vel passio, quare non habet esse permanens sicut alia entia
ab actione et passione? Respondeo: non omne aliud ens ab
actione et passione habet esse mansivum nec est alia causa huius
quaerenda quare hoc ens est hoc ens et illud ens est illud, ut
quare permanens est permanens et quare successivum est
successivum, quorum non est alia causa nisi quia sunt talia
secundum naturam vel secundum essentias suas. Quod enim
linea est permanens et tempus successivum, hoc ideo est quia
linea est linea et tempus est tempus, et nulla alia causa nisi
voluntas creantis illa talia. Sicut enim esse consequitur essentiam
119 Cf. supra n. 161.

120 Cf. supra n. 162.
an action. For such actions are always approaches to other forms,

and it is impossible to understand an approach without a term
any more than a relation without a term. Habits, however, that
follow operations, do not follow them as terms where the
operations end, because the operation is a terminal form and an
absolute quality in itself, as was said. But a habit follows an
operation as one form follows another, as heat follows warming
light.
192 I say therefore to the first proof of that minor [n. 161] that
not every second act is an action in the category of action, neither
is it a passion in the category of passion. There are other acts,
which are perfections of the agent, such as operations, which are
ends [in themselves], like 'to understand' and 'to will.' For as far
as they are final perfections of the agent, they are second acts, not
first acts; and by the very fact that they are produced, they are
not actions in the category of action, but are the terms of
preceding actions.
193 To the other [n. 162], when it is said that nothing is in a
state of coming to be other than action or passion, it must be said
that this is false; for this is not what makes a thing be in the
category of action. This is evident in regard to light, and perhaps
every creature with respect to the first agent43 is in a state of
coming to be; but in the beginning of Bk. II [we spoke] about this.
194 And when it is said that every being other than action and
passion have permanent being, and since an operation, according
to you, is neither action nor passion, why does it not have
permanent being as beings other than action and passion? I
reply: not every being other than action and passion has being
that remains, nor should one seek another reason for this, that
this being is this and that being is that, and permanent being is
permanent, and transient being is transient. For there is no other
cause, except that they are such by nature and by reason of their
essences. For that a line is permanent and time is transient, is
because a line is a line and time is time, and there is no other
reason for this except the will of the one creating them so. For
just as being follows essence immediately, so this or another mode
43 That is, God, as a 'conserving cause' of creation.

immediate, ita et modus essendi talis vel talis similiter

consequitur, et ideo non oportet quod omnis qualitas sit mansiva.
195 Ad tertiam probationem,121 quando dicitur quod actio dicitur
de actione immanente et transeunte, dicendum quod haec divisio
uno modo est aequivoci in aequivocata, vel vocis in suas
significationes; alio modo superioris in sua inferiora, vel
universalis in partes subiectivas. Nam si intelligatur per
actionem immanentem operatio, sic actio immanens est qualitas
et ultima perfectio operantis, et actio ut transiens est actio de
genere actionis et sic est divisio aequivoci in aequivocata. Si
autem intelligatur per actionem immanentem actio quae
terminatur ad aliquem terminum, tunc actio immanens est actio
de genere actionis, quae terminatur ad operationem imma
nentem, quae est actio absoluta, sicut dicere et elicere et spirare
terminantur ad dictum, elicitum vel spiratum; et actio transiens
isto modo est ad aliquem terminum extra factum vel productum;
et haec divisio est superioris in sua inferiora.
196 Ad probationem quartam122 dicendum quod Augustinus non
negat aerem esse factum lucidum propter hoc quod non sit factus
lucidus ab aliquo agente, sed quia lux habet esse ex continua
influentia suae causae.
197 Ad secundum principale123 patet responsio per praedicta,
quod forma non generatur nec producitur per se et primo, nisi
sicut formalis terminus productionis et non sicut productum, eo
modo quo dictum est.
[Quaestio 7
Utrum in mente sit imago Trinitatis]
198 Utrum in mente sit imago Trinitatis distincte.
Videtur quod non:

Imago distincte repraesentat illud cuius est imago; sed mens
non repraesentat Trinitatem; ergo non est imago. Probatio
minoris: mens est naturaliter cognoscibilis, ergo et illud quod
121 Cf. supra n. 163.

122 Cf. supra n. 164.
12:1 Cf. supra n. 165.
of being follows as well, and therefore it is not necessary that

every quality be lasting.
195 To the third proof [n. 163], when it is said that action is
called immanent and transient,* it must be said that this is in
one way a division of what is equivocal into its equivocates, or of a
word into its significations; in another way it is a division of what
is superior into its inferiors, or what is universal into its parts
that are under it. For if one may think of an operation as an
immanent action, in this way immanent action is a quality and
the final perfection of the operator, and action as transient is
action in the category of action, and thus the division of what is
equivocal into its equivocates. But if one may understand
immanent action as an action that ends at some term, then
immanent action is action in the category of action that ends with
an immanent operation, which is an absolute action, as 'to speak'
and 'to elicit' and to spirate' end with what is said, what is
elicited, and what is spirated; and transient action in this way is
towards some external term that is made or produced; and this
division is one of what is superior into its inferiors.
196 As for the fourth proof [n. 164], it must be said that
Augustine does not deny that air is made lucid for the reason that
it is not made lucid by some agent, but because light has being
from the continuous influence of its cause.
197 The answer to the second initial argument [n. 165] is
evident from what has been said, i.e., that form is not generated
or produced per se and primarily, except as a formal term of
production, and not as a product,* in the way that has been
stated.
Question Seven
Is there an image of the Trinity in the mind?
198 Is there an image of the Trinity in the mind distinctly? It

seems not: An image represents distinctly that of which it is an
image; but the mind does not represent the Trinity; therefore it is
not an image Proof of the minor: the mind is naturally
knowable, therefore also that which is represented through it,
namely what is imagined, is naturally knowable; but the Trinity
repraesentatur per eam, scilicet imaginatum, est naturaliter

cognoscibile; sed Trinitas non est a nobis naturaliter cognoscibilis;
ergo mens non est imago eius.
199 Item, nulla creatura in repraesentando excedit ideam suam;
sed idea non ostendit Trinitatem sive Deum ut trinum, quia per
Trinitatem non est assimilabilis vel ratio imitabilis a creatura;
ergo nec mens repraesentat Trinitatem.
200 Item, in qualibet persona divina est formaliter memoria,
intelligentia et voluntas; ergo mens non plus repraesentabit
unam trinitatem quam aliam.
201 Contra:
Augustinus in littera.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
202 Responsio: Hic sunt quattuor videnda: primo, quid vel quae
sit ratio imaginis de hoc dictum est prius quaestione de
vestigio. Haec enim erat differentia inter vestigium et imaginem,
quia vestigium repraesentabat distincte partem et indistincte
totum et vestigium repraesentabat per modum similis, imago
vero repraesentat distincte totum, et non tantum per modum
similis sed per modum imitabilis. Licet enim unum ovum sit
alteri simile, non tamen est imago alterius, quia non repraesentat
eum per modum imitabilis. Secundo videndum est de imagine,
cuius est repraesentativum, si est repraesentativum Trinitatis eo
quod conceptus Trinitatis est quasi conceptus totius. Tertio, per
quem modum repraesentat Trinitatem, quia illa tria
repraesentantur secundum quandam unitatem. Quarto, est
videndum in quibus consistit ratio imaginis.
203 Unde quantum ad hoc sciendum quod actus illi in quibus
consistit ratio imaginis sunt experiti in nobis, scilicet actus
intelligendi et volendi; experimur enim quod intelligimus cum
volumus; ergo multo magis volumus cum volumus eo quod sunt in
potestate nostra. Sequitur ergo quod oportet ponere in nobis
principia formalia istorum actuum, et has res invenimus in mente
nostra, scilicet aliqua duo vel plura non curo, quantum ad
memoriam, quae sunt principia istorum actuum.
Dist. 3, Question Seven 244
is not naturally knowable by us; therefore the mind is not an

image of it.
199 Also, no creature in representing exceeds its idea [i.e., the
idea of what it represents]; but the idea does not show the Trinity
or God as triune, because in the Trinity there is no notion that
can be imitated or assimilated by a creature; therefore neither
does the mind represent the Trinity.
200 Also, in each divine person there is formally memory,
intelligence and will; therefore the mind will not represent one
trinity more than another.
201 To the contrary: Augustine in the text* [of the Sentences].
To the Question
202 Reply: Here there are four things to investigate: first, what
is the essence of an image? This was discussed earlier in the
question about a vestige. For this was the difference between an
image and a vestige: a vestige represents a part distinctly and a
whole indistinctly, and represents by way of similarity; but an
image represents the whole distinctly, and not only by way of
similarity, but by way of imitation. Although one egg is similar to
another, it is not an image of another, because it does not
represent it by way of imitation. Secondly, one must investigate
what an image represents, if it is representative of the Trinity
insofar as the concept of the Trinity is a quasi-whole. Thirdly, in
what manner does it represent the Trinity, because these three
[persons] are represented as having a certain unity? Fourth, it
must be seen in what things the notion of the image consists.
203 To this end, therefore, it should be known that we
experience those acts which constitute the notion of the image,
namely the acts of understanding and will. Furthermore, what we
experience is that we [can] understand at will; therefore, even
more so we will at will, because [these acts] are in our power. It
follows, therefore, that one must postulate the formal principles
of these acts in us, and it is in our mind that we find these
thingsI do not care whether they are two or more, so far as
memory goesthat are principles of these actions.
204 Quae sunt ergo illa tria in quibus consistit imago?

Respondeo quod accipiendo illum actum primum unicum vel duos
actus primos cum aliquo uno per quos possumus in actus
secundos, habemus in nobis aliquod principium fecundum ad
operationes producibiles in mente, et sic habemus trinitatem.
205 Primo igitur principium fecundum dicitur in quantum est
non ab alio, quia tunc esset procedere in infinitum. Principium
igitur in nobis fecundum ostendit personam fecundam respectu
suae notitiae producendae et respectu producendi amoris, et ista
sunt infinita. Ergo producuntur per rationes infinitorum
principiorum, quae sunt intellectus et voluntas in Deo. Sed in
nobis est notitia et amor quae sunt proportionata et
correspondentia notitiae infinitae in Deo et amori infinito.
Quidquid igitur in nobis habet fecunditatem a se, et utramque
fecunditatem a se, scilicet notitiae et amoris, proportionatam et
correspondentem ad notitiam producentem et ad amorem spi-
rantem in divinis, et necessario repraesentat primam personam
in divinis. Habendo ergo productionem primam proportionatam
huic principio fecundo, scilicet intellectionem, habemus secundam
personam. Habendo etiam productionem secundam in nobis,
scilicet volitionem proportionatam huic principio fecundo,
habemus tertiam personam. Sic igitur habemus hic tria in nobis
quae sunt ut unum aliqua unitate, et non invenio aliqua tria in
nobis ita perfecte repraesentantia trinitatem et unitatem.
206 Non tamen est similis unitas hic et ibi, quia in nobis sunt
unum unitate subiecti et accidentis, sed in divinis illa tria sunt
unum unitate essentiae, quia in divinis non invenitur unitas
conformis unitati subiecti et accidentis. Habemus igitur tria in
nobis quae repraesentant Trinitatem, scilicet principium
fecundum et hoc est memoria perfecta in nobis quae includit
204 Just what are these three that constitute an image? I

respond that by admitting that unique first act, or the two
primary acts, with some one [act]44[the acts] through which we
have a capacity for second acts45we have in us some fecund
principle whereby producible operations [can arise] in the mind,
and so we have a trinity.46
205 Thus, the primary fecund principle is so called insofar as it
is not from another, for otherwise there would be infinite regress.
At the same time, the fecund principle in us reveals a prolific
person as regards producing knowledge and love, and these are
infinite. Therefore they are produced in the manner of principles
that are infinite, which are intellect and will in God. But in us
there is knowledge and love that are [only] proportionate and
correspond to the infinite knowledge in God and to his infinite
love. Thus, whatever in us of itself has fecunditymoreover, [that
has] both types of fecundity of itself, namely, of knowledge and
love, being proportionate and corresponding to the prolific
knowledge and spirating love in the divinenecessarily
represents the first person in the divine. Therefore, by positing a
first production proportionate to this fecund principle, namely,
intellection, we have the second person. And also by positing a
second production in us, namely, volition proportionate to this
fecund principle, we have the third person. In this way, therefore,
we have these three in us that are one by some sort of unity, and
I find no other triad in us that so perfectly represents both trinity
and unity.
206 But the unity here and there is not alike, because in us they
are one as subject and accident, but in the divine these three are
one by a unity of essence. For in the divine there is no unity
resembling that of subject and accident. We have, therefore, three
things in us which represent the Trinity: namely [1] a fecund
principle, and this is in us perfect memory (which includes the
44 I.e., intellect, will, and memory in various combinations.

45 E.g., an act of knowing (intellectio) and one of willing (volitio).
4,i Namely, three principles: e.g., memory, intellect, and will, whereby we can
remember, think and love. Memory, whereby we re-create some past event, is a
symbol of the Father begetting the Word; knowledge or wisdom is a symbol of the
Son as Word; love is a symbol of the mutual love of Father and Son breathing or
spirating the Holy Spirit.
essentiam animae et speciem intelligibilem et voluntatem sicut

parentem et copulantem, et duas operationes vel productiones
quae respondent illi principio fecundo duplici fecunditate, scilicet
intellectus et voluntatis, sive intellectionis et volitionis princi-
pium et ex hoc habemus ordinem originis.
207 Modo ad mentem Augustini IX De Trinitate, cap. 5, i24 ubi
pulcherrime assignat imaginem et perfectissime, quando dicit:
mens, notitia, amor. Unde dicit 'mens' quae non dicit praecise
fecundum principium vel potentiam ad gignendum vel
spirandum, sed quendam actum primum habentem in se
virtualiter utrumque, et sic repraesentat Patrem qui habet
utramque fecunditatem a se; et hoc est propriissime imago
Trinitatis assignata, iudicio meo.
208 Alibi autem, scilicet IX De Trinitate,i25 assignat haec tria:
memoria, intelligentia, et voluntas, et ista plus et principalius
repraesentant unitatem quam trinitatem, quia sunt eadem res
cum anima; sed non ita repraesentant quoad productiones et ut
trinus. Memoria enim non dicit fecunditatem nisi ad intel-
ligendum, et ideo non repraesentat Patrem ut habet utramque
fecunditatem, sicut mens repraesentat utramque. Similiter
intelligentia non repraesentat Filium ut productum, sive sub actu
notionali; nec intelligentia ut est potentia, originatur a memoria.
Similiter voluntas ut accipitur pro potentia non repraesentat
Spiritum Sanctum.
209 Sed Augustinus non accipit ibi voluntatem pro potentia, sed
pro actu volendi, sicut patet XV De Trinitate cap. 3, i26 ubi
comparat istas imagines et dicit quod voluntas ex notitia gignitur,
eo quod non diligit nisi cognitum, sive nemo diligit nisi quod prius
novit. Quod ergo dicit Augustinus quod secunda assignatio
imaginis est subtilior quam prima, verum est quantum ad
aliquam eius condicionem, quia perfectius repraesentat unitatem
essentiae, ut dictum est.
i* August., De Trin. IX, c. 5-1 1 (CCSL 50, 300-9; PL 42, 965-70).

Rectius August., De Trin. X. c. 10-12 (CCSL 50, 326-32; PL 42, 980-4).
Cf. August., De Trin. XV, c. 3, n. 5 (CCSL 50A. 465; PL 42, 1060).
essence of the soul and an intelligible species and a will, as parent

and its partner), and two operations or productions that
correspond to this fecund principle with a twofold fecundity,
namely [2] intellect and [3] willor principles of intellection and
volition; and from this we have an order of origin.47
207 Now as to what Augustine means in Bk. IX of the Trinity,
chapter 5, where he most beautifully and perfectly points out
what the image is, when he says: "Mind, knowledge, love." Hence
he says 'mind,' which does not precisely express a fecund
principle or potency of begetting or spirating, but rather a certain
primary act having both of these virtually in itself. And in this
way it represents the father as having both fecundities by
himself, and this is the most appropriate way of assigning the
image to the Trinity, in my judgment.
208 Elsewhere, however, namely in Bk. IX of the Trinity, he
assigns these three: "memory, intelligence and will," and these
primarily represent the unity, more so than the trinity, because
they are the same thing as the soul, and thus do not represent the
productions and [God] as triune. For memory expresses fecundity
only in respect to understanding, and hence does not represent
the Father as possessing both fecundities, as 'mind' does.
Similarly, intelligence does not represent the Son as produced, or
under a notional act, neither does intelligence, as potency,
originate from memory. Similarly, willtaken as potencydoes
not represent the Holy Spirit.
209 But Augustine does not take will here as a potency, but for
an act of volition, as is evident from Bk. XV of the Trinity, chapter
3, where he compares these [descriptions of] images and says that
the will is born of knowledge, for the reason that it only loves the
known, or no one loves what he does not first know. As to the fact
that Augustine says that the second description of an image is
more subtle than the first, this is true as regards one of its
conditions, for it represents more perfectly the unity of the
essence, as has been said.
17 The three divine persons are constituted by opposite relationships* of

origin;* the Father as that from whom the Son originates; the Holy Spirit (as
spirated) originates from Father and Son (as spirating).
210 Sed videtur quod tu assignas quaternitatem in divinis

secundum quattuor quae sunt in imagine, quia tu non ostendis
quin quaelibet potentia sicut est diversa ab alia, sic diversa ab
essentia animae, vel non ostendis quod in una potentia sint duo
principia productiva duorum actuum; immo videtur quod sicut
sunt duo actus distincti et duae potentiae distinctae et sic
quattuor in divinis eis correspondentia.
211 Respondeo quod non est quaternitas, quia uterque actus
primus accipitur pro una entitate principii a se fecundi, et sic
mens, ut est pars imaginis, continet in se memoriam sub actu
memorandi et voluntatem ut est principium volendi.
212 Sed quaero quomodo salvas manifestationem Trinitatis
quoad originem, sic assignando imaginem, cum memoria vel mens
non producat intellectum nec voluntatem quae aliquae sunt
partes imaginis?
213 Dico quod in hoc nulla potest esse similitudo vel reprae-
sentatio, quia oppositum est in proposito, eo quod prima persona
producit secundam et communicat sibi fecunditatem ad
producendum aliam tertiam, et ideo quantum ad origines vel
emanationes, nunquam potest accipi imago in mente nostra nisi
ex actibus modo dicto.
[II. Ad arguments principalia]
214 Ad primum127 quando dicitur quod imago distincte

repraesentat, verum est; et quando dicis: si mens vel imago est
naturaliter cognoscibilis, ergo et illud cuius est, scilicet Trinitas,
verum est, si cognosceretur esse imago illius distincte nec posset
simul alia repraesentare; et ideo dicit Augustinus de imagine
quod videtur sicut speculum, sed non videtur per speculum,
scilicet illud quod repraesentat, quia non credunt ipsum esse
speculum.
215 Ad secundum,128 quando dicitur quod creatura non excedit
suam ideam etc. dico quod nulla essentia creata, ex hoc quod est
essentia, est imago; unde anima non plus est imago quam lapis;
sed ex hoc tantum repraesentat Trinitatem in quantum essentia
m Cf. supra n. 198.

1!W Cf. supra n. 199.
210 But it seems that you assign a quaternary in the divine

according to four things that are in an image, because you cannot
avoid demonstrating that each potency, just as it is diverse from
the other, is [also] different from the essence of the soul, or you
fail to show that two productive principles of two acts are in one
potency. Furthermore, it seems that, just as there are two distinct
acts, so there are two distinct potencies, and so there are four
things in the divine corresponding to them.
211 I reply that there is no quaternary, because for both first
acts there is only one entity of a principle that is of itself fecund.
And so 'mind,' as a part of the image, contains in itself memory
under the act of remembering and the will as a principle of
willing.
212 But I ask: How do you save the manifestation of the Trinity
as to 'origin' by identifying the image [with memory or mind]? For
memory, or mind, does not produce 'intellect' or 'will,' which are
parts of the image.
213 I say that in this respect there can be no similitude or a
representation, because this is opposite to what we propose, for
the first person produces the second and communicates his
fecundity to produce another third, and therefore one cannot
speak of an image in our mind as regards origins or emanations,
but only by way of the acts mentioned before.
214 To the first [n. 198] when it is said that an image represents
distinctly, this is true; and when you say 'if the mind, or the
image, is naturally knowable, then that of which it is [an image],
namely, the Trinity, is also,' this is true [only] if it could be known
to be its image distinctly, nor could it simultaneously represent
other things. And therefore Augustine says of the image that it
appears to be, as it were, a mirror, but not that iti.e., that which
it representsis seen through a mirror, because they do not
believe it [the image] to be a mirror.
215 To the second [n. 199] when it is said that a creature does
not exceed its idea, etc., I say that no created essence as such,
from the fact that it is an essence, is an image. Hence the soul is
est habens in se aliquam unitatem et habet in se aliqua producta

ordine quodam quae sunt in se distincta, et tale potest
repraesentare.
216 Ad ultimum, quando dicitur quod nihil est in anima quod
repraesentet plus unam personam quam aliam, dico quod Pater
actu intellectionis vel intelligere non dicit nec gignit Verbum, sed
notitia memoriali in Patre, quae praecedit omnem intellectionem,
et haec dicitur memoria habitualis, quae formaliter est Patris et
principium productivum aliarum personarum; et ideo dico quod
mens distincte repraesentat unam personam, scilicet Patrem, et
non personam alterius, in quantum accipitur proprie mens ut a se
fecunda.
no more an image than a stone is; but on this account alone it

represents the Trinity: as an essence that has in itself some unity;
and it has in itself some products in a certain order, which are in
themselves distinct, and it can represent such.
216 To the last [n. 200], when it is said that nothing in the soul
represents one person more than another, I say that the Father
by the act of intellection or understanding does not speak nor
generate the Word, but it is by the remembered knowledge in the
Father, which precedes all intellection, and this is called the
habitual memory, which formally pertains to the Father and is a
productive principle of other persons; and therefore I say that the
mind distinctly represents one person, namely the Father, and
not another, inasmuch as one takes 'mind' properly as fecund of
itself.
[Distinctio 4
Quaestio 1
Utrum Deus genuit alium Deum]
1 Circa distinctionem quartam, quaero duas quaestiones:

primo utrum Deus genuit alium Deum; secundo, utrum haec sit
vera: 'Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus'.
2 Quantum ad primam quaestionem arguitur quod Deus

genuit alium Deum sic: Deus genuit Deum: aut ergo se Deum aut
alium Deum; non se Deum, quia nihil est quod se ipsum gignat
vel producat, I De Trinitate, [cap.] 1;i ergo genuit alium Deum.
3 Item, generans distinguitur a genito; ergo Deus genuit
alium Deum. Ista consequentia patet in exemplo: 'homo generans
distinguitur a genito; ergo generat alium hominem'.
4 Item, haec est vera: 'Deus genuit alium deum; ergo vel
alium Deum vel alium non-Deum'; non alium non-Deum, quia
deus genitus est Deus; ergo genuit alium Deum'.
Item, genuit alium habentem deitatem quia aliam personam
subsistentem in deitate, ergo genuit alium Deum. Probatio
consequentiae, Damascenus cap. 57:2 Deus est habens deitatem;
ergo si genuit alium habentem deitatem, genuit et alium Deum;
multiplicata enim descriptione, multiplicatur descriptum.
5 Contra: Non est alius Deus; ergo non genuit alium Deum.
Consequentia patet. Probatio antecedents, Deut. 6, [4]: "Audi,
Israel, Deus tuus unus est".
[I. Ad quaestionem]
6 Respondeo ad quaestionem quod non genuit alium Deum;

nam cuicumque entitati formali correspondet adaequate aliquod
ens, vel aliquis ens illa entitate formali; deitas quae est entitas
i August., De Trin. I, c. 1, n. 1 (CCSL 50, 28; PL 42, 820).

2 Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 55 [Til, c. 11] (ed. Buytaert, 207; PG 94, 1027).
249
Distinction 4
Question One
Has God generated another God?
1 About distinction four, I ask two questions: first, whether

God has generated another God; second, whether this is true: God
is Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
2 As for the first question, it is argued that God has generated
another God in this way. God has generated a God: therefore
either God has generated himself or another God. Not God
himself, because there is nothing that generates or produces
itself, according to Bk. I of The Trinity, chapter 1: therefore God
has generated another God.
3 Also, the one generating is distinguished from the one
generated; therefore God had generated another God. This
implication* is clarified in an example: a man generating is
distinct from the one generated; therefore, he generated another
man.
4 Also, this is true: God generated another god; therefore
either another God or another non-God; not another non-God,
because the god generated is God; therefore he had generated
another God.
Also, he generated another having deity, for [he generated]
another person* subsisting in deity, therefore, he generated
another God. Proof of the implication. Damascene [De fide
orthodoxa] chapter 57: God is one having deity; therefore if he has
generated another having deity, he has generated another God,
for if the description is multiplied, what is described is multiplied.
5 To the contrary: There is no other God; therefore he did not
generate another God. The implication is evident. Proof of the
antecedent: Deuteronomy 6:4: "Hear, O Israel! The Lord your God
is one."
To the Question
6 I reply to the question that he has not generated another

God; for to any formal* entity corresponds adequately some
249
formalissima, quia est tota forma, non habet aliquid sic id est
adaequate correspondens sibi nisi Deum. Patet inducendo.
Deitas autem est de se haec; ergo Deus est de se hic. Ei autem
quod est de se hic vel hoc repugnat non identitas; ergo et alietas
quae includit non identitatem. Hoc sufficiat quantum ad rem.
7 Quantum ad logicam, dico quod haec tria differunt: Socrates
est alius ab homine, 'alius ab'3 humanitate, et alius in huma-
nitate. Nam in prima cum dicitur: 'Socrates est alius ab homine',
terminus relationis, scilicet alietatis, negatur universaliter, quia
non potest negari respectus universaliter nisi negetur terminus
universaliter, et ideo terminus alietatis confunditur confuse et
distributive; unde sequitur: Socrates est alius ab homine; ergo est
alius ab isto et illo et sic de singulis. Sic est in proposito: o est
alius a Deo; ergo a qualibet persona quae est Deus.
8 In secundo, cum dico Socrates est 'alius ab'4 humanitate; ly
humanitas significatur esse formalis ratio differentiae, sicut in
primo significabatur homo esse terminus differentiae. Hic ergo
negatur etiam formalis ratio differentiae universaliter, quia in
nullo individuo conveniunt aliqua per illam formam per quam hoc
distinguitur ab illo, licet illa formalis ratio differentiae non stet
universaliter quantum ad illam affirmationem ibi inclusam. Unde
ratio formalis alietatis stat universaliter quantum ad negationem
Sc. alius ab <aliquo> humanitate.

i Cf. supra n. 7.
thing,* or somebody that exists through that formal entity; deity

is the most formal entity, because it is entirely form; it does not
have something in this way, that is adequately corresponding to
itself, except God alone. This is evident inductively. Deity is of
itself just 'this'i; therefore, God of itself is 'this,' and what is of
itself 'this' or 'that' is opposed to non-identity; therefore, it is
opposed to otherness, which includes non-identity. This suffices to
prove the fact.
7 As for the logic, I say that these three are different:
'Socrates is other than man,' 'other than [someone] on account of
humanity,' and 'other in humanity.'2 For in the first, when it says
that Socrates is other than man,3 the term of the relation, namely
[of the relation] of otherness, is what is negated universally,
because one cannot deny the relation universally except by
denying the term universally, and therefore the term of otherness
is what is negated indiscriminately and in an all-inclusive
manner.4 Hence it follows: 'Socrates is other than man; therefore
he is other than this man and that man and thus for all
individual men.' So in the case at hand it would be: a is other
than God; therefore, [other] than any person that is God.
8 In the second, when I say 'Socrates is other than [someone]
on account of humanity,' the 'humanity' signifies the formal
reason of the difference, as in the first case 'man' signified the
term of the difference. Therefore, here the formal reason for the
[identity or] difference is denied universally, because in no [two]
individuals can there be any agreement by reason of that form
through which this [individual] is distinguished from that,5 while
at the same time this formal reason of the [identity or] difference
does not hold good universally for that affirmation [of any
identity] included there.6 Hence the formal reason for otherness
i That is, a unique individual thing.

2 'In humanity' has the meaning 'as regards his humanity,' for the humanity
of Socrates is other than the humanity of Plato, for each has his own individual
human nature.
The Cambridge lecture indicates that this statement is false.
4 I.e., it is not specified in which respect as in n. 8 below.
5 The form through which one thing is distinguished from another refers to
the specific difference, rather than the individuating difference.
I.e., one can universally pronounce non-identity between what is human
and what is not human on the basis of 'humanity,' but one cannot establish any
ibi inclusam; nam sequitur 'Socrates est alius humanitate a

Brunello, ergo in nullo sunt idem'; nec conveniunt in humanitate,
cum illa ratio formalis differentiae non stat universaliter
quantum ad illam affirmationem ibi inclusam; unde non sequitur
'Socrates differt a Brunello humanitate, ergo differt ab illo hac
humanitate, scilicet Platonis'; antecedens enim est verum et con-
sequens falsum, quia in consequente significatur quod humanitas
Platonis sit formalis ratio differentiae Socratis a Brunello.
9 In tertio, cum dicitur Socrates est alius in humanitate',
alietas non negat universaliter humanitatem et alietas connotat
aliquam convenientiam extremorum in suo determinabili, sive
notat suum determinabile commune esse utrique extremo
determinabili et dividi sive distingui in ipsis extremis. Et ideo
haec non est vera: 'Socrates in humanitate est alius a Brunello',
quia determinabile alietatis non est commune Socrati et Brunello
nec dividitur in eis. Sed haec est vera: 'Socrates in alietate est
alius a Brunello', quia alietas est communis utrisque extremis et
dividitur in eis. Unde in hoc tertio exemplo, alietas connotat
aliquam convenientiam extremorum in suo determinabili et etiam
notat cum hoc aliquam non-identitatem eorundem in eodem.
10 Ad propositum ergo quam istarum trium significat haec
locutio 'Filius est alius Deus', dico quod non primam,5 quia tunc
trinus respectus alietatis negatur universaliter respectu cuius-
cumque termini et significatur quod Filius esset alius a quocum-
que habente deitatem, et ita a se. Nec significat secundam, quia
5 Cf. supra n. 7.
holds good universally when there is a negation; for it follows

Socrates is other on account of humanity from Brunellus,7
therefore in nothing [distinctively human] are they the same.' At
the same time, they do not agree in humanity, since that formal
reason for the [identity or] difference does not hold good
universally for the affirmation [of identity] included there; hence
it does not follow 'Socrates differs from Brunellus on account of
[his] humanity, therefore he differs by reason of that humanity,
namely, Plato's [but perhaps not but reason of some other
humanity].' For the antecedent is true and the consequent false,
since in the consequent the humanity of Plato is [said to be] the
formal reason Socrates is different from Brunellus.
9 In the third, when it is said 'Socrates is other in humanity,'
[the relation of] otherness does not deny universally the
humanity [of the other]; moreover, otherness connotes some
agreement of the terms as regards what is determinable in them,
or indicates that the determinable they both have in common is
divided or distinguished due to the terms themselves. And
therefore this is not true: 'Socrates in humanity is other than
Brunellus,' because what specifies otherness [in this case,
namely, belonging to humanity, but being distinct within it] is not
something Socrates and Brunellus have in common, nor is it
divided in them.8 However, this is true: 'Socrates in otherness is
other from Brunellus,' because otherness is common to both
extremes and is divided in them. Hence, in this third example,
otherness connotes some agreement of the terms in what specifies
them, and also in addition notes that there is some non-identity
in them as regards this.
10 To the issue at hand, of these three, which does the
statement 'The Son is another God', signify? I say that it is not
the first [n. 7], because then the triple relation of otherness
universally denies relations to each of the terms and signifies that
the Son is other than anyone having deity, and thus is [something
other] than himself. Nor does it signify the second, for then it
identity between these two individuals using the same category, despite the fact
that it is suggested.
7 Brunellus is the usual name scholastics gave to a donkey or an ass.
8 In other words, they are not distinct individuals of the same species.
tunc significaretur quod deitas esset ratio formalis differentiae

unius personae ab alia, quod est falsum, quia tunc formaliter
essent plures deitates, sicut etiam haec est falsa 'Socrates est
alius [in]6 humanitate a Platone' quia humanitas non est ratio
formalis, sed aliquid aliud in Socrate et Platone. Sed significat
tertiam, nam cum dicitur 'Filius est alius deus a Patre' ly alius
ponit suum significatum per se circa significatum sui deter-
minabilis, denominans ipsum esse commune utrique extremo
alietatis, in quo etiam aliquam non-identitatem habent, quia non
significant suum determinabile distingui in eis; quod cum hoc sit
falsum, tunc erit falsa illa propositio 'Deus genuit alium Deum'.
11 Ad primam rationem7 quando dicitur 'Deus genuit Deum'

concedo; 'aut ergo se Deum aut alium Deum' neutrum est
concedendum. Haec autem 'Deus genuit Deum' conceditur, quia
termini in concreto possunt supponere pro suppositis respectu
praedicatorum, quia non extraneantur suppositis. Unde sicut
haec est vera 'Pater genuit Filium', ita haec 'Deus genuit Deum'.
12 Et cum ultra deducis 'aut se Deum aut alium Deum',
neutrum est concedendum. Non primum, quia idem non generat
se; nec alium Deum, quia alietas connotat suum determinabile
distingui in antecedente quod non significatur in antecedente.
Unde sicut propositio est falsa ubi alietas additur determinabili
quod non est commune extremis, sicut haec est falsa 'sol est alius
6 Sic codd., sed hoc 'in' ad sensum reiiciendum est, cf. supra n. 8.
7 Cf. supra n. 2.
would signify that deity would be the formal reason why one
person is different from another, which is false. For then
formally* there would be several deities, just as also this is false
'Socrates on account of his humanity is other than Plato,' because
humanity is not the formal reason [of difference], but rather
something other in Socrates and Plato [although still present in
both].9 However, it signifies the third. For when it says: 'The Son
is another God [other] than the Father,' the term 'other' joins
what it signifies per se with what is signified by its determinable
[viz. deity], indicating that it is common to both terms of
othernessin which there is also some non-identity of the
termsbecause they do not signify that their determinable [viz.
deity] is distinguished in them. Since this is false, then this
proposition 'God has generated another God' will be false.
11 To the first argument [n. 2] when it is said 'God has

generated God' I concede; [but when it adds] 'therefore God has
generated either himself or another God' neither must be
conceded. But this statement 'God has generated God' is
conceded, because the concrete terms can stand for the terms
[currently] joined with the predicate,10 since the former are not
extraneous to the latter. Hence just as this is true 'The Father
has generated the Son,' so this is also true "God has generated
God.'
12 In addition, when you go further to infer 'either himself as
God or another God' neither must be conceded. Not the first,
because nothing generates itself; nor 'another God,' because [the
relation of] otherness connotes that its determinable is
distinguished [already] in the antecedent [i.e., God has generated
God], which [in this case] is not signified in the antecedent.
Therefore, just as the proposition is false where [the relation of]
otherness is added to the determinable that is not shared by the
extremesjust as this is false 'the sun is another mouse' and
3 Namely, their 'haecceity' or individuating difference is different.

10 Namely, the terms of the relation 'has generated .'
mus' et ideo non sequitur 'aut ergo genuit se murem aut alium
murem', sed bene sequitur 'ergo genuit alium qui est mus', ita
haec propositio est falsa 'Pater in deitate est alius a Filio', ubi
alietas additur determinabili quod non distinguitur in extremis;
sed bene sequitur 'ergo genuit alium qui est Deus', sicut
multipliciter declarat Magister in littera. Vide ibi.
13 Quod si probetur ulterius ista consequentia 'si generat

Deum, aut ergo eundem Deum aut diversum', quia idem et
diversum sunt immediate opposita circa ens, X Metaphysicae8 et
si eundem vel diversum, ergo se vel alium, respondeo: concedi
potest quod eundem, quia notatur identitas in deitate, nec
sequitur 'ergo se', quia pronomen reciprocum notat actum
determinari ad eundem sive idem suppositum a quo procedit
actus ille. Aliter non esset reciprocum. Potest igitur concedi
'eundem Deum', quia sicut alietas ponit suum significatum circa
suum determinabile denotans ipsum disponi alietate et distingui
et dividi in extremis quibus est commune, ita contrario modo
identitas ponit suum significatum circa suum determinabile
commune extremis denotans ipsum nec dividi nec distingui in eis.
Et ideo haec est vera 'Deus genuit eundem Deum', quia Pater
genuit Filium qui est idem Deus, sed non sequitur ex hoc quod
Deus genuit se Deum, quia pronomen reciprocum, ut dictum est,
notat actum terminari ad idem suppositum a quo procedit. Unde
non solum refert eundem in essentia, sed eundem in persona.
H Aristot., Metaph. X (I), c. 3 (10546 25-6).

therefore it does not follow11 that 'therefore [the sun*] has

generated either itself as a mouse or another mouse,' but what
does indeed follow is 'therefore it has generated another which is
a mouse'so this proposition is false 'The Father in deity is other
than the Son,' where 'otherness' is added to the determinable
which is [really] not distinguished in the extremes; but this
indeed follows,12 'therefore he has generated another who is God,'
as the Master* has declared in many ways in the text.* Look
there!
13 And if further one proves this implication "if God generated
God, then either the same God or a diverse God,' because 'same'
and 'diverse' are what is immediately opposed as regards being,
according to Bk. X of the Metaphysics, and if it be the same or
diverse, therefore it will be either himself or another, I
respond: it can be conceded that 'same,' because it denotes
identity* as regards deity, but it does not follow that 'therefore,
himself,' because the reciprocal pronoun denotes that the act is
determined to the same or the identical supposit* [or person]
from which that act proceeds. Otherwise it would not be
reciprocal. Therefore, it can be conceded 'the same God.' For just
as otherness adds what it signifies to its determinable, denoting
that it is disposed to otherness and distinguished and divided in
[or by] the terms [of the relation], to which it is common, so in a
contrary way identity adds what it signifies to its determinable
that is common to the terms, denoting that it is not divided nor
distinguished in [or by] them. And therefore this is true 'God has
generated the same God,' because the Father has generated the
Son who is the same God. But it does not follow from this that
God has generated himself as God, because the reciprocal
pronoun, as was said, denotes that the act terminates in the same
supposit from which it proceeded. Whence not only does it refer to
the same in essence, but to the same in the person. However, the
antecedent does not posit that much, but that 'he has generated
11 The antecedent of this inference must be a proposition that Scotus

regarded as true, namely, "the sun has generated a mouse." The inference would
only be true if a "relation of otherness" is added to the antecedent, such as 'the
sun is another mouse,' which in this case is false.
n The unnamed antecedent is "God has generated God."
Non ponit autem tantum antecedens, sed quod genuit eundem in

deitate, et ideo est fallacia figurae dictionis et fallacia con-
sequentis.
14 Ad secundum9 dico quod illa deductio,10 quando dicitur quod
generans distinguitur a genito etc., ex illa, ratione possunt deduci
duo syllogismi, quorum primus est iste 'generans distinguitur a
genito; Deus est generans; ergo Deus distinguitur a genito'.
Secundus syllogismus est iste ex obliquis 'a genito distinguitur
Deus; Deus est genitus; ergo Deus distinguitur a Deo'. In utroque
est fallacia antecedentis ex diverso modo praedicandi maioris
extremitatis de medio et eiusdem in conclusione de minori
extremitate, nam ex distinctione personali ostensa in maiori inter
generans et generatum, quae sunt opposita relativa, concluditur
distinctio essentialis in conclusione. Unde universaliter est
fallacia antecedentis ubi maior de medio dicitur secundum illam
rationem secundum quam medium et eius oppositum aequaliter
se habent ad extremum sumptum sub. Exemplum de albo, quod
distinguitur a dulci; lac est album, ergo lac distinguitur a dulci.
15 Ad tertium,11 quando dicitur 'genuit deum; ergo aut alium
Deum aut alium non-Deum', neutrum est concedendum.
16 Ad probationem per rationem contradictionis, respondeo
quod loquendo de contradictories complexis, semper altera est
vera. Et hoc modo in proposito: ista negativa est vera 'Deus non
genuit alium Deum', quae est contradictoria huius 'Deus genuit
alium Deum', et non ista 'Deus genuit alium non-Deum', sicut
accipit; et tunc affirmativa falsa est 'genuit alium Deum'.
n Cf. supra n. 3.
10 Pro illa deductio ... ex illa lege: ex illa deductione.
11 Cf. supra n. 4.
the same in deity,' and therefore it is a fallacy of speech and a

fallacy of affirming the consequent.
14 To the second [n. 3] I say that from this deduction, when it
is said 'the one generating is distinguished from the one
generated,' etc., [i.e., therefore, God has generated another god,]
by reasoning two syllogisms are deduced. The first of these
[implicit syllogisms] is this 'the generator is distinguished from
the generated; God is generating, therefore, God is distinguished
from the one generated.'13 The second syllogism, produced
indirectly, is this: 'God is distinguished from the generated; God
is the one generated; therefore God is distinguished from God.' In
both there is a fallacy of antecedent by predicating in a different
way the major term of the middle term and [of predicating] the
same [i. e., the major term] of the minor term in the conclusion.
For from the personal distinction shown in the major premise
between the one generating and the one generated, which are
opposed relationships, an essential distinction is inferred in the
conclusion. Whence, it is always a fallacy of the antecedent where
the major term is asserted of the middle term according to that
notion, according to which the middle term and its opposite
[minor] are equally related to the term that falls under [and thus
are not opposed in this sense]. Take 'white' for example: 'White is
distinguished from sweet; milk is white; therefore milk is
distinguished from sweet.'
15 To the third [n. 4], when it is said 'he has generated a god;
therefore either another God or another non-God,' neither is to be
conceded.
16 To the proof through the notion of contradiction, I respond,
speaking of contradictories in complex* statements, that it is
always the case that one is true. And in this way in the question
at issue, this negative is true: 'God has not generated another
God,' which is the contradictory of this: 'God has generated
another God,' and not 'God has generated another non-God,' as he
implies. And then the affirmative 'he has generated another God'
is false.
1:1 The unnamed minor premise of this truncated syllogism is 'God generated
God.'
17 Et si arguatur 'non genuit alium Deum, ergo genuit alium

non-Deum', non sequitur, quia ad negativam de praedicato finito
non sequitur affirmativa de praedicato infinito. Ergo debet sequi
'non genuit alium Deum, ergo genuit alium non-Deum'.
Respondeo quod si illa consequentia aliquando tenet, nunquam
tamen tenet in praedicatis compositis. Exemplum: 'lapis non est
lignum album; ergo est lignum non-album' non sequitur, quia
idem affirmatur sub aequipollentibus, scilicet lignum, quod tollit
eorum identitatem. Si autem arguatur de contradictoriis
incomplexis, de quolibet dicatur alterum illorum, non tamen de
quolibet dicitur quodcumque praedicatum determinatum per alte
rum illorum, quia nec ipsum determinabile dicitur de quolibet, et
ideo licet Deus vel non Deus dicatur de quolibet, non tamen aliud
vel aliud determinatum per Deum vel non-Deum; vel si dicatur
sicut hic 'genuit alium', non tamen cum hoc contradictorio vel
cum illo et hoc in sensu compositionis quia non ex omnibus
divisis sequitur coniunctum 'alium, ergo Deum vel non-Deum'
concedo, sed non sequitur 'genuit alium et Deum, ergo genuit
alium Deum', propter variationem alietatis.
18 Ad quartum12 dico quod non sequitur 'est alius habens
deitatem, ergo alius Deus', quia in antecedente subintelligitur
substantivum huius adiectivi 'habens', quod substantivum idem
significat quod persona, et circa illud ly alius ponit suum
significatum in consequente. Ponit ly alius suum significatum
circa significatum Dei; commutatur ergo hoc aliquid in quale
quid.
19 Ad Damascenum13 respondeo quod descriptio sua est
quaedam explicatio nominis, non autem per se expressio
significationis, quia nullum concretum de per se significato suo
importat hoc quod est 'habens', sed ipsam formam, ut album
12 Cf. supra n. 4.
13 Cf. supra n. 4.
17 And if it is argued 'he has not generated another God,

therefore he has generated another non-God,' this does not follow,
because the negative of a definite predicate is not followed by an
affirmative of an indefinite predicate. Hence this must
[sometimes] follow: 'he has not generated another God, therefore
he has generated another non-God.'14 I reply. If the implication
sometimes holds, it never holds in regard to composite predicates.
For example: 'the rock is not a white wood; therefore it is non-
white wood,' does not follow, because the affirmation must take
place regarding [two] equivalents, namely, [two pieces of] wood,
before their non-identity is stated. However, if it is argued of
contradictories in simple statements, either of these can be said of
anything. However, not any predicate determined by either of
these is affirmed of anything, because neither is what is
determined itself affirmed of anything. Therefore, although God
or non-God can be said of anything, this is not true, however, of
that or another [quality] determined by God or non-God. Or, if it
is said, as it is here, 'He has generated another,' but not with this
or that contradictory, in the sense of composition*for the
adjoined [statement] 'another, therefore God or non-God' does not
follow from all separate [statements] I concede. However, it
does not follow 'he has generated another and a God, therefore he
has generated another God,' because of the variation of otherness.
18 To the fourth [n. 4], I say that this does not follow: there is
another having deity, therefore there is another God.' For what is
understood implicitly in the antecedent is the substantive of this
adjectival expression 'having,' [namely] a person, and this
[substantive] adds its signification, [already] included in the word
'other,' to what is signified by 'God' in the consequent. Therefore,
'this something' [i.e., this person having deity] is changed to 'this
sort of thing' [i.e., God or essential deity].
19 To Damascene, [n. 4] I respond that his description is [just]
an explanation of the name, but it is not a per se expression of its
signification, because the fact of 'having' implies nothing concrete
about what it signifies per se, other than the form itself, just as
14 This repetition of the argument that has been refuted presupposes a

further unstated objection, viz. that 'It does, however, sometimes hold.' The reply
is directed to unstated objection.
solam qualitatem significat, sed tantum importat hoc quod est

'habens' de modo significandi, quia concernit suppositum habens
significatum, tamen eius est significatum abstracti per se, licet
modus significandi sit alius, et ideo in huiusmodi etymologiis et
descriptionibus non oportet quod quidquid vere potest coniungi
descriptioni, quod vere possit coniungi cum descripto. Nec est hic
paralogismus accidentis propter variationem medii, sed propter
diversum modum praedicandi in maiori et in conclusione, et quia
sunt quattuor termini. Quia in maiori praedicatur distinctio
personalis, cum dicitur 'generans distinguitur a genito', in
conclusione infertur distinctio essentialis 'ergo Deus distinguitur
a Deo' manente eodem medio et non variato. Nec oportet semper
medium variari in fallacia accidentis; patet nam, maiori
exsistente de necessario et minori de inesse ut nunc, non sequitur
conclusio de inesse ut nunc propter diversitatem praemissarum in
maiori et in conclusione. Exemplum: 'omnis homo de necessitate
est animal; homo albus est homo; ergo homo albus de necessitate
est animal'. Hic est fallacia accidentis, medio exsistente eodem et
non variato, quia praedicatum in maiori prout praedicatur de
medio repugnat sibi praedicari de minori extremitate.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus]
20 Secundo quaero utrum haec sit vera 'Deus est Pater et

Filius et Spiritus Sanctus'.
'white' signifies only a quality,* and the fact of 'having' only

indicates the way in which it signifies,15 for it points at the
supposit that has what is signified. However, it itself signifies
what the abstract term [i.e., whiteness, signifies] per se, except
that the way of signifying is different, and therefore in such
etymologies and descriptions it is not necessary that whatever is
truly joined to the description can be joined with what is
described. Neither is there a fallacy of accident because of the
variation of the middle term, but rather because of the different
way of predicating in the major [premise] and in the conclusion,
and because there are four terms. For in the major [premise] a
personal distinction is predicated, when it is said 'the one
generating is distinguished from the one generated,' [while] in the
conclusion, 'therefore God is distinguished from God,' an essential
distinction is inferred, the middle term remaining the same and
not being varied. For in a fallacy of accident, it is not always
necessary that the middle term be varied. For it is evident that,
from a major premise about what is necessary and a minor
premise about what is accidental or momentary, a conclusion
about what is accidental or momentary does not follow, because of
the difference of premises in the major and in the conclusion. For
example: 'every man of necessity is an animal; a white man is a
man; therefore white man of necessity is an animal.' Here there is
a fallacy of accident, where the middle term remains the same
and unvaried, for it is repugnant to the predicate in the major
[premise], as predicated of the middle term, to be predicated of
the minor term.
Question Two
Is this true, "God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit"?
20 Secondly, I ask whether this is true: "God is Father and Son

and Holy Spirit."
15 I.e., album ('white') is equivalent to habens albedinem ('one having

whiteness').
Quod non videtur:

Quia indefinita non est vera nisi de aliquo supposito
verificetur; sed de nullo supposito Dei verificatur quod sit Pater et
Filius et Spiritus Sanctus; ergo propositio non est vera.
21 Contra: Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unus Deus;

ergo eius conversa est vera, scilicet quod Deus est Pater et Filius
et Spiritus Sanctus.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
22 Respondeo quod haec propositio prima est vera, sed non ita
formaliter sicut secunda, quia in prima est praedicatio sicut
inferioris de superiori, cum dicitur Deus est Pater et Filius et
Spiritus Sanctus; sed in alia est e converso: superius enim
praedicatur de inferiori in conversa istius et ideo magis formalis.
23 Quod autem prima sit vera probo: quando enim id quod per
se ponit terminus vel extremum in oratione vel propositione est
simpliciter idem cum eo quod ponit alius terminus vel extremum
in propositione, tunc affirmativa est vera; sed haec natura divina
significata per Deum est eadem omnibus personis et sub eadem
indistinctione est eadem unicuique; ergo propositio est vera.
24 Sed dices; estne eadem veritas in abstracto et in concrete, ut

deitas est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et Deus est Pater et
Filius et Spiritus Sanctus? Dico quod non, sicut nec conversae
earum; sed est quaedam differentia, quia illa praedicatio quae est
in abstracto cum dicitur 'deitas' etc., non ita recedit a
praedicatione formali et per se sicut illa quae est in concreto.
25 Sed dices: ex quo 'Deus' in ista propositione stat pro essentia

ut est in supposito, et nullum suppositum est duae vel tres
personae, ergo propositio prima non videtur vera. Respondeo
It seems not:
For an indefinite [proposition] is not true unless it is verified
of some supposit; but of no supposit in God is it verified that it is
Father and Son and Holy Spirit; therefore, the proposition is not
true.
21 To the contrary: Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one
God; therefore its converse is true, namely, that God is Father
and Son and Holy Spirit.
To the Question
22 I respond that this first proposition is true, but not as

formally as is the second, because in the first there is predication,
as it were, of an inferior of a superior16 when it is said that 'God is
Father and Son and Holy Spirit.' In the other, however, the
reverse is the case, for in the converse proposition the superior is
predicated of the inferior and therefore the predication* is more
formal.*
23 That the first proposition is true I prove: for when that
which the term in a statement or proposition posits per se is
simply the same thing as that which the other term of the
proposition posits, then the affirmation is true. But this divine
nature signified by 'God' is the same as all the persons and with
the same lack of distinction it is the same as each single one;
therefore the proposition is true.
24 But you may ask: Is not the truth in the abstract expression,
'Deity is the Father and Son and Holy Spirit,' the same as the
truth in the concrete expression, 'God is Father and Son and Holy
Spirit'? I say that it is not, just as neither is [this the case with]
their converse; but there is a certain difference, because that
predication in the abstract when it is said that 'deity,' etc., does
not withdraw from formal and per se predication* as [much as]
that predication in the concrete does.
25 But you may say: from that fact that 'God' in this
proposition stands for the essence as it is in the supposit and no
supposit is two or three persons; therefore the first proposition
l0 The superior universal is broader in extension than the inferior universal

term.
secundum Augustinum, VII De Trinitate,14 et in multis locis aliis:

"Deus eo est quo Deus est". Unum enim esse est in divinis;
concipiendo ergo essentiam divinam ad se, antequam concipiatur
cum proprietate incommunicabili, in illo priori habeo ad se et per
se ens quod vel per quod est idem cum omnibus personis, licet
non concipiatur cum aliqua proprietate incommunicabili. Sed
potest concipi ut sapiens, potens et habens esse eo modo quo
Iudaei vel pagani philosophi posuerunt, et sic in illo priori possum
concipere non solum Deum, sed hunc Deum, non hunc entitate
vel haeccitate suppositali, cui etiam possunt multa inesse, quae
licet insint sibi in personis, non tamen ut est in personis sicut
sunt perfectiones essentiales vel attributales. Unde suppositio est
ibi simplex, distinguendo naturam contra personas; sed non est
simplex prout natura distinguitur contra subsistentem quemlibet,
sed est suppositio singularis. Unde omnis propositio, quae de Deo
adaequate est vera et dicitur de tribus personis non sub ratione
alicuius proprietatis, dicitur singularis et verificatur primo de
Deo hoc, quae haeccitas adaequat Deum, non quod hic alia
haeccitate ab essentia adaequat.
26 Exemplum de colore in tribus superficiebus cui non
competeret aliqua perfectio, ut disgregatio vel huiusmodi, ut est
in tribus vel in una superficie, sed ut in se est hic color, et sic per
se conveniret colori. Unde in proposito quaelibet persona causat
per deitatem in suppositis, non tamen primo, sed haeccitate
deitatis primo quae est communis tribus.
14 August., De Trin. VII, c. 5, n. 9 (CCSL 50, 259-60; PL 42, 942).

does not seem to be true. I respond, according to Augustine in

Bk. VII of The Trinity, and in many other places, "The same thing
makes God exist and makes him God." For there is but one being
in the divine; therefore by conceiving the divine being in itself,
before one conceives of it as having an incommunicable* property,
in that prior conception I have a per se being that in itself, or
through it, is the same thing as all the persons, although it is not
conceived with some incommunicable property.17 But it can be
conceived as wise, powerful and having being in the way that the
Jews and pagan philosophers postulated. And thus in that prior
conception I can conceive not only God, but this God, and not this
by personal entity or haecceity,* in which there could be many
traits present, which, although they exist in it so far as the
persons go, are nevertheless not [in it] insofar as it is in the
persons in the manner of essential perfections or attributes.
Hence there is simple or general supposition here, in
distinguishing the nature from the persons; but it is not simple
[supposition] where the nature is distinguished from any
[particular] subsistent [person], but this is singular or individual
supposition. Hence every proposition, which is adequately true
about God and is asserted of the three persons but not under the
notion of some [personal] property, is [also] said to be singular
and is verified primarily of this God, which haecceity is adequate
to God: not that it is adequate here by a haecceity other than the
essence.
26 Take the example of color in three [distinct] surfaces to
which some perfection, such as 'dispersing [light]' or the like,
pertains not insofar as it exists in three or one surface, but
insofar as it is in itself this color, and thus it pertains per se to
color. Hence in the case at hand, each person causes through
deity in the supposits, not however primarily, but primarily
through the haecceity of deity, which is common to all three.
17 Scotus adopts Richard of St. Victor's definition of 'personality' as 'an

incommunicable property' rather than the Boethian definition of person as an
individual rational substance, because the divine essence is such and
nevertheless it is communicated or shared by all three persons. What cannot be
shared in God is each unique individual personality. The Father communicates
his divine nature to the Son but not his Fatherhood.
27 Ad argumentum dicendum quod illa propositio est singula-

ris singularitate non incommunicabili, sed singularitate commu-
nicabili, qua hic Deus est communis tribus; et haec singularitas
vel haeccitas non invenitur similis in creaturis, quia in creaturis
nullum est hoc nisi ultima haeccitate quae est omnino incom-
municabilis.
Reply to the Initial Argument
27 To the argument it must be said that this proposition is

singular not by a singularity* that is incommunicable, but by a
singularity that is shared, by which 'this God' is common to three.
And a singularity or haecceity [similar to this] is not to be found
in creatures, because in creatures nothing is a 'this' except by the
ultimate haecceity, which is completely incapable of being shared.
[Distinctio 5
Pars I
Quaestio 1
Utrum essentia divina generet vel generetur]
1 Circa distinctionem quintam quaeritur primo utrum essen

tia divina generet vel generetur.
Videtur quod sic:

Augustinus, VII De Trinitate cap. 4:1 Idem est Verbum et
nata sapientia, ut in sapientia demonstretur essentia et in 'nata'
relatio; ergo sapientia ut dicit essentiam est nata.
2 Item, Richardus, VI De Trinitate cap. 22:2 "Multi, inquit,

surrexerunt temporibus nostris qui non audent dicere genitam
substantiam vel sapientiam"; sed hoc non dixit contra sanctos,
quia illi fuerunt ante eum, et ideo videtur loqui de Magistro
Petro. Et si dicatur quod auctoritates sunt exponendae quae
videntur asserere contrarium, nota ibi auctoritatem.
3 Item, per rationem hoc idem ostendo: essentia divina est

Pater, ergo generat. Probatio consequentiae: de quo dicitur per se
passio, id est generare, et subiectum, id est Pater, quia sunt
convertibilia; sed Pater dicitur de essentia; ergo etc.
4 Item, essentia est Pater Filii, ergo essentia generat. Probatio

antecedentis: patet per conversionem, ut prius. Probatio con
sequentiae: quia ex antecedente sequitur: ergo est Filius

2 Richardus de S. Victore, De Trin. VI, c. 22 (ed. J. Ribailler, TPMA VI. 259;
PL 196, 986-7).
260
Distinction 5
Part I
Question One
Might the divine essence procreate or be procreated?
1 In regard to distinction five, it is asked first whether the

divine essence might procreate or be procreated.
It seems that it might:
Augustine in Bk. VII of The Trinity, chapter 4: The Word* is
the same as wisdom that has been born, so that in 'wisdom' the
essence is shown, and in 'born' the relationship [of being
procreated]; therefore wisdom, in as much as it asserts the
essence, is born.
2 Also, Richard [of St. Victor] in Bk. VI of The Trinity, chapter
22: "Many, he says, have arisen in our time who do not dare say
that substance or wisdom is generated." But this accusation was
not made against the saints [or Fathers of the Church] that lived
earlier, and therefore he seems to be speaking about Peter
[Lombard], the Master.i And if one says that the authoritative
statements2 must be presented, which seem to assert the
contrary, note the authoritative statement there.
3 Also, I show this same by a rational argument: the divine
essence is the Father; therefore, it procreates. Proof of the
implication:* the proper attribute, i.e., to procreate, is predicated
of the same thing, of which the subject, i.e., the Father, [is
predicated], because they are interchangeable; but the Father is
predicated of the divine essence; therefore etc.
4 Also, the essence is the Father of the Son, therefore the
essence procreated. Proof of the antecedent: it is evident because
the terms are interchangeable, as before. Proof of the implication:
because from the antecedent it follows: 'therefore there is a Son of
i Peter Lombard in Bk. I of his Sentences, ch. 1, n. 54-6-1 indicates that

Augustine and Hilary state that 'substance generates substance.' but indicates
that 'substance' has the Greek meaning of subsistent' and refers not to the divine
essence, but to a divine person. Richard insists that "the Fathers put it well that
substance generates substance" and derides Peter Lombard and contemporaries
who follow him, for denying this literally to be the case.
This refers to the statements of Augustine and Hilary.
260
essentiae, et in omnibus tenet consequentia, ut si Socrates est

pater Platonis, ergo Plato est filius Socratis, et est argumentum
cuiusdam magni.
5 Item, quod praedicatur primo et per se de aliquo, potest
supponere pro illo; patet quando superius praedicatur de infe-
riori; sed Pater praedicatur de divina essentia; ergo etc.
6 Item, genitum in quantum huiusmodi est aliquid, quia
generatio non terminatur ad nihil; sed in divinis non est aliquid
nisi essentia; ergo etc.
7 Oppositum Magister in littera.
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Status quaestionis]
8 Respondeo: in hac quaestione erravit Joachim sicut patet

Extra de Summa Trinitate et Fide catholica.3 Et fuit error eius
duplex vel in duobus: unus fuit in reprobando Magistrum Petrum
quasi poneret quaternitatem in divinis, ex hoc quod Magister
ponit unam rem quae nec generat nec generatur, nec spirat nec
spiratur; ergo, ut dicit, est in divinis quaternitas. Alius error
fuit quia volens declinare quaternitatem negavit illas res esse
easdem sive negavit quod tres personae sunt una res simplex, sed
dixit eas esse unum aggregatione in concordia et voluntate
caritatis, sicut probat per Christum in evangelio qui dicit: ut sint
unum sicut et nos, sed si fuissent unum in natura, non fuissent
unum sicut et nos; ergo non sunt nisi sicut unus populus vel
ecclesia.
9 Secundum istorum est manifeste contra fidem, quia deitas
sive divina essentia non est divisibilis, ergo si omnes personae
non sunt una indivisibilis deitas et sunt tres unitates distinctae,
quaelibet persona erit Deus deitate distincta, et sic tres dii.
Oportet ergo dare unum aliquid in divinis cui convenit unitas
haec, scilicet naturae, et haec est essentia divina. Unde
1 Cf. Decretales Gregorii IX, lib. I, tit. 1, c. 2 (ed. A. Friedberg, II, 6).
Dist. 5, Part I, Question One 261
the essence,' and the implication holds in all cases, e.g., if

Socrates is the father of Plato, therefore Plato is the son of
Socrates, and it is an argument of some famous person.
5 Also, what is predicated primarily and per se of anything,
can stand for it; it is evident when the superior is predicated of
the inferior; but the Father is predicated of the divine essence;
therefore etc.
6 Also, what is generated as such is something, because
generation* does not end with nothing; but in the divine there is
nothing other than the essence; therefore etc.
7 The Master* in the text* says the opposite.
To the Question
8 I reply: in this question Joachim has erred, as is evident
from Extra de Summa Trinitate et Fide catholica. And his error
has been twofold or involves two things: one was in reproving
Master Peter as though he had posited a quaternary in the
divine, from the fact that the Master posits one thing* which
neither generates nor is generated, neither spirates* nor is
spirated; therefore, as he says, there is in the divine a
quaternary. The other error was that, wanting to avoid
'quaternary,' he denied those things to be the same or denied that
the three persons* are one simple thing, but said they are one by
aggregation in harmony and will of charity, as he proved through
Christ in the gospel, who said that 'they3 are one as we are.' But if
they had been one in nature, they would not have been 'one as we
are'; therefore, they are only like one people or the church.
9 The second error is manifestly against faith, because deity
or the divine essence is not divisible, therefore if all the persons
are not one indivisible deity and are three distinct unities, each
person will be God by reason of a distinct deity, and thus there
will be three gods. It is necessary, therefore, to have something
one in the divine to which this unity pertains, namely, a nature,
and this is the divine essence. Hence Pope Innocent replied to the
l Namely, Father and Son.

Innocentius papa respondet ad argumentum, quod hoc quod dico

'sicut' importat proportionem et ideo ut sint unum sicut nos,
scilicet caritate quae est unitas eorum, sicut nos caritate quae non
est natura nostra, sed sic sint unum caritate proportionata quae
competit eis, sicut nos sumus unum caritate quae nobis competit
quae est natura nostra. Ostendit autem hoc Innocentius per illud:
Estote perfecti sicut Pater vester caelestis perfectus est, scilicet
perfectione convenienti nobis, sicut Pater est perfectus perfec-
tione sua quae est idem cum eo.
10 Quantum ad primum errorem, respondet Papa et tenet pro
Magistro Petro; et in hoc Papa confirmat et canonizat opinionem
Petri, cuius4 auctoritas forte maior est quam scripturae vel
sanctorum sed non curo hoc asserere et ostendit quod non
sequitur consequentia quaternitatis, quia quando quaternitas sive
unitas quaternitatis est eadem cuilibet ternario, tunc quaternitas
non facit numerum cum ternario. Sic est hic: essentia divina est
eadem res cuilibet personae et sic non facit numerum cum illis, et
sic non erit unitas quaternitatis, sed identitatis.
1 1 Alia est opinio Petri Iohannis5 etc.
[B. Solutio Scoti]
12 Teneo igitur cum Magistro quod essentia non generat nec

generatur, et omnes rationes quas invenio quare realiter non
generat reducuntur ad istam: ista res, si generat, generat rem
distinctam ab essentia ista, quia nulla res se ipsam gignit; ergo
4 Papae vel Petri, non patet.

r> Petrus I. Olivi, Summa I, q. 4 in corp. (ed. M. Schmaus, BGPTM 29, no 2.
175*-6*).
argument; 'I say that "just as"4 implies a proportion and therefore
they5 are united just as we are, namely, by charity which is their
unity, just as we are united by charity that is not our nature.*
But they are one by a proportionate charity that is appropriate to
them in the same way as we are one by charity, which is
appropriate to us, and which is our nature.' But Innocent shows
this by that [exhortation]: "Be ye perfect just as your heavenly
Father is perfect,"6 namely by a perfection that is suited to us, as
the Father is perfect by his perfection which is the same thing as
him.
10 To the first error the Pope7 replies to it by siding with
Master Peter; and in so doing he confirms and canonizes the
opinion of Peter, whose authority is, perhaps, stronger than that
of Scripture or the Fathers of the Churchthough I do not care to
assert thisand shows that the inference of a quaternary does
not follow, because when a quaternary or unity of the fourth is
the same thing as each of the three, then the quaternary does not
form a number in addition to the three. But that is how it is here:
the divine essence is the same thing as each person, and thus
does not add a [fourth] number to it, and in this way there will
not be a unity of the quaternary, but that of identity.
11 The other is the opinion of Peter John [Olivi], etc.
The solution of Scotus
12 I hold with the Master, therefore, that the essence neither

procreates nor is procreated, and all the arguments that I find
why it does not generate really come down to this. If this thing
generates, then it procreates a real thing distinct from this
essence. For no real thing generates itself. Therefore, it
4 The Pope is explaining what Christ meant by 'sicut nos.'

5 Namely, Father and Son.
Matt. 5: 48.
7 In the Ordinatio I, dist. 5, p. 1, q. un., n. 12 (V, 15-6), Scotus quotes the
Pope as saying: "We, however, with the approval of the sacred Council, believe
and profess with Peter, that the divine essence or nature is one highest thing
that neither generates nor is generated; nor does it follow that there is a
quaternary, for these three thingsthe Father, the Son, and the Holy Spiritare
that one thing."
generat aliquam rem quae non est in natura divina, quia

intrinsece non est aliqua diversitas; et illa res, si est extra
naturam divinam, est aliquid in creatura; ergo essentia divina
erit principium, modo naturae, gignendi aliquid extrinsecum quod
non esset Deus, sed creatura, quod est impossibile, ergo quod
essentia generet est impossibile.
13 Ad hoc sunt aliae aliquae rationes: forma non agit nec
generat in creaturis, sed compositum; ergo nec essentia divina.
Hoc non valet, quia causa quare forma in creaturis non agit est
quia non est a se vel per se ens; sed essentia divina est
huiusmodi; ergo non est illa causa quare non generat.
14 Alia ratio est talis: operatio distincti operantis non potest
esse essentiae ut operantis, quia essentia non potest distingui in
divinis; sed talis operatio est generatio, quae est alicuius distincti
non in esse, sed quia 'non a se' genitum; ergo essentia non
generat. Haec ratio realiter idem est cum prima.
15 Sed quare essentia non potest dici generare ut supponit pro
Patre, sicut potest dici quod Deus generat ratione suppositi? Et
ideo facio ad propositum talem rationem: quando subiectum est
abstractum ultima abstractione et praedicatum non potest
praedicari nisi formaliter, propositio non est vera de talibus
terminis nisi sit propositio primo modo dicendi per se vera; sed
deitas est abstractum ultima abstractione et praedicatum, scilicet
generans, non potest praedicari nisi formaliter; ergo propositio
non potest esse vera nisi in primo modo dicendi per se. Quod est
falsum, quia omne relativum est aliud praeter hoc cuius est
procreates some real thing that is not in the divine nature,

because intrinsically there is no diversity there. And that real
thing, if it is outside the divine nature, is something in a creature.
Therefore, the divine essence will be, in the manner of nature, a
principle* of procreating something extrinsic that would not be
God, but a creature. That is impossible. Therefore it is impossible
that the essence would generate.
13 There are other reasons [that are given] for this: in
creatures a form does not act or generate, but the composite does;
therefore, neither does the divine essence. This is not valid,
because the reason why a form in creatures does not act is
because it is not something that exists of itself or is a being per
se; but the divine essence is just such a being, therefore, this is
not the reason why it does not generate.
14 Another reason is this: an operation of a distinct operator
cannot belong to the essence as operating, because the essence
cannot be distinguished in the divine; but procreation is such an
operation that belongs to something that is distinct: not in
essence, but insofar as what is procreated does not exist of itself
[and what procreates does]; therefore the essence does not
procreate. This reason is really the same as the first.
15 But why cannot the essence be said to generate, as it stands
for the Father, just as it can be said that God generates by reason
of the supposit*? And therefore I make such a reason for the case
in hand: when the subject is something abstracted by a final
abstraction8 and the predicate can only be predicated formally,*
the proposition is only true of such terms if a proposition is true
in the first mode* of per se predication;*9 but 'deity' is abstract by
a final abstraction and the predicate, namely 'generating', can
only be predicated formally; therefore the proposition can only be
true in the first mode of per se predication. This is false, because
every thing relative* is something other than what it is relative
8 The ultimate abstraction considers only the formal notion of something in

itself, apart from whatever is not included in it precisely.
9 In the first mode of per se predication, only essential characteristics are
predicated such as genus, specific difference or the species as such; in the second
mode of per se predication necessary attributes are predicated.
relativum, secundum Augustinum,6 et sic generatio nullo modo

potest esse praedicatum per se et formaliter de essentia divina.
16 Ad declarandum maiorem, dico quod abstractiones sunt
multiplices: quaedam enim est accidentis a subiecto, alia
quiditatis a supposito.
17 Item, abstractio est ab omni re alterius generis.
18 Item, in relativis est duplex abstractio, sicut accidentis a
subiecto, secundo respectus a fundamento.
19 Sed tunc est ultimata abstractio, quando ratio formalis
consideratur praecise secundum se absque quocumque alio quod
per se non includitur in illa ratione formali, ut humanitas non est
nisi humanitas tantum.
20 Probatio: nunquam adiectivum praedicatur identitate sola,
sive nunquam potest praedicari praedicatione identica, quia
modus significandi adiectivi est per modum informantis et
adiacentis et denominantis naturam sive substantivum. Ergo
praedicatum praedicatur opposite modo suae rationi concipiendi,
si praedicetur identice et non formaliter; et ideo sequitur quod
talis propositio est falsa, quia subiectum et praedicatum
accipiuntur sub oppositis rationibus. Sed non hic cum dicitur:
Deus est generans, quia Deus non hic accipitur sub ultimata
abstractione, et ideo praedicatur de eo aliquid quod non
includitur in per se et ratione formali eius.
21 Minor patet quia nihil convenit alicui formaliter, nisi quod
includitur in ratione eius formali; et sic quando dicitur: essentia
generat vel est generans, ponitur adiective, et ideo non potest
esse vera praedicatio primo modo per se dicendi.
22 Ad primum7 dico quod hic accipio natum vel sapientiam

natam prout includit relationem, sicut Magister respondet dist. 8
et 6 et 23, ubi exponit quomodo intelligitur sapientia nata, id est
Filius pro quo 'sapientia' vel 'essentia' supponit; stat enim pro
0 August., De Trin. VII, c. 1, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 247; PL 42. 935). Obscure dictum
est hic, cum in textu Augustini clare: "Omne enim quod dicitur ad aliud, est
aliquid praeter relationem".
7 Cf. supra n. 1.
to, according to Augustine, and thus generation in no way can be

predicated per se and formally of the divine essence.
16 To clarify the major, I say that abstractions are multiple; for
one is the abstraction of an accident from its subject, another is
the abstraction of the quiddity* from a supposit.
17 Also, abstraction is from every thing of another kind.
18 Also, in relatives there is a double abstraction, that of an
accident from its subject, and secondly of a relation from its
foundation.
19 But then the ultimate abstraction is when a formal* reason
is considered precisely according to itself without anything else
which is not included per se in its formal notion, as humanity is
only humanity itself.
20 Proof: an adjective is never predicated as identical [with its
subject], or never can it be predicated by an identical*
predication,* because the way an adjective signifies is as
informing', 'added to', and 'denominating' a nature or noun.
Therefore if a predicate is predicated identically and not formally,
it is predicated in a manner opposed to the very way it
conceptualizes, and therefore it follows that such a proposition is
false, because subject and predicate are taken under opposed
conceptions. But that is not the case here when it is said: 'God is
generating,' because 'God' is not taken in the sense of its ultimate
abstraction, [as 'deity,'] and therefore something is predicated of
it that is not included in its per se formal notion.
21 The minor is evident, because nothing pertains to anything
formally unless it is included in its formal notion; and thus when
it is said: 'The essence generates or is generating,' 'generating' is
posited as something added, and therefore it cannot be a true
predication in the first mode of per se predication.
To the Initial Arguments
22 To the first [n. 1] I say that here I accept 'born' and 'wisdom
that is born' as including a relation, as the Master replies in
distinction [28, ch.] 6, [n.] 23, where he explains how to
understand 'wisdom that is born,' that is, as the Son that wisdom
and essence stand for; for they stand for a hypostasis,* that is, a
hypostasi, id est persona. Ad Augustinum respondet: exponit

enim quod intelligitur illud pro quo 'sapientia' supponit sic:
'essentia' hypostasis.
23 Sed hic tunc restat dubium: quomodo sapientia potest
supponere pro hypostasi, cum essentia et sapientia sint idem et
quaelibet sit abstractum? Respondeo quod licet sapientia
abstrahatur a sapiente, non tamen a ratione principii operativi,
sicut essentia, quae est abstracta ultimata abstractione, scilicet
formali; et ideo quia omnino abstracta, essentia tantum pro se
ipsa supponit, et haec est melior ratio quam ego invenio pro hac
conclusione. Sed auctoritates sanctorum nimis expresserunt
distinctionem propter errorem Sabellii et nimis identitatem
propter errorem Arii.
24 Ad dictum Richardi:8 non video contra quem loquitur nisi

contra Magistrum Petrum et Ecclesia approbat et confirmat
sententiam suam; et ideo si contra eum loquitur Magister Petrus
habet hic auctoritatem canonizatam, scilicet Ecclesiae, quae forte
maior est quam scripturae, sicut dicit Augustinus Contra
epistolam Fundamenti:9 "Evangelio non crederem, nisi ecclesiae
credidissem" etc. Nec Magister Petrus adducit extorte vel exponit
nisi secundum mentem eius. Si autem Richardus loquitur contra
alium quam contra Magistrum Petrum, intelligenda est
substantia sicut Graeci accipiunt, id est, pro subsistentia; et tunc
talis qui hoc negaret esset arianus; sed nescio quis talis fuerit
tempore suo.
25 Ad primam rationem10 dicendum quod consequentia non
valet, quia substantiva possunt praedicari per identitatem, non
autem adiectiva. Cuius ratio est, quia nec illud quod concipitur
nec modus repugnat substantivis, sed adiectivis. Unde quando
dicitur 'Pater est essentia', hic 'Pater' est substantivum, id est illa
hypostasis quae habet paternitatem. Non enim idem est Patrem
esse et genuisse, secundum Magistrum, quia genuisse accipitur
adiective et Pater hypostatice sive substantive. Ad
probationem quando dicitur quod passio praedicatur de omni eo
H Cf. supra n. 2.
8 August., Contra epist. Fundamenti c. 5, n. 6 (PL 42, 176).
10 Cf. supra n. 3.
person. To Augustine, he replied that he has explained that what

'wisdom' stands for is the essence of the person.
23 But here a doubt remains: how can wisdom stand for a
person, since the essence and wisdom are the same thing and
what is abstracted? I reply that although wisdom is abstracted
from one who is wise, it is not [abstracted] from the notion of an
operative principle in the way 'essence' is, which is abstracted by
the ultimate abstraction, namely, one that is formal; and
therefore, because it is completely abstracted, the essence only
stands for itself, and this is a better reason which I have found for
this conclusion. But the authoritative statements of the Fathers
have expressed too much of a distinction because of the error of
Sabellius and attributed too great an identity because of the error
of Arius.
24 To the statement of Richard [n. 2], I do not see whom he is
speaking against except Master Peter, and the Church has
approved and confirmed the latter's opinion; and therefore if
[Richard] is speaking against him, Master Peter has here
authority, canonized, namely, by the Church, which perhaps is
greater than that of scripture, as Augustine says in Contra
epistolam Fundamenti: "I would not have believed the gospel, had
I not believed the Church," etc. Neither does Master Peter do
violence to [Augustine]; he only explains what he meant. But if
Richard is speaking against someone other than Master Peter,
'substance' must be understood as the Greeks interpret it, i.e., as
subsistence;*10 and then such who deny this would be Arian; but I
do not know who could have held such in his day.
25 To the first [rational] argument [n. 3], it must be said that
the implication is invalid, because nouns can be predicated as
identical, but not adjectives. The reason is this, because neither
what is conceived11 nor the way it is conceived is repugnant to
substantives but is opposed to adjectivals. Hence, when it is said:
"The Father is the essence," 'Father' is substantive, that is the
person that has paternity. For 'the Father exists' and 'generates'
are not the same thing, according to the Master, because
'generates' is taken adjectivally, and the Father personally or
10 What subsists is a divine person.

1 1 That is, nouns like 'essence' or 'Father.'
de quo subiectum, dico quod verum est, si passio potest habere

eundem modum praedicandi subiecto; sed passio non potest
praedicari nisi formaliter, id est, generans. Sed si in abstracto
accipitur, tunc praedicari potest praedicatione per identitatem, ut
essentia est generatio; haec est vera.
26 Ad aliud:11 dicitur a quodam doctore12 quod magister
Alexander13 distinxit hanc propositionem, scilicet essentia est
Pater Filii, quia potest Pater teneri vel adiective vel substantive;
si adiective, tunc est falsa; si substantive, tunc est vera, sed tunc
non sequitur.
27 Item, recitat opinionem Praepositini14 qui dicit quod haec
simpliciter vera. Vide in littera etc.
28 Tertio, praedictus doctor tenet contra utrumque dicens quod
propositio est simpliciter falsa; cuius ratio est quia nomina
imposita a potentia activa vel passiva maxime significant
adiective ex respectu quem habent ex potentia quae ordinatur ad
illud ut genitor, creator vel dator etc. Quanto autem adiacens est
indeterminatior, tanto minorem inclinationem habet ad
suppositum vel ad substantivum et minus habet rationem
adiectivi. Unde verbum infinitum magis indeterminatur quam
alia verba; similiter verbum neutrum indeterminatius et ideo
potest substantiari; similiter masculinum magis adiacens quam
neutrum; sed talia imposita a potentia nullo modo possunt
substantiari, sicut hic Pater determinatur ut non possit teneri
nisi adiective: quare simpliciter falsa.
11 Cf. supra n. 4.
12 Henricus Gand., Summa a. 54, q. 3 ad 7 (II, 84 1-85 K).
1:1 Alexander de Hales, STh I, p. 1, inq. 2, tr. un., q. 1, tit. 1, c. 3, a. 1 ad 5 (I,
426b).
H Henricus Gand., ibid.
substantively. To the proof, when it is said that a proper

attribute is predicated of everything of which the subject is, I say
this is true, if the attribute can have the same mode of
predication as the subject; but a proper attribute can only be
predicated formally, i.e., generating. But if it is taken in the
abstract [i.e., as an abstract noun], then it can be predicated by a
predication of identity,* e.g., 'the essence is generation'; this is
true.
26 To the other [n. 4]: it is stated by a certain doctor that
Master Alexander made a distinction regarding this proposition,
namely, "The essence is father of the Son,' because 'father' can be
taken either adjectivally or substantively; if taken adjectivally,
the [proposition] is false; if taken substantively, it is true. But
then it does not follow.i2
27 Also, he cites the view of Praepositinus, who says this [i.e.,
'The essence is the father of the Son'] is simply true. Look in the
text, etc.
28 Thirdly, the aforesaid doctor holds against both [i.e.,
Alexander and Praepositinus] that the statement [i.e., the essence
is the father of the Son] is simply false. The reason why is
because names derived from an active or passive potency* have
mostly adjectival meaning because of the connotation that they
retain from the potency with which such [names] are connected,
such as 'begetter,' 'creator,' or 'giver,' etc. For [in general] the
more indeterminate what is added is, the less inclination it has
towards a supposit or what is substantive, and the less it has the
character of an adjective. Hence an infinitive [of a] verb is more
indeterminate than other words; similarly, a neuter word is more
indeterminate and therefore can be substantivized; similarly a
masculine word is more adjectival than neutral; but such
[names], when they are derived from a power or potency, in no
way can be substantivized, just as here it is determined that
'Father' could only be used in an adjectival sense. Wherefore [the
proposition]i3 is simply false.
i1 In the Ordinatio version (cf. IV, 36-7) Scotus accepts the distinction made
by Alexander, but declares that while 'father' can be taken substantively or
adjectivally, ifof a son' is added it is always adjectival.
i:i 'The essence is the father of a Son.'
29 Ad probationem respondet quod conversio non valet, sed sic:

'aliquid quod est essentia, est Pater Filii', sicut aliquid quod est
homo est individuum vel Socrates.
30 Ad illud de Praepositino, respondet quod est figura dictionis:
'essentia nullius est Pater'; non enim sequitur 'essentia est Pater,
ergo alicuius', immo est figura dictionis.
31 Sed contra, quaero a te: aut Pater habet conceptum ad se, et

tunc non concipis Patrem nec adiective nec substantive.
Impossibile enim est aliquem modum concipiendi essentialem
esse conceptui qui est sub modo; quia modus concipiendi non
destruit conceptum; tunc enim non est modus eius. Ergo concipis
Patrem ut ad alium terminum, ergo semper est habitudo Patris
ad terminum.
32 Item, confirmatur hoc, quia impossibile est Patrem magis
indeterminate concipi quam paternitatem, quam tamen impos
sibile est concipere quin includatur relatio opposita, quia relativa
in conceptu suo mutuo se includunt.
33 Item, iste concedit quod Pater Filii est essentia, non tamen
concedit conversam, scilicet quod essentia sit Pater Filii. Ergo si
propter hoc quod non potest concipi Pater in praedicato nisi in
habitudine ad terminum, scilicet ad Filium; ergo nec in subiecto
potest concipi nisi cum eadem habitudine, et sic vel utraque erit
vera vel neutra.
34 Respondeo ergo et teneo cum magistro Alexandra quod
propositio est distinguenda, quia potest teneri substantive
secundum Magistrum, vel adiective secundum Alexandrum, quia
per expressionem 'Filii' non ita determinatur Pater quin sit
relativum, et sic non absolvitur a respectu ad alterum. Sic igitur
essentia est Pater Filii.
35 Et cum arguisi5 'ergo Filius est essentiae, quia in relativis

tenet conversa praedicatio', respondeo quod consequentia
mutua tenet in relativis primo sicut inter patrem et filium, et in
IB Cf. supra n. 4.
29 As to the proof, he replies that the conversion is invalid, and

should read: 'something that is the essence, is the father of the
Son,' just as 'something that is a man is an individual or
Socrates.'
30 As for the argument of Praepositinus, he replies that it is an
error of the figure of speech. 'The essence is nobody's Father,' but
it does not follow 'the essence is the Father, therefore somebody's.'
Indeed, it is a fallacy of figure of speech.
31 To the contrary, however, I ask of you: Does the Father have
a concept that stands on its own? [If he does,] then you conceive
'Father' neither adjectivally nor substantively. For it is impossible
that some mode of conceiving be essential to the concept that is
under that mode, because the mode of conceiving does not destroy
the concept: for then, it is not its mode. Therefore, you conceive
'Father' as related to another term; therefore, there is always this
relationship to a term [in the concept] of the Father.
32 Also, this is confirmed, because it is impossible that 'Father'
be more indefinitely conceived than 'paternity,' which however it
is impossible to conceive so as to exclude the opposite relative, for
in its concept [each correlative] mutually includes the other.
33 Also, this doctor concedes 'the Father of the Son is the
essence,' but he does not concede the converse, namely 'the
essence is the Father of the Son.' Therefore, if this be because he
cannot conceive of 'Father' in the predicate without having a
relationship to a term, namely, the Son, neither can he conceive
of it in the subject without the same relationship; and so either
both are true or neither is true.
34 I respond, therefore, and hold with master Alexander that
one must make a distinction regarding this proposition,14 for it
can be taken substantively according to the Master, or
adjectivally according to Alexander, because 'Father' is not
determined by 'of the Son' without becoming a relative term, and
thus its relationship to another is not destroyed. Therefore, in
this way the essence is the Father of the Son.
35 And when you argue [n. 4] 'therefore there is a Son of the
essence, because in relatives there is converse predication' I
respond that the mutual implication holds in primary relatives,
14 'The essence is the Father of the Son.'

relativis formaliter illis relationibus, ut 'Socrates est pater

Platonis, igitur Plato filius Socratis'. Quando autem relationes
dicuntur de aliquibus non formali praedicatione, sed per
identitatem, non tenet conversa vel mutua praedicatio. Et sic est
hic: 'Essentia est Pater Filii', haec est vera per identitatem, sed
non sequitur e converso. Quia nunquam valet consequentia, si
plus ponatur in consequente quam in antecedente. Quando enim
aliqua relativa nata sunt construi cum suis correlativis et referri
aliqua habitudine casuali, sicut pater refertur ad filium in
genitivo, semper in sua casuali propositione, in qua refertur,
construitur et ipsum correlativum eius, et ex vi constructionis
habet lllud pro correlativo. Unde ista propositio 'canis est pater
Socratis' est falsa, licet canis sit pater et possessio Socratis, quia
denotatur quod sit eius correlativum. Sed hic cum dicitur
'essentia est Pater Filii', non notavi nisi identitatem, non casuali
constructione; quare eius conversa est simpliciter falsa, scilicet
quod sit filius essentiae.
36 Ad illud argumentum principalei6 quando dicitur 'quod
praedicatur de aliquo per se et primo potest supponere pro illo',
verum est: quidquid per se praedicatur formaliter sive
praedicatione formali, alias non supponeret pro eo; sed non est
verum, quando est propositio vel praedicatio identica, sicut est hic
'essentia est Pater Filii'. Et per hoc patet ad formam argumenti:
'Pater generat; Pater est essentia; ergo essentia generat'. In
maiori est praedicatio formalis, sed in minori est praedicatio
identica, et sic variatur medium vel praedicatio, quia in
praemissis nulla una praedicatio includitur secundum quam
inferatur in conclusione. Sed in isto paralogismo non variatur
medium, sed praedicatio in praemissis, quia in maiori est
i Cf. supra n. 5.
as between father and son, and in relatives that formally

[depend] on those relationships, as 'Socrates is the father of Plato,
therefore Plato is the son of Socrates.' But when relations are
predicated of something not by formal predication, but by
identity, neither the converse nor the mutual predication holds
good. And so it is here: "The essence is the 'Father of the Son'" is
true by identity, but the converse does not follow. For the
implication is never valid, if more is stated in the consequent
than in the antecedent. For when some relatives are by nature
suited to be construed together with their correlatives and
referred to [them] by some grammatical caseas 'father' is
referred to 'son' by means of the genitive caseit is always the
case that both this [particular] correlative [and not any other] is
put in this grammatical case construction, by means of which it is
referred, and [its particular relative, but not any other] has that
for a correlative by virtue of this [same] construction. Hence this
proposition 'A dog is the father of Socrates' is false (although a
dog is a father and it is [a dog] of Socrates), because it denotes
that it [father] is his [Socrates'] correlative [which is false]. But
here when it is said "the essence is the 'father of a son'" I have
only indicated an identity, but not by a case construction [i.e., the
genitive], hence its converse is simply false, namely, that there is
a Son of the essence.
36 To the other initial argument [n. 5], when it is said that
'what is predicated of something per se and in the first mode, can
stand for it,' this is true, [if] something is predicated per se
formally or by formal predication. Otherwise, it does not stand for
it. This however is not true, when it is an identical proposition or
predication, as it is here: 'the essence is the father of a Son.' And
this clearly applies to the form of the argument: 'The Father
generates, the Father is the essence; therefore the essence
generates.' In the major there is formal predication, but in the
minor there is identical predication, and thus the middle term or
the [type of] predication is varied, because no uniform [type of]
predication is included in the premises, according to which
[something] may be inferred in the conclusion. But in this fallacy,
what is varied is not the middle term, but the predication in the
premises, because in the major premise there is formal
praedicatio formalis et in minori per identitatem et infertur de

eadem minori extremitate praedicatio formalis, unde potest fieri
talis syllogismus ubi maior de necessario et minor de inesse ut
nunc, et sequitur conclusio de inesse ut nunc, et non de
necessario. Et ratio est quia aliqua praedicatio infertur in
conclusione quae non fuit una in praemissis. Aliqui tamen
prioristae dicunt quod hoc est propter variationem medii.
37 Ad ultimum17 quando dicitur quod 'genitum est aliquid in
quantum huiusmodi', concedo quod est aliquid secundum quod
esse aliquid accipitur communiter pro ente a se, non autem si
accipias praecise rationem geniti. Tunc enim non est aliquid, sed
ad aliquid, nec ad illud terminatur generatio, sed ad suppositum
primo et per se cuius terminus formalis est essentia.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum essentia sit communicata vel communicans]
38 Iuxta hoc breviter quaeritur utrum haec sit vera 'essentia

est communicata vel est communicans'.
Videtur quod non:

Quia si haec est vera 'essentia communicatur', ergo essentia
generatur vel spiratur, quia non communicatur nisi generatione
vel spiratione; consequens falsum.
[Responsio Scoti]
39 Dicendum quod in producto est distinguere terminum

primum, id est suppositum, et terminum secundum, id est
formalem terminum productionis. Similiter in producente est ista
distinguere; quando enim aliquid dicitur productum, notatur
quod ab aliquo supposito producitur; essentia autem ut sic non est
suppositum, sed terminus secundus notatur in generare, quod est
17 Cf. supra n. 6.
predication and in the minor predication by identity and formal

predication is inferred of the minor term. Hence, such a syllogism
can occur where the major is a necessary proposition and the
minor is a simple predication of the presently existing condition,
and the conclusion that follows will be a simple predication of the
presently existing condition, and not a necessary predication. And
the reason is that some [type of] predication is inferred in the
conclusion, which was not uniform in the premises. However,
some earlier [logicians] say this is because of the variation of the
middle term.
37 To the last [n. 6], when it is said that 'what is procreated is
something as such,' I concede that it is something insofar as 'to be
something' is understood commonly as a being by itself, but not if
you take precisely the notion of 'procreated.' For then it is not
something, but a relative, nor does generation terminate in it, but
in a supposit primarily and per se, whose formal term is the
essence.
Question Two
Is the essence communicated or communicating?
38 Next to this the brief question is asked whether this is true

"The essence is communicated or is communicating."
It seems not: because if this were true, 'the essence is
communicated,' therefore it is generated or spirated, because it is
communicated either by generation or spiration;* the implication
is false.
Reply of Scotus
39 It must be said that in the product*15 the first term, i.e., the
supposit, and the second, or formal term16 of the production,* are
distinguished. Similarly these are distinguished in the producer;
for when something is called a product, this indicates it is
produced by some supposit. But the essence as such is not the
supposit, but the second term in 'to generate,' which is ordered to
5 The Son as the recipient of the divine essence.

0 The essence as communicated.
in ordine ad terminum primum productum quando dicitur:

essentia generat, et sic falsa est propositio. Communicare autem
significat relationem ad terminum, quia forma communicatur
generato vel aliter producto, ut spirato, per participationem in
forma quae est eadem in generante et producto, et ideo forma
dicitur communicari, non autem generari. Ratio autem formalis
generationis in divinis est essentia divina; sic igitur non valet
consequentia: essentia divina est communicata, ergo est producta.
[Pars II
Quaestio unica
Utrum Filius in divinis sit genitus de substantia Patris]
40 De secunda parte quintae distinctionis, quaeritur utrum

Filius in divinis sit genitus de substantia Patris.
Videtur quod non:

Augustinus, VII De Trinitate cap. 2: 18 "Tres personae non
sunt de essentia" etc.; "sed tres personas eandem essentiam
dicimus".
41 Item, Filius non est Filius substantiae Patris, quia tunc
esset substantia generans; ergo non est de substantia Patris.
Probatio consequentiae: propositio casualis cum suo casuali
ablativo, scilicet 'de', tantam distinctionem notat quantam in
genitivo; sed Filius non est Filius substantiae in genitivo; ergo
non genitus de substantia.
42 Item, aut ista propositio denotat distinctionem aliquam, aut
non; si sic, tunc est falsa, eo quod eadem est substantia utriusque;
si non, ergo Pater posset dici de substantia Patris, quod est
falsum.
iH August., De Trin. VII, c. 6, n. 11 (CCSL 50, 265; PL 42, 945).

Dist. 5, Part I, Question Two 270
the first term produced,17 when it is said 'the essence generates.'

And in this sense the proposition is false. For to communicate
signifies a relationship to the term, because the form is
communicated to the one generated or produced in another way,
e.g., spirated, through participation in the form, which is the
same in the one generating and the one produced, and therefore
the form is said to be communicated, but not to be generated. But
the formal principle of generation in the divine is the divine
essence; in this way therefore the following implication is not
valid: 'the divine essence is communicated, therefore it is
produced.'
Part II
Sole Question
Is the divine Son begotten from the substance of the
Father?
40 In the second part of distinction five it is asked: Is the Son

in the divine begotten from [de] the substance of the Father?
It seems not: Augustine in Bk. VII of The Trinity, chapter 2:
"We do not say that the three persons are from the [same]
essence," etc. "but are the same essence."
41 Also, the Son is not the Son of the substance of the Father,
because then the substance would be the one generating;
therefore [the Son] is not from the substance of the Father. Proof
of the implication: an expression de ["from"] with something
added in the ablative case indicates no greater distinction than
something [simply] added in the genitive case; but the Son is not
the Son of the substance ([construction] in the genitive case);
therefore he is not generated from [de] the substance.
42 Also, either this proposition denotes some distinction or not;
if it does, then it is false, since the substance of both is the same;
if it does not, then the Father could be said to be of the substance
of the Father, which is false.
"That is, the Son.

43 Contra, Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, cap. 9, 19 exponit

Apostolum qui dicit: regnum Filii dilectionis suae, id est Filium
substantiae suae.
44 Item, Contra Maximinum, libro III,20 et est auctoritas in
littera.21
45 Item, in creaturis non est filius nisi sit de substantia patris.
Non enim est in animalibus, quia non est ibi filiatio, nec in
inanimatis, quia generant de aliena materia. Proprie igitur in
rationabilibus solum est filius, quia de substantia patris; et quia
hoc est perfectissimae naturae et est perfectionis in ea, in divinis
si est filius, erit de substantia Patris.
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio Henrici Gandavensis]
46 Respondeo: hic communiter omnes antiqui tenent eandem

conclusionem, sed in modo ponendi est quidam doctor qui habet
novum modum ponendi. Dicit enim quod sicut in generatione
istarum rerum inferiorum sunt tria, scilicet potentia-materia et
actus-forma et per se compositum, sic in divinis correspondent
tria suo modo, scilicet essentia, proprietas et persona, ita quod
essentia quasi materia et proprietas quasi actus et persona quasi
compositum. Dicit igitur quod Filius generatur de essentia sicut
de quasi materia.
47 Ad declarationem modi, dicit quod hoc quod dico 'de'
tripliciter potest exponi, secundum Anselmum, Monologion 8;22
potest enim accipi materialiter, effective vel originaliter. Filius
ergo vel est de aliquo, vel de nihilo; non de nihilo, quia esse de
nihilo est tripliciter, secundum Anselmum, ubi supra: vel quia
non de aliquo, et isto modo Filius non est de nihilo; secundo modo
1!1 August., De Trin. XV, c. 19, n. 37 (CCSL 50A, 514, PL 42, 1087).
M August., Contra Maximinum II, c. 14, n. 2 (PL 42, 771).
21 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 5, c. 1, n. 14 (SB IV, 85): "Sed miil horum
est; ergo aut de nihilo, aut de aliqua substantia natus est".
11 Anselmus, Monologion, c. 8 (ed. F.S. Schmitt 1. 23; PL 158, 156).
43 To the contrary: Augustine in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter

[19], explains the Apostle as saying: "[He has transferred us to]
the kingdom of the Son of his love,"18 i.e., the Son of his
substance.
44 Also, Against Maximin, Bk. IIlhis statement is cited in
the text.
45 Also, in creatures there is no son, except from the substance
of a father. For in animals there is no son, because there is no
filiation there; nor is there a son in inanimate things, since they
generate from other matter. Therefore, it is only so in rational
beings that there is a son, because he is from the substance of the
father; and because this pertains to the most perfect nature and it
is a matter of perfection in it, if there is a son in the divine, it will
be from the substance of the Father.
To the Question
46 I reply: here all the ancients together defended the same

conclusion,19 but in the way of presenting it, there is a certain
doctor who has a new approach. For he says that just as in
terrestrial generation there are three things, namely potency
(matter), act (form) and the composite itself, so too in the divine
there is a corresponding trio, namely, the essence, the property
and the person, such that the essence is quasi-matter and the
property a quasi-act and the person as the quasi-composite.
Therefore, he says that the Son is generated from the essence as
from the quasi-matter.
47 And to explain how this happens, he says that 'from' [de]
can be explained in three ways, according to Anselm's
Monologion, chapter 8; for it can be taken in the sense of denoting
matter, effective principle, or origin. Therefore, the Son is from
either something or nothing; he is not from nothing, for to be
'from nothing' is threefold according to Anselm (above): first, on
account of not being [made] from something, and in this way the
Son is not from nothing. According to the second way of asserting
18 Colossians 1:13,
19 Namely, the divine Son is generated from the substance of the Father.
affirmando nihil est de nihilo et sic nec isto modo; tertio modo
affirmando 'de' cum origine, id est quod Filius sit post nihil, et
iste modus tantum congruit creaturis quae prius natura et origine
intelliguntur non esse quam aliquid esse. Patet igitur quod Filius
in divinis nullo modo est de nihilo; ergo est de aliquo et per
consequens de substantia Patris.
48 Respondet autem ad hoc quod dicit Magister quod Filius est
de essentia Patris, id est de Patre qui est essentia. Unde dicit
quod 'de' in ista expositione Magistri dicit circumstantiam
principii originativi; sed hoc non sufficit, immo requiritur aliud ad
hoc quod sit de substantia Patris.
49 Arguit autem contra se sic: actus purus non est in potentia
ad aliquid aliud; sed essentia est actus purus et materia potentia;
ergo etc.
50 Item, eadem est essentia trium; igitur si Filius est de
substantia Patris, erit de essentia trium; hoc falsum est.
51 Respondet ad primum quod aliquid esse in potentia est
dupliciter: vel differens re vel intentione ab actu; et ita ad quod
vadit, hoc est vel per differentiam rei vel intentionis. Exemplum
primi est de materia quae vadit ad formam per transmutationem
realem; exemplum secundi est quod genus est in potentia et vadit
ad differentiam per transmutationem rationis sive ad actum
scilicet per divisionem, vel vadit ad differentias. Tertio modo est
in potentia aliquid sola ratione differens et semper coniuncta sibi;
et sic se habet essentia ad proprietates, et ista differt ab omni alia
[from ], nothing is from nothing, and so neither [is the Son from
nothing] in this way. The third way of affirming 'from' is that it
has to do with 'origin,' i.e., the Son is after [being] nothing, and
this way is suited only to creatures, which we understand by
nature and origin to be non-being, prior to being something.
Therefore, it is evident that the Son in the divine is in no way
from nothing; hence, he is from something and, as a consequence,
he is from the substance of the Father.
48 To that statement of the Master that the Son is from the
essence of the Father, he replies that he is from the Father, who
is the essence. Hence, he says that 'from' in this explanation of
the Master asserts the circumstance of the 'originative* principle.'
But this does not suffice, indeed it needs [some] other
qualification for him to be from the substance of the Father.
49 He argues against himself, however, in this way: pure act is
not in potency to anything else; but the essence is pure act and
matter is potency; therefore etc.
50 Also, the same essence belongs to three [persons]; therefore
if the Son is from the substance of the Father, he will be from the
essence of all three, and this is false.
51 He replies to the first [objection] that something is in
potency' can be understood in two ways: as something that is
different from act either really or in concept; and so something
goes [from potency] to that [act] by becoming either a different
thing or a different concept. An example of the first is when
matter goes to form through a real transmutation; an example of
the second is that a genus is in potency,20 and goes to the
[specific] difference through a conceptual transmutation, or goes
to act, namely by division,2i or goes to differences.22 In a third way
something is in potency to what differs from it only conceptually
and is always joined to it; and in this way the essence is related to
the [personal] properties. And this differs from all the other
20 A generic notion, like 'animal,' is in potency to further specification by the

difference, like 'rational.'
*1 The genus can be divided into its individual species.
22 That is, logically or grammatically the genus in potency to further
specification goes to actual specification by the addition of some difference. Scotus
calls this transformation of a generic concept to a specific concept intentional* or
conceptual. The Ordinatio version (cf. IV, 43) is worded more clearly.
transmutatione, quia transmutatio realis est ad aliam rem a

generatione, quia vadit de imperfecto ad perfectum; unde hoc
magis assimilatur alterationi quam generationi; sed tamen
differt, quia illud ad quod vadit alteratio differt realiter, sed non
hic; et ideo magis convenit cum transmutatione rationis, licet
differat in multis, quia essentia divina non determinatur per illas
proprietates vel rationes sicut genus per differentias.
52 Ad secundum23 respondet quod verum est cum ista
determinatione: Filius est de substantia Patris, sed non cum ista:
Filius est de substantia trium.
53 Aliqui sequaces huius addunt quattuor rationes ad hoc.
Prima talis est: illud in creaturis est subiectum generationis quod
manet semper idem sub utroque termino generationis; sed
essentia est huiusmodi in divinis; ergo etc.
54 Item, secundo sic: idem est subiectum generationis sive
dispositionis et formae inductae; sed essentia recipit in se
relationem personalem, quia est fundamentum eius et proprietas
illa est terminus formalis generationis; ergo generatio erit in
essentia sicut quasi in subiecto.
55 Item, cuicumque potentiae activae correspondet aliqua
potentia passiva; sed fecunditas in Patre est sicut potentia activa;
ergo essentia erit quasi potentia passiva.
56 Item, si ignis generaret ignem de se et de substantia sua,
eodem modo se haberet illud de quo generaretur sicut si
generaretur de aere vel de aliquo alio; ergo propter identitatem
illius de quo sive materiae non debet negari quin Pater de
essentia sua generet Filium.
" Cf. supra n. 50.

transmutations, because it is a real transmutation to something

different than in generation, for [a thing] goes from what is
imperfect to what is perfect. Hence this resembles alteration23
more than generation; but nevertheless it differs, because that to
which an alteration goes, differs really, but that is not the case
here. Therefore it agrees more with a conceptual transmutation,
although it differs from this in many ways, because the divine
essence is not delimited through these properties or notions the
way a genus is delimited through differences.
52 To the second [n. 50] he responds that it is true [the Son is
from the substance] with this qualification, the Son is from the
substance of the Father,' but not with this, 'the Son is from the
substance of the three.'
53 Some of his followers24 give four more reasons to support
this [claim of Henry]. The first goes like this: the subject of
generation in creatures is what remains always the same under
both terms of generation; but the essence in the divine is this sort
of thing; therefore, etc.
54 Also, secondly in this way: the same thing that is a subject
of generation or an arrangement is also the subject of the form
that is introduced; but the essence receives into itself the personal
relation, because it is the latter's foundation, and that [personal]
property is the formal term of generation; therefore generation
will be in the essence as in a subject.25
55 Also, to whatsoever active potency some passive potency
corresponds; but the fecundity of the Father is an active potency;
therefore the essence is a quasi-passive potency.
56 Also, if fire were to generate fire from itself and from its
substance, that from which it is generated would have the same
status [as, e.g., air, etc.] if it were generated from air or
something else. Therefore, because of the identity of 'that from
which,' or matter, one ought not deny that the Father generates
the Son from his essence.
n Alteration is a change in quality.

** A marginal note in the Vienna manuscript (f. 30rb) reads: Richardus
quidam bacculareus Angliae; probably the Franciscan, Richard of Conington.
2r> According to the axiom actio est in passo. the action takes place in the
recipient or in what is changed.
57 Ad dictum Magistri respondent et dicunt quod non gene-

ratur obiective, sed intelligit quod generatur subiective, et
probant quod generatur subiective, quia quod movetur, est; quod
autem generatur, non est. Ergo neutra propositio posset intelligi
de generatione formae vel obiecti. Et confirmant hoc, quia actus
denominat illud in quo est; sed generatio est actus; ergo alicuius
subiecti.
[B. Contra opinionem Henrici]
58 Hanc conclusionem24 non intelligo et arguo contra eam per

quattuor rationes. Primo sic: essentia divina est formalis
terminus generationis Filii, non ergo est materia vel quasi-
materia de qua producatur Filius.
59 Probatio antecedentis per quinque vias. Primo sic: nulla
entitas simplex habetur per productionem nisi sit terminus illius
formalis productionis vel contenta in termino formali illius. Sed
essentia si non sit terminus formalis generationis Filii, relatio erit
terminus generationis Filii; cum ergo relatio non sit contenta in
tali termino formali, eo quod relatio non continet essentiam per
identitatem, quia non est formalitas infinita, et sic cum essentia
non possit contineri in relatione ut in termino formali, sequitur
quod ipsa essentia sit terminus formalis.
60 Item, per auctoritates: Ioannis 10, 28 dicitur: Pater quod
dedit mihi maius omnibus est; sed essentia est maius proprietate
relativa; ergo illam dedit Pater Filio ut terminum formalem.
61 Item, Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, cap. 6:25 "Sicut Filio
praestat essentiam de Patre generatio, sic Spiritui Sancto
praestat essentiam de utroque processio"; et sic forma vel divina
essentia communicata est ut terminus formalis generationis et
spirationis.
24 Cf. supra n. 47.

m August., De Trin. XV, c. 26. n. 47 (CCSL 50A. 528; PL 42. 1094-5).
57 As to the dictum of the Master they respond to it and say

that [the Son] is not generated as an object, but he understands
him to be generated as in a subject; and they prove that it is
generated as in a subject, because what is moved, [already] exists;
but what is generated, does not [yet] exist. Therefore, neither
proposition could be understood of the generation of a form or an
object. And they confirm this because act names that in which it
is; but generation is an act; therefore it is the act of some subject.
58 This conclusion [in n. 4726] I do not understand and I bring

four arguments against it. [Arg. 1] First in this way: the divine
essence is the formal term of the generation of the Son, therefore
it is not the matter or quasi-matter from which the Son is
produced.
59 Proof of the antecedent in five ways, [i] the first of which
goes in this way: no unqualified entity results from a production
unless it is the formal term of the production or is contained in
that formal term. But if the essence is not the formal term of the
generation of the Son, then a relation will be the term of the
generation of the Son. Therefore, since [a] the relation is not
contained in such a formal term, for the relation does not contain
the essence by identity, because it [the relation] is not an infinite
formality*, and in this way, since [b] the essence [as infinite]
could not be contained in the relation as in a formal term, it
follows that the essence itself is the formal term.
60 [ii] Also, there are authoritative statements. John 10:29
states: "What my Father has given to me, is greater than all"; but
the essence is greater than the relational property; therefore that
is what the Father gave to the Son as formal term.
61 Also, Augustine in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 6: "As
generation from the Father gives the essence to the Son, so
procession* from both gives the essence to the Holy Spirit." And
so the form or the divine essence is communicated as the formal
term of generation and spiration.
26 Namely, that the Son is generated from the substance of the Father as
quasi-matter.
62 Item, per rationem, Philosophus II Physicorum26 ostendit

quod generatio est natura, quia est "via in naturam" sive in
formam; ergo natura est per se terminus formalis generationis et
non proprietas individualis individuans naturam, cum natura non
sit primus terminus generationis, sed compositum. Ergo multo
magis natura vel essentia divina erit formalis terminus
productionis et non relatio.
63 Item, mutatio et omnis per se productio ponitur per se in
genere termini ad quem et praecipue in genere termini formalis,
V Physicorum,21 ubi exemplificatur de omnibus per se motu et
mutatione, scilicet generatione et alteratione et augmentatione.
Si igitur formalis terminus productionis Filii non est essentia sed
relatio, tunc productio Filii non esset generatio, sed magis
adaliquatio erit; igitur non est quasi materia.
64 Item, materia est in potentia ad formam; sed essentia nullo
modo est ad aliud, quia non est potentia vel quasi potentia; alias
contradictoria implicarentur, quod scilicet sit ad se et non ad se;
ergo etc.
65 Probo consequentiam principalis rationis28 tripliciter. Primo
sic: eadem persona non potest habere essentiam illam duobus
modis, scilicet, ut principium materiale vel quasi materiale et ut
terminum formalem; alias illa persona prius haberet essentiam
quam haberet eam. Cuius probatio est, quia productum ex
principio materiali vel quasi materiali prius intelligitur habere
illud principium materiale quam terminum formalem qui
recipitur in illo materiali principio; ergo si essentia sit formalis
terminus productionis, non poterit esse principium materiale vel
quasi materiale productionis.
66 Item, secundo probatur haec consequentia sic: communicatio
principii materialis praeintelligitur productioni termini formalis;
ergo si essentia communicetur per modum principii materialis
2,i Aristot., Physica II, c. 1 (1936 6-14).

*7 Aristot., Physica V, c. 1 (224a 26-30), etc.
** Cf. supra n. 58.
62 [iii] Also, the Philosopher in Bk. II of the Physics, shows

through rational argument that generation is by nature,27
because it is a 'way into nature' or 'into form"28; therefore it is
nature that is the per se formal term of generation, not the
individual property individuating that nature, for it is not nature
but the composite that is the primary term of generation. All the
more so, therefore, will the nature or the divine essence, and not
the relation, be the formal term of production.
63 [iv] Also, change' and every per se production is posited per
se in the genus of the term 'towards which it proceeds' and
particularly in the genus of the formal term; see Physics Bk. V
where it is exemplified of every form of per se motion or change,
namely of generation and alteration and augmentation. Hence, if
the formal term of production of the Son were not the essence but
the relation, then the production of the Son would not be
generation, but some process producing relationships; therefore,
it is not quasi-matter.
64 [v] Also, matter is in potency in relation to form; but the
essence is in no way relative to something, because it is not
potency or quasi-potency; otherwise contradictories would be
implied, namely, it would be absolute and not absolute; therefore
etc.
65 In three ways I prove the implication of the principle reason
[n. 58]. First in this way: the same person cannot have that
essence in two ways, namely [a] as a material or quasi-material
principle and [b] as a formal term. Otherwise a person would
possess the essence before having it. There is proof of this,
because something produced from the material or quasi-material
principle is first understood to have that material principle before
having the formal term that is received in this material principle;
therefore, if the essence is the formal term of production, it could
not be the material or quasi-material principle of the production.
66 Also, this implication is proved secondly in this way:
communication of the material principle is understood to be prior
to the production of the formal term; therefore, if the essence is
communicated to the Son himself in the manner of a material
27 That is, it is a natural,* not a voluntary process.

*8 That is, it is a production of a nature or of a form.
ipso Filio, prius intelligetur communicata quam Filius produ-

catur, sicut materia generationis praeintelligitur aliquo modo ipsi
formali termino generationis; et sic ante productionem Filii
intelligeretur essentia realiter communicari et esse relationem
realem Patris communicantis ad illam antequam ad Filium
intelligeretur communicari, quod est falsum.
67 Item, tertio probatur consequentia sic: si persona produ-
cenda habet essentiam quasi materiam, ergo intelligeretur essen
tia communicata alteri quasi materia et non per productionem,
quia adhuc non intelligeretur terminus producendus, eo quod
istud, scilicet essentia, intelligitur ut subiectum primo et non ut
terminus et per consequens intelligitur huiusmodi personae,
scilicet Filii, et non per productionem: quod est falsum, quia
Filius nihil habet nisi per productionem generationis.
68 Item, secunda ratio ad principale talis est: omne principium
reale entis realis habet esse reale secundum quod principiat,
principle, it will be understood to be communicated before the Son

is produced, just as the matter of generation is in some way29
understood to be prior to the formal term of the generation. And
so prior to the production of the Son, the essence would be
understood to be really communicated and there would be a real
relationship of the Fatherin the process of communicating30to
that31 [essence] before it is understood to be communicated to the
Son,32 which is false.
67 Also, the implication is proved thirdly in this way: if the
person to be produced has the essence as if it were matter, then
the essence would be understood to be communicated to the other
[person] as if it were matter and not through any production, for,
up to now, the term to be produced does not come into equation,
since that [entity], namely the essence, is understood primarily as
a subject and not as a term, and as a consequence [as a subject] it
is understood to be of such a person, viz. of the Son, and not [as
something had] through production, which is false, because the
Son possesses nothing except through the production of
generation.
68 [Arg. 2] Also, the second argument for our main proposal33 is
of this sort: every real principle of a real thing (ens)34 has real
2ll It is at least prior in nature if not in time.

30 Namely, the Father as active fecundity communicating the individuating
property of filiation to the essence as quasi-matter.
31 The feminine form of the pronoun refers to an anterior feminine noun
mentioned and this seems to be 'essentia' rather than 'productionem Filii.'
:,2The Latin text 'et sic.. .ad Filium' as it stands is too cryptic to be clear.
According to the Ordinatio version of what seems to be the corresponding
conclusion (cf. n. 79; IV, 55), Scotus maintains that if in the Father there were a
relationship of active fecundity to his divine essence as quasi-matter or as the
passive recipient of the new form [i.e., the personal property of the Son], then this
relationship to the divine essence as quasi-matter would either precede or be
concomitant with, but other than, the relationship of being the Father begetting
the Son, and this is what Scotus finds incongruous, because the additional
relationship would be redundant.
33 Namely, that Henry's conclusion that the Son is generated from the
substance of the Father as quasi-matter is false.
,'1 Ens has the meaning of a thing or being (as a noun); Scotus defines it as
'that to which existence is not repugnant,' and hence refers to either what exists
or what can exist.
alioquin illud quod principiat esset non-ens; essentia est prin-

cipium reale et entis realis, scilicet in quantum est principium
quasi materiale, et entis realis, scilicet Filii; ergo dat sibi aliquod
reale esse. Ergo vel dat sibi esse ad se vel esse ad; sed non dat sibi
esse ad se, quia tunc Filius esset de substantia Patris secundum
esse ad se; ergo de substantia trium, eo quod substantia ad se non
est plus unius personae quam alterius. Sic ergo patet quod
essentia secundum esse ad se non est principium de quo
principiatur Filius.
69 Si autem essentia ut est principium quasi materiale det esse
ad, ergo hoc erit vel in prima persona vel in secunda; non dat esse
'ad' in secunda, quia cum illa persona sit terminus productionis,
ergo oportet ut ante productionem sint duae personae, quia
oportet intelligi illud principium quasi materiale ante terminum
generationis. Nec dat 'esse ad' in prima persona, quia secundum
idem 'esse ad' istius aliquid est principium materiale generationis
existence (esse)35 according to which it functions as principle,

otherwise what functions as a principle would be a non-thing
(non-ens); the essence is a real principle of a real thing, namely
insofar as it is a quasi-material principle, and of a real thing,
namely of the Son; therefore it gives him some real existence.
Therefore, either it gives him absolute existence36 or it gives
relative existence.37 It does not give absolute existence, however,
for then the Son would be of the substance of the Father
according to its absolute existence; hence he would be of the
substance of [all] three [persons], for the substance, qua
something absolute does not pertain to one person more than to
another.38 Therefore it is evident that the essence according to its
absolute existence cannot be the principle by means of which the
Son is produced.
69 But if the essence as a quasi-material principle were to give
'relative being' (esse ad)39; therefore this will be in either the first
person or the second; but it does not give relative being in the
second, because, since that person is the term of a production,
therefore it is necessary that there be two persons prior to the
production, because it is necessary that the quasi-material
principle be understood to be before the term of generation can
exist. Nor can it give relative existence in the first person,
because according to the same relative existence in it, something
is the material principle of generation and it receives the form.
:,r' Esse has the meaning of existence (i.e., to exist) or being (as a participle).
Since being has a dual meaning depending on its grammatical form, we avoid it,
and use 'existence' to translate esse and 'thing' to translate ens throughout this
paragraph.
36 That is, existence as a complete, independent, individual person or thing.
17 That is, existence as a relation or connection between two or more things.
,s The Father consists of the divine substance (which has absolute esse) plus
the property of paternity (which has purely relative esse). Since the divine
substance is shared equally by all three persons, all three persons through their
shared substance would be the unique principle that gives real esse to the Son,
rather than the paternity of the Father that gives real but relative esse to the
Son. At Paris Scotus taught that the divine persons were constituted as distinct
persons solely by opposed relationships.
38 Since in the expression esse ad ('to be towards,' i.e., related), esse or 'to be'
seems to have the ambiguity characteristic of potential or actual being, and hence
could refer to what can exist or what exists, we have translated it throughout this
paragraph simply as relative being.
et recipit formam; ergo secundum esse istius principii quasi

materialis in prima persona recipitur proprietas Filii, et sic
filiatio recipitur in Patre et sic Filius substantiae. Similem
rationem feci de conversione intellectus in Patre sive de intellectu
converso, distinctione 2.29
70 Item, quandocumque ad productionem unius effectus
concurrunt principium activum et passivum, prior est naturaliter
relatio activi ad passivum secundum approximationem vel aliam
relationem, quam habitudo activi et passivi ad productum, vel
saltem necessario simul. Ergo si producens active in divinis
requirit essentiam ut principium quasi-materiam, prior est
habitudo principii productivi ad essentiam quam ad productum,
scilicet Filium, vel saltem simul; quae habitudo non erit ens
rationis, sed relatio realis, et sic erit habitudo et relatio realis
Patris ad essentiam et cum hoc ad Filium, et sic ante
productionem Filii erit relatio realis.
71 Item, Augustinus, Contra Maximinum, libro III, cap. 15:30
"Spiritus Sanctus non est de aliqua materia vel de nihilo, sed inde
est unde procedit"; ita quod eodem modo concedit Spiritum
Sanctum de substantia Patris et Filii, sicut Filium esse de
substantia Patris. Sed secundum istum vel secundum istos, in
spiratione essentia non est quasi principium materiale, quia non
est quasi per modum susceptivum sicut in generatione, sed est
quasi per modum expulsivum, sive per excussionem a Patre et
Filio; sic ergo essentia non erit in generatione quasi principium
materiale sicut nec in spiratione.
72 Confirmatur hoc: quia essentiae, ut de ea generatur Filius,
oportet necessario assignare aliquod esse, quia non posset
principiare aliquod unum ens nisi haberet aliquod unum esse.
Quaero ergo quod esse convenit sibi ut sic principiat, vel esse
essentiae absolute, ut esse ad se, et sic Filius esset de essentia ut
esset omnium trium; vel ut est in aliqua subsistentia, et tunc
*l Cf. supra, Dist. 2, n. 154; Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 2, n. 285 01, 295.16-297.2).

"l August., Contra Maximinum II, c. 14, n. 2 (PL 42, 771).
Therefore, according to the existence of this quasi-material

principle in the first person, the property of the Son is received,
and thus filiation is received in the Father and thus the 'Son of
the substance.'40 I have made a similar argument [against Henry]
about the turning or reflection of the intellect in the Father or
about the turned intellect, in distinction 2.
70 [Arg. 3] Also, whenever an active and a passive principle
concur to produce a single effect, the relation of the active to the
passive according to proximity or other relationship is naturally
before, or at least necessarily concomitant with, the relationship
of the active and passive to the product. Therefore, if producing
actively in the divine requires the essence as a principle or quasi-
matter, the relationship of the productive principle to the essence
is prior to its relation to what it produces, namely the Son, or at
least is necessarily concomitant. This relationship will not be a
conceptual being but a real relation,* and so there will be a real
respect and relationship of the Father to the essence and with
this to the Son, and thus there will be a real relation before the
production of the Son.
71 [Arg. 4] Also, Augustine, Against Maximin, III, ch. 15: "The
Holy Spirit is not from some matter or from nothing, but from
that from which it proceeds;" thus he concedes the Holy Spirit is
from the substance of the Father and the Son in the same way as
the Son is from the substance of the Father. But according to this
one [i.e., Henry] or those [followers of him], the essence is not a
quasi-material principle in spiration, because it is not in a
receptive manner as in generation, but rather in an eruptive way,
a breathing forth by the Father and Son. The essence, therefore,
will not be a quasi-material principle in generation, just as it isn't
that in spiration.
72 This is confirmed: because it is necessary to assign some
being or existence to the essence, insofar as the Son is generated
from it, because it could not produce a unified being unless it had
some unified existence. I ask, therefore, what sort of being or
existence (esse) pertains to it so that it could function as a
principle? Either [it is] the being of the essence absolutely as it
exists in itself, and thus the Son would be from the essence, as it
40 In other words, the Father will be two persons.

quaero in qua. Quia vel ut subsistentia Patris, vel in subsistentia

Filii; neutrum patet ibi propter inconvenientia quae sequuntur ut
supra.
[II. Responsio ipsius Scoti]
73 Ad quaestionem ergo respondeo et declaro duo: primum

quod Filius est de substantia Patris, sed non de quasi-materia, ita
quod essentia habeat quasi rationem materiae aliquo modo ut de
qua producatur Filius. Secundo declaro quod non obstante quod
non sit de essentia ut de materia vel quasi-materia, absolute est
concedendum quod Filius est de substantia Patris.
[A. Art. 1: Filius est de substantia Patris sed non de

quasi-materia]
74 Primum probo tripliciter. Primo per differentiam inter

productionem et mutationem, sive inter generationem et
productionem et inter generationem et mutationem et quomodo
generatio ut importat productionem, quae31 ut sic non requirit
materiam nec quasi materiam et ut sic dicit perfectionem sine
imperfectione; ergo ut sic habet attribui Deo. Sed nullo modo
concipitur sine imperfectione ut intelligitur praesupponere
materiam; ergo etc.
75 Quod autem sit differentia inter generationem, produc
tionem et mutationem, patet; quia mutatio est actus per se
mutabilis et termini sunt non tale et tale. Unde illud dicitur
mutabile quod se habet aliter nunc quam prius. Generatio autem
non est actus mutabilis, sed est per se via ad formam, sicut
corruptio ad privationem, et ita termini eius sunt esse et non
esse, id est forma et privatio. Productio autem est via non ad esse
Melius sine quae.

pertains to all three; or [it is its being] in some subsistence,41 and

then I ask: In what? For it is either in the subsistence of the
Father, or subsistence of the Son. Neither is evident there,
because of the incongruities that would follow, as above.
The Reply of Scotus
73 To the question, therefore, I respond and declare two things:

first that the Son is of the substance of the Father, but not as
quasi-matter so that the essence would have a quasi-aspect of
matter in some way, as that from which the Son is produced.
Secondly, I declare that, not withstanding that it is not from the
essence as from matter or quasi-matter, it must be conceded in an
absolute sense that the Son is from the substance of the Father.
Article One
The Son is from the substance of the Father, but not as
from quasi-matter
74 I prove the first in three ways: first through the difference

between production and mutation, or between generation and
production and between generation and mutation, and how
generation, as it implies a production, as such requires no matter
or quasi-matter and as such expresses perfection without
imperfection; therefore as such it has to be attributed to God.
However, insofar as [generation] is thought to presuppose matter,
in no way is it conceived without imperfection; therefore, etc.
75 That there is a difference between generation, production
and mutation, however, is evident, because mutation is an act of
[something] per se mutable and [its] terms are 'not such' and
'such.' Hence that is said to be mutable which is now otherwise
than it was before. Generation however is not an act of
[something] mutable, but it is per se a way to the form, as
corruption* is to privation, and thus its terms are being or
existence and non-being or non-existence, that is form and
privation. Production, however is a way not to being or non-being
41 That is, in some divine person that exists as independent and self-
contained.
vel non esse sive ad formam et privationem, sed ad genitum vel

productum, ita quod habet pro per se termino non formam sed
compositum, secundum Philosophum, VII Metaphysicae.32
76 Sed quae est causa quare in creaturis coniunguntur haec
duo, scilicet mutatio et productio? Quia nulla creatura est per se
agens nec ponit totum effectum in esse, sed producit aliquid
faciendo de non tali tale, eo quod praesupponit aliquid prius non
tale de quo producit. Ergo in parte illa praesupposita inducit
aliquid, id est compositum. Et sic in divinis totum erit productum,
quia creatio nihil praesupponit, sed ponit totum effectum in esse.
Si igitur generatio daret totum esse generati, sicut est in
creatione, tunc nulla esset mutatio in creaturis, prout mutatio
dicitur alicuius quod se habet aliter nunc quam prius. Si ergo
generatio ex creaturis debet transferri ad divina, relinquenda
sunt ea quae sunt imperfectionis, et sic mutatio quae dicit quid
imperfectionis in creaturis non debet transferri ad divina nisi sub
ratione generationis, et in hoc in quantum est productio quae non
requirit diversitatem activi nec requirit aliquid susceptivum
propter mutationem; ergo requiritur tantum materia. Et in
divinis materia negatur ab omnibus; ergo nec materia nec quasi
materia, cum sit ratio imperfectionis in productione creaturarum,
debet poni in productione divina. Respondebit igitur illi
generationi quae est in divinis producens et productum quae sunt
perfectionis in creatura.
77 Exemplum ad hoc ponitur tale: si poneretur aliqua materia
aliquo ordine recipere plures formas, ita quod manens sub una
forma, puta sub forma ignis, reciperet aliam formam ut aeris,
nihilominus mutaretur; licet enim non mutaretur mutatione
corruptiva ignis formae praecedentis, mutaretur tamen
mutatione acquisitiva aeris et aliter se haberet nunc quam prius.
78 Aliud exemplum est ad hoc: si ponatur quod eadem anima
primo debet inesse cordi et per hoc ordine quodam manui et pedi,
Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 8 (10336 15-9).

or to form and privation, but to what is generated or produced, so

that it has for its per se term not form, but the composite,
according to the Philosopher in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics.
76 But what is the reason why in creatures these two are
joined, namely mutation and production? Because no creature is
an agent that acts per se nor does it put the entire effect into
existence, but it produces something by making it this sort of
thing from that sort of thing, for it presupposes something prior
that is not of the same sortfrom which it produces. Therefore,
on the part of that which is presupposed something is induced;
that is the composite. And thus in the divine the whole will be
produced, because creation presupposes nothing, but posits the
whole effect in existence. If generation, therefore, were to give the
whole existence to the generated as is the case in creation, then
there would be no mutation in creatures, insofar as mutation is
predicated of something that is otherwise than it was before. If
generation, therefore, were to be transferred from the creatures
to the divine, the aspects of imperfection would have to be
relinquished, and thus mutation which implies something of
imperfection in creatures, cannot be transferred to the divine
except as generation: and only insofar as it is production which
does not require more than one active principle, nor does it
require something receptive for the sake of mutation. Only
matter, then, is required, and in the divine matter is denied by
all. Hence, in divine production, one should posit neither matter
nor quasi-matter, since it has the character of imperfection in the
production of creatures. Therefore, to that generation in the
divine will correspond the one producing and the one produced,
which in creatures is a matter of perfection.
77 This example is given: if some matter were assumed to
receive several forms in some order, so that, remaining under one
form, such as that of fire, it would receive another form, such as
that of air, it would still be changed. For although it would not be
changed by a corruptive mutation of the preceding fire form, it
would nevertheless be changed by an acquisitive mutation of air,
and would now be otherwise than it was before.
78 Another example would be if it were stipulated that the
same soul had to be present first to the heart and through this in
ita tamen quod haec non sint partes alicuius totius cui anima
adaequate dat esse, quia hoc est imperfectionis, sed quod haec
sint per se subsistentes idem esse habentes, ita quod eadem
anima per se sufficeret cuilibet istorum dare esse ut per se
subsistenti, non tunc mutaretur anima, sed illa quibus
communicat esse, quia non se haberet aliter nunc quam prius,
quia nullum esse acquireret dando sic pluribus esse, licet multis
daret esse quibus non prius.
79 Sic in proposito. Non imaginor essentiam communem sicut
primo modo sed quasi animam et quasi formam et dat esse
formale quiditativum sicut natura suppositis, et recipitur in
suppositis ordine quodam absque mutatione, quia nihil novi est
recipiens. Unde si poneretur, secundum praedictam opinionem,
quod essentia esset quasi-materia et relationes supervenientes
essent respectu eius ordine quodam, sicut actus et termini
productionis formales, essentia intelligeretur quasi mutata, ut
patet de creatura si ponatur ab aeterno, licet non sit mutata
realiter de non esse ad esse, tamen in intellectu nostro
intelligeretur ut mutata; et sic est in proposito. Sed non sequitur
hoc, si intelligatur secundo modo, ita scilicet ut essentia commu-
nicetur ut terminus formalis pluribus personis relationibus quae
dent esse eis, non quod relatio perficiat essentiam ut actus eius,
quia tunc non intelligeretur essentia non mutata, eo quod prior
est ratio essentiae omni proprietate respectiva et post perficitur
relatione ut quodam actu eius: ergo mutatur.
80 Secundo, arguitur sic: nihil convenit essentiae divinae ut
essentia est, nisi sit proprium formae vel commune materiae et
formae; ergo essentia divina nullo modo habet rationem materiae.
a certain order be present to the hand and to the foot, but in such
a way that these would not be parts of some whole to which the
soul gives being adequatelyfor this would imply imperfection
but [in such a way] that these were per se subsistent things all
having the same being, so that the same soul per se would suffice
to give being to each of these, as to a thing that subsists per se.42
Neither would the soul then be changed, but those to which it
gave being, because it would not be now otherwise than before,
since it would acquire no being by giving being in this way to
several things, although it would give being to many, to which it
had not done so before.
79 It is that way in the case at hand. I do not imagine the
common essence as in the first way,43 but as a quasi-soul and a
quasi-form; and it gives formal quidditative being as a nature to
the supposits, and it is received in the supposits in a certain order
without change, because it is receiving nothing new. Hence if one
were to postulate, according to the aforesaid opinion, that the
essence were quasi-matter and the relations added to it were in a
certain order in respect to it as the acts and the formal terms of
production, the essence would be understood as if it were
changed, as is evident of a creature if it were posited from
eternity. Although it would not be really changed from non-being
to being, however, in our intellect it would be changed. And so it
is in the case at hand. But this does not follow if it may be
understood in the second way, namely when the essence is
communicated as the formal term to several persons by means of
the relations that give being to them; [but] not [in the sense] that
the relation perfects the essence as its act, because then the
essence would not be understood to be unchanged, according to
the following reasoning: the notion of the essence is prior to every
relational property and afterwards it is perfected by the relation
as its kind of act; therefore it is changed.
80 Second it is argued in this way: nothing pertains to the
divine essence qua essence except what is proper to form or is
common to matter and form; therefore the divine essence in no
42 That is, if the soul gave each part an independent existence, instead of one
that is suited to its function in the body as a whole.
4:1 That is, the way that Henry does.
Antecedens probatur: quia si aliqua proprietas materiae

conveniret essentiae divinae, ut est de quo generatur Filius,
maxime esset illa qua materia dicitur manere sub utroque
termino eadem; sed haec non manet; ergo nulla. Probatio minoris:
quia impossibile est eandem materiam numero manere sub forma
generantis et geniti, quodcumque sit generans vel genitum, quia
non potest eadem materia simul perfici duabus formis ultimis
quae dant esse completum materiae; potest tamen eadem forma
dare esse pluribus materiis simul, sive uni materiae cui non
dabat prius. Patet in augmentatione ubi, corrupta forma alimenti
in carnem, forma carnis de novo perficit materiam alimenti, quia
caro convertit alimentum in carnem et perficit materiam alimenti
ut carnem praeexsistentem in alimento. Ergo ex hoc quod
essentia est sub forma relativa in Patre et in Filio, non sequitur
quod sit materia sub utroque termino; sed potius sequitur quod
debet esse in duobus suppositis relativis subsistentibus in ea.
81 Item, tertio arguitur sic: genera causarum non se habent ex
aequo in perfectione, quia causae intrinsecae includunt
limitationem et imperfectionem, non autem causae extrinsecae,
scilicet efficiens et finis, sed dicunt perfectionem. Cum ergo omne
imperfectum reduci habet ad perfectum et non e converso, oportet
ut causalitas causarum intrinsecarum, scilicet materiae et
formae, reducatur ad perfectionem causalitatis causarum
extrinsecarum perfectissimam; perfectissima autem causalitas
extrinseca non requirit aliam causam secum communicantem,
sicut perfectum non requirit imperfectum necessario ad hoc ut
agat.
82 Primum ergo efficiens ad quod omnes aliae causae redu-
cuntur non requirit aliquam aliam causam secum communican
tem, sicut patet in creatione, ubi totum producitur sine
mutatione, ut dictum est. Ergo cum propter idem ponatur in
divinis ordo principiorum, ubi non est causalitas vel efficientia,
way has the character of matter. The antecedent is proved:

because if some property of matter would pertain to the divine
essence, as that from which the Son is generated, above all it
would be that by which matter would remain the same under
both terms; but [matter] does not remain [the same]; therefore no
[property pertains]. Proof of the minor: because it is impossible
that the matter that is numerically the same should remain
under the form of generating and generated, whatever [this]
generating or generated is, because the same matter cannot be
simultaneously perfected by two ultimate forms which give
complete being to the matter; however, the same form can give
being to several matters at the same time, or to one matter to
which it did not give [being] before. This is evident in
augmentation where, the form of food having been corrupted into
flesh, the form of flesh newly perfects the matter of the food,
because the flesh converts the food into flesh and perfects the
matter of the food as flesh preexisting in food. Therefore from the
fact that the essence is under a relative form in the Father and in
the Son, it does not follow that [the essence] is matter under both
terms; but rather it follows that it must be in two relational
supposits that subsist in it.
81 Also, thirdly it is argued in this way: the genera of causes
are not equal in perfection, because the intrinsic causes include
limitation and imperfection, although the extrinsic causes do not,
namely efficient and final causes, but rather imply perfection.
Therefore, since every imperfect thing has to be traced back to
something perfect, though the converse does not hold, it is
necessary that the causality of the intrinsic causes, namely of
matter and form, be traced back to the most perfect perfection of
the causality of the extrinsic causes. Hence, the most perfect
extrinsic causality does not require another cause that cooperates
with it, as the perfect does not require necessarily the imperfect
for it to act.
82 The first efficient cause, therefore, to which all the other
causes are traced back, does not require some other cause that
cooperates with it, as is evident in creation, where the whole is
produced without change, as has been said. For the same reason,
an order of principles may be posited in the divine, where there is
erit reductio ad primum principiantem, eodem modo in ordine

principiorum erit aliquod principium perfectissimum quod non
requirit aliquod aliud principium secum comprincipians, et
maxime ratione principii materialis; talis est Pater generans
Filium fecunditate infinita sine quocumque principio materiali
vel quasi materiali. Istae igitur sunt tres declarationes principalis
propositi iam dictae.
[B. Art. 2: Filius vere et proprie est de substantia

Patris]
83 Secundo principali ostendo quod Filius vere et proprie est de

substantia Patris, et hoc concedendum absolute, et tamen non de
materia nec de quasi-materia. Hoc enim quod dico 'de' notat
substantialitatem originati ad originantem, secundum Magis-
trum, sive cum originante, ita quod casuale notat a et genitivus
constructus cum casuali notat aliud, scilicet principium originans,
et iste modus loquendi non est extraneus a communitate
loquendi.
84 Exemplum: iste anulus est de auro et si aliquid aureum
produceret esse sub anulo, tunc esset anulus de auro illius; unde
sicut aurum est illud commune in quo esset ista consubstan-
tialitas, sic in proposito idem est dicere Filium esse de substantia
Patris quod Filium habere substantiam de Patre originante qui
est eadem substantia; unde non praecise 'de' notat originem, quia
sic producere Filium esset creare, sed 'de' dicit consubstantialita-
tem originati cum originante, et sic dicit utrumque.
85 Quod autem sit intentio Augustini, patet in littera, unde
Filium homoousion confitetur. Item, XV De Trinitate cap. 14,33
vult expresse Augustinus: Filius est de Patre scientia et de Patre
M August., De Trin. XV, c. 14, n. 23 (CCSL 50A, 496; PL 42, 1076-7).

no causality or efficiency; in this case, the reduction will be to the

first that functions as a principle. In the same way in the order of
principles there will be some principle that is most perfect, which
requires no other principle cooperating with it and above all
needs no material principle. Such is the Father generating the
Son with infinite fecundity without any material or quasi-
material principle. These, then, are three clarifications of the
main proposition already stated.
Article Two
The Son is truly and properIy from the substance
of the Father
83 I show the second main point that the Son truly and
properly is from the substance of the Father, and this must be
conceded absolutely and nevertheless he is not from matter or
quasi-matter. For that 'from' denotes the commonness of
substance of that, which is originated* in respect to, or with that
which originates, according to the Master, so that the word in the
[ablative] case [with 'from'] denotes a, and the genitive
construction with it [i.e., 'of] denotes something else, namely, the
originating principle, and this way of speaking is not foreign to
the common way of speaking.
84 For example: this ring is from [i.e., 'out of] gold and, if
something gold were responsible for the being of that ring, then it
would be a ring from the gold of that thing. Hence just as gold is
that common thing in which this consubstantiality exists, so in
the case at hand it is the same thing to say that the Son exists
from the substance of the Father as that the Son has the
substance from the originating Father, who is the same
substance. Hence 'from' does not exactly denote origin,* because
in this way to produce the Son would be to create, but 'from' does
indicate the consubstantiality of that which is originated with
that which originates [it] , and in this way is affirmed of both.
85 That, however, is the intent of Augustine, as is evident from
the text [of the Master], hence he acknowledges the Son to be of
the identical substance. Also, in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter
14, Augustine expressly states that the Son is knowledge from the
sapientia etc. Vide eam in littera, ubi Magister allegat eam in fine
paenultimi capituli. Sic ergo 'de aliquo' competit Filio, quod
excludit omni modo esse de nihilo. In creaturis, ignis autem
genitus non est de nihilo, quia est de materia quae est aliquid sui.
Si igitur propter materiam excluditur quod sit de nihilo, multo
magis propter formam; ergo essentia communicata Filio omnino
excludit Filium esse de nihilo.
86 Ultimo declaro quod Filius sit de substantia Patris sic: filius
in creaturis est genitus vivi de vivo post decisionem seminis, licet
tunc non generetur filius, quia requiruntur multae alterationes.
Unde quod sint ibi multae generationes vel alterationes mediae,
hoc est ex imperfectione generantis; sed si esset perfectum agens
in decisione seminis statim produceret filium sive suppositum, et
statim generaret vivum et hoc de substantia sua. Sic autem est in
proposito: Pater enim est perfectissimum agens sive producens
propter terminum formalem communicationis in subsistente, et
ideo communicatur essentia Filio sicut terminus formalis per se
subsistens. Similiter, semen patris non fuit pars suppositi patris,
sed fuit in eo sicut in loco vel alio aliquo modo.
87 Contra ista arguitur vel potest sic argui: illud cui

communicatur, praesupponitur ei quod communicatur; sed relatio
non praesupponitur essentiae; ergo essentia non poterit esse
formalis terminus communicatus, sed e converso, cum illud quod
communicatur praesupponat aliquid cui communicetur.
88 Respondeo. Duplex est communicatio: quaedam qua
communicatur aliquid praeexsistenti, et hoc est imperfectionis, ut
scientia animae communicatur et universaliter accidens subiecto
suo et forma materiae mutabili. Alia est communicatio qua
Father and wisdom from the Father, etc. See in the text where
the Master quotes him in the next to last chapter. Therefore, in
this way 'from something' pertains to the Son, which excludes
completely his being from nothing. In creatures, however, fire is
not generated from nothing, because it is from matter that is
something of it. Therefore if because of matter it is excluded from
being from nothing, all the more so because of form; therefore the
essence communicated to the Son completely excludes the Son
from being from nothing.
86 Finally, I clarify that the Son is from the substance of the
Father in this way: a son in creatures is an offspring of some
living thing [generated] from some living thing by the sowing of
seed, although a son would not be generated [just] then, because
many alterations are required. There are many intermediate
alterations or generations there, and this is a matter of
imperfection in the generator; but if it were acting perfectly in the
sowing of the seed the son or supposit would be immediately
produced, and immediately generated alive and this from his
[father's] substance. This is the way it happens in the case at
hand: for the Father is the most perfect agent or one producing
because of the [presence of the] formal term of communication in
one subsisting; and therefore the essence is communicated to the
Son as the formal term subsisting per se. Similarly, the semen of
the father was not a part of the supposit14 of the father, but is in
him as in a place* or in some other way.
87 Against this it is argued or can be argued in this way: what
is communicated presupposes that to which it is communicated;
but the essence does not presuppose the relation; therefore the
essence cannot be the formal term communicated, but the
converse is the case, since that which is communicated
presupposes something to which it is communicated.
88 I reply: communication is twofold: one sort is that by which
something is communicated to what preexists, and this is a
matter of imperfection, as knowledge is communicated to the
soul, and in general an accident to its subject, and a form to
changeable matter. Another sort is communication whereby
11 That is, the semen is not something that constitutes a father as an

individual subject or person.
communicatur aliquid alicui ut ipsum sit, ita quod terminus

communicationis sit ipsum totum et non forma tantum, ut in
creatione. Maior autem est vera de communicatione primo modo,
sed non de communicatione secundo modo; unde non
praeintelligitur cui communicatur secundo modo, quia Patrem
communicare deitatem non est aliud quam Filium subsistere in
deitate. In primo autem modo communicationis praeintelligitur
illud cui communicatur, quia accipit esse.
[III. Ad argumenta Henrici]
89 Ad primum argumentum illius opinionis,34 quando dicitur

quod Filius aut fit de nihilo aut de aliquo, respondeo quod non fit
de nihilo vel de aliquo ut materia. Hoc autem 'de' non tantum
exponendum est originaliter sed consubstantialiter; nullo tamen
modo materialiter, ut dictum est. Et quando concludis: ergo Filius
erit creatura, non sequitur, quia creatura ideo est de nihilo quia
est post nihil sui, sive post non esse sui, sed Filius non est post
nihil sui, sed post totum esse sui.
90 Ad aliud,35 quando dicitur quod illud est subiectum
generationis quod manet semper idem sub utroque termino, dico
quod materia nunquam manet eadem sub utroque termino
productionis, scilicet in generante et genito, sed forma bene
manet eadem et sic est in proposito: essentia manet eadem in
producente et producto. Sed quod materia maneat eadem sub
utroque termino, hoc est ratione mutationis, quia quando aliquid
mutatur, manet idem subiectum ut materia sub terminis
oppositis, scilicet sub privatione et forma.
91 Ad aliud36 quando dicitur quod idem est subiectum
generationis et termini sive formae inductae, dico quod
argumentum est ad oppositum, scilicet pro me, quia formalis
terminus generationis in divinis est essentia et primus per se
M Cf. supra n. 47.

M Cf. supra n. 53.
36 Cf. supra n. 54.
something is given to a thing in order that this thing itself may

exist, so that the term of the communication is not just some
form, but the whole thing, as is the case in creation. But the
major [premise of the objection] is true of communication in the
first sense, but not of communication in the second sense; hence
in this second sense that to which it is communicated is not
presupposed, because for the Father to communicate deity is
nothing other than for the Son to subsist in deity. In the first way
of communication, however, that to which [something] is
communicated is presupposed, because it receives existence.
To the arguments of Henry
89 To the first argument for this opinion [n. 47], when it is said
that the Son is either from nothing or from something, I respond
that he does not come to be from nothing or from something as
matter. However, this 'from' must not only be interpreted in
terms of origin but also in terms of consubstantiality, but in no
way materially, as has been said. And when you conclude:
therefore the Son will be a creature, this does not follow, because
a creature is from nothing because it exists after being nothing, or
after having no existence, but the Son is not after being nothing,
but after the whole of his existence.
90 To the other [n. 53], when it is said that a subject of
generation is that which remains always identical under both
terms, I say that matter never remains the same under both
terms of production, namely, in the generator and the one
generated, but a form does indeed remain the same and so it is in
the case at hand; the essence remains the same in the one
producing and the one produced. But that matter remains the
same under both terms, this is by reason of change, because when
something is changed, the same subject remains as matter under
opposite terms, namely under privation and form.
91 To the other [n. 54], when it is said that the subject of
generation and the term or form induced are the same, I said that
the argument proves the opposite, namely in my favor, because
the formal term of the generation in the divine is the essence and
the first per se term is the person. But the essence is not the
terminus est persona. Essentia autem non est subiectum termini

nec relationis; relatio enim nullo modo recipitur in essentia, sed
est proprietas individui producti, non essentiae.
92 Ad aliud37 quando dicitur quod cuilibet potentiae activae
correspondet potentia passiva, ad oppositum est. Nunquam enim
potentiae activae primae correspondet passiva aeque, quia nulla
causa intrinseca coagit causae efficienti perfectissimae, ut dictum
est in quaestione.
93 Ad aliud38 quando dicitur 'si ignis generaret ignem de sua
substantia' etc. dico quod si ignis generaret de sua substantia
sicut vivum de vivo, esset pater propter terminum formalem
communicatum. Unde si semen esset filius, tunc decisio per quam
generatur filius esset communicatio termini formalis. Non enim
semen est quasi-materia habens aliam formam decisum et non
decisum, eandem enim formam habet in matrice quam prius
habuit in patre. Sic igitur Pater in divinis est Pater perfectissime
communicans essentiam Filio, sicut terminum formalem, non de
essentia sicut de materia.
[IV. Ad argumenta principalia]
94 Ad primum principale,39 concedo maiorem. Sed quando

dicitur quod non est idem Deo esse et esse personam, dico quod
nulla persona est in divinis quin sit essentialis essentiae, non
enim est ibi aliud essentia et aliud persona; et sic non possunt
dici tres personae de eadem essentia, sed Filius et Spiritus
Sanctus possunt dici de substantia Patris, in quantum 'de' dicit
originem et consubstantialitatem.
95 Ad aliud40 quando dicitur quod non est Filius substantiae
Patris, dico quod est Filius substantiae Patris. Et est exponenda
sicut ista: Filius caritatis suae, id est Filius substantiae suae, et
tunc utraque exponenda, id est Filii sui dilecti, id est, caritate
dilecti.
31 Cf. supra n. 55.

M Cf. supra n. 56.
39 Cf. supra n. 40.
40 Cf. supra n. 41.
subject of the term or of the relation; for the relation in no way is

received in the essence, but it is a property of the individual
produced, not of the essence.
92 To the other [n. 55], when it says that to each active potency
there corresponds a passive potency, the opposite is the case. For
never does a passive potency correspond equally to the active
potency of the first [cause], because no intrinsic cause cooperates
with the most perfect efficient cause, as was said in the question.
93 To the other [n. 56], when it is said that 'if fire were to
generate fire from its substance,' etc., I say that if fire were to
generate from its substance the way a living thing does from what
is alive, it would be father on account of the formal term
communicated. Hence if semen were the son, then the sowing
through which the son is generated would be a communication of
the formal term. For semen is not quasi-matter having a different
form when sowed and not sowed, for it has the same form in the
mother as it previously had in the father. In this way, therefore,
the Father in the divine is a Father who most perfectly
communicates the essence to the Son, as a formal term, and does
not do so from the essence as from matter.
94 To the first argument at the beginning [n. 40], I concede the

major. However, when it says that to exist in God is not the same
as to be a person, I say that no person is in the divine without
being essential to essence. For the person there is not one thing
and the essence another thing; and thus one cannot say all three
persons are from the same essence, but only the Son and the Holy
Spirit can be said to be from the substance of the Father, insofar
as 'from' expresses the origin and the consubstantiality.
95 To the other [n. 41], when it is said that the Son is not from
the substance of the Father, I say that the Son is from the
substance of the Father. And it must be explained as this is: The
Son of his love, that is the Son of his substance, and then both
must be explained, that is 'of his beloved Son,' i.e., beloved by
love.
96 Ad aliud41 dico quod 'de' notat distinctionem et consubstan-

tialitatem, et sic excluditur utrumque inconveniens, sicut patet.
97 Ad argumenta in oppositum,42 patet ex praedictis.
[Pars III
Quaestio unica
Utrum relatio sit actus essentiae divinae]
98 Propter dicta in quaestione praecedenti, quaeritur tertio

utrum relatio sit actus essentiae divinae.
Videtur quod sic:

Quia ex duobus non fit vere unum nisi unum sit actus et
aliud potentia; ex duobus enim in actu non fit unum, VII
Metaphysicae.43 Sed persona divina est vere unum; ergo oportet
quod essentia in ea sit actus relationis vel e converso. Essentia
autem non potest esse actus relationis, quia relatio est posterior
ibi et ultimus actus personae; ergo necessario relatio est actus
essentiae.
99 Item secundo sic: nunquam ex duobus fit unum, nisi
alterum illorum sit in alio; ex essentia et relatione fit unum; ergo
vel essentia est in proprietate relativa vel e converso; non
essentia in relatione, quia relatio non est potentia eius; ergo e
converso relatio est in essentia sicut actus eius.
100 Item, relatio est in fundamento; sed fundamentum videtur
potentiale respectu illius quod fundatur in eo; ergo etc.
101 Item, actus separat et distinguit, illud ergo quod maxime
distinguit et separat est maxime actus; sed huiusmodi est relatio
et non essentia; ergo relatio erit maxime actus essentiae, quae
non distinguitur nisi ut est sub relationibus.
11 Cf. supra n. 42.

41 Cf. supra nn. 43-5.
Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 13 (1039a 4-5).
96 To the other, [n. 42] I say that 'from' denotes distinction and
consubstantiality, and thus excludes both incongruities, as is
evident.
97 To the arguments for the opposite [n. 43-45], the answer is
evident from what has been said.
Part III
Sole Question
Is the relation an act of the divine essence?
98 Because of what has been said in the preceding question, it

is asked thirdly whether the relation is an act of the divine
essence.

For from two things nothing becomes truly one unless one is
an act and the other a potency; one thing cannot come from two
things in act, according to Bk. VII of the Metaphysics. But the
divine person is truly one; therefore it is necessary that the
essence in it be an act of the relation, or vice versa. However, the
essence cannot be the act of the relation, because the relation
there is posterior and the ultimate act of the person; therefore,
necessarily the relation is the act of the essence.
99 Also, secondly in this way: one never comes from two unless
the one of them is in the other; from the essence and the relation
it becomes one; therefore either the essence is in the relative
property or the converse is the case; the essence is not in the
relation, because the relation is not in potency to it; hence the
converse: the relation is in the essence as its act.
100 Also the relation is in a foundation; but the foundation
seems to be potential as regards what is based in it; therefore, etc.
101 Also, act separates and distinguishes, hence that which
most of all distinguishes and separates is above all act; but such
is the relation and not the essence; therefore the relation will be
above all the act of the essence, which is not distinguished except
insofar as it is under relations.
102 Contra:
Ubi est actus et potentia, ibi est compositio; si ergo essentia
habeat rationem potentiae et relatio rationem actus, persona
habens essentiam cum relatione erit composita ex eis, quod
falsum est, quia quaelibet persona est summe simplex et essentia
et relatio.
[I. Ad quaestionem
103 Hic dicerent sequentes primam opinionem de materia vel

quasi-materia quod cum Filius generetur de substantia Patris
quasi de materia, quod relatio se habet respectu essentiae per
modum actus et essentia per modum potentiae; sed rationes quae
sunt contra opinionem illam sunt contra istam.
[B. Responsio Scoti]
104 Respondeo ad quaestionem et dico quod relatio non est actus

nec quasi-actus, nec essentia est potentia vel quasi-potentia
aliquo modo actuabilis per relationem, quia essentia est ultimus
actus et infinitus cui repugnat omnis alia actualitas.
105 Cuius probatio est ista: in creaturis ordo generationis et
perfectionis sunt contrarii, quia illa quae sunt priora generatione
sunt posteriora perfectione, IX Metaphysicae 44 et hoc ideo est,
quia creatura procedit de imperfecto ad perfectum et de potentia
ad actum. Sed in simpliciter primo, ut in Deo, idem est simpliciter
primum origine et perfectione, secundum Philosophum ibidem,
quia totus ordo originis reducitur ad aliquid primum perfectione
sicut primum ordinis totalis; in Deo simul concurrunt ordo
originis et perfectionis.
106 Sicut ergo in creaturis, si concurrerent uniformiter ordo
originis et perfectionis et quodcumque esset primum origine et
perfectione, non quaereremus primo materiam quae substernitur
formae et secundo formam perficientem eam, sed quaereremus
" Aristot.. Metaph. IX (0), c. 8 (1050a 5-6).

Dist. 5, Part III, Sole Question 288

Where there is act and potency, there is composition; if the
essence would have the characteristic of potency and the relation
that of act, the person having the essence with the relation would
be a composite of these, which is false, because each person is
most simple and is the essence and the relation.
To the Question
103 Here those who are followers of the first opinion about
matter or quasi-matter would say that, since the Son is generated
from the substance of the Father as if it were from matter, the
relation as regards the essence would have the mode of act and
the essence the mode of potency; but the arguments that are
against this opinion also refute this view.
The reply of Scotus
104 I respond to the questions and say that the relation is not
act or quasi-act, nor is the essence potency or quasi-potency that
is in any way able to be in act through the relation, because the
essence is the ultimate and infinite act to which any other
actuality is repugnant.
105 Proof of that is this: in creatures the order of generation and
perfection are contraries, because those things which are prior in
generation are posterior in perfection, according to Bk. IX of the
Metaphysics; and the reason for this is that the creature proceeds
from the imperfect to the perfect and from potency to act. But in
what is simply first, as in God, the same thing is simply first in
both origin and perfection, according to the Philosopher in the
same place, because the whole order of origin is reduced to
something first in perfection as [to] the first of the entire order; in
God at the same time the order of origin and perfection concur.
106 Therefore, if the order of origin and that of perfection were
to concur uniformly in creatures and each would be first in origin
and perfection, we would not be seeking first the matter that
underlies form and secondly the form which is perfecting it.
primo formam quae nata esset dare actum materiae, et secundo

quaereremus materiam quae nata esset recipere esse per formam
vel suppositum, quod natum esset subsistere per illam formam,
sic in divinis. In primo omnino signo naturae est essentia Dei
quae habet esse ex se et in se, quod non convenit alicui naturae
creatae, quia natura creata non habet esse prius naturaliter
quam in supposito. In isto autem signo primo ut abstractissime
consideratur prior omnibus personis, non occurrit ut receptivum
alicuius perfectionis, sed ut perfectio infinita et ut pelagus
infinitae perfectionis secundum Damascenum,45 potens quidem in
secundo signo naturae communicari alicui, non ut forma
informans communicatur materiae, sed ut quiditas communicatur
formaliter exsistenti per eam, imaginando Deum sicut quandam
animam infinitam eo modo quo dictum est in alia quaestione.
107 Sicut ergo in creaturis primo est materia, secundo forma,
non sic in divinis primo est essentia ut quasi-materia et per se
subsistens, et relatio ut quasi actus eius, quia relatio non dicit
perfectionem nec est formaliter infinita sicut essentia, et ideo iste
ordo est in divinis quod essentia est primum perfectissimum et se
habet quasi-actus omnium personarum et relatio est actualis per
essentiam.
108 Item, secundo sic: ubi relatio est actus fundamenti, ibi
suppositum habens fundamentum dicitur referri secundum illud
fundamentum, sicut Socrates dicitur esse similis secundum
albedinem quae est fundamentum similitudinis; sed haec est
falsa, secundum Augustinum, VII De Trinitate:46 'Pater deitate
est Pater', licet haec sit vera 'Pater paternitate est Pater', quia si
Pater paternitate est Pater et non deitate, ergo relatio non est
actus sui fundamenti in Patre.
109 Sed ultra hoc restat videre quomodo ex relatione et essentia
sit unum et tamen quod neutrum sit actus respectu alterius.
Respondeo ad hoc quod tria inveniuntur in creaturis,
considerando quiditatem speciei et proprietatem individualem
ir, Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 9 [1, c. 9] (ed. Buytaert, 49; PG 94, 835).
August., De Trin. VII, c. 1, n. 1-2 (CCSL 50, 245-7; PL 42, 933-5).
Rather we would be first seeking the form that is suited by nature

to give actuality to matter, and secondly the matter that is suited
by nature to receive existence through form, or the supposit that
subsists through that form; and so it is in the divine. In the very
first sign* of nature is the essence of God, which has existence of
itself and in itself, something that does not pertain to any
creature: for a created nature does not have existence naturally
prior to being in a supposit [or person]. In that first sign of
nature, however, [the divine essence], considered most abstractly
as prior to all persons, does not occur as receptive of some
perfection, but as infinite perfection and as a sea of infinite
perfection, according to Damascene. Nevertheless, in the second
sign of nature it is able to be communicated to something (not as
an informing form is communicated to matter, but as quiddity is
communicated to what formally exists through it) by imagining
God as a kind of infinite soul in the way that was explained in the
other question.
107 Therefore, while in creatures matter is first, and form is
second, not so in the divine, i.e., the essence is not per se
subsisting first as quasi-matter and the relation as its quasi-act,
because a relation does not express perfection nor is it formally
infinite like the essence. Hence the order in the divine is as
follows: the essence is primary [and] most perfect and is the
quasi-act of all persons, and the relation is actual through the
essence.
108 Also, secondly in this way: where the relation is the act of a
foundation, there the supposit having that foundation, is said to
relate on the basis of that foundation, as Socrates is said to be
similar by reason of whiteness, which is the foundation for
similarity. This is false, however, according to Augustine in Bk.
VII of The Trinity; 'Father is Father by reason of deity,' although
this is true: 'The Father is Father by reason of paternity.' For if
the Father is Father by paternity and not by deity, then the
relation is not an act of its foundation in the Father.
109 But beyond this it remains to see how from the relation and
the essence there is one thing, and nevertheless neither is the act
of the other. I respond to this that in creatures three things are
found by considering the quiddity of the species and the
individui; nam humanitas quae est quiditas hominis est quaedam

forma cuius ratio essentialis est dare aliquod esse supposito ut
quo, et secundum hoc omnis quiditas est actus, sed non actus
informans materiam, sed est actus quo species habet esse. Secun-
do ex parte individui est considerare proprietatem individualem,
quae est quidam actus ut socrateitas qua incommunicabiliter
exsistit Socrates et differt ab omni alio individuo; sed est actus
totius compositi, non ut inhaerens, sed qua Socrates habet esse
talis individui. Tertio possum comparare proprietatem indivi
dualem ad naturam, et ista proprietas individualis ipsam
naturam actuat, limitat et distinguit; nam licet natura sive
essentia specifica sit actus in se, tamen respectu actus indivi
dualis determinabilis est et per consequens potentialis.
110 Ad propositum dico quod in divinis, quoad primam
condicionem, est aliquid simile, quia deitas est qua Pater est
Deus, eo quod est actus eius, sed non per inhaerentiam, quia est
actus infinitus. Est etiam ibi, quoad secundam, proprietas
personae correspondens proprietati individuali in creaturis, quae
est actus personae constituens et distinguens ipsum47 in esse
personali; sed non est actus sibi conveniens per inhaerentiam, et
huiusmodi actus est relatio in divinis sicut nec in creaturis relatio
est actus per inhaerentiam. Sed quoad tertiam condicionem in
creaturis, est dissimile in divinis, quia proprietas personalis non
limitat essentiam nec determinat nec distinguit eam, sicut in
creaturis proprietas individualis distinguit naturam et adaequat
sibi, ita quod non alii, eo quod proprietas personalis in divinis
characterizat hypostases, non naturam, secundum Damascenum,
libro I, cap. 50;48 essentia enim divina propter sui communitatem,
47 Ipsum: sic. codd.

Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 50 [III, c. 6] (ed. Buytaert, 187; PG 94, 1002).
individual property of the individual; for humanity, which is the

quiddity of man, is a certain form, the essential feature of which
is to give being to the supposit as that by which [it is human], and
according to this every quiddity is an act. However, it is not an
act informing matter, but an act by which the species has being.
Secondly, on the part of the individual, there is the individual
property to consider, which is a certain act, as, e.g., socrateity by
which Socrates exists incommunicably45 and differs from every
other individual; but it is an act of the whole composite, and not
as something inhering,46 but is that by which Socrates has
existence as such an individual. Thirdly, I can compare the
individual property to the nature, and this individual property
actuates the nature itself, limiting and distinguishing it; for
although nature or the specific essence is an act in itself,
nevertheless with respect to the individual act it is determinable
and hence potential.
110 To what we propose I say that in the divine, so far as the
first condition goes, there is something similar, because deity is
that by which the Father is God, inasmuch as it is an act of his,
but it does not do so by inhering, because [deity] is an infinite act.
And also there is [in the divine], so far as the second condition
goes, the property of person corresponding to the individual
property in creatures, which is an act of the person constituting
and distinguishing it47 as personal being; but it is not an act that
is associated with it by inherence. And the relation in the divine
is [precisely] such an act, for neither is a relation in creatures an
act through inherence. But as to the third condition in creatures,
the situation in the divine is dissimilar, because the personal
property does not limit the essence nor determine or distinguish
it the way the individual property in creatures distinguishes the
nature and makes it equal to itself, so that it is not that of
another; the fact is that the personal property in the divine
characterizes the individual person or hypostasis, and not the
nature, according to Damascene, in Bk. I, chapter 50. For the
45 That is, what makes Socrates Socrates is something he alone possesses

and it cannot be given to another.
4n That is, added to something as an accident.
47 Emending ipsum into ipsam.
sui simplicitatem et infinitatem non potest determinari ab aliquo,

sed omnia in divinis vere transeunt in eam secundum
perfectionem et identitatem, et ideo persona non est aliquid quasi
compositum ex essentia et proprietate, sicut ex potentiali et
actuali quae faciunt aliquid unum secundum unionem sicut
partes compositi in creaturis, quae sunt unum unitate unionis,
sed est ex essentia et proprietate, quae sunt unum realiter
secundum omnimodam identitatem.
111 In divinis igitur nullum actum informantem inveniemus;
sicut nec proprietas individualis in creaturis aliquid informat, sic
minus paternitas: nullo modo est actus deitatis, et ita non est
quaerendus hic actus et potentia, quia quidquid est in divinis est
omnino simplex. Quomodo igitur est idem sibi? Dico quod pura
simplicitate, sicut unum idem in se.
112 Ad primum argumentum49 dico quod quando ex aliquibus

duobus realiter distinctis fit unum per unionem, ibi oportet
alterum esse in potentia et alterum in actu, sed quando fit unum
ex duobus quorum unum omnino transit in aliud secundum
perfectam identitatem et secundum tantam simplicitatem realem
quantam alterum haberet si non transiret, sed esset per se, tunc
neutrum habet rationem potentiae respectu alterius; unde relatio
in divinis quantum ad realem identitatem transit in essentiam,
secundum etiam illos qui dicunt essentiam quasi-materiam, licet
maneat secundum rationem formaliter.
113 Ad secundum50 concedo maiorem quod paternitas sit in
essentia, scilicet in deitate, quia aliter esset per se subsistens sine
essentia. Sed non sequitur: paternitas est in deitate, ergo est
actus deitatis, quia Pater est in deitate ut suppositum in natura
et deitas est in Patre ut natura in supposito, nec tamen est
alterum actus et alterum potentia; similiter paternitas est in
40 Cf. supra n. 98.

50 Cf. supra n. 99.
divine essence, because of its common possession, its simplicity

and infinity, cannot be determined by another, but everything in
the divine is truly carried over into it in all its perfection and
identity, and therefore the person is not something that is, as it
were, composed of the essence and the property, the way the
potential and actual form something one or unified in creatures
as the parts of a composite, which are one by reason of the unity
of a union; rather the person is something constituted from the
essence and property, which are really one according to complete
identity.
111 In the divine, therefore, we find no informing act; just as in
creatures the individual property does not inform something, so
all the less so is paternity an act of deity, and thus we must not
look here for act and potency, because whatever is in the divine is
entirely simple. How then is it the same as itself? I say that is by
pure simplicity, as the same one thing in itself.
112 To the first argument [n. 98], I say that when something
becomes one through a union of two really distinct parts, it is
necessary that one of them should be in potency and the other in
act; but when something becomes one from two in which the one
passes entirely into the other according to perfect identity and
according to such real simplicity as the other would have if this
transit had not occurred, but it would remain per se, then neither
has the characteristic of potency as regards the other. Hence the
relation in the divine passes into the essence according to real
identity, even according to those who claim that the essence is
quasi-matter, although [the relation] remains so far as its formal
nature is concerned.
113 To the second [n. 99], I concede the major premise that
paternity is in the essence, namely in deity, because otherwise it
would be something subsisting per se without the essence. But it
does not follow: 'paternity is in deity, therefore it is an act of
deity,' because the Father is in deity as a supposit in a nature,
and deity is in the Father as a nature in a supposit, and not that
one of them is act and the other potency. Likewise, paternity is in
deitate ut proprietas personalis in natura et eodem modo essendi

in5i quo totum est in aliquo primo et pars dicetur consequenter
esse in eodem, ut patet, IV Physicorum;52 et ideo eodem modo
essendi quo suppositum est in natura, proprietas erit in natura,
nisi quando proprietas dividit naturam; tunc proprietas est actus
respectu naturae, et ideo non est mirum si alio modo sit in natura
quam suppositum sit in natura. Paternitas autem est in deitate
sicut relatio in suo fundamento, sed non est in deitate ut actus in
suo actuabili.
114 Ad tertium53 dicendum eodem modo quod non sequitur
'relatio est in essentia ut fundamento, ergo est actus eius'. Nec est
intelligendum, sicut aliqui imaginantur, quod tres personae
pullulant54 in ipsa essentia sicut tres subsistentes, et essentia est
quasi substratum eis, non quibus ipsa essentia recipiat esse, sed
quibus det esse; et ita pullulant ex ea relationes non sicut formae
vel actus dantes sibi esse, sed ut natae esse Deus ipsa deitate;
unde essentia est fundamentum relationis pullulantis in ea sub
ratione formae et non sub ratione quasi materiae. Exemplum
igitur de pullulatione intelligendum est e converso, ut scilicet
essentia sit quasi anima infinita, relationes autem vel tres
hypostases ab ea pullulatae non ut actus eius, sed ut rationes per
se subsistentes. Essentia igitur est fundamentum ut forma
infinita.
115 Ad quartum55 dicendum quod quilibet actus sicut est actus,
ita separat et distinguit illud cuius est actus; et ideo sicut actus
personalis separat et distinguit personam ab omni alia persona,
ita actus quiditativus et actus naturae separat naturam et
quiditatem ab omni alia quiditate; et perfectius distinguit actus
naturae et quiditativus quam actus personalis, quia primus actus
distinguit essentialiter per respectum ad extra ab omni alia
quiditate et natura, sed actus personalis tantum distinguit ad
intra; sed perfectius distinguit actus qui distinguit ab omni alia
natura quam qui distinguit a persona ad intra, quia cum prima56
5i In quo: melius lege quo.

5* Aristot., Physica IV, c. 3 (210o 28-34).
r,:i Cf. supra n. 100.
m Cf. Dist. 28, n. 57.
r,r> Cf. supra n. 101.
r,l: Prima ... secunda: sic codd.
deity as a personal property is in a nature and according to the

same way of being, according to which the whole is in something
primarily and consequently a part is said to be in the same thing,
as is evident from Bk. IV of the Physics; and therefore according
to the same way of being, according to which a supposit is in a
nature, a property will be in a nature, except when the property
divides nature; then a property is an act with respect to a nature,
and therefore it is not surprising if it is in a nature in another
way than a supposit is in a nature. Paternity, however, is in deity
as a relation is in its foundation, but it is not in deity as act is in
what can be something actual.
114 To the third [n. 100], it must be said in the same way that it
does not follow that 'The relation is in the essence as in its
foundation, therefore it is its act.' Nor must it be thought, as some
imagine, that the three persons sprout forth in the essence as
three subsistent individuals, and the essence is there as their
quasi-substrate, so that the essence itself does not receive being
through these, but gives them being; and so the relations spring
forth from it not as forms or as acts giving being to it, but as
suited by nature to be God by deity itself; hence the essence is the
foundation of the relation that springs forth from [the essence]
under the aspect of a form, and not as if it were quasi-matter.
Hence, the example of springing forth must be understood in an
opposite way, namely the essence is as it were a soul that is
infinite; but the relations or three persons spring from it not as its
act, but as features that subsist per se. The essence, therefore, is
a foundation as an infinite form.
115 To the fourth [n. 101], it must be said that each act, to the
extent that it is an act, thus separates and distinguishes that of
which it is the act; and therefore, just as a personal act separates
and distinguishes a person from every other person, so the
quidditative act and the act of nature separate the nature and
quiddity from every other quiddity. And an act of nature and a
quidditative act distinguishes more perfectly than does the
personal act, because the former act distinguishes essentially [a
thing] from every other quiddity and nature extrinsic to it, but
the [latter, or] personal act only distinguishes [a thing] internally;
but an act that has distinguished [a thing] from every other
est impossibilis identitas, in secunda est omnimoda identitas

realis et ideo minor distinctio et minus perfecta, quia extrema
quiditative distinguentia sunt magis perfecta, ut essentia divina
et essentia creata, quam distinguentia tantum personaliter, quia
talia non sunt nec respectu Dei nec respectu creaturae formaliter
infinita; et ideo non sequitur quod relatio sit actus essentiae, quia
nec ipsam determinat nec distinguit, eo quod tunc essentia non
esset simpliciter infinita. Ista enim, scilicet determinari et
distingui, important imperfectionem.
nature, is more perfect than an act that has distinguished

intrinsically [a thing] from [another] individual [of the same
species]. For with the first, identity is impossible; in the second,
however, there is real identity of all sorts and therefore less of a
distinction and it is less perfect, because terms distinguished by
their quiddity, like the divine essence and a created essence, are
more perfectly distinguished than are things distinguished only
personally, for such [personal properties]neither in God nor in
creaturesare formally infinite. And therefore it does not follow
that a relation is the act of the essence, because it neither
distinguishes nor determines it, for then the essence would not be
simply infinite. For to be determined and distinguished implies
imperfection.
[Distinctio 6
Quaestio 1
Utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate]
1 Circa distinctionem sextam, quaero primo utrum Pater

genuerit Filium voluntate.
Videtur quod sic:

Richardus, VI De Trinitate, cap. 16:i "Gignere est in Patre
velle Filium habere voluntatem conformem".
2 Item, Augustinus, Contra Maximinum:2 Si Pater non genuit
Filium, aut quia non potuit aut quia noluit; sed quia noluit, fuit
invidus, sed invidia non est nisi subtrahendo bonum quod habet
communicari per actum voluntatis; ergo Pater produxit Filium
voluntate.
3 Contra:
Damascenus, c. 8 vel 4:3 generatio est opus naturae. Et
Magister in littera;4 et accipit hoc ab Augustino, Ad Orosium;5
vide in littera etc.
4 Responsio: aliqui distinguunt hic de voluntate ablative vel

de ipsa in concreto: utrum Pater volens genuit? Et de hoc in
sequenti quaestione.
5 De primo, utrum scilicet genuerit voluntate sive voluntarie
vel utrum ut principio productivo, dicendum quod hic sunt tria
videnda: primo quod Pater non genuit Filium voluntate tanquam
principio productivo propinquo; secundo quod nec ut principio
productivo remoto; tertio quod nec ut principio applicato
memoriae ad gignendum.
i Richardus de S. Victore, De Trin. VI, c. 17 (ed. J. Ribaillier, TPMA VI. 251;

PL 196, 982).
2 August., Contra Maximinum II, c. 7 (PL 12, 762).
i Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 8 [I, c. 8) (ed. Buytaert, 32; PG 94, 814).
4 Petrus Lombardus. Sent. I, d 6, c. un. (SB IV, 89).
5 Ps. -August., Dialogus quaestionum 65, q. 7 (PL 40, TMi).
294
Distinction 6
Question One
Has the Father begotten the Son by his will?
1 Regarding distinction six I ask first whether the Father has

begotten the Son by his will.
It seems that he has:
Richard in Bk. VI of The Trinity, chapter 16: "To beget in
the Father is to will that the Son have a will conformed."
2 Also, Augustine, Against Maximin: "If the Father had not
begotten a Son, it would be because he had been either unable or
unwilling"; if unwilling, he was envious; but envy is only
withdrawing a good, which has to be communicated through an
act of the will;* therefore the Father produced the Son by his will.
3 To the contrary:
Damascene, chapter 8 or 4: "Procreation is a work of
nature.*" And the Master* [cites this] in the text:* and he takes
this1 from Augustine, To Orosius, look in the text.
4 Response: some distinguish here between 'will' taken

abstractly or 'will' taken concretely: whether the Father has
procreated willingly; and this will be treated in the following
question.
5 About the first, namely whether he has procreated by the
will, or voluntarily, or whether by the will as a productive
principle,* it must be said that here there are three things to be
taken into consideration: first that the Father has not procreated
the Son by the will as a proximate productive principle; secondly
that he has not done so [by the will] as a remote productive
principle; thirdly that he has not done so [by the will] as a
principle applied to memory* in order to beget.
1 "The will cannot precede knowledge" (praeire voluntas sapientiam non

potest).
294
[A. Art. 1: Pater non genuit Filium voluntate tanquam

principio propinquo]
6 Primum probatur sic: unius productionis tantum est unum

principium productivum sufficiens; alioquin aliquid produceretur
ab aliquo sufficienter, quo non producente, nihilominus produ
ceretur; sed ut ostensum est prius, distinctione secunda, memoria
Patris perfecta quae non includit voluntatem in principiando, sed
praeintelligitur ei, est sufficiens principium productivum Verbi;
ergo non producitur voluntate ut per se principio productivo; alias
produceretur idem bis.
7 Confirmatur, quia sicut intellectus vel memoria in quantum
est potentia operativa potest intelligere prius naturaliter quam
voluntas velit aliquid ut potentia operativa immo si per
impossible vel incompossibile voluntas non esset, intellectus
posset suum intelligere ita a simili de productione in quantum
est potentia productiva potest sufficienter principiare productum
prius naturaliter quam voluntas possit in suum productum et
constat quod respectu sui productibilis est primo productiva, ergo
etc.
[B. Art. 2: Pater non genuit Filium voluntate tanquam

principio remoto]
8 Sed an Pater producat Filium voluntate tanquam principio

remoto videtur hic facere difficultatem.
9 Ad hoc enim sunt auctoritates Augustini, IX De Trinitate,
cap. 4:6 "Verbum amore concipitur"; et ibidem, cap. 21.
10 Item, II De Trinitate, cap. 4:7 "Voluntas aciem aversam
coniungit memoriae, tenet et copulat" etc.
i: August , De Trin. IX, c. 7, n. 13 (CCSL 50, 304; PL 42, 967).

7 Ibid., XI, c. 3, n. 6-c. 4, n. 7 (CCSL 50, 341-2; PL 42, 989-90).
Article One
The Father has not procreated the Son by the will
as a proximate principle
6 The first is proved in this way. To one production*

corresponds only one proximate productive principle that is
sufficient, otherwise something would be produced by something
sufficiently, [and yet, even] if the latter were not producing,
nevertheless the former would still be produced; but as was
shown earlier in distinction two, the perfect memory of the
Father, which, functioning as a principle, does not include the
will, but is understood as a precondition for it, is a sufficient
productive principle of the Word;* therefore the latter is not
produced by the will as by the per se productive principle,
otherwise it would be produced twice.
7 This is confirmed. For just as the intellect or the memory in
so far as it is an operative principle can think of something
naturally prior to the will willing it as an operative principle
indeed, even if, to assume the impossible or incompatible, the will
did not exist, still the intellect could have its thought, so
likewise as regards production in so far as it is a productive
principle, it2 could sufficiently produce its product* naturally
before the will could produce its product and it is certain that as
regards what it can produce, the intellect is the primary
productive power; therefore etc.
Article Two
The Father did not generate the Son by the will as a
remote principle
8 However, there seems to be a question as to whether the

Father might produce the Son by the will as a remote principle.
9 For there are authoritative statements of Augustine for this
in Bk. IX of The Trinity, chapter 4: "The Word is conceived of
love;" and again in chapter 21.
10 Also, Bk. II of The Trinity, chapter 4: "The will turns the
distracted attention to the memory, holds and joins," etc.
2 The intellect or memory.

11 Item, per rationem videtur hoc idem, quia ille actus

voluntatis ponendus est in divinis cuius est repraesentativus
actus voluntatis nostrae ut pars imaginis; in nobis actus
voluntatis est avertere vel convertere memoriam et tenere
conversam; sic igitur videtur in divinis in generatione Verbi quod
voluntas erit principium superius et prius quam intellectus.
12 Responsio: dico quod sicut memoria in nobis est principium
proximum in generatione verbi, ita non habet aliquid superius in
nobis. Voluntas enim non habet actum respectu intellectionis
primae, sed illa habita potest habere rationem principii superioris
applicantis, quia voluntas in nobis circumvolvit alia omnia; et sic
loquitur Augustinus de voluntate ubi supra. Sic enim respectu
secundarum notitiarum vel intellectionum potest esse principium
copulans; sed si in nobis esset unicus actus primus simpliciter
stans, scilicet actus intelligendi, voluntas non esset principium
copulans, et sicut respectu talis actus intelligendi non diceretur
principium superius, sic nec respectu alicuius alterius, quia
nullus alius esset. In divinis autem sicut non est nisi unica
intellectio formaliter qua Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus
intelligunt, sic nec est ibi nisi unica dictio Patris formaliter, quae
praecedit actum spirandi semper idem manens. Ergo respectu
illius dictionis non erit voluntas principium copulans, quia non
est nisi unica intellectio et unica dictio, ut dictum est, quae
praecedit actum voluntatis; ergo voluntas in divinis non erit
principium propinquum nec remotum respectu Verbi.
[C. Art. 3: Filius non gignitur voluntate ut principio

applicato memoriae]
13 Quomodo ergo voluntas erit principium in productione Filii?

Estne per applicationem memoriae ad gignendum?
Videtur enim habere dubium propter dicta Augustini qui
videtur dicere quod voluntas ut superior potentia requiritur
11 Also, reason seems to prove this, because that act of the will
must be posited in the divine, of which our act of the will is
representative as part of the image; in us the act of the will is
[required] to turn away from, or turn to the memory and remain
there; so therefore it seems that in the divine in the generation*
of the Word, the will will be a higher principle and prior to the
intellect.
12 Response: I say that just as in us the memory is a proximate
principle in the generation of a word, so it has nothing above it in
us. For the will does not have [a capacity to] act as regards the
first intellection, but given that [intellection], it can play the role
of a higher principle in applying [the intellect], because in us all
other things* revolve about the will; and it is in this way that
Augustine speaks of it above. For in this way as regards
secondary knowledge or intellections it can be a 'joining' principle.
But if in us one act were simply first in an unqualified sense,
namely the act of understanding, the will would not be a joining
principle; and just as the will would not be said to be a superior
principle regarding such an act of understanding, so neither
would it be with respect to some other [act], because there would
be no other. In the divine, however, just as there is only one
unique intellection whereby the Father and Son and Holy Spirit
formally* understand, so also there is formally only one unique
speaking* [of the Word] by the Father, which precedes the act of
spiration,* always remaining the same. Therefore with respect to
that act of speaking the will will not be a joining principle,
because there is only one unique intellection and one unique act
of speaking which precedes the act of the will, as was said; hence
the will in the divine will be neither a proximate nor a remote
principle as regards the Word.
Article Three
The Son is not procreated by the will as a principle
applied to memory.
13 How then will the will be a principle in the production of the

Son? Is it by applying [it] to the memory in order to procreate?
For there seems to be a doubt here, because of the words of
copulans memoriam cum obiecto ad productionem Verbi; ergo sic

videtur in Trinitate perfecta et increata.
14 Respondeo quod in nobis est triplex actus in voluntate,
scilicet volitio actus notitiae, et volitio obiecti cogniti, et volitio
coniungens respectu intellectionis sequentis. Prima duo sunt in
divinis, complacet enim voluntati in actu intellectionis sive
notitiae et diligit obiectum cognitum. Sed tertium non est ibi,
scilicet voluntas copulans respectu alterius intellectionis, quia
non est ibi nisi una simplex. Sic igitur secundum duo prima actus
voluntatis nostrae est pars imaginis et repraesentativum
voluntatis divinae, non autem secundum actum copulandi.
15 Ad primum8 dicendum quod verbum Richardi est abbrevia

ture, et ideo sermo debet exponi per concomitantiam; praedicatio
enim in abstractione glossanda est; unde suo velle Pater vult se
esse, non tamen suo velle producit se, et ita gignere Patris sive
gigni Filii non est velle Filium esse; sed velle concomitatur Filium
genitum sive Patrem gignentem; immo si per impossibile vel
incompossibile non esset voluntas in divinis, Filius generaretur et
esset genitus.
16 Ad aliud9 quando dicit Augustinus quod si non genuit
aequalem sibi Filium fuit invidus et invidia est in voluntate etc.,
dico quod est in voluntate complacente, non autem in voluntate
principiante; sicut ego possum docere, et substrahere me ne
docerem. Primum, scilicet posse docere, non est voluntatis
principiativae nec complacentis; sed subtrahere me esset
voluntatis complacentis, et hoc est invidiae. Ille enim est invidus
qui potest communicare aliquid voluntate sua complacente, et
subtrahit illud non voluntate praecipiente vel principiante. Sic
8 Cf. supra n. 1.
9 Cf. supra n. 2.
Augustine, who seems to say that the will is the higher power
required to join the memory with the object for the production of
the Word; therefore in this way it seems perfect and uncreated in
the Trinity.
14 I reply that in us there is a threefold act of the will, namely,
willing an act of knowing, willing an object known, and the
uniting or joining volition as regards the following intellection.
The first two are in the divine, for the will is pleased in the act of
intellection or knowledge, and it loves the object known; but the
third act is not there, namely, of the uniting will as regards
another intellection, because only one simple [intellection] is
there. Hence, in this way, regarding the first two [acts], but not
the uniting act, the act of our will is a part of the image and
something representative of the divine will.
15 To the first [n. 1], it must be said that Richard's expression

is abbreviated, and hence the statement must be interpreted in
terms of what accompanies it; for an assertion expressed in the
abstract needs to be glossed; hence by his willing the Father wills
himself to be, not however by his willing does he produce himself,
and so 'to procreate' of the Father or 'being procreated' of the Son
is not accomplished by willing the Son to be, but 'to will'
accompanies the Son's procreation or the Father's procreating;
indeed, if to assume the impossible or incompatible there was no
will in the divine, the Son would [still] be procreated and would
be begotten.
16 To the other [n. 2] when Augustine says that if he did not
procreate a Son equal to himself, he would be envious, and that
envy is in the will, etc., I say that it is in the will as taking
pleasure in something, not in the will as functioning as a
productive principle; just as I can teach and withdraw myself
from teaching. The first, namely, to be able to teach, does not
pertain to the will either as a productive principle or something
that one takes pleasures in, but to withdraw myself would pertain
to the will as taking pleasure in something, and this would be
envy. For that person is envious who can communicate something
ergo si Pater posset generare Filium voluntate concomitante, non

ut principio productivo, sed ut volens et concomitante voluntate,
sicut possum velle docere, et si nollet communicare essentiam
suam Filio per generationem, id est non complaceret sibi, esset
simpliciter invidia, et sic non communicatur bonum per actum
voluntatis effectivae vel principiativae, sed tantum voluntate
complacente.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum Pater volens genuerit Filium]
17 Utrum Pater volens genuerit Filium.
Videtur quod non:

Quia si sic, ergo voluit generationem Filii; consequens est
falsum. Probatio: quia nihil habet rationem volibilis nisi quod
habet rationem boni; sed relatio non habuit rationem boni, quia
ratio boni est ratio ad se; ergo Pater non voluit generare Filium.
18 Contrarium patet per Magistrum in littera.
19 Responsio: hic non est nisi una difficultas: si productio Filii

esset mere naturalis sicut productio ignis ab igne, scilicet
calefactio, et si genito vel producto iam Filio, complaceret Patri
eius generatio iam posita, nunquam tamen diceretur Pater volens
generare Filium nisi concomitanter et voluntate complacente,
by his complacent will, and withdraws that by the will not

enjoining or producing. In this way, therefore, if the Father could
procreate the Son with his will accompanyingnot [by will] as a
productive principle, but as being willing to do so and with his
will accompanying, just as I can will to teachand if he [the
Father] did not wish to communicate his essence to the Son
through procreating, i.e., if it did not please him, that would be
simply envy. And in this way good is not communicated through
an act of the effective or producing will, but only with the will
being complacent.
Question Two
Has the Father willingly procreated the Son?
17 Has the Father willingly procreated the Son?

It seems not:
Because if he had, then he has willed the procreation of the
Son; the consequent is false. Proof: because nothing has the
aspect of being able to be willed unless it has the aspect of being
something good; but a relation does not have this aspect of a good,
because the aspect of good is an absolute attribute; therefore, the
Father has not willed to generate the Son.
18 The contrary is evident from what the Master says in the

text.
19 Response: here there is only one difficulty, which could be

removed when [the following condition is observed]:3 if the
production of the Son were merely natural* as is the production
of fire from fire, namely heat, and if, after the Son had been
already procreated or produced, his procreation as already
accomplished would have been pleasing to the Father, yet he
would never have been said to be willing to procreate the Son
except concomitantly and with the will being complacent, just as
fire could not be said to be willing to generate another fire,
The final statement in this paragraph has been moved up for intelligibility.
sicut nec ignis diceretur volens generare alium ignem, licet ignis
iam productus aliqualiter sibi placeret; et tunc non esset hic
difficultas.
[A. Opinio Godefridi

Expositio opinionis]
20 Sed hic dicit quidam doctor10 quod voluntas nec principiative

nec concomitanter est in productione Verbi in divinis, sed tantum
eo modo quo dictum est, Filio iam genito complacet sibi, scilicet
Patri. Quod probat sic: "actus intelligendi non perficitur sine
conceptu aliquo emanante ab huiusmodi agente mediante illo
actu"; ergo intelligere in Patre non est perfectum sine Verbo
producto cuius productione perficitur; sed intelligere naturaliter
praecedit velle; ergo et Verbum conceptum per actum intellectus
praecedet velle; ergo Pater non generat Filium voluntate, nisi
forte concomitanter.
21 Item, hoc secundo sic probatur: potentiae distinguuntur per
actus et actus per obiecta; ergo unius tantum potentiae re et
ratione erit unicus actus re et ratione; memoriae ergo gignentis
tantum est unus actus; sed actus eius est intelligere et similiter
dicere vel Verbum exprimere; ergo isti sunt idem actus. Sed cum
intelligere naturaliter praecedat velle, ergo et dicere.
[B. Contra opinionem Godefridi]
22 Sed non credo quod intelligere sit actus productionis Verbi,

nec principium formale productivum eius. Arguo ergo contra hoc
quod dicit iste Magister, quod scilicet dicere est actus intelligendi.
Contra dupliciter: primo sic: actus intelligendi est perfectio
simpliciter, quia illo actu Pater est beatus formaliter; dicere
autem non est perfectionis simpliciter, quia non convenit omnibus
personis; ergo actus intelligendi non est productivus Verbi.
10 Godefridus de Font., Quodl. V, q. 4 (PhB III, 16).

although the fire already produced could in some sense be

pleasing to it.
The opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines

20 But a certain doctor here says that the will neither functions
as a principle nor is concomitant in the production of the Word in
the divine, but is only [there] in the manner stated, namely, once
the Son is begotten this is pleasing to the Father. This he proves
in this way: "an act of understanding is not perfected without
some concept emanating from such an agent through the
mediation of that act"; therefore 'to understand' in the Father is
not perfect without the Word produced, by whose production it is
perfected; but 'to understand' naturally precedes 'to will';
therefore the Word conceived through an act of the intellect also
precedes volition; therefore the Father does not generate the Son
by the will, except perhaps concomitantly.
21 Also, it is proved in this second way: potencies are
distinguished through acts and acts through objects; therefore,
there will be only one act pertaining to a single potency* both in
reality and conceptually; hence there is only one act of the
memory procreating, but its act is to understand and likewise to
speak or express the Word; therefore these are all one and the
same act. But since 'to understand' naturally precedes 'to will';
therefore so too does 'to speak.'
Against the opinion of Godfrey
22 But I do not believe that to understand is the act of

producing the Word, nor is it its formal* productive principle.
Therefore, against what this master says, namely that to speak
[the Word] is an act of understanding, I argue in two ways. First
in this way: an act of understanding is a pure* perfection, because
by that act the Father is formally happy; to speak, however, is not
a pure perfection, because it does not pertain to all the persons;*
therefore the act of understanding is not what is productive of the
Word.
23 Item secundo sic: dicere non potest intelligi sine contra-

dictione nisi sit respectu alicuius termini producti, sicut nec
universaliter actio de genere actionis, quia essentialiter est via in
terminum; alias esset via et non via; sed intelligere non est
necessario alicuius termini ut producti, sive alicuius producti ut
termini ulterioris, quia intelligere est finis agentis vel
intelligentis, sed requiritur quod sit obiecti tantum praesuppositi
et nullius producti, nisi forte habitus qui generatur ex actu
intelligendi. Sed absque contradictione potest intelligi intelligere
quod non generabit habitum nec augmentabit intensive, ut supra
ostensum est.
[II. Resolutio quaestionis

A. Responsio Scoti ad quaestionem]
24 Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem quod proprie Pater genuit

Filium voluntate non tantum concomitanter vel complacenter, sed
quodammodo voluntate antecedente, quia licet intelligere Patris
praecedat velle, velle tamen in Patre praecedit dicere sicut
intelligere praecedit velle, quia prius est Pater perfectus et beatus
in se per intelligere et velle quam ista alteri personae productione
communicet, quia quod non habet in primo instanti quo est Pater,
nunquam habet eo quod nulla perfectio potest sibi addi per
perfectionem cuiuscumque alterius personae, cum nulla alia
habeat nisi quod est sibi communicatum ab ista. Velle igitur sicut
intelligere praecedit dicere, quia dicere non est intelligere. Sed
spirare sequitur dicere aliquo modo, sicut ordine originis termi
nus spirationis sequitur terminum generationis vel dictionis, ut
Filium sequitur Spiritus Sanctus; sed spirare non est velle.
25 Sic igitur dico quod Pater volens generat, non tantum
voluntate concomitante, sed antecedente, quod intelligo sic:
memoria perfecta, de qua supra dictum est, est ratio operandi et
23 Also, secondly in this way: 'to speak' cannot be thought of

without contradiction except in relation to some term produced,
just as universally neither can any action in the category of
'acting,' because essentially it is process into the term; otherwise
it would be a process and not a process; but 'to understand' is not
necessarily about some term as produced or about some product
as a further term, because 'to understand' is the end of the one
acting or understanding, but it needs to be about an object only as
presupposed and not as produced, unless perhaps it is a habit*
generated from the act of understanding. But 'to understand' that
will not generate or augment a habit intensively can be thought
of without contradiction, as was shown above.
Solution of the Question

Reply of Scotus to the Question
24 I respond therefore to the question [by saying] that the

Father has properly procreated the Son by the will not only [in
the sense of a] concomitant or complacent will, but in some
fashion by an antecedent will, because in the Father, although 'to
understand' may precede 'to will,' nevertheless 'to will' precedes
'to speak,' just as 'to understand' precedes 'to will.' For the Father
is perfect and happy in himself as understanding and willing
before sharing these with another person by a production,
because what he does not have in the first moment in which he is
Father, he will never have, since no perfection can be added to
him through the perfection of any other person whatsoever. For
no other [person] has anything unless it is communicated to him
by this [person]. Hence, 'to will,' like 'to understand,' precedes 'to
speak,' since 'to speak' is not 'to understand.' But 'to spirate'*
follows 'to speak' in some way, just as according to the order of
origin,* the term of spiration follows the term of generation or of
speaking, as the Holy Spirit follows the Son; but 'to spirate' is not
'to will.'
25 Thus, I say, therefore, that the Father willingly procreates,
not only by a concomitant will, but also by one that is antecedent.
I understand this in the following way: perfect memorywhich
has been discussed aboveis what appears to be operating and
producendi in Patre, ita quod est principium operandi in quantum

per memoriam formaliter intelligit, hoc est, ab ea habet per quod
formaliter intelligit; aliter non esset memoria perfecta; et non
solum est principium operandi intra sicut perfectionem suam, sed
etiam potest extra se producere, quia intellectus paterni
fecunditas non est exhausta usque ad terminum productum sibi
adaequatum. In primo ergo instanti Pater habet intelligere
perfectum cuiuslibet intelligibilis et volibilis a se; ergo in illo
signo intelligit generationem Filii et vult, et in secundo signo
instantis habet Filium productum; unde in signo primo, si nulla
persona procederet ab eo, haberet intelligere et velle, et in illo
priori intelligit actum dicendi qui est quasi posterior respectu
actus intelligendi et volendi. Non igitur Pater complacet tantum
voluntate in productione Filii, sicut dicebat ille, sed voluntas
etiam praecedit actum generationis Filii, eo quod Pater per suam
essentiam intelligit quidquid intelligit, et per essentiam vult
quidquid vult.
[B. Contra rationes Godefridi]
26 Ad primum alterius positionis,ii dico quod productio Verbi

est mere naturalis, sed tamen non sic est naturalis quin ipsam
praecedat velle Patris sicut et intelligere eius, et quando arguitur
quod actus intelligendi perficitur mediante conceptu emanante ab
intelligente etc., dico quod hoc falsum est; nunquam enim
intelligere Patris perficitur per aliquod productum, quia non est
actus productivus habens pro termino ipsum productum, sed
i i Cf. supra n. 20.

producing in the Father, so that it is the principle of operation in

so far as through the memory he formally understands. That is,
from it he has that whereby he formally understands; otherwise
the memory would not be perfect. And not only is it the principle
of operating internally, as it were, within his perfection, but he
can also produce outside himself, because the fecundity of the
paternal intellect is not exhausted by producing a term equal to
himself. In the first moment, therefore, the Father has perfect
understanding of everything that can be understood or willed by
him; therefore in that instant* [of nature]4 he understands and
wills the procreation of the Son, and in the second instant he has
produced the Son; hence in the first instant, if no person were
produced by him, he would [still] have understanding and
volition, and in that prior [moment] he understands the act of
speaking, which is, as it were, posterior to the act of
understanding and willing. Hence it is not that the Father's will
is merely pleased in the production of the Son, as this master has
said, but his will also precedes the act of the procreation of the
Son, in so far as the Father through his essence understands
whatever he understands, and through the essence wills
whatever he wills.
Against the arguments of Godfrey
26 To the first [argument] [n. 20] for the other position, I say
that the production of the Word is merely natural,5 but it is not
natural in such a way as to avoid being preceded by the Father's
willing or his understanding, and when it is argued that the act of
understanding is perfected by means of a concept emanating from
the one understanding, etc., I say that this is false. For never is
the Father's understanding perfected through something
produced, because [understanding] is not a productive act having
* The actual term that Scotus uses here is signum or signum instantis.
Scotus distinguishes instances of conceptual priorities from those of temporal
priorities, where a presupposes b but b does not presuppose a, referring to the
former as distinct 'signs' or 'signs of nature.' since the priority is based on the
essential nature of the items distinguished.
5 That is 'not-voluntary,' for he speaks of the two major divisions of 'agent' or
'active potecy' as nature and will.
activus operativus ut dictum est. Hoc tamen verum est quod

productio vel actio de genere actionis non perficitur sine aliquo
producto, et ideo dicere non est perfectum sine Verbo producto.
27 Ad aliud,12 quando dicitur 'unius potentiae re et ratione non
est nisi actus unicus etc.', respondeo: si loquaris de unico actu
operativo tantum vel de unico productivo tantum, verum est quod
unius potentiae non est nisi unicus actus vel operativus praecise
vel productivus tantum, et sic unus actus tantum unius rationis
est unius potentiae unius rationis; sed si potentia non est
eiusdem rationis, ut potentia operativa et productiva, tunc non
est inconveniens, immo est necessarium quod sint plures actus,
scilicet operativus et productivus. Sic patet de voluntate quae
necessario habet duplex velle. Et sic potest dici de qualibet alia
potentia quae est operativa et productiva.
[III. Ad rationem principalem]
28 Ad primam principalem rationem13 dico quod Pater vult

generationem Filii. Et quando dicitur quod nihil est volibile nisi
bonum, potest hic dici quod rationes divinae sunt volibiles eadem
volitione qua essentia est volibilis propter realem et omnimodam
identitatem relationum ad essentiam, qua identitate sunt bonum
illud ad se; sed relationes non sunt primo volibiles nec habent
rationem boni ad se primo, et ideo Pater non est beatus in volendo
primo generationem Filii, sed in ipsa essentia ad se primo, et ideo
Pater non est beatus in volendo primo generationem Filii, sed in
ipsa essentia, ut est intelligens et volens eam.
29 Aliter posset responderi: si in quolibet praedicamento sit
propria bonitas et propria entitas, sicut videtur velle Philosophus
et Commentator super 7 capitulum I Ethicorum,14 tunc esset
ia Cf. supra n. 21
1:1 Cf. supra n. 17.
" Aristot., Eth. Nic. I, c. 6 (1096a 19-29).
a product as its term, but is something active [or] operative, as

has been said. This however is true, a production or action in the
category of 'acting' is not perfected without some product, and
therefore 'to speak' is not perfect without the Word being
produced.
27 To the other [n. 21] when it is said: of one potency in reality
and conceptually there is but one sole act, etc. I respond: if you
are speaking of a unique operative act only or of a unique
productive [act] only, it is true that of one potency there is but one
unique act that is precisely operative only or productive only, and
in this way only one act of one sort pertains to one potency of one
sort; but if a potency is not of the same sort, as a potency that is
both operative and productive, then it is not incongruous, indeed
it is necessary, that there be several acts, namely operative and
productive. And it is evident in this way about the will, which
necessarily has a double way of willing.6 And this can be said of
any other potency that is both operative and productive.
To the Initial Argument
28 To the first initial argument [n. 17], I say that the Father
wills the procreation of the Son. And when it is said that nothing
can be willed unless it is good, it can be said that divine
characteristics can be willed by the same volition by which the
essence can be willed on account of the real and complete
identity* of the relations with respect to the essence, by which
identity they are that good absolutely. But the relations cannot
primarily be willed, nor do they have the aspect of good primarily
in themselves, and therefore the Father is not primarily happy in
willing the generation of the Son, but in the essence itself
primarily. And hence, his primary source of happiness* is not in
willing the generation of the Son, but in the essence as knowing
and willing it.
29 One could respond in another way: if in each category there
is a proper goodness and a proper entity, as the Philosopher and
the Commentator, it seems, desire in Bk. I, chapter 7 of the
6 It can deliberately choose either to act or not act, both of which, Scotus
says, are positive acts of willing.
concedendum quod relatio per se esset volibilis, eo quod haberet

propriam bonitatem suam, sed non esset infinite volibilis ex parte
obiecti, quia non habet bonitatem nec entitatem formaliter
infinitam; sed tantum esset volibilis volibilitate sibi correspon-
dente et bonitati suae.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum Pater genuerit Filium necessitate]
30 Utrum Pater genuit genuerit Filium necessitate.
Videtur quod non:

Per Augustinum, Ad Orosium:15 "Deus Pater non necessitate
genuit Filium, quia in eo necessitas cadere non potest"; et habetur
in littera.
31 Contra:
Si non necessario genuit Filium, ergo contingenter genuit
eum; consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
32 Respondeo: ablativus constructus cum verbo activo significat

per modum principii formalis agendi active respectu effectus,
sicut hic 'ignis calore calefacit', quia calor est principium formale
quo calidum calefacit. Necessitas autem in Patre non est
principium formale quo Pater producit Filium, sed memoria
perfecta, et ideo haec est falsa 'Pater necessitate ut principio
productivo et ut sumitur notionaliter genuit Filium'. Si
autem non posset sic accipi de virtute sermonis, ut propositio sit
vera, accipitur tunc adverbialiter, ut sit idem dicere 'Pater genuit
Filium necessitate, id est necessario genuit Filium', et tunc est
vera haec 'Pater genuit Filium necessario', id est immutabiliter et
necessitate concomitante et non ut principio elicitivo.
r' Ps. -August., Dialogus quaestionum 65, q 7 (PL 40, 736).

Ethics, then one could concede that a relation itself could be

wanted inasmuch as it would have its own goodness, but not be
wanted infinitely as an object, because it does not formally have
infinite entity or goodness; but it would be able to be wanted with
an appropriate desirability corresponding to its goodness.
Question Three
Has the Father procreated the Son by necessity*?
30 Has the Father procreated the Son by necessity?

It seems not:
According to Augustine To Orosius: "God the Father did not
procreate the Son out of necessity, because in him necessity
cannot occur." And it is found in the text.
31 To the contrary:
If he has not procreated the Son necessarily, therefore he
has procreated him contingently; the consequent is false,
therefore the antecedent is also.
To the Question
32 I respond: an ablative construction with an active verb

signifies the way in which a formal principle of acting regards its
effect, as this 'Fire heats by heat,' because heat is the formal
principle by which what is hot heats. But necessity in the Father
is not the formal principle, by which the Father produces the Son,
but perfect memory is, and therefore this is false: "The Father by
necessity as a productive principleand as taken notionally*7
has procreated the Son." But if one could not accept by virtue of
the wording that the proposition is true, then it is taken
adverbially, so that it would be the same thing to say "The Father
has procreated the Son by necessity, that is, necessarily he has
procreated the Son." And, then, this is true: "The Father has
procreated the Son necessarily," that is immutably and with
necessity being concomitant, and not as an eliciting principle.
That is, taken as characteristic of a person.

33 Quod probo dupliciter. Primo sic: in omni condicione et

generatione entis, necessitas est condicio perfecta et nobilis si est
possibilis, quia quandocumque ens dividitur per aliqua duo,
semper unum extremum simpliciter est perfectionis et nobilitatis.
Patet cum dividitur ens per causam et causatum, per potentiam
et actum, per necessarium et contingens sive possibile; et per
consequens in quocumque est perfectionis una pars ubi est
possibilis. Ens etiam dividitur per producens et productum, et
condicio producti non est condicio nobilior in ente, sed ratio
producentis.
34 Tunc arguo sic: illud quod est nobilitatis in ente est com-
possibile cuilibet nobilitati condividenti ens; si ergo necessarium
sit simpliciter nobilius possibili et in omni condicione entis cui est
possibile, sequitur quod est compossibile producenti, quod est
differentia nobilior dividens ens in dicta divisione per producens
et productum; ergo maxime est compossibile primo producenti,
quod est producens perfectissimum; et ita Patri non repugnat
Filium necessario vel necessitate immutabili generare. Et haec
est una via ad probandum productionem ad intra in divinis esse
necessariam. Sed oporteret accipere in minori quod primum
producens non producit necessario ad extra, quod negarent
philosophi. De hoc dicetur distinctione 8.
35 Item, secundo sic: agens naturale non agit contingenter nisi
altero16 istorum trium modorum: vel quia in agendo dependet a
superiori agente, vel quia eius actio potest impediri per
contrarium agens, vel per indispositionem passi et materiae, si
requirat passum in quod agat. Sed Pater naturaliter generat
Filium, ergo non generat illum contingenter, nisi altero trium
modorum possit impediri in generando. Sed hoc non contingit
primo modo, quia non habet aliquod superius agens: nec ad extra,
ut probatum est distinctione 3, nec voluntatem ad intra quia non
,i Altero ... trium: sic!

33 This I prove in two ways, the first of which is so: in every

condition and generation of a being, necessity is a perfect and
noble condition if it is possible, because whenever being is divided
into two, one extreme is of unqualified perfection and nobility.
This is evident when 'being' (ens) is divided through cause and
caused,' through potency and act,' through 'necessary and
contingent or possible'; and as a consequence in everything,
where this is possible, there is one part that is of perfection.
'Being' is also divided through producing and produced,' and the
condition of 'produced' is not the more noble condition in being,
but rather the notion of 'producing.'
34 Then I argue in this way: what is of nobility in being is
compatible with anything of nobility co-dividing being; if
therefore 'necessary' is simply more noble than 'possible,' and,
moreover, [it is so] in every condition of being in which 'necessary'
is possible, it follows that it is compatible with 'producing,' which
is the more noble difference dividing being by the aforesaid
division of 'producing and produced'; therefore it is above all
compatible with what is primarily producing, which is producing
most perfectly. And so 'to generate the Son necessarily out of
immutable necessity' is not repugnant to the Father. And this is
one way of proving production internally in the divine to be
necessary. But it would have to be accepted in the minor premise
that the primary producer does not produce necessarily
externally, which the philosophers would deny. In distinction
eight something will be said about this.
35 Also secondly [it can be proved] in this way: one acting
naturally does not act contingently unless it be in one of these
three ways: [i] because in acting it depends upon a superior
agent, or [ii] because its action can be impeded by a contrary
agent, or [iii] if it requires something passive in which it acts and
the matter or recipient of the action is indisposed. However, the
Father procreates the Son naturally, therefore he does not
procreate him contingently unless he could be impeded in
procreating in one of these three ways. But this could not happen
in the first way, because he has no superior agent: neither
outside, as was proved in distinction three, nor by the will8
H Scotus believes the will to be superior to the intellect or memory.

generat voluntate ut principio elicitivo vel productivo, ut

ostensum est prius. Nec secundo modo, quia agens contrarium
quod potest impedire oportet quod sit fortius et perfectius, aliter
nunquam actionem eius impediret; quod non contingit in
proposito. Nec modo tertio, quia non producit Filium de materia
vel quasi de materia, ut ostensum est distinctione 5. Ergo nullo
modo Pater producit Filium contingenter, sed necessario.
36 Ad auctoritatem Augustini in oppositum,17 dico quod Pater

non genuit Filium necessitate violentiae, sic enim intendit
Augustinus, sed genuit Filium necessitate immutabilitatis.
17 Cf. supra n. 30.

internally, because he does not procreate by the will as an

eliciting or productive principle, as was shown earlier. Nor [could
it happen] in the second way, because any contrary agent that
could impede would have to be stronger and more perfect;
otherwise it never could impede his action; this does not happen
in the case at hand. Nor [could it happen] in the third way,
because he does not produce the Son from matter or quasi-matter,
as was shown in distinction five. Therefore, in no way does the
Father produce the Son contingently; rather he does so
necessarily.
36 To the authoritative statement of Augustine to the contrary

[n. 30], I say that the Father has not procreated the Son by
necessity of violence, and this is what Augustine had in mind, but
he did procreate the Son by the necessity of immutability.
[Distinctio 7
Quaestio 1
Utrum principium producendi in divinis sit relatio vel
essentia, sive absolutum aliquid vel relativum]
1 Circa distinctionem septimam, primo quaeritur utrum

principium producendi in divinis sit relatio vel essentia, sive
utrum potentia generandi in Patre sit aliquid absolutum vel
respectivum.
Videtur quod sit relatio, sive quod dicat ad aliquid et non

aliquid absolutum:
Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, cap. 6:1 "Eo est Pater quo est ei
Filius"; ergo eo est Pater quo generat; sed paternitate est Pater,
ergo paternitas generat.
2 Item, generare est actus proprius suppositi, ergo est a
propria forma. Probatio antecedentis: V Metaphysicae et II
Physicorum2 dicitur quod causa et effectus correspondent sibi in
ratione communis et proprii, sive in ratione particularis et
universalis. Probatio consequentiae: quia propria forma dat
supposito esse, ergo dat sibi agere.
3 Item, medium est in eodem genere cum extremis, X
Metaphysicae;3 sed extrema sunt generans et genitum; ergo
medium erit principium generandi quo et de genere respectus.
4 Item, potentia et actus sunt eiusdem generis; sed actus
generandi est ad aliquid; ergo et potentia generandi.
5 Contra:
Damascenus, cap. 8, I:4 "Generatio est opus naturae", ergo
relatio non est principium generandi quo, quia nullius actionis
realis et naturalis principium est.
6 Item, Hilarius, V De Trinitate:5 "Ex virtute subsistit Filius"
etc.
1 August., De Trin. V, c. 5, n. G (CCSL 50, 210; PL 42, 914).

2 Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 2 (1014a 10-3); Physica II, c. 3 (1956 25-7).
:l Aristot., Metaph. X (I), c. 7 (1057a 38-6 2).
4 Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 8 [I, c. 8] (ed. Buytaert, 32; PG 94, 814).
5 Hilarius, De Trin. V, n. 37 (CCSL 62, 191, PL 10, 155).
306
Distinction 7
Question One
Is the principle* of producing in the divine a relation or
the essence, or is something absolute or relative?
1 Regarding distinction seven I ask first whether the principle

of producing in the divine is a relation or the essence, or whether
the power of procreating in the Father is something absolute or
relative.
It seems to be a relation, or what implies a relation to

something, and not something absolute: Augustine in Bk. XV of
The Trinity, chapter 6: "He is Father by virtue of having the Son";
therefore, he is Father by virtue of procreating; but he is Father
by virtue of paternity, therefore it is paternity that procreates.
2 Also, to procreate is an act proper to an individual subject or
person;* therefore it stems from a form proper [to this individual].
Proof of the antecedent: in Bk. V of the Metaphysics and Bk. II of
the Physics it is stated that cause and effect agree with each other
in a common aspect and a proper aspect, or in what is a particular
aspect and a universal one. Proof of the implication:* because the
form proper to the individual subject or person gives it being,
therefore it gives it ability to act.
3 Also, the mean is in the same genus as the extremes,
according to Bk. X of the Metaphysics; but the extremes are
'generating' and 'generated,' therefore the intermediate will be
the principle of generating 'by which,' and will be in the category
of relation.
4 Also potency* and act* are in the same genus, but the act of
generation* is towards something [i.e., a relation], therefore so
too will be the potency of generating.
5 To the contrary:
Damascene, Bk. I, chapter 8: "Procreation is a work of
nature.*" Therefore a relation is not a principle of procreation,
because it is not a principle of any real or natural* action.
6 Also, Hilary in Bk. V of The Trinity: "From power the Son
subsists," etc.
306
7 Item, Magister in littera dicit6 quod "Pater non est potens

nisi natura".
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio Thomae Aquinatis
1. Exponitur opinio]
8 Responsio: hic sunt famosae opiniones et diversae. Quidam

dicunt quod principium vel potentia generandi est aliquid
absolutum, quia illud quo generans generat est forma qua
generans producit sibi simile; formae enim est assimilare, et hoc
est essentia divina quae communicatur Filio per generationem;
sed relatio non est communicativa nec assimilativa, sed solum
distinctiva; ergo non est principium generandi elicitive, sed
essentia.
[2. Contra opinionem Thomae secundum aliam

opinionem]
9 Contra istam opinionem arguitur sic: omnis forma elicitiva

actionis, si per se est, per se potest agere. Patet in formis quae
non possunt per se esse, ut calor si esset separatus, esset
principium sufficiens calefaciendi; sed deitas est huiusmodi. Est
autem per se antequam intelligatur in supposito et est sufficiens
et per se principium elicitivum actionis; ergo in illo priori aget,
quod falsum est; essentia enim non generat.
10 Item, forma in quantum est illud in quo generans genito
assimilatur, non habet aliquam unitatem realem, sed rationis
tantum; sed nihil rationis est principium actionis realis, nisi sit
aliquid unum reale; ergo forma ut est communis vel ratio
assimilationis generanti et genito non est principium generati-
onis.
11 Item, forma non est principium agendi nisi alicui agenti, nec
ill! agenti est principium nisi ut est in actu per ipsam; non est
0 Potrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 7, c. 2 (SB IV, 93).

7 Also, the Master* says in the text:* "The Father is only

potent by nature."
To the Question
The opinion of Thomas
8 Response: here there are famous and diverse opinions.

Certain ones say that the principle or potency of procreating is
something absolute, because that by which the procreator
generates is the form by which he produces something like
himself; for to make alike pertains to the form, and this is the
divine essence that is communicated to the Son through
procreation. A relation, however, is not communicative or
assimilative, but only distinctive; therefore it is not an eliciting
principle of generation, but the essence is.
Against the opinion of Thomas according to another

opinion
9 Against this opinion it is argued in this way: every form that

elicits action, if it is per se, can act per se. It is evident in forms
that cannot exist per se, such as heat: if it were separated, it
would [still] be a sufficient principle of heating; but deity is this
sort of thing.* It exists, however, per se before it is thought to be
in a individual subject or person and it is a sufficient and per se
eliciting principle of action; therefore it would act in this prior
[moment], which is false; for the essence does not generate.
10 Also, form, inasmuch as it is that in which the one
procreating is similar to what is generated, does not have any
real unity but only a conceptual one, but nothing conceptual is a
principle of real action unless it is some one real thing. Therefore,
the form, as something that is common or the reason why the one
generating and the one generated are alike, is not the principle of
procreation.
11 Also, the form is a principle of acting only for some agent,
and it is only a principle for that agent insofar as it is in act
through it; but it is not in act through it unless it is a 'this' [or an
autem in actu per ipsam nisi ut est hoc; ergo non est principium
actionis in quantum assimilativa, sed in quantum distinctiva,
essentia autem divina non est distinctiva; ergo etc.
12 Item, productio prius est distinctiva quam assimilativa;
igitur principium producendi prius erit principium distinguendi
quam assimilandi, id est prius forma ut haec erit principium
actionis quam ut forma absolute. Probatio antecedentis: omnis
productio est distinctiva, non tamen omnis productio est
assimilativa, sicut patet de productione aequivoca.
13 Item, contra rationem istorum, quia maior patitur multas
instantias, quia brutum generat brutum quae non conveniunt in
specie, et assimilantur in anima sensitiva quae tamen non est
principium generandi, secundum aliquos.
14 Item, accidentia sunt principia proxima activa, secundum
aliquos, et tamen non est in eis assimilatio principaliter, sed in
forma substantiali est assimilatio.
[B. Opinio Henrici Gandavensis

1. Rationes pro opinione]
15 Alia est opinio quae dicit quod in divinis oportet dare

positivum principium elicitivum actionis, sicut terminus produc
tionis est positivus; et sic essentia, ut dicunt, est principium
elicitivum generandi; sed quia essentia secundum se est
indeterminata ad hoc quod sit principium determinatae actionis,
oportet quod determinetur. Sed determinate eius non est nisi
relatio sive per relationem, quae est principium determinativum
agendi et essentia est principium elicitivum actionis.
individual] ; therefore it is not a principle of action in so far as it is

assimilating [in respect to what generates and what is generated],
but insofar as it is distinquishing; the divine essence, however, is
not such; therefore, etc.
12 Also, production* is first distinctive before it is assimilative;
therefore a principle of production will first be a principle of
distinguishing before it will be one of making something similar,
that is, the form as such will first be a principle of action before
being a form absolutely. Proof of the antecedent: every production
is distinctive; not every production is assimilative, as is evident in
an equivocal production.
13 Also, against the arguments of those,i because the major
suffers many objections, since 'beast generates beast,' where
[ beast ] could be of different species, but [at the same time] alike
as regards the sensitive soul, which nevertheless is not the
principle of generating, according to some.2
14 Also, accidents are the proximate active principles,
according to some, and nevertheless in these there is no likeness
principally, but in a substantial form there is assimilation.

Reasons for the opinion
15 There is another opinion which says that in the divine there

must be a positive eliciting principle of action, as the term of the
production is positive; and so the essence, as they say, is the
eliciting principle of procreating; but because the essence itself is
indeterminate in respect to being a principle of a determinate
action, it is necessary that it be determined. But its
determination is only a relation or through a relation, which is
the determinative principle of acting, while the essence remains
an eliciting principle of action.
i Thomas Aquinas, and those who follow him.

2 I.e., the uniting principle (sensitive soul) is not capable of producing 'across
the species.' despite its 'assimilating' properties.
16 Contra istam opinionem arguo sic: quando aliquid est

indeterminatum ad aliqua indeterminatione potentiae activae, ex
se est sufficienter determinatum ad quodcumque illorum,
circumscripto omni alio determinativo; sed essentia divina, si sit
indeterminata respectu productionis Filii et Spiritus Sancti, hoc
est indeterminatione potentiae activae; ergo etc.
17 Ad evidentiam istius rationis, primo videatur differentia
inter indeterminationem quae est ex parte potentiae passivae et
quae est ex parte potentiae activae in entibus. Indeterminatio
quae ex parte potentiae passivae est imperfectionis, ut
indeterminatio materiae ad diversas formas. Et tale non est
activum nisi determinetur, quia non est aliquod ens actu nisi per
formas. Alia indeterminatio potentiae activae non est propter
carentiam actus, sed est ex plenitudine perfectionis, et ista
indeterminatio non exspectat aliquid formale determinans.
18 Prima igitur indeterminatio, scilicet potentiae passivae, est
ad contradictoria sive ad privative opposita; sed secunda ad
disparata, ut sol sive potentia activa solis aeque indeterminata ad
herbam sicut ad animal etc., et tamen ex se determinatur ad
producendum quodlibet.
19 Modo sic: quod est indeterminatum ex se ad plura
indeterminatione potentiae activae est determinatum sufficienter
ad quodcumque eorum; sed essentia divina est huiusmodi; ergo
frustra ponitur aliquod determinans. Maior patet: quia
indeterminatio quae est ad disparata et non ad contraria vel
contradictoria non impedit agere. Sola enim illa indeterminatio
quae est ad agere et non agere impedit unam partem nisi
determinetur, non autem illa indeterminatio quae est ad
disparata. Patet de sole, qui est causa aequivoca, indeterminatus
ad plantam vel vermem, non tamen est indeterminatus ad
16 Against this opinion I argue in this way: when something is

indeterminate as regards certain things due to a lack of
determination of an active potency, of itself it is sufficiently
determined to each of these, apart from any other determinative;
but if the divine essence is indeterminate as regards the
production of the Son and the Holy Spirit, this is by a lack of
determination of an active potency; therefore, etc.
17 As to the evidence for this argument, first let us point out a
difference between indetermination on the part of a passive
potency and that on the part of an active potency in beings.
Indetermination that is on the part of a passive potency is a
matter of imperfection, as the indeterminacy of matter to diverse
forms. And such is only active if it is determined, because it is
only through forms that some being is in act. The other
indetermination of an active potency is not because of a lack of
act, but it is from a plenitude of perfection, and this
indetermination is not awaiting something formal* that is
determining.
18 Hence the first indetermination, namely of passive potency
is with respect to what is contradictory or privatively opposed,
but the second is with respect to disparate things, as the sun* or
the active potency of the sun is equally undetermined with
respect to plants as it is with respect to animals, etc. and
nevertheless of itself it is determined to produce anything.
19 Or in this way: what is indeterminate of itself with respect
to several things by an indetermination of active potency is
sufficiently determined to any of these; but the divine essence is
this sort of thing; therefore it is useless to postulate something
determining. The major is evident: because indetermination,
which is with respect to disparate things and not to contraries or
contradictories, does not prevent acting. For only that
indetermination which is with respect to acting and not acting
impedes one part unless it is determined, but not that
indetermination which is with respect to disparate things. This is
evident in the case of the sun, which is an equivocal* cause,
indeterminate with respect to plants and worms. For it is not
producendum vel non producendum, sed indeterminatus est ad

producendum hoc et illud, et posito passo determinato7 producit
herbam, et tamen simul posito alio passo determinata potest
producere vermem.
20 Item,8 secundo probatur ista maior sic: potentia activa, si
esset tantum huiusmodi producti, esset determinata ad
productionem huiusmodi effectus; sed si habet virtutem activam
sufficientem non solum ad hoc sed ad aliud producendum, nihil
tollitur de causalitate eius respectu huiusmodi, sed intenditur,
quia secundum istum doctorem, essentia non potest esse
immediatum fundamentum vel principium nisi per intellectum et
voluntatem quae sunt absoluta et actu infinita, et sic primo
determinatur essentia per aliquod absolutum quam per rela-
tiones.
21 Item, secundo arguo contra positionem dictam sic: indeter-
minatum quod est prius determinatum quam per relationes non
requirit determinari per respectus vel relationes; hoc patet, quia
subiectum includit praedicatum; sed essentia, si est principium
productivum, prius est determinata ad producendum quam per
relationes; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: quia essentia ut essentia
non potest esse principium plurium productionum unius rationis,
ut dictum est supra, nec per relationes, quia determinatur ad
plures productiones per intellectum et voluntatem quae praece-
dunt relationes, cum sint formaliter infinitae, relationes autem
non sunt huiusmodi; ergo etc.
22 Item, quando aliquid est indeterminatum ad duo producta
ordine quodam, ex se est determinatum ad illa, quia ex se est
determinatum ad primum, et posito primo determinatur ad
secundum; sic est de essentia divina respectu productionis
personarum.
23 Item, essentia, per te, in quantum talis est principium quo
elicitivum; sed essentia ut talis non potest determinari per
relationes; ergo ut talis non potest esse principium quo. Probatio
7 Determinato: pro determinate scripsimus, quod in codd. potius legitur.

H Ordo paragraphorum in V codice turbatus est hoc modo: nn. 19, 20, 22, 21,
23.
indeterminate with respect to producing or not producing, but

indeterminate with respect to producing this and that, and given
something determinate to act upon it produces a plant, and
nevertheless at the same time with another determinate thing to
act upon it can produce a worm.
20 Also, secondly this major is proved in this way: an active
potency, if it were only of such a product,* would be determined
to produce such an effect; but if it has sufficient active power to
produce not only this but also another, nothing is subtracted from
its causality as regards such, but it is increased, because
according to this doctor, the essence cannot be the immediate
basis or principle except through the intellect and will which are
absolutes and infinite in act, and thus the essence is first
determined through something absolute before it is through
relations.
21 Also, secondly I argue against the aforesaid position in this
way: the indeterminate that first becomes determined before it is
determined through relations does not need to be determined
through relations; this is evident, because the subject includes the
predicate; but the essence, if it is the productive principle, is first
determined to produce before being determined through relations;
therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: because the essence qua essence
cannot be the principle of producing several of one sort, as was
said above, nor can it [be that] through relations, because it is
determined to several productions through the intellect and will
which precede the relations, since they are formally* infinite; the
relations, however, are not such; therefore, etc.
22 Also, when something is indeterminate with respect to two
products in a certain order, it is determined of itself to those,
because of itself it is determined to the first, and when the first is
posited it is determined to the second; such is the divine essence
as regards the production of the persons.
23 Also, the essence, according to you, is the sort of thing that
is the principle* 'by which' (principium quo)* something is
elicited; but the essence as such cannot be determined through
relations;3 therefore as such it cannot be a principle* 'by which.'
:l The essence determined by a relation is one of the divine persons, and as

such is a principium quod* or a subject that acts
minoris per Anselmum et per Damascenum, 50 cap., I:9

proprietates sunt characteristicae hypostasium, non naturae.
24 Item, relatio est per se forma operantis et per se entitas
agentis, et cum hoc est principium determinativum. Principium
igitur elicitivum habet duplicem rationem principii respectu
generationis sive productionis; primum habet, scilicet quod sit
principium operationis et in illo instanti non habet esse
principium quo productionis, sed oportet quod sit quasi medium
inter principium quo et ipsam actionem sive productionem, et in
uno praecedit essentiam et in alio sequitur.
25 Ista opinio declaratur per simile in creatura, quia in
creaturis relatio est de ratione potentiae activae et determinat,
sicut patet de potentiis animae etc.
26 Sed hoc non credo quod in potentiis naturalibus activis
quod10 approximatio nec relatio sit determinans principium quo
sed in potentiis animalibus vel sensitivis, si sunt passivae, unde
possunt terminari per relationem.
[II. Opinio propria Scoti]
27 Dico ergo quod relatio non est principium quo

determinativum et ad quaestionem respondeo. Quando quaeritur
de potentia generandi, distinguo de potentia: uno enim modo
potentia est ut differentia entis distincta contra actum, et talis
nullo modo est ponenda in divinis. Nec quaerenda quae dicitur
potentia metaphysica; potentia enim generandi isto modo non
dividitur contra actum, quia illa generatio est necessaria.
28 Restat ergo de potentia quae est ut principium, non ut est
potentia logica, sed ut est principium quo et activum. Dico ergo
0 Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 50 [III, c. 6] (ed. Buytaert, 187: PG 94. 1002).

,n Quod superfluum.
Proof of the minor through Anselm and through Damascene,

chapter 50, Bk. I: properties are characteristics of the persons,
not of the nature.
24 Also, a relation is the per se form of the operator and the per
se entity of the agent, and with this, is a determinative principle.
Therefore the eliciting principle has a twofold role to play as a
principle of generation or production; the first role is that it is the
principle of operation,4 and in that instant it does not have the
character of being the principle 'by which' the production takes
place, but it must be a kind of intermediate between the principle
'by which' and the action itself or production, and in one way it
precedes the essence5 and in the other6 it follows.
25 This opinion is clarified through something like it in a
creature, because in creatures a relation has the character of an
active potency and something that determines, as is evident from
the potencies of the soul, and the like.
26 But I do not believe that in natural active potencies an
approximation or a relation is a determining principle 'by which',
but [they are] in the potencies of animals or sensitive things, if
these [potencies] are passive, whence the latter can terminate in,
or be determined through a relation.
27 1 say, therefore, that a relation is not the determinative

principle 'by which' and reply to the question. When the question
is asked about the potency of generating I make a distinction
about a potency: for in one way potency is a difference of being in
contrast to act, and such a thing must not be postulated in the
divine. Neither must one seek for what is called metaphysical
potency; for the potency of procreating in this way is not
distinguished from act, because that procreation is necessary.
28 What remains, therefore, is potency that is potency as a
principle, and not as it is logical potency, but as it is a principle
4 It is the subject that acts, and a principium quod.

5 That is as the individual thing or person that acts.
0 That is as a subject actually producing, the producing person requires the
essence and hence follows or presupposes the essence.
quod hoc nomen 'potentia', ut est principium quo, est nomen

concretum quodammodo et quodammodo abstractum. Quanto
autem aliquid magis concernit plura de ratione sua, tanto plures
potest habere abstractiones; unde in substantia non est nisi una
abstractio, scilicet quiditatis a supposito. In accidentibus
absolutis, quia concernunt substantiam alterius naturae, ut
albedo lignum, est abstractio non solum quiditatis a supposito,
sed etiam accidentis a subiecto. Sed relativa addunt tertiam
abstractionem, scilicet a fundamento; relatio enim ut paternitas
concernit aliquid ut obiectum, scilicet Filium; et aliquid ut
subiectum; et aliquid ut fundamentum. Similiter est hic de
potentia quae est concretum. Ideo necessario concernit plura,
scilicet subiectum potens, ut potentia calefaciendi respicit ignem
ut subiectum, et est concretum respectu fundamenti, scilicet
caloris; secundo est calor qui est potentia; tertio ut principium
actionis; quarto abstrahitur ad proprium genus potentialitatis ut
haec potentialitas; ultimo abstrahitur ab hac potentialitate
potentialitas in universali ut quiditas a supposito. Sic igitur
concreta possunt accipi pro hoc quod per se significant vel pro illo
quod denominant, sive pro quo supponunt.
29 Si ergo quaestio quaerat de significato vocabuli, significat
potentia idem quod potentialitas et est relatio sicut album
significat albedinem, et sic nulla est quaestio, nec aliquis intendit
hic inquirere. Quaeritur ergo de proximo fundamento huiusmodi
relationis vel generationis, in quo fundatur potentialitas. Et de
hoc dico quod relatio in divinis non est proximum fundamentum
relationis praecise eiusdem ut eiusdem, sicut iste videtur dicere.
30 De generare et de paternitate eadem dico: relatio non potest
esse ratio fundandi aliqua distincta. Vel sic formatur ratio ista: si
relatio in Patre est per se potentia vel principium quo respectu
'by which' and it is active. I say, therefore, that this word

'potency'as it is a principle 'by which'is at times a concrete
term and at times an abstract term. But the more things
something consolidates in itself by its nature [as something
concrete], the more abstract notions one can draw from it; hence
in substance there is but one abstraction, namely of the quiddity*
from the individual subject or person. In accidents that are
absolutes, because they consolidate substance of another nature,
as whiteness [in respect to] wood, there is an abstraction not only
of quiddity from the individual subject, but also of accident from
the subject. But relative* things add a third abstraction, namely
from the foundation; for a relation like paternity concerns
something as an object, namely the son; and something as a
subject; and something as a foundation as well. It is similar here
with potency as a concrete term. Hence, it is necessary that it has
to do with several things, namely with the subject that is potent,
as the potency of heating has reference to fire as its subject, and
is concrete as regards its foundation, namely heat; secondly there
is heat that is a potency; third [there is heat] as a principle of
action; fourth one abstracts [it] according to the proper genus of
potentiality as 'this [sort of] potentiality'; finally one abstracts
from 'this [sort of] potentiality' potentiality in general, as quiddity
from the individual subject or person. In this way, therefore,
concrete terms can be taken for that which they signify per se or
for that which they name or for that for which they stand.
29 If therefore the question is asked about the signification of
the word, potency signifies the same thing as potentiality and is a
relation just as white signifies the same thing as whiteness, and
thus there is no question, nor need one inquire further here.
Therefore, the question is raised about the proximate foundation
of this relation or of generation, in which this potentiality is
based. And about this I say that a relation in the divine is not the
proximate foundation of precisely this or that relation, as that
person seems to say.
30 About 'to procreate' and about paternity I say the same: a
relation cannot be the basis for founding some things that are
distinct. Or the argument is formed in this way: if the relation in
the Father is per se potency or a principle 'by which' the Son is
productionis Filii, ergo Pater perfectior est Filio. Probatio

consequentiae: omne principium formale producendi aliquid
aequivoce est perfectius producto termino, et si sit productio
univoca, est aeque perfectum termino producto; sed paternitas
aequivoce est principium, quia Filius non convenit in paternitate
cum Patre.
31 Vel aliter potest formari probatio consequentiae sic: illa
forma quae est principium agendi est perfectior quam illa quae
non; sed filiatio non est principium producendi Filium nec
Spiritum Sanctum, ergo nec paternitas, quia si sic, esset
perfectior quam Filius, quod est falsum, quia aequalis perfectionis
sunt, si aliquam perfectionem dicunt.
32 Dico ergo quod absolutum aliquid est fundamentum
potentialitatis et non relatio. Prima ratio talis est: absolutum est
formalis terminus generationis, ergo absolutum est formale
principium eius. Probatio antecedentis: patuit distinctione 5 in
ratione contra opinionem Henrici diffuse. Probatio consequentiae:
in quacumque productione formale principium est aeque
perfectum vel perfectius cum termino producto; sed in divinis
nihil est aeque perfectum formaliter quod non est essentia; relatio
enim non est perfecta formaliter; ergo non potest esse principium
communicandi essentiam.
33 Item, illud quod ponit perfectionem in principio productivo
non tollit ab aliquo quod sit principium productivum, si sibi
conveniat; communicare autem se in identitate numerali et
adaequate est principium perfectionis in Patre producente; ergo
ista perfectio quae est communicare in identitate numerali non
tollit ab aliquo quin sit principium productivum. Probatio
minoris: multo perfectius est si aliquid communicaret se in
identitate numerali quam si in specifica, quia prima est
adaequata communicatio; unde ignis uno calore habet plures
calefactiones et hoc est imperfectionis in eo, quia non potest se
tantum communicare unica calefactione, sicut pluribus, quia non
adaequate communicat se.
produced, therefore the Father is more perfect than the Son.

Proof of the implication: every formal principle of producing
something equivocally is more perfect than the term produced,
and if the production is univocal,* it is as perfect as the term
produced; but paternity is an equivocal* principle, because the
Son does not agree in paternity with the Father.
31 Or one can formulate the proof of the implication in another
way thus: that form that is the principle of acting is more perfect
than that which is not; but filiation is not a principle of producing
the Son nor the Holy Spirit, therefore neither is paternity,
because if it were, it would be more perfect than the Son, which is
false, because they are equal in perfection, if one can speak of
some perfection.
32 I say therefore that something absolute is the foundation of
the potentiality and not a relation. The first reason for this is: an
absolute is the formal term or result of generation; therefore an
absolute is its formal originating* principle. Proof of the
antecedent: it has been made clear in many ways in distinction
five in the argument against Henry's opinion. Proof of the
implication: in any production whatsoever the formal principle 'by
which' is equally perfect or more perfect than the term produced;
but in the divine nothing is equally perfect formally that is not
the essence; for a relation is not formally perfect; therefore it
cannot be the principle of communicating the essence.
33 Also, what posits perfection in a productive principle, if it is
appropriate to it, does not prevent it from being a productive
principle; but to communicate itself adequately and with
numerical identity is a principle of perfection in the Father
producing; therefore this perfection, which is to communicate
with numerical identity, does not prevent anything from being a
productive principle. Proof of the minor: it is much more perfect if
something were to communicate itself with numerical identity
than to communicate with identity proper to a species, because
the first is an adequate communication; it is a matter of
imperfection that fire can heat by one fire several things, since it
cannot communicate itself adequately by a single communication
[to a single thing] only, as it does by several, being unable to
communicate itself adequately.
34 Ulterius, isto probata, si ista communicatio in divinis fieret,

non in unitate numerali sed specifica, nec adaequate, tunc
dicerem quod Deus deitate produceret alium deum numero et
tertium et quartum etc., sicut ignis calore aliam et aliam
calefactionem. Ergo quando communicatur in identitate numerali
naturae et adaequate, multo perfectior erit productio et nihil erit
productivum nisi Deus est sic necessario aliquid absolutum.
35 Sed quod erit illud absolutum in divinis nisi essentia sub
ratione memoriae perfectae in Patre? Sic enim memoria est
primum principium et adaequatum respectu primae productionis
et non nisi unicum proximum et immediatum et formale
principium. Loquendo autem de potentia, quod est secundum
principale, non pro fundamento proximo praecise, sed pro
omnibus quae concurrunt cum ea ad exeundum in actum,
respondeo quod potentia isto duplici modo potest accipi: vel
praecise pro principio formali producendi, vel cum omnibus quae
concurrunt et conveniunt principio ad hoc ut statim agat. Cum
prima potentia stat impossibilitas ad agendum, sicut patet in
damnatis, qui licet habeant formale principium quo possent bene
velle, scilicet intellectum et voluntatem quae manent in eis
integra, non tamen possunt velle bene et gratiose, et ita licet
habeant potentiam, non tamen potentialitatem vel possibilitatem
ad agendum, quia non habent ea quae deberent concurrere ad
bene volendum cum tali principio formali.
36 Ita in proposito: essentia divina est principium formale
producendi aliquam personam et sufficienter sine quacumque
determinatione, sed non potest exire in actum nisi concurrente
personali proprietate. Et isto modo intelligendo principium
formale producendi aliquid, non discordat forte haec opinio a
priori in re, sed tantum in verbo, nam concedo quod relatio
concurrit cum essentia ad producendum Filium, non ut
34 Further, given this proof, if this [sort of] communication

i.e., one that is inadequate, and not according to numerical
identity, but specificwere to take place in the divine, then I
would say that God by deity would produce another God
numerically, and a third and a fourth, etc., just as the fire by its
heat produces another and another heating. Therefore, a
production will be much more perfect when it is communicated
adequately according to the numerical identity of nature, and
nothing will be produced in this way unless God is necessarily
something absolute.
35 But what will that absolute be in the divine except the
essence under the aspect of perfect memory* in the Father? For
in this way the memory is the first and adequate principle as
regards the first production and is the unique proximate,
immediate, and formal principle. But speaking about potency as a
second principle, not precisely as the proximate foundation, but
as including all that concurs with it in order to proceed to act, I
respond that potency can be taken in this twofold way: either
precisely as the formal principle of producing, or with all those
things that concur and pertain to the principle so that it may act
immediately. Incapacity to act can coexist with potency in the
first sense, as is evident in the damned, whothough they have
the formal principle whereby they can will correctly, namely,
intellect and will that remain integral in them,nevertheless
they cannot will properly and graciously. And though they may
have the potential, they lack the ability or capacity to act, because
they do not have that which should concur with such a formal
principle [for them] to will correctly.
36 And so it is in the case at hand: the divine essence is the
formal principle of producing some personmoreover, sufficiently
without any determinationbut it cannot proceed to function
unless the personal property concurs. And if the formal principle
of producing something is understood in this way, perhaps this
opinion is not at variance with the prior one in reality but only
verbally, for I concede that the relation concurs with the essence
to produce the Son, not to determine the essence which is
determined of itself, but in order that the latter may come to be in
determinet essentiam quae de se est determinata, sed ut fiat in

potentia propinqua ad agendum in qua non est nisi ut in
supposito et persona.
37 Istam distinctionem de potentia propinqua et remota ponit
Philosophus IX Metaphysicae,11 ubi dicit quod ad potentiam
propinquam requiritur omnia impedientia removeri: nullo
namque exteriori prohibente, non oportet addere ad potentias
irrationales etc., scilicet quantum ad illa quae dicta sunt in
definitione possibilis sive potentiae propinquae; et sic patet quod
in possibili includitur remotio omnium impedimentorum. Sicut
igitur in creaturis ad potentiam propinquam qua aliquod agens
agit vel producit requiritur dispositio passi, scilicet materiae, et
approximatio agentis debita et simpliciter impedimentorum
amotio per quam, si desit, non est potentia proxima, sic ad
propositum in divinis oportet dare aliquod suppositum conveniens
actioni per tale principium sive propinquam potentiam produ-
cendi.
38 Si quaeras igitur de potentia propinqua generandi, dico
quod erit includens quid absolutum et relativum et illud quo est
suppositum et non est ad se, quia tunc implicatur in eo proprietas
quae convenit actioni. Sed dices quod sic non erit unum quo sed
duo, scilicet remotum et propinquum; et remotum erit absolutum,
scilicet essentia, et aliud relativum; dico quod non est nisi unum
quo propinquum quod in se coimplicat utrumque de sua ratione
formali, et tale quo non est ad se, quia sic nihil produceret.
39 Ad primum,12 quando dicitur quod 'eo est Pater quo est ei

Filius; ergo eo est Pater quo generat', dico quod ablativus
constructus cum verbo activo, ut hic 'quo generat', significat
11 Aristot., Metaph. IX (0), c. 5 (1048a 7-21).

12 Cf. supra n. 1.
proximate potency* for acting, in which it can only be insofar as it

is in an individual subject and person.
37 The Philosopher posits this distinction between a proximate
and remote potency in Bk. IX of the Metaphysics, where he says
that a proximate principle requires that all impediments be
removed: for nothing external preventing it' need not be added to
non-rational potencies, etc., namely taking into consideration
those [things] that are stated in the definition of 'possible' or of a
proximate potency; and so it is evident that the 'possible' includes
the removal of all impediments. Therefore, just as in creatures a
disposition of that which receives the act, namely the matter, is
required in addition to the proximate potency by which some
agent acts or produces, as well as a suitable approximation of the
agent and an unqualified removal of impediments (for if the latter
does not happen, the potency will not be proximate), so too in the
case at hand there must be in the divine some individual subject
or person appropriate for the action through such a principle or
proximate productive potency.
38 If you ask, therefore, about the proximate principle of
procreating, I say that it will include something absolute and
something relative, or that by which the individual subject or
person exists and not as an absolute, because then the property
that pertains to the action would be involved. But you may say
that this will not be one [principle] 'by which' but two, namely a
remote and a proximate one; and the remote will correspond to an
absolute, namely the essence, and the other [i.e., proximate] to
what is relative. I say that there is only one principle 'by which'
a proximate onethat contains both [the absolute and the
relative] in itself by virtue of its formal notion, and such 'by
which' is not ad se [i.e., absolute], because in this way it would
produce nothing.
39 To the first [n. 1] when it is said 'He is Father by virtue of

having the Son, therefore he is Father by virtue of procreating,' I
say that the ablative construction with the active verbal form, as
principium formale agendi, sed ablativus constructus cum

adiectivis, sicut 'album albedine', significat formale principium
essendi. Exponenda igitur est propositio Augustini 'eo est Pater'
formaliter in genere relationis quo formaliter est ei Filius, id est
quo respicit Filium in ratione correlativi, et hoc idem est dictu
quod Pater paternitate est Pater, sicut album albedine, sed non
sequitur ultra 'ergo paternitate generat', quia ex principio formali
essendi infers aliud principium quo, scilicet agendi, id est
generandi.
40 Ad aliud,13 quando dicitur quod actus vel actio propria est a
propria forma, dico quod forma propria est dupliciter: uno modo
quia non potest communicari vel haberi eadem numero ab aliis,
sicut in creaturis quodlibet individuum habet propriam formam;
alio modo dicitur propria, quia est in uno solo, tamen de se
communicabilis. Et per oppositum commune dicitur dupliciter
correspondens duplici proprio vel singularitati formae: quoddam
enim est commune secundum rationem ut universale quod est in
creaturis; et quoddam commune reale, scilicet essentia in divinis,
secundum Damascenum. Ad propositum: ubi est commune et
proprium, id est universale et singulare, tunc propositio habet
veritatem quod propria actio est a propria forma, et sic loquitur
Philosophus ibi quod proprii effectus est causa propria et
communis effectus causa universalis proportionata. Ubi autem
est commune communitate reali et idem numero, ibi non oportet
quod si principium est commune, quod actio vel productio sit
communis, quia principium quo potest esse commune et tamen
cum aliquibus condicionibus quae tollunt rationem principii quo
sive potentiae propinquae, et sic non potest agere.
13 Cf. supra n. 2.
'by virtue of procreating'7 in this case, signifies the formal

principle of acting, but the ablative construction with the
adjective, such as 'white by whiteness,' signifies the formal
principle of being. Therefore, the proposition of Augustine 'He is
Father by virtue of must be explained formally in the light of the
category of relation, by virtue of which formally 'he has the Son,'
that is, by virtue of which he relates to the Son as to a correlative,
and this is the same as saying that the Father is Father by
paternity,' [i.e., it falls into the same category as the phrase]
'white [is white] by whiteness.' It does not follow further,
however, 'therefore by paternity he procreates,' because from the
formal principle of being you infer another principle 'by which,'
namely of acting, that is of procreating.
40 To the other [n. 2], when it is said that act or proper action
is from a proper form, I say that a proper form is twofold: in one
way because it cannot be communicated or be shared by others,
remaining numerically identical, as in creature each individual
has a proper form; in another way something is said to be proper,
because it is only in one, and nevertheless it is communicable* of
itself. And, correspondingly, its opposite, or something common,
has two meanings corresponding to the two meanings of 'proper1
or the singularity* of the form: for there is something common
conceptually as a universal, which is in creatures; and something
common really, as the essence in the divine according to
Damascene. To the case at hand: where there is common and
proper, that is universal and singular, then the proposition is true
that a proper action is from a proper form, and the Philosopher
speaks in this way there that the proper effect is by a proper
cause, and a common effect by a proportionate universal cause.
But where something is common by a real commonness and
identical numerically, there it is not necessary, if the principle is
common, that the action or production be common, because the
principle 'by which' can be common, and nevertheless with some
conditions, which destroy the character of a principle 'by which' or
of a proximate principle, and so it cannot act.
7 The phrase has been adjusted to follow the English, rather than the Latin
grammar; the argument is more clear in the Latin.
41 Ad consequentiam14 de forma quae dat esse, ergo et agere,

dico quod falsum est, quia filiatio dat esse et non agere; nec
relatio nec quantitas dat agere et tamen dant aliquod esse; credo
enim quod solae formae substantiales et aliquae qualitates sunt
activae.
42 Ad aliud,15 quando dicitur quod potentia et actus sunt in
eodem genere, dico quod illa propositio est vera de potentia
cuiuscumque generis opposita actui, sed non sic est de potentia
generandi in divinis, quia non est opposita actui sed semper
coniuncta actui, ut dictum est.
43 Ad aliud,16 quando dicitur quod medium est in eodem genere
cum extremis, dicendum quod medium dicitur dupliciter: vel quia
compositum ex extremis participans aliquid de natura
extremorum, et de hoc loquitur Philosophus X Metaphysicae, quod
est in eodem genere cum extremis; aliud est medium secundum
acceptionem nostram, scilicet secundum quod est propinquius uni
extremo, ut actio est medium inter potentiam et obiectum, et de
hoc medio est falsa propositio; essentia enim angeli est potentia in
genere substantiae et actus in genere actionis, et sic in proposito
accipitur medium secundum metaphoram.
44 Aliter respondetur ad minorem quod principium quo non est
medium, sed tenet se ex parte alterius extremi, scilicet generantis
quo generans generat; si autem accipitur medium proprie, id est
generatio, vel spiratio, illa sunt eiusdem generis, id est relationis.
[IV. Ad argumenta alterius opinionis]
45 Ad primum argumentum alterius opinionis17 quando dicitur

'si per se est, per se potest agere', dicendum quod licet ratio sit
facta contra positionem illam, tamen quia contra me est, ideo dico
quod haec propositio est vera de illa forma quae sufficienter est
principium elicitivum alicuius productionis vel actionis vel
factionis terminatae ad distinctum ut distinctum, aliter non est
vera. Omnis enim productio vel actio vel factio in quantum
M Cf. supra n. 2.
15 Cf. supra n. 4.
"i Cf. supra n. 3.
17 Cf. supra n. 9.
41 To the inference [n. 2] about a form that gives being, and

therefore should give something the ability to act, I say that this
is false, because filiation gives being and not the ability to act;
neither a relation nor quantity* give that ability to act, and
nevertheless they give some being; for I believe that only
substantial forms and some qualities are active.
42 To the other [n. 4], when it is said that potency and act are
in the same category, I say that this proposition is true of the
potency of whatever genus that is opposed to [some] act, but it is
not so of the potency to procreate in the divine, because it is not
opposed to act but is always joined to act, as has been said.
43 To the other [n. 3], when it is said that the intermediate is
in the same genus as the extremes, it must be said that an
intermediate is twofold: either because a composite of the
extremes shares something of the nature of the extremes, and the
Philosopher is speaking about this in Bk. X of the Metaphysics,
that it is in the same genus with the extremes. [Or] the other is
intermediate according to the way we take it, namely, one that is
closer to one extreme, as action is intermediate between potency
and the object, and of this intermediate the proposition is false.
For the essence of an angel is a potency in the genus of substance
and act in the genus of action, and so in the case at hand the
intermediate is used as a metaphor.
44 Otherwise it is replied to the minor that the principle 'by
which' is not intermediate, but it is joined to one extreme, namely
to the one generating, and is that by which the one generating
generates; if however an intermediate is taken in its proper
sense, that is, generation or spiration,* they are of the same
genus, i.e., they are relations.
45 To the first argument of the other opinion [n. 9] when it is

said that 'if it exists per se, it can act per se,' it must be said that
although the argument is directed against that opinion,
nevertheless because it is against me as well, therefore I say that
this proposition is true of that form, which sufficiently functions
as an eliciting principle of some production or action or making
huiusmodi terminatur ad distinctum ut distinctum, eo quod nihil

facit vel producit aliquid nisi distinctum. Sic autem est minor
falsa, quia essentia divina non est alicuius productionis
principium quo terminatur ad distinctum ad intra nisi ut est in
persona.
46 Ad alias rationesi8 quae sunt contra opinantem, quia ipse
concedit praemissas quod forma non habet unitatem nisi rationis,
patebit in quaestione vel materia individuationis.
47 Ad aliudi9 de distinctivo et assimilativo, respondeo quod est
prius secundum consequentiam, et hoc quia communius, et est
prius secundum causalitatem, et hoc potest esse secundum
convertibilitatem. Ad propositum dico: principium prius est
distinctivum secundum consequentiam, sed non probas quod illud
principium quo sit formale, immo oppositum: quod enim generatio
sit prius distinctiva, hoc est imperfectionis ratio, sed quod sit
assimilativa, hoc est posterius et ideo ratio perfectionis; ergo
secundum illud quod est perfectionis debet assignari principium
quo formale generationis et non secundum illud quod est
imperfectius.
48 Ad aliud, quantum ad instantiam de calore et de anima in
nutrimento vel augmento, potest dici quod sunt ibi duo principia
subordinata ad producendum unum effectum; coagit enim calor
ad vegetationem vel productionem carnis.
49 Ad illam instantiam de bruto,20 quae forma sit principium
generandi in bruto, vel sensitiva vel vegetativa, de hoc poterit dici
in secundo libro.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum Filius in divinis posset generare]
50 Utrum Filius in divinis posset generare.
IH Cf. supra n. 10-11.

i3 Cf. supra n. 12.
m Cf. supra n. 13.
that terminates with something distinct as distinct; otherwise it

is not true. For every production or action or making as such
terminates with something distinct as distinct, in so far as
nothing makes or produces something unless it is distinct from it.
In this way, however, the minor is false, because the divine
essence is not the principle 'by which' of some production, by
which the latter terminates with something distinct internally,
except qua [the divine essence] is in a person.
46 To the other reasons [n. 10-11] that are against the one
proposing them, because he concedes the premise that the form
does not have unity except conceptually, [the reply] will be
evident in the question or the matter of individuation.
47 To the other [n. 12], about what is distinctive and
assimilative, I respond that there is priority of succession, in
which case [what is prior] is what is more common, and there is
priority of causality, when [something] can be [prior] according to
convertibility. To what is proposed I say: a principle is primarily
distinctive according to the priority of succession [i.e., according
to what follows from it], but you do not prove that this principle
'by which' is formal, indeed [you prove] the opposite. For the fact
that procreation is first distinctive, that is a matter of
imperfection, but that it is assimilative this is posterior and
therefore a matter of perfection; therefore one should assign the
formal principle 'by which' of procreation according to that which
is a matter of perfection and not according to that which is less
perfect.
48 To the other, about the objection about heat and the soul in
nourishment and growing, it can be said that there are two
subordinate principles to produce one effect; for heat cooperates
for growing and the production of flesh.
49 To that objection about beast [n. 13], i.e., as to which form is
a principle of generation in the beast, either sensitive or
vegetative, this will be discussed in the second book.
Question Two
Could the Son in the divine procreate?
50 Could the Son in the divine procreate?

Videtur quod sic:

Ad Hebraeos I, 3 loquens de Filio ait: "Portans omnia verbo
virtutis suae"; habet ergo Filius verbum, sed verbum non est sine
generatione, ergo etc.
51 Item, Augustinus, Contra Maximinum,21 et ponitur in
littera: Filius non genuit, non quia non potuit, sed quia non
oportuit. Hic sunt duae negationes quae aequipollent affirma-
tioni, ergo Filius potuit generare.
52 Item, filius in creaturis potest generare, quia habet naturam
aeque perfectam cum generante et hoc est perfectionis in eo; sed
quidquid perfectionis est in filio creato eminentius competit Filio
Dei; ergo etc.
53 Contra:
"In sempiternis non differt esse et posse", III Physicorum:22
si ergo Filius in divinis potest generare, ergo generat, et sic sunt
ibi plures quam tres personae; consequens falsum, ergo et
antecedens.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
54 Respondeo quod haec propositio est impossibilis, sive flat

sermo de potentia logica quae dicit modum compositionis
extremorum et non repugnantiam eorum (ut sit sensus: hoc est
impossibile 'Filius potest generare', quia termini repugnant), sive
fiat sermo de potentia et principio reali, quia Filius Dei non habet
principium ad istum actum realem, licet habeat potentiam ad
alium actum realem, puta ad producendum Spiritum Sanctum.
55 Hoc probo sic: si Filius habet potentiam generandi, aut
igitur eadem generatione qua Pater generat, aut alia. Non eadem;
quia si sic, Filius generaret se sicut Pater generat ipsum. Nec alia
generatione, quia productio unius rationis tantum est unica in
Deo, eo quod quaelibet est de se hoc, ut supra probatum est
August., Contra Maximinum II, c. 12, n. 3 (PL 42, 768).

11 Les Auctoritates Aristotelis n. 103 (ed. J. Hamesse, 148); Cf. Aristot.,
Physica III, c. 6 (206a 14-21).
It seems he could:
In Hebrews 1:3, speaking of the Son he says: 'sustaining all
things by his mighty word'; therefore the Son has the word, but
the word does not exist without procreation; therefore, etc.
51 Also, according to Augustine Against Maximin, and it is
cited in the text: "The Son does not procreate, not because he
could not, but because it had not been necessary." Here there are
two negations that are equivalent to an affirmation; therefore the
Son could have procreated.
52 Also, the son in creatures can procreate, because he has a
nature that is equally perfect to the one procreating and this is a
matter of perfection in him; but whatever is a matter of perfection
in a created son, pertains even more eminently* to the Son of
God; therefore etc.
53 To the contrary:
"In eternal things what can be, is" (Bk. IIl of the Physics); if
therefore the Son in the divine can procreate, then he does
procreate and so there are more than three persons there; the
consequent is false, therefore so is the antecedent.
To the Question
54 I respond that this proposition is impossible, [i] whether one

speaks of logical possibility, which asserts a mode of composition
of the extremes and their lack of repugnance, in this sense: this is
impossible 'The Son can procreate,' because the terms are
repugnant; or [ii] whether one speaks of potency as a real
principle, because the Son does not have a principle for this real
act, although he has potency for other real acts, for instance,
producing the Holy Spirit.
55 I prove that in this way: if the Son had the potency to
procreate, either he would procreate by the same generation as
the Father does, or by another. Not by the same; for if he did, the
Son would procreate himself, just as the Father generates him.
Not by another generation, because there is no more than one
production of a given sort in God because each is of itself just this,
as was proved above in distinction two,8 and also each production
8 Cf. supra, Rep. I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 191-194.

distinctione 2, et etiam quaelibet productio adaequata est suo

principio productive); ergo nullo modo habet Filius potentiam
generandi.
[A. Tria dubia:

1. Primum dubium: Quare suppositum perfectum non
potest agere]
56 Hic videntur tria dubia; primo quare suppositum perfectum

habens principium perfectum agendi non impeditum nec exigens
passum non potest illo agere, si omnia huiusmodi impedimenta
tollantur, et cum Filius habeat istud principium, scilicet
memoriam perfectam modo supra exposito, non impeditum nec
requirens passum, quare ergo non potest generare?
[2. Responsio ad primum dubium]
57 Responsio: ista differunt 'forma eiusdem rationis est

principium actionis eiusdem rationis' et 'forma eiusdem rationis
in quolibet est principium actionis eiusdem rationis in quolibet',
quia prima propositio est vera nisi forma fuerit forma imperfecta
cum conveniat formae secundum se, et habetur a Philosopho, V
Metaphysicae de causis.23 Secunda propositio in creaturis sequitur
ex prima, quia nulla forma eiusdem rationis est in duobus
suppositis; sed posito per impossible quod aliqua una forma
unius rationis in creaturis esset in pluribus suppositis, ita quod
eadem numero esset adaequate communicata ab alio, tunc falsa
esset in creaturis illa secunda propositio. Ut si calor qui est in
igne communicaret se eundem numero ligno et communicatione
adaequata, ita quod iste calor non posset esse principium alterius
calefactionis, certe tunc esset impossibile lignum calefacere
aliquid aliud, cum tamen habeat calorem qui est principium
calefactionis: non se, quia accipit esse eo quod accipit calorem
13 Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 2 (1013a 24-1014a 25).

is suited precisely to its productive principle; therefore in no way

does the Son have the potency of procreating.
Three doubts
First doubt: Why cannot a perfect individual subject
or person act?
56 Here there seem to be three doubtful matters; first, why

cannot a perfect individual subject or person act by means of a
perfect principle of acting, unimpeded and requiring no passive
principle, if [this person] possesses it and if all impediments of
this sort are removed? Moreover, since the Son has this principle,
namely a perfect memory in the way explained above, that is not
impeded and needs nothing passive, why then can he not
procreate?
Response to the first doubt
57 Response: these two statements differ: 'a form of the same

sort is a principle of the same sort of acting' and 'a form of the
same sort in anything is a principle of the same sort of acting in
anything.' Indeed, the first proposition is true unless the form in
question is imperfect, and [only] pertains to a self-sustained form,
as described by the Philosopher in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,
section about causes. The second proposition as regards creatures
follows from the first, because no [one] form of the same sort is in
two individuals; but if one supposes the impossible, that some one
form of one kind in creatures were in several individuals, so that
the numerically same [form] were adequately communicated by
another, then this second proposition would be false as regards
creatures. E.g., if heat that is in fire were to communicate itself as
numerically the same to wood by an adequate communication, so
that this heat could not be a principle of another heating,
certainly then it would be impossible for wood to heat something
else,9 although it would still have heat, which is a principle of
heating. It would not [heat] itself, because it receives being or
;l That is, it could not do so by the heat that gave it existence, because that
had been exhausted in giving it being.
calefactione quae est ab hoc calore; non aliud, quia ista calefactio
ligni ponitur adaequata illi calori in ratione principii activi.
58 Eodem modo in proposito, etsi Filius habeat essentiam quae
est principium productivum Filii, non tamen potest illo producere,
quia praeintelligitur in Patre habere terminum adaequatum illi
productioni, et ideo in Filio non potest esse principium
productionis eiusdem rationis, quia tunc non fuisset adaequata
principio in Patre.
[B. Secunda dubitatio:

1. An in Filio sit potentia generandi]
59 Secunda dubitatio est ista: an in Filio sit potentia generandi.

Et quod sic, videtur, quia in praedicatione praecisa cui repugnat
subiectum, et praedicatum; sed haec est praedicatio praecisa
'essentia est potentia generandi', quia est principium formale
generationis, ut dictum est; ergo cum essentia sit in Filio, si Filio
repugnaret potentia generandi, et essentia ei repugnabit.
[2. Responsio ad secundam dubitationem]
60 Responsio: dico quod haec absolute est falsa 'Filius habet

potentiam generandi', nec est distinguenda secundum compositi-
onem et divisionem, quia tunc nullus sermo talis esset
determinate verus vel falsus, ut 'album habet potentiam
disgregandi et calidum calefaciendi'.
existence through the fact that it receives heat by a heating that

is from this heat; nor would it [heat] some other thing, because
that heating of the wood is posited as adequate to that heat in the
sense of an active principle.
58 And in the same way in the case at hand, although the Son
has essence which is the principle of producing the Son, he
cannot, however, produce by that [principle], because it is
understood before, in the Father, to have a term adequate to that
production, and therefore in the Son it cannot be the principle of
a production of the same sort, because then [the production]
would not have been adequate to the principle in the Father.
Second doubt: Is there a potency to procreate in the Son?10
59 A second doubt is this: is there a potential to procreate in

the Son? And it seems that there is, because in a precise
predication if something is repugnant to the subject, it is also
repugnant to the predicate; but this 'the essence is the potency to
procreate' is a precise predication, because [the essence] is the
formal principle of generation, as has been said; therefore, if the
Son were repugnant to the potency to generate, he would also be
repugnant to the essence, [which is not true,] since the essence is
in the Son.11
Response to the second doubt
60 Response: I say that this is false in an absolute sense: 'The

Son has the potency to procreate,' nor must there be a distinction
made according to composition* and division,* because then no
such statement would be determinately true or false, as 'white
has the potency to dilate12 and heat to heat.'
10 As the following argument shows, what is at stake here is a subtle

grammatical distinction, e.g., between 'can generate' and 'has a potency to
generate,' which cannot be adequately expressed in English. Hence the argument
makes more sense in the Latin.
1 1 The grammar and sentence structure have been adjusted for clarity.
] z According to the Aristotelian theory of the transmission of color, white has
the property of dilating the medium and black of contracting it.
61 Cuius probatio est: quia quando aliqua forma nata est

haberi formaliter, quidquid significat eam in abstracto, signi-
ficatur ab illo haberi formaliter et non per identitatem tantum, ut
cum dicitur 'paries habet albedinem' vel 'albedo inest parieti'.
Ergo cum potentia sit forma nata haberi formaliter a principio
agente, si significetur in abstracto, denotatur formaliter haberi ab
illo, et ita formaliter denotatur haberi a Filio, si sibi denotetur
convenire in abstracto. Sed quando gerundivum construitur cum
principio activo, ut potentia et huiusmodi, quod denotatur ab
aliquo haberi formaliter, significat actum posse egredi ab eodem
supposito a quo talis forma habetur formaliter. Actus generandi
non potest egredi a Filio, ut prius probatum est, ergo haec est
falsa 'Filius habet potentiam generandi'. Et propter hoc etiam non
conceditur ista: 'Filius habet scientiam generandi vel creandi vel
voluntatem generandi', sicut ista conceditur: 'iste Filius scit
generationem, scit creationem'. Iungantur igitur ista simul: cum
dicitur 'Filius habet potentiam generandi' significatur potentia
formaliter convenire Filio et haberi formaliter ab illo. Hoc per
primum. Et per secundum habetur, quia gerundivum construc-
tum cum forma alicuius suppositi significat actum ut potentem
egredi ab eodem supposito. Ergo sic est falsa propositio haec:
'Filius habet potentiam generandi' et haec videtur esse intentio
unius antiqui doctoris24 in dubitatione quinta litterali, et etiam
intentio Magistri in littera.
62 Ad rationem ergo istius dubitationis dicendum est quod haec
non est praecisa 'essentia est principium generandi'. Immo est
21 Bonaventura, Sent. I, d 7, dub. 5 (I, 145o6).

61 The proof is this: because when some form is suited by

nature to be possessed formally, whatever signifies that [form] in
the abstract, signifies that this form is possessed formally, and
[this is the case] not only [when signification is made] by way of
identity,* as when it is stated 'a wall has whiteness' or 'whiteness
is in the wall.' Hence, since potency is a form suited by nature to
be possessed formally by an acting principle, if it is signified in
the abstract, it indicates that [the active principle] formally has
it. And thus it indicates that the Son formally has it, if it is
denoted that it pertains to him in the abstract. But when the
infinitive13 is construed with [a word denoting] an active
principle, such as 'potency' and the like, which [i.e., the principle]
is denoted to be possessed formally by something, it signifies that
an act could issue from that individual subject or person that
formally possesses such a form. An act of procreation cannot issue
from the Son, as proved earlier; therefore this is false 'the Son has
the potency to procreate.' And because of this also the following is
not conceded, 'The Son possesses knowledge [i.e., know-how] of
generating or creating or has the will to procreate,' just as this is
conceded: 'This Son knows [i.e., is aware of] generation, knows
creation.' Therefore, let these [two types of] statements be
considered together: when it is stated 'The Son has the potency to
procreate' this signifies that potency pertains formally to the Son
and is possessed by him formally. This is according to the first
[type].14 The second [type]15 also signifies possession, because the
infinitive construction with the form of some individual subject or
person signifies the act as capable of issuing from the same
individual subject or person. Thus this proposition, then, is false:
'The Son has the potency to procreate,' and this seems to be the
intention of one ancient doctor (Bonaventure) in the fifth doubt in
his account, and also that of the Master cited in his text.
62 Therefore, as for the argument for this doubt, it must be
said that this is not a precise expression: 'the essence is the
,S 'Infinitive' that matches the English construction 'potency to procreate'

has been substituted, throughout this paragraph, for 'gerund' in the Latin that
matches the Latin construction potetitia generandi ('power ofprocreating).
14 That is, 'if form is signified in the abstract, it indicates formal possession.'
15 That is, 'when the gerundive is construed with [a word denoting] an active
principle, it indicates that an act can issue from a principle or potency.'
truncata nisi sic determinetur: 'essentia est huic, scilicet Patri,

principium generandi'; ergo non sequitur 'In Filio erit potentia
generandi', immo est fallacia accidentis. Nam essentia est in Filio
sub illa ratione sub qua repugnat sibi minor extremitas et
potentia generandi, ut ostensum est.
[C. Tertia dubitatio:

1. Quomodo Filius non potest generare?]
63 Tertia dubitatio: quomodo Filius non potest generare? Nam

in quocumque est generatio activa, potest generare; in Filio est
formaliter potentia activa; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia in
quocumque est aliqua forma potest dici tale, illa forma, ut illud in
quo est albedo, potest dici album. Minor patet, quia generatio
actio non est immanens actus sed transiens, quia quando est
actus immanens, tunc actio et terminus actionis sunt in eodem
agente formaliter. Filius autem non est sic in Patre, quia tunc non
essent distinctae personae, licet sit in eo per circumincessionem.
Ergo generatio actio est transiens, talis autem est in eo in quo est
terminus; ergo etc.
[2. Responsio ad tertiam dubitationem]
64 Responsio: generatio actio non est in Filio, quod ostendo

dupliciter. Primo sic: oppositae relationes originis non sunt in
eodem supposito, quia nihil originatur nec producitur a se; sed
generatio actio et generatio passio sunt huiusmodi, sicut Pater et
principle of generation.' Indeed it is a truncated version unless it

is specified 'the essence is the principle of procreating for this one,
that is, the Father'; therefore it does not follow that there will be
a potency to generate in the Son, indeed that is a fallacy of
accident. For the essence is in the Son under such an aspect,
under which the minor extreme, the potency to generate, is
repugnant to him, as has been shown.
Third doubt: How can the Son not generate?
63 The third doubt: How can the Son not procreate? For in
whatever there is an active procreation, that can procreate; in the
Son there is formally an active potency; therefore etc. The major
premise is evident, because in whatever there is some form, it can
be said to be such by virtue of that form, as that in which there is
whiteness, can be said to be white. The minor is evident, because
the procreation-action is not an immanent act* [i.e., the one that
remains inside] but transient* [i.e., the one that crosses over or
transcends the agent], for when an act is immanent, then the
action and the term of the action are formally in the same agent.
But the Son is not in the Father in this way, because then they
would not be distinct persons, although [the Son] is in him
through circumincession.16 Therefore the generation-action is
transient, but such [action] is [also] in him who represents [its]
term.17 Therefore, etc.
Response to the third doubt
64 Response: generation-action is not in the Son, which I show

in two ways. The first in this way: opposed relations* of origin*
are not in the same individual subject or person, because nothing
originates from, or produces itself; but generation, as action,18
and generation, as a receptivity,19 are such, as Father and Son;
16 A technical theological term to describe how one and the same divine
essence is shared by three really distinct individual persons.
17 A transient action is in the patient according to the maxim actio est in
passo.
18 That is, generation as an activity.
19 That is, receiving generation or the result of generation.
Filius; ergo non sunt in eodem. Sed generatio passio est in Filio,
ergo non generatio actio.
65 Item, secundo sic: generatio actio vel est idem paternitati,
quod verius credo, et differt tantum appellatione; vel si non est
eadem sibi, saltem est proxima ratio fundandi paternitatem, quia
licet relatio non sit fundamentum relationis realis, potest esse
tamen proxima ratio fundandi relationem. Si primo modo,
habetur propositum quod generatio actio sit in Patre et non in
Filio; si secundo modo, adhuc habetur propositum, quia aliter non
esset ratio proxima fundandi paternitatem.
66 Ad argumentum in oppositum,25 dico quod actio immanens
in creaturis et eius terminus habent idem pro agente et pro
recipiente; sed actio ibi transiens et eius terminus habent aliud
ab agente, scilicet quod terminus talis actionis est in recipiente et
patiente et non in agente; nulla vero actio recipitur in suo
termino ita quod transeat in suum terminum, quia transiens
ponitur in mutabili, secundum communem opinionem, quae sit
eadem realiter motui qui est in mobili.
67 Quidquid sit secundum veritatem, in generatione Filii nulla
ponitur materia vel subiectum per cuius transmutationem Filius
generetur. Nullo ergo modo generatio actio est in Filio in divinis,
nec est extra agens, quia non est ibi materia nec subiectum
transmutabile, sed est actio immanens in Patre generante. Sed
non sequitur propter hoc quod eius terminus sit immanens ipsi
agenti vel generanti. Nam in creaturis actio immanens et eius
terminus sunt in eodem, quia ibi terminus vel termini actionum
sunt formae inhaerentes ipsi subiecto per cuius mutationem
inducuntur, et ideo sunt in eodem formaliter. Sic non est in
divinis, quia ibi generatio actio est ad terminum per se
subsistentem et non inhaerentem; et ideo non oportet quod
w Cf. supra n. 63.

therefore they are not in the same [person]. But generation as a

receptivity is in the Son, not generation as action.
65 Also, secondly in this way: generation as action is either the
same as paternity, which I believe more truly, and differs from it
only by name, or if they are not the same, at least it is the
proximate basis for paternity, because although a relation is not
the basis for a real relation,* it can be the proximate reason for
basing a relation. If it is in the first way,20 I have what I propose,
because generation as action is in the Father and not in the Son;
if it is in the second way,21 I still have what I propose, because
otherwise it could not be the proximate reason for basing
paternity.
66 To the argument for the opposite [n. 63], I say that in
creatures the agent and the recipient of the immanent actionas
well as of its termis the same thing; but [the recipient of] the
transient action thereas well as of its termis something
different from the agent, namely because the term of such an
action is in the recipient and patient* and not in the agent.
However, no action is received in its term in such a way that it
passes [entirely] into its term, because, according to the common
opinion, the transient [action], which is the same really as motion
in the mobile, is posited in the mutable.
67 Whatever be the truth of the matter, in the generation of
the Son there is no matter or subject posited through whose
transmutation the Son is procreated. Hence, in the divine
generation-action is not in the Son in any way, nor is it outside of
the agent, for there is no matter there nor is there a transmutable
subject, but it is an immanent action in the procreating Father. It
does not follow from this, however, that its term is immanent in
the agent or the generator. For in creatures the immanent action
and its term are in the same thing, because there the term or
terms of the actions are inherent forms in the subject itself
through whose mutation they are induced, and therefore they are
in the same thing formally. But this is not so in the divine,
because there generation-action is directed toward the term as
subsisting per se and not something inhering; and therefore there
Generation action is the same as paternity.

Generation action is the proximate basis for paternity.
generatio actio et eius terminus sint in eodem formaliter. Nec

sequitur ultra 'si terminus actionis est extra agentem et per se
subsistens, ergo est actio non immanens sed transiens', quia quod
terminus actionis transeuntis et ipsa actio sint in eodem in
creaturis, hoc ideo est quia huiusmodi actio requirit materiam in
qua recipitur; quod non contingit in proposito. Unde generatio
actio in divinis convenit cum actione immanente quia est in
generante, et convenit cum actione transeunte quia terminus eius
est per se subsistens extra agentem. Et ideo generatio actio nec
est formaliter immanens actio nec transiens quantum ad
condicionem actionis et termini in utraque actione.
68 Ad primum principale26 dicitur quod Filius portat omnia

verbo virtutis suae, id est imperio suo virtuoso; nec accipitur ibi
verbum notionaliter pro Verbo producto, sed essentialiter pro
imperio virtuoso quod convenit omnibus personis.
69 Ad secundum27 dicendum quod ibi accipitur negatio privans
quae non est in usu, ut si diceretur non quia impotuit' et non est
negatio infinitans. Et si arguitur quod ad negativam de
praedicato private sequitur negativa de praedicato infinite
sequitur enim 'homo non est iniustus, ergo non est non iustus'
dico quod non sequitur, quia non sequitur 'lapis non est caecus,
ergo non est non-videns', quae aequipollet huic: 'ergo est videns',
quae est falsa. Nam non sequitur 'lapis non est caecus, ergo est
videns', quia neutrum privativorum inest necessario nisi apto
26 Cf. supra n. 50.

r' Cf supra n. 51.
is no need for generation-action and its term to be in the same

thing formally. Nor does it follow further that if the term of the
action is outside of the agent and subsisting per se, therefore it is
not an immanent but a transient action. Because if the term of
the action as passing into [its recipient] and the action itself are
in the same thing in creatures, the reason for this is because such
action requires matter in which it is received, which does not
happen in the case at hand. Hence generation-action in the divine
can be classified as immanent action because it is in the one
generating, and can be classified as transient action because its
term is subsisting per se outside the agent. And therefore
generation-action is formally neither immanent action nor
transient action as regards the condition of both action and term
in each action.
68 To the first initial argument [n. 50] it is said that the Son
sustains all things 'by his mighty word,' that is, 'by his mighty
command.' Neither is 'word' taken notionally* there for the Word*
produced, but essentially for the command, which pertains to all
the persons.
69 To the second [n. 51], it must be said that the negation
employed there is taken as privative, which is not what is used
there, e.g., as in the case if it were stating: 'not because he has
been unable,' which is not a negation of an unlimited kind. And if
it is argued that the negative of an unlimited predicate [always]
follows from a negative of a privative predicate (for it follows
'man is not unjust, therefore, it is not that he is not just'), I say
that it does not follow, for this does not follow 'it is not the case
that a stone is blind, therefore it is not the case that it is not
seeing,' which is the equivalent to this, 'it is seeing,' which is
false. For it does not follow, 'a stone is not blind, therefore it is
seeing,' because neither of the privatives22 is necessarily
indwelling unless suited by nature to be there. This however is
true 'A stone is not seeing, therefore a stone is not blind,' because
11 That is, 'blind' and 'unseeing.'

nato. Haec tamen est vera 'lapis non est videns, ergo lapis non est
caecus', quia pura negativa potest dici tam de apto nato quam non
apto nato.
70 Ad tertium28 dico quod posse generare in filio creato est
perfectionis supplentis imperfectionem et quam concomitatur
necessario aliqua imperfectio, quia nulla creatura potest se ipsam
totam sufficienter communicare in uno supposito, neque ibidem
suum esse perpetuo vel continue conservare; ideo per gene-
rationem suppletur ista perfectio: quod communicatio uni
supposito in illo sit principium communicandi se alteri per ipsius
divisionem continuam et per novam ipsius generationem.
Opposita istarum condicionum sunt in Deo, sicut de se patet.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum generatio divina sit univoca vel aequivoca]
71 Utrum generatio divina sit univoca vel aequivoca.
Videtur quod sit aequivoca:

Quia paternitas et filiatio differunt specie vel sunt alterius
rationis, quia sunt duae quiditates relativae et non sicut duo
individua eiusdem quiditatis, et sic constituta per ea differunt
specie. Probatio consequentiae: tantum differunt constituta
quantum constitutiva; sed illa, ut dictum est, differunt specie;
ergo Pater et Filius, et per consequens non est generatio univoca
sed aequivoca.
72 Item, productiones, scilicet generatio et spiratio, sunt
alterius rationis, ergo et termini. Consequentia patet, quia
termini proportionantur productionibus; ergo quando Filius
spirat Spiritum Sanctum, erit aequivoca spiratio; et eodem modo
per consequens quando Pater generat Filium, generatio erit
aequivoca.
2H Cf. supra n. 52.

a pure negative can be predicated of something, no matter

whether it is or is not apt by nature [to contain this].
70 To the third [n. 52] I say that to be able to procreate in a
created son is a matter of perfection supplementing imperfection
and which some imperfection necessarily accompanies, because
no creature can communicate the whole of itself sufficiently in
one subject or person, nor can it conserve its being perpetually or
continually there; therefore this perfection is supplemented
through procreation: because [the process of] communicating to
one individual [in its turn] becomes in this [individual] a principle
of communicating itself to another through the continuous
division of itself and through a new generation of itself. The
opposite of these conditions are in God, as is evident of itself.
Question Three
Is divine procreation a univocal or an equivocal
production?
71 Is divine procreation a univocal or equivocal production?
It seems to be equivocal:
For paternity and filiation differ specifically or are of
different sorts, because they are two relative quiddities23 and are
not like two individuals of the same quiddity, and so things that
are constituted through them [also] differ specifically. Proof of the
implication: things that are constituted differ as much as what
constitutes them; but the latter, as has been said, differ
specifically; therefore Father and Son do also, and as a
consequence procreation is not univocal but equivocal.
72 Also, the productions, namely generation and spiration, are
of different sorts; therefore, their terms are also. The implication
is evident, because the terms are proportionate to the
productions; therefore when the Son spirates* the Holy Spirit, it
will be an equivocal spiration; and in the same way as a
consequence when the Father procreates the Son, procreation will
be equivocal.
23 The plural of 'quiddity.' The divine persons are said to be constituted

essentially by their opposite relationships, which are in the category of relation.
73 Item, differentia specifica perfectior est quam numeralis

sive individualis, quia species sunt de intentione naturae, non
individua; in divinis autem ponendum est quidquid est
perfectionis in entibus; ergo generatio terminatur ibi ad diversum
in specie, et sic aequivoca generatio.
74 Contra:
Augustinus, VI De Trinitate, ultimo,29 loquens de Filio qui
est imago Patris, dicit quod ista imago est omni modo similis
Patri; ergo eius generatio non est aequivoca, sed univoca omni
modo. Consequentia patet in generatione aequivoca.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
75 Responsio: dico quod est maxime et simpliciter univoca,

magis quam aliqua possit esse in creaturis.
76 Probatur hoc per duas rationes. Prima est ista: in supposito
generante est natura et proprietas individualis: aut igitur debet
attendi univocatio penes naturam ut distinguitur contra
proprietatem individualem, aut penes illam proprietatem; si
penes naturam, cum illa sit maxime una in generante et genito
quantum non est una aliqua natura in creaturis, quia haec
secundum unitatem numeralem in utroque est eadem, scilicet in
generante et genito, sequitur quod haec generatio maxime sit
univoca; si penes proprietatem individualem attendenda sit
univocatio generationis, nulla erit univocatio sive nulla generatio
erit univoca, quia omnes proprietates individuales tam in Deo
quam in creaturis sunt per se diversae, eo quod universaliter
omnia differentia ultima sunt primo diversa, X Metaphysicae,30
quia si in aliquo convenirent, non sunt ultimo diversa nec ultimae
differentiae; unde non tantum conveniunt differentiae ultimae
individuales quantum res diversorum generum, ut albedo et lapis,
quia ista conveniunt in aliquo ut in transcendente; illae autem in
nullo, quia tunc non essent ultimae; ergo secundum istas
proprietates individuales non est attendenda univocatio, quia
tunc nulla est univoca.
August., De Trin. VI, c. 10, n. 11 (CCSL 50. 241; PL 42, 931).

m Cf. Aristot., Metaph. X (I), c. 4 (1055a 4-20).
73 Also, a specific difference is more perfect than a numerical

or individual difference, because species are intended by nature,
and individual differences are not; in the divine, however, one
must posit what is of perfection in beings; therefore procreation
terminates there in something diverse in species, and so
procreation will be equivocal.
74 To the contrary:
Augustine in Bk. VI of The Trinity, last chapter, speaking of
the Son who is the image of the Father, says that this image is in
every way similar to the Father; therefore his procreation will not
be equivocal, but univocal in every way. The implication
regarding equivocal generation is evident.
To the Question
75 Response: I say that it is simply univocal in the highest

degree, more so than any [generation] can be in creatures.
76 Proof of this is based on two reasons. The first is this: in the
subject generating there is a nature and an individual property:
hence one must view this univocation either as referring to the
nature as distinguished from the individual property, or as
referring to that property. If one were to consider the nature,
since the latter [here] is maximally one in the generator and
generatedto a degree not found in any nature in creatures,
since it is numerically one in both, namely in the procreator and
procreatedit follows that this generation is maximally univocal.
If the univocation of procreation were viewed from the point of
view of the individual property, no procreation would be univocal,
because all individual properties both in God and in creatures are
diverse per se, because all ultimate differences universally are
primarily diverse, according to Bk. X of the Metaphysics. For if
they agreed in anything they would not be primarily diverse or
ultimate differences. Hence, ultimate individual differences do
not even agree as much as things of diverse genera, as whiteness
and stone, because these [still] agree in something, as in a
transcendental.* These, however, agree in nothing, because then
they would not be ultimate; therefore, univocation does not take
these individual properties into account, because then nothing
would be univocal.
77 Item, secundo sic: generatio est assimilativa et distinctiva:

primum habet a forma ut forma est, secundum habet a forma ut
est hoc; sed ratio formae simpliciter est perfectior ratione
huiusmodi ut huiusmodi sive singularitatis, quia ratio formae est
principium agendi sed singularitas, licet sit condicio agentis, non
est principium agendi; ergo illa generatio est nobilior cui magis
convenit ratio assimilativi quam distinctivi; sed generatio univoca
est huiusmodi, quia in divinis est perfectissima similitudo in
natura. Si enim attendenda esset univocatio penes distinctiva,
cum ratio distinctiva conveniat imperfectissimae generationi,
sequitur quod si generatio est aequivoca in divinis quod
conveniret cum imperfectissima et ita esset imperfecta, ergo etc.
78 Hoc etiam probatur ex parte termini, quia haec productio
habet terminum aeque perfectum cum producente: quod non
convenit generationi aequivocae. Haec autem generatio habet
nobilissimum modum communicandi; et ideo generatio divina est
univoca, nullo modo aequivoca.
79 Si vero dicas quod philosophi non dicerent istam
generationem esse univocam, respondeo: Certe, quia negarent
minorem, scilicet quod nulla est ibi generatio; sed si concederent
nobiscum antecedens, scilicet quod est ibi generatio in unitate
naturae eiusdem perfectissimae, concederent consequens quod
ista esset maxime univoca et sibi competeret omnis ratio
nobilitatis.
80 Hic tamen duo sunt intelligenda: primo quod differentia
ultima sunt primo diversa, sed distincta per ea nunquam sunt
primo diversa, sed sunt aliquid idem entia. Ergo non est tanta
diversitas in distinctis quanta in distinguentibus, quia
distinguentia non dant distinctis praecise illam diversitatem
absolute quam in se habent, sed dant constitutis talem
differentiam qualis potest consurgere ex natura illorum31 in qua
31 Add. 'et ex natura illorum' (vel 'verborum') omnes codd., sed ad sensum
potius delendum esse videtur.
77 Also, secondly in this way: generation is assimilative and

distinctive: it has the first characteristic from the form as form,
and it has the second from the form as it is 'this' [or individual];
but the notion of the form in an unqualified sense is more perfect
than the notion of such and such, or singularity, for the notion of
form is the principle of acting; but singularity, although it is a
condition of the agent, is not the principle of its acting; therefore,
that generation is more noble to which the assimilative aspect
pertains to a greater degree than the distinctive aspect. Univocal
generation, however, is such, because in the divine there is a most
perfect likeness in nature. But if the [question of] univocation
were raised as regards the distinctive, since the notion of the
distinctive pertains to the most imperfect generation, it follows
that if generation in the divine is equivocal, it would agree with
the most imperfect [type] and so would be imperfect; therefore
etc.
78 This also is proved on the part of the term, because this
production has a term equally perfect with the one producing:
which does not pertain to equivocal generation. This generation,
however, has the most noble mode of communicating; and
therefore divine generation is univocal and in no way equivocal.
79 If, however, you say that the philosophers would not call
this generation univocal, I respond: Certainly, because they
would deny the minor, namely, [by saying] that no generation
exists there; but if they would concede with us the antecedent
that generation is there in the unity and identity of the most
perfect nature, they would concede the consequent that this
would be most univocal and every aspect of nobility would belong
to it.
80 Here however two things must be kept in mind: first that
the ultimate differences are primarily diverse, but those things
that are made distinctive through them are never primarily
diverse, but they have something of identity. Therefore the
diversity in the distinct things themselves is not as great as the
one in what distinguishes them, because the distinguishing
features do not give to the distinct things precisely and in the
absolute sense that diversity that they themselves have. Rather
they give to what they constitute such a difference as can arise
sunt istae ultimae differentiae, sive quam constituunt; et ideo

huiusmodi distinctorum sic per tales differentias ultimas est
differentia vel distinctio media.
81 Secundo, est hic sciendum quod non est idem aliqua
distingui et habere repugnantiam, quia quae maxime distin-
guuntur quandoque nullam habent repugnantiam, ut albedo et
lapis maxime distant et tamen non repugnant. Magis enim
distingui aliqua est in paucioribus convenire, ut homo et albedo
sunt magis non idem entia sive non convenientia quam albedo et
nigredo, quae conveniunt in colore etc., et tamen magis sibi
repugnant albedo et nigredo, et homo et albedo magis
compatiuntur se. Tanta enim est repugnantia hominis et asini
quanto est rationalis et irrationalis, et tamen non est inter se
tanta distinctio, quia differentiae ultimae sunt primo distinctae.
Sic est in proposito: unde si comparentur constituta ad
distinguentia ut repugnant, sic sunt constituta; si autem
comparentur ut sunt distincta sive ut non conveniunt, sic non
conferunt constitutis.
82 Per hoc patet ad argumenta.

Ad primum,32 quando dicitur quod quidquid in divinis est
alterius rationis est alterius speciei, concedo; ergo distincta per
illa differunt specie, nego: non sequitur. Tu probas, quia tantum
differunt constituta quantum constituentia: falsum est, quia illa
non tribuunt distinctionem nisi sub unitate naturae in qua
exsistunt, et ideo non est tanta distinctio inter distincta nisi
accipiendo distinctionem pro incompossibilitate vel repugnantia;
12 Cf. supra n. 71.

from its own nature, in which these ultimate differences are, or

which they constitute; and therefore the difference or distinction
of such things that are distinct in this way through such ultimate
differences is [in fact] intermediate.
81 Secondly, it must be recognized here that for something to
be distinguished and to be repugnant is not the same thing,
because things that are maximally distinguished at times have no
repugnance, as whiteness and stone are maximally distant and
nevertheless are not opposed. Indeed, for some things to be more
distinguished means to agree in fewer things, as man and
whiteness are beings that are not the same to a greater degree, or
agree less than whiteness and blackness, which agree in color,
etc. and nevertheless whiteness and blackness are more opposed
to each other, and man and whiteness are more compatible with
one another. For there is as much repugnance between man and
ass as there is between rational and irrational, and nevertheless
there is not such a distinction between them, because it is their
ultimate differences that are primarily distinct. It is so in the case
at hand: hence if the constituted things are compared on the basis
of what distinguishes them insofar as the latter are repugnant, in
this way they remain constituted; if however they are compared
[on the basis of what distinguishes them] insofar as these are
distinct or less in agreement, in this way the latter do not
contribute anything to the constituted [qua constituted].
82 Through this [the answer] to the arguments is evident:

To the first [n. 71], when it is said that whatever in the
divine is of another sort is of another species, I concede.
[However,] that therefore, things made distinct through these
differ in species I deny. It does not follow. You prove it: because
constituted things differ as much as do the things that constitute
them. This is false, because those things [i.e., the differences] do
not contribute to the distinction except under [the condition of]
the unity of nature in which they exist, and therefore there is not
as much of a distinction between the distinct things unless you
take 'distinction' to be incompatibility or repugnance. But it has
sed ostensum est quod non sunt idem. Unde verum est quod
constituta tantum repugnant, sed non tantum sunt distincta sicut
sunt distinguentia vel constituentia.
83 Ad secundum,33 quando dicitur 'productiones sunt alterius
rationis, ergo et termini sive hypostases', non sequitur, quia
productiones sunt relationes fundatae in natura et non sunt
subsistentes, sed termini sunt per se subsistentes et distincti.
84 Ad probationem consequentiae, 'quia termini proportiona-
ntur productionibus' etc., respondeo quod illa proportio non est
ibi, scilicet distingui vel non distingui, quia maior distinctio est,
ut dictum est, inter productiones quam inter terminos, sed
accipienda est proportio, scilicet quod terminus accipiat esse ab
una sicut alius terminus ab alia. Sic enim Spiritus Sanctus
proportionaliter accipit esse per spirationem sicut Filius per
generationem.
85 Ad aliud,34 quando dicitur quod differentia specifica est
perfectior quam numeralis, dicendum quod verum est in
imperfectis sicut in creaturis, eo quod differentia specifica est
perfectio supplens imperfectionem; quia quaelibet species vel
differentia est finita; et sic in creaturis differentia specifica est
perfectionis concomitanter, quia per eam in diversis speciebus
suppletur imperfectio; sed si poneretur quod aliqua creatura sit
infinita, tunc illa sola differentia sufficeret. Sed in divinis nulla
est differentia vel perfectio supplens imperfectionem, sed tota est
perfectio et una numero perfecta nihil exspectans perfectionis ab
aliquo, eo quod de se haec; ergo etc.
33 Cf. supra n. 72.

M Cf. supra n. 73.
been shown that these are not the same thing. Hence, it is true
that the constituted are repugnant to the same degree [as what
constitutes them], but they are not as much distinct as are their
distinguishing or constituting features.
83 To the second [n. 72], when it is said that 'productions are of
another sort, therefore the terms or persons are also,' this does
not follow, because the productions are relations founded in the
nature and are not subsisting things, but the terms are per se
subsisting and distinct.
84 To the proof of the implication, 'because the terms are
proportionate, or correspond to the productions,' etc., I respond
that there is no correspondence in this area there, namely as
regards being distinguished or not being distinguished; for there
is a greater distinction between the productions, as has been said,
than there is between the terms; but [the following]
correspondence must be accepted, namely that one term receives
being from one, just as another term receives it from another. For
in this way the Holy Spirit correspondingly receives being
through spiration just as the Son does through generation.
85 To the other [n. 73], when it is said that a specific difference
is more perfect than a numerical one, it must be said that this is
true in imperfect things as in creatures, for the specific difference
is a perfection supplementing an imperfection; because each
species or difference is finite; and thus in creatures the specific
difference is a matter of perfection concomitantly, because
through it in diverse species imperfection is supplemented. But if
one were to assume that some creature is infinite, then that sole
difference would suffice. But in the divine there is no difference or
perfection supplementing for an imperfection, but there is total
perfection, perfect in numerical unity, expecting no perfection
from anything, for it is of itself just this; therefore etc.
[Distinctio 8
Pars I
De entitate Dei]
1 Circa distinctionem octavam, ubi videtur Magister ostendere

quod Deus verissime est, notandum est quod ex distinctione 2
huius, patet quod Deus verissime est et verissime est suum esse;
nam primum in quocumque genere verissime est; ergo primum in
tota natura entis est unum verissimum ens. Sed, ut probatum est
in distinctione 2, Deus est primum in entitate omni primitate,
quae non includit imperfectionem; ergo verissime est suum esse,
sicut vult Damascenus 9 cap:1 Deus verissime est ipsum esse
totum in se comprehendens tanquam pelagus substantiae
infinitae.
2 Ex hoc sequitur quoddam corollarium: quod intelligere non
est primo in Deo, sed primum dans esse est ipsum esse, tum quia
operatio non potest esse prima ratio essendi in aliquo, tum quia
intelligere praesupponit rationem obiecti et potentiae sicut per se
causas eius vel principia. Haec autem praesupponunt rationem
entis, quia nihil agit ut principium in quantum est non ens, et
ideo intelligere non est primo dans esse divinum.
3 Et si dicatur quod primum esse divinum est vivere, hoc

autem in Deo non est nisi intelligere et velle, ergo etc., respondeo
quod hic aequivocatur vivere; nam vivere uno modo significat
actum primum verbaliter, tamen neutraliter ut lucere nullum
significat agere; et sic vivere est idem quod vita. Unde isto modo
sumit Philosophus II De anima:2 "vivere viventibus est esse"; et
isto modo in divinis magis significat actum primum quam aliqua
ratio attributalis, quia illa essentia in esse primo habet vivere et
1 Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 9 0, c. 9] (ed. Buytaert, 49; PG 94, 835).

2 Cf. Aristot., De anima II, c. 2 (413a 23-7).
331
Distinction 8
Part I
On the entity1 of God
1 In regard to distinction eight, where the Master* seems to

show that God most truly is, it must be noted that from
distinction two of this work, it is evident that God most truly is
and most truly is his being [esse]; for the first in any genus most
truly is; therefore the first in the whole nature of being [entis] is
most truly one being [ens]. But, as is proved in distinction two,
God is first in entity [entitas] by every primacy, which does not
include imperfection; therefore he is in the most true sense his
being, as Damascene wishes to say in chapter 9: "God most truly
is, comprehending in himself the whole of his being, as a sea of
infinite substance."
2 From this a certain corollary follows: that to understand
does not have a primary position in God, but what primarily gives
being [esse] is being itself, both because an operation cannot be
the first reason for being in something, and because to
understand presupposes the notion of an object and a potency* as
its per se causes or as principles.* These, however, presuppose
the notion of being [ens], because nothing acts as a principle
inasmuch as it is non-being, and therefore to understand is not
what primarily gives being in the divine.
3 And if it be said that to be divine is primarily to live, but
this in God is nothing other than to understand and to will,
therefore, etc., I respond that here 'to live' is taken equivocally;
for 'to live' in one way signifies the first act2 in the form of a verb,
however, neutrally, as 'to light' signifies no acting; and in this
way to live is the same thing as life. Hence the Philosopher in Bk.
II of De anima takes this in the same sense: "to live in living
things is to be." And in this way in the divine it signifies the first
act in a greater degree than some attributable notion does,
1 Scotus takes being here as an entity and denies any composition in an

entity, whether in God or in creatures, as being some kind of composite of essence
and existence. See A. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function, in the
Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1946).
2 The first act is to be or exist; to operate is a second act and presupposes the
first.
331
idem omnino sic significat vivere et vita, licet primum significat

verbaliter et aliud nominaliter, sicut lux et lucere. Unde secun
dum Anselmum, Monologion:3 idem significat calor et calere.
4 Alio modo accipitur vivere pro actu secundo ut pro
operatione vitali, intelligendi scilicet et volendi, et isto modo
accipit Philosophus II De anima;4 et sic non dicit formaliter actum
primum, sed illum praesupponit; et in creaturis sunt accidentia,
non in Deo, sed tamen praesupponit essentiam, ut dupliciter
fecundam ad istos actus quasi secundos eliciendos; quare nullo
modo intelligere est prima ratio essendi in divinis.
[Pars II
De immutabilitate et simplicitate Dei
Quaestio 1
Utrum Deus sit mutabilis]
5 Utrum Deus sit mutabilis.
Videtur quod sic:

Deus habet habitudinem ad aliquid mutabile, ergo est
mutabilis. Antecedens patet, quia Deus est principium istorum
mutabilium. Consequentia probatur, quia mutato uno correlativo-
rum, mutatur illud quod habet necessariam habitudinem ad
ipsum; ergo etc.
6 Item, Deus habet proximam rationem causae efficientis ad
aliquid mutabile quod immediate est ab ipso, ergo aliter se habet
nunc quam prius, quia si eodem modo se haberet, non posset
assignari ratio quare nunc producit et non prius. Non enim causa
:l Anselmus, Monologion c. 56 (ed. F.S. Schmitt I, 67; PL 158, 203-4).

i Aristot.. De anima, ibid.
Dist. 8, Part I 332
because for that essence to live is primarily to be, and in this way
to live and life signify the same thing entirely, although the first
does so as a verb and the other as a noun, just as light and to
light. Hence, according to Anselm, in the Monologion: 'heat and to
heat signify the same thing.'
4 In another sense to live can be taken for a second act,* such
as a vital operation, namely of understanding and willing. And in
this way the Philosopher takes it in Bk. II of De anima; and in
this way it does not assert the first act formally,* but presupposes
it. And in creatures they3 are accidents, but not in God;
nevertheless it presupposes the essence,4 as doubly fecund
towards those acts [which are], as it were, to be elicited secondly;
wherefore in no way is to understand in the divine the first
reason for being.
Part II
On the immutability and simplicity of God
Question One
Is God mutable?
5 Is God mutable?
It seems that he is:
God has a relationship to something mutable; therefore, he
is mutable. The antecedent is evident, because God is a principle
of these mutable things.* The implication* is proved, because the
change of one correlative changes the other that has a necessary
relationship to it; therefore etc.
6 Also, God has the proximate relationship of an efficient
cause to something mutable that immediately stems from him;
therefore he is now otherwise than he was before, because if he
were in the same way [as before], no reason could be assigned
why he is producing now and not before. For no cause can be
3 Namely, second acts.

1 Essentia, often meaning the same as esse in Scotus, in this case stands for
the 'first act,' or being.
assignari potest ex parte creaturae, quia illius causa quaeritur

quare non producitur. Nec ex parte passi potest assignari ratio,
quia nullam requirit. Ergo ratio mutabilitatis necessario requi-
renda est ex parte agentis et sic in ipso erit mutatio, ut videtur.
7 Contrarium patet in littera per auctoritates quas Magister

adducit: vide eas; et est auctoritas Augustini ibidem.5
[Quaestio 2
Utrum Deus sit summe et perfecte simplex]
8 Iuxta hoc quaeritur utrum Deus sit summe simplex et

perfecte; et ista quaestio solvetur primo, quia ex eius solutione
potest ostendi Deum esse omnino immutabilem, nam ex eius
simplicitate, et infinitate, et ex eo quod est necesse esse, quae tres
condiciones excludunt omne genus compositionis, potest ostendi
quod Deus sit simpliciter immutabilis. Sed propter processum
Magistri in littera, quaestio de immutabilitate Dei fuit primo
proponenda et quaerenda.
9 Arguitur igitur ad istam secundam quaestionem quod Deus
non sit perfecte simplex. Primo sic: nihil in Deo ponendum est
essentialiter nisi quod est perfectionis simpliciter; sed ratio
simplicitatis non est perfectionis simpliciter, quia tunc quodlibet
habens simplicitatem esset perfectius quod falsum est, quia tunc
materia esset perfectior quam compositum et universaliter in istis
inferioribus perfectiora sunt compositiora; ergo in divinis non est
ponendum nisi quod est perfectionis; sed in creaturis, scilicet
compositio et non simplicitas.
10 Item, quod uni est substantia nulli est accidens, I
Physicorum6 et Commentator, et e converso; sed sapientia in
nobis non est substantia, ergo nec in Deo; et sic in Deo erit
compositio ex accidente et substantia.
r, Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 8, c. 2, n. 1 (SB IV, 97).

0 Aristot., Physica I, c. 3 (1866 4-5).
ascribed on the part of the creature, because it is its [own] cause

that is being sought: [why is it or] why is it not produced? Nor can
it be ascribed on the part of the patient,* because it requires
none. Therefore, the reason for mutability necessarily has to be
sought on the part of the agent and in this way in it there will be
change, as is seems.
7 The contrary is evident in the text* through the
authoritative statements adduced by the Master: look at them;
and there is the authority of Augustine in the same place.
Question Two
Is God supremely and perfectly simple?
8 In addition to this, it is asked whether God is supremely and

perfectly simple. And this question is solved first, because from
its solution one can show that God is entirely immutable, for from
his simplicity and infinity, and from the fact that he is necessary
being, which three conditions exclude every kind of composition,
it can be shown that God is simply immutable. However, because
of the procedure of the Master in the text, the question of
immutability of God has been proposed and asked about first.
9 And so, it is argued against this second question that God is
not perfectly simple. First in this way: one should postulate
nothing essentially in God unless it is something of pure*
perfection. The notion of simplicity, however, does not imply pure
perfection. For then anything whatsoever possessing simplicity
would be more perfect, which is false, since then matter would be
more perfect than the composite, while in general in these things
here below the more perfect things are to a greater degree
composite; therefore in the divine one must assume only what is a
matter of perfection; but in creatures [this is] composition and not
simplicity.
10 Also, what is a substance to one, cannot be an accident to
anything, according to Bk. I of the Physics, and the Commentator,
and vice versa; but in us wisdom is not a substance, therefore
neither is it in God; and so in God there will be composition from
accident and substance.
11 Item, dare esse non est imperfectionis, sed dependere; ergo

in Deo non est ponenda talis ratio, quia potest dare esse absque
dependentia; in creaturis autem simplex dependet a composito. Si
igitur in Deo est aliquid quod det esse, erit necessario aliqua
compositio in Deo.
12 Contra:
Augustinus: Deus vere et summe simplex; vide in littera;7
ergo etc.
[I. Ad quaestionem secundam]
13 Respondeo ad secundam quaestionem. Primo teneo quod

Deus perfecte simplex est. Ad cuius evidentiam distinguo de
modis compositionis, qui inter alios sunt tres. Primus est ex
partibus essentialibus et per se, et iste est in substantiis, ut
compositio materiae ad formam; secundus est in quantitate ex
partibus quantitativis, qualis esset si quantitas esset separata;
tertius est accidentis ad subiectum. Sed Deus est simplex
simplicitate opposita istis tribus compositionibus.
14 [Probatio quoad primum modum] Probatio quantum ad
primum modum: quia Deus est primum efficiens; sed tale non est
componibile ex materia et forma, quia tale compositum necessario
habet aliud efficiens; sed primum efficiens non potest habere
aliud; ergo etc.
15 Probatio antecedents: quia causalitas materiae et formae
intrinseca non est perfectionis simpliciter, quia ambae includunt
partialitatem, et omne tale imperfectum est. Omne autem habens
imperfectionem reducitur ad perfectionem simpliciter; causalita-
tes igitur intrinsecae, scilicet materiae et formae, reducuntur ad
alias causalitates, scilicet efficients et finis. Maior patet, quia
materia non materiat nisi per formam, nec forma informat nisi
per efficientem per se coniungentem et causantem utrumque in
7 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 8, c. 4, n. 3 (SB IV, 99).

11 Also, to give being is not a matter of imperfection, but to

depend is; therefore in God such a notion must not be posited,
because he can give being without dependence; in creature
however, the simple depends upon the composite. If therefore in
God there is something that gives being, there will be necessarily
some composition in God.5
12 To the contrary: Augustine: 'God truly is supremely simple';
see the text; therefore etc.
To the Second Question
13 I respond to the second question. First I hold that God is

perfectly simple. As to the evidence for this I distinguish between
the [different] modes of composition, of which there are three,
among others. The first is [composition] from the essential parts
that are per se, and this is in substance, as a composition of
matter and form; the second is in quantity* from quantitative
parts, which kind would be present if quantity were to be
separated; the third is of an accident and the subject. But God is
simple with a simplicity opposed to these three modes of
composition.
14 [Proof as to the first mode of composition] Proof according
to the first mode: because God is the first efficient [cause]; but
such cannot be composed of matter and form, since such a
composite necessarily has another efficient [cause]; but the first
efficient cause cannot have another; therefore etc.
15 Proof of the antecedent: because the intrinsic causality of
matter and form is not a matter of pure perfection, since both
include partiality, and every such thing is imperfect. But
everything of imperfection is traced back to pure perfection;
therefore the intrinsic causalities, namely of matter and form, are
traced back to other causalities, namely efficient and final. The
major is evident, because matter does not act as matter except
through form, neither does form inform except through the
efficient [agent] that per se joins [the two together] and causes
both in their causality; for it causes matter to stand beneath and
r> Since there could not be simplicity due to lack of dependence.

causalitate; actuat enim ut materia substet et ut forma informet;

ergo praeter causalitatem materiae et formae oportet dare aliam
causalitatem perfectiorem.
16 [Probatio quoad secundum modum] De secunda
compositione, scilicet partium quantitativarum, patet quod non
est in Deo; Philosophus enim VIII Physicorum8 supponit quod
primum habet potentiam infinitam quia non potest esse in
magnitudine, quia tunc esset dare maiorem potentiam in maiori
magnitudine; ergo infinita non potest esse in magnitudine finita;
ergo oportet quod sit in infinita; sed nulla est talis; ergo potentia
infinita in nulla est magnitudine.
17 Sed quid ad propositum? Non enim videtur valere ratio,

quia si potentia infinita esset in magnitudine non esset maior in
maiori, sed tota esset ubique, puta tota potentia infinita in
qualibet parte caeli, sicut dicitur de anima in corpore; et si
poneretur quod anima infinita spiritualiter maior est in maiori
corpore vel magnitudine, illa propositio non esset vera nisi de
potentia extensa; talis non est virtus vel potentia infinita; ergo
ratio non valet.
18 Responsio: dico quod ratio sua non plus concludit nisi quod
primum non est in magnitudine extensum per accidens, sicut
calor et huiusmodi; quod sic probat: potentia activa quae est
extensa per accidens est maior in maiori; non autem intensior,
quia non est efficacior, sicut in parvo igne aliquando potest esse
calor intensior quam in maiori igne; tamen ceteris paribus, maior
calor est maioris ignis, id est densior quam in parvo. Modo, virtus
infinita est intensissima et haec non posset esse nisi in maxima
magnitudine. lunge igitur quod non est extensa per accidens, sed
est omnino immaterialis, est igitur omnino inextensa, quia si sic
oportet dare subiectum extensibile vel oportet habere formam
advenientem extensioni. Ergo illa potentia erit extensa per
accidens et tunc reciperet magnitudinem vel reciperetur in
H Aristot , Physica VIII, c. 10 (266a 24-b 6).

form to inform; therefore besides the causality of matter and form

there must be some more perfect causality.6
16 (Proof according to the second mode] Regarding the second
[mode of] composition, namely of quantitative parts, it is evident
that this is not in God; for the Philosopher in Bk. VIII of the
Physics suggests that the first [cause] has infinite power because
it cannot be in magnitude.* For then in greater magnitude there
could be [even] greater power; therefore infinite [power] cannot
be in finite magnitude; hence it must be in infinite [magnitude];
but no [magnitude] is such; therefore infinite power is in nothing
that has magnitude.
17 But what value has this for our proposal? For the reason
does not seem to hold. For if infinite power were in magnitude it
would not be 'greater in the greater magnitude,' but the whole
[power] would be everywhere [i.e., in the whole extent of this
magnitude], for example the whole infinite power in whatever
part of the heavens, [or] as is said of the soul in the body;
moreover, if one were to posit that a soul infinite in a spiritual
sense is greater in a larger body or by magnitude, that proposi
tion would only be true if [this] power were extended; power or
infinite power is not such; therefore this reason does not hold.
18 Response: I say that his argument only implies that the first
is not extended accidentally in magnitude, as heat or some such
thing. This he proves in this way: 'active power that is extended
accidentally is greater in what is greater.' It is not more intense,
however, because it is not more efficacious, just as in a small fire
at times the heat can be more intense than in a larger fire.
Nevertheless, other things [i.e., intensity] being equal, the greater
heat is from a greater fire, since it has greater volume than in one
that is small. Now, infinite power is most intense and this could
only be in what has maximum magnitude.7 Add to this that it is
not extended accidentally, but is entirely immaterial, and is
therefore completely without extension, for if it were [extended
accidentally] it would have to have a subject able to be extended
or to have a form which extension receives. Therefore that power
will be extended accidentally and then it would receive
6 Namely, the causality of something that is simple.

7 Which is impossible, as has been proved above.
magnitudine. Hoc falsum est, quia non est in magnitudine nec in

materia; ergo Deus sic est simplex respectu partium magnitu-
dinis.
19 [Probatio quoad tertium modum] De tertia compositione
quae est ex subiecto et accidente, quod non est in Deo patet, quia
nec quantum, nec ubi, nec quando, nec situs etc., nisi forte
reciperet aliquid de prima specie qualitatis; sed haec nullo modo
est ibi, quia probatum est distinctione 2 quod ad primitatem
exemplaritatis requiritur actualis et distincta intellectio omnium,
et sic nec habitus, nec est ibi species, nec per consequens
accidens. In eadem etiam natura est medium ad probandum per
hoc quod est primum efficiens et necesse esse et per infinitatem:
quae tria excludunt omnem compositionem in divinis.
20 Probatio de primo: primum efficiens est necesse esse a se,
quia vel est necesse vel possibile a se: si possibile esse, ergo non
est a se sed ab alio. Hoc falsum est de primo efficiente, ergo
primum efficiens est necesse esse.
21 Praeterea, primum efficiens non potest incipere esse a se
quia nihil efficitur a se nec desinere esse a se; quod patet, quia
nihil potest desinere esse nisi per potentiam alicuius vel
privationem quod est sibi incompossibile positum in esse; sed hoc
non potest esse per aliquod privativum, quia tunc illud esset
primum efficiens; sed nullum istorum potest esse primum
efficiens, quia illud privativum vel positivum esset a se vel ab
alio: si a se, sic duo incompossibilia sibi essent in rerum natura:
ergo ab alio. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia impossibile est quod
esse ab alio habeat firmius esse quam esse a se, sive quam illud
quod habet esse a se, immo minus firmum eo quod dependet ab
alio; sed praeexsistens nunquam destruitur nisi habeat debilius
esse quam additum, unde si duo dii essent, nullus posset alium
destruere, nisi secundus haberet esse firmius.
magnitude or would be received in [what has] magnitude. This is

false, because it is neither in magnitude nor in matter; therefore
God is simple as regards parts of magnitude.
19 [Proof according to the third mode] Regarding the third
[mode of] compositionof subject and accidentit is evident that
this is not in God, because there is no quantity, no whereabouts,
no when, no position, etc., unless perhaps he would receive
something of the first species of quality;* but this is in no way
there, because it has been proved in distinction two that the
primacy of exemplarity* requires an actual and distinct*
knowledge of all things, and thus neither a habit* nor a species,
nor as a consequent any accident is there. Also, in the same
nature there is a means of proving through this that it is the first
efficient [cause] and necessary being, and through infinity: which
three exclude all composition in the divine.
20 Proof regarding the first: the first efficient [cause] is a
necessary being from itself, because either it is necessary or
possible from itself: if it is possible being it is not from itself but
from another. This is false of the first efficient, therefore, the first
efficient cause is a necessary being.
21 Furthermore, the first efficient cause cannot begin to be
from itselffor nothing is effected of itselfnor cease to be of
itself. This is evident because nothing can cease to be unless it is
through the power of something or through a privation, which is
posited as incompatible with it in being; but this cannot be
through something privative, because then that would be the first
efficient cause. But nothing of these can be the first efficient
cause, because that privative or positive thing [incompatible with
the first efficient] would exist of itself or from another. If from
itself, in this way two incompatibles would exist in the nature* of
things; therefore, it would have to exist from another. But this is
impossible, because it is impossible that 'to be from another' have
a firmer being than what exists of itself, or what has existence of
itself: indeed it would be less firm because it would depend upon
another: but what preexists is never destroyed unless it has
weaker being than what is added. Hence if two gods existed,
neither could destroy the other unless the second would have
firmer being.
22 Item, si primum efficiens vel necesse esse habet compositi-

onem ex duobus, oportet quod habeat partem vel a se vel ab alio,
sive quod sit ex se necesse esse vel ex se possibile esse: si aliqua
pars est possibilis esse, ergo hoc totum non est necesse esse, si
autem est neccesse esse ex se, ergo exsistit in ultima actualitate,
sive in ultimata positione exsistendi: ergo non est pars alicuius.
Alias si necesse esse poneretur compositum, includit repugnan-
tiam.
23 Item, ex infinitate Dei ostenditur quod nec sit componibilis
nec compositum alicui. Primo, quod non est componibilis sic:
omne componibile potest secundum suam entitatem excedi, quia
omne totum est maius sua parte; sed contra rationem infiniti est
posse excedi; ergo infinitum non potest esse pars sive componibile
alicui.
24 Item, quod est componibile cum aliquo non habet perfectio-
nem illius cum quo componitur, sive non ut est in toto composite.
Sed infinitum habet omnem perfectionem quam non habet
compositum. Quia si esset compositum, vel esset compositum ex
finitis vel ex infinitis. Non ex infinitis, quia infinite non sunt
componibilia; nec ex finitis, quia tunc non esset infinitum. Ergo
nullo modo est compositum; est ergo perfectissime simplex.
[II. Ad arguments principalia secundae quaestionis]
25 Ad primum,9 quando dicitur quod simplicitas non est perfec-

tionis simpliciter, nego; simplicitas enim talis est perfectionis
simpliciter. Ad probationem quod in materia est imperfectionis
simplicitas, dico quod simplicitas in quolibet supposito non
determinando in natura in qua subsistit est perfectionis quae
scilicet de se excludit omnem compositionem, sed multis
suppositis est incomponibilis sicut simplicitas in supposito
9 Cf. supra n. 9.
22 Also, if the first efficient or necessary being were composed

of two, it would be necessary that it have a part either of itself or
from another, or that it be of itself necessary being or of itself
possible being; if some part is possible being, therefore this whole
is not necessary being; if however it is necessary being of itself,
therefore it exists in its final actuality or in the ultimate position
of existing: therefore it is not a part of something. Otherwise if
necessary being were posited as composite, this would include a
contradiction.
23 Also, from the infinity of God it is shown that he is unable to
be composed or to be a composite [part] of something. First, that
it is unable to be a composite [part], in this way: everything that
is able to be a composite [part] can by its nature be exceeded,
because every whole is greater than its part; but it is against the
notion of the infinite than it could be exceeded; therefore the
infinite cannot be a part nor is it able to be a component in
something.
24 Also, what is able to be a component of something does not
have the perfection of that with which it is composed, or [at least]
not qua it is in the whole composite. But the infinite has all
perfection, which the composite does not. Because if it were
composed, it would be either of finite or infinite [parts]. Not of
infinite parts, because infinite things are not able to be composed;
nor of finite parts, because then it would not be infinite. Therefore
in no way is it composed; therefore it is most perfectly simple.
To the initial arguments for the second question
25 To the first [n. 9], when it is said that simplicity does not
pertain to pure perfection, I deny this; for such simplicity is a
matter of unqualified perfection. To the proof that in matter
simplicity pertains to imperfection, I say that simplicity in any
individual subject that does not have to be limited in the nature
in which it subsists, is a matter of perfectionnamely,
[simplicity] that of itself excludes all composition, but is
incompatible with many individual subjectsas simplicity in an
absolute individual subject in the nature that is not repugnant is
absolute in natura non repugnante est perfectionis simpliciter;

sed in cane et huiusmodi non esset perfectionis.
26 Sed ulterius arguitur: ergo saltem illa natura quae est
componibilis est perfectior et per consequens materia.
Respondeo: multae sunt perfectiones et non oportet quod illa
perfectio sit hic, licet aliquid sit propinquius in una perfectione
non tamen in alia. Unde licet materia sit propinquior in
simplicitate, non tamen in actualitate; et sic falluntur multi, quia
aliquae perfectiones sunt in uno ordine quae non sunt in alio, ut
incorruptibilitas est perfectionis simpliciter in caelo et tamen non
invenitur in homine qui habet esse nobilius et perfectius, saltem
quoad esse intellectum. Sic est in proposito: materia simplicior
homine et tamen homo perfectior; quare non sequitur 'aliquid est
simplicius, ergo perfectius'.
27 Ad secundum,10 quando dicitur: quod uni est accidens, nulli
est substantia, hoc patebit magis in sequenti quaestione. Dico
tamen quod sapientia secundum illam rationem qua in nobis
formaliter est accidens non est in divinis, sed modo perfectiori, ut
dicetur; et ideo in nobis est de prima specie qualitatis sapientia.
non autem in Deo.
28 Ad tertium,11 quando dicitur 'dare esse est perfectionis
quando est sine dependentia', dico quod dare esse formaliter, licet
sit perfectionis, tamen habet imperfectionem concomitantem,
quia limitate dat esse et quia non habet illud cui dat esse
formaliter, ideo includit imperfectionem dependentiae in compa-
ratione ad causam efficientem.
10 Cf. supra n. 10.

11 Cf. supra n Il.
a matter of perfection in an unqualified sense; but in a dog8 or in

some such thing it is not a matter of perfection.
26 But it is argued further: therefore at least that nature which
is able to be a component is more perfect and as a consequence
matter [is more perfect]. I respond: there are many perfections
and it is not necessary that here there be that [particular]
perfection, although something can be more advanced in one
perfection but not in another. Hence, even though matter is more
advanced in simplicity, it is not [more perfect] in actuality; and in
this way many are mistaken, because there are some perfections
in one order that are not in another, as incorruptibility is a
matter of pure perfection in heaven and nevertheless it is not
found in man, who is [otherwise] more noble and more perfect, at
least in regard to being intelligent. And so it is in the case in
hand: matter is simpler than man and nevertheless man is more
perfect; hence it does not follow 'something is simpler, therefore it
is more perfect.'
27 To the second [n. 10], when it is said, that what is an
accident to one, cannot be substance to anything, this will become
more evident in the following question. I say, however, that
wisdom in the divine is not according to that notion by which in
us it is formally an accident, but in a more perfect way, as will be
said; and therefore in us it is in the first species of quality, but not
in God.
28 To the third, [n. 11] when it is said: to give being is a matter
of perfection when it is without dependence, I say that to give
being formally, although it is a matter of perfection, nevertheless
has a concomitant imperfection. For it gives being in a limited
way, and, because that to which it formally gives being does not
have it, therefore the latter includes the imperfection of
dependence in relation to the efficient cause.
8 Cf. Duns Scotus, Metaph. VIII, q. 1, n. 27: "The example would be: if there
were some intelligent dog that could not possess the high degree of viciousness
appropriate for a dog precisely on account of its intelligence, that dog would be
less perfect than a non-intelligent dog."
[III. Ad primam quaestionem]
29 Ad primam quaestionem de immutabilitate, utrum sit in

Deo, respondeo quod primum ens est omnino immutabile et
simpliciter, sive sit mutatio de esse ad non esse et e converso, sive
simpliciter vel secundum quid, sive substantialis sive secundum
accidens; quaelibet enim mutatio est exclusa a primo ente per ea
quae dicta sunt. Patet de prima, scilicet de non-esse ad esse et e
converso, quia ista excluditur per hoc quod primum ens ex se est
necesse esse. Secunda exclusa est supra per exclusionem
compositionum. De mutatione substantiali patet, quia non est ibi
compositio ex materia et forma; et de accidentali, quia non est ibi
compositio ex accidente et subiecto.
30 Istam conclusionem probat Philosophus VII et VIII
Physicorum12 et totus septimus in hoc consistit, licet introducat
illud de alteratione. Probat enim quod omne motum quod est
motum ab alio non est ex se primum; et deductio sua est, quia
omne quod movetur, aliqua eius parte quiescente, non est motum
ex se primum, quia tunc motum finitum moveretur in tempore
infinito; nihil igitur se ipsum movet. Sed Philosophus ex tota sua
deductione non habet nisi quod primum movens non est corpus,
sive quod non moveretur ex se primo, sicut corpus vel aliquid
habens partem, et sic quod nullum corpus potest moveri nisi ab
alio; et probatio sua est ex ratione partis quiescentis etc.
31 Similiter, processus Philosophi, VIII Physicorum,13 de motu
naturali et violento et de primo motu lationis et de aliis
probationibus in XII Metaphysicae14 totum nihil probat nisi de
motu corporali, scilicet quod primum non est isto modo movens.
Sic ergo patet conclusio probata de simplicitate Dei quantum ad
secundam quaestionem et de immutabilitate quantum ad
primam.
" Aristot., Physica VII, c. 1 (242a 13-20; 2426 18-9); ibid., VIII, c. 10 (266a
24-6 6).
13 Aristot., Physica VIII, c. 4 (2556 31-256a 3).
14 Aristot., Metaph. XII (A), c. 6-8 (10716 2-10746 15).
To the First Question
29 To the first question about the immutability, whether it is in

God, I respond that the first being is completely immutable and
in an unqualified sense, whether it be a mutation from being to
non-being or the converse, [or] whether [it be a mutation] simply
or in a qualified sense, [or] whether [it be a] substantial mutation
or one according to accident. For mutation of every sort is
excluded from the first being through those things, which have
been stated. It is evident about the first [kind], namely from
being to non-being and the converse, because this is excluded
through the fact that the first being of itself is necessary being.
The second is excluded by what was said above about lack of any
composition. It is [equally] evident about substantial mutation,
because there is no composition there of matter and form; and
accidental mutation is excluded because there is no composition
there of accident and subject.
30 The Philosopher proves this conclusion in Bk. VII and VIII
of the Physics, and the entire seventh book consists in this,
although he introduces this in regard to alteration. For he proves
that anything moved that is moved by another is not of itself first;
and his deduction is that everything that is moved, while some
part of it is at rest, is not first moved of itself, for then a finite
moving object would be moved in time that is infinite; hence
nothing moves itself. But the Philosopher from the whole of his
deduction only concludes that the first mover is not a body, or
that it would not move by itself primarily as a body or as
something having parts, and thus that no body can be moved
except by another; and his proof is based on the argument of the
part that is at rest, etc.
31 Similarly, the procedure of the Philosopher in Bk. VIII of
the Physics, about natural* and violent change and about the first
change of place* and the other proofs in Bk. XII of the
Metaphysics, as a whole proves nothing except what has to do
with bodily movement, namely that the first being is not moving
in this fashion. In this way therefore the conclusion is proved
about the simplicity of God as regards the second question and
about the immutability as regards the first.
[IV. Ad argumenta principalia primae quaestionis]
32 Ad primum argumentum primae quaestionis,15 quando

dicitur quod Deus habet aliquam habitudinem ad ista mutabilia,
dico quod nulla habitudo realis est in Deo ad posteriora, nec
primum mutatur tali mutatione relativa, quia in eo non est
relatio ad creaturas nisi rationis tantum, scilicet ut est terminus
illius habitudinis tantum.
33 Ad secundum,16 quando dicitur quod Deus habet rationem
proximam causae efficientis etc., dico quod voluntas antiqua
producit absque omni mutatione nec potest habere novam
voluntatem sive volitionem, sicut in me si esset voluntas efficax
ad legendum cras de qua alias dictaret mini ratio, si starem usque
cras in ista voluntate, esset in me absque omni mutatione
volitionis, et praecipue si mensuraretur aeternitate: sic est in
voluntate divina. Unde quod voluit ab initio mundi, voluit ab
aeterno et quod voluit in tempore voluit ab aeterno, et non
exspectavit tempus nisi fuissent temporalia; sed nullum tempus
habet in se, sed in alio. Non igitur reductibilis est mutatio ad
efficientem, quia primum agens ipsum efficiens manet
immutabiliter in eadem voluntate antiqua sine omni innovatione.
[V. Dubitatio quaestioni annexa]
34 Sed ex quo voluntas fuit efficax pro toto aeterno, quare non
ab aeterno produxit, sed nunc? Respondeo sicut Commentator,
IV Metaphysicae^1 indisciplinati est quaerere causas omnium.
Dico igitur quod sicut in necessariis est invenire propositiones
immediatas quarum non quaeruntur causae, sic et in
contingentibus. Unde haec est immediata: calor est calefactivus,
et necessaria; et haec similiter immediata: calor calefacit, sed
contingens. Quaerere igitur causam quare calor est calefactivus
non est aliud nisi quaerere quare calor est calor. Haec est causa
quare calor est calefactivus, quia calor est calor. Si quaeras de
15 Cf. supra n. 5.
16 Cf. supra n. 6.
17 Points cf. Aristot., Metaph. IV (P), c. 4, 6, 7 (1006a 5-8; 1011a 8-13; 1012a
21).
Reply to the Initial Arguments of the First Question
32 To the first argument of the first question [n. 5], when it is

said that God has some relationship to these mutable things, I
say that there is no real relation* in God to what is posterior, nor
is the first being changed by such a relative mutation, because in
him the relation to creatures is only conceptual, namely insofar as
he is the term of this relationship merely.
33 To the second [n. 6], when it is said that God has a character
of a proximate efficient cause, etc. I say that the will* from of old
produces without change and cannot have a new will or volition,
as could be said of me, if my will were intent on lecturing
tomorrow9 and I were to remain firm in this will until then, it
would be in me without any change of volition, and especially if it
were measured by eternity: such as is the case in the divine will.
Hence what he has willed at the beginning of the world, he has
willed from eternity, and what he has willed in time he has willed
from eternity, and has only envisaged the time as regards
temporal things; but he has no time in himself, but only in what
is another. Therefore, no change can be traced back to the
efficient cause; because the first efficient agent itself remains
immutably in the same will of old without any innovation.
A doubt connected to this question
34 But if his will was efficacious for all eternity, however, why
has it not produced from eternity, but does so now? I reply as
the Commentator in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics: 'the unlearned
ask for the causes of everything.' I say therefore that just as in
necessary things one finds immediate propositions [i.e., axioms,]
whose causes are not sought after, so also in contingent things.
Hence, this is an immediate and necessary proposition: heat is
the sort of thing that heats; and this likewise is immediate but
contingent: heat is heating [now]. So to ask for the reason why
heat is the sort of thing that heats is only to ask why heat is heat.
This is the reason why heat is the sort of thing that heats,
9 The short phrase contained here in some MSS (de qua alias dictaret mihi
ratio) seems to be unnecessary to the argument.
ista quare calor calefacit, dico similiter quod nihil est quaerere,
quia calefacit eo quod calor est calor. Sic igitur in proposito,
quando quaeritur 'quare voluntas divina est volitiva producere
creaturas' quae est propositio necessaria: certe non est alia causa
nisi quia voluntas est voluntas; et 'quare actu est volens pro isto
tempore', quae est propositio contingens, non est alia causa nisi
quia voluntas est voluntas; unde sicut necessariae sunt
immediatae, ita et contingentes propositiones sunt immediatae,
ut dictum est; et si calor non requireret passum, generaret absque
passo calorem; sic voluntas divina non requirit materiam ad
productionem rerum.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum quodlibet aliud a Deo sit simpliciter mutabile]
35 Quaeritur tertio de mutabilitate creaturae, utrum quodlibet

aliud a Deo sit simpliciter mutabile.
Videtur quod non:

Philosophus XII Metaphysicae,18 postquam probavit
simplicitatem primae substantiae et eiusdem immutabilitatem,
quaerit consequenter utrum sint plures tales substantiae vel una
tantum; et determinat ibidem quod sint plures tales substantiae
separatae, scilicet immutabiles.
36 Contra:
Solus Deus habet immortalitatem, [I] Ad Timotheum [6,16]:
sola immortalitas vera immutabilitatas est, patet per Augusti-
num19 et in littera.
37 Respondeo quod in ista quaestione est controversia inter

theologos et philosophos. Ideo in ista quaestione sic procedendum
est: primo est videnda intentio philosophorum, Aristotelis scilicet
et Avicennae, qui sunt inter omnes famosiores; secundo, ponentur
18 Aristot., Metaph. XII (A), c. 8 (1073a 23-6 3).

10 August., De Trin. I, c. 1, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 29, PL 42, 821).
because heat is heat. If you ask about this 'why is heat heating
[now]?' I say, likewise, that it is a meaningless question, since it is
heating because heat is heat. Therefore, it is this way in the case
at hand when it is asked why the divine will produces creatures
voluntarily, which is a necessary proposition: certainly there is no
other cause except that the will is will. And the fact that it is
actually willing at this time, which is a contingent proposition,
has no other cause than that the will is will. Hence, just as
necessary propositions are immediate, so also contingent are
immediate, as has been said; and if heat did not require a
recipient, it would generate heat without a recipient. In this way
the divine will does not require matter to produce things.
Question Three
Is everything except God simply mutable?
35 Thirdly, the question is raised about the mutability of

creature, is everything except God simply mutable?
It seems not:
The Philosopher in Bk. XII of the Metaphysics, after he has
proved the simplicity of the first substance and its immutability,
asks subsequently whether there are several such substances or
only one; and he determines there that there are several such
substances separated from matter, namely that are immutable.
36 To the contrary:
Only God has immortality, in the epistle to Timothy10: only
immortality is true immutability, as is evident from Augustine
cited in the text.
37 I respond that in this question there is a controversy among

the theologians and philosophers. Therefore in this question one
must proceed in this way: first one must see what the mind of the
philosophers is, namely Aristotle and Avicenna, who are among
all the most famous; secondly, some reasons in their favor will be
proposed; thirdly, arguments will be raised against them, so that
10 I Timothy, 6:16.
aliquae rationes pro eis; tertio, arguetur contra eos per rationes,
ut veritas quaesita appareat magis certa, scilicet quod omnis
creatura est mutabilis.
[Art. 1 Intentio Philosophorum

38 Circa primum, dicit quidam doctor20 quod decem sunt modi

essendi quorum tantum tres sunt modo ad propositum. Primus
est quod aliquid sit ex se formaliter necessarium et ab alio
effective; et istum modum necessitatis dicit Philosophum non
posuisse in substantiis separatis, primo quia implicat
contradictionem et non est verisimile tantum philosophum
posuisse aliquid quod implicet contradictionem; secundo, quia
quidquid est ab alio effective de se est possibile, ergo non est
necessarium. Item, allegat Commentatorem in XII Metaphysicae21
(in quaestione Ioannis grammatici) ubi vult quod motus caeli
possit perpetuari, cum sit ab alio. Sed substantia aliqua non
potest: quod enim ex se est necessarium formaliter non potest
esse ab alio effective.22
39 Item, habet auctoritates Aristotelis et Commentatoris, I De
caelo et mundo,23 ubi dicit quod omne generabile est corruptibile
et e converso, et omne incorruptibile perpetuum et e converso.
Sed si essent tales substantiae separatae formaliter necessariae
de se et ab alio effective, essent ex primo incorruptibiles et
perpetuae et ex secundo generabiles sive productibiles et per
consequens corruptibiles, quod est contra mentem Aristotelis et
Commentatoris.
40 Item, imponit eis quod ipsi senserint omnes species esse
incorruptibiles et ex se necessarias simpliciter, sed diversimode,
quia species incorruptibilium ponunt ex se necessarias in uno
individuo; species vero corruptibilium posuerunt ex se necessarias
in pluribus individuis, sicut posuerunt elementum secundum se
totum incorruptibile, secundum tamen partes eius corruptibile, et
*1 Henricus Gand , Quodl. VIII, q. 9 in corp (f. 314K).

zl Averroes, Metaph. XII, com. 41 (cd Iuntina VIII, 324R)
" Henricus Gand., ibid., f. 314N.
a Aristot., De caelo I, c. 12 (283a 4-7; 283a 24-6 1-6); Averroes, De caelo I,
com. 138 (ed. Iuntina V, 93vI-E).
Dist. 8, Part II, Question Three 342
the truth one seeks might appear more certainly, namely, that all
creatures are mutable.
Article One
The opinion of the philosophers
38 Regarding the first, a certain doctor says that there are ten
modes of being of which three are relevant to the case at hand.
The first is that something of itself is formally necessary and is
the effect of another: and this mode of necessity* the Philosopher,
according to him, has not postulated in substances separated
from matter, because, first, it implies a contradiction and it is not
probable that such a great philosopher has proposed something
that implies a contradiction; secondly, whatever is from another
effectively is of itself possible, therefore it is not necessary. Also,
he quotes the Commentator in Bk. XII of the Metaphysics (in the
question of John the grammarian) where he claims that the
motion of the heavens could be perpetuated, since it is from
another. But some substance cannot: for what is of itself formally
necessary cannot be something that is produced efficiently by
another.
39 Also, he has the authoritative statements of Aristotle and
the Commentator, in Bk. I of De caelo et mundo, where he [i.e.,
Aristotle] says that everything able to be generated is able to be
corrupted and vice versa, and everything incorruptible is
perpetual and vice versa. But if such separate* substances were
formally necessary of themselves and were effects of another,
they would be from the first [aspect11] incorruptible and perpetual
and from a second [aspect12] able to be generated or produced and
as a consequence corruptible, which is against the mind of
Aristotle and the Commentator.
40 Also, he attributes to them that they felt that all species
were incorruptible and of themselves simply necessary, but in
diverse ways. For the species of what are incorruptible are
posited of necessity in one individual; whereas the species of what
1 1 Namely, as necessary of themselves.

18 Namely, as effects of another.
sic nihil sit a primo movente nisi mediante motu. Et ultra: quid
igitur est ab alio in incorruptibilibus? Respondet, secundum
eos, quod nihil in caelo est ab alio nisi motus nec elementa
secundum totum sunt ab alio, sed tantum secundum partes ab
alio.
41 Sed quod ista opinio non sit Philosophi nec implicet

contradictionem, secundum eos, aliquid esse ex se necessarium
formaliter et tamen ab alio effective, ostendo per auctoritates
Philosophi et per rationes. Dicit enim Philosophus, II Meta-
physicae,24 de principiis sempiternis quod ea esse verissima
necesse est, quia ipsa sunt causa veritatis univocae in aliis, quia
unumquodque est maxime tale in quantum est causa illius in aliis
ut sint talia. Et sequitur ibidem: unumquodque sicut ad
veritatem, ita ad esse; et probatur ibidem quod non est processus
in infinitum in ullo genere causae. Ergo est aliquod principium
maxime verum quod est causa veritatis et entitatis in omnibus
aliis. Simul ergo stant, secundum eum, quod aliquid sit ex se
formaliter necessarium et tamen ab alio effective.
42 Item, vide auctoritatem Commentatoris, De substantia
orbis, et Aristotelis, I De caelo et mundo. Dicit enim
Commentator, De substantia orbis, cap. 3, 25 quod "corpus caeleste
non indiget virtute movente in loco tantum, sed etiam virtute
quae largiatur sibi suam substantiam et permanentiam
aeternam" quae auctoritas directs contradicit auctoritati
praeallegatae Aristotelis et Commentatoris, I De caelo et
mundo;26 sequitur enim ubi prius continue: "de opinione
Aristot., Metaph. II (a), c. 1 (9936 24-30); ibid., c. 2 (994a 1-6 30).

25 Averroes, De substantia orbis (ed. A. Hyman, 83-4).
m Cf. supra n. 39.
are corruptible are posited of necessity in several individuals, just

as they posit that an element as regards itself is incorruptible,
but qua partsi3 it is corruptible, and in this way nothing is from
the first mover except by means of movement. And further: what
therefore is from another in things incorruptible? He replies,
that according to them, there is nothing in the heavens that is
from another except motion, neither are the elements as a whole
from another, but only as parts are they from another.
Scotus's own reply against that of Henry
41 But this is not the opinion of the Philosopher, nor does it

imply a contradiction, according to them, that something in itself
is formally necessary and nevertheless is from another effectively,
as I show through the authoritative statements of the Philosopher
as well as from rational arguments. For the Philosopher says in
Bk. II of the Metaphysics, about the eternal principles that it is
necessary that they be most true, because they are the cause of
the univocal truth in others, since something is such in the
highest degree insofar as it is the cause of this [quality] in others
that makes them such. In addition, it follows, in the same place,
that as something is in respect to truth, so it is in respect to
being. Moreover, in the same place, it is proved that there is no
infinite regress in any kind of cause. Therefore, there is some
principle that is maximally true that is the cause of truth and
entity in everything else. Therefore, according to him,i4
something can be in itself formally necessary and nevertheless at
the same time from another effectively.
42 Also, see the authoritative statement of the Commentator in
De substantia orbis, and Aristotle in Bk. I of De caelo et mundo.
For the Commentator says in De substantia orbis, chapter 3, that
the "celestial body needs not only local moving power but also a
power that bestows on it its substance and eternal permanence."
This authoritative statement directly contradicts the previously
cited authority of Aristotle and the Commentator in Bk. I of De
caelo et mundo, for it follows in the same text continuously:
1:lThat is, composites whose parts are elements, are corruptible.

H Aristotle.
Aristotelis dixerunt quidam ipsum non ponere causam agentem

totum, sed tantum causam moventem; et istud fuit absurdum
nimis".27
43 Sed isti respondent ad dicta Commentatoris, quod ponentes
fundamenta falsa ex rationibus verisimilibus Aristotelis contra
Platonem ponentem oppositum, postmodum contradicunt sibi
ipsis ex rationibus veris.
44 Contra istos arguo sic: prius ostendunt Aristotelem et
Commentatorem negare primum modum essendi, quia includebat
contradictionem implicite et non concedunt ipsum Aristotelem et
Commentatorem quem pro eodem habent hic sibi explicite
ex rationibus veris contradicere. Maius enim inconveniens est
alicui contradicere sibi ipsi explicite, ubi omnibus apparet, quam
implicite quae multos latet.
45 Item, quod primus modus non includat contradictionem,
probo secundum intentionem Philosophi, XII Metaphysicae.2*
Dicit enim ibi quod primum principium et prima intelligentia
movet ut appetibile et intelligibile; et secundum ipsum ibidem,
intellectus istius substantiae separatae quae movetur a primo ut
ab appetibili et intelligibili, patitur et movetur ab illo intelligibili
et appetibili.
46 Ex hoc arguitur sic: secunda intelligentia amat et intelligit
primam, cum prima moveat secundam ut appetibile et intel
ligibile; sed intellectus secundae intelligentiae in quantum sic
movetur ab appetibili et intelligibili patitur ab illo et movetur;
ergo prima intelligentia habet causalitatem respectu intelligere
intelligentiae secundae. Sed intelligere intelligentiae secundae,
secundum Philosophum, etiam secundum quod iste concedit
Philosophum hic sensisse, est idem cum substantia et natura
ipsius intelligentiae secundae; ergo si prima est causa effectiva
sui intelligere, et causa effectiva suae substantiae; omnes tamen
istas intelligentias ponit Philosophus ex se formaliter necessarias.
Ergo non est contra intentionem eius aliquid esse formaliter
necessarium, et tamen ab alio effective.
11 Averroes, ibid., 86.

*H Aristot., Metaph. XII (A), c. 7 (10726 4); cf. ibid., c 8 (1073a 24-b 3).
"about the opinion of Aristotle, certain ones say that he did not
posit an agent cause of the whole, but only a moving cause; and
this was excessively absurd."
43 But these respond to the statement of the Commentator,
that positing false foundations from probable arguments of
Aristotle against Plato who proposed the opposite, they
afterwards contradict themselves from true arguments.
44 Against these I argue in this way: first they show Aristotle
and the Commentator deny the first mode of being, because it
implicitly included a contradiction and they do not concede that
Aristotle himself and the Commentatorto whom they attribute
the same hereexplicitly contradicted themselves based on true
reasons. For it is more incongruous that someone contradicts
himself explicitly (where it is apparent to everyone) than
implicitly (where it is unknown to many).
45 Also, that the first mode does not include a contradiction, I
prove according to the intention of the Philosopher in Bk. XII of
the Metaphysics. For he says there that the first principle and the
first intelligence* moves as desirable and intelligible; and
according to him, in the same place, the intellect of this substance
separated [from matter], which is moved by the first as by what is
desirable and intelligible, is acted upon and moved by that
intelligible and desirable.
46 From this it is argued in this way: the second intelligence
loves and knows the first, since the first moves the second as
desirable and intelligible. The intellect of the second intelligence,
however, to the extent it is moved by the desirable and
intelligible, is acted upon by it and moved; therefore, the first
intelligence exercises causality as regards the understanding of
the second intelligence. According to the Philosopher, however
and even this one here concedes that the Philosopher perceived
thisthe understanding of the second intelligence is the same
thing as the substance and nature of the second intelligence;
therefore if the first is the effective cause of its understanding, it
is [also] the effective cause of its substance; however the
Philosopher assumes all these intelligences* to be formally
necessary. Therefore it is not against his intention that something
be formally necessary and nevertheless effected by another.
47 Item, ibidem, secundum intentionem Philosophi, primum

movens habet virtutem infinitam et agit, secundum eum, neces
sitate naturali, licet per intellectum et voluntatem, ut patet ex
VIII Physicorum;29 virtus autem infinita agens necessitate
naturali non potest movere corpus immediate in tempore, quia
tunc, secundum rationem eius VIII Physicorum, virtus finita et
infinita moverent in aequali tempore, ut ibidem concludit. Quia si
acciperetur virtus tantum excedens virtutem aliam quae movet in
minori tempore, quam30 virtus infinita, quantum minus tempus
exceditur a maiori tempore, illa moveret utique in aequali
tempore cum virtute infinita. Nec potest primum movens
infinitum movere caelum et circulare eum in instanti aliquo
temporis, quia tunc in illo instanti quaelibet pars caeli esset in
illo situ in quo prius fuit et per consequens non movetur, quia non
se habet aliter nunc quam prius. Patet ergo quod ipsum primum
non immediate fert nec movet localiter ipsum caelum; movet
autem ipsum, quia ex hoc concludit ipsum esse virtutis infinitae,
quia scilicet movet ipsum tempore infinito. Ergo secundum inten
tionem eius sequitur quod moveat ipsum effective, sed mediante
alia intelligentia movente ipsum proximo. Ergo secundum ipsum
duo moventia movent idem corpus: unus localiter et alius
effective. Hucusque nullus sciens intentionem eius negaret eum.
48 Tunc arguo: duo moventia movere idem corpus non potest
intelligi nisi tripliciter. Vel quia secundum movens moveat in
virtute primi et habeat esse a primo, et sic habetur propositum,
quod alia intelligentia ex se formaliter necessaria sit ab alio
effective quoad suum esse. Vel quod secundum movens recipiat a
primo movente influentiam, virtutem et applicationem ad motum,
29 Cf. Aristot., Physica VIII, c 5-10 passim (256a 5-2676 25).

:,n Quam: sic codd., sed ad sensum meliorem sic melius videtur quae [est]
virtus infinita vel quanta [est] virtus infinita; vide versionem angticam.
47 Also, in the same place, according to the mind of the

Philosopher, the first mover has infinite power and acts according
to him out of natural necessity, although it is endowed with
intellect and will, as is evident from Bk. VIII of the Physics.
Infinite power, however, acting out of natural necessity cannot
move a body immediately [and continuously] in time, because
then, according to his reasoning in Bk. VIII of the Physics, finite
and infinite power would move in equal time, as he concludes in
the same place. Because if one were to consider a power that
[quantitatively] exceeded another powerthe one that moved in
a shorter time, such asi5 infinite powerto the same extent, to
which the shorter time is exceeded by a longer time [i.e.,
infinitely], that [lesser power] would surely move in a time equal
to [the time of that] infinite power.i6 Neither could the infinite
first mover move heaven and circle it in an instant time, because
then in that instant each part of the heaven would be in the same
place in which it was before and as a consequence it would not
move, since it would not be otherwise than it was before. It is
evident therefore that this first [intelligence] does not
immediately transport or move heaven itself locally; yet it does
move it because from this he concludes it to be of infinite power,
namely because it moves it in an infinite time. Therefore,
according to his mind it follows that it would move it effectively,
but by the intermediacy of another intelligence moving it
proximately. Therefore, according to him two movers move the
same body, one locally, the other effectively. Up to now no one
knowing his intention would deny him.
48 Then I argue: two movers moving the same body can only be
understood in three ways, [i] Either because the second mover
moves in virtue of the first and has its being from the first. And in
this way we have what we propose, that another intelligence is in
itself formally necessary and from the other as to its being, [ii] Or
that the second mover receives from the first mover the influence,
i5 The grammar has been emended, since the comparative quam in the Latin
makes no sense: see note to the Latin.
"' I.e., since infinite power is infinitesimally greater than the lesser power,
moving infinitely fast does not give it any advantage over the latter in intensity;
indeed, increasing the lesser power quantitatively will eventually result in the
same (infinitely fast) time of operation.
ut baculus movetur a manu a qua applicatur ad movendum

pilam, et adhuc sequitur propositum, quia ista virtus vel
influentia activa non est nisi sua substantia; vel non est hoc
dandum, cum sit aptus natus ad movendum determinabilis per
intellectum suum et voluntatem. Vel tertio modo ita quod ambo
moveant idem mobile et sic quod neutrum dependeat ab alio in
movendo, movent tamen ordine quodam, ita quod primum movet
eminentius, secundum imperfectius, nec potest secundum movere
nisi primo movente se, sicut se habent pater et mater respectu
prolis; ubi neuter dat alteri causalitatem suam, licet unum causet
eminentius quam alterum; et eminentiori causa agente, secun
dum necessario concausat.
49 Sed iste tertius modus est impossibilis, secundum Philo-
sophum, quia tunc virtus infinita immediate causaret motum
corporis in tempore, quod probatum est esse impossibile
secundum ipsum. Ergo sequitur propositum quod secundum
movens moveat virtute primi moventis, quia capit esse ab eo, et
pro tanto dicatur primum movens movere immediate. Propter
quod Commentator, XII Metaphysicae,3i ponit caelum moveri a
duplici motore, scilicet separate et coniuncto.
50 Nec valet dicere quod prima intelligentia si per se tantum
moveret, tunc sequeretur secundum Philosophum ipsum movere
in tempore, sed si moveat immediate dicitur quod ad secundum
quod movet virtute finita; non dicetur movere in tempore, quia
universaliter causa secunda non determinat modum agendi
primae causae, sed e contra semper tenet suum proprium modum
agendi et movendi, sive aliud sit sive non sit agens quodcumque
agit secundum philosophos.
51 Quod etiam dicit iste doctor quod includit contradictionem
aliquid esse ex se formaliter necessarium et esse ab alio effective
sive causaliter, non est verum, quia efficientia abstrahit a
movente et transmutante. Patet, nam metaphysicus considerat
quattuor genera causarum quae etiam considerat naturalis, sed
:" Averroes, Metaph. XII, com. 36, 37, 14 (ed. luntina VIII, 318v, 319vH-
320vl; 327rE-328vM), etc.
power and application to motion, as a hand moves a bat applied to

moving a ball. And our proposal would still hold, because this
power or active influence is precisely its [i.e., second mover's]
substance. Or this should not be assumed, since it is suited by
nature to move what is determinable through its intellect and
will, [hi] Or in a third way so that both would move the same
mobile, and thus neither would depend upon the other in moving.
However, they would move in a certain order so that the first
moves in a more eminent* way than the other, and the second
less perfectly. Neither can the second move unless the first is
moving itself, as is the case with the father and mother with
respect to the child, where neither gives the other their causality,
although one causes in a more eminent way than the other, and
the second necessarily co-causes with the more eminent agent.
49 But this third way is impossible, according to the
Philosopher, because then infinite power would immediately
cause the motion of the body in time, which has been proved to be
impossible according to him. Therefore, our proposal follows: that
the second mover moves in virtue of the first mover, because it
receives being from it, and to this extent the first mover can be
said to move immediately. That is why the Commentator in Bk.
XII of the Metaphysics assumes that heaven is moved by a double
motor, namely one separated and the other conjoined.
50 Nor does it avail to say that, if the first intelligence would
move only through itself, then it would follow according to the
Philosopher that it would move itself in time. If it moved
immediately, however, it is said [to move] towards the second,
which moves by a finite power. One does not say it moves in time,
because universally the second cause does not determine the
manner of acting of the first cause, but on the contrary, it always
retains its own proper way of acting and moving, whether the
other be acting or not acting, whatever acts according to the
philosophers.
51 Also this doctor claims it includes a contradiction for
something to be formally necessary in itself and to be effectively
or causally from another. It is not true, because efficiency
abstracts from the one moving and transmuting. It is evident, for
the metaphysician considers the four genera of causes that the
modo communiori et abstractiori; nam a metaphysico considera-

ntur ut abstrahuntur a se ipsis, ut considerantur naturaliter.
Physicus enim simul considerat causam agentem ut est movens et
transmutans materiam ut est subiectum transmutatum a
privatione in formam, formam autem ut dat esse materiae per
respectum ad motum, finem vero ut est terminus motus. Sed
metaphysicus considerat causam agentem vel efficientem ut
abstrahit a motu et mutatione (et hoc secundum philosophos est
possibile quod aliquid det esse sine motu et transmutatione: patet
per Avicennam, VI Metaphysicae):32 materiam etiam considerat
ut substat formae a qua informatur (formam autem considerat ut
praecise est quiditas rei vel pars quiditatis); finem vero ut bonum
rei ad quod ordinatur secundum suam essentiam et non per
transmutationem. Non ergo est contradictio apud philosophos
quod aliquid sit necesse esse formaliter ex se et ab alio effective.
52 Hoc etiam patet secundum istum doctorem qui ponit Filium
in divinis generari de essentia Patris quasi de materia et Filium
esse possibile obiective, et tamen hoc non obstante ponit Filium
non habere eandem necessitatem cum Patre; ergo secundum
philosophos, si intelligentia secunda sit a prima necessitate
naturali non est contradictio quod sit possibile obiective et tamen
formaliter necessarium alia necessitate; plus enim includit
contradictionem, ut videtur, quod aliquid sit ab alio et tamen sit
necessarium eadem necessitate quam quod sit ab alio et alia
necessitate.
53 Ad hoc vero quod adducunt de Philosopho, XII Metaphy
sicae, et I De caelo et mundo33 dico ad illud et ad id de
perpetuitate motus, quod non repugnat motui esse possibile
formaliter in suo esse actuali et habere perpetuitatem et tamen
esse ab alio effective, quia motus non habet totum suum esse
:w Avicenna, Metaph. VI, c. 1 (AviL, 291-2).

Cf. supra n. 38, 39, 42
natural scientist also considers, but in a way that is more

common and abstract; for by the metaphysician they are
considered as abstracted from themselves qua considered
naturally. For the physicist considers the agent cause at the same
time as moving and transmuting matter, as it is the subject being
changed from a privation into a form; the form, however, [he
considers] as it gives being to matter through its relationship to
motion; the end, however, as it is the term of motion. But the
metaphysician considers the agent or efficient cause as abstracted
from motion and change (and it is possible according to the
philosophers that something gives being without motion and
transmutation: this is evident from Avicenna, in Bk. VI of the
Metaphysics); he also considers matter as it stands beneath the
form by which it is informed (however, he considers the form
precisely as the quiddity* of a thing or part of the quiddity); the
end, however, [he considers] as the good of a thing to which it is
ordered according to its essence and not through transmutation.
Therefore the philosophers see no contradiction in that something
is formally necessary in itself and is from another effectively.
52 This is also evident according to this doctor [Henry] who
assumes the Son in the divine is generated through the essence of
the Father as from quasi matter and that the Son is a possible
objectively. Notwithstanding this, he assumes the Son does not
have the same [sort of] necessity as the Father. Therefore,
according to the philosophers, if the second intelligence is from
the first by a natural necessity, it is not a contradiction that it be
objectively possible and nevertheless formally necessary by
another kind of necessity.17 For that something be from another
and nevertheless be necessary by the same sort of necessity
seems to include a greater contradiction than it would if it were
from another by another kind of necessity.
53 Regarding the fact that they adduce for this the Philosopher
in Bk. XII of the Metaphysics and I De caelo et mundo, however, I
say to this and to that about the perpetuity of motion, that it is
not repugnant to motion to be formally possible in its actual being
and have perpetuity and nevertheless be from another effectively,
17 Because the causality is natural it is necessary and therefore the effect

necessarily exists.
simul sed successive in partibus suis, et suum esse semper est

cum innovatione suarum partium reali. Substantia vero habet
suum esse permanens totum simul, et ideo quale accipit a sua
causa, tale esse retinet.
54 Arguit Philosophus igitur contra Platonem I De caelo et
mundo34 sic: si aliqua substantia accipit esse possibile a primo et
cuilibet potentiae passivae naturali correspondet alia activa
naturalis, ergo in natura est aliqua potentia activa naturalis nata
corrumpere possibilitatem passivam illius substantiae, nisi
impediatur; sed secundum ipsum ibidem, nullum impediens vel
violentum est perpetuum; ergo aliquando corrumpet illud; unde
secundum ipsum tale possibile ante actum scilicet corrumpetur
aliquando et necessario destruetur a tali potentia activa sibi
correspondente. Unde bene argueret contra Platonem, si Plato
concessisset assumptum, scilicet quod omni potentiae passivae
naturali correspondet aliqua potentia activa naturalis. Si autem
diceret, sicut nos dicimus, quod voluntate divina sint necessaria,
negando etiam assumptum argumentum, contra eum non haberet
evidentiam, sicut nec contra nos.
55 Si autem arguitur quod ita possunt35 plures intelligentiae
moventes mediate suos orbes, quae tamen immediate moventur a
suis motoribus coniunctis et tunc intelligentias sic mediate
moventes poneret Philosophus necessarias ex se et infinitas
infinite non habentes esse ab alio sed omnino infinitae sicut
primum est infinitum
M Cf. supra n. 39; also cf. Aristot.. De caelo I, c. 12 (280a 29-31)

M Lege: possunt esse.
because motion does not have the whole of its being

simultaneously but successively in its parts, and its being is
always marked by a real renovation of its parts. A substance,
however, has its whole permanent being simultaneously, and
therefore it retains precisely the sort of being it accepts from its
cause.
54 Therefore, the Philosopher argues against Plato in Bk. I of
De caelo et mundo in this way. If some substance accepts possible
being from a first [being or cause] and to each natural passive
potency corresponds another natural active one, therefore in
nature there is some natural active potency suited by nature to
corrupt the passive possibility of that substance unless it is
impeded. But according to him in the same work, nothing
impeding or violent is perpetual. Therefore, at some time it
corrupts it. Hence, according to him such a possible thing,
namely, before it becomes actual, is at some time corrupted and
necessarily destroyed by such an active potency that corresponds
to it. Hence, he would have argued well against Plato, if Plato
were to accept his assumption, namely that some active natural
potency corresponds to each passive natural potency. If however
he were to say, as we say, that there may be things made
necessary by divine will, and also denied the assumed argument,
[his case] against him18 would cease to be evident, just as it does
not hold good against us.
55 Suppose, however, it were argued that in this way there
could be several intelligences mediately moving their celestial
spheres, which however are moved immediately by their
conjoined motors19and then the Philosopher would assume
intelligences, moving through another in this way, to be
necessary of themselves and infinitely infinite, not having being
from anotherbut being entirely infinite just as the first
intelligence is infinite.
1H Plato.
19 According to the theory proposed (which was held by Avicenna and Arabic
philosophers to be the authentic view of the Philosopher), the intelligences that
emanated from God functioned as final causes, whereas the celestial movement
was caused efficiently by an internal motor principle or soul.
56 confirmatur hoc esse de intentione Philosophi, XII Metaphy-

sicae,36 quia postquam ibi ostendit primum movens esse virtutis
infinitae, quia movet tempore infinite, quaerit utrum ponenda sit
una talis substantia vel plures, et ostendit quod huiusmodi
substantiae sint plures; ergo vult quod sint plures substantiae
virtutis infinitae.
57 Item, idem concludit plures substantias esse naturaliter
sempiternas, necessarias et immobiles propter se sine omni
magnitudine propter eandem causam; causa autem quare
ostendit primum movens esse tale est infinitas eius virtualis; ergo
vult quod infinitas conveniat aliis substantiis separatis.
58 Sed quod omnis substantia separata, quantumcumque
necessaria et sempiterna, secundum intentionem Philosophi, sit a
prima effective, probatio: quia si omnes huiusmodi substantiae
immediate moveant, habetur propositum; quia tunc non erunt
virtutis infinitae, ut prius ostensum est.
59 Si dicit quod quaelibet intelligentia movens habeat suum
deum virtutis infinitae, cum ipsae habeant aliquem ordinem ad
primum simpliciter, ut ipsi dicunt, alitor enim inconnexam
facerent substantiam universi, secundum Philosophum XII
Metaphysicae, oportet quod istae plures substantiae sint eiusdem
speciei cum primo simpliciter, aut alterius speciei. Non ponit
Philosophus quod sint eiusdem speciei, quia inter illa quae sunt
eiusdem speciei non est ordo essentialis necessario, non enim est
unum individuum eiusdem speciei perfectius et aliud imperfec-
tius, nisi propter agens qui perfectius agit ad productionem unius
quam alterius. Non potest dici quod sint alterius speciei a primo,
quia intellectus non capit quod inter illa quae sunt infinitae
virtutis et naturae intellectualis, sit ordo essentialis, ita ut unum
* Cf. Aristot., Metaph. XII (A), c. 8 (1073a 24-6 3), etc.

56 This is confirmed to be the intention of the Philosopher in

Bk. XII of the Metaphysics, because after he shows there the first
mover to be of infinite power, because it moves in an infinite time,
he raises the question of whether there is one such substance or
several, and shows that there are several such substances of
infinite20 power.
57 Also, the same person implies that there are several
substances that are naturally eternal, necessary, and immobile of
themselves without any magnitude for the same reason; the cause
he cites why the first mover is such is his virtual infinity;
therefore he has in mind that infinity pertains to other
substances separated [from matter].
58 But there is proof that all separated [or immaterial]
substances, however necessary and eternal, according to the mind
of the Philosopher are from the first effectively: because if all
such substances moved immediately, we would have what we
propose; because then they would not be of infinite power, as was
shown earlier.
59 If he said that each moving intelligence had its god of
infinite power, since these [intelligences] have some unqualified
order to the first [intelligence], as these21 sayotherwise it would
destroy the substance of the universe's interconnection
according to the Philosopher in Bk. XII of the Metaphysics, it
would be necessary that these several substances would be either
of the same species as the first or of another species. The
Philosopher does not assume they are of the same species,
because among such there is necessarily no essential* order,22 for
it is not that one individual of the same species is more perfect
and another less perfect, unless it be on account of an agent
acting more perfectly in producing one than another. [At the
same time,] it cannot be said that [these several substances] are
of another species than the first, because the mind cannot grasp
that between those things which are of infinite power and of an
20 Their power is that of producing circular motion. If this is infinite, it is

equivalent to immobility. See n. 47 and 53 above.
21 Avicenna et alii.
22 According to Scotus one of the conditions for an essential order is that it
be between things that are not of the same kind and hence are specifically
different. See his argument for the existence of God earlier, dist. 2, n. 19.
essentialiter sit inferius alio in tali natura, licet hoc possit

contingere in his quae non sunt naturae intellectualis nec
infinita. Quae enim dicunt perfectionem limitatam, licet essent
infinita et illimitata in illa perfectione, non propter hoc sunt
infinita simpliciter vel perfecte illimitata. Linea enim si esset
infinita intensive vel extensive in perfectione quantitatis, adhuc
non esset simpliciter illimitata, sed solum in tali genere, eo quod
adhuc linea esset in genere. Et hoc ideo est quia nobilissimum in
superiori nunquam sequitur ad nobilissimum in inferiori, nisi
illud inferius sit nobilissimum contentum sub illo superiori, sicut
nunquam sequitur 'est nobilissimus asinus, ergo nobilissimum
animal', quia homo est nobilissimum animalium.
60 Ita in proposito. Nunquam ad infinitatem entis inferioris
sequitur simpliciter infinitas in ente, nisi sit nobilissimum
contentum sub ente. Et ideo si animal sit infinitum in
animalitate, non tamen propter hoc est simpliciter infinitas, quia
animalitas non est nobilior condicio contenta sub ente. Sed si
natura intellectualis quae est superior et nobilior contenta sub
ente sit infinita, sequitur simpliciter infinitas, et ideo quod est
supremum in intellectualitate est supremum in entitate. Sed
contradictionem includit plura esse suprema in intellectualitate
diversae speciei, quia in quantum talia unum dependet
essentialiter ab alio; in quantum sunt naturae intellectualis et
infinita, sunt simpliciter suprema in entitate et non dependent;
ergo simul dependent et non dependent. Sed contradictionem non
ponit Philosophus, secundum eos, ergo non ponit plures tales
substantias separatas et infinitas.
61 Item, potest hoc probari, sicut distinctione 2 quaestione de
infinitate probatum est. Si enim sunt duae substantiae infinitae,
aut una earum intelligit alteram quantum intelligibilis est, aut
non etc. Quaere ibi.
intellectual nature, there exists an essential order, so that one is

essentially inferior to another in such a nature, although this
could happen in those things which are not of an intellectual
nature nor infinite. For those things that imply limited
perfection, although they can be infinite23 and unlimited in that
perfection, are not on this account infinite in a simple and
unqualified sense or unlimited in a perfect sense. For a line, if it
were intensively or extensively infinite as regards the perfection
of quantity, would still not be simply unlimited, but would be so
only in such a genus, inasmuch as it would still be a line by
genus. And this is because the most noble thing in a superior
[genus or category] never followed from what is most noble in a
lesser [category] unless the latter is the most noble thing
contained under that higher category, just as this never follows 'it
is the most noble ass, therefore it is the most noble animal,'
because man is the most noble animal.
60 And it is so in the case at hand. Simple infinity in being
never follows the infinity of an inferior thing, unless it is the
noblest contained under being. And therefore if animal is infinite
in animality, it is not on this account that it is simply infinite,
because animality is not the nobler condition contained under
being. But if an intellectual nature, which is the superior and
nobler [condition] contained under being, is infinite, simple
infinity follows, and therefore that which is supreme in
intellectuality is supreme in entity. But that there be several of
diverse species that are supreme in intellectuality includes a
contradiction, because insofar as they are such one depends
essentially upon another, [but] inasmuch as they are of an
intellectual nature and infinite, they are simply supreme in entity
and are not dependent. Therefore, they are simultaneously
dependent and not dependent. But the Philosopher does not posit
a contradiction, according to them; therefore, he does not posit
several such separate and infinite substances.
61 Also, it can be proved, as it has been proved in distinction
two, in the question about infinity. For if there were two infinite
substances, either one would understand the other insofar as it
was intelligible, or it would not, etc. Look there.
M That is, possess that perfection perfectly.

62 Ex his concludo quod cum quamlibet aliam intelligentiam a

prima posuerunt finitae virtutis et nullam aliam posuerunt nisi
moventem caelum aut aliquem orbem, ut patet ex XII
Metaphysicae, quia nullam posuit sine operatione sua, et cum
quaelibet movens caelum vel orbem sit a primo effective, sequitur
quod omnes aliae intelligentiae sunt a prima effective.
63 Quando igitur dicunt quod Philosophus quaerit utrum sint
plures tales substantiae vel una, et dicit quod plures, dico quod
nunquam concludit tales plures esse infinitas; sed postquam
conclusit primam substantiam esse infinitam et virtutis infinitae,
concludit etiam quod est impassibilis, immaterialis et inaltera-
bilis; et in talibus condicionibus convenit prima intelligentia cum
aliis intelligentiis. Quaerit ergo utrum ponenda sit una talis
substantia vel plures, non quantum ad causalitatem infinitatis.
sed quantum ad causalitatem et convenientiam aliarum
condicionum praedictarum, et dicit quod plures. Unde isti saltant
unum paragraphum et non bene continuant litteram Philosophi.
64 Sed quando probant quod plures substantiae sunt
huiusmodi propter eandem causam, scilicet infinitatem virtutis,
dicendum quod illa causa non est infinitas virtutis, ut ipsi
concludunt, sed aliae condiciones, quae secundum ipsum sunt
communes omnibus intelligentiis, ut esse sine materia et esse
purus actus, quas condiciones probant eis prius competere. Unde
faciunt fallaciam consequentis: 'propter eandem causam, ergo
propter hanc causam, scilicet infinitatem', non sequitur, sed
propter condiciones omnibus communes intelligentiis' quae dictae
sunt.
65 Quod etiam dicunt de speciebus corporalium, quod sunt ex
se necessariae et non ab alio effective, secundum intentionem
Philosophi, dicendum quod hoc non est verum, quia cum species
non habeant37 esse reale nisi in individuis nisi poneres esse
platonicum, et secundum esse (quod habent in individuis)
i7 Habeant: sic codd. Lege: habeat (cf. Add. A/.).

62 And from this I conclude that since they assume that any
intelligence other than the first is of limited power and they posit
none that does not move the heaven or some celestial orb, as is
evident from Bk. XII of the Metaphysics, because he has posited
none without its operation, and since every one [of them] moving
heaven or an orb is effectively from the first, it follows that all
other intelligences are effectively from the first.
63 Therefore, when they say that the Philosopher asks whether
there are several such substances or only one, and says that there
are several, I say that never did he conclude that such are
infinite. On the contrary, after he has concluded that the first
substance is infinite and of infinite power, he also concludes that
it is incapable of suffering, immaterial and unalterable; and it is
in such [other] conditions that the first intelligence agrees with
the other intelligences. Therefore, he asked whether there was
one such substance or several not regarding the causality of
infinity, but regarding causality and an agreement in respect to
the other aforesaid conditions, and he said that there were
several. Hence, these skip one paragraph and do not follow well
the text of the Philosopher.
64 But when they prove that several substances are such
because of the same cause, namely because of infinite power, it
must be said that that cause is not infinite power, as they
conclude, but the other conditions, which according to him are
common to all intelligences, as to be without matter and to be
pure act, which conditions, they prove, pertain to them first.
Hence, they commit a fallacy of [affirming the] consequent:
'because the same cause, therefore because of this cause, namely,
infinity' does not follow, but [what does follow is] 'because of the
(aforementioned) conditions common to all intelligences.'
65 As to what they say about corporal species, that, according
to the mind of the Philosopher, they are necessary of themselves
and are not effectively from another, one must say this is not
true. For, since the species does not have real being except in
individualsunless you assume a platonic being, and the second
being (that the [species] have in individuals) is from the first
quocuraque alio movente est a primo effective sequitur quod

secundum esse suum reale totaliter sit ab alio effective, sive sit
necessaria vel non.
66 Quod etiam dicunt Philosophum sensisse de elemento non
est verum, quia cum totum sit eiusdem speciei cum parte et pars
sit ab alio effective, non potest dici quin totum sit ab alio effective
quantum ad esse reale quod habet. Unde sicut ponit Philosophus
partes elementi esse effective a partibus caeli, sic ponit totum
elementum a toto caelo effective, a quo in essendo conservatur
secundum totum, licet secundum partes corrumpatur. Una enim
pars caeli uno tempore plus corrumpit in una regione de uno
elemento et alia regione plus generat de eodem secundum aliam
partem caeli, et sic ponit totum elementum a toto caelo effective,
ut dictum est. Sic igitur quantum ad istum modum, dico quod
Philosophus ponit omnia necessaria ex se formaliter esse et a
primo effective, praeter primum, non tamen accipiendo esse post
non esse duratione, sed tantum natura.
67 Secundus modus necessitatis est secundum quem est aliquid
necessarium ex se formaliter et non ab alio effective, sed
dependenter ab alio; et doctor iste dicens Philosophum negasse
primum, dicit posuisse istum in substantiis separatis propter
ordinem eorum essentialem ad primum, licet non posuerit
ordinem causalitatis, sicut prius ostensum est, quemadmodum in
speciebus figurarum et numerorum, ubi quaelibet dependet ab
alia, licet nulla causetur ab alia.
effectively, through the mediation24 of something elseit follows

that, according to its real being, [the species,] whether it is
necessary or not, is totally from another effectively.
66 As to what they maintain the Philosopher thought about the
elements is not true, for, since the whole is of the same species as
the part and the part is from another effectively, it cannot be said
that whole is not from another effectively as regards the real
being that it has. Hence just as the Philosopher assumes the
parts of the element to be effectively from parts of the heaven, so
he postulates that the whole of the element is from the heaven
effectively, by which it is conserved in being as a whole, although
its parts may be corrupted. For one part of heaven at one time
corrupts more of one element in one region, and in another region
generates more of the same [element] according to another part of
heaven, and thus he assumes the whole element is effectively
from the whole heaven, as has been said. In this way, then, so far
as this first mode [of necessity] is concerned, I say that the
Philosopher assumes that all things that are of themselves
formally necessary, except the first, have their being effectively
from the first, where one takes 'being after non-being' not in a
durational sense,25 but only by nature.
67 The second mode of necessity is that according to which
something is formally necessary of itself and is not from another
effectively, but is dependent upon another. And this doctor
[Henry] declaring that the Philosopher denies the first, says that
he has postulated this [mode] in the separate substances because
of their essential order to the first, although he has not postulated
an order of causality, as has been shown earlier, just as in species
of figures and numbers, where each is dependent upon another,
although none is caused by the other.
u The translation "mediation," as well as proposing "species" as the subject

of the following clause (starting with "it follows that"), is suggested by the
corresponding reading in Add. M.
Scotus is referring here to the way in which Avicenna understood creation,
defined as 'being after non-being,' as compatible with necessary and perpetual
existence. That is to say the necessary intelligences were created inasmuch as
they were by their nature 'non-being' since they received their being from
another, and did not possess it by reason of their nature. Though they were given
existence from all eternity they had 'being after non-being' so far as their nature
was concerned, and not durationally.
68 Sed quod iste modus contradictionem includat negando

primum, probo etiam secundum intentionem Philosophi
quia quod nullo modo habet esse ab alio et est necesse esse a se
formaliter infinitum, nullo modo dependet ab alio. Dependentia
enim non potest esse sine causalitate quacumque, patet. Ergo hoc
ponere implicat contradictionem.
69 Nec exemplum eorum de numeris et figuris valet, quia una
species figurae vel numeri non dependet ab alia in actu, ut
quaternarius a ternario nec pentagonus a tetragono, nec plus
quam albedo a nigredine vel e converso: in actu, dico, quia potest
esse pentagonus vel tetragonus sine triangulo in actu et
quaternarius sine ternario sive binario in actu. Una tamen figura
dependet ab alia in potentia, sive una species ab alia in potentia,
quia potentia est pars eius; quaternarius enim non potest esse
sine ternario in ipso in potentia. Sic autem non dependet creatura
a Deo, quasi Deus sit in ipsa in potentia, quasi pars eius sit in
potentia; patet. Sic etiam est de speciebus aliis universi quod licet
una dependeat ab alia in mensurando et in cognoscendo, ut
nigredo ab albedine, non tamen in essendo, cum una possit esse
sine alia; omnes tamen dependent ad Deum in essendo, quia
contradictio est quod aliquid dependeat a Deo ita quod non possit
esse sine eo, tamen quod non sit ab eo quantum ad esse eius
effective.
70 Tertius modus necessitatis ponitur ut aliquid sit ex se
possibile et tamen sit ab alio necessarium, quia necessario
causatur ab illo, et istum modum posuit Avicenna, VI et IX
Metaphysicae,38 in separatis a materia aliis a primo quod est
simpliciter necesse esse.
71 Et dicit doctor praecedens quod Aristoteles istum modum
non posuit, quia implicat contradictionem. Quod probatur sic: si
Avicenna, Metoph. VI, c. 1 (AviL. 297-8); ibid., IX, c. 4 (AviL, 481).

68 But I prove that this mode includes contradiction by

negating the first modeeven according to the mind of the
Philosopherbecause that, which in no way has being from
another and is by itself necessary being that is formally infinite,
in no way depends upon another. For dependence cannot be
without causality of some sort, this is evident. Therefore, to
assume this implies a contradiction.
69 Nor is their example about numbers and figures valid,
because one species of figure or number does not depend upon
another in actuality, as neither a quaternary upon a ternary nor a
pentagon upon a tetragon, no more than whiteness upon
blackness or vice versa; and I say 'in actuality' because a
pentagon or a tetragon can be in actuality without a triangle and
a quaternary in actuality without a ternary or a binary. However,
one figure depends upon another in potency, or one species upon
another in potency, because a potency is a part of it; for a
quaternary cannot be without a ternary in it in potency. In this
way, however, a creature does not depend upon God, as though
God were in it in potency, as a quasi part of it is there in potency;
this is evident. It is this way also regarding the other species in
the universe: although one may depend upon another in
measuring and in knowing, as black upon white, it does not
[depend upon it] in being, since one can be without another; all
however depend upon God in being, because it is a contradiction
that something may depend upon God in such a way that it could
not be without him and yet not be from him effectively as regards
its being.
70 The third mode of necessity posits that something is of itself
possible and nevertheless is from another necessarily, because
necessarily caused by it, and this way Avicenna postulated in Bk.
VI and IX of his Metaphysics in things separated from matter
other than the first which is necessary being in an unqualified
sense.
71 And the preceding doctor26 says that Aristotle does not
postulate this mode, because it implies a contradiction, which he
proves in this way. For if something is possible of itself, this
M Henry of Ghent.
enim sit possibile ex se, ponatur in esse et quod non sit; ergo tunc
non causatur necessario ab alio.
72 Responsio: dico quod Aristoteles istum modum posuit in
omnibus intelligentiis citra primam; nec Avicenna contradicit
Philosopho in aliquo, sed ipsum in hoc exponit; nec includit
contradictionem. Probatio: quod capit esse ab alio in sua
quiditate, non includit esse sed posse esse, quia intelligere
praecise humanitatem non est intelligere ipsam ut includit esse,
sed in potentia ad esse, quia est in potentia ad omne illud quod
non habet, possibile tamen habere.
73 Et sic loquitur Avicenna de quiditate, V Metaphysicae,39
quod equinitas vel humanitas non est nisi humanitas tantum
praecise loquendo, nec actu nec potentia, nec includit esse vel non
esse; et ideo omne illud quod est extra praecisum conceptum
quiditatis vocat accidens ei; et sicut subiectum est in potentia ad
omnia accidentia sua, ita quiditas praecise considerata ad esse vel
non esse, actum vel potentiam et ad huiusmodi, quae sunt extra
formalem et quiditativum intellectum eius. Et isto modo dico
quod Aristoteles ponit omnem intelligentiam aliam a prima esse
in se possibilem et in potentia ad esse, quia nulla intelligentia de
formali et quiditativa ratione eius includit esse, sed Deus est
quiditative et formaliter ipsum esse. Concordant ergo
Philosophus et Avicenna. Nec primus modus essendi differt a
tertio in se.
74 Ad rationem eorum, cum dicitur 'si sit possibile, ponatur in
esse', responsio: ubi est possibilitas ante actum, ibi potest esse
potentia in esse realiter; sed quando non est talis possibilitas, sed
tantum in conceptu et secundum naturam qua unum naturaliter
praecedit aliud nec formaliter includit illud in suo conceptu, tunc
debet poni in esse, non in re, sed in conceptu, sic quod non est de
se in quantum consideratur eius quiditas praecise tale. Exem-
plum de ente et uno: cum enim ens in suo conceptu non includat
unum, sic est in potentia ad esse unum, sed non sequitur ex hoc
Ibid.. V, c. 1 (AviL, 228-33).

implies [at the same time] being and that it does not exist;
therefore it is not then caused necessarily by another.
72 Response: I say that Aristotle has postulated this mode in
all the intelligences besides the first; neither does Avicenna
contradict the Philosopher in anything, but he explains him in
this; nor does it include a contradiction. Proof: that which grasps
being from another in its quiddity, does not include existence but
possibility of existence. For to think of humanity precisely is not
to think of it as including existence, but only that it can be,
because it is in potency to all that which it does not have, but
possibly can have.
73 And in this way Avicenna speaks of the quiddity in Bk. V of
the Metaphysics that equinity or humanity is nothing but
humanity alone, if one is speaking precisely; neither is it act or
potency nor does it include existence or non-existence. And
therefore all that which is outside of the precise concept of
quiddity he calls an accident of it; and just as a subject is in
potency to all its accidents, so is quiddity precisely considered as
regards existence or non-existence, act or potency, and the like,
which are outside of the formal* and quidditative conception of it.
And in this way I say that Aristotle postulated any intelligence
other than the first to be possible in itself and in potency to
existence, because no intelligence by its formal and quidditative
concept includes existence, but God is quidditatively and formally
his existence. Therefore the Philosopher and Avicenna are in
agreement. Nor is the first mode of being in itself any different
from the third mode.
74 To their rational argument, when one says that if it is
possible, one may posit it to be, the response is: where there is
possibility before actuality, there can really be a potency to exist.
When there is no such [real] possibility, however, but only in
concept and according to nature, by which one naturally precedes
another and does not include that formally in its concept, then
one should posit that it has being in concept and not in reality; in
this way it is not from itself inasmuch as its quiddity may be
considered precisely as such. Take for example 'being' and 'one':
for since a being does not include one' in its concept, in this way
it is in potency to being one. It does not follow from this, however,
quod possibile sit ipsum non esse unum nec sic debet poni in esse
sed quod de se quiditative non est unum, id est ratio unitatis, et
hoc est verum; nec sequitur impossibile si sic ponatur in esse. Sic
est in proposito.
75 Sic ergo quantum ad primum articulum quae fuerit intentio
Aristotelis et Avicennae circa substantias separatas patet.
Posuerunt enim eas necessarias ex se et ab alio effective; et
similiter posuerunt illa possibilia ex se praescindendo rationem
quiditatis earum ab esse, et necessaria ab alio necessario
causante illa.
[Art. 2 Rationes ad confirmandum positionem

philosophorum]
76 Secundo principali ponendae sunt rationes quaedam, habita

intentione philosophorum circa immutabilitatem entium: quae
rationes sunt ad confirmandum positionem eorum.
77 Prima ratio est talis: nobilior modus causandi non tollit
nobilitatem sive nobilitatis condicionem in effectu, sed effectum
esse necessarium est condicio nobilitatis in effectu, et
voluntarium est condicio nobilitatis in causa. Si igitur primum
causaret necessitate naturali, effectus posset esse necessarius,
sed causa voluntaria; ista enim possunt esse simul, ut infra
ostendetur, necessitas et libertas.
78 Item, si primum ens causaret necessitate naturali potest in
effectus necessarios; et si libere, potest in effectus possibiles; sed
si tantum posset in effectus necessarios, arctaretur ad unam
differentiam entium, et si tantum ad effectus possibiles,
arctaretur ad aliam differentiam. Ergo cum omnis modus
nobilitatis in causando debeat attribui primo, sequitur quod
potest causare effectus necessarios et possibiles indifferenter.
79 Item, causa aliqua necessario agit sive causat, ergo causa
prima. Probatio consequentiae: ubi est ordo essentialis, non potest
necessarium dependere a non necessario; non enim posterius
that it is possible for it not to be one nor should one posit it to be

in this way, but that as regards itself quidditatively it is not one,
i.e., the notion 'one,' and this is true. Neither does the impossible
follow if one posits it to be in this way, and so it is in the case at
hand.
75 In this way, therefore, as for the first article it is evident
what may have been the intention of Aristotle and Avicenna as
regards substances separated [from matter]. For they postulated
them to be necessary of themselves and from another effectively;
and they likewise postulated them to be possible of themselves by
cutting off the notion of their quiddity from existence, considering
them necessary because another causes them necessarily.
Article Two
Arguments in favor of the philosophers' opinion
76 Secondly, once the opinion of the philosophers about the

immutability of things is established, certain reasons need to be
given that tend to confirm their position.
77 Such is the first reason: the more noble mode of causing
does not destroy the nobility or condition of nobility in the effect,
but for the effect to be necessary is a condition of nobility in the
effect, and to be voluntary a condition of nobility in the cause. If,
therefore, the first were to cause by a natural necessity, the effect
could be necessary, but the cause voluntary. For, as will be shown
later, necessity and liberty can exist at the same time.
78 Also, if the first being were to cause by a natural necessity,
it would have power in respect to necessary effects; and if it
caused freely, it would have power in respect to possible effects;
but if it could only have power as regards necessary effects, it
would be limited to one division of beings, and if it were capable
only of possible effects, it would be limited to another division [of
beings]. Therefore, since one should attribute all manner of
nobility in causing to the first, it follows that it could cause
necessary and possible effects indiscriminately.
79 Also, some cause acts or causes necessarily, therefore the
first cause does. Proof of the implication: where there is an
essential order, the necessary cannot depend upon the
potest esse necessarium quin prius sit necessarium, quia

necessarium non sequitur nisi ex necessario. Et sic si aliqua
connexio in effectu est necessaria, cum dependeat a prima, ergo
prima est necessaria et sic necessario causat.
80 Teneo igitur quod nihil aliud a Deo est nisi effective ab eo,
dico tamen quod non est necessario causatum.
[Art. 3 Contra positionem philosophorum]
81 Ad cuius evidentiam nunc tertio principali sunt ponendae

rationes contra positionem philosophorum, qui dicunt primum de
necessitate causare suos effectus.
[II. Argumenta Henrici Gandavensis

et responsiones Scoti]
82 Et arguunt aliqui sic: omne agens naturaliter perficitur sua

actione vel productione vel producto; sed primum agens non sic
perficitur, quia est infinitus, ergo etc. Maior probatur, quia omne
agens naturale agit propter finem; non ageret propter finem nisi
finis esset bonum et perfectio eius; ergo etc.
83 Sed contra: ostendo quod haec ratio non concludit, quia licet
agens agat propter finem, non sequitur quod finis sit perfectio
eius, quia primum non agit propter alium finem extra, et ideo non
perficitur alio; agit autem propter aliquid aliud ad quod ordinat
productum et hoc est propter se tantum, ergo etc.
84 Secunda ratio istorum est talis: si aqua non posset manere

in sua frigiditate nisi in ordine ad aliud infrigidans vel ad aliquid
circumstans, non esset perfecta in frigiditate, sed dependeret ab
illo in frigiditate. Deus autem a nullo dependet, sicut patet; ergo
perfectissimus in causando; ergo si Deus non potest esse nisi
causaret ens, esset imperfectum.
unnecessary; for the posterior cannot be necessary unless the first

is necessary, because the necessary only follows from the
necessary. And if some connection in the effect is necessary, since
it depends upon the first, therefore the first is necessary and thus
it causes necessarily.
80 I hold therefore that nothing other than God exists unless
effectively from him, but I say that it is not necessarily caused.
Article Three
Refutation of the arguments of the philosophers
81 Now in the third main article, reasons must be presented as

evidence for this against the position of the philosophers, who say
the first causes its effects out of necessity.
Arguments of Henry of Ghent and Scotus's response
82 And some argue in this way: every agent is naturally

perfected by its action or production* or product;* but the first
agent is not perfected, because it is infinite, therefore etc. The
major is proved, because every natural agent acts for the sake of
an end; it would not act if the end were not good and its
perfection; therefore etc.
83 Against this, however: I show that this reason is not
conclusive. For although an agent acts for the sake of an end, it
does not follow that the end is its perfection, because the first
does not act for any extrinsic end and therefore it is not perfected
by another; but it does act for the sake of something else to which
the product is ordered and this is for the sake of itself alone;
therefore etc.
84 The second reason of these is such: if water could not retain
its coldness except through a relation to something that makes it
cold or to some other circumstance, it would not be perfect in its
coldness, but it would depend upon another in coldness. However,
God is dependent on nothing, as is evident; therefore he is most
perfect in causing; therefore, if God could only exist if he caused a
being, he would be imperfect.
85 Sed ad hanc rationem potest esse responsio Avicennae, quia

non communicat bonitatem vel entitatem suam producendo res
extra quia dependens ad illas, sed ex plenitudine perfectionis.
86 Tertia ratio istorum est talis: potentia respiciens naturaliter

aliquod obiectum primum, non respicit essentialiter et necessario
nisi illa obiecta quae habent essentialem ordinem ad illud, et non
illa quae ordinantur ad illud obiectum accidentaliter. Sed
voluntas divina respicit essentiam suam ut primum obiectum ad
quod habent omnia alia creata tantum ordinem accidentalem;
ergo Deus illa non respicit necessario.
87 Sed contra hanc rationem, sic iste doctor ponit Deum velle
necessario respectu essentiarum quas ponit ab aeterno; ergo non
magis est ibi velle necessarium, scilicet in essentiis, quam in
exsistentiis creaturarum, eo quod neutrum habet essentialem
ordinem ad essentiam vel exsistentiam divinam, quae est primum
et per se obiectum divinae voluntatis.
[III. Solutio Scoti]
88 Et ideo praeter istas rationes deductas et formatas meliori

modo quo possunt, adduco tres rationes. Prima est ista: ens
absolutum, summe necessarium non potest non esse, quocumque
alio quod non est ipsum non exsistente; quodcumque enim aliud
est minus necessarium eo in entitate. Sed destructa entitate
minus necessaria, non propter hoc destruitur ens magis
necessarium, sicut nec ens minus perfectum potest destruere
magis perfectum ens; primum est huiusmodi, ergo etc.
89 Ponitur autem in maiore 'ens' et non tantum 'necessarium',
propter principium complexum necessarium et conclusionem
necessariam, ubi licet principium sit magis necessarium quam
conclusio, tamen ex non-entitate conclusions sequitur oppositum
principii, quia veritas conclusionis non est nisi quaedam partialis
Veritas principii. Sed si primum haberet necessariam causalita-
tem respectu aliorum, non posset esse illis non exsistentibus, quia
haberet necessariam habitudinem ad illa, et relativum non potest
esse sine suo correlativo, quia tunc illud minus necessarium non
exsistens haberet causalitatem respectu magis necessarii; ergo
85 However, to this reason the response of Avicenna could be

given. For he does not communicate his goodness and entity by
producing a thing outside because he is dependent upon it, but
out of the plenitude of his perfection.
86 The third reason of these is such: a potency naturally
regarding some first object, regards essentially and necessarily
only those objects that have an essential order to it, and not those
that are ordered to that object accidentally. But the divine will
regards its essence as its first object to which all other created
things have only an accidental order; therefore God does not
regard them necessarily.
87 However, against this reason, this doctor assumes that God
in this way wills necessarily with respect to essences that he
posits from eternity. Therefore his will is no more necessary
there, namely in essences, than in the existences of creatures,
because neither has an essential order to the divine essence or
existence, which is the first and per se object of the divine will.
88 And therefore besides these reasons conveyed and formed in

the best possible way, I adduce three reasons. The first is this: an
absolute being, necessary in the highest degree, cannot not exist,
[even] when nothing else, apart from it, exists; for whatever other
there is, is less necessary than it in entity. However, a destruction
of a less necessary entity does not bring about a destruction of a
more necessary being, just as a less perfect being cannot destroy a
more perfect being; and the first is such; therefore etc.
89 However, in the major 'being' is posited in addition to
'necessary,' for it is a complex necessary principle and a necessary
conclusion, where, although the principle is more necessary than
the conclusion, nevertheless from the non-entity or non-being of
the conclusion follows [some] opposition to the principle, because
the truth of the conclusion is nothing but a certain partial truth of
the principle. But if the first would have necessary causality with
respect to the others, it could not be when those things are non-
existing, because it would have a necessary relationship to them,
and a relative* cannot be without its correlative, since then that
non esset summe necessarium, quia perfectio non haberetur

summe ab aliquo nisi habeatur ab illo absolute et sine respectu ad
aliud. Et per hoc non tenet secunda ratio aliorum contra
philosophos dicta de aqua etc., quia non est absolute necessarium
nisi possit esse absque respectu ad alterum; sed aquae frigiditas
non est huiusmodi.
90 Secunda ratio probat sic: potentia respiciens ad aliquod
primum obiectum ad nullum aliud necessario respicit nisi illius
bonitas sit necessaria ratio tendendi in illud; voluntas divina
respicit bonitatem suam pro obiecto primo quae non est
necessaria ratio tendendi vel volendi alia volitione efficaci; ergo
etc.
91 Expositio minoris: voco volitionem vel voluntatem efficacem
non voluntatem complacentiae, qua voluntati divinae complacent
omnia alia cuius bonitas est ratio quare sibi complacent; sed
volitio est efficax qua res est in effectu, quae dat esse et efficere
rebus. Minorem probo, quia primum obiectum volitum non est
ratio necessaria tendendi in aliud nisi illud aliud sit necessarium
ad habendum vel conservandum vel consequendum primum; sed
primum dilectum nullo istorum modorum indiget creaturis ad sui
exsistentiam, sive nihil istorum contingit in proposito, ergo etc.
92 Item, tertio sic: aliquid fit contingenter in universo, ergo
primum contingenter causat. Expono antecedens: licet Deus
causaret necessario omnia, aliquod contingens posset fieri quod
posset ad tempus durare et post corrumpi a suo contrario. Sed
dico quod aliquid contingenter fit ita quod quando fit posset non
fieri in sensu diviso, et quando evenit potest non evenire; sicut
patebit de hoc, quaestione de praedestinatione.40 Aliter enim
destruitur consilii deliberatio et omnis actus humanus. Hoc
autem non esset possibile, si Deus necessario causaret quia
40 Cf. infra d 41.

less necessary non-existing thing would be causally linked to

what is more necessary; therefore the latter would not be
necessary in the highest degree, because something would not
have a perfection in the highest degree, unless it had it absolutely
and without a relation to another. And through this the second
reason of the others that speaks of water does not hold against
the philosophers, because it is not absolutely necessary unless it
could be without a relation to another; but the coldness of the
water is not such.
90 The second reason proves in this way: potency looking to
some first object regards nothing else necessarily unless its
goodness is a necessary reason for tending towards that; the
divine will regards its own goodness as a first object, which is not
a necessary reason for tending towards or willing another by an
efficacious will; therefore etc.
91 Explanation of the minor: by 'efficacious volition or will' I
mean not a will of complacency, by which all other things are
pleasing to the divine will, whose goodness is the reason why they
are pleasing to it; but a volition is efficacious when a thing is
effected by it, and it gives to things their existence and
efficaciousness. I prove the minor, because the first object
willed is not a necessary reason of tending towards another
unless that other is necessary in order to have, conserve, or
accompany the first; but the first beloved in none of these ways
needs creatures for its existence, or none of these happens in the
case at hand; therefore, etc.
92 Also, thirdly in this way: something happens in the universe
contingently, therefore the first causes contingently. I explain the
antecedent: even though God could have caused all things
necessarily, something contingent could come to be that could
endure for a time and then be corrupted by its contrary. However,
I say that something occurs contingently in such a way that when
it comes to be, it could have not come to be, in a divided sense,
and when it happens, it is capable of not occurring; as will be
made clear in the question about predestination [in Dist. 41]. For
otherwise deliberation in passing judgment, as well as every
human act would be destroyed. But this would not be possible, if
God were to cause necessarily, because he would move what is
moveret immediatum sibi necessario et illud iterum aliud sibi

immediatum necessario et sic usque ad proximum agens, et per
consequens non posset non evenire illud quod evenit.
93 Sed quomodo philosophi viderunt quod contingentia multa

accidunt in universo, et contingenter fieri multa, et tamen
posuerunt cum hoc primum causare et movere necessario?
Respondeo quod ista sunt incompossibilia: si primum moveat
immediatum sibi necessario, et omnia in illa coordinatione
necessario et quod effectus sub illa coordinatione causarum
contingenter eveniat, et ideo oportet quod sit alia coordinatio
contraria quae necessario se habeat ad non movere; et sic
secundum philosophos quaelibet coordinatio erit necessaria,
tamen contrariae necessitatis et tamen sequentur effectus
contingentes sicut patet de sole et saturno quorum sunt
contrariae influentiae. Concedo igitur quod quidlibet aliud a Deo
habet esse ab eo effective, a quo etiam est contingenter et nihil
aliud ab ipso est formaliter necessarium vel immutabile; sed
mutabile dicitur, id est vertibile de non esse ad esse et mutabile
ad esse actionem, sicut subiectum ad accidens, sicut patet de
angelo nobilissimo et eius operationibus. Et sic est in omni
substantia limitata quae potest perfici a quocumque agente, quod
potest sibi inesse et non inesse.
94 Ad primum argumentum principale41 quando dicitur pro

philosophis 'si primum causaret naturaliter, ageret necessario vel
causaret necessarium', dico quod unum impossibile vel
contradictorium sequitur ex alio impossibili vel contradictorio;
dico igitur quod primum includit incompossibilia quia in quantum
causaret voluntarie causaret contingenter et in quantum causaret
naturaliter, causaret necessario.
41 Cf. supra n. 77.

immediate to him necessarily, and that again would move

another next to it necessarily and so up to the proximate agent,
and as a consequence that which does occur could not have failed
to happen.
93 But how could the philosophers see that many contingent
things happen in the universe and many things come to be
contingently, and nevertheless postulate that this first moves and
causes necessarily? I respond that these are incompatible: 'if
the first would move what is immediate to it necessarily, also all
in that hierarchical order necessarily,' and 'that the effect under
that hierarchical order of causes would occur contingently.' And
therefore it is necessary that there be another contrary
hierarchical order which is necessarily disposed to 'not moving':
and thus according to the philosophers each hierarchical order
will be necessary, but [each] based on contrary necessity, and so
contingent effects will follow, as is evident of the Sun* and
Saturn, whose influences are contrary. I concede, therefore,
that everything other than God has existence from him
effectively: moreover, it stems from him contingently and nothing
other than himself is formally necessary or immutable, but is
called mutable. That is, it is able to turn from non-being to being
and is mutable as regards its action, just as a subject as regards
its accident, as is evident of the most noble angel and its
operations. And it is in this way regarding every limited
substance, which can be perfected by any acting that can be or
not be in it.
Reply to the main arguments
94 To the first main argument [n. 77], when it is said that for
the philosophers if the first were to cause naturally it would act
necessarily or cause something necessary, I say that one
impossible or contradictory follows from another impossible or
contradictory. I say, therefore, that the first includes
impossibilities, because insofar as it would cause voluntarily, it
would cause contingently, and insofar as it would cause naturally,
it would cause necessarily.
95 Et quando dicis quod nobilior causa debet habere nobiliorem

modum causandi concedo; 'et iste nobilior modus est condicio
necessarii vel necessitatis in causando', nego quia haec condicio
contradicit effectum. Necessitas enim in efficiente non est
condicio nobilis, sed contradicens effectum, ut alias patebit.
96 Ad secundam rationem42 dicendum quod est quaedam
necessitas immutabilitatis, et hoc est in prima causa. Et est alia
necessitas inevitabilitatis, et haec non est ibi, sicut patet per
Aristotelem, II Perihermenias.43 quod est quando est, necesse est
esse.
97 Et quando dicis quod causatur etc., dico quod est alia
differentia entis quam contingens et necessarium et quod essent
aliquae entitates necessariae et aliae contingentes; verum est
quod sequitur: sicut ex impossibili aliud impossibile vel sicut ex
contradictorio aliud contradictorium, ut dictum est.
98 Ad tertium,44 quando dicitur 'aliqua causa necessario causat,
ergo prima causa necessario causat', respondeo quod aliqua causa
necessario aliquo modo necessitatis causat, sed nulla causa
necessario simpliciter causat, quia sic primum necessario
causaret; sed si prima causatio sit contingens, et omnis alia
causatio erit contingens. Dico ergo quod aliqua causa necessaria
causat, non simpliciter sed secundum quid, id est necessario
quantum est de se in suo ordine considerata, non habendo
comparationem ad causam superiorem. In ordine autem causae
naturalis, necessario causat in quantum tales causae non habent
unde non causent ex se; unde ignis necessario causasset calorem
in camino trium puerorum, quantum erat ex extremis, nisi Deus
sua virtute speciali suspendisset calefactionem ignis.
u Cf. supra n. 78.

43 Aristot., De interpret, c. 9 (19a 24-6).
44 Cf. supra n. 79.
95 When you say that the nobler cause must have the nobler
mode of causing, I concede. I deny that this nobler mode is a
condition of the necessary or of necessity in causing, because this
condition contradicts the effect. For necessity in efficient cause is
not a noble condition, but is contradicting the effect, as will be
made clear elsewhere.
96 To the second reason [n. 78], one must say that there is a
certain necessity* of immutability, and this is in the first cause;
and there is another necessity* of inevitability, and this is not
there, as is evident from Aristotle, in Bk. II of the Perihermenias:
'What is, necessarily is, when it is.'
97 And when you say that it is caused, etc., I say that it is
another division of being, rather than [into] contingent and
necessary, and that there would be some necessary entities and
other contingent ones; [but] what follows is true: just as from the
impossible another impossible or from a contradictory another
contradictory, as has been said.
98 To the third [n. 79], when it is said that some cause
necessarily causes, therefore the first cause necessarily causes,' I
respond that some cause causes necessarily with some sort of
necessity, but no cause causes necessarily in an unqualified
sense. For if it did, the first would cause necessarily; but if the
first causation is contingent, then all other causes will be
contingent. I say therefore that some cause causes necessarily,
but not in an unqualified sense, but in a qualified sense, that is,
necessarily inasmuch as it is considered by itself in its own order,
and not in comparison to a superior cause. But in the order of a
natural cause, it causes necessarily inasmuch as such causes do
not have the ability not to cause of themselves; hence the fire in
the furnace of the three young men would necessarily have
caused heat inasmuch as it was extreme, had God not suspended
the heat of the fire by a special power.
[Quaestio 4
Utrum simplicitas divina consistit ex hoc quod Deus est
quidquid habet]
99 Quia Augustinus dicit II De Civitate Dei, cap. 10,45 quod

simplicitas in Deo est ex hoc quod Deus est quidquid habet, ideo
quaero utrum simplicitas divina in hoc consistit.
Videtur quod non:

Quia creatura aliqua est simplex et tamen non est quidquid
habet, quia in qualibet creatura differunt quo et quod, ergo etc.
100 Ad oppositum est Augustinus in littera et Magister, etc.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
101 Responsio: dico quod haec Deus est quidquid habet'

verissime ostendit simplicitatem Dei, quia ipse est intrinsece et
ex natura sua quidquid habet; sed habere intrinsece quidquid
habet est dupliciter: vel quo aliquid habet aliud, quidquid habet
formaliter, et alius modus habendi quidquid habet est sicut
relativum habet suum correlativum. Non autem dicit Augustinus
quod Deus est quidquid habet ad se praeter hoc quod habet ad
aliud, quia haec non est proprie exceptiva, sicut nec ista 'omnis
homo praeter asinum currit', quia quod excipitur debet esse pars
praeiacentis, sed hic non est ita; nec Augustinus dixit: Deus est
quidquid habet quod ad aliud dicitur, praeter hoc quod habet
quod dicitur ad se, propter eandem rationem. Et ideo ponit
communem descriptionem ad utrumque.
102 Hoc autem declaratur sic: creatura dicitur dupliciter aliquid
habere intrinsece: vel sicut totum habet partem sui, vel sicut
materia habet formam. In Deo autem non est pars et totum, nec
materia nec forma: patet ex una ratione praecedente. Quod autem
non sit compositum ex materia vel quasi materia et forma, patet
distinctione 5, nec forma informans, nec tamen propter hoc
Rectius: August., De civ. Dei XI, c. 10 (CCSL 48, 330; PL 41, 325)
Dist. 8, Part II, Question Four 361
Question Four
Does divine simplicity consist in this that God is
whatever he has?
99 Because Augustine says in Bk. II of The City of God, chapter

10, that simplicity in God is from this that God is whatever he
has, therefore I ask whether divine simplicity consists in this.
It seems it does not:
For there is some creature that is simple and, nevertheless,
it is not whatever it has, because in any creature that 'by which it
is' and 'what it is' differ; therefore, etc.
100 For the opposite is Augustine in the text and the Master,
etc.
To the Question
101 Response: I say that this, 'God is whatever he has,' shows

most truly the simplicity of God, because he is intrinsically and by
his nature whatever he has. However, to have intrinsically
'whatever he has' is twofold: either [meaning] the way by which
something formally has another, whatever it has; or another way
of having 'whatever it has' is as a relative having a correlative.
However, Augustine does not say: 'God is whatever he has as
regards himself except what he has as regards another,' because
this is not a proper way of making an exception. Just as neither is
this 'every man except an ass runs,' because that which is
excepted must be part of what was set out before, but here that is
not so. Neither does Augustine say: 'God is whatever he has that
is said [to be] as regards another, except that which he has that is
said [to be] as regards himself,' for the same reason. And
therefore he posits a description common to both.
102 But this is clarified in this way: a creature is said to have
something intrinsically in two ways: either as a whole has its
part, or as matter has a form. In God, however, there is no part
and whole, nor matter, nor form; this is evident from one reason
given before. That he is not composed of matter and form or
quasi-matter and form, however, is evident from distinction five,
362 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I -a
simplicitas Dei est punctalis per privationem perfectionis, sed

simplicitas eius est simplicitas immensitatis perfectionum ex
natura sua intrinsece, et ideo est quidquid habet isto modo.
[A. Dubium quaestioni annexum]
103 Ex hoc ergo praedicto occurrit hic unum dubium: videtur

enim si ex simplicitate Dei concipitur quod est quidquid habet,
ergo omnis praedicatio est vera qua praedicatur quidlibet de
quolibet, quod est contra Anselmum et Boethium, qui dicunt quod
omnia sunt unum in divinis ubi non obviat relationis oppositio.
Omne quod praedicatur de alio est quodammodo ipsum et unum
cum illo; sed si Deus est quidquid habet, et per conversionem
quidquid ab eo habetur est Deus. Ergo quidquid habetur ab ipso,
est quidquid habetur ab ipso, et ita quilibet in divinis praedicatur
de quolibet, quod non est verum, quia haec non est vera 'essentia
est filiatio', nec haec 'paternitas est filiatio'.
[B. Responsio ad dubium]
104 Responsio: dico quod non quidlibet praedicatur de quolibet

in divinis, quia adiectiva et concreta non praedicantur vere in
Deo, nisi praedicentur formaliter, et ideo non praedicantur vere
de essentia vel quiditate ultimate abstracta, ut dictum est
distinctione 5; et ideo haec est falsa 'essentia generat', quia si
esset vera, esset vera formaliter, quia praedicatum adiectivum
non est natum praedicari aliter quam in adiacentia formali. Sic
autem non dicitur de essentia, quia tunc esset de per se intellectu
eius, quod est falsum, quia generare non est de intellectu
essentiae, sicut nec relatio est de intellectu eius quod est ad se,
nec etiam praedicatur unum de alio in abstracto nec formaliter
nec per identitatem nisi alterum extremorum vel utrumque sit
formaliter infinitum, vel saltem unum sit infinitum ratione cuius
nor [is he] form as informing. Nor, because of this, however, is the
simplicity of God like a point, on account of the privation of
perfection. Rather his simplicity is the simplicity of immensity of
perfection from his nature intrinsically, and therefore he is
whatever he has in this way.
A doubt connected with the question
103 Therefore, from what was said before, one doubt occurs
here. For it seems that if from the simplicity of God one conceives
that he is whatever he has, then every predication is true
whereby anything whatsoever is predicated of anything, which is
against Anselm and Boethius, who say that all are one in the
divine where there is no opposition of relations. Everything that
is predicated of another is in some manner him and one with him;
but if God is whatever he has, by conversion also whatever is had
by him is God. Therefore whatever is had by him, is whatever is
had by him, and thus all in the divine is predicated of anything,
which is not true, because this is not true 'the essence is filiation,'
nor is this 'paternity is filiation.'
Reply to the doubt
104 Response: I say that not everything is predicated of

anything in the divine, because attributes and concrete terms are
not predicated truly in God unless they are predicated formally,*
and therefore they are not truly predicated of the essence or
quiddity that is ultimately abstract, as has been said in
distinction five. Therefore this is false 'the essence generates.' For
if it were true, it would be true formally, because the attributive
predicate is not suited by nature to be predicated otherwise than
in formal attribution. However, it is not predicated of the essence
in this way, because then it would belong to its per se meaning,
which is false. For to generate does not belong to the meaning of
the essence, just as a relation does not belong to the meaning of
that, which is of itself (ad se). Nor is one predicated of another in
the abstract or formally or by identity* unless one of the terms or
both are formally infinite, or at least one is infinite, by reason of
infinitatis sit idem cuilibet quod aptum natum est esse in eo; et
ideo haec est vera per identitatem 'sapientia est bonitas' propter
infinitatem formalem utriusque termini, et haec 'sapientia est
paternitas' vel ' essentia est generatio' est vera per identitatem
propter infinitatem alterius extremi, quia omne abstractum est
substantivum et potest esse idem alicui et sic praedicari de eo per
identitatem, licet non formaliter, nisi sit per se de intellectu eius.
Adiectivum autem omne praedicatur de quolibet formaliter; sed
haec est simpliciter falsa 'paternitas est innascibilitas vel filiatio',
quia neutrum est infinitum ratione cuius posset concipere aliud
per identitatem, quia formaliter non posset esse vera, cum
neutrum sit de intellectu alterius per se. Eodem modo in creaturis
unum accidens in concreto praedicatur de alio propter
identitatem et unitatem subiecti cui sunt idem et unum, ut cum
dicitur 'album est dulce'; sed si abstrahantur a subiecto tollitur
eorum identitas inter se. A simili in divinis, si abstrahatur
subiectum in quo fuerunt idem, et praedicetur unum de altero,
erit praedicatio simpliciter falsa, ut si dicatur 'albedo est dulcedo',
quia iam tollitur ratio identitatis subiecti in quo fuerunt idem et
unum, et ideo omnino tollitur eorum identitas inter se.
105 Haec igitur regula semper vera: Deus est quidquid habet,
sive quidquid habet ad se, si alterum extremum sit infinitum et
adiectivum formaliter praedicetur; unde licet haec sint in eodem
genere paternitas et innascibilitas tamen quia neutrum ad
se, ideo est simpliciter falsa, 'paternitas est innascibilitas'.
[II. Ad rationem principalem]
106 Ad rationem46 patet responsio, quia simplicitas creaturae

non est immensa sicut divina, et ideo non sequitur 'in ea sit idem
quo est et quod est', sicut in Deo.
1,i Cf. supra n. 99.

whose infinity it is identical to anything that is suited by nature

to be existing in it. And, therefore, this is true by identity:
'wisdom is goodness,' because of the formal infinity of both terms.
And this 'wisdom is paternity,' or 'the essence is generation,' is
true through identity, because of the infinity of one of the terms.
For every abstract term is substantive and can be identical to
something [else] and thus predicated of it through identity,
although not formally, unless it pertains per se to its meaning.
But every attribute is predicated about anything formally. This,
however, is simply false 'paternity is innascibility or filiation,'
because neither is infinite due to which it could be conceived as
the other through identity. Because formally it could not be true,
since neither belongs to the per se meaning of the other. In the
same way in creatures one accident is predicated concretely of the
other on account of the identity and unity of the subject with
which they are one and the same thing, as when one says 'the
white is sweet'; but if they are abstracted from the subject their
identity with each other is destroyed. It is similar in the divine, if
these [attributes] are abstracted from the subject in which they
were the same thing, and one is predicated of the other, the
predication will be simply false, as if one were to say 'whiteness is
sweetness.' For already the condition of the identity of the
subject, in which they were one and the same thing, is removed,
and therefore their identity with each other is [also] completely
destroyed.
105 Therefore this rule is always true: God is whatever he has,
or whatever he has non-relationally (ad se), if the other term is
infinite and the attribute is predicated formally; hence although
these are in the same genus'paternity' and 'innascibility'
nevertheless neither is non-relational (ad se), and therefore this
is simply false, 'paternity is innascibility.'
106 The reply to the argument [n. 99] is evident, because

simplicity of a creature is not immense like the divine, and
therefore it does not follow that in [a creature] that 'by which it is'
and 'what it is' is the same thing, as in God.
[Quaestio 5
Utrum simplicitati divinae repugnet quod aliquid dictum
de eo formaliter sit in genere praedicabiIi]
107 Utrum simplicitati divinae repugnet quod aliquid dictum de

eo formaliter sit in genere praedicabili, et addo formaliter'
propter praedicata transumptive dicta de eo, quae non dicuntur
formaliter de eo, ut lapis, leo et huiusmodi, vel alia quae
conveniunt transumptive toti Trinitati.
Videtur quod non repugnet divinae simplicitati, quia haec

praedicatio est formalis in quid 'Deus est ens intelligens et
volens'. Iste autem conceptus entis est indifferens ad Deum et ad
alia: ergo determinabilis est cuius determinativum se habebit ut
differentia sive ut conceptus differentiae. Ergo erit in Deo ratio
generis et differentiae, et sic ratio praedicabilis.
108 Item, Avicenna, II Metaphysicae cap. 1,47 dicit quod ens
immediate et sufficienter dividitur sicut in contradictoria in ens
quod est substantia et in ens quod est accidens, sive in ens quod
non est in subiecto et quod est in subiecto; sed Deus est ens; ergo
vel in subiecto vel non in subiecto. Non est in subiecto, quia esset
accidens, ergo primo modo; et illud est substantia, quae est
praedicamentum; ergo etc.
109 Item, ubi est species, et genus, quia correlativa secundum
Porphyrium; sed in Deo est species, secundum Damascenum, 50
capitulo, et ponitur dist. 9, et in Elementario:48 substantia
incorporea continet Deum.
110 Item, sapientia et scientia formaliter dicuntur de Deo et
secundum eandam formalem rationem, sicut de intellectu nostro;
alias in intellectu nostro non dicerent perfectionem simpliciter,
ergo nec concluderem quod essent in Deo; sed sapientia et
scientia, ut dicuntur de creato intellectu, sunt plures qualitates;
17 Avicenna, Metaph. II, c. 1 (AviL, 65-6).

4H Porphyrius, Isagoge (AL 1.6, 8-9); Damasc., De fide orthod. c 48 [III, c. 4]
(ed. Buytaert, 180; PG 94, 998); idem, Institute elementaris ad dogmata c. 7 (PG
95, 105-8).
Dist. 8, Part II, Question Five 364
Question Five
Is it repugnant to divine simplicity that something that is
formally said of him be in a predicable genus?
107 Is it repugnant to divine simplicity that something that is

formally said of him be in a predicable genus? And I add
'formally' because of predicates said of him in a transferred sense,
which are not said of him formally, as 'stone,' 'lion,' and the like,
or others that are appropriate to the whole Trinity in a
transferred sense.
It seems it is not repugnant to divine simplicity, because
this predication* is formal about the essence (in quid)* 'God is a
being, intelligent and willing.' This concept of being, however, is
indifferent in respect to God and to other things. Therefore, it is
determinable, and what determines it will be a difference or the
concept of a difference. Therefore, there will be in God a notion of
genus and difference, and thus a notion of [something] predicable.
108 Also, Avicenna in Bk. II of his Metaphysics, chapter 1, says
that being is immediately and sufficiently divided, as into
contradictories into 'a being that is a substance' and into 'a being
that is an accident,' or into 'a being that is not in a subject,' and 'a
being that is in a subject.' But God is a being, therefore, either in
a subject or not in a subject. He is not in a subject, because he
would be an accident; therefore in the first way; and that is a
substance, which is a one of the [ten] categories* (praedicamen-
tum); therefore, etc.
109 Also, where there is a species, there is also genus, because
[they are] correlatives according to Porphyry; but in God there is
species, according to Damascene, chapter 50, and it is posited in
distinction 9, and in the Elementarium: incorporeal substance
contains God.
110 Also, 'wisdom' and 'science' are formally predicated of God
and according to the same formal notion, just as they are
predicated about our intellect. Otherwise, in our intellect they
would not assert pure perfection. Therefore, neither would I
conclude that they were in God; but wisdom and science, as they
are predicated of a created intellect, are several qualities;
therefore they are transferred to God [as such], and this is
ergo transferuntur in Deo; et hoc est quod dicunt quidam quod

species transferuntur ad Deum, non autem genus, eo quod dicit
imperfectionem.
111 Contra, Augustinus De Trinitate,49 et est in littera pulchra

auctoritas; et nota eam.
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio aliorum]
112 Responsio: hic est opinio aliquorum quod aliquid formaliter

conceptum de Deo sit in genere praedicabili, et allegant
Damascenum ubi supra in Elementario,50 quia sicut in substantiis
separatis substantia incorporea continet angelos, ita in divinis
Deus continet personas, ergo etc.
113 Item, Boethius, De Trinitate:5i in divinis manent duo
genera, scilicet substantia et relatio; unde omnia alia praeter
relationem ad Deum comparata, transeunt in substantiam, et sic
manent tantum duo formaliter, et sic quantum ad modum
praedicamentorum. Non enim potest dici quod maneant quantum
ad similem modum praedicandi, quia qualitas et alia
praedicamenta fere praeter passionem in Deo inveniuntur
quantum ad similem modum praedicandi, ergo etc.
114 Item, Augustinus hoc dicit: intelligimus Deum magnum sine
quantitate, bonum sine qualitate, et De Trinitate V, 7 capitulo:52
in rebus creatis quidquid non secundum substantiam dicitur,
secundum accidens dicitur; sed in divinis est dare medium,
scilicet secundum relationem, quod non dicitur nec secundum
substantiam nec secundum accidens.
115 Item, ad hoc est Commentator, X Metaphysicae,53 ubi
inquirit Philosophus de primo in quolibet genere: dicit quod
primus motor est primum in quolibet genere, et mensura; sed
mensura prima in quolibet genere est species intrinseca generis.
August., De Trin. V, c. 1, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 207; PL 42, 912).

r>0 Cf. supra n. 109.
r>l Boethius, Quomodo Trinitas uniis Dens ac non tres dii c. 6 (PL 64. 1255).
r>* August., De Trin. V, c. 1, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 207; PL 42, 912).
r,:i Cf. Averroes, Metaph. X, com. 23 (ed. Iuntina VIII, 271rE-vI).
because some say that species are transferred to God, but not a
genus inasmuch as it implies imperfection.
111 To the contrary is Augustine in The Trinity, and this
beautiful authoritative statement is in the text; note it.
To the question
112 Response: here there is the opinion of some that something

formally conceived of God is in a predicable genus, and they cite
Damascene, above in the Elementarium, because as in separate
substances27 'incorporeal substance' contains the angels; so in the
divine, God contains the persons;* therefore, etc.
113 Also, Boethius, On the Trinity: in the divine two genera
remain, namely substance and relation; hence all others besides
relations in respect to God pass into substance, and in this way
there remain only two formally, and according to the mode of
[ten] categories. For it cannot be said that they remain according
to the similar mode of predicating, because quality and almost
[all] other categories, except receptivity, are found in God
according to the similar mode* of predicating; therefore, etc.
114 Also, Augustine says this: We understand God to be great
without quantity, good without quality, and in Bk. V of The
Trinity, chapter 7: in created things whatever is not predicated
according to substance, is predicated according to accident. But in
the divine, there is something intermediate, namely what is said
according to a relation, which is not said either according to
substance or according to accident.
115 Also, for this purpose is what the Commentator says in Bk.
X of the Metaphysics, where the Philosopher inquires about the
first in any genus: the first mover is the first in any genus, and
[the first] measure; but the first measure in any genus is the
intrinsic species of the genus.
11 That is, immaterial substances.

116 Item, substantia ut est ens per se potest intelligi indifferens,

quod nec ens creatum vel increatum, finitum vel infinitum, quia
dicunt conceptus simplices, et substantia dicit compositum
conceptum non omnino simplicem. Ergo tantum illud habet unum
conceptum simplicem qui est contrahibilis per istos conceptus et
hoc est ens; ergo etc.
117 Item, simplicitas divina non excludit quin ponatur in
genere, quia res sive creaturae simplices sunt in genere, ut
accidentia et angeli, secundum quod plures dicunt, sunt in
genere; ergo etc.
[B. Opinio propria Scoti]
118 Sed hanc positionem non intelligo et habeo rationes ad

oppositum triplici via: ex divina simplicitate, secundo ex eius
infinitate, tertio ex eius necessitate.
[1. Prima via: ex simplicitate divina]
119 Secundum primam viam arguo dupliciter. Primo sic:

quidquid est in genere habet aliquam realitatem a qua accipitur
ratio generis quae secundum se et essentialiter est in potentia ad
aliam realitatem a qua accipitur ratio differentiae; sed in Deo
nulla est talis realitas, quae secundum se et essentialiter sit in
potentia, cum quaelibet sit infinita et infinitum non est in
potentia ad aliquid; ergo etc.
120 Maior probatur per Philosophum, VIII Metaphysicae,54 ubi
vult quod idea, si ponatur, non definitur, quia oportet
definitionem vel terminum esse rationem longam habentem quid
et quale, scilicet materiam et formam. Hoc intelligo sic: non quod
omne definibile habet materiam et formam, quia angeli secundum
aliquos non habent materiam nec accidentia, quae tamen
definiuntur; sed quod in omni definibili sit aliqua realitas a qua
accipiatur genus, quae est principium convenientiae unius speciei
cum altera, et alia realitas, quae sit principium differentiae realis
unius speciei ab alia a qua accipitur ratio differentiae. Cum enim
eadem realitas non possit esse principium realis convenientiae et
M Aristot , Metaph. VIII (H). c. 1 (1042a 10-32); ibid., c. 6 (1045a 10-6 5).
116 Also, substance inasmuch as it is a being per se can be

thought of indifferently, that is, as neither a created nor an
uncreated being, [or as] neither finite nor infinite, because these
assert simple concepts, and substance asserts a composite concept
not completely simple. Therefore only that has one simple concept
that can be contracted through those concepts and this is 'a
being'; therefore, etc.
117 Also, divine simplicity does not exclude being posited in a
genus, because simple things or creatures are in a genus, as
accidents and angels, according to many, are in a genus;
therefore, etc.
118 But this position I do not understand and raise arguments

against it in a threefold way: from divine simplicity, secondly
from its infinity, and thirdly from its necessity.
The first way: from divine simplicity
119 According to the first I argue in two ways. The first goes this
way: whatever is in a genus has some reality from which it
accepts the notion of genus, which according to itself and
essentially is in potency to another reality from which it receives
the notion of a difference. But in God there is no such reality,
which according to itself and essentially is in potency, since
everything is infinite and the infinite is not in potency to
anything; therefore, etc.
120 The major is proved through the Philosopher in Bk. VIII of
the Metaphysics, where he wishes to say that an idea if it is
posited, is not defined, because a definition or extended term is a
longer statement having a 'quid' and a 'quale,' namely matter and
form. I understand this in the following way: not that everything
definable has matter and form, because neither angels nor
accidents, according to some, have matter, and nevertheless can
be defined; but that in every definable there is some reality from
which genus is taken that is the source of agreement of one
species with another, and another reality that is the basis for a
realis differentiae, quia tunc eadem realitate aliqua realiter

convenirent et realiter differrent, quod est impossibile, sequitur
quod aliam oportet ponere realitatem generis et differentiae in
omni definitione.
121 Item, hoc vult Philosophus, VII Metaphysicae,55 nam "sicut
ratio, id est definitio ad rem, ita partes definitionis vel rationis ad
partes rei"; ergo sicut in definitione sunt plures partes, ita in
definito sunt plures partes reales quas non oportet semper ponere
materiam et formam, sed alias realitates quarum una sit
necessario in potentia ad aliam.
122 Item, per rationem: intellectus concipiendo genus habet
conceptum de aliquo quod est in re ex natura rei; alioquin non
conciperem aliquid quod dicatur de homine in quid; et non loquor
hic de secunda intentione generis, sed de eo quod concipitur
obiective. Similiter concipiendo differentiam, concipio aliquid
quod est in re obiective. Si ergo genus vel differentia dicat totam
realitatem definiti, genus sufficienter definiret totum, et constat
quod differentia dicit eandem realitatem definiti: ergo iungendo
genus differentiae, bis diceretur idem totaliter, quod est unum
inconveniens; et aliud, scilicet quod definitio non sit primo eadem
definito, quod est falsum, quia cuiuslibet quiditas est semel ipsa
idem.
123 Sed dicetur quod per istam rationem non excluditur quin
proprietates personales sint in genere, immo hoc videtur concludi
per hanc rationem. Nam si omne quod est finitum sit in genere et
tales proprietates non sunt infinitae, quia non sunt perfectiones
simpliciter, sequitur quod sint finitae, quia inter infinitum et
finitum non est medium et per consequens sunt in genere.
Aristot.. Metaph. VII (Z), c. 10 (10346 21-2).

real difference of one species from another from which the

concept of the difference is taken. However, since the same reality
cannot be a principle of a real agreement and a real difference
because then some things would really agree and really differ by
virtue of the same reality, which is impossibleit follows that one
must posit separate realities for genus and difference in every
definition.
121 Also, the Philosopher in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics wishes
to assert this. "For just as the notion, i.e., the definition
[corresponds] to the real thing, so too the parts of the definition or
notion correspond to the parts of the thing"; therefore, just as in
the definition there are several parts, in the same way in the
defined there are several real parts, which need not always
consist of matter and form, but are different realities, one of
which is necessarily in potency to the other.
122 Also, a logical reason: the intellect conceiving the genus has
a concept of something that is in a thing by reason of its nature;
otherwise I would not conceive of something that is predicated of
man as essence or 'what he is' (in quid), and I do not speak here
of genus as a second intention,*28 but of what is conceived
objectively. Likewise in conceiving the difference, I conceive of
something that is in a thing objectively. But if the genus or
difference asserted the entire reality of the defined, the genus
would sufficiently define the whole, and it would be the case that
the difference expressed the same reality of the defined.
Therefore, by joining the genus to the difference, the same thing
would be asserted twice, which is one thing that is unfitting; and
there is another, namely, that the definition would not primarily
be the same as the defined, which is false, for the quiddity of
anything itself is uniquely that very thing.
123 But if it were said that this reason does not exclude the
personal properties from being in a genus, indeed it seems one
can conclude this from the argument. For if all that is finite is in
a genus, and such properties are not infinite, because they are not
pure or unqualified perfections, it follows that they are finite,
because between finite and infinite there is nothing intermediate,
and as a consequence they are in a genus.
28 That is as a concept.
124 Responsio: dico quod proprietates personales nec sunt

formaliter finitae nec infinitae: non infinitae, quia tunc haberet
aliqua persona in divinis aliquam perfectionem quam alia non
haberet, quod est inconveniens. Nec sunt formaliter finitae, quia
tunc non possent esse idem realiter cum infinito: quia nihil
formaliter finitum est idem realiter cum eo quod est formaliter
infinitum, quia tunc finitum esset infinitum formaliter. Sed
proprietates personales sunt eaedem realiter cum essentia divina.
Nec tamen sunt formaliter finitae vel infinitae; quia sicut proprie
loquendo finitum et infinitum quantitati molis congruunt et nulli
alii, I Physicorum,56 ita ista transumptive dicta non conveniunt
nisi habentibus quantitatem virtualem cuiusmodi sunt entia
quiditative dicta vel perfectiones quiditativae quarum gradus
intrinseci sunt finitum vel infinitum et non ratio hypostatica
personalis vel individualis quaecumque non est quiditativa.
125 Item, hoc probatur secundo sic secundum eandem viam:

perfecta Dei simplicitas consistit in hoc quod est quidquid habet
ad se, ut Magister declarat in littera per auctoritates sanctorum;
sed nihil quod est in genere est huiusmodi, quia habet genus et
differentiam quorum neutrum continet aliud, quia nec genus
habet perfectionem differentiae nec e converso; nec etiam
perfectio unius partis, scilicet generis vel differentiae tantum
continet totam perfectionem speciei. Ergo Deus, quia est quidquid
habet ad se non est in genere.
126 Dicetur quod licet rationalitas non sit formaliter animalitas,

tamen unum potest praedicari de alio per identitatem. Et sic cum
hoc non prohibeat aliquid esse in genere, ut per identitatem sit
quidquid habet ad se, cum sic in divinis unum habeat aliud, ut
r": Aristot, Physwa I, c. 2 (185a 33-6 3).

124 Response: I say that the personal properties are neither

formally finite nor infinite: not infinite, because then some person
in the divine would have some perfection that another did not
have, which is unsuitable. Neither are they formally finite,
because then they could not be the same thing really as the
infinite: because nothing formally finite is really the same thing
as that which is formally infinite, because then the finite would
be formally infinite. But the personal properties are the same in
reality with the divine essence. Neither are they formally 'finite
or infinite'; because just as properly speaking finite and infinite
are consistent with quantity of mass and with nothing else,
according to Bk. I of the Physics, in the same way these, in a
transferred sense, agree only with something having virtual
quantity such as are beings asserted quidditatively29 or
quidditative30 perfections whose intrinsic grades are finite or
infinite, and not a hypostatic* notion that is personal or
individual and not quidditative.
125 Also, according to [simplicity] this is proved secondly in this
way. Perfect simplicity of God consists in this that he is whatever
he has as regards himself, as the Master declares in the text
based on the authoritative statements of the saints.3i Nothing in
a genus, however, is this sort of thing, since it has a genus and
difference. Neither of these contains the other, since the genus
lacks the perfection of the difference, and vice versa. Nor does the
perfection of one part alone, namely of the genus or difference,
contain the whole perfection of the species. Therefore, God, since
he is whatever he has as regards himself, is not in a genus.
126 It may be said that although 'rationality' is not formally
'animality,'32 nevertheless, one can be predicated of the other
through identity. And in this way, since this does not prevent
something from being in a genus[i.e.,] that it is whatever it has
in reference to itself by identity , [and] since in the divine one
would have another in this way, as wisdom has goodness through
29 Essentially.
m A perfection that expresses what a thing is.
ii Fathers of the Church.
12 The characteristic of being an animal
sapientia bonitatem per identitatem et non formaliter, non pro-

hibet quin talia sint in genere.
127 Responsio: praedicatio per identitatem non habet locum in
creaturis, ut distinguitur contra praedicationem formalem, nam
quidquid est ibi verum per identitatem est verum formaliter; et
ratio huius est quia facta abstractione aliquorum ab aliquo in quo
fuerunt idem, tollitur veritas praedicationis unius de alio vel
formaliter vel identice; non enim habet identitatem vel unitatem
nisi ratione totius in quo sunt idem; et ideo rationem generis
abstractive concipiendo vel rationem differentiae, neutrum dicitur
de altero, nec uno modo nec alio, quia neutrum includit aliud ut
sunt partes definiti, quia quaelibet est ratio limitata et primo
diversa ab alia. Non sic est in divinis quia ibi extrema sunt
infinita, et ideo sunt quidquid habent per identitatem, sed non
formaliter quia neutrum talium est necessario de per se intellectu
alterius, ut cum dico: sapientia in divinis est bonitas etc.
[2. Secunda via: ex infinitate divina]
128 Quantum ad secundam viam secundum infinitatem,

arguitur sic: conceptus speciei non est tantum conceptus realitatis
modo intrinseco illius realitatis; tunc enim albedo in aliquo gradu
albedinis posset esse genus et secundus gradus differentia, quod
est falsum, quia tunc sola differentia vel solum genus posset
definiri, cum utrumque habeat suum gradum intrinsecum, scilicet
entitatis. Est ergo conceptus rei cum modo suo et cum gradu suo
intrinseco simplicior quam conceptus speciei; sed infinitas quae
quasi determinat ad realitatem divinam vel immensitas non dicit
nisi modum intrinsecum illius essentiae et cuiuslibet quod est ibi
essentiale; ergo conceptus Dei non potest ibi esse conceptus
speciei realiter compositae ex genere et differentia.
identity and not formally, it would not prevent such from being in
a genus.
127 Reply: predication through identity* is not in creatures
insofar as it is distinguished from formal* predication, for
whatever is there truly by identity is formally true. And the
reason for this is because, after the abstraction of some
[characteristics] from something in which they were the same, the
truth of the predication of one about the other is destroyed,
whether [predication be taken] formally or identically. For it33 has
no identity or unity, except through the notion of the whole in
which these [characteristics] are the same. And therefore, by
conceiving the notion of the genus or that of the difference
abstractly, neither is predicated of the other, be it in one way or
another, because neither includes the other as they are parts of
what is defined, since each notion is limited and primarily diverse
from the other. But it is not this way in the divine, for there the
terms are infinite, and therefore they are whatever they have
through identity, though not formally, since neither of them is
necessarily about the per se meaning of the other, as when I say
wisdom in the divine is goodness,' etc.
The second way: from divine infinity
128 As for the second way from infinity, it is argued as follows. A

concept of the species is not only the concept of a reality in a way
intrinsic to that reality, for then whiteness in some degree of
whiteness could be the genus and in a second degree the
difference, which is false. For then, the difference alone or the
genus alone can be defined, since each would have their intrinsic
degree, namely of entity. Hence, the concept of a thing with its
mode and with its intrinsic degree is simpler than the concept of
the species. But infinity or immensity, which delimits, as it were,
divine reality, asserts only an intrinsic* mode of that essence and
of whatever is essential there; hence the concept of God cannot be
there a concept of a species really composed of genus and
difference.
i:i A proposition affirming one characteristic of another, such as 'wisdom is

goodness.'
129 Ad hoc dicetur quod licet infinitum non sit differentia

contrahens conceptum Dei ut sit in genere, aliquid tamen aliud
vel aliquis alius conceptus potest esse differentia contrahens
ipsum ut sit in genere, ut necesse esse vel aliquid huiusmodi.
130 Sed contra: sit illud determinans in ratione differentiae a;
tunc quaero: aut intelligitur a tunc prius determinare illam
realitatem a qua accipitur ratio generis in Deo quam infinitas,
aut quod infinitas prius iam determinetur. Si primo modo, cum
illud quidquid sit sit quasi extrinsecum essentiae a qua
accipitur ratio generis, sequitur quod aliquid extrinsecum
essentiae divinae prius conveniet quam suus gradus intrinsecus,
qui est infinitas; quod est falsum, quia illud extrinsecum est sicut
qualitas perficiens et in bene esse sive in secundo esse.
131 Si secundo modo determinetur. sequitur quod omnino
repugnat sibi determinari ulterius quia iam est in ultima sui
determinatione et actualitate, quia extra infinitum nihil est. Istud
patet in exemplo: si enim animalitas habet plures gradus,
intelligendo eam sub quocumque gradu non intelligetur
rationalitas vel irrationalitas esse modus intrinsecus animalitatis,
sed animalitas intelligeretur in quocumque gradu perfectibilis a
rationalitate vel irrationalitate. Ita est in proposito: si deitas
habens infinitatem ut modum suum intrinsecum haberet
differentiam, adhuc intelligeretur ut perfectibilis per illam: quod
est impossibile.
[3. Tertia via: ex ratione necesse esse]
132 Ex tertia via, scilicet ex ratione necesse esse arguitur sic: si

necesse esse habet genus, ergo aut intentio sui generis est
formaliter necesse esse, aut non sed possibile. Si primum, ergo
non cessabit quousque perveniat ad differentiam. Hoc intelligo
sic, scilicet quod necessario genus includet differentiam, quia
129 To this it is said that although 'infinite' is not a difference

contracting the notion of God, so as to make it into a genus,
however, something other or some other concept can be a
difference contracting it as if it were a genus, such as 'necessary
being' or the like.
130 To the contrary: call that determining element in the notion
of the difference a; then I ask: Is it before infinity that a is
thought of as determining that reality from which the notion of
genus in God is taken, or would [this reality] be already before
that determined as infinity? If it is in the first way, since that
whatever it beis as it were extrinsic to the essence from which
the notion of genus is taken, it follows that something extrinsic
first pertains to the divine essence before its intrinsic degree does,
which is infinitywhich is false. For that extrinsic thing is like a
perfecting quality in [the thing's] well-being or second34 being.
131 If it is determined as in the second way, it follows that it is
entirely opposed to being further determined, because it is
already in its final determination and actuality, since there is
nothing outside of the infinite. This is evident from an example:
for if 'animality' has several grades, by thinking of it under any
grade one does not involve thinking of rationality or irrationality
to be an intrinsic mode of 'animality,' but 'animality' would be
understood to be in any grade perfectible by rationality or
irrationality. And so it is in the case at hand: if deity having
infinity as an intrinsic mode would have a difference, it would
still be understood as perfectible through this: which is
impossible.
The third way: from the notion of necessary being
132 From the third way, namely from the notion of necessary
being, it is argued in this way: if necessary being had a genus,
therefore either the notion of its genus formally implies necessary
being, or it does not, but [implies] possible. If the first, therefore it
will not cease until it attains to the difference. This I understand
in this way, namely that the genus would necessarily include the
M A thing's first being is that it exists, its second being is a thing's

characteristic, or perfection.
necesse esse dicit formaliter ultimam actualitatem, et sine

differentia non est in actu ultimo; et si genus includat
differentiam, non est genus. Si detur secundum, sequitur quod
necesse esse constituitur ex aliquo quod non est formaliter
necesse esse, et ita non erit formaliter necesse esse. Haec est ratio
Avicennae, VIII Metaphysicae, cap. 4.57
133 Item, iuxta istam viam arguo sic: quidquid est in genere
abstrahit ab actuali exsistentia, quia tota coordinatio cuiuslibet
generis potest sufficienter salvari in entibus intellectis intel-
lectione abstractiva quae non includit exsistentiam obiecti, quia
haec pertinet ad intellectionem intuitivam; sed necesse esse ex
sua ratione includit actualem exsistentiam, quia ipsa est
necessario exsistentia in essendo; ergo non est in genere.
134 Haec etiam via confirmatur per auctoritates Augustini, VII
De Trinitate, cap. 8,58 quam adducit Magister in littera:
substantia substat omnibus accidentibus ut est genus generalis-
simum; Deus non, ergo etc.
135 Ista ratio tenet ex infinitate Dei, de qua processit secunda
via,59 et ideo expono auctoritatem Augustini sic: non enim
intelligit Augustinus quod ratio formalis substantiae, ut est
genus, sit substare accidentibus, quia haec est eius ratio
respectiva, et respectus non includitur per se et formaliter in
conceptu absoluti cuiusmodi est substantia; et parum ante
praemisit Augustinus quod absurdum est substantiam relative
dici; ratio tamen substandi accidentibus concomitatur substan
tiam ut est genus. Quia quod aliquid non possit substare
accidentibus, hoc contingit dupliciter vel duplici causa: aut
propter imperfectionem sui, propter quam non potest terminare
dependentiam accidentis, aut propter illimitatam et perfectam sui
excellentiam propter quam non potest ulterius actuari. Manifes-
tum est autem quod omnis substantia quae est genus potest
" Avicenna, Metaph. VIII, c. 4 (AviL, 403).

August., De Trin. VII, c. 5, n. 10 (CCSL 50, 260; PL 42, 942)
o Cf. supra n. 128-131.
difference, because 'necessary being' expresses formally the

ultimate actuality, and without a difference it is not in ultimate
act. However, if the genus includes the difference, it is not a
genus. If the second is given, it follows that necessary being is
constituted from something that is not formally necessary being,
and thus it will not be necessary being. And this is the argument
of Avicenna in Bk. VIII of his Metaphysics.
133 Also, according to this way I argue in this manner: whatever
is in a genus abstracts from actual existence, because the whole
hierarchical structure of any genus can be sufficiently saved in
beings thought of in an abstract way, which does not include
existence of the object, because this pertains to intuitive*
intellection. But necessary being from its notion includes actual
existence, because the latter is [nothing but] 'existence
necessarily in being'; therefore it is not in a genus.
134 This way is also confirmed through the authoritative
statements of Augustine, in Bk. VII of The Trinity, chapter 8,
which the Master cites in the text: substance stands beneath all
accidents as a most general genus; God does not; therefore, etc.
135 This reason holds because of the infinity of God, on which
the second way [n. 128-131] is based. Therefore, I explain the
authority of Augustine in this way: for Augustine did not think
that the formal notion of substance, insofar as it is a genus, is to
stand beneath accidents. For this is its relational aspect, and
relation is not included per se and formally in a concept of
something absolute such as is substance. A little earlier
Augustine says that it is absurd that a substance be asserted
relatively; for the notion of standing beneath accidents
accompanies substance insofar as it is a genus. For that
something could not stand beneath accidents happens in two
ways or has a twofold cause: either it is because of its
imperfection on account of which it cannot support the
dependence of an accident, or because of its unlimited and perfect
excellence on account of which it cannot be further actualized.
But it is manifest that every substance, which is a genus, can
support the dependence of an accident. Hence, the fact that some
substance cannot in this way support the dependence of an
terminare dependentiam accidentis. Ergo quod aliqua substantia

non possit sic substare accidenti est propter infinitatem eius
actualem qua non potest ulterius actuari.
136 Alia est ratio Avicennae, ubi prius:60 genus est pars, Deus
non habet partem, cum sit omnino simplex; ergo non est in
genere. Haec ratio tenet ex simplicitate divina.
137 Item, alia ratio ponitur ab aliquibus talis: quidquid est in
aliquo est in illo per modum illius; Deus continet perfectiones
omnium generum; ergo sunt in illo per modum eius; ergo Deus
non est in aliquo genere illorum.
138 Ista probatio non valet, quia diceretur quod est in proprio
genere ut in genere substantiae et quod est primum illius generis,
licet contineat perfectiones omnium generum virtualiter, quia si
Deus sola individua substantiae causasset, illa haberent
sufficienter ex se formaliter causalitatem omnium accidentium,
non tamen propter hoc negatur tale primum in genere causae; sed
ratio tenet ex absoluta infinitate Dei ut prius.
[II. Proponuntur aliqua dubia

A. Primum dubium
1. Via de infinitate non concludit]
139 Sed contra istud sunt dubia: unum quod via de infinitate
non videtur concludere propositum, scilicet impedire aliquid esse
in genere, quia VI Topicorum61 increpat Philosophus istam
definitionem lineae rectae quae est 'cuius medium non exit
extrema', quia si infinita esset, recta posset esse. Sed non est
aliqua definitio increpanda, quia non convenit illi cui impossibile
est esse in genere; increpatur ibi definitio lineae rectae praedicta
quia non convenit lineae infinitae; ergo linea, si esset infinita.
esset in genere.
[2. Responsio ad primum dubium]
140 Responsio: primo, ad intentionem Philosophi, linea recta est

quoddam totum per accidens, et licet Philosophus non intendat ibi

l Aristot., Topica VI. c. 11 (1486 23-32).
accident is because of its actual infinity further than which it

cannot be actualized.
136 The other reason is that of Avicenna, in the passage [cited]
before [n. 132]: that genus is a part [of a composite]; God does not
have parts, since he is entirely simple; therefore, he is not in a
genus. This reason holds because of the divine simplicity.
137 Also, another reason posited by some goes in this way:
whatever is in something is in it after its own manner; God
contains the perfections of all genera; hence, they are in him after
his own manner; therefore, God is not in some of these genera.
138 This proof is not valid, because it would be said that he is in
a proper genus, such as substance, and that he is the first of this
genus, although he may contain the perfections of all genera
virtually.* For if God were to cause only individuals of substance,
these would have sufficiently of themselves the formal causality
of all accidents; but this is not a reason to deny that such is the
first in the genus of 'cause.' This reason holds, however, because
of the absolute infinity of God, as before.
Certain doubts
First doubt
The way of infinity is invalid
139 But against this certain doubts are raised: one that the way
of infinity does not seem to imply the proposal, namely to prevent
something from being in a genus, because in Bk. VI of the Topics,
the Philosopher reproves this definition of a straight line as that
whose center is in a line with its extremes.' For, if a line were
infinite, it could still be straight. But one must not reprove some
definition because it does not agree with what cannot be in a
genus; the definition of a straight line there is reproved because it
does not apply to an infinite line; therefore a line, if it were
infinite, would [still] be in a genus.
Reply to the first doubt
140 Response: first as to the intention of the philosopher, a

straight line is a certain accidental whole, and although the
definire ens per accidens, quia non potest definiri, sicut patet per
ipsum in VII, tamen sicut est ens, ita oportet ipsum definiri. Si
enim hoc totum definitur, assignabitur una definitio
correspondens lineae, et alia rectae, quae duplex est una per
accidens. Nunc autem increpat Philosophus dictam definitionem,
quia non ponitur in illa definitione ratio recti nec aliquid quod
pertineat ad rationem vel definitionem recti. Aliquid autem potest
formaliter repugnare subiecto quod non repugnat formaliter
passioni, licet virtualiter ei repugnat. Patet: repugnat homini
formaliter esse in genere accidentis, sed non repugnat formaliter
risibili quae est passio eius, sed per se sic sibi convenit infinitas.
Ergo licet repugnet lineae, non tamen repugnat recto ut rectum
est; et ideo quantum ad rationem recti, non bene definitur linea
recta, cum dicitur 'cuius medium non exit ab extremis', quia
rectum unde rectum non includit essentialiter nec medium nec
extrema, quia si rectum esset infinitum, adhuc maneret ratio
recti et tamen tunc non haberet medium nec extrema.
141 Alio modo quantum ad rem posset aliquis dubitare utrum
scilicet linea, si esset infinita, posset esse in genere. Solvo ad
rem, quia infinitas vel excessus in natura inferiori non concludit
nobilissimum sive infinitatem simpliciter in superiori, nisi sit
nobilissimum contentum sub superiori; sed huiusmodi
nobilissimum contentum sub ente non est linea vel aliquid
alicuius generis, sed natura intellectualis infinita; et ideo
nunquam potest infinitas simpliciter inferri ad infinitatem lineae
vel hominis vel ad aliquid cuiuscumque generis, sed solum ad
nobilissimum contentum sub ente, si sit infinitum, ut si sit natura
intellectualis infinita, sequitur infinitas simpliciter.
Philosopher did not intend there to define an accidental being,

because it cannot be defined, as is evident in Bk. VII,
nevertheless just as it is a being, so it ought to be defined. For if
this whole is defined, one definition that will be assigned
corresponds to the line and another to 'straight,' which duo is one
accidentally. But now the Philosopher begins to upbraid the
aforementioned definition, because it does not contain the notion
of 'straight' nor something that pertains to the notion or
definition of straight. For something can be formally opposed to
the subject that is not formally opposed to the attribute, although
the latter is virtually opposed to it. It is evident that it is
repugnant to 'man' to be in a genus of accident, but it is not
formaDy repugnant to 'risible,' which is his attribute. It is in this
way, however, that infinity pertains per se to [a line]. Therefore,
although it may be repugnant to 'line,' it is not opposed to
straight' as straight. And therefore, so far as the notion of
'straight' goes, it is not a good definition of 'straight line' when it
is said that 'its center is in a line with its extremes,' because
'straight' qua straight does not include essentially either a center
or median or extremes, because if the straight were infinite, the
notion of straight would still hold, and nevertheless then it would
have neither median nor extremes.
141 In another way as to the thing itself, someone could
question, namely, whether a line, if it were infinite, could be in a
genus. I solve this real issue, because infinity or an excess in
lesser [or subordinate] nature does not imply the noblest or
simply infinity in a higher [or more general category] unless it is
the noblest contained under a higher [category]. But such a most
noble [nature] contained under being is not a line or something in
a genus, but an infinite intellectual nature. And therefore, never
can infinity in an unqualified sense be inferred from the infinity
of a line or of man or of something in any genus whatsoever, but
only from the most noble [nature] contained under being, if it is
infinite, so that if it be an infinite intellectual nature, unqualified
infinity follows.
[B. Secundum dubium:

1. De modo praedicandi in divinis]
142 Secundum dubium est de modo praedicandi in divinis,

scilicet qualia sunt illa praedicata quae dicuntur de Deo formali-
ter, quae non sunt in genere; hoc enim addidi in proponendo
quaestionem.
[2. Responsio ad secundum dubium]
143 Responsio: dico quod illa sunt transcendentia, non de genere

substantiae, nec quantitatis, nec qualitatis, nec cuiuscumque
alterius generis, quia quidquid dicitur de Deo est transcendens.
Cuius probatio est, quia quidquid convenit enti, antequam
descendat in decem genera, est transcendens; sed quidquid
convenit Deo est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Minor probatur: quia ens
prius dividitur in ens finitum et infinitum quam dividatur in
decem genera, quia tantum alterum, id est ens finitum in decem
genera dividitur; et sic de aliis condicionibus entis, scilicet ens
possibile, ens necessarium, et actus, quae prius conveniunt enti,
ita quod ens per illa et sua opposita prius dividitur, quam ens
secundum alterum istorum descendat in decem genera.
144 [Instantiae aliquae] Sed dices: quomodo igitur sapientia

et paternitas quae videntur species specialissimae dicuntur de
Deo et quomodo sunt transcendentia?
145 Item, hoc videtur destruere logicam Aristotelis, qui non
videtur ponere nisi decem praedicamenta dicta in quid de
omnibus, et nullum eorum quae tu ponis conveniunt enti
antequam descendat in decem genera.
146 Item, Porphyrius non posuit nisi quinque universalia,
quorum nullum est aliquid dictum de Deo secundum te; ergo ipse
et Philosophus insufficientes.
147 [Responsio ad instantias] Ad primum62 responsio: de
ratione generalissimi est non quod habeat plures species, sed
quod non habeat superveniens genus. Quodlibet autem
praedicamentum et contentum sub praedicamento non est

Second doubt
The mode* of predicating in the divine
142 A second doubt is about the mode of predicating in the

divine, namely what sorts of things are those predicates that are
said of God formally that are not in a genus; for I added this in
proposing the question.
Reply to the second doubt
143 I respond: I say that those things are transcendentals,* not

in the genus of substance, nor quantity, nor quality, nor any other
genus, because whatever is said of God transcends [categories].
Of this there is a proof, for whatever pertains to a being before it
descends into the ten categories transcends [them]; but whatever
pertains to God is such; therefore etc. The minor is proved:
because being is first divided into finite and infinite before it is
divided into the ten categories; because only one of them, i.e.,
finite is divided into the ten categories. And so it is about the
other conditions of being, namely possible being, necessary being,
and act, which first pertain to being, so that being is first divided
through these and their opposites, before descending into the ten
categories according to one of these.
144 [Some objections] You may say: how then are wisdom and
paternity, which seem to be the ultimate species, predicated of
God and how are they transcendentals?
145 Also, this seems to destroy the logic of Aristotle, who seems
to posit only ten categories predicated as the quiddity (in quid)
about all, and none of these that, as you posit, pertain to being
before it descends into the ten categories.
146 Also, Porphyry has posited only five universals, none of
which is something said of God according to you; therefore he and
the Philosopher do not suffice.
147 [Reply to the objections] Reply to the first [n. 144]: The
characteristic of what is most general is not that it has more
species [under it], but that it has no genus above it. However,
immediate ens, sed medium est ens finitum; sed ens transcendens
dicitur, quia nihil habet nisi a se, sicut primum transcendens.
Alia sunt transcendentia quae considerat metaphysicus quae licet
habeant aliquid supra se, scilicet ens, tamen immediate
continentur sub ente.
148 Confirmatur hoc, sicut patet de passionibus entis simplici-
bus quae convertuntur cum ente, ut unitas, bonitas et huiusmodi;
et de passionibus etiam disiunctis, sicut actus et potentia, idem et
diversum, finitum et infinitum et huiusmodi, quae sunt passiones
transcendentes disiunctae entis, sicut par et impar passiones
numeri; et sunt transcendentes passiones praedictae sicut
simplices et convertibles. Si igitur una pars passionum huius
modi sit transcendens, pari ratione et alia; sed finitum est
transcendens super omnia praedicamenta; ergo et infinitum quae
est alia pars passionis erit transcendens. Sapientia autem et
quidquid est in divinis ad se est infinitum et sic isto modo potest
dici transcendens, non quin habeat aliquid supra se, sicut ens et
alios conceptus universaliores, sed quia nihil habet nisi a se. Hoc
enim est de ratione infiniti et transcendentis uno modo.
149 Ad aliud63 dico quod non destruo logicam Aristotelis.
Problema enim non est nisi de praedicamento de quo dubitatur
utrum insit vel non insit, vel de modo utrum sic insit. Sed de
transcendentibus non est dubium, ut utrum aliquid sit ens vel
unum, etc. Similiter nec de passionibus entis transcendentibus
est dubium, sive simplicibus sive disiunctis; et ideo non
determinavit Philosophus de huiusmodi transcendentibus
praedicamentis.
150 Ad aliud de Porphyrio64 dicendum quod transcendens
dictum de Deo praedicatur per modum universalis non quia sit de

M Cf. supra n. 146.
whatever is a category and is contained under a category is not

being' immediately but falls under 'finite being' as an
intermediate division; but 'being' is said to be a transcendental,
because it has nothing except from itself, as the first
transcendental. Other transcendentals that the metaphysician
considers, although they have something above themselves,
namely being, are nevertheless contained immediately under
being.
148 This is confirmed, as is evident about the simple attributes
of being that are coextensive with being, as unity, goodness and
the like; and also about the disjunctive attributes, as act and
potency, same and diverse, finite and infinite, and the like, which
are disjunctive transcendent*35 attributes of being, as equal and
unequal are the attributes of number. And the aforesaid
attributes, qua simple and convertible, are transcendent. If
therefore, one part of such an attribute is transcendent, for the
same reason also the other; but 'finite' transcends all the
categories; therefore also 'infinite,' which is the other part of the
attribute, will be transcendent. But wisdom (and whatever is in
the divine as regards itself) is infinite, and so in this way it can be
called transcendent: not because it does not have something
above itself, as being and other more universal concepts, but
because it has nothing except from itself. For this pertains to the
concept of infinite, as well as of the transcendent, by the same
token.
149 To the other [n. 145] I say that I do not destroy the logic of
Aristotle. For the problem is only about a category, about which it
is doubted whether it is present in something or not, or about the
manner in which it is in it. About the transcendentals, however,
there is no doubt, as to whether something is a being or one, etc.
Similarly neither is there a doubt about the transcendental
attributes of being, either simple or disjunctive. And for this
reason the Philosopher has not determined [or expressed his
opinion] about such transcendental categories.
150 To the other about Porphyry [n. 146], one must say that the
transcendental is predicated about God as a universal not
't5 "Transcendent" here and below: in the sense "transcending" or "one that
transcends the ten categories."
numero quinque universalium sed quia praedicatur secundum

aliquera modum similem alicui modo universalis. Praedicatur
enim in quid sicut genus. Unde dicit Philosophus, VI Topicorum,65
quod si aliquid praedicatur in quid non convertibiliter, difficile est
prohibere quin sit genus, et utendum est genere. Verum est
opponenti, sed non respondenti. Licet tamen sit difficile prohibere
quin sit genus, non tamen est impossible: similiter aliquid
praedicatur modo simili praedicandi quem habet differentia, ut
Deus est infinitus et huiusmodi. Sic igitur patet quod aliquid
praedicatur per modum universalis, non tamen est universale.
[C. Responsio ad argumenta alterius opinionis]
151 Ad illud Damasceni66 quod Deus continet omnia in divinis

etc., dicendum quod ibi in illa auctoritate est unum verbum quod
solvit totum: substantia quae continet supersubstantialiter
omnem creaturam et increatam deitatem, et sic substantia divina
continet alia omnia supersubstantialiter. Sed substantia quae est
generalissimum continet ea substantialiter, et sic substantia est
genus; ergo non primo modo. Sic autem Deus continet omnia
supersubstantialiter in quantum ablatis omnibus imperfectioni-
bus sive limitatis perfectionibus creaturarum per abstractionem,
manet quod est perfectionis, et hoc competit substantiae divinae.
Unde Dionysius67 nominat Deum sic, scilicet supersubstantialem,
65 Cf. Aristot., Topica VI, c. 5 (143a 15-30).

wl Cf. supra n. 112.
7 Sc. in 'De divinis nominibus', multis tons
because it is one of the five universals but because it is predicated

according to some mode similar to that of [such] a universal. For
it is predicated as a quiddity (in quid)*6 like genus. Hence, the
Philosopher says in Bk. VI of the Topics that if something is
predicated in quid that is not convertible [i.e., coextensive with
being], it is difficult to keep it from being a genus, and it is to be
used as a genus. This is true to an opponent,37 but not to a
respondent. Although it is difficult to keep it from being a genus,
it is nevertheless not impossible: likewise something may be
predicated in a way similar to the way of predicating that a
difference has, e.g., God is infinite and the like. In this way,
therefore, it is evident that something may be predicated after
the manner of a universal that nevertheless is not a universal [of
Porphyry].
Reply to the arguments of the other opinion
151 To that of Damascene [n. 112] that God contains all in the
divine [as a category], it must be said that in that authoritative
statement there is one word that solves the whole [objection]:
'substance that contains super-substantially every creature and
uncreated deity,' and in this way the divine substance contains
everything else super-substantially. But the substance that is the
most general [category] contains these things substantially, and it
is in this way that substance is a genus. Therefore, it is not in the
first way.38 In this way, however, God contains all super-
substantially inasmuch as, when all imperfections or limited
perfections of created things are taken away through abstraction,
there remains what is of perfection, and this pertains to the
divine substance. Hence, Dionysius [in the Divine Names] names
God in this way, namely super-substantial, super-good, and
super-intelligent and the like. In this way, therefore, it is evident
That is, as a noun expressing what (quid) it is.

i7 Scotus puts this objection and the answer to it in the context of a
disputation where one bachelor takes the role of the opponent, and the other of
the respondent.
m I.e., not as containing super-substantially.
superbonum, superintelligens, et huiusmodi. Sic ergo patet

quomodo Deus continet omnia non sicut generalissimum sua
inferiora.
152 Ad illud Boethii,68 qui vult quod duo genera maneant in
divinis, dicendum quod nullum genus nec modus praedicandi
alicuius praedicamenti vel praedicabilis, nec ratio alicuius
praedicamenti manet in divinis, quia fundamento exsistente
finite, quidquid fundatur in eo ex natura rei est finitum; res
praedicabilis est limitata et finita, et ideo modus eius, si sit verus,
et ratio praedicabilis erit finita. Manet tamen in divinis duplex
modus praedicandi similis duobus modis praedicandi duorum
generum, scilicet substantiae et relationis. Manet enim modus
praedicandi ad se, qui est similis modo praedicandi substantiae,
et manet modus praedicandi ad alterum, qui est similis modo
praedicandi relationis.
153 Sed contra istud videtur posse argui. Videtur enim quod
eadem ratione possent concludi alii modi praedicandi in divinis
similes modis praedicandi quantitatis et qualitatis, quia Deus
dicitur magnus et bonus simili modo praedicandi in creaturis
quantitatis et qualitatis, ergo etc.
154 Responsio: prima infinitas in divinis est in essentia primo;
infinitum autem in quantum tale habet quidquid est sibi
compossibile esse idem. Sicut ergo propter hanc primitatem
essentiae ad omnia alia, omnia essentialia in divinis et ad se
sive significentur ut qualitates, ut bonitas, sapientia etc., sive ut
quantitas, ut immensitas, magnitudo virtualis et huiusmodi
dicuntur essentialiter et ad se et transeunt sic in essentiam vel
substantiam, ita propter eandem primitatem praedicandi ad se et
quiditative modus praedicandi tam quantitatis quam qualitatis,
quae dicuntur ad se, transeunt in modum praedicandi essentiae
et eius quod est primo quid. Et ideo omnia essentialia dicuntur ibi
praedicari modo essentiae propter primitatem et etiam quid et
, Cf. supra n. 113.

how God contains all, [but] not as the most general [contains] its
inferiors [or subcategories].
152 To that of Boethius [n. 113], who wishes to say that two
genera remain in the divine, it must be said that no genus nor
mode of predicating of some one of the ten categories
(praedicamenta) or five universals (predicabilia), nor the notion
of some category remain in the divine. For given an existing finite
foundation, whatever is founded on it from the nature* of the
thing is finite. A predicable is limited and finite, and therefore its
mode, if it is true, and its notion of predication will be finite.
However, there remains in the divine a double mode of
predicating that is similar to the two modes of predication of the
two categories, namely substance and relation. For there remains
the mode of predicating with reference to oneself (ad se), which is
similar to the way of predicating 'substance,' and there remains
the mode of predicating with reference to another, which is
similar to the way of predicating 'relation.'
153 But it seems one could argue against this. For it appears
that the same argument would imply there are other modes of
predicating in the divine similar to the modes of predicating
'quantity' and 'quality,' because God is said to be great and good
in a way similar to predicating 'quantity' and 'quality' in
creatures; therefore, etc.
154 Response: the first infinity in the divine is primarily in the
essence; 'infinite,' however, as such includes whatever is
compatible with being the same thing as it. Therefore, because of
this primacy of the essence to all else, all essentials in the divine
that are ad se [i.e., substantive] whether they signify qualities
such as goodness, wisdom, etc., or quantity, such as immensity,
virtual magnitude and the likeare affirmed essentially and ad
se and in this way pass into the essence or substance. In the same
way on account of the same primacy of predicating ad se and in a
quidditative way39 the modes of predicating both quantity and
quality, which are affirmed ad se, pass into the mode of
predicating the essence and that which primarily is a quid or
'what.' And therefore, all essentials there are said to be
predicated in the way of the essence because of its primacy; and
That is, grammatically as nouns or as what a thing is.

quantum sunt idem illi essentiae. Sunt igitur in divinis duo modi
praedicandi, scilicet in quid et ad aliquid sub quorum primo
continentur modus praedicandi qualitatis et quantitatis, et omnia
alia genera sub modo praedicandi ad aliquid sive ad alterum.
Licet ergo sapientia, magnitudo et huiusmodi praedicata in
divinis habeant modum praedicandi ad se, non tamen aufertur ab
eis modus praedicandi denominative et quasi secundum praedi-
cationem formalem; alter enim modus praedicandi relationi
similis manet, ut dictum est.
155 Ad aliud69 de Commentatore, X Metaphysicae, quod primus
motor est primum et mensura in genere substantiae, dico quod
falsum est et contra Philosophum et non loquitur contra
platonicos. Hoc ipsum unum abstractum secundum platonicos
ponendum pro mensura vel aliquid quod sit sicut unum, id est
abstractum et substratum et haec est aliqua natura quae est
unum, cum igitur nihil magis hoc ipsum unum quam Deus; et ab
hoc ipso uno excluditur quod70 non est mensura prima in genere
substantiae, sed quaedam substantia substrata, quae est finita et
causata est mensura in genere substantiae.
156 Et si dicis quod mensura est modus dependentiae sine

causalitate etc., sicut arguunt aliqui de speciebus numerorum et
figurarum dico quod nulla species eorum dependet ab altera ut
sic, sed in quantum una est in potentia, altera vero in actu; unde
figura secunda potest esse prima, licet non posset esse
pentagonus quin tetragonus sit in eo in potentia, nec quinarius
quin quaternarius sit in eo in potentia; sed possible est primam
Cf. supra n. 115.

70 Excluditur quod non est: sic codd.; melius: excluditur ne sit.
even 'what a thing is' (quid) and 'how great it is' (quantum) are
the same thing as that essence. Therefore, in the divine there are
two modes of predicating, namely as a quiddity (in quid) and as a
relation (ad aliquid), under the first of which are contained the
modes of predicating quality and quantity, and all other genera
[are] under the mode of predicating 'in respect to something' or as
regards another. Therefore, although wisdom, magnitude and the
like predicates in the divine have the mode of predicating ad se,40
the mode of predicating denominatively and, as it were, according
to formal predication is not removed from them; but the other
form of predicating remains similar to a relation, as has been
said.
155 To the other [n. 115] about the Commentator in Bk. X of the
Metaphysics that the first mover is the first and the measure in
the genus of substance, I say that this is false and against the
Philosopher and does not answer the Platonists. According to the
Platonists one must posit for a measure that abstract One itself,
or something that is like 'one,' that is, [some] abstract underlying
substrate, the latter being some nature that is one, while nothing
is more [fitting to be] this One itself than God. And being the first
measure in the category of substance is excluded from this One
itself. Rather a certain underlying substance41 beneath [it] that is
finite and caused is the measure in the category of substance.
156 And if you say that the measure is a mode of dependence
without causality etc., as some argue about the species of number
and figure, I say that no species of these depends upon another as
such, but only insofar as one is in potency [in the other], and the
other is in act. Hence, a secondary figure can [potentially] be a
primary [figure]; thus there could not be a pentagon without a
tetragon being in it in potency, nor a quinary without a
quaternary in it in potency. However, it is possible for the first
cause to exist and produce without the second. Thus, in this way
40 That is, non-relationally as a noun or quiddity.

41 There is a discrepancy of terms characterizing this "underlying substance"
in the MSS, from "abstract" and "separated" to "subject" and "underlying" (or
"substrate"). The clearest readings were chosen. However, the whole notion can
be explained in terms of the well-known Neoplatonic scheme: the One that is
beyond anything, and then the Intellect and the Soul that are also "one" but have
some connection to the world.
causam esse et producere sine secunda et ita non dependet Deus

a creatura quod sit pars vel in potentia etc., nec e converso:
creatura non est pars nec in potentia; tamen in figuris sive in
numeris sic dependent species, quod secunda non potest esse sine
prima, non tamen e converso.
157 Sed dices ulterius: quomodo necessitas formaliter potest
stare cum productione? Dico quod productio non repugnat
necessitati immutabilitatis secundum nos, sed secundum7i
necessitatem inevitabilitatis secundum quam posuerunt philo-
sophi Deum producere res extra.
158 Ad 'primum'712 igitur dico quod primus motor separatus non
est mensura prima in genere substantiae sed de motore
coniuncto, scilicet de nobilissimo angelo, et ille est prima
mensura.
159 Ad illud73 quod arguebatur quod substantia ut est ens per se
potest intelligi ut indifferens, quod nec est ens creatum vel
increatum, finitum vel infinitum, dico quod non est possibile
substantiam ut est genus absolvere ab isto conceptu, quin sit ens
creatum, finitum et limitatum; sed absolvere a conceptu finiti et
limitati, quod est imperfectionis, et sic concedo quod unus
conceptus communis remanebit Deo et creaturae, sed non
conceptus generalis sive intra genus, sed erit transcendens.
160 Ad aliud,74 quando dicitur quod aliae res simplices sunt in
genere, ut accidentia etc., dicendum quod simplicitas conceptus
quae est in genere exigit ex parte rei aliqua diversa quorum
quodlibet est finitum, et ideo non est simplicitas absoluta; sed
simplicitas est talis in divinis quod quaelibet realitas secundum
se considerata est simpliciter infinita.
161 Ad primum principale,75 quando dictur quod praedicatio

haec 'Deus est ens' et huiusmodi est formalis et in quid et est
conceptus indifferens et ideo contrahibilis, respondeo quod genus
7i Secundum necessitatem: sic codd.; melius, necessitati.

Cf. supra n. 115.
Cf. supra n. 116.
God is not dependent upon a creature so as to be a part or in

potency [in it], etc. Nor is the converse true, a creature is not a
part or in potency [in God]. However, in figures or in numbers the
species are dependent in such a way that the second cannot be
without the first, but not the converse.
157 But you may ask further how necessity can formally coexist
with production. I say that production is not opposed to the
necessity of immutability according to us, but only to the
necessity of inevitability, according to which the philosophers
assumed God produced things outside.
158 Regarding the term 'first,' [n. 115] therefore, I say that it is
not the separate first mover that is the first measure in the
category of substance, but [he refers to] the one that is conjoined
[to that category], namely, to the most noble of the angels, and
this is the first measure.
159 To the other [n. 116] where it was argued that substance as
a being per se can be thought of as indifferent as to whether it is
a created or an uncreated being, finite or infinite, I say this. It is
not possible that substance as a genus be freed from that concept,
[i.e.,] from being a created being, finite and limited. But [it is
possible to think of substance as a per se being that is] freed from
the concept of finite and limited that is a matter of imperfection,
and thus I concede that one concept will remain that is common
to God and to a creature. Such is not a general concept or one
within a genus; rather it will transcend [the category of genus].
160 To the other [n. 117], when it is said that other simple
things are in a genus, as accidents, etc., it must be said that
simplicity of concept which is in a genus demands on the part of
the thing some diverse things. Of these, each is finite; hence, it is
not [a notion] of absolute simplicity; nevertheless, such simplicity
is in the divine that each reality considered in itself is simply
infinite.
161 To the first initial argument [n. 107], when it is said that
this predication 'God is a being' and the like, is formal and in quid
and [that being] is an indifferent concept and therefore able to be
potest contrahi dupliciter: vel per rem vel per conceptum tantum.
Transcendens contrahitur per conceptum tantum; nec sequitur:
'ergo conceptus determinans est sicut differentia', quia ille
conceptus contrahens dicit modum intrinsecum entis, et sic est
quod infinitum est gradus vel modus intrinsecus entis divini sive
essentiae; sed genus, ut dictum est, contrahitur per aliquam
aliam realitatem extra intentionem generis, sicut sunt
differentiae.
162 Ad aliud76 de ente in subiecto et non in subiecto, concedo.
sed non sequitur: 'non est in alio, ergo est substantia', sed 'similis
substantiae'.
163 Ad aliud77 quando dicitur quod ubi est species, et genus, dico
quod in Deo sunt aliquae condiciones speciei, sed non omnes eo
quod non dividi potest in plura individua. Et ideo Augustinus hoc
negat in littera.
164 Ad ultimum,78 quando dicitur de sapientia, dico quod non
dicitur de Deo in ratione generis vel speciei, sed in ratione
transcendentis.
76 Cf. supra n. 108

77 Cf. supra n 109.
contracted, I respond that a genus can be contracted in two ways,

either through a thing or through just a concept. The
transcendental is contracted only through a concept. Neither does
it follow: 'therefore the determining concept is like a difference,'
because that contracting concept refers to the intrinsic mode of
'being,' and in this way 'infinite' is a degree or intrinsic mode of
the divine being or essence. However, a genus, as has been said,
is contracted through some other reality outside the notion of
'genus'; such are differences.
162 To the other [n. 108] about a being in the subject and not in
the subject I concede, but it does not follow: 'it is not in another,
therefore it is a substance,' but rather 'similar to a substance.'
163 To the other [n. 109], when it is said that 'where there is a
species, there is also genus,' I say that in God there are some
conditions characteristic of 'species,' but not all, for he cannot be
divided into several individuals. And hence in the text is
Augustine's denial of this.
164 To the last [n. 110], when it speaks about wisdom, I say that
it is not predicated of God under the aspect of genus or species,
but under its aspect as a transcendental.
[Distinctio 9
Quaestio unica
Utrum generatio Filii in divinis sit aeterna]
1 Circa distinctionem nonam quaeritur unum: utrum

generatio Filii in divinis sit aeterna.
Videtur quod non: Augustinus, 83 Quaestionum, quaest. 37:1

qui semper nascitur numquam natus est.
2 Item, quod habet principium esse, et durationis, quia esse et
duratio idem saltem in Deo; sed Filius habet principium sui esse;
ergo etc.
3 Contra: Ambrosius, I De Trinitate, 5,2 et est in littera:3 inter4
gignere et gigni non est medium etc.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
4 Hic non sunt opiniones apud theologos, quia non ponitur in

divinis aliqua generatio sub ratione mutationis. Hic tamen erravit
Arius qui per divisionem essentiae arguit Filium minorem Patre.
5 Respondeo ergo quod generatio in divinis est aeterna et
probo primo possibilitatem generationis aeternae, secundo quod
ita sit de facto.
6 Primum sic patet: in divinis non manet generatio sub
ratione mutationis, sed tantum sub ratione productionis, ut
dictum est distinctione 2 et 5;5 sed generationi non repugnat
aeternitas nisi ratione mutationis, cuius termini sunt oppositi,
scilicet forma et privatio; ergo cum illo modo non sit generatio in
divinis, non repugnat ibi quin sit aeterna et sic est possibile quod
sit aeterna.
7 Secundum probatur, quod scilicet ita sit de facto. Nam quod
effectus non sit coaevus suae causae, hoc est vel ex condicione
i August., De diversis qq. 83, q. 37 (CCSL 44A, 59; PL 40, 27).

* Ambrosius, De fide I, c. 11, n. 73 (CSEL 78, 31; PL 16, 568). Hoc opus
Ambrosii saepe sub nomine 'De Trinitate' divulgabatur.
3 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 9, c. 2, n. 2 (SB IV, 103).
1 Cf. Hilarius, De Trin. XII, n. 21 (CCSL 62A, 595-6; PL 10, 446); Petrus
Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 9, c. 4, n. 8 (SB IV, 109).
r> Cf. supra Dist. 2. n. 110. 138; Dist. 5, n. 74-79.
381
Distinction 9
Sole Question
Is the generation* of the Son eternal in the divine?
1 In regard to distinction nine it is asked whether the

generation of the Son in the divine is eternal.
It seems not: Augustine in 83 Questions, question 37: 'who is
always born never has been born.'
2 Also, that which has a principle*1 [or origin] of existence,
also has [one] of duration, because to be and to endure are the
same thing, at least in God; but the Son has the principle of his
existence; therefore, etc.
3 To the contrary:
Ambrose in Bk. I of The Trinity, [ch.] 5, and he is cited in
the text:* 'Between to generate and to be generated there is no
intermediate,' etc.
To the Question
4 Here there are no opinions among the theologians, because

no generation is posited in the divine that involves mutation.
Here, however, Arius erred, who through a division of the essence
has argued that the Son is less than the Father.
5 I respond, therefore, that generation in the divine is eternal,
and I prove first the possibility of an eternal generation, and
secondly that such is a fact.
6 The first is evident in this way: in the divine generation
does not continue under the aspect of a mutation, but only under
that of a production,* as had been said in distinction two and five;
but eternity is only opposed to generation under the aspect of
mutation, whose terms are opposite, namely form and privation;
therefore since that is not the way generation is in the divine, it is
not repugnant to it there that it be eternal, and thus it is possible
that it is eternal.
7 The second is proved, namely that it is that way there as a
fact. For that an effect is not coeval with its cause stems either
1 As is evident from n. 11 below, the Latin term principium in this case is

equivocal and can also mean "origin," as here in the antecedent.
381
causae, vel ex condicione actionis talis causae. Ex condicione

causae dupliciter: vel quia agit voluntarie et potest agere et non
agere, vel si est agens naturale potest impediri per
indispositionem materiae vel per actionem agentis contrarii
fortioris, vel quia dependet ex superiori agente. Vel ex condicione
ipsius actionis: si sit cum motu, non potest habere effectum sibi
coaevum. Et non est dare aliam aliquam causam quare effectus
non sit coaevus suae causae; sed nullum istorum invenitur in
generatione Filii in divinis: non primum, quia Filius non
producitur per voluntatem ut per principium productivum, ut
probatum est distinctione 6. Nec producitur a Patre naturaliter ut
a causa impedibili, quia Pater non habet contrarium agens fortius
in divinis; nec propter indispositionem materiae, quia ibi non est
materia. Nec propter superius agens, quia Pater est primum
agens. Nec ex parte condicionis ipsius actionis, quae est per
motum, nec ex parte effectus qui est mutabilis, quia natura divina
non est mutabilis, ut ostensum est. Ergo relinquitur quod de facto
generatio sit aeterna.
8 Per hoc tenet illud exemplum Augustini:6 si ignis esset
aeternus, haberet splendorem aeternum sive sibi coaevum. Hoc
sic intelligo: in ratione causantis effective, semper intelligitur
ratio producentis; unde ratio productionis abstrahit a ratione
causationis. Si igitur ignis haberet splendorem coaevum, hoc
esset ratione productionis ut productio est, non ratione
causationis. Sed in Deo nulla est ratio causalitatis; ergo productio
est aeterna et productum aeternum.
9 Ex hoc etiam apparet quod non includit contradictionem,
secundum mentem Philosophi, quod aliquod sit formaliter
necessarium et tamen ab alio effective: non enim includit
contradictionem ratione productionis, quia in divinis est productio
aeterna; nec etiam ratione producti, quia si non repugnat
producto quod sit necesse esse, et hoc eadem necessitate qua
0 August., De Trin. VI, c. 1, n. I (CCSL 50, 228; PL 42, 923).

Dist. 9, Sole Question 382
from a condition of the cause or from a condition of the action of

such a cause. There is a twofold way it can stem from a condition
of the cause: either [1] because it acts voluntarily and can either
act or not act, or else [2], if it is a natural* agent, it can be
impeded through an indisposition of the matter or through the
action of a stronger contrary agent, or because it depends upon a
superior cause. Or [it can be] from a condition of the action itself:
if it acts with movement, it cannot have a coeval effect. And there
is no other reason why the effect cannot be coeval with its cause.
But none of these are found in the generation of the Son in the
divine. Not the first, because the Son is not produced through the
will* as from a productive principle, as was proved in distinction
six. Nor does the Father naturally produce him as a cause that
can be impeded, because in the divine the Father has no stronger
contrary agent, nor any indisposition of matter, since there is
none there. Neither is it because of a superior agent, since the
Father is the first agent. Nor on the part of the condition of the
action itself that is through movement, nor on the part of the
effect that is changeable, because the divine nature is immutable,
as has been shown. Therefore, what remains is the fact that
generation is eternal.
8 And on this basis the example of Augustine holds: 'if fire
were eternal, its brightness would be eternal splendor or one
coeval with itself.' This I understand in this way: the notion of an
effective cause always includes the notion of a producer; hence,
the notion of production [further] abstracts from the notion of
causation. Therefore, if fire had a coeval splendor, this would
have been because of the aspect of production as it is a
production, and not by reason of its being a cause. But in God
there is no aspect of causality; therefore the production is eternal
and the product* is eternal.
9 From this also it appears that there is no contradiction,
according to the mind of the Philosopher, that something be
formally necessary and nevertheless from another effectively. For
it does not include a contradiction by reason of production,
because in the divine there is an eternal production. Also, there is
no contradiction because of the product, for if to exist necessarily
is not repugnant to the product, and this by the same necessity*
producens, multo minus videtur repugnare quod productum sit

coaevum cum producente alia necessitate quam producentis.
10 Ad primum,7 quando dicitur quod Filius in divinis semper

nascitur, dico quod verba omnium temporum vere et proprie
dicuntur de Deo. Unde Augustinus Super Ioaiuiem, homilia 9s
super illud quaecumque audiet a Patre meo etc., dicit 'audiet' et
'audivit'; similiter 'procedet' et 'processit', etc.; talia verba posuit
Christus in futuro et in praeterito propter indifferentiam
temporis quam includit nunc aeternitatis. Talia enim non
consignificant nunc temporis praeteriti vel futuri, sed nunc
aeternitatis, non tamen simpliciter, sed ut coexsistens cuilibet
parti temporis. Tamen secundum appropriationem, praesentia
verius dicuntur de Deo quam praeterita vel futura. Absolute
autem verbum cuiuslibet temporis verum est de omni actione Dei
essentiali et notionali; sed ipsa actio non est mensurata nunc
temporis, sed nunc aeternitatis. Praeteritum enim quod non est,
licet concomitetur esse in intellectu nostro, non tamen in
formalitate sua habet esse. Similiter futurum quod nondum est;
et ideo sic exponit Hieronymus quod esse propriissime convenit
Deo, non autem fuisse vel fore. Similiter quantum ad expres-
sionem, verius exprimit Augustinus generationem aeternam
quando dicit quod Filius semper nascitur quam natus est. Licet
enim in creaturis semper nasci sit imperfectionis, et ista 'natus
est' sit perfectionis sicut factum esse et res permanens quam res
in fieri et successive, tamen ista in Deo verissime dicta est
'semper natus est'; et ista 'semper nascitur' verius exprimit quam
7 Cf supra n. 1.
H August., In loan. Evangelium, tr. 99, n. 4-5 (CCSL 36, 584-5; PL 35, 1888).
as that of the one producing, all the less does it seem repugnant
to the product that it be coeval with the one producing by a
necessity other than that of the producer.
10 To the first [n. 1], when it says that the Son in the divine is
always born, I say that the verbs in all tenses are truly and
properly applicable to God. Hence Augustine (Super Ioaiuiem,
ninth homily about this 'whatever he shall hear from my Father,'
etc.) says both that 'he shall hear' and he has heard'; likewise 'he
shall proceed' and has proceeded,' etc. Christ has set down such
verbs in the future and in the past [tense] because of the
indifference in respect to time that is included in the 'now' of
eternity. For such [verbal forms] do not signify the 'now' of past or
future time, but 'now' of eternity: not simply, however, but as
coexisting with each part of time. However, according to
appropriation,* statements in the present tense are more truly
said of God than those in the past or future tense. But in an
absolute sense a verb in any tense is true of every essential and
notional* action of God; however, this action itself is not
measured by the 'now' of time, but by the 'now' of eternity. For
the past that is no more, although it accompanies being in our
intellect, does not formally* have existence or being.2 Similarly
the future which is not yet; and therefore Jerome explains that 'to
be' most properly pertains to God, not however 'to have been' or
'will have been.' Likewise, as to the expression, Augustine more
truly expresses the eternal generation when he says that the Son
is always born rather than that he has been born. For although in
creatures 'to be always [i.e., continuously] born' is a matter of
imperfection, and this 'has been born' is a matter of perfection as
something that is a fact and a permanent* thing,* rather than a
thing that is 'coming to be' and is 'successively,'* nevertheless
regarding God this is most truly stated: 'he has always been born.'
And 'he is always being born' more truly expresses [the truth]
than 'he has been born' or 'he shall be born.' Hence, [it is in this
2 That is, though we have it in mind, we do not think of it as actually

existing as such.
nascebatur vel nascetur. Unde Augustinus intelligit 'non natus

est' propter annexam imperfectionem consignificatam in praete-
rito.
11 Ad aliud9 quando dicitur: quod habet principium esse, etc.,
dico quod est fallacia figurae dictionis. De virtute enim
constructionis est quod duratio sequatur suum non esse. Unde
non uniformiter accipitur principium nec sub eadem ratione in
utroque, quia in antecedente accipitur principium esse originis,
sed in consequente principium durationis, et ideo alio modo
construitur principium. Sed si accipias principium durationis
originaliter, sicut in antecedente accipitur principium esse, tunc
concedo quod sic habet principium durationis.
" Cf. supra n. 2.

way that] Augustine understands 'has not been born' [i.e., as

something positive] because of the imperfection introduced by
using the past tense.
11 To the other [n. 2], when it says that that which has a
principle [or origin] of being [also has one of duration], etc., I say
that this is a fallacy of speech. For it is in virtue of the
[grammatical] construction that the duration [of something]
follows the non-existence of this [thing]. Hence 'principle' is not
accepted uniformly nor under the same aspect in both [parts of
the statement], because in the antecedent 'principle' of being
refers to origin, but in the consequent it is a [proper] principle of
duration, and therefore, 'principle' is construed in another way.
But if you take 'principle of duration' in terms of origin, as
'principle' of being or existence is taken in the antecedent, then I
concede that in this way he has a principle of duration.
[Distinctio 10
Quaestio 1
Utrum voluntas divina possit esse principium per se
communicandi essentiam divinam]
1 Circa distinctionem decimam quaerenda sunt quattuor.

Primo utrum voluntas divina possit esse principium per se
communicandi essentiam divinam.
Videtur quod non: Quia unius naturae tantum est unus
modus communicandi secundum Commentatorem, I Physicorum,
commento 46 vel 49;i ergo etc.
2 Item, per descriptionem naturae: natura est vis insita rebus
ex similibus similia procreans.
3 Item, voluntas non est principium nisi artificialium; unde
pro eodem habet Philosophus, II Physicorum,2 voluntatem, artem
et propositum; sed habens eandem naturam cum producente non
est artificiale; ergo non potest natura divina, quae eadem est cum
producente, communicari per voluntatem.
4 Contra:
Voluntas in divinis non est minus activa vel productiva
quam intellectus in divinis, sicut nec in creaturis; ergo cum
intellectus possit esse principium communicandi perfecte, ita et
voluntas, ut probatum est supra distinctione 2 de intellectu quod
potest; ergo etc.
[I. Ad quaestionem
5 Hic est primo recitanda opinio unius magistri qui dicit quod
natura accipitur quadrupliciter. Primo pro essentia quae est quasi
materiale respectu omnium productionum; hoc improbatum est
distinctione 5. Secundo modo dicitur natura vis productiva similis
per modum naturae, et hoc est fecunditas in Patre respectu
productionis Filii; sic enim non producitur Spiritus Sanctus. Et
i Averroes, Physica VIII. com. 46 (ed. Iuntina IV, 387rF-388rA).

* Aristot., Physica II, c. 8 (199a 3-20).
385
Distinction 10
Question One
Could the divine will be a per se principle* of
communicating the divine essence?
1 In regard to distinction ten four questions need to be asked.

The first is whether the divine will could be a per se principle of
communicating the divine essence.
It seems that it could not:
For one nature has only one manner of communicating
according to the Commentator in Bk. VIII of the Physics,
comment 46; therefore, etc.
2 Also, through the description of nature:* nature is a force
residing in things,* procreating similar things from similar thing.
3 Also, the will* is a principle only of things artificial; hence,
the Philosopher, in Bk. II of the Physics, takes 'will,' 'art' and
'purpose' for the same thing; but what has the 'same nature as the
producer' is not something artificial; therefore, the divine nature,
which is the same with the producer, cannot be communicated by
the will.
4 To the contrary:
The will in the divine is no less active or productive than the
intellect in the divine, just as it is no less active in creatures;
therefore, since the intellect could be a principle of
communicating perfectly, so also the will, as has been proved
above in distinction two about the intellect that it can; therefore,
etc.
To the Question
5 First to be related here is the opinion of one master, who

says that nature must be taken in four ways. First it means the
essence, which is quasi-material as regards all productions;* this
has been disproved in distinction five. In the second way nature is
taken as a productive force similar to nature in its mode, and this
is fecundity in the Father as regards the production of the Son;
for in this way the Holy Spirit is not produced. And in this way
385
isto modo natura addit solum quemdam modum actionis sive

productionis super naturam primo modo dictam. Tertio modo
dicitur natura quaelibet vis in natura primo modo dicta, et sic
voluntas potest dici natura et sic est principium elicitivum
respectu Spiritus Sancti; non tamen absolute ut voluntas nec
intellectus ut intellectus est principium Verbi elicitivum, quia sic
esset in creaturis, sed in quantum sunt in natura primo modo
dicta, ex cuius assistentia non tanquam principio formali nec
impellente nec praeveniente, sed quasi concomitanter et annexe
se habente, contrahunt quasi quandam vim et ut sic sunt
intellectus et voluntas principia elicitiva respectu productionum.
Quarto modo dicitur natura naturalis necessitas concomitans
actum; et ista necessitas naturalis est etiam in productione
Spiritus Sancti sicut in productione Filii.
6 Sed ad propositum dicit quod quasi opposito modo se habet
de intellectu et voluntate, quia, licet utrumque naturalitatem
contrahat a natura divina, aliter tamen et aliter, quia respectu
generandi Filium natura est principalis ratio elicitiva illius actus,
intellectus vero quasi concomitans, ut sic quasi proprie dicatur
Patrem3 generare natura intellectuali quam intellectu naturali; et
quia natura sic est principalis ratio elicitiva generationis, ideo
genitum et productum magis dicitur Filius quam Verbum. Unde
natura intelligitur ibi quasi determinari per intellectum et non e
converso. Voluntas autem divina licet contrahat quandam
naturalitatem a natura divina, non tamen est natura principium
quo respectu spirationis Spiritus Sancti et voluntas quasi
determinativum illius principii. Sed voluntas ex libertate sua est
principium productivum perfecte Spiritus Sancti, natura divina
sibi assistente, quia voluntas, ut habens quandam vim naturae
assistentem sibi, est principium spirandi Spiritus Sancti. Et quod
ut sic sit prior, ut habet annexam sibi illam vim sine qua
Rectius: dicatur Pater generare.

nature adds only a certain mode of action or production to nature

affirmed in the first way. In the third way nature is understood
as some force in nature taken in the first way. And in this way
the will can be called nature and thus it is an eliciting principle
with respect to the Holy Spirit. However, neither [the will]
absolutely qua will, nor the intellect qua intellect is an eliciting
principle of the Word,* for in this way it would also be [so] in
creatures. Rather it is insofar as they [i.e., intellect and will] are
in nature understood in the first way, from whose assistance
([that comes] not as a principle that is formal* or impelling or
coming before, but, as it were, concomitantly and attaching itself),
they draw together a certain force and it is in this way that the
intellect and will are eliciting principles as regards productions.
In the fourth way nature is understood as natural* necessity*
accompanying act; and this natural necessity is present also in
the production of the Holy Spirit, as well as in the production of
the Son.
6 To the question at issue, however, he says that the situation
is different regarding the intellect and will. For, although both
draw a naturalness from the divine nature, they possess it,
however, in different ways, because as regards the generation* of
the Son the nature is the principal eliciting principle of that act,
but the intellect as it were accompanying it, so that in this way it
could be affirmed quasi-properly of the Father that he generates
by the intellectual nature rather than by the natural intellect.
And because the nature in this way is the principal eliciting
reason for generation, therefore the one generated and produced
is rather called Son than Word. Hence, nature is understood there
to be determined as it were through the intellect, and not vice
versa. However, although the divine will draws together a certain
naturalness from the divine nature, nevertheless the nature is
not the principle* 'by which' (principium quo)* as regards the
spiration* of the Holy Spirit and the will as quasi-determinative
of this principle. The will, however, from its liberty is in a perfect
sense a productive principle of the Holy Spirit, with the divine
nature assisting it, because the will, as having a certain force of
nature assisting it, is the principle of spirating* the Holy Spirit.
And the will in this way would be prior, having conjoined with it
exsistente non potest communicare naturam, assistens autem non

est principium formale eliciendi, sed voluntas sua libertate; nec
est principium praeveniens et impellens, quia repugnat libertati,
sed habet se sicut assistenter et consecutive.
7 Sed contra istud quod dicitur quod natura determinata per

intellectum est principium productionis Filii: falsum est. Patet
distinctione 7, ubi ostensum est quod essentia non se habet
passive, sive quod natura in divinis non potest determinari;
similiter quod essentia divina non est sicut quoddam commune
contrahibile per aliquid sibi additum. Similiter ostensum est ibi
quod intellectus coincidit cum natura in divinis, et nihil
determinans plus cum dicitur natura intellectualis quam quando
dicitur intellectus naturalis, quia natura non dicit habitudinem
principii quo; ergo natura, ut secundo modo accepta, non plus
determinatur per intellectum quam e converso.
8 Quod etiam dicitur de assistentia naturae respectu
voluntatis in productione Spiritus Sancti, non intelligo, quia
principium producendi perfectum et in supposito perfecto et
convenienti actioni. Hoc addo, quia in Filio est principium
perfectum quo, scilicet memoria fecunda et tamen non est
conveniens generationi activae. Licet ista principia productiva
sint in personis productis, non tamen sunt in eis ut principia
productiva, quia talia principia productiva praeintelliguntur
habere istas duas personas ut producta adaequata, et ideo in istis
personis non conveniunt actioni sive production!. Dico igitur quod
principium conveniens sic actioni est per se sufficiens ad
agendum et producendum; sed voluntas divina est principium
perfectum quo et in supposito perfecto et convenienti actioni,
scilicet in Patre, ut ipsi concedunt, et patebit magis in solutione
a force, without whose existence it cannot communicate the

nature. That which assists, however, is not the formal principle of
eliciting, but the will by its liberty is. Nor is [nature] a preceding
and impelling principle, because it is repugnant to liberty, but it
is, as it were, assisting and following.
7 But against what is said about the nature, i.e., that being
determined through the intellect, it is a principle of the Son's
production: this is false. This is evident from distinction seven,
where it has been shown that the essence is not passive or that
nature in the divine cannot be determined. Likewise [it has been
shown] that the divine essence is not like some general notion
that can be contracted through something added to it. Likewise, it
has been shown there that in the divine the intellect coincides
with the nature, and no more determination is added when the
nature is said to be intellectual than when the intellect is said to
be natural, because nature does not imply a relationship of the
principle* 'by which.' Therefore, nature taken in the second sense
is no more determined through the intellect than vice versa.
8 Also what is said about the assistance of the nature as
regards the will in the production of the Holy Spirit, I do not
understand, because [it is] a perfect principle of producing and in
a perfect individual supposit* suited to act. I add this ['suited to
act'] because in the Son there is a perfect principle 'by which,'
namely a fecund memory,* and nevertheless he is not suited for
active generation. Although these productive principles are in the
persons* produced, they are not in them, however, as productive
principles, because such productive principles are understood
beforehand to have these two persons as adequate products,* and
therefore in these persons they are not fitted for action or
production. I say therefore that a principle fitted in such a way
for action is sufficient per se to act and produce; but the divine
will is a perfect principle 'by which' and in a perfect individual
subject that is suited for action, namely in the Father, as these
themselves concede, and it will be made more evident in the
principals ergo talis assistentia nihil facit si non concurrit in

ratione principii productivi.
9 Item, quando aliqua concurrunt ad aliquam actionem et
habent se sicut prius et posterius, illud quod est prius prin
cipalius concurrit ad illam actionem, si sit activum; sed natura, ut
accipitur primo modo, mere essentialiter est prior voluntate; ergo
natura isto modo in productione Spiritus Sancti principalius se
habebit quam voluntas. Contradictionem ergo includit quod
natura concurrat ut concomitans vel assistens voluntati in
productione Spiritus Sancti et quod sic sit prior.
10 Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem et dico quod voluntas divina

habens obiectum diligibile sibi praesens, nullo alio cointellecto,
est sufficientissimum principium communicandi naturam Spiritui
Sancto sine quacumque alia assistentia.
11 Verumtamen dupliciter potest intelligi naturam assistere
voluntati: uno modo ut fundamentum, et sic verum est quod
natura assistit cuilibet principio productivo; sed hoc modo non
intelligit opinio. Alio modo assistit natura voluntati ut obiectum
assistit potentiae, et isto modo verum est quod natura assistit
voluntati, quia voluntas non potest producere amorem sibi
adaequatum, nisi praesente obiecto diligibili. Sed neutrum
modum istius assistentiae ponunt isti in proposito, quia utroque
modo concedunt naturam assistere intellectui in productione Filii.
Sed ultra hoc ponunt tertium modum assistentiae in proposito,
quia ponunt naturam assistere voluntati in productione Spiritus
Sancti in ratione principii productivi. Quod non est verum, quia
in quocumque instanti originis vel naturae intelligitur voluntas
habens obiectum diligibile actu sibi praesens tollendo quamlibet
aliam assistentiam naturae in ratione principii productivi, est
principium perfectum communicandi naturam.
principal solution. Therefore, such assistance does nothing if it

does not concur under the aspect of a productive principle.
9 Also, when some things concur for the purpose of some
action and are related as prior and posterior, that which is prior,
concurs with that action more principally, if it is active; but
nature, as it is taken in the first sense, is prior to the will, if only
essentially; therefore nature in this mode is more principal in the
production of the Holy Spirit than is the will. Hence, it includes a
contradiction that on the one hand the nature should concur as
concomitant with, or assist the will in the production of the Holy
Spirit, and that on the other hand in this way it should be prior.
Response of Scotus
10 I respond therefore, to the question and I say that the divine

will having a lovable object present to itself, apart from any
thought of another, is a most sufficient principle of
communicating the nature to the Holy Spirit without any other
assistance.
11 However, one can understand nature as assisting the will in
two ways: one way is as a foundation, and in this way it is true
that the nature assists any productive principle whatsoever; but I
do not understand the opinion [of Henry] in this way. The other
way nature assists the will is as an object when it assists a
potency,* and in this way, it is true that the nature assists the
will, because the will cannot produce love adequate to itself
unless the lovable object is present. In the case at hand, however,
thesei assume neither way of such assistance, because in both
senses [of nature] they concede that nature assists the intellect in
the production of the Son. But beyond this they postulate a third
mode of assistance in the case at hand, because they presume
that nature assists the will in the production of the Holy Spirit in
the role of a productive principle. That is not true, because in
whatever instance of origin* or nature one thinks of the will as
having a lovable object actually present to it apart from any
additional assistance of the nature as a productive principle, [that
will] is a perfect principle of communicating nature.
i That is Henry of Ghent and those who follow him

12 Hoc probatur sic: omnis voluntas perfecta habens obiectum

diligibile sibi actualiter praesentatum est principium producendi
amorem adaequatum illi obiecto. Et voco amorem adequatum hic
amorem tantum quantum potest habere respectu obiecti talis.
Ergo voluntas divina habens essentiam divinam summe
diligibilem sibi actu praesentatam est principium producendi
amorem adaequatum sibi et obiecto, id est tantum amorem
quantum4 potest amare illud obiectum; potest autem amare illud
obiectum amore infinito, quia obiectum est infinitum. Voluntas
etiam formaliter est infinita; ergo est principium producendi
amorem infinitum. Consequentia est manifesta, quia hoc est
perfectionis in qualibet voluntate. Antecedens patet, quia actio
vel productio non dependet ex aliis causis effectivis quam
potentia et obiecto.
[A. Tres instantiae contra praedictam rationem]
13 Sed contra hanc rationem obicitur, quod scilicet infinitas

non sit principium quo voluntas communicat naturam divinam
Spiritui Sancto, nam formale principium producendi est
determinatum et non convenit diversis principiis productivis;
infinitas vero est eiusdem rationis in intellectu et voluntate in
divinis; ergo non est uni eorum ratio formalis communicandi
naturam, non igitur quia voluntas infinita habens obiectum tale
sibi praesens, ideo potest esse principium producendi amorem sibi
et obiecto adaequatum.
14 Item, quod repugnat alicui secundum suam rationem
absolutam, non convenit sibi etiam si sit infinitum. Exemplum:
quia repugnat albo secundum se congregare, ideo qualecumque
sit, etiam si sit albedo infinita, adhuc non congregat, sed magis
disgregat, quia infinitas intendens formam principii productivi
non dat sibi modum agendi alterius rationis nec aliam formam
producendi; sed voluntati in quantum voluntas est repugnat esse
principium producendi terminum naturalem, quia si non
repugnaret sibi in quantum voluntas est, posset hoc convenire
i Quantum potest amare: sic codd.; melius lege: quanto potest amare vel
quantum potest exhibere amando, etc.
12 This is proved in the following way: every perfect will that

has a lovable object actually presented to it is a principle of
producing adequate love of that object. And by 'adequate love'
here I mean as much love as one can have as regards such an
object. Therefore, the divine will, having the divine essence as
most highly lovable presented to it, is a principle of producing a
love adequate to itself and the object, i.e., as much love as it can
have in loving that object; but it can love that object with an
infinite love, because the object is infinite. The will is also
formally* infinite; therefore it is a principle of producing infinite
love. The inference is evident because this is a matter of
perfection in any will. The antecedent is evident, because action
or production does not depend upon effective causes other than
the potency and the object.
Three objections against the aforesaid reason
13 But against this argument objections are raised, namely,

that infinity is not a principle by which the will communicates the
divine essence to the Holy Spirit, for the formal principle of
producing is determined or fixed, and does not pertain to [several]
diverse productive principles; but in the divine infinity of the
same character is present in both the intellect and will; therefore
it [i.e., infinity] is not the formal reason for communicating
nature in only one of these. Hence it is not because the will qua
infinite has such a lovable object present to it that it can be a
principle that produces love adequate to itself and its object.
14 Also, what is repugnant to something according to its
absolute meaning does not pertain to it even in the case if it is
infinite. For example: since it is repugnant for white of itself to
condense [the diaphanous medium], therefore, whatsoever quality
whiteness might have, even if it were infinite, it still would not
condense, but rather dilate [the medium]. For infinity qualifying
the form of a productive principle does not give it a mode of action
of another kind or another form of producing. But it is repugnant
to the will qua will to be a principle of producing a natural term,
because if it would not be opposed to it insofar as it is will, it
could pertain to a created will, which is false. Therefore, the will
voluntati creatae, quod falsum est. Ergo voluntas ut infinita non

erit principium communicandi naturam infinitam.
15 Item, videtur quod ratio istius positionis concedat proposi-
tum alterius positionis, scilicet assistentiam essentiae respectu
voluntatis; quia quaero: a quo voluntas contrahit istam
infinitatem? Non potest assignari aliud ab essentia quae est radix
et pelagus infinitatis; ergo voluntati ut habet infinitatem assistit
natura vel essentia, quae primo est infinita; ergo si voluntas ut
infinita communicat essentiam, communicat eam ut sibi assistit
essentia infinita.
[B. Responsio ad instantias]
16 Ad primum,5 dicendum quod infinitas non est formale

principium nec formalis ratio productionis alicuius, quia infinitas
non dicit passionem nec modum passionis, nec dicit aliquam
realitatem aliam quae est extra rationem illius cuius est, sed dicit
gradum intrinsecum virtualis quantitatis illius cuius est, sicut
sapientia et huiusmodi, sicut patet per oppositum de finito. Si
enim quaeritur quanta est ista albedo, non quaeritur nisi certus
gradus intrinsecus albedinis et non aliqua passio vel accidens
extra rationem eius. Ergo infinitas non est formalis ratio
producendi voluntatis divinae, sed modus intrinsecus virtutis
productivae, unde voluntas sub infinitate sicut sub gradu
quantitatis eius virtualis.
17 Istud patet comparando actionem ad obiectum, nam sicut in
actione sunt duae rationes, ut ratio specifica actus in tali genere
ut modus determinatus actus, et quod sit talis vel talis, ita est in
obiecto. Exemplum de actu beatifico: est enim considerare istum
actum secundum se, ut visionem vel fruitionem; et in speciali, ut
est talis actus, in quantum scilicet est quietativus. Obiectum
etiam beatificum potest considerari absolute, ut est bonum vel
verum; vel in speciali ut est bonum satians beatum, sive summum
verum et summum bonum. Et sicut istae rationes distinguuntur
r> Cf supra n. 13.

as infinite will not be a principle of communicating an infinite

nature.
15 Also, it seems that the reason for this position concedes
what the other position proposes, namely assistance of the
essence as regards the will; for I ask: what is the source of this
infinity that the will contracts? It cannot be something other than
the essence, which is the root and sea of infinity; therefore the
nature or essence, which is primarily infinite, assists the will to
the extent that it has infinity; therefore if the will as infinite
communicates the essence, it does so as aided by the infinite
essence.
Reply to the objections
16 To the first [n. 13], it must be said that infinity is not the
formal principle nor the formal reason for producing something,
because infinity does not imply 'being acted upon' or a mode of
such. Neither does it assert some other reality, that is outside the
concept of that, to which it belongs, but it does assert the intrinsic
degree of virtual quantity* of that, to which it belongs, e.g., of
wisdom and the like, as is evident by contrast regarding the
finite. For if one asks how great or intense this whiteness is, one
only asks about a certain intrinsic degree of whiteness and not
about some attribute or accident that lies outside of its notion.
Therefore infinity is not a formal reason why the divine will
produces, but is an intrinsic* mode of the productive power.
Hence, the will under infinity [is] as though it possessed a
[certain] degree of its virtual quantity.
17 This is evident by comparing action to the object, for just as
in action there are two aspectssuch as the specific notion of act
in such a genus (as a determined mode of act), and that it is such
or suchso is it in the object. For example, the beatific act: for
one can consider this act in itself, as vision or fruition; and one
can consider it in particular, as it is such an act, namely insofar
as it puts one at rest. Also the beatific act can be considered
absolutely, as it is good or true; or in particular as a good that
satisfies the blessed one, or highest truth and a supreme good.
And just as these notions are distinguished in both the act and
in actu et obiecto, ita possunt distingui in principio elicitivo. Nam

principium potest considerari prout est in tali genere absolute, vel
ut est in genere cum aliquo modo speciali, ut cum eminentia vel
aliquo tali.
18 Ad propositum: sicut in termino producto est considerare
amorem absolute et amorem sub tali modo, scilicet infinite, sic et
in principio productivo correspondent talia duo, voluntas
correspondet amori et infinitas in tali principio productivo
correspondet infinitati in producto. Infinitas igitur non est ratio
formalis producendi, sed est modus et gradus intrinsecus virtutis
eius qua agit et producit, sicut nec gradus qualitatis activae est
formale principium agendi vel modus quo sic agit vel producit;
nec est ita simplex principium quo formaliter agens agit vel
producit quin habeat certum gradum et modum virtutis.
19 Contra hoc instabis, quia sic voluntas non erit unum

principium quo simplex producendi, sed multiplex. Respondeo
quod est unum quo, quia impossibile est intelligere aliquid ita
simplex quin in eo intelligatur gradus suae virtutis vel
quantitatis virtualis tantus vel tantus, et talis certitudo gradus
sive finiti sive infiniti non facit compositionem aliquam vel
multiplicitatem in principio quo.
20 Sed adhuc dices: numquid voluntas est principium commu-

nicandi naturam sub aliquo alio modo quam sub infinitate?
Responsio: dico quod non solum sub modo infinitatis, sed sub
modo simplicitatis communicandi naturam. Quia voluntas, quae
est principium producendi amorem sibi et obiecto adaequatum,
est perfecte simplex, quia nec est composita nec alteri
componibilis; quia nec actui, id est amori producto, nec obiecto.
Ex quo patet quod voluntas non determinatur neque infinitate
nec aliquo alio, sed est principium simplex amandi et spirandi. Si
igitur voluntas simplex et amor eiusdem naturae simplex, et si
object, so can they be distinguished in the eliciting principle. For

the principle can be considered as it is in such a genus absolutely,
or as it is in a genus with some special mode, as with eminence
and something of that sort.
18 As to the case at hand: just as in the term produced love can
be considered absolutely and can be considered under such a
mode, namely infinitely, so also in the productive principle there
are two that correspond to these. The will corresponds to love,
and infinity in such a productive principle corresponds to infinity
in the product. Infinity, therefore, is not the formal notion of
producing, but it is a mode and an intrinsic grade of its [i.e., the
productive principle's] power whereby it acts and produces, just
as a degree of an active quality* is not a formal principle of acting
or a mode by which it so acts or produces. Neither is the principle
by which an agent formally acts or produces so simple as not to
have a certain degree or manner of power.
19 You will object to this, because in this way the will would
not be just one simple principle 'by which' as regards production,
but multiple. I reply that it is just one principle 'by which,' for
it is impossible to think that something is so simple as not to have
a greater or lesser degree of power or virtual quantity. Such
certainty of [having some] degree, either finite or infinite, does
not introduce some composition or multiplicity in the principle 'by
which.'
20 But still you ask: Is the will a principle of communicating
nature under a mode other than infinity? Response: I say that
it is not only communicating nature under the mode of infinity,
but under the mode of simplicity as well. For the will, which is a
principle of producing a love adequate to itself and an object, is
perfectly simple. For it is neither composed nor can form a
composite with another, whether it be with an act, i.e., with the
love produced, or with the object. From this it is manifest that the
will is not determined2 by infinity or anything else, but it is a
simple principle of loving and spirating. Therefore, if the will is
simple and the love of the same nature is simple, and if it is
unqualifiedly simple and the love likewise, then the will as such
2 'Determine' here has the meaning of 'to limit.'

simpliciter simplex et amor similiter, et sic voluntas est simplex

et non componibilis, nec amori, id est actui, nec obiecto, id est
essentiae.
21 Ad secundum6 dicendum quod assumptum est falsum. Non
enim voluntati in quantum voluntas repugnat communicare
naturam. Non enim repugnat sibi nisi in quantum est limitata et
imperfecta et componibile suo actui et perfectibilis illo sive per
illum. Sed sic non est voluntas in Deo; sed perfecta voluntas ut
dictum est, est ibi omnino simplex et incomponibilis et infinita
potest sic naturam communicare. Voluntas tamen in communi
nec est perfecta nec imperfecta, et ideo in communi non repugnat
sibi esse principium communicandi naturam, quia sic sibi
repugnaret ubi est perfecta, quod falsum est.
22 Ad tertium7 dicendum quod qualis est ordo inter aliqua ubi
est distinctio eorum realis, talis est ordo eorum ubi distinguuntur
tantum secundum rationem, nisi tollatur distinctio posterioris
propter deminutum esse prioris. Nunc autem realiter in divinis
est talis ordo quod primo est essentia, quae est fundamentum
omnium perfectionum in divinis; hanc autem secundum rem
consequuntur naturales proprietates essentiales quae sunt
perfectiones simpliciter convenientes ei ex natura rei, et ideo
quaelibet earum, secundum ordinem earum ad essentiam, capax
est infinitatis formaliter quam participant ab essentia quae primo
est infinita formaliter. Tertio consequuntur proprietates
personales quae non sunt infinitae formaliter nec capaces talis
infinitatis, cum non sint perfectiones simpliciter et essentiales.
Nec tamen sunt finitae formaliter, quia tunc non possunt esse
idem cum infinito. Ultimo sequuntur entitates creaturarum
formaliter finitae, ut rationes ideales factae ab intellectu divino.
23 Loquendo autem de perfectionibus essentalibus et naturali-
bus in divina essentia, quaelibet earum est formaliter infinita.
Quod autem quaelibet sit formaliter infinita, quia necessarium
est ad dicta quae sequuntur, probo tripliciter. Primo sic: natura
mere intellectualis quae nihil habet de non-intellectualitate
aequalis est in intellectualitate et intelligibilitate et omnino
unum et idem. Sic etiam de voluntate et volibilitate. Sed natura
6 Cf. supra n. 14.

7 Cf. supra n 15
is simple, and there can be no composition, either with the love,

that is, the action, or with the object, that is, the essence.
21 To the second [n. 14], it must be said that what is assumed
is false. For it is not repugnant to the will as will to communicate
the nature. For it is only repugnant to itself inasmuch as it is
limited and imperfect and able to be composed of its act and able
to be perfected by it or through it. But this is not the way the will
is in God, for, as has been said, it is a perfect will, that is,
completely simple and unable to be composed and infinite, and in
this way it can communicate nature. However, the will in general
is neither perfect nor imperfect, and therefore in general it is not
repugnant to it to be a principle of communicating nature,
because then it would be repugnant to it where it exists perfectly,
which is false.
22 To the third [n. 15], one must say that the sort of order that
exists among things where their distinction is real also exists
among things where their distinction is only conceptual, unless
the distinction in the posterior is removed on account of the
diminution* of being of the prior. Now, however, in the divine
there is really such an order that first is the essence, which is the
basis of all perfection in the divine. Natural essential properties,
however, that are pure* perfections pertaining to it from the
nature* of the thing, follow this according to reality, and
therefore each of these according to their order to the essence, is
formally capable of infinity, which they share with the essence
that is formally infinite primarily. Thirdly, come the personal
properties, which are neither formally infinite nor capable of such
infinity, since they are not pure and essential perfections.
However, they are not formally finite, because then they could not
be the same thing as the infinite. Finally, follow the entities of
creatures that are formally finite as ideal notions made by the
divine intellect.
23 Speaking of the essential and natural perfections in the
divine essence, however, all of these are formally infinite. Since it
is necessary for later statements, I prove that each is formally
infinite in three ways. First in this way: a purely intellectual
nature that has nothing of non-intellectuality is equally great in
intellectuality and intelligibility, and [is] entirely one, and [is] the
393 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-a
quae mere intellectualis et voluntaria est infinitae intelligibilita-

tis et volibilitatis; aliter enim non beatificaret. Ergo est infinita in
intellectualitate et volibilitate et per consequens voluntas et
intellectus sunt infinita in perfectione.
24 Item, secundo sic: obiectum infinitum non comprehenditur
nisi a potentia infinita, quia secundum Augustinum, XIII De
Civitate Dei, cap. 18,8 quidquid comprehenditur potentia vel
intellectu comprehendentis finitur; sed essentia divina quae est
formaliter infinita comprehenditur ab intellectu suo totaliter;
ergo eius intellectus est formaliter infinitus. Eodem modo potest
argui de voluntate et essentia volibili.
25 Item, tertio sic: infinita simul et distincte non intelliguntur
nisi ab intellectu infinito; patet distinctione 2, quaestione de
infinitate Dei; aliter possunt aequari finitum et infinitum, sicut
arguit VIII Physicorum.9 Sed intellectus divinus simul actu et
distincte intelligit infinita, ut patet per Augustinum ubi supra,
quia sapientiae eius non est numerus. Loquitur ibi de numeris et
figuris infinitis quae omnia Deus intelligit. Ergo intellectus
divinus est formaliter infinitus. Eodem modo arguitur de
voluntate.
[III. Ad formam quaestionis]
26 Dico ergo ad formam quaestionis qua quaeritur a quo

voluntas habeat suam infinitatem: dico quod fundamentaliter a
sua essentia. Sed unde habet quod sit formaliter infinita? Dico
quod voluntas divina habet hoc a se, quia scilicet est haec
voluntas, scilicet divina. Unde si per impossibile vel incom-
possibile desineret ista essentia esse et maneret intellectus et
voluntas eius in suo ordine, adhuc essent formaliter infinita, quia
in quocumque signo naturae vel originis voluntas est, voluntas est
infinita et principium communicandi naturam infinitam et
H Rectiiis: August., De civ. Dei XII, c. 19 (CCSL 48, 375; PL 41, 368)
0 Aristot., Physico VIII, c. 10 (2666 8-23).
same. In this way also [one can argue] about the will and the
ability to be willed. But a nature that is purely intellectual and
volitional is of infinite intelligibility and ability to be willed, for
otherwise it would not be able to make one happy. Therefore it is
infinite in intellectuality and in its ability to will and as a
consequence its will and intellect are infinite in perfection.
24 Also, secondly in this way: an infinite object is
comprehended only by an infinite potency, for according to
Augustine in Bk. XIII of The City of God, chapter 18, whatever is
comprehended is limited by a potency and the intellect of one
comprehending. But the divine essence, which is formally infinite,
is comprehended totally by his intellect; therefore, his intellect is
formally infinite. In the same way one can argue about the will
and the lovable essence.
25 Also, thirdly in this way: infinites are only understood
simultaneously and distinctly by an infinite intellect, as is evident
from distinction 2, the question on the infinity of God; otherwise
finite and infinite could be equal, as [Aristotle] argued in Bk. VIII
of the Physics. But the divine intellect understands infinites
actually and distinctly at the same time, as is evident from
Augustine, cited above, because 'his wisdom is without number.'
He speaks there about infinite numbers and figures, all of which
God comprehends. Therefore the divine intellect is formally
infinite. And in the same way one can argue about the will.
To the form of the question
26 Therefore I say to the form of the question by which it is

asked where the will's infinity comes from, and I say that
fundamentally it is from its essence. But what makes it formally
infinite? I say that the divine will has this of itself, namely
because it is this will, that is, divine. Hence, to assume the
impossible, or what is inconsistent, if this essence ceased to be
and his intellect and will remained in their order, they would still
be formally infinite, because in whatever sign* of nature or origin
the will is, that will is infinite and [remains] the principle of
communicating an infinite nature and doing so infinitely, and in
the same way it is evident as regards the divine intellect.
infinite; et eodem modo patet de intellectu divino. Concedo igitur

assistentiam esse fundamentaliter respectu voluntatis.
27 Ad primum argumentum principale,10 quando dicitur quod

unius naturae est tantum unus modus communicandi, responsum
est supra distinctione 2; et ad rationem Commentatoris similiter.
28 Ad aliud,11 quando dicitur quod natura est vis insita rebus
ex similibus similia procreans, dico quod natura habet hoc quod
producat simile ex simili ex natura productionis sive ex vi
productionis, non ratione essentiae vel naturae communicatae,
quia si per impossibile vel incompossibile auferretur essentia,
adhuc per modum similis rationis esset vis illa productiva, sed
non per modum similitudinis naturalis, sed intentionalis. Unde
quare dicitur Filius similis et imago Patris? Hoc non est ratione
essentiae communicatae, quia tunc Spiritus Sanctus diceretur
eodem modo imago sicut et Filius, quod falsum est. Ergo Filius
habet hoc quia producitur per modum naturae et intellectus et
per generationem, et alius non habet hoc, quia producitur per
modum voluntatis et per spirationem, et tamen productum est
simile in utroque producente, sicut patet.
29 Ad tertium,12 quando dicitur de voluntate quae non videtur
esse principium nisi artificialium et eorum quae sunt a proposito,
dico quod sicut Philosophus ponit in intellectu duplex principium,
scilicet operandi et producendi, sic et in voluntate, nam istae
potentiae ut comparantur ad proprios actus, sunt principia
operativa et activa, sed prout comparantur ad actus alios quos
imperant potentiis inferioribus, quarum sunt imperativae et
regulativae, sunt factivae, et praecipue respectu potentiae
motivae. Potentia autem motiva non movetur ab intellectu
l0 Cf. supra n. 1.
1 1 Cf. supra n. 2.
12 Cf. supra n. 3.
Therefore, I concede that there is assistance fundamentally as

regards the will.
27 To the first argument at the beginning [n. 1], when it is said

that one nature has only one manner of communicating, the
response is found above in distinction 2; and the Commentator's
reason likewise.
28 To the other [n. 2], when it is said that nature is a force
residing in things, procreating similar things from similar things,
I say that nature is such that it produces similar things from
those that are similar by reason of the nature or the force of the
production, not by reason of the essence or nature communicated.
For, to assume the impossible or incompatible, if the essence were
taken away, there still would be that productive force [acting]
according to the principle of similarity: however, not after the
manner of natural likeness, but an intentional* [likeness]. Why
then is the Son said to be similar and an image of the Father?
This is not by reason of the essence communicated, because then
the Holy Spirit would be said in the same way to be an image like
the Son, which is false. Therefore, the Son has this because he is
produced after the manner of nature3 and intellect, and by
generation, and the other [divine person] does not have this
because he is produced after the manner of the will and by
spiration; and nevertheless, the product is similar in both
productions, as is evident.
29 To the third [n. 3] when it is said of the will, that it seems to
be a principle only of artificial things and of those which are done
on purpose, I say that just as the Philosopher posits in the
intellect a twofold principle, namely of operating and producing,
so also in the will, for these potencies inasmuch as they are
viewed in respect to their proper acts, are operative and active
principles, but as regards other acts that they command in
powers subject to them of which they are imperative and
regulativethey are [the powers] of making, and mainly as
regards motive power. For motive powers are not moved by the
i That is, necessarily and not voluntarily.

speculativo vel practico absque voluntate movente, per quam

producuntur artificialia. Sic sunt potentiae factivae et produc-
tivae. Voluntas ergo non est principium artificiale, ut comparatur
ad proprium actum, sed est principium artificialium movendo
alias potentias inferiores ad suos actus, quorum actus et terminos
non potest immediate ponere in esse. Nunc autem actus
operativus voluntatis in nobis correspondet actui voluntatis
productivo in Deo respectu personae, sicut actus factivus in nobis
correspondet actui voluntatis divinae respectu creaturarum
exterius productarum, respectu quarum Deus dicitur esse artifex
et habere potentiam factivam.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum voluntas possit esse principium necessario
producendi]
30 Utrum voluntas possit esse principium necessario producen

di, ut Spiritum Sanctum.
Videtur quod non:

Potentia rationalis valet ad opposita, IX Metaphysicae;13 sed
voluntas est maxima potentia rationalis; ergo potest agere et non
agere.
31 Item, oppositi modi principiandi non possunt competere uni
principio formali; sed principiare necessario et contingenter sunt
oppositi modi principiandi; et principiare contingenter competit
voluntati divinae; patet in productione creaturarum; ergo
respectu nullius potest principiare necessario.
32 Contra:
Quod est perfectionis in productione non repugnat perfec-
tioni principii productivi sive productioni principii productivi
perfecti; sed necessitas est perfectionis in productione, quia in
omni condicione entis necessitas est perfectionis cui est possibilis,
cum sit membrum nobilius dividens ens quam suum oppositum.
Voluntas autem est principium productivum perfectum; ergo non
repugnat sibi necessario producere.
13 Aristot., Metaph.. IX (0), c. 5 (1048a 8).

speculative or practical intellect without the will moving, through

which artificial things are produced. [Thus] in this way they are
the powers of making and producing. Therefore, the will is not an
artificer-principle as regards it proper act, but is the principle of
artificial things when it moves other powers subject to it towards
their acts, whose acts and terms cannot be put into existence
immediately. Now, however, the operative act of the will in us
corresponds to the productive act of the will in God as regards a
person, just as the act of making in us corresponds to the act of
the divine will as regards creatures produced externally, as
regards which God is said to be an artisan and to have the power
to make things.
Question Two
Could the will be a necessary principle of producing?
30 Could the will be a necessary principle of producing, e.g.,

the Holy Spirit?
It seems not:
A rational potency is capable of opposite [effects], Bk. IX of
the Metaphysics; but the will is the most rational potency;
therefore it can act and not act.
31 Also, opposite modes of functioning as a principle cannot
pertain to one formal principle; but to function as a principle
necessarily and functioning as a principle contingently are
opposite modes of functioning as a principle; and to function as a
principle contingently pertains to the divine will, as is evident in
the production of creatures; therefore, as regards nothing can it
function as a principle necessarily.
32 To the contrary:
What is a matter of perfection in production is not
repugnant to the perfection of a productive principle or to the
production resulting from a perfect productive principle; but
necessity is a matter of perfection in production, because in every
condition of being necessity is a matter of perfection if it is
possible, since it is the more noble qualification in the division of
being than is its opposite. But the will is a perfect productive
principle. Therefore, it is not repugnant to it to produce
necessarily.
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio Henrici Gandavensis
33 Hic est opinio quae ponit triplicem actum voluntatis et

unam necessitatem ponit in volitione summi boni sive ultimi finis
clare visi, et duplicem necessitatem in actu notionali spirandi.
Una ergo actio voluntatis est ab ea sine naturalitate et mere
contingens eorum quae sunt ad finem; alia quae tendit in finem
ultimum clare visum; tertia procedens in amorem intentivum
boni; et hic est duplex necessitas: una ex parte voluntatis et alia
ex vi naturae assistentis.
34 Sed contra: impossibile aliquam necessitatem esse in

fundato quin maior vel aequalis sit in fundamento, et per
consequens impossibile est quod sit duplex necessitas in actu
spirandi et una in voluntate ut tendit in summum bonum clare
visum. Probatio antecedentis: quia si sit duplex necessitas in
fundato, et una tantum in fundamento, circumscripta ergo illa
necessitate quam habet fundatum a fundamento, adhuc remanet
fundatum alia necessitate, et tunc non remanet fundamentum
necessarium, quia circumscribitur. Si ergo sic est, remanebit
fundatum necessarium et fundamentum non necessarium: quod
est impossibile. Ergo cum actus quo voluntas tendit in summum
bonum et clare visum sit fundamentum et ratio quare tendit in
amorem notionalem intentivum quia non tendit in amorem
intentivum nisi quia prius tendit in amorem infinitum et
To the question
33 Here there is an opinion that postulates a triple act of the

will and posits one necessity in willing the highest good or the
ultimate end that is clearly seen, and a double necessity in the
notional* act of spirating. One action of the will, therefore, stems
from it without any necessity characteristic of nature
(naturalitas4) and is purely contingent as regards those things
that are means towards the end; the other [action of the will]
tends towards the ultimate end [viz. God or the divine nature]
that is clearly seen; a third, which proceeds in love aspiring after
the good. And here5 there is a double necessity: one on the part of
the will and the other from power of the nature assisting.
34 But to the contrary: it is impossible that some necessity be

in what rests on the foundation without an equal or greater
[necessity] existing in the foundation, and as a consequence it is
impossible that there be a double necessity in the act of spiration
and one in the will as it tends to the highest good clearly seen
[viz. the divine nature]. Proof of the antecedent: for if there is a
double necessity in what rests on the foundation, and only one
[necessity] in the foundation, therefore, that necessity that it has
from the foundation having been written off, what rests on the
foundation still remains by the other necessity, and at some time
there does not remain a necessary foundation, because it is
written off. If then this is so, there will remain [something]
necessary that rests on a foundation that is not necessary: which
is impossible. Therefore, since the act by which the will tends to
the highest good as clearly seen is the foundation and the reason
why it tends to notional intent lovesince it does not tend to
intent love unless it first tends to the highest and infinite love
4 The two primary divisions of an active power according to Scotus are

nature, whose action is necessary, and will, whose actions are contingent.
5 In the notional act of spiration.
summum clare visum, secundum eos , ergo non potest esse

duplex necessitas in actu spirationis quo tendit in amorem
intentivum et productum, et una tantum necessitas in amore quo
tendit in summum bonum clare visum.
[B. Alia opinio

1. Opinio proponitur]
35 Alia est opinio quae dicit quod voluntas potest considerari ut

natura et ut voluntas, et quod voluntas respectu finis est ut
natura et respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem est libera.
[2. Contra hanc opinionem]
36 Sed contra hoc arguitur per Augustinum in Enchiridion, 73

et 80 cap.,14 et ponitur in II libro, distinctione 25, ubi dicit quod
aut voluntas non est aut libera est; ergo si aliquid volumus
voluntate, et libera voluntate.
37 Item, per rationem sic: rationes illae quae primo distinguunt
potentias activas ab invicem non possunt esse eiusdem principii
activi primo; huiusmodi sunt natura et libertas ex II Physi-
corum;15 ergo si voluntas necessario tendit in finem et in ea quae
sunt ad finem contingenter, voluntas non erit aliqua una
potentia.
38 Confirmatur hoc, quia si non est eadem potentia respectu
finis et eorum quae sunt ad finem, nulla potentia eligit ea quae
sunt ad finem propter finem nec aliqua una potentia uti potest
nec eligere quod est impossibile, quia potentia potens operari
super unum extremum in ordine ad aliud, habet operari circa
utrumque extremum. Patet de sensu communi qui habet
discernere de differentiis diversorum sensibilium ab invicem, ut
inter colorem et sonum; quod non posset nisi cognosceret
utrumque extremum.
14 August.. Enchirid. c. 28. n 105 (CCSL 46, 106; PL 40, 281); Petrus
Lombardus, Sent. II, d. 25, c. 4 (SB IV, 463).
15 Cf. Aristot., Physica II, c. 1 (1926 10); c. 6 (1976 1).
clearly seen, according to thesetherefore, there cannot be a

double necessity in the act of spiration whereby it tends to intent
love that is produced, and only one necessity in love whereby it
tends to the highest good clearly seen.
Another opinion
35 Another opinion says that the will can be considered as

nature and as will, and the will as regards the end is as nature6
and as regards those things that are means to the end, is free.
Against this opinion
36 But we argue against this through Augustine in the

Enchiridion, chapters 73 and 80, and it is cited in Bk. II,
distinction 25, where he says that either it is not will or it is free;
therefore if we will something by the will, it is by the free will.*
37 Also, by reason in this way; those reasons that primarily
distinguish active potencies from one another cannot belong
primarily to the same active principle; such are nature and
liberty, from Bk. II of the Physics; therefore if the will necessarily
tends to the end and contingently towards the means to the end,
the will would not be one potency.
38 This is confirmed, because if the same potency cannot
[operate] with respect to the end and to those things that are
[means] to the end, no potency chooses those things that are
[means] to the end because of the end, nor can one use, or choose
by some one potency, which is impossible, for a potency that can
be operative in respect to one term as ordered to another, has to
be operative in respect to both terms. This is evident about the
common sense [i.e., the imagination which combines the sense
perceptible data], which has to discern the differences of diverse
sense impressions from one another, as between colors and
sounds; which could only take place if it knew both terms.
6 That is, acting as nature, i.e.. necessarily.

[VI. Opinio propria Scoti]
39 Respondeo ergo et dico quod voluntas divina est principium

necessario producendi amorem ratione termini; sed hoc est
probare a posteriori. Declaro autem hoc a priori sic: voluntas
divina est principium communicandi entitatem necessariam, ut
patet ex quaestione praecedente; sed entitas necessaria non
potest contingenter communicari, quia tunc eius communicatio
esset contingens et per consequens communicatum non esset ex
se necessarium. Ergo si terminus communicatus vel productus
per voluntatem habet esse necessarium, et voluntas erit
principium communicandi entitatem necessariam necessario.
40 Sed dicetur quod haec probatio est a posteriori concludens

de necessitate producti necessitatem principii productivi, sed
adhuc quaerenda est ratio a priori, quare voluntas est principium
necessario producendi vel communicandi naturam divinam per
spirationem.
41 Responsio: huiusmodi declaratio a priori est ista: voluntas
infinita necessario est in actu secundo productivo, quia potest
esse in actu secundo et non mutatur; ergo semper est in actu
secundo volendi circa primum obiectum.
42 Item, semper est in actu secundo circa primum obiectum,
quia non est in actu secundo circa obiectum secundarium, nisi
quia est in tali actu circa obiectum primum. Si enim posset
habere actum volendi circa obiectum secundum et non circa
obiectum primum, vilesceret voluntas eius, sicut arguit
Philosophus XII Metaphysicae,16 quia moveretur voluntas eius
formaliter infinita ab aliquo formaliter finite, et sic perficeretur
ab eo et tunc vilesceret.
43 Item, voluntas infinita semper est in actu volendi recto
necessario, quia si posset esse in actu volendi non recto, ergo de
l Aristot., Metaph. XII (A), c. 9 (10746 26-8).

39 I respond therefore and say that the divine will is a

principle of producing love necessarily by reason of the term; but
this is to prove a posteriori* However, I explain this a priori* in
this way: the divine will is a principle of communicating
necessary entity, as is evident from the preceding question; but
necessary entity cannot be communicated contingently, because
then the communication would be contingent and as a
consequence what is communicated would not be necessary of
itself. Therefore, if the term communicated or produced through
the will has necessary being, then the will would also be the
principle of communicating necessary entity necessarily.
40 It may be objected, however, that this proof is a posteriori,
concluding the necessity of the productive principle from the
necessity of the product, but still one must look for an a priori
reason why the will is a principle of producing or communicating
the divine nature through spiration necessarily.
41 Response: such an a priori explanation is this: infinite will
necessarily is in second act,*7 that is, productive, because it can
be in second act and not changed8; therefore, it is always in
second act of willing in regard to the first object.9
42 Also, it is always in second act as regards its first object,
because it is not in second act as regards its secondary object,10
except on account of [first] being in such an act as regards its first
object. For if it could have an act of willing as regards its
secondary object and not regarding its first object, it would
denigrate the will, as the Philosopher argues in Bk. XII of the
Metaphysics, because [God's] formally infinite will would be
moved by something formally finite, and thus it would be
perfected by it and then denigrated.
43 Also, the infinite will is necessarily always in an upright act
of will, because if it could be in an act of willing that is not right,
7 The will is in first act by the fact that it exists, and is in second act by the
fact that it is acting or loving or spirating.
H That is, always producing.
0 The divine nature.
10 That is, created or finite things.
necessitate esset in actu volendi non recto, cum non possit mutari
et cum omnis actus non rectus habeat regulari per aliquem actum
superioris potentiae, et superior potentia est infinita. Sequitur a
primo ad ultimum quod si voluntas infinita posset esse non recta
vel in actu non recto, quod necessario sit in actu volendi non recto
etiam circa primum obiectum volibile. Primum autem obiectum
volibile, quod est summum bonum, est summe et necessario
volendum ex ratione sui; aliter sua volibilitas dependeret a
voluntate acceptante suam volibilitatem vel diligibilitatem; ergo
etc. Voluntas ergo creaturae dependet a voluntate prima
acceptante, quod est impossibile de obiecto infinitae voluntatis, eo
quod est primum et adaequatum obiectum voluntatis eius
infinitae in infinitum. Patet ergo quod voluntas infinita vult de
necessitate primum obiectum eius, scilicet essentiam suam
infinitam.
44 Ex hoc arguitur sic: quae est necessitas voluntatis ad
volendum aliquod obiectum diligibile sibi praesens, eadem est
necessitas voluntatis in supposito perfecto et convenienti actioni
ad producendum amorem adaequatum illi obiecto. Sed probatum
est, in voluntate infinita est necessitas ad volendum recto actu
primum obiectum, quod ex se est necessario diligibile infinitum;
ergo voluntas infinita eadem necessitate in Patre et Filio, quod
est suppositum conveniens actioni tali, erit necessario principium
producendi amorem adaequatum illi obiecto infinito; ista ergo
ratio est a priori quare voluntas divina necessario spirat amorem
adaequatum summo diligibili, quia est infinita et necessario recta
habens obiectum infinitum diligibile sibi praesens infinite
volendum; et ideo sicut ex necessitate est principium volendi
bonum infinitum, ita ex necessitate est principium spirandi
amorem adaequatum illi bono.
45 Ad primum in oppositum,i7 dico quod potentia rationalis

respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem, ubi non est ratio tota obiecti
et summi boni, est ad opposita. Voluntas etiam creata circa finem
est ad opposita, quia non est ex se necessario recta. Voluntas
i7 Cf. supra n. 30.

therefore it would of necessity be in an act of willing that is not

right, since it cannot be changed and since every act that is not
right must be regulated through some act of a superior potency,
and a superior potency [in this case] is infinite. It follows from
first to last that if the infinite will could be not right or in an act
that is not right, it is necessarily in an act of willing that is not
right also as regards its first willable object. But its first willable
object, which is the supreme good, must be willed in the highest
and necessarily by reason of itself; otherwise its ability to be
willed would depend upon the will recognizing its ability to be
willed or loved, therefore etc. Therefore, the will of the creature
depends on the first will recognizing it, which is impossible in the
case of the object of an infinite will, for it is the first and adequate
object of [God's] infinite will ad infinitum. Hence, it is evident
that the infinite will wills of necessity its first object, namely its
infinite essence.
44 From this one argues in this way: the same sort of necessity
whereby the will wills some lovable object present to it, is found
in the perfect supposit that is suited to an [appropriate] action,
[in this case, the necessity] to produce adequate love of that
object. But as has been proved, in the infinite will there is a
necessity to will rightly the first object, which is of itself
necessarily an infinite lovable. Therefore, the infinite will by the
same necessity in the Father and Son, which is a supposit suited
to such an action, will be necessarily a principle of producing love
adequate to that infinite object. Hence, this reason is an a priori
reason why the divine will necessarily spirates adequate love of
the highest lovable object, because it is infinite and necessarily
right, having an infinite lovable object that has to be infinitely
loved present to it. And therefore, just as out of necessity it is a
principle of willing an infinite good, so out of necessity is it a
principle of spirating an adequate love of that good.
45 To the first argument for the opposite [n. 30], I say that a
rational potency with respect to those things that are means to an
end, where the consideration of an entire object and highest good
autem divina infinita necessario est recta, et ideo talis voluntas in

supposito convenienti actioni et respectu obiecti infiniti semper
recti sibi praesentis, necessario spirat amorem adaequatum illi
obiecto.
46 Ad secundum,i8 dico quod modi oppositi qui distinguunt
principia agendi non conveniunt eidem principio; sed modi
huiusmodi oppositi non sunt isti, scilicet necessitas et
contingentia circa actionem, quia uterque modus agendi invenitur
in utroque principio activo quae primo distinguuntur in genere
potentiae activae, quia aliquod est agens naturale quod
necessario agit, et aliquod contingenter. Similiter est de agente
libero et agente a proposito, quod aliquod necessario agit et
aliquod contingenter.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum necessitas et libertas compatiantur se respectu
eiusdem productionis]
47 Utrum sit hoc verum, scilicet quod in voluntate respectu

eiusdem productionis compatiantur se necessitas et libertas.
Videtur quod non:

Quia principium in quo est necessitas ad agendum ex se
determinatur ad agendum; sed quod ex se determinatur ad
agendum est principium activum naturale; sed principium
naturale et liberum sibi repugnant, quia contra se invicem
distinguuntur primo, sicut patet II Physicorum et IX
Metaphysicae;i0 ergo etc.
48 Contra: Perfectio principii productivi non tollitur a principio

perfectissimo productivo; sed necessitas est perfectionis condicio
in principio productivo, ut prius deductum est, quia est differentia
nobilior entis; ergo non repugnat voluntati, quae est principium
perfectissimum productivum.
IH Cf. supra n. 31.

1!l Cf. Aristot.. Physica II. c. 1 (1926 10-1936 20); c. 6 (197a 30-198a 12);
Metaph IX (6), c. 2 (1046a 35-10466 25).
is not present, is [capable of] opposite [effects]. For the created

will is [capable of] opposite [effects even] as regards the end,
because it is not of itself necessarily right. But the infinite divine
will is necessarily right and, therefore, such a will, in a supposit
suited to act and as regards an infinite object (which is always
right) being present to itself, necessarily spirates adequate love of
that object.
46 To the second [n. 31], I say that opposite modes that
distinguish principles of acting do not pertain to the same
principle. However these, namely necessity and contingency as
regards the action, are not such opposite modes, because both
[these] modes of acting are found in both active principles that
are first distinguished [into necessary and contingent] in the
category of active potency, because something is a natural agent
that acts necessarily and something [that acts] contingently. It is
similar as regards a free agent and as regards the agent acting for
a purpose, that something acts necessarily and something
contingently.
Question Three
Are necessity and liberty compatible as regards the same
production?
47 It is asked whether this is true, namely are necessity and

liberty compatible as regards the same production?
It seems not:
For the principle, in which there is a necessity to act, is
determined of itself to act; but what is determined of itself to act
is an active natural principle. But a natural and a free principle
are repugnant, because they are primarily distinguished from
each other, as is evident from Bk. II of the Physics and Bk. IX of
the Metaphysics; therefore etc.
48 To the contrary:
The most perfect productive principle is not deprived of
anything that perfects a productive principle; but necessity is a
condition of perfection in a productive principle, as has been
deduced before, for it is the more noble difference of being;
therefore it is not repugnant to the will, which is the most perfect
productive principle.
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio Henrici Gandavensis
49 Hic dicunt aliqui20 quod non repugnant in voluntate

necessitas et libertas respectu eiusdem productionis. Quaelibet
enim condicio agendi potest stare cum libertate voluntatis, quae
non ponit modum agendi naturae, quae primo distinguitur contra
voluntatem; sed necessitas non ponit modum et condicionem
agendi naturae, scilicet per impressionem, sed per expressionem,
et ideo licet ponatur voluntatem2i aliquid producere de
necessitate, non tamen naturaliter vel modo naturae, quia non
producit per impressionem, sed per expressionem.
[2. Contra positionem Henrici]
50 Sed contra hoc quod hic dicitur de actione per impressionem

respectu alicuius quasi materialis in divinis est improbatum
distinctione 2 et 5. Sed specialiter contra illud quod hic dicitur ad
propositum arguo sic: si agens naturale per impossibile de nihilo
ageret, adhuc esset quaerendum de modo agendi ipsius quomodo
tunc ageret. Tunc autem non ageret per modum voluntatis et
modum liberum, quia tunc modus agendi naturae non
distingueretur a modo agendi voluntatis; quod est falsum, quia
agens naturale aget per impressionem, voluntas non, sed per
expressionem. Non enim quaeritur de principio activo in
comparatione ad passum in quod fit impressio, sed in
comparatione ad actionem; ergo dato quod natura ageret per
impressionem vel non, adhuc restat quaerere de modo suo agendi
proprio quo distinguitur a modo agendi libero, quia non est
certitudo22 passum in quod fit impressio.
m Henricus Gand., Summa a. 6O, q. 1 in corp (II, 155X-Y).

2] Rectius: ponatur voluntas ... producere; cf. supra dist. 10, q. 1, n. 6.
n Certitudo: pro certe.
To the Question
Opinion of Henry of Ghent
Exposition of the opinion.
49 Here some say that necessity and liberty in the will are not
repugnant as regards the same production. For any condition of
acting whatsoever is compatible with liberty of the will, provided
that it does not posit the mode of acting that belongs to nature,
which is primarily distinguished from the will. Necessity,
however, does not posit a mode and condition of acting like
nature, namely through impression, but through expression, and
therefore although one may assume that the will produces
something of necessity, nevertheless it does not produce naturally
or after the mode of nature, because it does not produce through
impression, but through expression.
Against the Opinion of Henry
50 But against this: what it is said here of action through

impression as regards something that is quasi-material in the
divine was disproved in distinctions two and five. But I argue
specifically against what is said here in this way: if, to assume the
impossible, a natural agent were to act regarding nothing, one
would still ask about its mode of acting how it would then act. But
then it would not act according to the mode of will and in a free
mode, because then the mode of nature would not be
distinguished from the mode of acting voluntarily, which is false.
For a natural agent acts through impression, but not the will, but
rather through expression. For [in this case] one is not asking
about the active principle in respect to what is acted upon in
which the impression takes place, but in respect to its action.
Therefore, whether the nature acts through impression or not, it
still remains to ask about its own proper mode of action by which
it is distinguished from acting freely, because [in this case] there
is certainly nothing that is acted upon in which the impression
takes place.
[II. Opinio propria Scoti]
51 Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem et dico quod necessitas cum

libertate stat in agendo: quod primo nunc ostendo; secundo eius
possibilitatem declaro. Primum sic: libertas est aliqua condicio
intrinseca voluntatis ut comparatur ad suam actionem; quod ergo
non repugnat voluntati ut comparatur ad suam actionem, non
repugnat eius libertati; sed necessitas non repugnat voluntati ut
comparatur productioni suae, immo, ut est probatum, voluntas
est principium necessario producendi amorem etc.; ergo nec
necessitas repugnabit libertati voluntatis ut comparatur ad
eandem productionem.
52 Sed hoc non videtur possibile, cum liberum, eo quod tale,
videtur importare quoddam dominium ad posse se determinare
ad hoc et ad eius oppositum; necessarium autem ex se
determinatur ad unum; ergo etc.
53 Respondeo: sicut quamlibet formam activam consequitur
immediate quod sit principium agendi, ita immediate consequitur
eam modus agendi; et ideo sicut non est aliqua causa quaerenda
quare talis forma agit vel potest agere, ut quare calor est
calefactivus et quare calidum calefacit, nisi quia sunt tales
formae, ita non est aliqua causa quaerenda quare habent talem
modum agendi, ut calefacere per modum naturae et huiusmodi,
nisi quia sunt tales formae. Unde sicut non est medium inter
formam et principium activum, ita non est medium inter modum
agendi et principium agendi, et ideo sicut quamlibet entitatem
sequitur immediate modus essendi eius proprius, ita quamlibet
formam activam sequitur immediate modus eius agendi proprius.
Non est ergo aliqua causa quaerenda quare voluntas vult nisi
quia voluntas est voluntas, nec quare sic vel sic vult: necessario et
contingenter, necessario et libere, nisi quia est talis et talis
voluntas. Haec enim est propositio contingens immediata
'voluntas creata vult', quia sicut in propositionibus necessariis
standum est tandem ad aliquam immediate necessariam, ita in
propositionibus contingentibus oportet stare ad immediatam
contingentem et non necessariam, quia ex necessaria non
sequitur contingens, sicut nec ex vero sequitur falsum. Et quia
propositionis immediatae, sive sit necessaria sive sit contingens,
51 I respond, therefore, to the question and I say that necessity

in acting goes together with liberty. First, I demonstrate this;
secondly, I explain how it is possible. The first I show in this way:
liberty is some condition intrinsic to the will in respect to its
action. Hence, what is not repugnant to the will in respect to its
action is not repugnant to its liberty. But necessity is not
repugnant to the will in respect to its production; indeedas has
been provedthe will is a principle necessarily producing love,
etc.; therefore neither is necessity repugnant to liberty of the will
in respect to the same production.
52 But this does not seem possible with what is free, which as
such seems to imply a certain power that enables it to determe
itself both to this and to its opposite; however, what is necessary
is of itself determined to something one; therefore, etc.
53 Response: just as that which is a principle of acting follows
immediately certain active forms, so also are they followed
immediately by a way of acting. And, therefore, just as there is no
cause to be sought why such forms act or can act, as why heat
tends to heat and why something hot heats, except that they are
this sort of forms, so no cause should be sought why they have
this mode of acting except that they are such forms: for example,
to heat after the manner of nature, and these sorts of things.
Hence, just as there is no intermediary between the form and the
principle of acting, so there is no medium between the mode of
acting and the principle of acting. And, therefore, just as a mode
of being proper to it follows immediately each entity, so the mode
of acting proper to it follows each active form immediately.
Therefore, there is no reason to ask why the will wills except that
it is because it is the will, nor why it wills thus or thus
necessarily and contingently, necessarily and freelyexcept that
it is such and such a will. For this is an immediate contingent
proposition, 'the created will wills.' For just as in necessary
propositions one must finally come to a halt and stop at some one
that is immediately necessary, so in contingent propositions it is
necessary to stop with one that is immediately contingent, and
not necessary. For from necessary propositions a contingent does
non est quaerenda aliqua causa ulterior quare est immediata,

quia talis est in ordine suo prima, et indisciplinati sit quaerere
causam cuius non est causa, IV Metaphysicae et Commentator,23
ideo huius propositionis 'voluntas necessario vel contingenter
producit' non est quaerenda causa alia ab ipsa voluntate nisi quia
voluntas est voluntas. Sicut ergo natura ex se determinatur ad
unum, ita et voluntas ad producendum aliquid necessario vel
contingenter, nec istae differentiae actionis, necessitas et
contingentia, sunt differentiae essentiales propriae activi vel
productivi, sed sunt differentiae accidentales non convertibiles
cum principio activo naturali nec cum principio libero, quia
utroque modo potest utrumque principium agere.
[III. Ad argumentum principale]
54 Ad argumentum in contrarium24 est dicendum quod

voluntas quae necessario producit determinatur ex se ad
producendum. Et quando dicitur quod tunc sequitur quod ex
natura sua determinatur ut principium naturale, dicendum quod
natura accipitur uno modo communiter pro essentia rei, et sic
unumquodque sicut habet entitatem ita et naturam. Unde sic
dicimus quod natura negationis est talis vel talis, et natura
quantitatis et qualitatis est huiusmodi, licet negatio vel quantitas
non sit res naturalis. Alio modo accipitur natura pro principio
naturali, ut est vis quaedam productiva similis ex simili et hoc vi
productionis suae; et isto modo producitur Filius in divinis natura
vel naturaliter, quia ex vi productionis suae procedit ut similis ex
simili in natura. Nam generatio quae est ad filium est productio
similis ex simili in substantia, V Physicorum.25 Voluntas ergo, etsi
necessario determinetur ad producendum ex natura sua
2:l Aristot., Metaph. IV (T), c. 4 (1006a 5-8); c. 6 (101 la 813); c. 7 (1012a 2).
M Cf. supra n. 47.
Aristot.. Physica V, c 1 (225o 1-20).
not follow, just as from true propositions no false one follows.

And, indeed, regarding immediate propositions, whether they are
necessary or contingent, one must not seek a further reason why
they are immediate, for such is first in its order. It is those who
are not instructed who ask for causes of those things, for which
there are no causes, according to Bk. IV of the Metaphysics and
the Commentator. Hence, regarding this proposition 'the will
produces necessarily and contingently' one ought not to ask for
another cause apart from the will itself, which amounts to
'because will is will.' Therefore, just as nature is of itself
determined to one, so the will is to producing something
necessarily or contingently, nor are these differences of action,
[i.e.,] necessity and contingency, proper essential differences of an
active or productive principle. They are, rather, accidental
differences that are not convertible with an active natural
principle or with a free principle, because both principles can act
according to both modes.
54 To the argument to the contrary [n. 47], it must be said that

the will, which necessarily produces, is determined of itself to
produce. And when it is said 'then it follows that it is of its nature
determined as a natural principle,' it must be said that 'nature' is
taken in one sense commonly for the essence of a thing, and in
this case each thing, just as it has entity, also has a nature. Hence
in this way we say that the nature of negation is such or such,
and the nature of quantity and quality is of this sort, although
negation or quantity is not a natural thing. In another sense,
'nature' is taken for a natural principle, as it is a certain power to
produce something similar from something similar, and this by
virtue of its production. And in this way the Son is produced in
the divine by nature, or naturally, because by force of his
production he proceeds as something similar from something
similar in nature. For the generation that exists regarding a son
is a production of something similar from something similar in
substance, according to Bk. V in the Physics. The will, therefore,
although necessarily determined to produce from its nature
accipiendo naturam primo modo non tamen, ut natura, est

principium naturale producens naturaliter productum simile ex
simili, ita quod ex vi productionis suae sit sibi similis in natura.
Voluntas tamen necessario determinatur ad producendum ubi
necessitas non est condicio propria principii activi naturalis, isto
modo accipiendo naturam.
[Quaestio 4
Utrum voluntas sit formale principium producendi
Spiritum Sanctum]
55 Utrum voluntas sit formale principium producendi Spiritum

Sanctum.
Videtur quod non:

Quia quidquid producitur per voluntatem est praecognitum,
Augustinus XV 27;26 sed Spiritus Sanctus non est praecognitus a
Patre et Filio antequam producatur, quia cognitio Patris et Filii
non est nisi intuitiva rei, scilicet ut exsistit. Si sic
praecognosceretur, esset antequam produceretur, et ita esset
antequam esset, quod est impossibile.
56 Ad oppositum est Magister in littera, et adducit

Hieronymum vel Augustinum, Super Psalmum 14, quaere in
littera.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
57 Responsio ad hanc quaestionem patet ex praecedentibus.

Dico quod Spiritus Sanctus producitur a voluntate Patris et Filii
sicut a principio quo, non tamen sicut principium vel a principio
quod producit; et ideo non proprie dicitur quod voluntas producit
Spiritum Sanctum vel potius quod sit principium spirandi
Spiritum Sanctum, quia gerundivum additum cum principio
activo non dicit tantum principium quo sed principium quod, et ea
quae concurrunt cum principio quo, ut dictum est distinctione 7;
notat enim actum ut egredientem vel posse egredi ab lllo
m August.. De Trin. XV, c. 27, n. 50 (CCSL 50A. 532; PL 42, 1097).

taking nature in the first sensehowever, is not, like nature, a

natural principle producing naturally a similar product from
something similar, so that from the force of its production [its
product] would be similar to it in nature. The will, however, is
necessarily determined to produce where necessity is not a proper
condition of a natural active principle, in this way of taking
'nature.'
Question Four
Is the will a formal principle of producing the Holy Spirit?
55 Is the will the formal principle of producing the Holy Spirit?

It seems not:
For whatever is produced through the will is known
beforehand, Augustine in Bk. XV, [of The Trinity], c. 27; but the
Holy Spirit is not known by the Father and the Son before it is
produced, because the Father and the Son only have intuitive*
knowledge of a thing, namely, concurrent with its existence. And
so if it were known beforehand, it would be before it was
produced, and thus before it existed, which is impossible.
56 For the opposite is the Master* in the text,* and he cites
Jerome or Augustine Super Psalmum 14. Look for it in the text.
To the Question
57 The response to this question is evident from the preceding

questions. I say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the will of the
Father and the Son as from the principle 'by which,' not however
as from the 'principle which'ii produces; and therefore it is not
properly said that the will produces the Holy Spirit or rather that
it is the principle of spirating the Holy Spirit. For the gerund
joined with the active principle' implies not only the principle 'by
which,' but the principle 'which,' and those things that concur
with the principle 'by which,' as has been said in distinction
seven, for it indicates the act as coming forth or being able to
" Scotus distinguishes here the principle who or what produces, namely the
Father and the Son, from the principle 'by which' they produce, namely the divine
will they share in common.
supposito cui attribuitur tale principium activum. Sed falsum est

quod Spiritus Sanctus producatur isto modo a voluntate, sed ut
quo spirant Pater et Filius Spiritum Sanctum.
58 Hoc probatur ex praecedentibus sic: quia voluntas infinita
habens obiectum diligibile sibi praesens et infinitum in supposito
perfecto et convenienti actioni est principium communicandi
naturam, ut patet supra; ergo voluntas ut sic est principium
formale producendi personam aliquam in esse. Probatio
consequentiae: quia non potest communicari natura nisi in
persona, nam in illa essentia nullum est accidens quod possit in
illa produci; patet distinctione 8 de simplicitate Dei. Ergo per
voluntatem infinitam communicatur natura in supposito
exsistente, non in supposito quod praecedit istam productionem,
scilicet Patris vel Filii; non Patris, quia nihil producit se ipsum;
nec Filii, quia Filius producitur alio principio sufficienti, ut prius
patuit; ergo voluntas est principium quo producitur Spiritus
Sanctus.
59 Ad argumentum in oppositum,27 dico quod haec est absolute

et simpliciter falsa: quidquid producitur per voluntatem est
praecognitum, nam non oportet actum voluntatis intrinsecum,
antequam ab ea eliciatur vel producatur, esse praecognitum vel
praecognosci nisi obiectum tantum, ut quilibet experitur in se.
Sed bene verum est quod antequam actus eius imperatus aliis
potentiis producatur per motionem illarum potentiarum
inferiorum, oportet quod praecognoscatur per respectum ad ista
obiecta secundaria vel producta sive actus imperatos, quae non
dicuntur volitiones, sed volita, et talia oportet esse praecognita; et
haec est causa quare intellectio non est practica extensa ad
volitionem, sed ad volita, unde omnes praxes quas ponit
Philosophus sunt praxes, id est imperatae a voluntate, quae non
imperat nisi volens; sed velle est prima praxis a qua omnes
praxes habent quod sint praxes, et prima praxis, scilicet volitio
est conformis obiecto absque cognitione. Volitiones tamen
secundariae, quia sunt volita et imperata, ideo oportet quod sint
Cf. supra n. 55.

come forth from that supposit [or person] to whom such an active
principle is attributed. But it is false that the Holy Spirit is
produced in this way by the will, but [the latter is] that 'by which'
the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit.
58 And this is proved from the preceding in this way: because
the infinite will, having a lovable object present and infinite in a
perfect supposit suited to the action, is the principle of
communicating the nature, as is evident above; therefore the will
as such is a formal principle of producing some person in being.
Proof of the implication:* because nature can only be
communicated in a person, for in that essence nothing is an
accident that could be produced in it; it is evident from distinction
eight about the simplicity of God. Therefore, through the infinite
will the nature is communicated in an existing supposit, not in a
supposit that precedes this production, viz. of the Father or the
Son. Not of the Father, because nothing produces itself; not of the
Son, because the Son is produced by another sufficient principle,
as has been made clear before; therefore, the will is the principle
'by which' the Holy Spirit is produced.
59 To the argument for the opposite [n. 55], I say that this is
absolutely and simply false: 'whatever is produced through the
will is known beforehand,' for it is not necessary that an intrinsic
act of the will, before it is elicited or produced by it, be foreknown
or previously known except as far as an object is concerned, as
each experiences in oneself. But it is indeed true that before its
act commanding other powers be produced through the
movement of those lesser powers, it has to be foreknown as
regards those secondary objects or products or commanded acts,
which are not called 'volitions' but things willed,' and such things
need to be foreknown. And this is the reason why the practical
intellect is not extended to volition, but to things willed. Hence,
all willed actions (praxes),i2 which the Philosopher posits, are
i2 Praxis, from the Greek Ttprirttiv, 'to do,' is perhaps best described as a
willed action or activity. 'Practice,' although stemming from the same Greek root,
praecognita; sed talis non est actus voluntatis productivus

Spiritus Sancti, quia actus ille assimilatur alicui intrinseco
voluntatis et non extrinseco, cuiusmodi est actus creationis, quia
illum actum concedo praecognosci, quia est imperatus antequam
creatura producatur. Obiectum etiam voluntatis divinae, ut
diligibile infinitum cuius amor spiratur, concedo similiter
praecognosci, scilicet essentiam divinam, non autem ipsum
amorem qui est Spiritus Sanctus, qui non procedit sub ratione
voluntatis imperantis.
praxes, that is, actions commanded by the will, which does not
command except as willing. But to will is the first actual willed
action, from which all others derive their character as praxes or
willed actions. And the first praxis, namely, volition [or the act of
willing] is conformed to an object without cognition. Secondary
volitions, however, because they are willed and commanded, need
to be known beforehand: but the act of the will productive of the
Holy Spirit is not such, because this act is assimilated to
something intrinsic to the will and not to something extrinsic,
such as the act of creation, since that act, I concede, is foreknown,
because it is commanded before the creature is produced. Also I
concede that the object of the divine will, namely, the divine
essenceas an infinite lovable [object], the love of which is
spiratedis similarly foreknown, but not that love, which is the
Holy Spirit, who does not proceed under the aspect of will
commanding.
rather connotes repeated actions that have as their purpose a proficiency in

performing the action.
[Distinctio 11
Quaestio 1
Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio]
1 Circa distinctionem undecimam primo quaeritur utrum

Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio.
Videtur quod non: Damascenusi loquens de Spiritu Sancto a
Patre procedente et in Filio quiescente.
2 Item, in Legenda Sancti Andreae.
3 Item, Damascenus,2 cap. 8: ex Filio non dicimus etc.
4 Item, Epistola De Trisagio in fine ad Iordanum,3 ubi dicit
quod est Spiritus Filii et non ex Filio, et sic dicitur spiritus oris
Dei.
5 Praeterea, per rationem: nihil est tenendum tanquam
articulus fidei nisi quod exprimitur in Evangelio vel in Novo
Testamento, quia ibi exprimitur tota fides; sed in Evangelio nec in
Novo Testamento est expressum quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a
Filio, quia ubicumque ponitur 'ex' ponitur 'ex Patre', et 'Filii'
semper habetur in genitivo; ergo non est articulus fidei; et est una
ratio Graecorum.
6 Item, alia ratio est et ponitur in littera,4 quia Leo papa
scripsit in lamina vel tabula argentea quod a Patre procedit et in
fine subiunxit: qui contrarium asseruit anathema sit.
7 Item, dilectio in nobis non procedit a verbo nostro; ergo nec
in divinis.
8 Item, spiratio passio tantum convenit uni personae, ergo et
spiratio actio, quia relativa commultiplicantur; ergo qua ratione
una spiratio esset in duabus personis, et alia, scilicet passiva:
quod est impossibile.
9 Contra: Athanasius in symbolo: "Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et
Filio". Et in symbolo Apostolorum: "qui ex Patre Filioque
procedit";5 ergo etc.
i Damasc.. De fide orthod., c. 7 0, c. 7] (ed. Buytaert, 26; PG 94, 806).

* Damasc., De fide orthod., c. 8 [I, c. 8] (ed. Buytaert, 47; PG 94. 831).
:i Damasc., De hymno trisagio, n. 28 (PG 95, 60).
* Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 11, c. 1, n. 3 (SB IV, 115).
5 Ps. -Athanasius, Symbolum 'Quicunque' (ed. H. Denzinger, n. 39); Symbo-
lum Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum (ed. H. Denzinger, n. 86).
407
Distinction 11
Question One
Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son?
1 In regard to distinction eleven it is asked first whether the

Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.
It seems not:
Damascene speaks of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the
Father and coming to rest in the Son.
2 Also, in the Legend of St. Andrew.
3 Also, Damascene, chapter 8: "We do not say 'from the Son, "
etc.
4 Also, at the end of the Epistle on the Trisagion to Jordan,
where he says that it is the Spirit of the Son and not from the
Son, and thus he is said to be the spirit of the mouth of God.
5 Furthermore, through a rational argument: nothing must be
held as an article of faith unless it is expressed in the Gospel or in
the New Testament, because there is expressed the whole of faith.
But [neither] in the Gospel nor New Testament is it expressed
that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, because wherever
'from' is posited it is in 'from the Father,' and the Son is always
mentioned in the genitive. Therefore, it is not an article of the
faith; and this is one of the reasons cited by the Greeks.
6 Also, another reason is given and it is cited in the text,*
because Pope Leo1 wrote on a silver plate or tablet that he
proceeds from the Father and at the end he added: who asserts
the opposite let him be anathema.
7 Also, the love in us does not proceed from our word:
therefore neither does it in the divine.
8 Also, passive spiration* only pertains to one person,*
therefore also active spiration, because correlatives are multiplied
together; the same reason, therefore, that would make one
spiration be in two persons, [would make] the other, namely,
passive [spiration] also [be in two], which is impossible.
9 To the contrary: Athanasius in the creed: "The Holy Spirit is
from the Father and the Son." And in the Apostles' creed: "who
proceeds from the Father and the Son"; therefore, etc.
1 Pope Leo the Great.
407
[I. Ad quaestionem]
10 In quaestione ista discordant Graeci a Latinis. Inveni tamen

notulam Lincolniensis, Super Epistolam de Trisagio in fine,6 quod
non discordant realiter Graeci a Latinis, quia sententia
Graecorum est quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre per Filium.
Sic ergo duo sapientes, unus Graecus et alius Latinus, non
amatores propriae dictionis sed divini zeli, non invenirent forte
discordiam realem sed vocalem: alias vel Latini vel Graeci essent
haeretici. Sed quis dicet Basilium, Gregorium Nazianzenum,
Gregorium Nyssenum,7 Damascenum, Chrysostomum et multos
alios excellentes doctores esse haereticos; et ex alia parte
Ambrosium, Hieronymum, Augustinum, Gregorium, Hilarium
etc., qui fuerunt doctores Latini excellentissimi, esse haereticos?
Forte moderni Graeci addiderunt praedicto articulo ex pertinacia
sua quod doctores praecedentes non dixerunt nec intellexerunt.
Tenendum igitur est hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre
et Filio, quia Ecclesia dicit hoc.
11 Hoc autem ostendo ratione sumpta ex fide sic: quodcumque
suppositum perfectum habet principium productivum conveniens
aliquo ordine prius quam productio ponatur in esse, potest illo
principio producere, quia nihil aliud requiritur ad productionem:
sed Films habet principium productivum Spiritus Sancti aliquo
modo prius quam Spiritus Sanctus producatur; ergo potest
producere Spiritum Sanctum. Ergo necessario producit Spiritum
Sanctum quia in divinis non differt posse et esse.
12 Probatio minoris, quia principium productivum Spiritus
Sancti est voluntas infinita habens obiectum diligibile infinitum
sibi praesens, ut patet prius distinctione 10;8 sed illud habet
Filius aliquo modo prius quam Spiritus Sanctus producatur.
Probatio: quia sicut intellectus et voluntas habent ordinem in
operando, ita et in producendo. Sicut igitur intellectus in
operando praecedit voluntatem in operando, ita et in producendo.
Filius igitur qui producitur per intellectum sive per actum
6 Robertus Grossatesta, Notula super epistolam Ioannis Damasceni 'lie

trisagion' (cod. Oxon. Magdal. li)2, f 215rb)
7 Nyssenum: scripsimus; codd.: Nicenum.
H Cf supra Dist. 10. q. 1, n. 10.
To the Question
10 On this question the Greeks disagree with the Latins. I have

found, however, in a note of Lincoln on the Epistle on the
Trisagion at the end, that the Greeks really did not disagree with
the Latins, because the opinion of the Greeks is that the Holy
Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. In this way,
therefore, two wise ones, one Greek and the other Latin, not
lovers of proper speech but of divine zeal, would perhaps find the
disagreement not to be real, but one of words, for otherwise either
the Latins or the Greeks would be heretics. But who wishes to say
that Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Damascene,
Chrysostom and many other excellent doctors are heretics; and
for the other part that Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Gregory,
Hilary, etc., who were the most excellent Latin doctors, are
heretics? Perhaps modern Greeks have added to the aforesaid
article from their obstinacy what the preceding doctors have not
said nor understood. This must be held, therefore, that the Holy
Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, because the Church
declares this.
11 However, I show this by an argument taken from faith in
this way. Any perfect supposit* that has a productive principle*
appropriate in some orderly fashionbefore the production* is
posited in existence, can produce by that principle, because
nothing more is required for production. But the Son has the
principle of producing the Holy Spirit in some way before the
Holy Spirit may be produced; therefore, he can produce the Holy
Spirit. Therefore, he necessarily produces the Holy Spirit, because
in the divine 'can be' and 'is' do not differ.
12 Proof of the minor: because the principle of producing the
Holy Spirit is the infinite will having an infinite lovable object
present to it, as is evident from distinction ten, but the Son has
this in some way before the Holy Spirit may be produced. Proof:
because just as the intellect and the will* operate according to a
certain order, so also they produce. Thus, just as the intellect in
operating precedes the will in operating, so also in producing.
Therefore, the Son, who is produced through the intellect or
through an act of the intellect, precedes in some way the Holy
intellectus praecedit aliquo modo Spiritum Sanctum qui

producitur per modum et actum voluntatis; sed in illo priori
communicatur sibi voluntas infinita fecunda, habens obiectum
diligibile infinitum sibi praesens; ergo in illo priori potest esse
principium productivum Spiritus Sancti antequam Spiritus
Sanctus producatur.9
14 Sed contra istam rationem insto sic: quia non videtur quod
intellectus et voluntas habeant eundem ordinem in producendo
quem habent in operando. In operando enim habent ordinem,
quia obiectum non potest esse praesens perfecte voluntati nisi
fuerit praecognitum; non autem est sic de actu dicendi et
spirandi, quia dicere non praesupponitur ad spirationem.
Responsio: inter intellectum et voluntatem est ordo propter duo,
scilicet propter praesentiam obiecti et secundo propter naturalem
ordinem potentiarum, sicut patet in potentiis inferioribus, scilicet
sensitivis, quae licet habeant obiecta sibi praesentia, adhuc est
ordo inter eas propter naturalem ordinem et dependentiam
ipsarum ad invicem. Primus ordo inter intellectum et voluntatem
iam patet ex dictis, quia voluntas non habet obiectum nisi per
intellectum fiat sibi praesens in ratione cogniti. Licet igitur iste
ordo non maneat inter intellectum et voluntatem ut sunt
principia productiva, manet tamen secundus ordo, scilicet
9 Add. omnes codd. hoc loco: J 1 3] Sed haec ratio potest habere calumniam, et
ideo pono eam aliter sic: in quocumque supposito perfecto sunt principia activa
habontia ordinem in essendo, habent consimilem ordinem in agendo, si utrumque
sit perfecte activum. Hoc dico, quia substantia et qualitas activa non se habent
aeque perfecte in agendo. Sed in Patre est fecunditas ad generandum et
spirandum et prius in ordine essendi concipitur et constituitur per fecunditatem
generandi et non per principium spirandi vel spirativum; ergo et prior erit in
agendo et producendo fecunditas generandi quam spirandi. Sed per fecunditatem
generandi in Patre Filius producitur; ergo fecunditas spirandi sibi communicatur
a Patre Sed nunc in Patre est fecunditas ad generandum et spirandum
secundum ordinem in essendo, ergo in operando; sed in priori illo Filius fuit
intelligens et volens et habet quidquid est necessarium principio productivo; ergo
communicabit Kilio fecunditatem voluntatis ad producendum. Wir paragraphias,
cum in omnibus codd. contineatur, potius tamen reiiciendus est, cum ordinem
argumenti minime sequatur, consimillunusque n. 15 sit. Cf. Add. M. ubi hic textus
abest, et Ord. I, dist. II, q. I, n. 13 (V, 4) ubi aliquod simile continetur.
Spirit, who is produced through an act of the will. But in that

prior moment the infinitely fecund will, having an infinite lovable
object present to it, is communicated to him. Therefore, in that
prior moment [this will] can be a principle of producing the Holy
Spirit before the Holy Spirit is produced.2
14 But against this argument I object in this way: because it
does not seem that the intellect and the will would have the same
order in producing that they have in operating: for in operating
they have an order, because the object cannot be perfectly present
to the will unless it is known beforehand. It is not so, however,
with the act of speaking* and spirating, because speaking is not
presupposed before spiration. Response: between the intellect
and will there is an order for two reasons, namely because of the
presence of the object and secondly because of the natural* order
of potencies, as is evident in the inferior potencies, namely the
sensitive ones. Although these have the objects present to
themselves, still there is an order among them, because of the
natural order and their dependence upon one another. The first
sort of order between intellect and will is evident already from
what has been said, because the will does not have an object
unless it is through the intellect making it present in a cognitive
way. Therefore, although this order between the intellect and will
as productive principles does not remain, nevertheless the second
sort of order, namely of the potencies, does remain, so that the act
2 The following paragraph (n. 13) contained in all MSS is omitted from the
present text (cf. n. 15 below; more detailed reasons are outlined in the note to the
Latin): [13] But this argument can be falsely denied, and therefore I propose it
differently in this way: if in some perfect supposit there are active principles that
are ordered in being, these are similarly ordered in operating, if both are
perfectly active. I say this, because a substance and an active quality* are not of
themselves equally perfect in acting. But both fecundity in generating and one in
spirating* are found in the Father, who is first conceived and constituted in the
order of being through fecundity in generating and not through the principle of
spirating or what is spirating; therefore, in acting and producing, fecundity in
generating will also be prior to one in spirating. But it is through the fecundity in
generating in the Father that the Son is produced; therefore, the fecundity of
spirating is communicated to him from the Father. Now in the Father fecundity
to generate and spirate are ordered according to being; therefore [also] as regards
operating; but in that prior moment, the Son was knowing and willing and had
whatever was necessary for a productive principle. Therefore, the fecundity of the
will as regards production will be communicated to the Son.
potentiarum, ita quod actus per quem praesentatur intellectui est

dictio, et actus per quem praesentatur voluntati est spiratio, et sic
tenet ista ratio.
15 Item, secundo arguitur sic: in quocumque sunt principia

ordinata in essendo, eundem ordinem habent in agendo, si
utrumque est perfecte activum. Hoc additur propter substantiam
et accidens quarumi0 substantia non est perfecte activa. Sed in
Patre est fecunditas ad generandum et spirandum, et habent in
Patre ordinem in essendo, quia fecunditas ad generandum est
prior quam fecunditas ad spirandum, quia per fecunditatem
generandi constituitur Pater in esse Patris; potentia vero spirandi
est quasi proprietas adventitia Patri iam perfecte in esse
constituto; ergo similem modum habebunt in operando et
producendo. Et tunc arguitur sicut prius: per potentiam
generandi producitur Filius, ergo habet potentiam vel principium
quo producitur Spiritus Sanctus antequam Spiritus Sanctus
producatur.
16 Ad rationes in oppositum et ad auctoritates:ii primo ad

Damascenum, quod ibi non loquitur asserendo sed negando
tantum dictum, non rem; et ideo loquitur 'dicimus', et ideo facile
est solvere.
17 Sed alia eius auctoritas, 8 cap., videtur negare rem, et ideo
difficilis ad solvendum. Ad quam respondeo quod multipliciter
dicitur hoc 'huius', sicut hoc ex hoc: uno modo quod Spiritus
Sanctus sit huius, scilicet Filii, id est per Filium, et hoc nihil aliud
est dicere quam quod nos dicimus Spiritum Sanctum procedere a
Patre et Filio, et sic Spiritus Sanctus est Filii sicut hoc ex hoc.
Alio modo quod Spiritus Sanctus sit Filii sicut exponunt Graeci
moderni, scilicet quod Spiritus Sanctus sit in Filio per modum
quiescentis in eo, et sic negandus est Damascenus, si ita
intellexit.
i0 Quarum: sic codd.; cf. quorum in Add. M.

i i Cf. supra nn. 1-4.
through which it [i.e., the object] is present to the intellect is

speaking, and the act through which it is present to the will is
spiration, and so this reason holds.
15 Also, secondly it is argued in this way: in whatever there are
principles ordered in being, they have the same order in acting, if
each is perfectly active. This is added because of substance and
accident, of which substance is not perfectly active. However, in
the Father there is fecundity towards generation* and spiration
and these have an order in the Father in respect to being. For
fecundity towards generation is prior to fecundity towards
spiration, since it is through fecundity towards generation that
the Father is constituted in being Father. The potency* to spirate,
however, is a quasi-property coming to the Father already
perfectly constituted in being. Hence, these will have a similar
order in operating and producing. And then it is argued as before:
through the potency of generating the Son is produced, therefore
he has the potency or principle by which the Holy Spirit is
produced before the Holy Spirit may be produced.
16 To the arguments for the opposite. To the authoritative

statements [n. 1-4], first to Damascene, that there he does not
speak as asserting something, but only as denying something
about speech, not something in reality; and hence he says 'we
say,' and therefore it is easy to solve.
17 His other authoritative statement in chapter 8, however,
appears to deny something in reality and therefore is difficult to
solve. To this I respond that 'of this'like 'this from this'is said
in various ways. In one way [the expression] that the Holy Spirit
is 'of this,' namely 'of the Son,' means through the Son, and this is
no different from our assertion that 'the Holy Spirit proceeds from
the Father and the Son,' and in this way the Holy Spirit is 'of the
Son' as 'this from this.' In another way the Holy Spirit is 'of the
Son,' as the modern Greeks explain this, in the sense that the
Holy Spirit is in the Son by way of coming to rest. And in this
way, Damascene must be denied, if he has thought so.
18 Ad aliud12 quando dicitur quod non est articulus fidei nisi

exprimatur in Evangelio, dico quod falsum est, sicut respondetur
in littera; nam non legitur in Evangelio quod descenderit ad
infernum. Similiter in Ioanne dicit Christus multa habeo vobis
dicere quae lion potestis portare modo; sed Spiritus Sanctus
postea qui habuit tantam auctoritatem quantam Christus docuit
Apostolos. Sic etiam est de sacramentis aliquibus et de multis
aliis. Multa etiam sunt quae Ecclesia tenet et docet quae non
tradiderunt Apostoli sed Ecclesia, eodem Spiritu dictante,
ordinavit; et ideo credo quod quidquid Ecclesia tradidit
credendum est ut articulus fidei in universali in eadem
auctoritate. Unde "credo in Spiritum Sanctum, sanctam Eccle-
siam catholicam";13 et ideo Augustinus:14 "Evangelio non
crederem nisi Ecclesia me docuisset", etc.
19 Ad aliud15 quando dicitur de symbolo scripto per Leonem
papam etc., dicendum quod multa fuerunt tradita explicite in
symbolis ultimis quae continebantur implicite in primis. Unde
haereses fuerunt occasio exprimendi et explicandi veritates, et
ideo in primo symbolo non oportuit explicare, quia tunc non fuit
haeresis, sed post fuit et sequitur novum symbolum et tanta
auctoritate quanta fuerunt priores; unde non est corruptio primi
symboli, sed explicatio; nec facimus alium symbolum, sed novum,
ex quo enim 'a Patre procedit' et 'idem est in Filio quod in Patre',
ergo 'a Filio procedit'. Et quod adducit de fide, quod anathema sit
etc., verum est sicut dicit Augustinus, quicumque docuerit
contrarium eorum quae continentur in symbolo, sed hoc non est
contrarium, sed idem.
20 Ad rationem primam16 quando dicitur quod dilectio in nobis
non procedit a verbo nostro, dicendum quod hoc est propter
imperfectionem verbi in nobis, quia non procedit in eadem
natura, sed est accidens, et ideo non communicat sibi
fecunditatem dilectionis; et multa sunt dissimilia inter verbum
12 Cf. supra n. 5.
1:1 Symbolum Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum (ed. H. Denzinger. n. 86)
14 August.. Contra epist. Fundamenti c. 5 (CSEL 25.1, 197; PL 42, 176).
15 Cf. supra n. 6.
"' Cf. supra n. 7.
18 To the other [n. 5] when it is said that an article of faith is

only what is expressed in the Gospel, I say that this is false, just
as [this objection] is answered in the text. For one does not read
in the Gospel that 'he descended into hell.' Likewise, in John3
Christ says "I have much more to tell you, but you cannot bear it
now." But the Holy Spirit, who has as great authority as Christ,
has taught the apostles afterwards. It is also this way about some
of the sacraments and many other things. For there are many
things, which the Church holds and teaches, that were not
handed on by the apostles, but which the Church, at the dictates
of the same Spirit, has ordained. Therefore I believe that
whatever the Church transmitted should be believed as an article
of faith in general with the same authority. Hence "I believe in
the Holy Spirit, the holy Catholic Church"; and therefore,
Augustine says: "I would not have believed in the Gospel if the
Church had not taught me," etc.
19 To the other [n. 6] when it states what Pope Leo wrote about
the creed, one must say that many things were transmitted
explicitly in the final creeds that were contained implicitly in the
first ones. Hence, heresies were the occasion of expressing and
explaining truths, and therefore, in the first creed it was not
necessary to explain, because then there was no heresy.
Afterwards, however, there was, and a new creed followed, and
with as much authority as those before had. Hence there is no
corruption of the first creed, but an explanation; nor did we make
another creed, but a new one from it. For [the Holy Spirit]
proceeds from the Father, and the same thing is in the Son that is
in the Father, therefore he proceeds from the Son. And what he
adduces about faith that 'he shall be anathema,' etc., it is true, as
Augustine says, [regarding] whoever would teach contrary to
those things that are in the creed; but this is not contrary, but is
the same thing.
20 To the first rational argument [n. 7] when it is said that love
in us does not proceed from our word, it must be said that this is
because of the imperfection of the word in us, since it does not
proceed in the same nature, but it is an accident. Therefore, it
does not communicate the fecundity of love to itself. And there
lJohn 16: 12.

nostrum et Dei; mens enim nostra quae habet utramque

fecunditatem non communicat verbo fecunditatem dilectionis
ratione imperfectionis praedictae, sed in divinis ubi est una
natura et Pater communicat totam Filio fecunditatem ante
productionem Spiritus Sancti, ideo Verbum in divinis producit
amorem.
21 Ad aliudi7 quando dicitur: 'spiratio passio convenit tantum
uni personae, ergo et spiratio actio', non est simile, quia eadem
persona non potest habere esse nec produci nisi unica
productione, et sic spiratio passio non est nisi in uno tantum, sed
plures personae possunt dare esse uni, quia habent idem
principium activum et productivum. Ad probationem, quando
dicitur quod relativa commultiplicantur, dico quod multiplicantur
in quantum relationes, sed non supposita nec absoluta etiam ut
alibi dictum est.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum Spiritus Sanctus, si non procederet a Filio, posset
realiter distingui ab eo]
22 Utrum Spiritus Sanctus, si non procederet a Filio, posset

realiter distingui ab eo.
Videtur quod non:
Boethius, De Trinitate:i8 Relatio multiplicat Trinitatem.
23 Item, Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti:i9 omnia in
divinis sunt eadem "ubi non obviat relationis oppositio"; sed si
Spiritus Sanctus non procederet a Filio, relatio non multiplicaret
nec obviaret oppositio relativa; ergo Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non
essent distincti, sed unus.
24 Contra:
Augustinus, V De Trinitate [cap.] 7, 20 dicit quod causa quare
Filius non est Spiritus Sanctus nec e converso, est quia Spiritus
Sanctus procedit non quomodo natus, sed quomodo datus.
i7 Cf. supra n 8.
IH Boethius, Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii c. 6 (PL 64, 1255).
i9 Anselmus. De processione Spiritus Sancti c. 2 (ed. F.S. Schmitt II, 181 ; PL
158. 288).
*l August., De Trin. V, c. 14. n. 15 (CCSL 50, 222; PL 42, 920-1).
are many dissimilar things between our word and God's. For our
mind, which has either fecundity, does not communicate the
fecundity of love to the word, because of the aforesaid
imperfection. In the divine, however, there is but one nature and
the Father communicates the whole fecundity to the Son before
producing the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the Word* in the divine
produces love.
21 To the other [n. 8] when it is said that 'passive spiration
pertains only to one person, therefore also active spiration,' it is
not similar, because one and the same person cannot have
existence nor be produced except by one production, and thus
passive spiration is only in one. Several persons, however, could
give existence to one, because they have the same active and
productive principle. To the proof, when it is said that
correlatives are multiplied together, I say that they are
multiplied insofar as they are relations, but not [insofar as] they
are supposits, nor as absolutes, as has been stated elsewhere.
Question Two
If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, could he
be really distinguished from him?
22 If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, could he be
really distinguished from him?
It seems not:
Boethius in The Trinity: Relation multiplies the Trinity.
23 Also, Anselm in On the Procession of the Holy Spirit says
that everything in the divine is the same "where the opposition of
relations does not intervene." But if the Holy Spirit did not
proceed from the Son, the relationship would not be multiplied
nor would the relative opposition intervene. Therefore, the Son
and the Holy Spirit would not be distinct, but one.
24 To the contrary:
Augustine in Bk. V of The Trinity, chapter 7, says that the
reason why the Son is not the Holy Spirit, and vice versa, is
because the Holy Spirit proceeds not as born, but as given.
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio quae evacuat quaestionem]
25 In ista quaestione sunt duae opiniones famosae,2i et

quaelibet habet duas rationes, et in his stat tota altercatio. Alia
tamen opinio, et tertia, est quae evacuat quaestionem, quia etsi
impossibilia possunt poni, non tamen incompossibilia; sed ista
quaestio includit incompossibilia; ergo non est ponibile et per
consequens non est quaerendum quod ponitur ex tali posito vel
positione.
26 Probatio assumpti: positio est obligatio ad sustinendum
positum tanquam verum; nihil ergo ponibile, nisi quo posito
possunt salvari regulae disputationis, scilicet concedere
consequens ex posito in antecedente et negare repugnans posito
scilicet antecedenti. Sed si ponantur vel quaerantur incompossibi
lia, nec consequens potest concedi nec repugnans negari. Probatio
minoris, scilicet quod istud positum sit incompossibile: quia
quidquid est in divinis verum, est summe necessarium; ergo per
oppositum quidquid est falsum est summe impossibile, et tale est
incompossibile; ergo etc.
[B. Contra hanc opinionem

1. Argumenta Scoti]
27 Sed contra: ista positio non est nisi fuga, quia ad hoc
movetur quaestio ut inquiratur praecisum distinctivum Filii a
Spiritu Sancto, et ut hoc habeatur ponitur Spiritus Sanctus non
procedere a Filio, et intentio quaestionis est utrum filiatio sit per
quod per se et praecise distinguitur Filius a Spiritu Sancto, et
certum est quod haec est aliqua quaestio.
28 Item, licet antecedens positum quod includit contradic-
toria in suo primo intellectu non sit possibile, tamen positum
quod secundo intellectu includit contradictoria et respectu
accidentalium et extrinsecarum condicionum, hoc potest poni.
Sunt autem accidentales condiciones vel dispositiones ut causa et
*1 Cf. infra n. 35.

To the Question
An opinion that renders the question void
25 In this question there are two famous opinions, [n. 35] and
each has two reasons, and the whole dispute is contained in them.
A third opinion, however, renders void the entire question,
because although impossible things could be postulated,
incompatibles could not, and this question includes incompatibles.
Therefore, it is not possible and, as a consequence, one need not
ask what is postulated from such an opinion or position.
26 Proof of the assumption: to take a position [in a disputation]
entails an obligation to hold the opinion to be true. Therefore,
nothing can be postulated unless by taking a position the rules of
disputation can be saved, namely to concede the consequent from
the position taken in the antecedent, and to deny what is opposed
to that position, namely, to the antecedent. But if they posit or
ask about incompatibles, neither the consequent can be conceded
nor what is opposed to it can be denied. Proof of the minor,
namely that this position is incompatible; because whatever in
the divine is true, it is most highly necessary; therefore, through
the opposite, what is false is most highly impossible; but such is
the incompatible; therefore, etc.

The argument of Scotus
27 To the contrary however: this position is only an avoidance

of [the question], because the point of the question is to inquire
what precisely distinguishes the Son from the Holy Spirit. And to
this end, one assumes the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the
Son, and the intent of the question is whether filiation is that
which precisely and essentially distinguishes the Son from the
Holy Spirit; and it is certain that this is a [legitimate] question.
28 Also, although positing the antecedent that includes
contradictories understood in the first way is not possible,
however, positing [the antecedent] that includes contradictories
understood in the second way, and as regards conditions that are
accidental and extrinsic, is possible. Accidental conditions and
causatum, passio respectu sui subiecti etc. Exemplum huius:

'homo non rationalis' non est ponibile, sed haec 'homo non est
risibilis', sed neganda est consequentia 'homo non est risibilis,
ergo non est homo rationalis'; et sic negandum est, quod non sunt
contradictoria, quia negandum est medium consequentiae, si fiat
talis syllogismus: 'risibile est rationale, homo non est risibilis,
igitur homo non est rationalis'. Negandum igitur est medium
huius consequentiae, scilicet 'risibile est rationale', quod est
oppositum positi, scilicet huius: 'homo non est risibilis', et per
consequens neganda est consequentia. Ergo non reducitur ad
contradictionem. Potest ergo aliquis concedere hanc: 'homo non
est risibilis', et tamen negare hanc: 'homo est non rationalis', et
hanc: 'risibile est rationale', quia repugnans est antecedenti posito
scilicet huic: 'homo non est risibilis'. Sic igitur est in proposito:
'spiratio actio' non est de primo intellectu alicuius personae, quia
nullam constituit in esse personali. Similiter spirari secundum
suum primum intellectum potest intelligi ut a Patre tantum, et
hoc posito, licet falso et impossibili, potest sustineri omnis
consequentia et est neganda vel negari potest omnis repugnantia
tali posito, scilicet quod Spiritus Sanctus non procedat a Filio;
sicut enim 'spiratio actio' non est de primo intellectu Filii ut
persona haec, quia non est constitutivum eius, sic nec spirari,
quia potest intelligi primo ut est a Patre.
29 Item, remoto aliquo quod est de per se intellectu illius,
potest quaeri de eo aliquod praedicatum quod non convenit ei
ratione illius amoti. Exemplum: homo est rationalis, sed
rationalis non distinguit hominem a lapide; unde si auferretur
rationale ab homine, adhuc potest quaeri utrum homo
distinguatur per animal a lapide vel per aliquid aliud. Sic est in
proposito: posito quod spirare sit de essentia Filii, non tamen
propter hoc sequitur quod distinguatur per spirationem a Spiritu
dispositions are such as cause and caused, attribute as regards its

subject, etc. An example of this: 'Man is not rational' cannot be
posited, but this 'man is not risible' [can], although the
implication* must be denied: 'man is not risible, therefore he is
not a rational man.' And it must be in this way denied because
these ['not risible' and 'rational'] are not contradictories, for one
must deny the middle term of the inference, if a syllogism like
this is formulated: 'Man is not risible, risible is rational, therefore
man is not rational.' Therefore one must deny the middle term of
this inference, namely 'risible is rational,' which is placed over
and against that which is posited, namely of this: 'Man is not
risible.' And as a consequence the implication must be denied.
Hence, it is not reduced to a contradiction. Therefore, one can
always concede this: 'Man is not risible,' and nevertheless deny
this: 'man is not rational,' and this: 'risible is rational,' for it is
repugnant to the antecedent posited, namely to this: 'Man is not
risible.' So it is in the case at hand: 'active spiration' does not
pertain to the first meaning of some person, because it constitutes
none in personal being. Similarly, to be spirated according to its
first meaning can be understood as from the Father only, and this
having been posited, although it is false and impossible, [yet]
every implication can be sustained and all repugnance to such a
position, namely that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the
Son, has to be or can be denied; for just as 'active spiration' does
not pertain to the primary understanding of the Son as this
person, because it does not constitute him, in the same way nor
does 'to be spirated,' because it can be understood primarily as
being from the Father.
29 Also, after removing something, which belongs to the per se
understanding of this [thing], one can [still] inquire about it
regarding some predicate that does not pertain to it by reason of
that which has been removed. For example: Man is rational, but
'rational' does not distinguish man from a stone. Hence, if
'rational' were taken away from man, one could still ask whether
man is distinguished from a stone through 'animal' or through
something else. So it is in the case at hand: given that to spirate
is of the essence of the Son, it does not follow from this that he is
distinguished from the Holy Spirit through spiration, because the
Sancto, quia Filius per proprietatem suam personalem, scilicet

filiationem, remota spiratione, adhuc distingueretur ab eo.
[2. Auctoritates pro opinione]
30 Pro ista opinione sunt multae auctoritates. Nam Augusti-

nus, V De Trinitate, [cap.] 6:22 "Si Pater esset non innascibilis,
nihil prohiberet eum genuisse Filium" et tamen impossibile est
quod sit nisi innascibilis.
31 Item, VI De Trinitate, cap. 10.23
32 Item, Richardus, De Trinitate:24 "Si tantum esset una
persona in divinis, adhuc esset sapiens et bona, non tamen
fecunda".
33 Item, Philosophus, IV Physicorum, cap. 'De vacuo',25 dicit:
"Si aliquod spatium esset non habens corpus, sed colorem vel
sonum, utrum illud esset vacuum", et non respondet immediate
sic vel sic; sed dicit quod esset vacuum, si esset aptum natum
recipere corpus.
[II. Responsio ad quaestionem]
34 Dico igitur quod quaestio est rationalis et sub forma in qua

proposui eam, quia condicionalis; et licet antecedens includat
opposita vel incompossibilia, adhuc tamen potest quaeri de
veritate condicionalis.
[A. Duae opiniones]
35 Haec ergo est duplex opinio: una quae dicit quod non
distingueretur a Filio nisi procederet ab eo. Alii autem dicunt
quod distinguitur et non procedit ab eo, sicut ponunt Graeci.
36 Qui sunt de prima opinione, habent duas rationes. Prima
talis est: quia si distinguerentur, vel relationes distinguerent
Filium et Spiritum Sanctum secundum quiditatem earum vel
** August., De Trin. V, c. 6. n. 7 (CCSL 50, 21 1; PL 42. 914).

Ibid., VI, c. 10, n. 11 (CCSL 50, 241; PL 42, 931).
24 Richardus de S. Victore, De Trin. III, c. 16 (ed J. Ribaillier, TPMA VI,
151-2; PL 196, 925-6).
*r, Aristot., Physica IV, c. 7 (214a 9-11).
Son would still be distinguished from him through his personal

property, namely, filiation, spiration having been removed.
Authorities for this opinion
30 For this opinion there are many authoritative statements.

Indeed, Augustine in Bk. V of The Trinity, chapter 6, says: "If the
Father were not incapable of being born, nothing would have
prevented him from having begotten a Son," and nevertheless, it
is impossible for him to be other than incapable of being born.
31 Also, Bk. VI of The Trinity, chapter 10.
32 Also, Richard On the Trinity: "If there were only one person
in the divine, he would still be wise and good, but not fecund."
33 Also, the Philosopher in Bk. IV of the Physics, the chapter
on the void, says: "If some space did not have a body, but color or
sound, would that be a void?" And he does not answer whether it
would be or not, but says that it would be a void, if it were suited
to receiving a body.
Reply to the Question
34 I say therefore that the question is reasonable, moreover, in

the form in which I have proposed it, because it is conditional;
and although the antecedent includes opposites or incompatibles,
nevertheless one could still ask about its conditional truth.
Two opinions
35 Therefore, there is a twofold opinion: one that says that he

would not be distinguished from the Son unless he proceeded
from him. But others say that he is distinguished and does not
proceed from him, as the Greeks hold.
36 Those who are of the first opinion have two reasons: The
first is this, because if they were distinguished, either the
relations would distinguish the Son and the Holy Spirit according
to their quiddity* or according to their being. Not in the second
way, because relations according to their being pass into [the
essence] in the divine and, therefore, they would distinguish
secundum esse earum. Ntin secundo modo, quia relationes

secundum esse transeunt in divinis, ergo distinguerent secundum
quiditates; sed de ratione quiditativa istarum relationum est
oppositio, quae non esset nisi una persona, scilicet Spiritus
Sanctus esset ab alia, scilicet a Filio; ergo etc.
37 Item, aut istae relationes distinguunt ut oppositae, et
habetur propositum; aut disparatae, et tunc in Patre erunt duae
relationes disparatae, scilicet paternitas et spiratio activa, quae
constituerent personam Patris. Et dicit quidam quod Pater tunc
spiraret, sed non nisi amorem rationis, quia non distingueretur
realiter spiratione activa.
[B. Contra hanc opinionem]
38 Sed contra istam opinionem arguitur sic: quocumque for-

maliter constituitur aliquid in esse aliquo, eo habet unitatem
correspondentem illi; sed filiatione formaliter accepta et praecise
constituitur Filius in esse personali, non autem spiratione activa;
ergo per illam habet distinctionem personalem in se et esse
distinctum a quocumque non habente filiationem; sed Spiritus
Sanctus non habet filiationem; ergo etc.
39 Minor nota est utrique parti. Item probatur ista minor,
quia illo constituitur persona quo est primo haec et Filius quo est
primo hic; sed non est hic fecunditate spirativa; ergo etc. Quia
alia proprietas, scilicet spiratio activa est quasi adventitia
personae constitutae; sed alia proprietate, scilicet filiatione est
persona haec, accipiens esse a Patre; ergo etc.
[C. Responsio aliorum]
40 Sed hic respondent aliqui et bene, secundum quod audivi,

iudicio meo, ad maiorem praedictae rationis, et dicunt quod est
falsa. Habent enim instantiam: ut homo constituitur in esse
specifico hominis per rationale et tamen non distinguitur
according to their quiddity; but an opposition arises from the

quidditative aspects of these relations, which would not exist
unless one person, namely the Holy Spirit, were from another,
namely from the Son; therefore, etc.
37 Also, either these relations distinguish as opposites, and we
have what we propose, or they are disparate, and then there will
be two disparate relations in the Father, namely paternity and
active spiration, which would constitute the person of the Father.
In addition, a certain one says that the Father then would
spirate, but only conceptual love, because it would not be really
distinguished from active spiration.
38 But against this opinion it is argued in this way: whatever

formally* constitutes something in some being, the same thing*
gives it a corresponding unity. The Son, however, is constituted in
personal being by filiation taken formally and precisely, and not
by active spiration; therefore it is through that [filiation] that he
has a personal distinction in himself and is distinct from
whatever does not have filiation; but the Holy Spirit does not
have filiation; therefore, etc.
39 There is a minor to both.4 Also this minor is proved, because
a person is constituted by that by which it is primarily 'this'
[person], and the Son by that by which he is primarily a 'this,' but
he is not a 'this' by virtue of spirative fecundity; therefore, etc.
Because the other property, namely active spiration is quasi-
adventitious to a constituted person [i.e., it does not give him
being]; but by another property, namely filiation, it is 'this' person
accepting being from the Father; therefore, etc.
The response of others
40 But here some reply and in my judgment appropriately,

according to what I have heard, to the major of the aforesaid
argument, and they say that it is false. For they cite this
objection: as 'man' is constituted in the specific being of man
4 I.e., to the general statement and to the particular statement

quiditative ab omnibus rationalitate, sed tantum ab his cum

quibus convenit omnibus26 aliis, puta ab irrationalibus; sed
rationalitate non distinguitur a non-vivis, sed a non-animatis
differt animato in quantum animal differt a planta et corpus
differt a spiritibus et substantia ab accidentibus, et sic de aliis.
Unde quando multa sunt in aliquo per ordinem se habentia,
quodlibet distinguit a suo opposito et ultimum tantum distinguit
a convenientibus in omnibus aliis, ut homo rationalitate tantum
distinguitur ab irrationalibus quibus omnia alia quae sunt in
homine praeter rationalitatem conveniunt.
[D. Contra hanc responsionem]
41 Sed hoc exemplum non excludit rationem praedictam, immo

confirmat propositum. Homo enim non distingueretur essentiali-
ter a lapide, si animalitas non esset de essentia eius. licet non
ultimate constitutivo. Quod sic probo: Quodcumque ens distingui
tur a quocumque in quantum tale per se distinguitur per aliquid
quod est de ratione eius; Filius ut Filius distinguitur per se a
quocumque alio quod non est Filius formaliter; ergo per aliquid
quod est de ratione Filii per se; spiratio autem activa non est de
ratione Filii per se, quia consequitur rationem constitutivam
ipsius; ergo non est condicio essentialis Filii; ergo nec per eam per
se distinguitur Filius ab aliquo.
42 Item maior est vera, scilicet quod illud sufficienter et per se
a quolibet distinguit27 quod est per se ratio essendi: haec et alia
non sunt haec. Quaelibet enim affirmatio per se et primo
distinguit a sua negatione. Sed si rationalitas sola esset per se
sine animalitate et aliis rationibus quae sunt in homine, adhuc
hoc ens esset rationale et lapis non esset rationalis ita quod
26 Omnibus aliis sc. in omnibus aliis (vide infra)

27 Lectio distinguit (T) ad sensum per alios codd. confirmatur; cf. MB: quod
aliquid sufficienter et per se distinguitur a quocumque per illud quod est per se
ratio essendi.
through rational and nevertheless is not distinguished

quidditatively from all by rationality, but only from these with
whom he agrees in everything else, for example from irrational
things. However, man is not distinguished from non-living by
rationality, but he differs from non-animated [those which have
no soul] by what is animated, in the same way as an animal
differs from a plant, and a body differs from spirits and substance
from accident, and so about the others. Hence, when many things
are in something in an orderly way, each distinguishes from its
opposite and only the ultimate one distinguishes from things
agreeing in everything else, as it is only by rationality that man is
distinguished from irrational things, with which all the other
properties that are in man except rationality are concordant.
Against this response
41 But this example does not exclude the aforesaid reason;

indeed it confirms the proposal. For man would not be
distinguished essentially from a stone, if animality were not of his
essence, although it is not what is ultimately constitutive. Which
I prove in this way: any being whatsoever is distinguished from
everything else inasmuch as such is distinguished per se through
something pertaining to its very conception. The Son as Son is
distinguished per se from whatever else that is not formally the
Son; therefore, [he is distinguished] through something that
pertains to the notion of the Son per se. But active spiration does
not pertain to the notion of Son per se, because it follows his
constitutive notion. Therefore, it is not an essential condition of
Son; hence, neither is the Son distinguished per se through it
from something.
42 Also, the major is true, namely, that which is the per se
notion of being sufficiently and per se distinguishes [something]
from anything else whatsoever: this and others are not this. For
each affirmation per se and primarily distinguishes a thing from
its negation. But if only rationality were per se, but without
animality and the other notions that are in man, this being would
still be rational and a stone would not be rational, so that rational
rationale solum distingueret ab omni alio quod non esset ratio

nale, sive animato sive inanimato.
43 Ista ratio confirmatur per simile: si enim Filius spiraret et
non Pater, adhuc Pater distingueretur a Spiritu Sancto, licet non
haberet spirationem activam, et sic non distingueretur a Spiritu
Sancto relatione opposita.
44 Item, si spiratio esset a solo Patre, ergo productio esset
realiter distincta a productione alia, scilicet Filii; et si productio
ns essent realiter distinctae, et termini. Probatio istius con-
sequentiae: quia si productiones essent distinctae realiter et non
termini, tunc idem a duobus acciperet esse vel duabus
productionibus, quod non est intelligibile. Probatio antecedents,
scilicet quod productiones sint distinctae, si spiratio esset a solo
Patre: quia principia sunt formaliter distincta et habent oppositos
modos principiandi, sed impossibile est principia primo distincta
habentia oppositos modos principiandi principiare idem princi-
piatum sive eandem productionem realiter; ergo etc.
45 Item, principium per se productivum sufficit, omni alio
circumscripta, ad productionem perfectam; sed principium per se
productivum est in Patre respectu productionis Spiritus Sancti:
ergo impossibile est concurrere aliud principium ad talem
productionem, et tunc non esset amor rationis productus per
talem productionem a tali principio in Patre solo, sed etiam amor
realis quia esset a principio realiter distincto et in modo
principiandi.
46 Unde non video istam consequentiam esse necessariam nisi
ratione materiae, quia si ratione formae teneret consequentia,
Graeci moderni essent haeretici, quia plane inferretur contra eos
alone would be distinguishing from everything else that would

not be rational, whether animated or not animated.
43 This reason is confirmed by an analogy; for if the Son
spirated and not the Father, the Father would still be
distinguished from the Holy Spirit, although he would not have
active spiration, and thus would not be distinguished from the
Holy Spirit by an opposite [i.e., correlative] relationship.
44 Also, if spiration were from the Father alone, therefore the
production would be really distinct from the other production,
namely that of the Son; and if the productions were really
distinct, then the terms would be as well. Proof of this
implication: for if the productions were really distinct and not the
terms, then the same thing would accept being from two sources
or from two productions, which is unintelligible. Proof of the
antecedent, namely that the productions are distinct, if spiration
were from the Father alone: [the reason is] because the principles
are formally* distinct and have opposite modes of functioning as
principles. It is impossible, however, that principles primarily
distinct and having opposite modes of functioning as principles
were to produce the same product* or the same production really;
therefore, etc.
45 Also, a principle that is productive per se suffices for a
perfect production, everything else having been written off; but in
the Father there is a principle that is productive per se as regards
the production of the Holy Spirit; therefore it is impossible for
another principle to concur for the purpose of such a production.
For then there would not be only a conceptual love produced
through such a production by such a principle in the Father
alone, but also a real love because it would be from a principle
that is really distinct, moreover, as regards the manner of
producing.
46 Hence, I do not see this implication to be necessary except
by reason of its matter,5 because if the implication held good by
reason of form, the modern Greeks would be heretics, because a
negation of the Trinity would obviously argue against them.
5 That is, by reason of the implication itself: a true conclusion can follow
logically from false premises, e.g., 'All bread is stone, all stone is nourishing,
therefore all bread is nourishing.'
negatio Trinitatis. Unde dico quod Pater distinguitur paternitate

a Spiritu Sancto et a Filio, et eodem modo si Spiritus Sanctus non
procederet a Filio, distingueretur ab eo, et per idem distinctivum
quo modo distinguitur, scilicet filiatione; et sic per relationem
disparatam, non oppositam relative, quia spiratio activa non est
de ratione formali Spiritus Sancti, sed tantum spiratio passiva.
[III. Ad argumenta opposita

A. Ad argumenta principalia]
47 Ad auctoritates28 dico quod relatio multiplicat.

48 Et quando dicit Anselmus quod 'ubi non obviat relationis
oppositio', dico quod non est intelligendum de oppositione quae
est inter relationes originis, sed de disparatis. Quod enim relatio
originis modo distinguat Filium a Spiritu Sancto, hoc est gratia
materiae, sed disparata etiam possent distinguere. Sed quaedam
relationes disparatae sunt activae vel consequentes actionem, et
quaedam sunt passivae vel etiam consequentes passionem.
Primae sunt distinctae secundum quiditatem non suppositive sive
secundum supposita, quia possunt esse in eodem supposito, et
idem suppositum potest agere multis principiis activis et per
consequens plures tales relationes in eodem. Unde non sunt
incompossibiles tales relationes disparatae in eodem supposito, ut
generatio actio et spiratio actio in Patre; sed relationes passivae
disparatae sunt incompossibiles in eodem quia impossibile est
idem suppositum bis habere vel accipere esse, quia sic esset
productum duabus productionibus, nec propter hoc sequitur quod
Pater sit duae personae. Unde licet nunc de facto spiratio activa
in Filio distinguat a spiratione passiva opposita ei in Spiritu
Sancto, tamen filiatio prima distinctio est et primo distinguit
*H Cf. supra nn. 22-23.

Hence, I say that the Father is distinguished both from the Holy
Spirit and from the Son by paternity, and in the same way if the
Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would [still] be
distinguished from him, moreover, by the same distinctive sign by
which he is presently distinguished, namely filiation, and thus
through a disparate relation, but not the one relatively opposed
([i.e.,] due to the fact that active spiration does not pertain to the
formal* reason constitutive of the Holy Spirit, but only passive
spiration).
To the arguments for the opposite view

47 To the authoritative statements [n. 22-23]: I say that a

relation does multiply.
48 And when Anselm says where there is no opposition of
relation,' I say that this must not be understood about the
opposition that exists between relations* of origin,* but about
disparate relations. For that a relation of origin now distinguishes
the Son from the Holy Spirit, this is thanks to the matter [of fact],
but disparate relations also could distinguish. But certain
disparate relations are active or the consequence of action, and
certain ones are passive or also following from being acted upon.
The former are distinct according to quiddity, without a reference
to what is personal or according to supposits, because they can be
in the same supposit. And the same supposit can act through
many active principles, and as a consequence several such
relations [could be] in the same [supposit]. Hence such disparate
relations are not incompatible in the same supposit, as
generation-action and spiration-action in the Father. But passive
disparate relations are incompatible in the same, because it is
impossible that the same supposit have or accept being twice,
since in this way it would be the product of two productions; nor
because of this should it follow that the Father would be two
persons. Hence, although now as a matter of fact active spiration
in the Son may distinguish [him] from passive spiration opposed
to it in the Holy Spirit, nevertheless filiation is the first
distinction and primarily distinguishes formally. Therefore, in
formaliter. Sic ergo dico quod relationes disparatae activae non

distinguunt personas formaliter, sed passivae, ut dictum est.
[B. Ad argumenta aliarum opinionum]
49 Ad rationem primam,29 quando dicitur quod relationes

distinguerent vel secundum quiditatem vel secundum esse, non
intelligo nec video quae sit ista philosophia. Idem enim est
quiditas et esse. Unde utrumque distinguit, quia esse relationis
est ad alterum sicut et quiditas eius, quia idem secundum esse et
secundum quiditatem manet et transit. Quid est formaliter?
Manere 'esse ad alterum'. Quia non est ad se, sicut dicit
Augustinus:30 'non eo Deus quo Pater'; transire autem est istud
esse realiter idem illi, non faciendo compositionem cum illo. Et sic
relatio transit in divinis, quia est idem essentiae non faciens
compositionem cum ea. Unde praedicta distinctio relationis nulla
est; hic enim est distinguere aliquid in duas relationes et unum
nihil. Relatio enim comparata ad fundamentum est unum nihil,
quia tunc non est relatio, sed tantum in habitudine ad oppositum ;
unde relatio omnibus modis quibus est relatio est ad aliud et res
aliqua; tamen secundum intellectum ut comparatur ad
fundamentum est quasi medium ut comparatur ad terminum.
50 Sed contra: quia sic sequitur quod relatio in quantum

transit, distinguit.
Responsio: relatio est simplicissima, unde nunquam tamen
'in quantum' vel 'per se' in tertia figura sequitur conclusio cum
ista reduplicatione 'in quantum', sed semper accidens, quia 'per
se' vel 'in quantum' dicunt rationem inhaerentiae praedicati ad
subiectum. Sed in praedicato secundum dispositionem tertiae
figurae sunt duae causae vel possunt esse, quare neutra per se
potest concludi esse ratio alterius; sed semper fallacia
consequentis. Tunc ergo quando dicitur quod relatio in quantum
relatio est idem essentiae realiter, concedo. Relatio etiam in
quantum relatio manet, id est esse ad alterum formaliter,
concedo. Et ibi distinguit, concedo. Ergo relatio distinguit in
29 Cf supra n. 36.
1 Cf. August., De Trin. VII. c. 1, n. 1 (CCSL 50, 245; PL 42. 933).
this way I say that disparate active relations do not distinguish

persons formally, but passive ones do, as has been said.
Reply to the arguments for the other opinion
49 To the first reason [n. 36], when it says that relations would
distinguish either according to quiddity or according to being, I do
not understand nor see what philosophy asserts this. For quiddity
and being (esse) is the same thing. Hence, each distinguishes,
because the being of a relation is 'towards another' just as its
quiddity is, for the same thing both remains and passes over [into
the essence], both according to being and according to quiddity.
What, then, is [this relation] formally? Remaining as 'being
towards another.' For it is not towards, or in relation to itself, as
Augustine says: "What makes him God is not the same as what
makes him Father." At the same time, to pass over is for
something to be really the same thing as something else, not to
form a composition with the latter. And it is in this way that a
relation in the divine passes into [essence], because [then] it is
the same thing as the essence, not producing a composition with
it. Hence, the aforesaid distinction of a relation is non-existent;
for this is to distinguish something into two relationships, one of
which is nothing. For a relation compared to its foundation is a
nothing, because then it is not a relation, but only in potency
towards an opposite. Hence, a relation in every way in which it is
a relation is 'towards another' and is some reality; however
according to how one thinks of it as compared to the foundation, it
is the mean, as it were, as it is compared to the term.
50 To the contrary, however: because in this way it follows that
insofar as a relation passes over, it distinguishes. Response: a
relation is most simple. Hence, 'insofar as' or 'per se' in the third
figure is never followed by a conclusion that repeats that 'insofar
as,' but [such repetition is] always accidental, because 'per se' and
'insofar as' assert the aspect of inherence of a predicate in relation
to its subject. But in a predication according to the 'third figure'
type there are, or can be two causes, and therefore neither of
them per se can be inferred to be the reason for the other; but
there is always a fallacy of affirming the consequent. Therefore,
quantum est idem essentiae' non sequitur, sed fallacia accidentis.

Sed bene verum est quod in quantum distinguit, est realiter idem
essentiae. Idem enim est de differentia et de genere 'homo in
quantum homo est rationalis' et 'homo in quantum homo est
animal', etc. Sic ergo identitas non est causa distinctionis nec e
converso. Quae enim est ista ratio: 'relatio in quantum relatio est
eadem essentiae'? Et similiter alia: 'unum enim praedicatum
includit duas rationes inhaerentiae, ergo unum praedicatum
continet rationem inhaerentiae alteri praedicato'? Debet ergo
sequi conclusio: 'relatio quae est filiatio, secundum quod est idem
essentiae, secundum illud est distinguens'. Sed identitas non est
ratio distinctionis nec distinctio est ratio identitatis, et dato quod
identitas esset causa, adhuc oporteret quod esset identitas
adaequata, praecisa et convertibilis; sed haec relatio sic est eadem
identitate essentiae partialiter quod non convertibiliter, quia
relatio alia illi opposita est similiter idem essentiae, et sic non
sequitur 'relatio habet identitatem cum essentia ratione suae
immensitatis et illimitationis, ergo sub ista ratione distingueret',
quia ista identitas est quasi transcendens et non adaequata.
when then it is said that a relation insofar as it is a relation is

really the same as the essence, I concede this. I also concede that
a relation, insofar as it is a relation, formally remains 'being
towards another.' I concede, 'and there it distinguishes.'
'Therefore, a relation distinguishes insofar as it is the same as the
essence,' [however], does not follow, but is a fallacy of accident.
But it is indeed true that insofar as it distinguishes, it is really
the same as the essence. For the same thing is the case about a
difference and about a genus:6 'Man insofar as he is man is
rational' and 'man insofar as he is man is animal,' etc. In this way
identity* is not the cause of the distinction, or vice versa. For
what about this idea: "relation insofar as it is a relation is the
same as the essence ? And likewise the other: 'for one predicate
includes two aspects of inherence, therefore one predicate
contains a notion of inherence in the other predicate'? Therefore,
the conclusion should follow, 'relation that is filiation, according
to its being the same thing as the essence, is distinguishing
according to that.' But identity is not the reason for distinction,
nor is distinction the reason for identity, and given that identity
would be a cause, still the identity would need to be adequate,
precise and convertible. However, this relation is partially
identical to the essence in such a way that it is not convertible.
For the other relation opposed to it is likewise the same as the
essence, and thus it does not follow that 'a relation has identity
with the essence by reason of its immensity and being unlimited,
therefore under this aspect it would distinguish,' because this
identity is quasi-transcendent and is not adequate.
In the following 'rational' is the difference, and animal' the genus.

[Distinctio 12
Quaestio 1
Utrum Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum Sanctum
in quantum unum sunt]
1 Circa distinctionem duodecimam ubi Magister inquirit

quomodo Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum Sanctum, quaero utrum
spirent Spiritum Sanctum in quantum sunt unum omnino vel in
quantum distincti.
Videtur quod in quantum sunt distincti:
Augustinus, VI De Trinitate, [cap.] 5:1 "Spiritus Sanctus est
unio amborum", scilicet Patris et Filii; sed unio est distinctorum;
igitur etc.
2 Item, actio est suppositi, ergo distinctorum suppositorum
erunt actiones distinctae.
3 Item, si spirarent Spiritum Sanctum in quantum unum: aut
in quantum unum in essentia, et sic non, quia tunc Spiritus
Sanctus spiraret; aut in quantum unum in persona, et hoc est
falsum; vel in quantum conveniunt in virtute spirativa; ergo si
sic, erit a Patre in quantum duo et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quia
Pater habet duas proprietates relativas.
4 Contra:
Augustinus, in littera ponit Magister:2 Pater et Filius sunt
unum principium Spiritus Sancti.
5 Responsio: conclusio ista manifesta est per Augustinum in

auctoritate allegata ubi dicit quod sunt unum principium.
6 Item, Extra de fide catholica Gregorius.3
7 Item, ratio est ad hoc, quia naturali ordine Filius habet
fecunditatem ad spirandum prius quam, scilicet, producatur
Spiritus Sanctus; et habet idem formale principium cum Patre;
ergo aget cum eo eodem formali principio.
1 August., De Trin. VI, c. 5, n. 7 (CCSL 50. 235; PL 42, 928)

* Ibid., V, c. 14, n. 15 (CCSL 50. 222-3; PL 12, 921).
:1 Dccretales Gregorii IX, lib. 1, tit. 1, c. 1-2 (ed. A. Friedberg. II, 5-7).
422
Distinction 12
Question One
Do the Father and Son spirate* the Holy Spirit insofar as
they are one?
1 In regard to distinction twelve where the Master* inquires

about how the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit, I ask
whether they spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as they are entirely
one or insofar as they are distinct?
It seems that it is insofar as they are distinct:
Augustine in Bk. VI of The Trinity, chapter 5: "The Holy
Spirit is a union of both," namely of the Father and the Son; but a
union is of distinct things;* therefore etc.
2 Also, action is of the supposit,* therefore there would be
distinct actions of the distinct supposits.
3 Also, if they spirated the Holy Spirit insofar as they are one:
either it is inasmuch as they are one in essence, and it is not in
this way, because then the Holy Spirit would spirate [himself]; or
insofar as they are one in person,* and this is false; or insofar as
they agree in the spirative power; but if this is so, both the Son
and the Holy Spirit will be from the Father insofar as he is two,
since the Father has two relative* properties.
4 To the contrary:
Augustine in the text* cited by the Master: The Father and
Son are one principle* of the Holy Spirit.
5 I respond: this conclusion is manifest through Augustine in

the authoritative statement cited where he says that they are one
principle.
6 Also, Extra de fide catholica, Gregory.
7 Also, a reason for this, because the Son by a natural* order
has fecundity to spirate precisely before the Holy Spirit is
produced; and he has the same formal* principle as the Father;
therefore he will act with the Father by the same formal
principle.
422
8 Haec veritas habet unum dubium, quia voluntas ista quae

ponitur principium spirandi unum, si consideretur in quantum
est eadem in Patre et Filio, tunc non est difficile videre quod
Spiritus Sanctus sit ab eis sicut ab uno principio. Potest ergo
considerari voluntas ut una est in Patre et Filio, vel ut concors in
Filio cum Patre. Si Spiritus Sanctus sit ab eis primo modo, tunc
planum est quod est ab eis in quantum unum. Si secundo modo,
cum concordia notet distinctionem suppositorum, ideo Spiritus
Sanctus necessario procedit ab eis in quantum duo.
[A. Opinio Henrici Gandavensis]
9 Et ideo est opinio cuiusdam doctoris Sollemnis4 quod sicut

sunt duo supposita distincta, sic spirant ut distincti. Unde licet
isti duo in quantum sunt voluntas non sunt distincti, tamen ut
sunt concordes necessario sunt distincti; et sic voluntas ut concors
est unum principium spirandi. Habent pro se et probant hoc
multis auctoritatibus: Richardus, De Trinitate,5 et Damascenus.
73 cap.6 Et omnes auctoritates in hoc consistunt quia amor est
iocundus et amor est mutuus, et sic oportet quod amans et
amatum habeant plene condilectum. Sic igitur dicunt quod Pater
et Filius spirant amore concordi, ita quod concordia sit vis
spirativa et principium spirandi in eis quo Pater diligit Filium et
Filius Patrem, et sic spirant aliquo modo ut distincti.
[B. Contra opinionem Henrici Gandavensis]
10 Contra: in quocumque signo originis vel naturae est

principium productivum perfectum et in supposito convenienti
actioni vel productioni, in illo potest esse productio per tale prin
cipium. Voluntas infinita, habens obiectum diligibile infinitum
i Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 54, q 6 ad 8-9 (II. 94vE-96rP).

r> Richardus de S. Victore, De Trin. III. c. 3 (ed. J. Ribaillier. TPMA VI, 137-8;
PL 196. 917).
Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 7, 8, 10 [I, c. 7, 8, 10] (ed. Buytaert. 25-6, 38-40,
51-2; PG 94, 805, 821-4, 840-1)
8 There is a doubt about this truth, regarding this will that is

posited as the one principle of spiration.* If [this will] were
considered inasmuch as it is the same in the Father and Son,
then it does not seem to be difficult to see that the Holy Spirit is
from them as from one principle. But the will* can be considered
[in two ways]: either as it is one in the Father and Son, or as it is
in the Son as agreeing with the Father. If the Holy Spirit is
considered to be from them in the first way, then it is plain that it
is from them insofar as they are one. If in the second way, since
an agreement indicates a distinction of the supposits, then the
Holy Spirit necessarily proceeds from them insofar as they are
two.
9 And therefore there is an opinion of a certain doctor

Solemn' that just as there are two distinct supposits, so they
spirate as distinct. And although these, insofar as they are
identified with the will, are not distinct, nevertheless as they are
in agreement with each other, they are necessarily distinct; and
thus it is by agreement that the will is one principle of spiration.
Theyi prove this from the many authoritative statements they
have for themselves: Richard, On the Trinity and Damascene in
chapter 73. And all the authorities agree in this, that love is
genial, and love is mutual, and therefore it is necessary that the
lover and beloved have a fully shared delight. In this way,
therefore, they say that the Father and Son spirate with a
concordant love, so that it is mutual agreement that is the
spirative power and principle of spirating in these two, as the
Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father, and so they
spirate in some way as distinct.
10 To the contrary: in whatever instance* of origin or nature*

there is a perfect productive principle, moreover, that is in a
supposit suited for action or production,* in that [instance] there
Henry and those who follow him.

sibi praesens quod est principium productionis Spiritus Sancti,

est aliquo modo prius in Patre et Filio quam Pater diligat Filium
et Filius diligat Patrem, et in supposito convenienti actioni et
productioni. Ergo prius aliquo modo Spiritus Sanctus producitur
quam Pater et Filius concorditer isto modo se diligunt.
11 Minor probatur dupliciter. Primo sic: habitudo potentiae ad
obiectum primum prior est habitudine eiusdem potentiae ad
obiectum secundarium, et maxime quando non habet habitudi-
nem ad obiectum secundarium nisi per obiectum primum. Sed
primum obiectum voluntatis divinae est infinite diligibile, scilicet
essentia. Ergo voluntas divina prius respicit obiectum illud quam
habeat habitudinem ad Patrem et Filium simul ista voluntate se
diligentes, quia ista obiecta 'Pater' et 'Filius' sunt relativa et per
consequens secundaria; in illo autem priori voluntas illa est in
Patre et Filio; ergo etc.
12 Secundo probatur eadem minor sic: Pater non gignit
Verbum ut actu intelligens vel ut intelligentia actualis sed ut
memoria; patet prius distinctione 2, quia non gignit intelligentia
vel intellectione formaliter, ita quod intellectio actualis sit ratio
formalis. Ergo pari ratione Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum
Sanctum, non ut actu volentes formaliter, sed voluntate absolute.
Sic autem est aliquo modo prior in eis quam mutuo se ament illa
voluntate actu. Ergo voluntas absolute prior amore mutuo sive
voluntate concordi produceret. Unde eodem modo sicut intellexi
supra de productione Filii, sic hic intelligo de Spiritu Sancto.
Sicut enim memoria habens obiectum diligibile infinitum sibi
praesens, scilicet divinam essentiam, est sufficiens et formale
principium in productione Filii, sic dico hic quod voluntas infinita,
habens obiectum primum diligibile infinitum sibi praesentatum
per actum intellectus, scilicet essentiam divinam vel bonitatem
can be a production through such a principle. The infinite will,

having an infinitely lovable objectthat is the productive
principle of the Holy Spiritpresent to it, is in some way prior in
the Father and Son to the Father loving the Son and the Son
loving the Father, and it is in a supposit suited to the action and
production. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is produced somehow
before the Father and the Son love themselves concordantly in
this way.
11 The minor is proved in two ways. The first is this way: the
relationship of a potency* to its primary object comes before the
same potency has a relationship to its secondary object, and
especially when it does not have a relationship to the secondary
object except through the first object. But the first object of the
divine will is the infinitely lovable, namely the essence. Therefore
the divine will first regards that object before it has a relationship
to the Father and the Son who love each other simultaneously by
that will, because these objects Father' and Son' are relative and
as a consequence secondary; in that prior [instance], however,
that will is in the Father and Son; therefore, etc.
12 Secondly, I prove that same minor in this way: the Father
does not beget the Son insofar as [the Father] is intelligent in act,
or as actual intelligence, but as memory;* this is evident above in
distinction two, because he does not beget formally* by
intelligence or intellection in such a way that actual intellection is
the formal reason. Therefore by the same token the Father and
Son spirate the Holy Spirit not as actually willing formally, but
by the will considered absolutely. In this way, however, the latter
is somehow prior in them to their actual loving themselves
mutually by that will. Therefore, the will considered absolutely
would produce before their mutual love or their concordant will
[becomes actual]. Hence in the same way as I have understood
the production of the Son above, so here I understand that of the
Holy Spirit. For just as the memory having an infinite lovable
object present to it, namely the divine essence, is sufficient as the
formal principle in the production of the Son, so here I say that
the infinite will, having its first object as an infinite lovable,
namely the divine essence or the infinite goodness of God,
presented to itself by an act of the intellect, is the principle of
Dei infinitam, est principium productionis Spiritus Sancti. Non

quod amore actuali amor producatur, ut isti dicunt, immo
voluntas talis est principium amoris, et ille post est amoris mutui.
13 Item, principium aeque perfectum in uno sicut in duobus
aeque sufficiens principium agendi est in uno sicut in duobus; sed
voluntas est huiusmodi principium; igitur etc. Maior patet, quia
voluntas divina non accipit perfectionem nisi a se, ergo non est
mutua vel concors voluntas.
14 Si dicas quod voluntas non est aeque perfectum principium

in Patre sicut in utroque, quia in Patre non est voluntas
fecundum principium et sufficiens, sed ex dilectione et quasi ex
productione Filii, et est in potentia antequam producatur Filius;
ergo etc. Respondeo quod Pater habet utramque fecunditatem
a se, secundum Augustinum, et formale principium spirandi.
Quamcumque enim proprietatem relativam non habet Pater a se,
nullam habet. Ergo in primo signo originis utrumque habebit
principium sive fecunditatem utriusque principii. Unde Pater
dicitur principium et fons totius deitatis.7
15 Ad auctoritates illas de amore iocundo et mutuo,8 dico quod
sunt ad oppositum, quia in nobis redamatio est ratio amabilitatis
reddens amabiliorem priore amore, et aliter non est amor
iocundissimus, et haec est ratio perfectae amabilitatis quae reddit
eum amabiliorem quam sola virtus. Sed in divinis est totum
oppositum, quia in Deo non est redamabilitas sive ratio
redamabilitatis alia a Deo; sed est idem, non alius simplex amor
et amor redamationis; non enim propter hoc amabilior Filius
Patre, quia redamat Patrem.
16 Item, amor redamans non debet latere. Oportet enim quod
redamatio sit cognita, secundum Philosophum, VIII Ethicorum:9
Amicitia non est latens in contra passos. Ergo cognitio amoris
mutui est proximior ratio quam amor mutuus in productione
Spiritus Sancti. Ergo intellectus erit prima ratio huiusmodi
7 August., De Trm IV. c. 20, n. 29 (CCSL 50, 200; PL 42, 908).

H Cf supra n. 9.
Aristot., Eth. Mr. VIII, c. 2 (1 156a 3-5).
producing the Holy Spirit. Not that love may be produced by

actual love, as these say; indeed such a will is a principle of love,
and that [love] that comes afterwards results in mutual love.
13 Also, a principle that is as perfect in one as it is in two, is as
sufficient as a principle of acting in one as it is in two; but the will
is such a principle; therefore etc. The major is evident, because
the divine will does not accept perfection except from itself;
therefore it is not the mutual or concordant will.
14 If you object that the will as a principle is not as perfect in
the Father as it is in both, because in the Father the will is not a
fecund and sufficient principle, but from the love and, as it were,
from the production of the Son [it becomes so], and it is in potency
before the Son is produced, therefore, etc. I respond that the
Father has both fecundities from himself, according to Augustine,
as well as the formal principle of spirating. For whatever relative
property the Father does not have from himself, he does not have.
Therefore in the first instance of origin he will have both
principles, as well as the fecundity of both principles. Hence the
Father is said to be the principle and font of the entire deity.
15 To those authoritative statements [n. 9] about love as genial
and mutual, I say that they prove the opposite. Indeed, it is in us
that the return of love is the reason for amiability rendering [new
love] more amiable than the prior love, and otherwise it is not the
most genial love, and this is the essence of perfect amiability that
renders it [i.e., love] more amiable than the power [of love] alone.
But in the divine it is just the opposite, because in God there is no
return of love or notion of such that is different from God; but
simple love and the return of love is the same thing; for not on
account of this is the Son more amiable than the Father, because
he returns love to the Father.
16 Also, the love in return should not be hidden. For it is
necessary that the action of returning love be known, according to
the Philosopher in Bk. VIII of the Ethics. Friendship is not hidden
from those who bear it. Therefore knowledge of mutual love is a
more proximate reason than mutual love in the production of the
Holy Spirit. Therefore the intellect will be the primary reason of
such a production, not the will. But to the extent that the Father
productionis, non voluntas. Sed in quantum Pater scit se amare

Filium, et Filius scit se amare Patrem; ergo etc.
17 Dico igitur ad quaestionem quod Pater et Filius non spirant

Spiritum Sanctum in quantum distincti, nec voluntate concordi in
actu elicito, sed ut omnino est in eis una voluntas, et ut
conveniunt in isto principio totaliter uno, nisi quod in Patre est a
se et in Filio ab alio. Sed hoc non variat in aliquo unitatem
principii, quia in nullo actu concordant ante productionem
Spiritus Sancti. Unde spiratio non est amatio, nec spirare est
amare, sicut nec dicere est intelligere. Et licet habeant actum
amandi essentialem, tamen amorem essentialem non spirant, et
multo fortius nec in amore personarum mutuo vel concordi
spirant aliquo modo.
18 Ad verbum Richardii0 quando dicit quod in eis est concors
voluntas, dico quod est una concors voluntas in suppositis ad
actum secundum respectu creaturarum sive in effectu producto,
sicut si duo homines concordarent ad aliquid faciendum, et sic est
voluntas in distinctis suppositis. Alio modo est habitualis
concordia in voluntate quae de se nata est ut sit in eis concordia
ad agendum vel producendum, ita quod concordia non notat
rationem formalis principii, sed est condicio necessaria annexa et
concomitans rationem formalem principii productivi, quia prius
est in suppositis voluntas et per consequens concordia in eis ad
producendum Spiritum Sanctum. Et ideo prius origine voluntas
habitualis, non aliquo actu elicito, est principium productivum
Spiritus Sancti quam necessario concomitatur concors voluntas in
actu elicito.
i0 Cf. supra n !)
knows himself to love the Son, the Son knows himself to love the
Father; therefore, etc.
Reply of Scotus
17 I say then to the question that the Father and Son do not
spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as they are distinct, or by a
concordant love in an elicited act, but insofar as in them there is
entirely one will, and as they are joined together in this principle
that is totally one, except that in the Father it is from himself,
and in the Son it is from another. But this does not affect the
unity of the principle in someone, because in no act do they agree
before the production of the Holy Spirit. Hence the spiration is
not love, nor is 'to spirate' the same as 'to love'; just as 'to speak*'
is not to understand.' And although they have an essential act of
loving, nevertheless they do not spirate essential love; moreover,
they do not spirate somehow in the process of a mutual and
concordant love of persons.
18 As for the statement of Richard [n. 9] when he says that in
them there is a concordant will, I say that there is one concordant
will in the supposits as regards the second act* in reference to
creatures or regarding the effect produced, just as if two men
were to agree to do something; and it is in this way that the will
is in distinct supposits. In another way there is habitual* concord
in the will, which is suited by nature to ensure that there be in
them an agreement to act or produce, so that the agreement does
not imply a character of a formal principle, but is a necessary
condition annexed to and accompanying the formal notion of a
productive principle, because the supposits first have the will,
and as a consequence an agreement to produce the Holy Spirit.
And therefore the habitual will, not in some elicited act, is a
productive principle of the Holy Spirit that is prior in origin to a
concordant will that necessarily accompanies [it] in an elicited
act.
19 Ad primum argumentumii quando dicitur quod Spiritus

Sanctus est unio amborum etc., et quod unio est distinctorum,
dicendum quod unio est distinctorum, sed non sequitur 'ergo
producunt ut distincti' nisi quia praeintelligitur distinctio cui non
supervenit unitas.
20 Ad aliudi2 quando dicitur 'actio est suppositi' etc., dicendum

quod vel est suppositi vel habentis modum suppositi ultimo
denominati. Actio enim denominat suum principium 'quo', et si
suppositum nullum est, tunc ultimo denominatur actio a principio
'quo', quia actio potest esse principiorum agendi ultimo denomi-
natorum, ut si calor separatus etc. Sed non sequitur 'ergo plurium
suppositorum plures actiones distinctae'; formae enim respec-
tivae, cuiusmodi est causa, plura denominant quam absolutae. Ita
actio primo denominat suppositum denominatione ultimata, hoc
est ut causans non nisi suppositum. Unde 'calor est causa caloris'
denominative, non essentialiter. Sed ista 'calor est causans'.
scilicet cum concreto suppositi, non denominat nisi suppositum.
Exemplum: si una albedo esset in tribus superficiebus, omnes
dicerentur disgregare disgregatione mediata. Unde haec esset
mediata 'albedo disgregat', sed haec esset immediate 'album
disgregat'.
21 Ad aliudi3 dico quod spirant in quantum sunt unum vi
spirativa. Ad probationem quando dicitur 'Pater ergo propter
duo principia erit plures producentes', non sequitur, quia concrete
non plurificantur nisi supposita plurificentur, eo quod terminus
numeralis non denotat pluralitatem formae nisi denotet
pluralitatem in suppositis; sicut non sunt plures scientes nisi sint
plures homines, sic nec 'plures producentes' potest dici Pater quia
non nisi unus.
i i Cf. supra n. 1.
i2 Cf. supra n 2
i:i Cf. supra n. 3.
19 To the first [n. 1], when it is said that the Holy Spirit is a
union of both, etc., and that a union is of what is distinct, it must
be said that a union is of distinct [persons], but it does not follow
that therefore they produce as distinct' unless one preconceives a
distinction that is not preceded by unity.
20 To the other [n. 2], when it is said that 'action is of the
supposit' etc., it must be said that it is either of the supposit
[loosely stated] or of something that has the character of an
ultimately designated supposit. For action indicates its principle*
'by which,' and if there is no supposit, then the action is
ultimately designated by the principle 'by which,' because the
action can [also] pertain to the principles of acting that have
received [their] ultimate designation, e.g., if heat were separated,
etc. But it does not follow therefore of several supposits there are
several distinct actions'; for the relative formsand the cause is
of such a kinddesignate more [supposits] than absolute [forms].
Thus the action primarily designates the supposit by an ultimate
designation, that is, as causing only the supposit. Hence 'heat is
the cause of heat' by designation, not essentially. But this 'heat is
causing'namely, with the concrete of a supposit[ultimately]
designates only a supposit. An example: if one 'whiteness' were in
three surfaces, all would be said to dilate [the medium] by a
shared dilation. Hence this would [express] the shared [action]:
'whiteness dilates,' but this would stand for an individual [action]:
'white dilates.'
21 To the other [n. 3] I say that they spirate insofar as they are
one in their spirative power. To the proof when it is said
'therefore, the Father because of two principles will multiply into
several producers,' this does not follow, because concrete things
are not multiplied unless the supposits are multiplied, for a
numeric term does not designate a plurality of form unless it
denotes plurality in the supposits, just as there are not several
who know unless there are several human individuals, and thus
neither can 'several producers' be said of 'Father,' because there is
only one.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum Pater et Filius sint duo spiratores]
22 Utrum Pater et Filius sint duo spiratores.
Quod sic videtur:

Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum Sanctum, ergo sunt
spirantes Spiritum Sanctum, quia a verbo ad eius participium est
consequentia necessaria. Et ulterius sequitur 'si duo spirantes,
ergo duo spiratores', quia sequitur est spirans ergo spirator, ergo
duo spirantes duo spiratores' ex modo significandi pluralis et
singularis.
23 Contra:
Augustinus, V De Trinitate, cap. 17: i4 "Pater et Filius sunt
unum principium Spiritus Sancti, sicut tota Trinitas est unum
principium creaturae". Sed respectu creaturae sunt omnino unum
principium et non plura. Ergo sicut unus creator, quia opera
Trinitatis sunt indivisa, ita et unus spirator.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
24 Respondeo quod non sunt duo spiratores, sed unus tantum.

Et si oppositum inveniatur dictum ab auctoritatibus glossandum
est et exponendum secundum expositionem Magistri, distinctione
12.
25 Hoc autem ostendo tripliciter:

Primo sic: substantivum non dicitur de aliquibus pluraliter
cum termino numerali, nisi eius significatum plurificetur in eis.
Sed significatum et vis spirativa spiratoris non plurificatur in
Patre et Filio. Ergo non est concedendum quod sint duo
spiratores.
26 Maior probatur, quia terminus numeralis additus alicui
substantivo quod potest eius dependentiam terminare ponit suum
significatum, scilicet distinctionem et plurificationem circa ipsum
M August., De Trin. V, c. 13, n. 14 (CCSL 50, 221; PL 42. 920); c 14, n 13

(CCSL 50, 222-3; PL 42, 921).
Question Two
Are the Father and Son two spirators?
22 Are the Father and Son two spirators?

It seems that they are:
Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit, therefore they are
the ones spirating the Holy Spirit, because there is a necessary
connection between a verb and its participle. And furthermore it
follows 'if there are two who are spirating, therefore there are two
spirators,' because it follows 'there is one spirating, therefore a
spirator, therefore two who are spirating, [and as a consequence]
two spirators' from the mode of signification of plural and
singular.
23 To the contrary:
Augustine in Bk. V of The Trinity, chapter 17: 'The Father
and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, just as the entire
Trinity is one principle of a creature.' But as regards the creature
they are entirely one principle and not several. Therefore just as
there is one creator, because the works of the Trinity are
undivided, so there is one spirator.
To the Question
24 I respond that there are not two spirators, but only one. And
if the opposite may be found in citation from authorities it must
be glossed and explained according to the exposition of the Master
in distinction 12.
25 I show this, however, in triplicate:
First in this way: a noun is not predicated of several things
in the plural by adding a numeral term, unless what it signifies is
multiplied in them. But what is signified and the spirative force
of the spirator is not multiplied in the Father and the Son.
Therefore it should not be conceded that there are two spirators.
26 The major is proved because the numeral term added to
some noun that can terminate its dependent nature, adds what it
signifies, namely the distinction and multiplication, to [the
signification of] this [noun] and denotes that it is numbered and
distinguished. But when a numeral term is added to an adjective
et denotat ipsum numerari et distingui. Sed quando terminus

numeralis additur adiectivo quod non potest dependentiam eius
sistere vel terminare non ponit significatum suum immediate
circa significatum adiectivi. Sed utrumque et terminus
numeralis et adiectivum ponunt significatum suum circa
significatum substantivi et primo determinans dependentiam
utriusque scilicet termini numeralis et adiectivi.
27 Minor probatur: quia sicut actio significat actum per modum
habitus et quietis ut 'lectio' significat sic actum ita nomen
verbale illius actionis significat principium talis actionis per
modum habitus et quietis et per modum concernentis suppo-
situm, ut lector. Sicut spiratio dicit actum per modum habitus et
quietis, ita spirator dicit principium talis actus. Haec autem vis
vel principium spirandi non potest plurificari in Patre et Filio
sicut ostensum est in quaestione praecedente. Ergo terminus
numeralis additus tali principio quod significatur per hoc nomen
verbale, quod dicitur spirator, cum principium sit omnino unum
in Patre et Filio, non poterit ponere suum significatum circa illud
nomen dicendo in plurali 'duo spiratores' nisi propositio sit falsa.
Ex hoc apparet unum corollarium: quare conceditur in divinis
adiectiva posse plurificari, non autem substantiva. Conceditur
enim quod Pater et Filius sunt duo spirantes et non duo
spiratores. Rationem huius assignant aliqui talem: adiectiva
significant in adiacentia ad supposita. Et ideo sicut supposita
plurificantur, ita et adiectiva possunt plurificari.
28 Item, dependens nunquam determinatur ad aliud aeque
dependens; terminus numeralis adiectivus est additus huic
adiectivo 'spirantes', ergo non determinatur eius dependentia per
tale adiectivum; ergo non ponit significatum suum circa illud,
quia habet idem pro dependenti et determinativo. Sic igitur talis
terminus notat distingui illud ad quod terminatur et ad quod
adiacet. Circa quod igitur ponit significatum suum quando dicitur
'Pater et Filius sunt duo spirantes' et quod est terminans
that cannot stop or terminate its dependent nature, it does not

add what it signifies immediately to what the adjective signifies.
But both the numeral term and the adjective add what they
signify to a noun's signification, i.e., to that which primarily
determines the dependence of both, namely of a numeral and
adjectival term.
27 The minor is proved because just as 'action' or 'acting'
signifies an act after the manner of a disposition or restas
'reading' signifies an act in this wayso the verbal noun
corresponding to this action signifies the principle of such an
action after the manner of a disposition or rest and from the point
of view of pertaining to a supposit, e.g., 'reader' or lector. Just as
'spiration' indicates an act after the manner of a disposition or
rest, so 'spirator' indicates the principle of such an act. But this
power or principle of spirating cannot be multiplied in the Father
and Son as has been shown in the preceding question. Therefore
the numeral term added to such a principle that is signified
through this verbal noun 'spirator'since the principle is entirely
one in the Father and Soncannot add what it signifies to [the
signification of) this noun, by saying in the plural 'two spirators'
without the proposition being false. And from this one corollary
follows, by which it is conceded that an adjective in the divine can
be multiplied, but a noun cannot. For it is conceded that the
Father and the Son are two 'spirating' and not two 'spirators.' The
reason some assign for this is that adjectives signify by being
adjacent to a supposit, and hence just as the supposits can be
multiplied, so adjectives can be put into the plural.
28 Also, what is depending is never determined as regards
something that is equally depending. Therefore, [when] a
numeral adjectival term is added to this adjective 'spirating,' its
dependent nature is not terminated through such an adjective;
therefore it does not add that which it signifies to [the
signification of] this [adjective], because [then] it has the same
thing for both what is depending and what determines it. In this
way, therefore, such a term indicates that that which terminates
it and that to which it is adjacent are distinguished. Now when it
is said that 'Father and Son are two spirating,' what does [the
numeral adjective] refer to with its signification? And what is it
dependentiam, dicitur quod in masculino est aliquid personale

respectu cuius terminus numeralis additur adiectivo, sed non
habemus nomina hypostasium, et ideo non est mirum si plurifi-
cantur ut duo spirantes. Sed secus est si terminus numeralis
adderetur substantivo ut duo spiratores sicut ostensum est.
29 Item, secundo principals5 probatur sic principale proposi-

tum: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti, sicut
dicit Augustinus, V De Trinitate, cap. 17, non autem sunt unum
principium 'quo', quia suppositum agens non est principium 'quo'
sicut forma in supposito est principium 'quo' sed quod agit.
Pater ergo et Filius sunt unum quod spirat Spiritum Sanctum.
Ergo poterit convenienter dici de Patre et Filio, si aliquo uno
nomine exprimatur, sed non potest convenientius exprimi per
aliquod nomen quam per hoc nomen 'spirator' dicendo quod Pater
et Filius sunt unus spirator, quia falsum est quod sint unus
spirans; igitur etc.
30 Sed contra istam rationem forte instabis sic: quia si Pater et

Filius sunt unum principium quod spirat, ergo sunt unum
principium spirans, quod est falsum, ut videtur, quia tunc Pater
et Filius essent unus spirans. Responsio: concedo quod Pater et
Filius sunt unum principium spirans; sed non sequitur quod sint
unum spirans. Quod patet ex dictis in praecedenti quaestione,
quia adiectivum significat in adiacentia et dependentia ad
substantivum. Et quia plures substantivi in masculino huius
adiectivi cum dico 'sunt unum spirans' ad quos terminatur
dependentia huius adiectivi 'spirans', ideo haec non est vera 'sunt
unum spirans', sicut nec 'sunt unum creans', sed plures creantes
sicut plures qui spirant vel qui creant. Ista tamen conceditur
quod sunt unum principium spirans, quia hic exprimitur quod
substantivum sufficienter terminat dependentiam adiectivi,
ls Cf. supra n. 23.

that terminates its dependent nature? It is said that there is

something personal in the masculine gender which is indicated by
the numeral term added to the adjective, except that the noun for
'persons' is not used. Therefore it is not surprising if the adjective
is put into the plural, 'two spirating.' But it is a different matter if
the numeral term would be added to a noun, as 'two spirators,' as
has been shown.
29 Also, the second main proof of our proposal goes in this way:
The Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, as
Augustine says in Bk. V of The Trinity, chapter 17, but they are
not one principle 'by which,' because a supposit acting is not a
principle 'by which'in the sense in which the form in a supposit
is the principle 'by which'but a supposit is 'that which' acts. The
Father, therefore, and the Son are [something] one 'that' spirates
the Holy Spirit. Therefore it could suitably be said of the Father
and the Son, if it may be expressed by some one noun, but it could
not be more suitably expressed through another noun, rather
than through this noun 'spirator,' by saying that the Father and
the Son are one spirator, because it is false that they would be
one spirating'; therefore, etc.
30 But perhaps you will attack this argument in this way. For
if the Father and the Son are one principle that spirates,
therefore they are one principle spirating, which is false, as it
seems, because then the Father and the Son would be 'one
spirating.' Response: I concede that the Father and Son are one
principle spirating, but it does not follow that they are one
spirating. Which is evident from what was said in the preceding
question, because the adjective signifies in adjacency to, and
dependence on the noun. And because several nouns of the
masculine gender2 correspond to this adjective 'spirating'when I
say 'they are one spirating'which terminate the dependence of
this adjective spirating,' therefore this is not correct 'they are one
spirating,' as neither is this 'they are one creating,' but several
creating, just as there are several who spirate and who create.
Nevertheless this is conceded that they are one principle
spirating, because here it is clear that a substantive sufficiently
terminates the dependence of the adjective, namely of a numeral
1 Namely, 'Father' and 'Son.'

43 1 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A
scilicet termini numeralis, quod substantivum est idem in Patre

et Filio, et sic si uno nomine significetur, potest vere dici de Patre
et Filio, ut cum dicitur 'Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator'.
31 Item, tertio sic: omni entitati formali correspondet aliquod
ens, vel aliquis ens illa entitate formali adaequata, ita quod
quanta est communitas entitatis, tanta est illius entitatis. Ergo vi
spirativae, quae est quaedam entitas formalis in Patre et Filio,
correspondet adaequate aliquod ens vel aliquis ens illa entitate;
hoc non est nisi spirator; ergo sunt unus spirator et non duo
spiratores. Illi enim entitati, scilicet vi spirativae vel voluntati
fecundae, non correspondet tantum Pater sicut nec tantum Filius.
Ergo spirator est aliquis ens qui adaequate correspondet illi
entitati.
32 Sed contra instabis huic rationi: quia tunc sequitur quod

Pater et Filius sunt unum in spiratione, et per consequens, quia
omnia participia sunt adiectiva, et sic potest dici quod Pater et
Filius sunt unus spirans quia talis entitas formalis est aliquis
ens: Responsio: concedo quod sunt unum quod spirat vel unum
spirans, sed non unus. Nomina enim adiectiva non sunt imposita
ad significandum nisi addito aliquo substantivo; et ideo debet dici
unum principium spirans et non unus spirans. Conceditur ergo
quod si esset unum nomen impositum, illud diceretur de eis. Hoc
autem est nomen spiratoris et per circumlocutionem dicimus
spirans principium.
33 Ad rationemi6 quando dicitur quod Pater et Filius spirant

Spiritum Sanctum, ergo sunt duo spirantes, concedo istam
consequentiam et probationem eius. Et quando additur si duo
spirantes, ergo duo spiratores' nego consequentiam. Et ad
probationem quando dicitur quod numerus singularis infert
Cf supra n. 22
term. This substantive is the same in both the Father and the
Son, and in this way, if it may be signified by one noun, it can be
truly predicated of the Father and Son, as when it is said 'the
Father and Son are one spirator.'
31 Also, thirdly [the proposal] is proved in this way: to every
formal entity corresponds some being 'that' [aliquod ens] or some
being who' [aliquis ens], the latter entity being adequate to [the
corresponding] formal [entity], so that the latter entity has the
same [degree of] commonness as the [formal] entity. Therefore,
since to the spirative power, which is a certain formal entity in
the Father and Son, adequately corresponds some being 'that' or
some being 'who' as the [aforementioned corresponding] entity,
this can only be a 'spirator'; therefore they are one spirator and
not two spirators. For that entity, namely the spirative power or
the fecund will, does not correspond only to the Father or only to
the Son. Therefore, the spirator is some being 'who' that
adequately corresponds to that entity.
32 But you may attack this reason, because then it would
follow that the Father and Son are one thing [unum] in spiration,
and as a consequence, because all participles are adjectival, it can
be said that the Father and Son in this way are one spirating
'who' [unus], because such a formal entity is some being 'who.'
Response: I concede that they may be one thing that spirates or
the one thing spirating, but are not one who.' For the adjectives
are not used for signification unless [they are] added to some
noun; and therefore one must say 'one spirating principle' and not
'one spirating who.' Hence it is conceded that if one noun were
imposed, that would be said of [both of] them. But that noun is
spirator' and by circumlocution we say spirating principle.'
33 To the argument [n. 22], when it is said that the Father and
Son spirate the Holy Spirit, therefore there are two spirating, I
concede this implication* and its proof. And when it is added 'if
there are two spirating, therefore there are two spirators' I deny
the implication. And as for its proof, when it is said that the
singular number implies the plural, I say that a singular only
plurale, dico quod singulare non sequitur nisi ad singulare, nec

plurale nisi ad plurale, quando consequens plurificatur ad pluri-
ficationem antecedentis. Unde bene sequitur 'persona divina, ergo
Deus', sed non sequitur 'tres personae, ergo tres dii', quia
consequens est ibi plurificatum, sed antecedens quod est 'Deus'
non plurificatur, sicut nec universale in quantum huiusmodi.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum Pater et Filius spirent uniformiter
Spiritum Sanctum]
34 Utrum Pater et Filius spirent uniformiter Spiritum San

ctum.
Quod non videtur:
Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, cap. 17:17 Pater spirat
principaliter; sed Filius non spirat principaliter; ergo Pater et
Filius non spirant uniformiter.
35 Item, Magister in littera18 secundum Ambrosium: "Pater
proprie".
36 Item, Richardus, De Trinitate, cap. 6:19 "Procedit a Patre
immediate et mediante Filio"; ergo non uniformiter.
37 Item, Hilarius:20 "Spiritum Sanctum per Verbum procedere"
etc.
38 Item, per rationem: Omnis causa prima immediatius et
perfectius producit quam causa secunda,21 et 'propter quod
unumquodque tale et illud magis', et sic in Patre erit aliqua
perfectio principiandi quae non est in Filio.
39 Contra:
Una et eadem actio non potest esse difformis, quae est ab
uno et eodem principio. Sed spiratio actio una in Patre et Filio est
ab eodem formali principio, ergo etc.
17 August , De Trin. XV, c. 17, n 29 (CCSL 50A. 503-4; PL 42, 1081).

18 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 12, c. 2, n. 4 (SB IV, 119-20).
19 Richardus de S. Victore, De Trin. V, c. 9 (ed. J. Ribaillier, TPMA VI, 205.
PL 196, 955-6).
-"l Hilarius. De Trin. XII, n. 57 (CCSL 62A, 627; PL 10, 472).
21 Cf. Liber de causis. prop. 1 (ed. A. Pattin, 46).
follows a singular, and a plural only follows a plural, [as] when

the consequent is put in the plural, because the antecedent is in
the plural. Hence it would well follow 'a divine person, therefore
God,' but it does not follow 'Three persons, therefore, three gods,'
because the consequent is in the plural, but the antecedent that is
'God' cannot be put in the plural, just as neither can a universal
insofar as it is such.
Question Three
Do the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit uniformly?
Do the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit uniformly?

34 It does not seem that they do:
Augustine in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 17: The Father
spirates mainly; but the Son does not spirate mainly; therefore
the Father and Son do not spirate uniformly.
35 Also, the Master in the text, according to Ambrose: "The
Father does so properly."
36 Also, Richard in De Trinitate, chapter 6: 'He proceeds from
the Father immediately, through the mediation of the Son';
therefore not uniformly.
37 Also, Hilary: "The Holy Spirit proceeds through the Word,"*
etc.
38 Also, through an argument from reason: 'Every first cause
produces more immediately and more perfectly than a secondary
cause,' and 'on this account something is such, and another more
so,' and in this way the Father will have some perfection of
producing which is not in the Son.
39 To the contrary:
One and the same action that is from one and the same
principle cannot be diversified. But active spiration in the Father
and the Son is one, from the same formal principle; therefore, etc.
[I. Responsio Scoti]
40 Respondeo quod actio ista spirationis potest considerari

tripliciter: vel in se, vel ad alterum, vel ut est in suppositis
agentibus. Primis duobus modis est uniformitas, sicut si esset
unius suppositi. Sed tertio modo haec actio habetur ab ipsis
suppositis non uniformiter. Quia nihil natum habet Pater, et
quidqmd habet Filius, accipiendo per generationem habet. Sic
igitur habent spirationem actionem ordine quodam, et ratione
huius potest dici quaedam difformitas. Et sic sunt intelligendae
auctoritates; non enim aliter intelligo dicere.
[A. Dubium quaestioni annexum]
41 Sed hic est unum dubium: quia si Pater prius spirat, ergo
Filius non potest spirare nisi Spiritus Sanctus bis acciperet esse,
quod est impossibile; sed Pater in illo priori dat esse et producit
Spiritum Sanctum, et in illo non spirat Filius; ergo prius est
Spiritus Sanctus antequam Filius spiret.
42 Item, quodcumque principium in aliquo supposito intelligi-
tur habere terminum adaequatum antequam aliud suppositum
habeat illud principium, illud aliud non potest agere illo principio:
sed virtus vel principium spirandi ut in Patre intelligitur habere
terminum adaequatum, quia ut in Patre est fecundum; ergo
Filius in illo priori non potest illo agere vel producere.
[B. Responsio Scoti ad dubium]
43 Respondeo et dico quod non est similis ordo originis hic inter
Patrem spirantem et Filium spirantem, sicut inter generationem
Filii et spirationem Spiritus Sancti. Primo modo intelligitur actio
prius elici secundum quandam prioritatem et terminus produci in
The reply of Scotus
40 I respond that this action of spiration can be considered in

three ways: either in itself or towards another, or as it is in
supposits acting. In the first two ways there is uniformity, just as
if it were of one supposit. But in the third way, this action would
not be uniformly from those supposits. For the Father has
nothing that has been born, and whatever the Son has was
received through generation.* In this way, therefore, they would
have the spiration action according to a certain order, and by
reason of this a certain diversity could be asserted. And in this
way one should understand the authorities; for I don't understand
them in any other way.
A doubt attached to the question
41 But here there is one doubtful point, because if the Father

spirates beforehand, then if the Son spirates, the Holy Spirit
would be spirated twice, which is impossible. But the Father does
give existence to, and produces the Holy Spirit in that prior
moment, and in that moment the Son does not spirate. Therefore
the Holy Spirit is spirated before the Son spirates.
42 Also, if any principle whatsoever in some supposit is
understood to have an adequate term before another supposit
would have that principle, this other [supposit] could not act by
that principle; but the power or principle of spiration is
understood to have an adequate term in the Father, because it is
fecund there. Hence the Son in that prior moment cannot be
understood to act or produce through spiration.
Response of Scotus to the doubt
43 I respond and say that there is no order of origin* here

between the Father and the Son spirating, similar to the one that
exists between the generation of the Son and the spiration of the
Holy Spirit. For in the first way one understands the action to be
elicited, and the term, namely, the Son, to be produced in being
through generation, according to a certain priority before the act
esse, scilicet Filius per generationem antequam eliciatur actus

voluntatis propter ordinem principiorum, et antequam produca-
tur persona Spiritus Sancti. Sed ex parte alia est talis ordo quod
Pater prius agit fecunditate sua prima, scilicet virtute generativa,
et termino illius fecunditatis, scilicet Filio, communicat secundam
fecunditatem, scilicet virtutem spirativam. Ergo in illo instanti
quo Pater exit in actum secundae fecunditatis, et Filius simul exit
cum eo, non secundum ordinem acceptum in argumento, et ideo
principium spirativum ut in Patre tantum non praeintelligitur
habere terminum adaequatum; ergo etc.
[C. Ad argumenta dubii]
44 Ad argumentum22 ergo illud est dicendum quod si Pater

prius spirat quam Filius, illud prius non est accipiendum nisi
quia Pater spirat a se, et sic non est prioritas actionis vel termini
nisi ut actio est Patris a se quam Filius non habet a se. Et tunc
est sensus talis: prius, id est, Pater a se spirat, Filius autem non
prius, id est non a se, et tunc non est prioritas termini accipientis
esse, quia tunc Spiritus Sanctus esset a se. Sed prioritas tantum
esset a parte agentis, non termini vel actionis, et sic est ordo in
habentibus eandem actionem.
45 Ad secundum23 quando dicitur quod principium quod in
aliquo supposito intelligitur habere terminum adaequatum etc.,
dicendum quod ista propositio non est universaliter vera quod
tale principium habens adaequatam actionem non possit esse
alteri principium agendi: licet sit verum quod non potest esse
alteri principium agendi alia actione, sed eadem actione bene
potest, si communicetur alteri supposito, sicut est in proposito.
Debet ergo intelligi non esse principium ad aliam actionem vel ad
alium terminum, et prioritas illa non est a parte actionis vel
22 Cf. supra n. 41.

Cf. supra n. 42.
of the will may be elicited, because of the order of the principles,

and before the person of the Holy Spirit may be produced. But in
the other case there is this sort of order, that the Father first acts
by his fecundity, namely by his generative power, and
communicates the second fecundity, namely the spirative power,
to the term of the [first] fecundity, namely the Son. Hence, in that
instant in which the Father goes into the actualization of the
second fecundity, the Son also at the same time acts with him, not
according to the order the argument presumes exists, and
therefore the spirative principle is not understood to have an
adequate term beforehand only in the Father; therefore, etc.
To the arguments for the doubt
44 To that argument [n. 41] therefore, one must say that if the
Father spirates before the Son, that 'before' must only be accepted
in the sense that the Father spirates of himself, and thus there is
no priority of action or of the term except in the sense that the
action of the Father is from himself whereas the Son does not
have it from himself. And then the sense is this: the Father
spirates 'beforehand,' i.e., from himself; the Son, however, does
not [spirate] beforehand, i.e., he doe9 not [have this power] from
himself. Then there is no longer that priority of the term
receiving being, since, if that were so, the Holy Spirit would be of
himself. But the priority would only be on the part of the agent,
not of the term or of the action, and this is how order is in those
that have the same action.
45 To the second [n. 42], when it is said that [if] the principle
that is in some supposit is understood to have an adequate term,'
etc., one must declare that this proposition is not universally true
that such a principle having an adequate action could not serve as
a principle of acting to the other, although it is true that it could
not serve the other as a principle of acting by way of another
action. But as regards the same action it could well be, if it were
communicated to the other supposit, as happens in the case at
hand. Hence it should not be understood to be the principle aimed
at another action or at another term, and that priority is not on
the part of the action or term, but on the part of the agent, just as
termini sed agentis, sicut Pater intelligitur prius creare, et tamen

non tunc creatur creatura antequam Filius et Spiritus Sanctus
producatur, licet Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non creet a se, quia
Filius a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque. Et sic non sequitur
quod creatura sequatur actionem creationis ut est in Patre, sed
tantum ut est a tribus.
46 Ad primum principale24 quando dicit Augustinus quod Pater

habet25 esse principaliter principium Spiritus Sancti, dico quod
hoc habet Filius a Patre quod habet Pater a se principaliter. Et
patet ex dictis solutio.
47 Ad illud Ambrosii vel Ieronymi:26 'proprie' potest accipi ut in
possessionibus proprietarius, ita quod non dependet ab alio, sed
habet a se denominative et sic solus Pater habet 'proprie', id est a
se. Secundo modo habet 'proprie' usurarius, et isto secundo modo
intelligitur ut distinguitur contra 'improprie', et sic omnes habent
proprie. Sed Pater tantum proprie primo modo.
48 Ad Hilarium27 dico quod nihil aliud intelligit nisi quod in
Filio est subauctoritas, scilicet quando dicit "Pater spirat per
Filium". Aliter dicitur ad hoc quod per' quando construitur
cum casuali suo et cum verbo transitivo, ut 'iste secat per serram'
vel scindit per cultellum', tunc nulla principalitas intelligitur in
*4 Cf. supra n. 34
'a Pro habet esse lege: est.
Cf. supra n. 35.
" Cf. supra n. 37.
the Father is understood to create first, and nevertheless the

creature is not created before the Son and Holy Spirit have been
produced, even though the Son and the Holy Spirit would not
create of themselves, because the Son [has the ability to create]
from the Father and the Holy Spirit from both. And in this way
one could not conclude that the creature would follow from the
action of creation as it is in the Father, but only as it is from all
three.
46 To the first initial argument [n. 34], when Augustine says

that the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit principally, I
say that the Son has this principle from the Father, which the
Father has chiefly from himself. The solution is evident from
what has been said.
47 To the other of Ambrose or Jerome [n. 35], 'properly' can be
understood as meaning a proprietor in regard to possessions, as
when he does not depend upon another but has this definitively of
himself, and in this way only the Father has this 'properly,' that
is of himself. In a second way a usurer has something 'properly,'
and in this second way it is understood in contrast to having it
'improperly,' and in this way all [three persons] have this
properly. But only the Father has this properly in the first sense.
48 To Hilary [n. 37] I say that this says nothing other than that
in the Son [he does so] subordinately, namely as if he were to say
'The Father spirates through the Son.' In another way one may
answer to this that when 'through' is construed with [a noun in]
its [proper grammatical] case and a transitive verb, as in 'he saws
through [the mediation of] a saw' or 'he cuts through [the
mediation of] a knife,'3 then no primacy is understood as regards
this case-expression. But when it is construed with an
I.e., 'the Father spirates [the Holy Spirit] through the Son' where the
Father and Son (or the hand and knife) act like one in respect to the direct object
of the verb.
illo casuali. Sed quando construitur cum intransitivo, tunc

notatur principalitas in illo casuali et formalitas in verbo.
49 Per idem patet ad illud Richardi,28 quia si Pater daret istam
fecunditatem spirandi Filio ita quod non remaneret in Patre, tunc
Pater non spiraret immediate. Sed sic Pater non communicat
formale principium spirandi Filio quod non maneat in eo, sed in
Filio; immo uterque agit et producit, nec est difformitas in agendo
vel in actione, sed ex parte agentis tantum, quia Pater a se et
Filius ab alio; tamen uterque immediate in producendo.
50 Ad rationem29 quando dicitur "omnis causa prima
immediatius et perfectius agit quam quaecumque causa secunda",
dicendum quod propositio illa debet intelligi quando utraque
causa agit per formam propriam. Tunc enim prima causa et
superior perfectius agit et immediatius. Sed hic est totum
oppositum, quia principiis simul principalibus aeque immediate
et perfecte producitur effectus ab uno sicut ab alio, ut creatio
immediate a tribus personis. Hic autem utraque persona, scilicet
Pater et Filius, uno tantum principio formali producunt et non
sub formis vel principiis formalibus distinctis, ergo quaelibet
immediate.
28 Cf. supra n. 36.

Cf. supra n. 38.
intransitive verb,4 then it denotes primacy as regards this case-

expression and formality* in the verb.
49 Also by the same token the answer is evident to what
Richard says, [n. 36] because if the Father were to give this
fecundity to the Son in such a way that it would not remain in the
Father, then the Father would not spirate immediately. But the
Father does not communicate the formal principle of spiration to
the Son in such a way that it does not remain in him, but is in the
Son. Rather, both act and produce, nor is there any diversity in
acting or in the action, but only on the part of the agent, because
the Father has it from himself and the Son from another.
However, both are immediate in producing.
50 To the reason [n. 38], when it is said that 'every first cause
[produces] more immediately and more perfectly than a
secondary cause,' it must be said that this proposition must be
understood under the condition that each cause acts through its
proper form. For then the first and superior cause acts more
perfectly and more immediately. But here we have the total
opposite, because when principles are at the same time equally
first, the effect is produced immediately and perfectly by one as
by the other, as creation is immediately from three persons. But
here both persons, namely Father and Son, produce only by one
formal principle and not under distinct forms or formal principles;
therefore each [produces] immediately.
* I.e., 'the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son' as something that has
primacy.
[Distinctio 13
Quaestio unica
Utrum processio Spiritus Sancti sit generatio]
1 Circa distinctionem decimam tertiam quaero unum: utrum

processio Spiritus Sancti sit generatio, vel utrum Spiritus
Sanctus possit dici genitus.
Videtur quod sic:
Omnia sunt unum in divinis, secundum Boethium1 et Ansel-
mum,2 ubi non obviat relationis oppositio; sed inter generationem
passivam et spirationem passivam nulla est oppositio; ergo etc.
2 Item, in creaturis distinguitur generatio ab aliis mutati-
onibus, quia est ad substantiam, scilicet ad personam; sed
processio est ad substantiam, id est ad personam Spiritus Sancti;
ergo non est distincta a generatione.
3 Item, generatio non est distincta productio a processione
Spiritus Sancti, ergo sunt idem. Probatio antecedentis: quia
relationis non est relatio, sicut nec mutationis est mutatio, V
Physicorum;3 sed distinctio sive alietas importat relationem; ergo
generationis a processione non est distinctio.
4 Dices quod distinctio vel alietas non est alia relatio a
generatione, quia generatio seipsa4 distinguitur a processione.
Respondeo quod alietas est relatio eiusdem rationis in extremis
sicut identitas, similitudo et dissimilitudo, quia sunt relationes
communes. Sed si generatio seipsa et spiratio seipsa essent
distinctae, non essent eiusdem rationis.
5 Contra:
Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, cap. 17:5 "Spiritus Sanctus
procedit, non quomodo natus sed quomodo datus"; et haec est eius
propriissima et distinctissima processio secundum Augustinum.
1 Boethius, Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii c. 6 (PL 64, 1255).
2 Anselmus, De processione Spiritus Sancti c. 1 (ed. F.S. Schmitt II, 181-2;
PL 158. 288-9).
:l Aristot., Physica V, c. 1 (2246 7-10).
1 Lege, ipsa; pronomine reflexivo 'se ipsum' hic et alias usus est pro intenswo
'ipse', contraque usum classicum, tamquam in nominativo stare posset!
5 Rectius: August., De Trin. V, c. 14, n. 15 (CCSL 50, 222; PL 42, 921)
437
Distinction 13
Sole Question
Is the procession* of the Holy Spirit a generation*?
1 In regard to distinction thirteen I ask one question, whether

the procession of the Holy Spirit is a generation (or whether the
Holy Spirit can be said to be generated.)

All things* are one in the divine, according to Boethius and
Anselm, where the opposition of a relation does not prevent it; but
there is no opposition between passive generation and passive
spiration;* therefore etc.
2 Also, in creatures generation is distinguished from other
changes, because it has to do with substance, namely with a
person;* but the procession [of the Holy Spirit] has to do with
substance, i.e., with the person of the Holy Spirit; therefore it is
not distinct from generation.
3 Also, generation is not a production* distinct [in kind] from
the procession of the Holy Spirit; therefore they are the same
thing. Proof of the antecedent: because [the distinction brought
about by] a relation is not from [another] relation, just as that of
change does not come from [another] change, according to Bk. V
of the Physics, but it is a distinction or otherness that brings
about a relation; therefore there is no distinction between
generation and procession.
4 Your may say that a distinction or otherness is not a
relation different from generation, because generation is
distinguished from procession by itself. I respond that
otherness is a relationship of the same sort as regards the
extremes, e.g., identity, similarity and dissimilarity, because they
are common relations.* But if generation and spiration were
distinct by themselves, they would not be of the same sort.
5 To the contrary:
Augustine Bk. XV, on The Trinity, chapter 17: "The Holy
Spirit proceeds not as born, but as given"; and this is his most
proper and distinct procession, according to Augustine.
437

A. Opinio prima
6 Hic dicitur6 quod generatio et processio distinguuntur ex

terminis productis, quia motus, secundum Philosophum, V
Physicorum,1 distinguitur ex termino; et quia hi termini sunt
distincti, scilicet personae productae, ideo et productiones sunt
distinctae, quia sunt viae ad personas, et quoad hoc rationem
motus habent.
[2. Contra opinionem aliorum]
7 Contra: Productiones istae formaliter distinguunt personas,

ut probatum est distinctione 11, quia unumquodque per id per
quod constituitur in esse, per illud ab omni alio distinguitur; et
ideo Pater, ut ibi deductum est, distinguitur ab omni alio per
generationem activam et Filius per generationem passivam; ergo
si productiones e converso distinguantur per personas, erit
circulus in distinctionibus et per consequens in esse, quia hoc erit
per illud et e converso.
8 Praeterea, illud de V Physicorum,8 quod est probatio eorum,
duco ad oppositum. Quia cum dicit quod motus distinguitur ex
terminis, loquitur ibi de terminis formalibus, non de terminis
primis. Nam primus terminus ipsius motus est aliquod per
accidens, ut lignum album vel aliquid huiusmodi, ut patet ibidem
et quod est per accidens non est in genere. Vult ergo quod motus
sit in genere termini formalis, et ideo distinguitur per ipsum
terminum formalem ut sit motus alterationis si sit ad albedinem
vel nigredinem et huiusmodi. Sed hoc non est nisi quia vel forma
fluens est eiusdem rationis cum forma terminante motum sicut
Thomas de Sutton. QuodI. IV, q. 2 ad 1 (ed. M. Schmaus. BGPTM 29.2.

69*): "Cum arguitur primo quod emnnationes non distinguuntur ex parte termini
qui est natura communicata. concedendum est. Sed distinguuntur per terminos,
qui sunt supposita emanantia".
7 Aristot., Physica V, c. 5 (229a 25-7).
H Cf. supra n. 6.

The first opinion
6 Here it is said that generation and procession are

distinguished through their products,* because motion according
to the Philosopher in Bk. V of the Physics, is distinguished
through the term; and because these terms are distinct, namely
the persons produced, therefore the productions are distinct,
because they are ways to the persons, and in regard to this they
have the character of motion.
7 To the contrary: These productions formally* distinguish

the persons, as has been proved in distinction eleven, because
something is distinguished from every other through that,
through which it is constituted in being; therefore the Father, as
has been deduced there, is distinguished from every other by
active generation and the Son by passive generation; therefore, if
conversely the productions were distinguished through the
persons, there would be a [vicious] circle in [making] distinctions
and as a consequence in being, because here this will be through
that, and the converse.
8 Furthermore, that statement from Bk. V of the Physics,
which thesei give as proof, I direct to the opposite. For when he
says that motion is distinguished from the terms, he is speaking
there of the formal* terms, and not about the first terms. For the
first term of motion is something accidental, as white wood or
some such thing, as is evident in the same place, and what is
accidental is not in a genus. Therefore, he2 implies that motion is
in the genus of the formal term, and therefore it is distinguished
through that formal term itself, [e.g.,] so as to be the motion of
alteration, if it were [motion] towards whiteness or blackness, and
the like. But this happens only because either the transitional
form is of the same sort as the form ending the motion, as [in the
i Henry and those who follow him.

2 Aristotle.
imperfectum et perfectum, vel quia motus est forma fluens

secundum veriorem opinionem, ut vult Commentator, III
Physicorum9. Si altera autem istarum duarum causarum vel
condicionum deficiat, non erit motus eiusdem rationis nec
eiusdem generis cum termino ad quem, nec distinguitur
secundum illum terminum. Patet de motu circulari et recto
respectu eiusdem ubi, qui non sunt eiusdem rationis cum
termino, quia non sunt eiusdem rationis secundum se, cum sint
motus incompossibiles ex VII Physicorum;i0 et impossible est
aliqua, quae non sunt eiusdem rationis secundum se, esse
eiusdem rationis cum tertio secundum quod sunt alterius
rationis. Et ideo motus rectus non distinguitur a motu circulari
per terminum motus, quia idem est terminus et ubi utriusque;
sunt autem alterius rationis secundum quod sunt super aliam et
aliam magnitudinem. Ergo cum in proposito illud quod
proportionatur motui, ut productio, sit relatio non eiusdem
rationis cum termino producto formali, qui est essentia divina,
sequitur quod istae productiones non distinguuntur ex terminis.
[B. Opinio secunda

9 Alia opinioii est quae ponit istas productiones distingui,

quia una persona est a duabus personis ut Spiritus Sanctus, et
alia, scilicet Filius, est tantum ab una.
[2. Contra secundam opinionem]
10 Sed contra: istud non sufficit, quia si idem sit formale

productivum, licet ponatur in diversis suppositis, non tamen
9 Averroes, Physica III, com. 4 (ed. Iuntina IV, 87r).

i0 Aristot, Physica VII, c. 4 (248a 10-6 8).
ii Thomas de Sutton, Quodl. IV, q 2 ad 1 (ed. M. Schmaus. BGPTM 29 2. 67-
70*); Thomas Aquinas, Sent I, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2 in corp (ed. Parmen. VI, 105b-
106a); STh. I, q. 36, a. 2 ad 7 (IV, 378b); S. contra gent. IV, c. 24 (XV, 92ab).
case with] the imperfect and the perfect, or because motion is the
transitional form, according to a truer opinion, as the
Commentator wishes to say in Bk. IIl of the Physics. If the other
of these two causes or conditions is wanting, motion will not be of
the same sort, or of the same genus with the term with which it
ends, nor distinguished according to that term. This is evident
about circular and rectilinear motion with respect to the same
destination, which are not of the same sort as the term [of
motion], because they are not of the same sort by themselves,
since they are incompatible motions, from Bk. VII of the Physics3;
and it is impossible that some things, which are not of the same
sort in themselves, be of the same sort with respect to a third, for
the reason that they are of another sort. And therefore rectilinear
motion is not distinguished from circular motion through the
term of the motion, because the term and the destination of both
are the same. However, they are of another sort insofar as they
cover different distances4 [and have different trajectories].
Therefore, since in the case at hand that which is the equivalent
of motion, i.e., production, is a relation that is not of the same sort
as the formal term produced, which is the divine essence, it
follows that these productions are not distinguished through their
terms.
Second opinion
9 Another opinion is that these productions are distinguished

because one person is from two persons, as the Holy Spirit, and
the other, namely the Son, is only from one.
Against the second opinion
10 To the contrary: this is not sufficient, because if what is

formally productive were the same, then, even though it may be
3 That is, if the circular and rectilinear motion happen with the same
velocity and take the same time to arrive at a certain point they are somehow
equal, but, according to Aristotle, they are still incommensurable.
4 A free interpretation of magnitudo.
propter hoc variatur productio nec est alterius rationis. Patet de

calore de ligno et lapide, quia uterque califactione calefacit. Ergo
non ex hoc tantum distinguitur generatio a processione, quia haec
ab uno et illa a duobus.
[3. Contra utramque opinionem]
11 Item, contra utramque opinionem arguo sic: prima distin-

ctiva vel distinguentia sunt primo diversa, aliter non primo
distinguerent, et sic esset procedere in infinitum. Sed neutra
opinio assignavit prima distinguentia; non prima, quia terminus
formalis est communis Filio et Spiritui Sancto; similiter nec
secunda opinio, quia personae a quibus sunt istae productiones
non sunt primo distinctae, ergo etc.
[C. Opinio tertia Godefridi

12 Tertia opinio12 dicit quod distinguuntur, quia una productio

stat cum alia et sua opposita; alia vero non stat cum suo
opposite13 sed est ei incompossibilis. Generatio enim activa et
spiratio activa sunt in eodem simul ut in Patre, et spiratio activa
stat simul cum opposita generationis activae, scilicet cum
generatione passiva in Filio. Sed generatio activa nullo modo stat
cum spiratione passiva, et sic quaecumque non sunt possibilia
eidem, non sunt eadem inter se.
[2. Contra opinionem tertiam]
13 Sed contra: nihil repugnat alicui nisi quia ipsum est ipsum.
Impossibile enim est incompossibilitatem esse primam
repugnantiam nisi quia affirmationes repugnant, IV Metaphy-
sicae et PerihermeniasM Nam negativa non est vera nisi quia
i* Godefridus de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 4 in corp. (PhB III, 291).

13 Pro suo opposito lege, opposite alterius productions.
14 Aristot., Metaph. IV (T), c. 4 (1008a 16-8); De interpr. c. 14 (246 3).
posited in diverse supposits,* production, however, would not

vary nor be of another sort. This is evident about heat in wood
and in stone, because each heats by heating. Therefore, it is not
only from this that generation differs from procession, i.e.,
because this is from one and the other from two.
Against both opinions
11 Also, against both opinions I argue in this way: the first

distinctive or distinguishing features are primarily diverse,
otherwise they would not distinguish primarily, and thus one
would proceed to infinity. But neither opinion has assigned first
distinguishing features; not the first, because the formal term is
common to the Son and the Holy Spirit; likewise the second has
not, because the persons from which these productions proceed
have not been first distinquished; therefore, etc.
A third opinion: Godfrey of Fontaines

12 A third opinion says that they are distinguished, because

one production [i.e., spiration] coexists with the other and its
opposite; the other, however, does not coexist with the opposite [of
the other production], but is incompatible with it. For active
generation and active spiration are in the same one
simultaneously, i.e., in the Father, and active spiration coexists
with the opposite of active generation, namely passive generation
in the Son. But active generation in no way coexists with passive
spiration, and thus things to which certain features do not
[equally] apply are not the same as one another.
Against the third opinion
13 But to the contrary: something is opposed to another only

through [first] being itself. For incompatibility cannot form the
first opposition unless affirming both together is [already]
repugnant, according to Bk. IV of the Metaphysics and the
Perihermeneias. For the negative is not true except when the
affirmativa est primo vera. Oportet ergo dare aliquam causam

priorem quam repugnantiam vel 'non stare simuT. Prius ergo est
aliqua entitas in generatione et spiratione antequam repug-
nantia.
[D. Opinio quarta

14 Quarta opinio15 ponit quod distinguantur quia una est ab

alia: non originaliter, sed quia una est praevia alteri et
praesupponit aliam, et propter naturalem ordinem illarum
distinguuntur. Esse enim ab alio est dupliciter: vel proprie, sicut
Filius a Patre et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque, et hoc est esse ab
alio formaliter; isto modo una productio non est ab alia. Alio modo
esse ab alio praesuppositive, non sicut suppositum a supposito
sed tanquam a quodam praevio sine quo distinctio non esset. Et
sic hic, quia spiratio non esset nisi generatio praefuisset.
[2. Contra opinionem quartam]
15 Sed contra: ordo nunquam potest esse prima ratio

distinguendi, quia ordo est in ordinatis et est distinctorum, et non
eiusdem a se, et praesupponit distinctionem originis huius ab illo.
Et sic ordo non erit nec potest esse primum distinguens.
16 Item, prioritas vel ordo convenit generationi respectu
spirationis ex alia causa priori, scilicet per aliquam rationem vel
per principium formale. Ergo, illa ratio vel formale principium
erit ratio prima distinguendi et non ordo.
"i Henricus Gand., Summa a. 54, q 5 in corp (II, 89N-90S)

affirmative is true first. Therefore it is necessary to give some

cause that is prior to this repugnance or to 'inability to coexist
simultaneously.' Therefore generation and spiration are first
certain entities, before [some] opposition appears.
A fourth opinion
14 A fourth opinion posits that they are distinguished because

one is from another: not by way of origin,* but rather because one
is prior to, and presupposes another, and they are distinguished
on account of the natural order among them. For to be from
another is twofold: either properly, as the Son is from the Father
and the Holy Spirit is from both, and this is being from another
formally; in this way one production is not from another. The
other way of being from another is where some thing is
presupposed: not as a supposit [is] from a supposit, but [to be]
from something prior, without which the distinction would not
exist. And so it is here, because spiration would not exist unless
generation pre-existed.
Against the fourth opinion
15 But to the contrary: an order never can be the primary

reason why things are distinguished, because an order exists only
among ordered things and those that are distinct, and not within
the same thing itself, and presupposes a distinction of origin of
this from that. And thus the order will not be nor can it be the
first distinguishing thing.
16 Also, priority or order pertains to generation in respect to
spiration because of another prior cause, namely on account of
some reason or formal principle.* Therefore, it is this reason or
formal principle, and not order, that will be the primary motive
for distinguishing.
[3. Contra omnes opiniones simul]
17 Sed contra omnes istas opiniones simul arguo sic: ista

distinctio generationis a processione Spiritus Sancti est praecisa.
Ergo causa distinctionis est praecisa ita quod non contingit
assignare plures productiones. Sed nulla praedictarum opinionum
assignat causam praecisam quare sunt tot istae productiones et
non plures. Immo per illas opiniones dicetur quod quarta persona
est a tribus et quinta a quattuor, et sic in infinitum. Prima ergo
opinio non assignat causam praecisam, quia termini magis
distinguuntur per origines et per principia quam e converso.
Nec secunda, quia tunc quarta persona esset a tribus et quinta a
quattuor, et sic in infinitum. Nec tertia, quia spiratio activa in
tertia persona potest stare cum spiratione passiva per respectum
ad quartam personam. Nec quarta, ut dictum est supra. Ergo
nulla.
[E. Opinio quinta: Henrici Gandavensis

18 Hic dicit unus doctori6 quod proprietates personarum

producentium sunt principia elicitiva et formalia emanationum.
Et cum emanationes, secundum eum, distinguantur per principia
formalia, sequitur quod distinguantur per proprietates persona-
rum producentium, scilicet proprietatibus relativis. Sed hoc est
improbatum distinctione 7.
19 Item, ista positio assignat distinctionem magis manifestam
per distinctionem minus manifestam. Nam magis notum est
spirationem passivam et generationem passivam distingui quam
spirationem activam et generationem activam, quia hae
compatiuntur se in eodem supposito, et illa non; ergo etc.
20 Item, tunc emanatio quaelibet esset per modum naturae,
quia relatio quaelibet aeque respicit suum correlativum; ergo si
distinguitur per proprietates in personis a quibus emanant, et ita
Henricus Gand., Summa a 54, q. 6 in corp (II. 92FG)

Against all these opinions simultaneously
17 But against all these opinions I argue at the same time in

this way: this distinction of generation from procession of the
Holy Spirit is precise. Therefore the cause of the distinction is
precise, so that more productions could not be assigned. But none
of the aforesaid opinions assigns a precise cause why there are
just this many productions and not several more. Rather, from
these opinions one may conclude that a fourth person is from
three and a fifth from four, and so without ending. The first
opinion therefore does not assign a precise cause, because terms
are distinguished through origin and through principles to a
greater degree than vice versa. Nor the second, because then a
fourth person would be from three, and a fifth from four, and so
on without ending. Nor the third, because active spiration in
the third person can coexist with passive spiration as regards a
fourth person. Nor the fourth, as has been said above.
Therefore none do.
A fifth opinion of Henry of Ghent

18 Here one doctor says that it is the properties of the persons

producing that are formal eliciting principles of emanations. And
since emanations, according to him, are distinguished according
to formal principles it follows that they are distinguished through
the properties of the persons producing, namely the relative*
properties. But this has been refuted in distinction seven.
19 Also, this position assigns a more manifest distinction from
a less manifest one. For it is better known that passive spiration
and passive generation are distinguished than that active
spiration and active generation are, because these are compatible
with one another in the same supposit, and those are not;
therefore, etc.
20 Also, then each emanation would be through a mode of
nature,* because correlatives in every relation are equally
[positioned]; therefore if they are distinguished through the
properties in the persons from which they emanateand in this
productio sit mere naturalis, cuius principium se habet mere

naturaliter, utraque emanatio erit per modum naturae.
21 Respondet alibi quod utraque emanatio est naturalis: una
tamen dicitur per modum naturae, alia per modum voluntatis,
quia similitudinem habent istae emanationes cum illis, eo quod
una praesupponit aliam, sicut voluntas intellectum. Actio autem
dicitur naturalis quae de ratione sua non praesupponit aliam; sed
productio intellectus non praesupponit actionem voluntatis, sed e
converso.
22 Sed contra istud: non videtur ad intentionem sanctorum qui

dicunt Verbum produci per actum memoriae et intellectus, et
Spiritum Sanctum per actum voluntatis, et ideo haec est praecisa
causa distinctionis et non illa.
23 Item, si propter talem similitudinem diceretur Filius
produci per actum intellectus et Spiritus Sanctus per modum vel
actum voluntatis, non esset ratio quare Filius ex vi productionis
suae diceretur Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus donum, quia nihil
dicitur Verbum ex vi productionis suae nisi producatur per actum
memoriae; nec aliquid dicitur donum ex vi suae productionis nisi
liberaliter producatur et communicetur per actum voluntatis;
aliter esset contra Augustinum qui dicit quod Spiritus Sanctus
non quomodo natus etc.
24 Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem quod generatio non est

processio nec e converso. Ad cuius veritatem sciendam primo
videnda est distinctio generationis et spirationis; secundo utrum
distinctio eorum habeat reduci ad aliam causam priorem.
way the production, whose principle itself functions naturally, is

merely natural*both emanations will be through a mode of
nature.
21 He replies elsewhere that both emanations are natural: one,
however, is the result of nature, the other the result of the will.*
Indeed, these emanations have a similarity to the above [two],
because one of the [emanations] presupposes the other, as the will
presupposes the intellect. But the action is said to be natural
when its notion does not presuppose the other; but the production
of the intellect does not presuppose the action of the will, but vice
versa.
22 But against this: it does not seem the intention of the

Fathers of the Church, who say that the Word* is produced
through an act of the memory* and intellect, and the Holy Spirit
through an act of the will, and therefore this is the precise cause
of the distinction, and not the other.
23 Also, if it is, because of such similarity, that the Son would
be said to be produced by an act of the intellect and the Holy
Spirit after the manner or by the act of the will, there would be no
reason why the Son by virtue of his production would be called
the Word, and the Holy Spirit the gift, because nothing is called
the Word by the virtue of its production, unless it is produced
through an act of the memory; nor is something called a gift by
virtue of its production unless it is freely produced and
communicated through an act of the will; otherwise it would be
against Augustine, who says that the Holy Spirit is not by way of
being born, etc.
Reply of Scotus
24 I respond, then, to the question [by saying] that generation

is not procession, and vice versa. For knowing the truth of this,
one needs to investigate first the distinction of generation and
spiration; secondly whether their distinction needs to be reduced
to some prior cause.
[A. Art. 1: De distinctione inter generationem et

spirationem]
25 Quantum ad primum dico quod seipsis17 formaliter

distinguuntur. Quod probatur duplici auctoritate Augustini, XV
De Trinitate, cap. 27 et ultimo:18 "Attolle oculos tuos" etc.
Voluntatem de notitia procedere nullus dubitat; non tamen ille
amor est imago notitiae, quia non est hoc cogitatione intueri quod
desiderare vel appetere voluntate.
26 Item, patet hoc ratione, quia hoc non est hoc quia hoc est
hoc, secundum Augustinum, V De Trinitate, cap. 17. 19 Nec mirum
quia formae distinguentes supposita in creaturis primo
distinguuntur seipsis et non per aliqua alia. Ergo cum personae
distinguantur per istas emanationes, ut probatum est distinctione
4, 11, oportet istas emanationes formaliter distingui.
27 Sed contra istam rationem instatur, quia istae emanationes

non sunt a seipsis, ergo non distinguuntur seipsis. Responsio:
differentiae specificae in creaturis non sunt a se, et tamen a se
primo distinguuntur formaliter, quia non per aliquid quod
includunt distinctivum, sed setotis;20 tamen ab alio habent esse
effective et distinctionem. Unde si per impossible starent
differentiae per se sine efficientibus, formaliter distinguerentur.
Species autem non sunt a se primo distinctae, sed differentiae.
17 Cf. supra n. 4
18 August., De Trin. XV, c. 27, n 50 (CCSL 50A. 532; PL 42, 1097).
Ibid., V, c. 14, n. 15 (CCSL 50, 222; PL 42, 920-1).
m Pro ipsis totis; cf. supra seipsis et notam ad n. 4 supra.
Article One
The distinction between generation and spiration
25 As for the first I say that they are formally distinguished of

themselves. The two authoritative statements of Augustine prove
this: from Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 27 and the last: "Raise
your eyes," etc.5 No one doubts the will proceeds from knowledge.
However, that love is not an image of knowledge, because to
consider by thinking is not the same as to desire or seek by the
will.
26 Also, this is evident through a rational argument, since this
is not this,6 because this is this,7 according to Augustine, in Bk. V,
chapter 17. Nor is it surprising, because forms distinguishing
supposits in creatures are primarily distinguished of themselves
and not through something else. Therefore since the persons are
distinguished through these emanations, as has been proven in
distinctions four and eleven, it is necessary that these emanations
be formally distinguished.
27 But against this reason it is objected that because these
emanations are not of themselves, therefore they are not
distinguished of themselves. Response: specific differences in
creatures are not of themselves, and nevertheless they are
primarily distinguished formally of themselves, because it is not
on account of something distinctive that they include, but totally
of themselves; however, they have being and distinction
effectively from another. Hence, ifto assume the impossible
differences were to remain per se without their efficient
[productive principles], they would [still] be formally
distinguished. Species, however, are not primarily distinct of
themselves, but differences are.
5 "Raise your eyes to that light itself and fix them upon it, if you can. For in
this way you will see in which way the birth of the Word of God differs from the
procession of the Gift of God."
,i The meaning of this, just as of the following, needs to be interpreted in the
light of the text of Augustine cited in this paragraph (q.v), i.e., procession is not
generation, because the Holy Spirit 'comes forth not as one born, but as one
given.'
7 Procession is just 'this,' i.e., unique, because it is 'as one given.'
[B. Art. 2: Utrum sit causa prior huius distinctionis

28 Ex hoc descendo ad secundum: utrum distinctio emana-

tionum reducatur ad aliquid prius. Ubi dicunt aliqui2i quod sic, ut
ad distinctionem principiorum tanquam ad aliquid prius
reducatur distinctio emanationum. Et ulterius distinctio princi
piorum oportet reduci ad aliquid omnino idem re et ratione, quod
est essentia divina. Quod probatur tum ex illimitatione ipsius
essentiae, tum ex primitate eiusdem essentiae respectu omnium
perfectionum quae sunt in Deo. Sicut enim duo limitata agentia
sunt principia distincta distinctarum actionum, ita multo magis
unum illimitatum principium infinitum est principium vel
potest esse duarum actionum.22 Patet per simile, quia essentia
habet aliquam primitatem respectu perfectionum attributalium,
et tamen istae perfectiones sunt distinctae; ergo a simili in
proposito. Dicunt igitur quod distinctio emanationum reducitur
ad producentes et ad principia distincta ratione; sed non
reducitur ad aliqua formalia distincta, sed ad unum omnino idem,
scilicet essentiam divinam. Et sic sola essentia potest esse prin
cipium formale istius distinctionis.
[2. Contra positionem Henrici]
29 Sed contra hanc positionem, quae videtur mihi magis

probabilis quam aliqua praedictarum, habeo rationes. Primo sic:
quidquid unius rationis indifferens est ad plura ex se, non
determinatur ad quaecumque talia vel certum numerum talium.
Patet hoc tam de specie respectu individuorum quam etiam de
causa respectu suorum effectuum. Sed essentia divina, ut est vel
potest esse in pluribus suppositis divinis est unius rationis et per
te, ut est principium productivum, non determinatur ad
producendum hoc vel illud. Sed in se idem re et ratione est
*1 Secundum notam marginalem, Henricus Gand., fortasse Summa a. 60. q

2 (II, 163B): "Dicendum ad hoc quod generatio et spiratio sunt processiones
distinctae inter se realiter non re absoluta, sed re relationis. et hoc non nisi penes
rationem originis, quia hoc est ab hoc et unum eorum ab alio suam trahit
originem ut sit quodammodo hoc ab hoc".
Ibid., a. 68, q. 5 ad 2 (II. 234NO).
Article Two
Is there a prior cause for this distinction?
28 From this one proceeds to the second [article]whether this

distinction of emanations is reduced to something priorwhere
some say that it is, so as to trace back the distinction of
emanations to a distinction of principles as to something prior.
And further the distinction of principles is traced back to
something that is completely the same in reality and conception,
which is the divine essence. This is proved both from the infinity
of the essence itself and from the primacy of the same essence
with respect to all perfections which are in God. For just as two
limited agents are distinct principles of distinct actions, so one
unlimited principle to a greater degree is, and can be an infinite
principle of two actions. It is evident from an analogy, because the
essence has some priority with respect to attributed perfections,
and nevertheless these perfections are distinct; therefore likewise
in what is proposed. Therefore, they say that the distinction of
emanations is traced back to the producers and to the principles
that are conceptually distinct; however, it is not reduced to some
formal distinct things, but to one that is completely the same,
namely the divine essence. And in this way only the essence can
be the formal reason for these distinctions.
29 But against this position, which seems to me more probable

than some of the previous ones, I have some arguments. First in
this way: any thing whatsoever of one sort that is indifferent in
relation to several that proceed from it, is not determined to any
such or certain number of such. This is evident both in the case
of species as regards individuals, and also [in the case] of causes
with respect to effects. But the divine essence, insofar as it is or
can be in several divine supposits, is of one sort, and according to
you is a productive principle, not determined to produce this or
that. But it is what is really and conceptually the same thing in
itself that is the principle of the emanations. Therefore it is not
principium emanationum. Ergo non determinatur ex se in quot

suppositis. Sic ergo, si nihil ponatur eius determinativum poterit
esse in infinitis. Principium enim productivum non accipit a
suppositis principiationem sed dat eis, et si poterit esse, est; sed
hoc est impossibile; ergo illud ex quo sequitur.
30 Item, actus voluntatis, ut positus in esse, non est liber, sed
tantum ut praeintelligitur in sua causa et voluntate quae
naturaliter praecedit actum suum. Ergo productio Spiritus
Sancti, ut iam posita est in esse, non est iam libera, sed in
principio spirativo ut praeintelligitur spiratione. Sed in essentia,
ut est omnino idem re et ratione respectu emanationum, non
intelligitur libertas. Ergo si essentia eadem re et ratione esset
immediatum principium emanationum diversarum, sequeretur
quod productio Spiritus Sancti non est libera.
31 Antecedens probo dupliciter: primo sic, quia actus voluntatis
iam positus in esse est accidens, ita naturaliter perficiens
voluntatem, sicut albedo parietem. Ergo in se non est magis liber
quam albedo, sed tota libertas praeintelligitur in suo principio
vitali quod est voluntas. Actus autem non est de se vitalis, sed
qualitas naturalis.
32 Secundo idem probatur sic: quod est de se liberum,
cuiuscumque ponitur principium, illius est principium liberum:
sed cuiuscumque habitus velle vel actus voluntatis sunt prin
cipium, sunt principium illius mere per modum naturae. Ita enim
naturaliter generatur habitus appetitivus ex actibus appetitus
sicut ex actibus intellectus generatur habitus intellectivus. Unde
a principio, secundum Philosophum, III Ethicorum,23 "fuit in
potestate nostra habituari"; tamen electione posita in esse iam
necessario derelinquitur ex multis electionibus habitus virtutis
moralis.
33 Item, arguitur quod tunc essent quinque personae, quia
memoria perfecta in divinis et voluntas perfecta sunt principia
communicandi naturam, non essentia, sicut probatum fuit
distinctione 6 et 10. Si igitur essentia sit principium duarum
personarum et ut prior est actui intellectus et voluntatis,
communicat se, erunt primo duae personae productae. Et cum
certum sit quod memoria et voluntas sunt principium
2:1 Aristot., Eth. Nic. Ill, c. 5 (11136 11-4).

determined of itself to be in so many supposits. Hence in this way,

if nothing may be posited as its determinative, it could be in
infinite persons. But the productive principle does not derive its
productivity from the supposits, but gives them its productivity,
and if it could be [in infinite persons], it is; but this is impossible;
therefore, also that from which it follows.
30 Also, an act of the will as posited in being, is not free, but
only as it is preconceived in its cause and will which naturally
precedes its action. Therefore the production of the Holy Spirit, as
already posited in being, is not then free, but [it is] in the
spirating* principle, as it is preconceived in spiration. But in the
essence, as it is entirely the same thing in reality and
conceptually as regards emanations, liberty is not perceived.
Therefore, if the essence, insofar as it is the same thing in reality
and conceptually, were the immediate principle of diverse
emanations, it would follow that the production of the Holy Spirit
would not be free.
31 I prove the antecedent in two ways: the first is this, because
an act of the will already posited in being is an accident, thus
naturally perfecting the will, as whiteness perfects the wall.
Therefore, in itself it is no freer than whiteness, but all the liberty
is preconceived in its vital principle, which is the will. But the act
is not of itself vital, but a natural quality.
32 Secondly, the same is proved in this way: regarding
something that is of itself free, if one posits a principle of it, it is
always a free principle; but if willing or act of the will are
principles of some habit,* they are principles of that merely after
the manner of nature. For an appetitive habit is generated from
appetitive acts just as naturally as an intellective habit is
generated from acts of the intellect. Hence [if it were only] on the
basis of a principle, according to the Philosopher in Bk. IIl of the
Ethics, "it would be in our power to retain a habit"; nevertheless,
once a choice has been posited in being, a habit of moral virtue is
already necessarily left behind due to many choices.
33 Also, it is argued that then there would be five persons,
because it is perfect memory and perfect will in the divine, not
the essence, that are principles communicating nature, as has
been proved in distinction 6 and 10. If the essence, therefore, is
productivum duarum personarum ut sunt in Patre, ergo erunt

tres aliae personae, et sic necessario sunt quinque personae in
divinis, quod est falsum.
[3. Responsio Scoti ad secundum articulum]
34 Ideo dico quod distinctio istarum emanationum reducitur ad

aliqua priora distincta quorum distinctio sit ratio distinctionis
emanationum activa sive effectiva, et non formalis. Et ideo non
reducuntur istae emanationes ad aliquod principium unum
primum re et ratione, quia impossibile est emanationes
diversarum et oppositarum rationum reduci ad unum omnino
idem principium re et ratione indistinctum. Reducuntur ergo ad
tantam paucitatem ad quantam possunt reduci; possunt autem
reduci ad dualitatem principiorum ut ad memoriam perfectam et
ad voluntatem perfectam, ita quod essentia ut in intellectu et
voluntate est principium remotum istarum emanationum, et
principia proxima sunt intellectus et voluntas. Non ergo essentia
secundum se est principium istarum emanationum. Et ratio
huius est quia actio prima quae convenit naturae intellectuali,
competit sibi ut intellectualis est. Et24 ideo forte haec est causa
quare angelus non potest producere formas reales, ut alias
dicetur. Non enim imaginor quod Pater habeat aliquam actionem
naturalem per essentiam suam priorem ante memoriam, sed
prima actio naturae intellectualis est actio quae competit sibi ut
intellectualis est, scilicet intelligere, gignere vel dicere per
memoriam; et prima actio vitalis est intellectio, et sic prima
operatio in Patre est intelligere et prima actio dicere; secunda
operatio velle et secunda actio spirare etc.
35 Sic igitur dico quod distinctio istarum emanationum non
reducitur ad aliquid unum prius, quod sit omnino idem re et
Et dicetur: hic textus in codd. RMB litteris 'ab' signatus est.

the principle of two persons and communicates itself as prior to

the act of the intellect and will, there will be first two persons
produced. And since it is certain that the memory and will, as
they are in the Father, are productive principles of two persons,
therefore there will be three other persons, and in this way there
are necessarily five persons in the divine, which is false.
Scotus's reply to the second article
34 Therefore I say that this distinction of emanations is traced

back to some prior distinct things, whose distinction is the active
or effective, and not formal reason for the distinction of
emanations. And therefore these emanations are not traced back
to some first principle that is one in reality and conceptually,
because it is impossible that emanations corresponding to diverse
and opposed notions be reduced to one principle that is
completely the same indistinct thing in reality and conceptually.
Therefore they are reduced to as few as possible; but they can be
reduced to a duality of principles, as to perfect memory and
perfect will, so that the essence, as it is in the intellect and will,
would be a remote principle of these emanations, and the intellect
and will their proximate principles. Therefore it is not the essence
by itself that is the principle of these emanations. And the reason
for this is because the first action, which agrees with an
intellectual nature, is suited to it insofar as it is intellectual. And
perhaps this is the reason why angels cannot produce real forms,
as will be discussed elsewhere.8 For I do not imagine that the
Father would have some natural action through his essence that
is prior to the memory, but the first action of the intellectual
nature is the act which is suited to itself insofar as it is
intellectual: namely to understand, beget or speak* through the
memory; and the first vital action is intellection, and thus the
first operation in the Father is to understand and the first action
is to speak; the second operation is to will and the second action*
to spirate, etc.
35 Thus I say that the distinction of these emanations is not
reduced to some one prior thing which is completely the same
H In the MSS this sentence is marked off by letters a and b.

ratione, scilicet ad essentiam. Nec pluralitas primorum princi-

piorum potest reduci nisi ad duo et non ad plura nec ad pauciora.
Et ideo distinctio praecisa istorum principiorum est causa et ratio
distinctionis aliorum in divinis et praecisa causa praecisionis in
aliis.
36 Ad primum25 quando dicitur quod omnia sunt unum in

divinis etc., dico quod verum est 'omnia sunt unum ubi non obviat
relativa oppositio', vel stricte sumendo oppositionem vel pro
oppositione opposita vel disparata quae includit impossibilitatem;
et tales relationes oppositae, id est disparatae, incompossibiles
sunt, sicut sunt illae quae fundantur super produci passive,
scilicet generatio et spiratio passiva.
37 Ad secundum26 quando dicitur quod generatio est distincta
mutatio ab aliis, quia est ad substantiam etc., dico quod in
creaturis generatio est sub ratione mutationis et ideo non sortitur
speciem a principio formali productivo sed a termino. E contra
autem est hic: quia generatio in divinis non est mutatio nec habet
rationem mutationis, sed tantum distinctio est ut est habitudo
inter producens et productum respectu essentiae ut est natura vel
voluntas.
38 Ad tertium27 dicendum quod licet relatio originis non
fundetur super aliam relationem, quia oportet quod illud super
quod fundatur relatio originis sit aliqua perfectio simpliciter, sive
sit principium productivum sive essentia aliqua, aliquae tamen
aliae relationes possunt super relationem, ut proportionalitas
quae est formaliter relatio fundatur super proportionem
aliquorum ad invicem, sicut probatur in toto libro V Euclidis.28
Nec tamen propter hoc erit processus in infinitum, quia ultimo
stabitur ad aliquam relationem quae immediate fundatur super
aliquid absolutum. Relationes autem originis non fundantur in
relatione sed in absoluto. Sed de aliquibus relationibus, ut dictum
1!i Cf. supra n. 1.

*' Cf. supra n. 2.
11 Cf supra n. 3.
2H Cf. Euclides, Elementa V (ed. H.L.L. Busard. 145-64).
thing in reality and conceptually, namely to the essence. The

plurality of the first principles can only be reduced to two, and
not to more nor to less. And therefore it is the precise distinction
of these principles that is the cause and the reason for the
distinction of others in the divine and the precise cause of the
precision in the others.
36 To the first (n. 1], when it is said that all are one in the
divine, etc., I say that it is true that 'all are one where there is no
opposed relationship,' either taking the opposition strictly or as
opposition opposed or disparate, which includes impossibility; and
such opposite, that is disparate, relationships are incompatible,
just as those which are founded upon being passively produced,
namely passive generation and spiration.
37 To the second [n. 2], when it is said that generation is a
change distinct from others, because it has to do with substance,
etc., I say that in creatures generation falls under the notion of
mutation and therefore it does not receive its species from the
formal productive principle but from its term. Here however this
is not the case, because generation in the divine is not a mutation
nor does it have the character of a mutation, but the only
distinction is that of a relationship between the producer and the
produced with respect to the essence as it is nature or will.
38 To the third [n. 3] it must be said that although a
relationship* of origin* is not founded upon another relation,
because it is necessary that that upon which a relationship of
origin is founded is some unqualified perfection, either a
productive principle or some essence, however some other
relations could be founded upon a relation: e.g., proportionality,
which is formally a relation, is founded upon the proportion of
some things to one another, as is proved in the entire fifth book of
Euclid. Nor because of this will there be a process without end.
Because ultimately it will stop with some relation which is
immediately founded upon an absolute. Relations of origin,
however, are not founded upon a relation but upon an absolute.
But about some relations, as it has been said, it is conceded: e.g.,
est, conceditur; ut proportionalitas quae est similitudel duarum

proportionum fundatur in proportione quae est totius et partis
(ibidem 20 propositione) et ista est fundamentum respectu
proportionalitatis.
39 Aliter dicitur quod alietas non est relatio, sed negatio relati-
onis. Formaliter enim nihil aliud est quam negatio identitatis.
Unde non sunt contraria, sed privative opposita, X Metaphy-
sicae.29 Sunt enim sicut idem et non idem, sicut idem et diversum.
Sed haec responsio non evadit argumentum. Et ideo dicendum est
sicut prius etc., scilicet quod relatio originis non potest fundari ut
in proximo fundamento in relatione, sed ex parte principu
productivi, et tunc producti est aliqua entitas positiva quae est
fundamentum relationum originis, scilicet essentia.
Aristot., Metaph. X (I), c. 3 (10546 14-27).

proportionality, which is a similarity of two proportions, is

founded upon a proportion which is that of the whole and part (in
the same [book of Euclid], proposition 20). And this is the
foundation with respect to proportionality.
39 Otherwise it is said that otherness is not a relation, but the
negation of a relation. For formally it is nothing other than a
negation of identity. Hence these are not contraries, but privative
opposites, according to Bk. X of the Metaphysics. For they are like
the same and not the same. But this reply does not evade the
argument. And therefore one must adopt the first, namely that a
relation of origin cannot be based upon a relation as a proximate
foundation, but upon the productive principle, and then the
product has some positive entity, namely the essence, that is the
foundation of the relations of origin.
[Distinctiones 14-15
Quaestio 1
Utrum omnes personae divinae mittant Filium et
Spiritum Sanctum]
1 Circa distinctionem 14, ubi Magister agit de missione Filii et

Spiritus Sancti, et etiam 1 cap. 15 distinctionis, quaeritur circa
utramque distinctionem utrum omnes personae divinae mittant
Filium et Spiritum Sanctum.
Videtur quod non:

Quia si sic, tunc Filius mittit se et Spiritus Sanctus mittit
se. Consequens est falsum, quia secundum Bedam in homelia I
dominicae post Ascensionem, et ponitur in littera:1 Spiritus
Sancti missio est eius processio, et similiter missio Filii est eius
generatio; sed neutra persona procedit a se, quia nec Filius
generat, nec Spiritus Sanctus spirat se; ergo etc.
2 Item, si Filius et Spiritus Sanctus mittant se, ergo Filius
refertur ad se, et Spiritus Sanctus similiter relatione mittentis et
missi. Sed hoc est falsum, quia istae relationes sunt per modum
productionis et producti, actionis et acti, quae sunt incompossi-
biles in eodem respectu eiusdem.
3 Item, tertio sic: omnis actus quo persona aliqua reflectitur
super se est mere essentialis, et ideo Filius non dicitur se dicere,
sed se intelligere. Ergo si Filius et Spiritus Sanctus actu mittendi
reflecterent se super se, mitti esset essentiale et tunc conveniret
Patri, quod falsum est, quia Pater non mittit se, eo quod non
procedit a se; ergo etc.
4 Contra:
Augustinus, IV De Trinitate, cap. 17, 2 et Magister in littera.3
1 Cf. infra n. 4
* August.. De Trin. IV, c. 21, n. 32 (CCSL 50. 205; PL 42, 910-11).
:l Petrus Iximbardus, Sent. I, d. 14, c. 2, n. 6 (SB IV, 129); ibid., d. 15. c 9-10
(SB IV, 137).
150
Distinctions 14-15
Question One
Do all the divine persons* send the Son
and the Holy Spirit?
1 In regard to distinction fourteen, where the Master* treats

of the mission of the Son and Holy Spirit, and also in regard to
chapter one of distinction fifteen one question asked about both
distinctions is whether all the divine persons send the Son and
Holy Spirit.
It seems they do not:
For in this way, then, the Son would send himself and the
Holy Spirit would send himself. The consequent is false according
to Bede in his homily on the first Sunday after the Ascension, and
it is cited in the text.* The mission of the Holy Spirit is his
procession,* and similarly the mission of the Son is his
generation;* but neither person proceeds from itself, because the
Son does not generate himself, nor the Holy Spirit spirate*
himself; therefore, etc.
2 Also, if the Son and the Holy Spirit sent themselves,
therefore the Son is related to himself, and the Holy Spirit
likewise as sending and sent. But this is false, because these
relationships are through the mode of production* and product,*
of action and act, which are incompatible in the same subject with
respect to itself
3 Also thirdly in this way: every act by which some person1 is
reflecting upon himself is only essential,2 and therefore the Son is
not said to speak* himself, but to understand. Therefore, if the
Son and the Holy Spirit reflected upon themselves by an act of
being sent, they would be sent by what is essential, and then
being sent would pertain to the Father, which is false, because
the Father does not send himself, inasmuch as he does not
proceed from himself; therefore, etc.
4 To the contrary:
Augustine in Bk. IV of The Trinity, chapter 17, and the
Master in the text.
1 This refers to a divine person.

2 That is, an act of the divine essence.
450
[Quaestio 2
Utrum quaelibet persona mittatur]
5 Iuxta hoc quaeritur utrum quaelibet persona mittatur.
Videtur quod sic:

Quia quod est essentiale est commune omnibus; sed mitti
est huiusmodi. Probatio huius: quia dicit respectum ad creaturam
et dicitur de Deo ex tempore; ergo etc.
6 Item, loan. 14[23] Christus dicit de se et de Patre: Ad eum
veniemus, et mansionem apud eum faciemus.
7 Contra:
Augustinus, ubi supra, IV De Trinitate, cap. 174 et cap.
paenultimo.
[I. Ad quaestiones
A. Opinio Magistri]
8 Hic est opinio Magistri,5 et ponitur in littera, quod mittere

sit essentiale et conveniat omnibus personis. Et per hoc solvitur
prima quaestio. Mitti autem, secundum eum, non est essentiale
nec convenit omnibus personis, sed tantum procedentibus. Et sic
solvit secundam quaestionem negative. Probatio primae
solutionis: quia Magister probat, 1 cap. 15 distinctionis, quod
opera Trinitatis sunt indivisa, secundum quod allegat Augustinus
II De Triuitate, cap. 8. 6 Sed mitti passive connotat processionem
aeternam et hoc convenit tantum duabus personis procedentibus.
[B. Contra opinionem Magistri]
9 Sed contra hoc arguitur sic: si mitti includat processionem

aeternam, hoc erit per respectum ad mittentem vel respectu eius
cui fit missio. Patet quod non secundo modo nec primo modo, quia
tunc omnis missus esset productus a mittente, et sic tunc Spiritus
4 Cf. supra n. 4.
r> Petrus I>ombardus, Sent. I, d. 15, c. 2 (SB IV, 132).
August., De Trin. II, c. 5, n. 8 (CCSL 50. 89; PL 42. 819).
Dist. 14-15, Questions One-Two 451
Question Two
Is any person whatsoever sent?
5 According to this, it is asked whether any [divine] person

whatsoever is sent.
It seems so:
Because what is essential is common to all; but to be sent is
such. Proof of this, because it implies a relation to creatures and
is said of God temporarily; therefore, etc.
6 Also, John 14:23: Christ says of himself and the Father: "We
will come to him and make our dwelling with him."
7 To the contrary:
See Augustine above, Bk. IV of The Trinity, chapter 17, and
the penultimate chapter.
To the questions
The opinion of the Master
8 Here is the opinion of the Master, and it is stated in the

text, that to send is essential and pertains to all the persons. And
this solves the first question. To be sent, however, according to
him, is not essential nor does it pertain to all persons, but only to
those who proceed. And this solves the second question
negatively. Proof of the first solution: because the Master proves
in the first chapter of distinction fifteen that the works of the
Trinity are undivided, according to what Augustine alleges in Bk.
II of The Trinity, chapter 8. But to be sent passively connotes
eternal procession and this pertains only to the two persons
proceeding.
Against the opinion of the Master
9 But against this it is argued in this way: if 'to be sent'

includes eternal procession, this will be with respect to the one
sending or with respect to the one to whom the mission happens.
It is evident that it is not in the second way, nor in the first way,
because then everyone sent would be produced by the one
sending, and in this way, then, the Holy Spirit would be from
Sanctus esset a se et Filius a se, quia quaelibet mitteret se. Sic

igitur relatio missionis non includit processionem aeternam, ut
videtur.
10 Item, mittere et mitti idem significant sed sub oppositis
modis grammaticalibus; ergo si mittere includit processionem,
sive si mittere est procedere, et mitti erit produci: sed Spiritus
Sanctus non producit; ergo non mittit.
11 Item, acceptis duabus correlationibus et quattuor extremis:
sicut se habet primum ad secundum, sic tertium ad quartum;
ergo si mittere includit procedere, et mitti produci.
12 Per hoc apparet opinio antiqua quod nec mittere nec mitti
est mere essentiale, sed includit notionale, quia connotat
producere et produci, et sic nulla persona mittit se. Sic ergo
dicerent quod mitti de virtute sua connotat effectum in creatura.
tamen subauthentice; et mittere connotat effectum cum
auctoritate vel fecunditate mittendi, id est authentice. Sicut patet
per simile: Pater dicitur creare per Filium, id est authentice
operari et hoc est dare actionem illi, et Filius dicitur creare
subauthentice per Patrem et sic nec mittere nec mitti; isto modo
est essentiale.
13 Ad rationem Magistri7 dicendum quod licet opera Trinitatis
sint indivisa, non tamen eodem modo operantur quantum ad
auctoritatem et subauctoritatem; 'ergo aliquid facit Pater quod
non facit Filius' non sequitur, sed est figura dictionis, sed bene
sequitur quod Pater aliquo modo facit vel creat ut per Filium. per
quem modum non creat Spiritus Sanctus.
14 Ad illud Augustini8 est dicendum quod loquitur de Christo
homine vel quantum ad eius benedictam incarnationem; sic enim
Pater non potest mittere Filium sine Spiritu Sancto. Similiter
7 Cf. supra n 8.
H Cf. supra n. 8.
himself and the Son from himself, because each would be sending
himself. In this way, then, the relation of mission does not include
eternal procession, as it seems.
10 Also, 'to send' and 'to be sent' signify the same thing but
under grammatically opposed modes; therefore, if to send
includes procession, or if 'to send' is 'to proceed,' also 'to be sent'
will be 'to be produced'; but the Holy Spirit does not produce,
therefore does not send.
11 Also, given two correlations and four terms, the first will be
related to the second, just as the third is to the fourth; therefore,
if 'to send' included 'to proceed,' then 'to be sent' will include 'to be
produced.'
12 Thus the old opinion reappears that neither 'to send' nor 'to
be sent' is merely essential; quite the contrary, it includes the
notional,* because it connotes producing and being produced, and
in this way no person sends himself. In this way, therefore, it
would be said that 'to be sent,' by virtue of its wording, connotes
the effect in the creature, but subordinately; and to send connotes
the effect with authority or the fecundity of sending, that is,
authoritatively. In a similar way it is evident from an analogy:
The Father is said to create through the Son, that is, to be
creative authoritatively, that is, to bestow action on him; and the
Son is said to create subordinately through the Father, and in
this way neither 'to send' nor to be sent'; for this way is essential.
13 As for the reason of the Master [n. 8], it must be said that
although the works of the Trinity may be undivided, they do not,
however, operate in the same way regarding authority and
subordination; [however,] 'therefore the Father does something
that the Son does not do' does not follow, but is a figure of speech;
but what does indeed follow is that 'the Father does or creates in
some way through the Son,' in which way the Holy Spirit does not
create.
14 To that of Augustine [n. 8] it must be said that he speaks
about Christ as man or about his blessed incarnation; for in this
way the Father cannot send the Son without the Holy Spirit.
Similarly Ambrose, treating that text of Isaiah:3 "The Spirit of the
:l Isaiah 61:1.
Ambrosius9, tractans illud Isaiae [61:1]: Spiritus domini super

me, dicit: Bene dicit super Christum, quia loquitur de missione
Verbi Dei in carnem.
[II. Responsio Scoti ad utramque quaestionem]
15 Sed propter reverentiam Magistri et Augustini potest teneri

alia opinio vel positio dicendo quod mitti includit processionem,
secundum Augustinum, IV De Trinitate, [cap.] 14 vel 18;i0 sed
mittere non includit productionem. Mitti enim est cognosci quod a
tali persona sit sive idem est quod procedere, et sic est notionale
quia tantum duorum, scilicet Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Sed mittere
est manifestare et hoc est essentiale, quia commune tribus
personis.
16 Unde Augustinus ponit exemplum, IV De Trinitate, cap.
19: ii Haec tria concurrunt ad formandum verbum in nobis:
memoria, intelligentia, et voluntas, ita quod quaelibet pars
manifestat imaginem, et memoria est unum signum et intelli
gentia aliud et voluntas aliud, et quaelibet pars est manifesta per
signum suum speciale; sed manifestatio non fit de qualibet parte,
sed de Verbo. Sic autem est in divinis.
17 Aliud exemplum est tale: scire ignem calefacere non
significat aliquid calefieri, sive non correspondet sibi sciri calefi-
eri, sed scirii2 calefacere, ita quod scire et sciri correspondent sibi,
non autem effectus in quos transeunt, quia uniformiter se habent
in activo ut calefacere utrobique vel calefieri in utroque. Sed in
modo sciendi se habent diversimode, quia scire active in uno et
sciri in altero passive. Sic igitur in proposito est quod procedere et
produci se habent uniformiter in utroque, sed manifestare et
manifestari diversimode.
18 Sic ergo patet ad primam quaestionem secundum opinionem
Magistri quod mittere est essentiale et convenit omnibus
personis.
!l Ambrosius, De Spiritu Sancto III, c. 1 (CSEL 79, 152-3; PL 16, 778).

"1 August., De Trin. IV, c. 20, n. 29 (CCSL 50, 199; PL 42, 907-8).
ii August., DeTrin. IV, c. 21, n. 30 (CCSL 50, 202-3; PL 42, 909-10).
i1 Omnes codd. praeter B hoc loco 'non' inserunt, sed ad sensum clare non
requirttur
Lord is upon me," says: "He speaks well about Christ, because he
speaks of the mission of the Word* of God in the flesh."
The reply of Scotus to both questions
15 But because of reverence owed to the Master and Augustine,

one can hold the other opinion or position by saying that 'to be
sent' includes procession, according to Augustine in Bk. IV of The
Trinity, chapter 14 or 18; but 'to send' does not include
production. For 'to be sent' is 'to be known that he is from such a
person' or is the same as to proceed, and in this way it is notional,
because it is only [true] of two persons, namely of the Son and of
the Holy Spirit. But 'to send' is 'to manifest' and this is essential,
because it is common to three persons.
16 Hence, Augustine gives this example, in Bk. IV of The
Trinity, chapter 19: These three concur to form the word in us,
memory,* intelligence and the will,* so that each part shows the
image, and memory is one sign and intelligence another and the
will another, and each part is manifest through its special sign;
but the manifestation [in general] does not occur regarding each
particular part, but regarding the Word. But it is this way in the
divine.
1 7 Another example is of this sort: to know that fire heats does
not signify that something is heated, i.e., it is not 'to be known to
be heated' that corresponds to it, but 'to be known to heat,' so that
to know and be known do correspond to it, but not the effects into
which they pass over. For they are uniformly in the active
[principle], as to heat on both parts or be heated in both. In the
manner of knowing, however, it is otherwise, because to know
actively [is] in one and to be known passively [is] in another. It is
this way in the case at hand, therefore, that to proceed and to be
produced is uniformly in both, but to manifest and be manifested
[is] otherwise.
18 In this way, it is evident as regards the first question,
according to the opinion of the Master, that 'to send' is essential
and pertains to all three persons.
19 Quantum ad secundam quaestionem, secundum eum, mitti

non est essentiale, sed tantum convenit procedentibus, et sic
Pater non mittitur.
[III. Ad argumenta primae opinionis]
20 Ad primumi3 quando dicitur quod si mitti includit

processionem aeternam, hoc erit vel per respectum ad mittere vel
respectu illius cui fit missio, dico quod divisio est insufficiens,
quia licet missio de primo significato suo non dicat nisi relationem
ad illa duo praedicta, tamen ratione connotati non determinatur
ad quodlibet illorum, sed indistincte significat vel connotat
relationem procedentis, sed non determinat quod sit huius nec
illius producti vel missi, et sic mittere et producere vel procedere
erit indifferens et commune, et tamen produci vel mitti erit
notionale.
21 Ad secundumi4 quando dicitur quod mittere et mitti idem
significant, dicendum quod illud quod est de significato vocabuli
non variatur, nec isti modi significandi variant per se
significatum, tamen illud secundario inclusum et connotatum
variatur, sicut patet de exemplo ignis supra.
22 Ad tertiumi5 quando dicitur de 'quattuor extremis et duabus
correlationibus', dicendum quod verum est si primum et tertium,
secundum et quartum idem significant et non includant
connotatum. Tunc enim ratione connotati non se habent
uniformiter, ut dictum est.
[IV. Ad argumenta principalia primae quaestionis]
23 Ad primum principalei6 quando dicitur quod Filius mitteret

se etc., dicendum quod non sequitur, quia procedere temporaliter
est procedere secundum quid, procedere autem aeternaliter est
procedere simpliciter. Et ideo sequitur quod procedat a se, non
simpliciter sed temporaliter. Et sic potest dici uno modo quod
i:i Cf. supra n. 9.

i4 Cf. supra n. 10,
i5 Cf. supra n. 11.
I6 Cf. supra n. 1.
19 As for the second question, according to him, to be sent is

not essential, but only pertains to those who proceed, and in this
way the Father is not sent.
To the arguments for the first opinion
20 To the first, [n. 9] when it is said that if to be sent includes

an eternal procession, this will be either as regards sending or as
regards the one who is sent, I say that the division is insufficient.
For, although mission as regards what it first signifies only
asserts a relationship to the two aforementioned things,
nevertheless the notion of what is connoted does not limit it to
any one of these, but it indistinctly signifies or connotes the
relation of the one proceeding. However, it does not determine
that it is of this or of that [person] produced or sent, and in this
way 'to send and produce' or 'to proceed' will be indifferent and
common, and nevertheless to be produced or sent will be notional.
21 To the second [n. 10] when it is said that to send or be sent
signifies the same thing, it must be said that what the word
signifies does not vary, nor do these modes* of signifying vary per
se what is signified, nevertheless what is secondarily included
and connoted does vary, as is evident from the example of fire
given above.
22 To the third, [n. 11] when the 'four terms and two
correlations' are mentioned, it must be said that it is true if the
first and the third, and the second and the fourth signify the
same thing and do not include what is connoted. For then by
reason of what is connoted they do not remain uniform, a9 has
been said.
Reply to the initial arguments of the first question
23 To the first initial argument [n. 1] when it is said that the

Son would send himself, etc., it must be stated that this does not
follow, because to proceed temporally is only to proceed in a
qualified sense, but to proceed eternally is to proceed in an
unqualified sense. And therefore it does follow that he proceeds
from himself, not in an unqualified sense, but in time. And thus it
Films mittit se et Spiritus Sanctus mittit se, sed non sequitur

'Filius mittit se, ergo procedit a se' nisi loquatur de processione
temporali de qua dicit Beda in homilia illa.
24 Aliter potest dici quod missio Filii non est eius processio nisi
secundum quid, nec missio Spiritus Sancti, et tunc dicendum
quod divisio processionis in temporalem et aeternam quam ponit
Magister in distinctione 14, non est univoci in univocata nec
aequivoci in aequivocata, sed divisio in aliquid quod est
simpliciter tale et in aliquid secundum quid tale.
25 Ad secundumi7 quando dicitur quod si Filius et Spiritus
Sanctus mitterent se, ergo referretur Filius ad se et Spiritus
Sanctus ad se, dicendum quod mittere et mitti quantum ad suum
principale significatum dicunt tantum relationem rationis. Et
huiusmodi relationes, licet sint oppositae, possunt tamen eidem
convenire, ut patet de intelligere et intelligi. Et sic mittere et
mitti possunt esse in eadem persona.
26 Ad tertiumi8 quando dicitur quod si mittere est actus
reflexus, esset essentiale, dicendum quod quantum ad principale
significatum huius quod est mitti, scilicet manifestari, potest esse
reflexio ut sic, et hoc est secundum eius per se significatum, non
autem quantum ad eius connotatum. Non est ergo reflexio
quantum ad actum tunc enim concluderet sed est reflexio
circa id quod per se significat et hoc est manifestari etc.
[V. Ad argumenta principalia secundae quaestionis]
27 Ad argumenta secundae quaestionis:

Ad primumi9 quando dicitur quod mitti est essentiale, quia
dicit respectum ad creaturam, dicendum quod non est mere
essentiale. Ad probationem dico quod non valet, quia incarnatio
dicitur de solo Filio, et tamen dicit respectum ad creaturam.
i7 Cf. supra n. 2.
iH Cf. supra n. 3.
i9 Cf. supra n. 5.
can be said that in one sense the Son sends himself and the Holy
Spirit sends himself, but it does not follow the Son sends himself,
therefore he proceeds from himself unless it is spoken of his
temporal procession, of which Bede speaks in that homily.
24 Otherwise it could be said that the mission of the Son is only
his procession in a qualified way and the same is true of the
mission of the Holy Spirit, and then it must be said that the
division of 'procession' into temporal and eternal that the Master
assumes in distinction fourteen is not a univocal division into its
univocal parts or an equivocal division into equivocal parts, but a
division of something into what is simply this sort of thing* and
what is of this sort in a qualified sense.
25 To the second [n. 2] when it is said that, if the Son and the
Holy Spirit were to send themselves, then the Son would be
referred to himself and the Holy Spirit to himself, it must be said
that to send and to be sent, as regards to what they signify
principally, assert only a conceptual relation. And such relations,
although they are opposed, can nevertheless pertain to the same
thing, as is evident about understanding and being understood.
And in this way to send and to be sent can be in the same person.
26 To the third [n. 3] when it is said that if 'to send' is a
reflexive act, it would be essential, it must be said that insofar as
what this principally signifies is concerned, which is 'to be sent,'
namely to be made manifest, there can be a reflection as such,
and this is as regards what it signifies per se, not however insofar
as what it connotes is concerned. Therefore it is not a reflection as
regards an actfor then [the argument] would be conclusivebut
it is a reflection as regards what it signifies per se and this is to
be made manifest, etc.
Reply to the initial arguments of the second question
27 To the arguments for the second question: to the first [n. 5]

when it is said that to be sent is essential, because it implies a
relationship to creatures, it must be said that it is not merely
essential. To the proof I say that it is not valid, because the
incarnation is said exclusively of the Son, and nevertheless it
implies a relationship to a creature.
28 Ad secundum20 quando dicitur, loan. 14, Veniemus etc.,

concedo quod Pater dat se temporaliter et dicitur inhabitare et se
manifestare, et hoc est venire. Sed mitti dicit plus quam dari vel
inhabitare, quia includit et connotat se cognosci se procedere21 ab
alio, et hoc non convenit Patri. Quare Pater non mittitur. Sed
utrum sancti mittant Spiritum Sanctum, de hoc dicetur in IV
libro.
20 Cf. supra n. 6.
n Se cognosci se procedere: lege cognosci se procedere iW se cognoscere se
procedere, etc.
28 To the second [n. 6) when it is said in John 14: "We will

come," etc., I concede that the Father gives himself temporally
and is said to inhabit and manifest himself, and this is 'to come.'
However, 'to be sent' implies more than to be given or inhabit,
because it includes and connotes knowing oneself to proceed from
another, and this does not pertain to the Father. Hence, the
Father is not sent. But whether the blessed [in heaven] send the
Holy Spirit, will be treated in book four.
[Distinctio 16
Quaestio unica
Utrum Spiritui Sancto conveniat missio visibilis]
1 Circa distinctionem 16 quaeritur utrum Spiritui Sancto

conveniat missio visibilis.
Videtur quod non:

Augustinus, IV De Trinitate, cap. 19, et ponitur in litterai:
"Fateamur Filium minorem factum, et in tantum minorem,
in quantum Filium, et in tantum factum, in quantum missum".
Ergo Filius ex hoc quod missus visibiliter, quia de illa missione,
ut ibi loquitur, est minor Patre. Ergo si Spiritus Sanctus sic
mitteretur a Patre et Filio, et minor Patre et Filio quod non est
concedendum.
2 Item, si Spiritus Sanctus mitteretur visibiliter, aut concurrit
cum eius missione revelatio interior vel non. Si non, frustra fieret
missio visibilis in aliquo signo exteriori, quia tunc ad nihil esset
utilis. Si autem concurrat revelatio interior, ergo frustra fieret
missio vel apparitio exterior visibilis, quia tale signum exterius
visibile vel sensibile distraheret a revelatione interiori, sicut a
prophetia, quia occupatio sensuum circa exteriora distrahit ab
interiori consideratione.
3 Contrarium vult Magister in littera et allegat Augustinum

ibidem.
4 Item, loan. 14, [15:26]: Cum venerit Spiritus veritatis qui a
Patre procedit, etc. Et iterum ibidem [16:7]: Si enim abiero,
mittam eum ad vos, ubi loquitur de missione temporali.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
5 Responsio. Cum personam mitti sit eam manifestari

procedere, ut patet alibi in quaestione praecedente, et missio
passiva, ut visibilis est, sit cum signo sensibili personam
1 August., De Trin. IV, c. 19, n. 26 (CCSL 50, 194; PL 42. 905): Petrus
Lombardus, Sent. I. d 16, c. 1, n. 4 (SB IV, 139).
457
Distinction 16
Sole Question
Does a visible mission pertain to the Holy Spirit?
1 In regard to distinction sixteen it is asked whether a visible

mission may pertain to the Holy Spirit.
It seems not.
Augustine in Bk. IV of The Trinity, chapter 19, and it is
cited in the text:* "We also confess that the Son was made lesser:
and he is lesser insofar as he is the Son, and he was made insofar
as he was sent." It is from the fact, then, that he was visibly sent
that he is the Son, because on account of that mission, as is said
there, he is less than the Father. Hence, if the Holy Spirit were
sent in this way from the Father and Son, he would be less than
the Father and Son, and this must not be conceded.
2 Also, if the Holy Spirit were to be sent visibly, either interior
revelation would concur with his mission or not. If not, the visible
mission in the form of some exterior sign would be made in vain,
because then it would be useful for nothing. If, however, interior
revelation concurred, then the visible exterior mission or
appearance would be in vain, because such an exterior visible or
sensible sign would distract from the interior revelation, just as
from prophecy, because the occupation of the senses in regard to
the exterior phenomena would distract from the interior
consideration.
3 In the text the Master* says the contrary and he cites
Augustine there.
4 Also, John 15:26: "When the Spirit of truth that proceeds
from the Father will have come," etc. And in the same work 16:7:
"If I go I will send him to you," where he speaks of his temporal
mission.
To the Question
5 Response. When a person* is sent, he proceeds to be

manifest, as is evident from the preceding question; and a passive
mission, insofar as it is visible, is accompanied by a sensible
signa person proceeds to be knownwhich sign, indeed, must
457
cognosci procedere quod quidem signum oportet esse

conveniens ad manifestandum suam processionem, ergo cum
Spiritus Sanctus possit manifestari procedere signo sensibili
conveniente suae processioni, sequitur quod Spiritus Sanctus
poterit visibiliter mitti. De missione vero visibili Filii dicetur in
III libro, quae fit per incarnationem.
6 Ad primam rationem2 dicendum quod non est simile, quia

Spiritus Sanctus non unit sibi naturam sensibilis signi quo illius
processio manifestatur, et ideo non oportet quod illa quae
conveniunt naturae talis signi conveniant Spiritui Sancto. Sed
Filius univit sibi naturam humanam in unitate suppositi vel
personae, et ideo illa quae dicuntur de illa natura, vere dicuntur
de divino supposito sustinente istam personaliter. Unde Filius
potest dici minor Patre ratione naturae assumptae. Non sic
autem Spiritus Sanctus, quia non habet esse in tali natura
speciali modo nisi sicut in signo.
7 Ad secundum3 concedo quod frustra esset illa apparitio
exterior nisi concurreret revelatio interior et illustratio, quia Ula
exterior apparitio non est nisi quoddam signum sensibile
repraesentans tale signatum ex institutione humana et ad
placitum et non a natura, quia aeque posset, quantum est de se,
aliud significare sicut illud, si placeret instituenti. Et ideo si ipso
fieret revelatio interior, non cognosceretur quid significaretur per
talem apparitionem. Non enim potest signum sensibile ex
institutione cognosci quid significet sub ratione repraesentantis
vel repraesentativi nisi cognoscatur repraesentatum per tale
repraesentativum.
8 Ad probationem eius4 dico quod licet intellectus distrahatur
ab intelligendo quando occupatur sensus circa sua sensibilia alia
a suo intelligibili quod tunc intelligit, quia sic potentiae mutuo se
impediunt nec invicem sibi iuvant in actibus, tamen quando
sensus occupatur circa singulare sensibile cuius universale per
2 Cf supra n. 1 .
:i Cf. supra n. 2.
i Cf supra n. 2.
be appropriate for making manifest his procession.* Therefore,

since the Holy Spirit could proceed to be manifest by an
appropriate sensible sign of his procession, it follows that the
Holy Spirit could have been sent visibly. As to the visible mission
of the Son, which comes about through the incarnation, it will be
treated in book three.
6 To the first argument [n. 1], it must be said that the case is
not similar, because the Holy Spirit has not united with himself
the nature of the sensible sign that manifests his procession, and,
therefore, it is not necessary that those things that pertain to the
nature of such a sign should pertain to the Holy Spirit. But the
Son has united a human nature with himself in the unity of a
supposit* or person; and, therefore, those things that are said of
that nature are truly said of the divine supposit sustaining it
personally. Hence, the Son can be said to be less than the Father
by reason of the assumed nature, but in this way the Holy Spirit
cannot, because he does not have being in such a nature in any
special way, except as in a sign.
7 To the second [n. 2], I concede that this exterior apparition
would be in vain unless an interior revelation and enlightenment
would concur, since that exterior apparition is only a certain
sensible sign representing a certain signified: by human
agreement and arbitrarily, and not by its nature.* For it could
equallyas far as it itself is concernedhave a meaning other
than this, if it pleased the one who made it up. And then, if he
had an interior revelation, it would not be known what such an
apparition signified. For one could not know what a sensible sign
[designated by human] institution signified from the point of view
of the thing that represents, unless it were known what was
represented under such a manifestation.
8 As for its proof, [n. 2] I say that although the intellect is
distracted in its thinking when the sense is occupied with some
sensible object other than what it is then thinking about (for in
this way the faculties are mutually impeded and fail to help one
another in their acts), nevertheless when the senses are occupied
speciem intelligitur, ut patet quando sensus sentit idem obiectum

quod phantasiatur et intellectus intelligit, non distrahitur tunc
intellectus, sed maxime confortatur, quia tunc potentiae circa
idem obiectum mutuo sibi administrant eius praesentiam, ut a
qualibet secundum eius proportionem apprehendatur. Hoc patet
quando volumus colere Christum et eius passionibus compati.
Facilius contemplamur eam si imaginem crucifixi frequentius
intuemur, et ex tali intuitione fortis species in phantasia
generetur, et hoc totum est modo propter ordinem naturalem
potentiarum in agendo. Prophetae non erant distracti per
sensibilia, nec eos multum iuvabant ad prophetiam, quia non
erant eis convenientia. Nam talia parum faciunt ad revelationem
quae est de his quae nec oculus vidit nec auris audivit etc., quae
non licet hominibus enarrari, secundum Apostolum. Tamen erat
aliquid sensibile eis praesens in imaginatione, quia ut
communiter omnes prophetae erant multum imaginarii, patet per
Augustinum, XII Super Genesim.5 Erant ergo multum distracti
quando occupabant se in exterioribus sensibilibus.
Cf. August.. De Genesi ad litt, libri 12. XII. c. 9. n. 20 (CSEL 28.1, 391. PL
M, 461).
with a sensible singular whose universal is grasped through an

intelligible* species (as is evident when the senses perceive the
same object that is imagined and understood by the intellect), the
intellect is not distracted then, but is greatly strengthened. For
then the faculties are mutually assisted by each other in
enhancing the presence of the same object, which each
apprehends according to its capacity. This is evident when we
want to worship Christ and sympathize with his passion. For we
more easily contemplate it, if we view more often the image of the
crucified, and from such contemplation a strong likeness may be
generated in the imagination, and all this because of the natural*
order of the potencies in acting. The prophets were not diverted
by sensible things,* nor were such much help for prophecy, since
they were unsuited for this. For such things do little for revealing
'what eye has not seen, nor ear heard,'i etc., whichaccording to
the Apostle'it is not lawful to relate to men.'2 Still, something
sensible was present to them in the imagination, for in general all
the prophets were very imaginative, as is evident from Augustine,
in Bk. XII Super Genesim. However, they were much distracted
when they engaged themselves [excessively] in exterior sensible
things.
i 1 Cor. 2:9.
* 2 Cor. 12:4.
[Distinctio 17
Pars I
Quaestio 1
Utrum in anima viatoris necesse sit ponere
caritatem creatam formaliter inhaerentem]
1 Circa distinctionem 17, primo quaeritur utrum in anima

viatoris necesse sit ponere caritatem creatam formaliter
inhaerentem ad hoc ut a Deo acceptetur.
Videtur quod non:

Augustinus, VIII De Trinitate, cap. 2:1 Consequens est ut qui
Deum diligit dilectionem diligat. Quaero ergo quomodo accipitur
'dilectio' in maiori quae est 'ut Deum diligat'. Si ibi effective, et in
minori formaliter accipiatur, quae est 'ut diligat dilectionem', tunc
erunt ibi quattuor termini, et ita nihil sequitur. Si in utraque
accipitur dilectio formaliter, tunc est fallacia consequentis, sicut
si dicerem 'Socrates est homo, Plato est homo, ergo Plato est
Socrates'.
2 Item, Augustinus, ibidem cap. 13:2 ista contextio declarat
fraternam dilectionem qua diligimus fratrem.
3 Item, XV De Trinitate, cap. 19 vel 18:3 caritas est donum
excellentissimum quod dividit inter filios regni et perditionis. Sed
hoc non potest esse nisi sit Deus, quia nullum donum excellentius
persona Spiritus Sancti quae est donum. Probatio per eundem:
XV De Trinitate, cap. 26 de magnis et 37 de parvis,4 loquitur de
Spiritu Sancto quatenus est Deus qui dat Deum donum.
1 August.. De Trin. VIII, c. 7, n. 10 (CCSL 50, 285; PL 42, 957).

* Ibid., c. 8, n. 12 (CCSL 50, 287; PL 42, 958).
:1 Ibid., XV. c. 18, n. 32 (CCSL 50A, 507; PL 42, 1082).
4 Ibid., c. 19, n. 37 (CCSL 50A, 513; PL 42, 1086).
460
Distinction 17
Part I
Question One
Is it necessary to posit created charity formally* inhering
in the soul of the pilgrim*?
1 In regard to distinction seventeen, the first question asked

is whether it is necessary to posit created charity formally
inhering in the soul of the pilgrim for this purpose that it be
accepted by God.
It seems not:
Augustine in Bk. VIII of The Trinity, chapter 2: the
consequent is that one who loves God, loves love itself. I ask,
therefore, how to take 'love' in the major premise, which is 'loves
God.' If it may be taken there 'efficiently' and 'formally' in the
minor, which is 'loves love,' then there are four terms, and thus
nothing follows. If it is taken 'formally' in both, then there is a
fallacy of the consequent, just as if I were to say: 'Socrates is a
man, Plato is a man, therefore Plato is Socrates.'
2 Also, Augustine in the same book, chapter 13: this context
speaks of fraternal love, by which one loves his brother.
3 Also, in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 19 or 18: charity is
the most excellent gift that divides the children of the kingdom
and children of perdition. But this can only be God, because no
gift can be more excellent than the person* of the Holy Spirit who
is the gift. The proof is from the same work, The Trinity, Bk. XV,
chapter 26 of the 'greater' chapter headings and 37 of the 'lesser'
chapter headings,i where he speaks of the Holy Spirit as God who
gives the gift of God.
1 The term "lesser" and "greater" chapters (parrn et magna capitula) refers
to the twofold division of Augustine's works that is preserved in contemporary
editions (cf. CCSL); at present, in citations the "greater" chapters are usually
designated as "chapters" (c.), and the "lesser" as section "numbers" (n ). However,
the numbering indicated by Scotus at times does not correspond to the one used
in CCSL (as it does in this case and below in n. 10), and at times what we would
consider "lesser" chapters (n.) are clearly referred to as "greater" (cf. Dist. 28, n.
65). Also cf. Dist. 27, n. 77.
460
4 Item, XV De Trinitate, cap. 17:5 'Deus est caritas' et non est

dicta per causalitatem sicut ista 'Deus est spes mea vel fides mea',
immo est praedicatio formalis sicut haec 'Deus est sapientia' etc.
5 Item, per rationem: omnis creatura si est bona potest
intelligi non-bona, quia est tantum per participationem et
participans potest intelligi sine participato. Sed caritas non potest
intelligi non-bona quia est bona per essentiam. Ergo non est
creatura.
6 Item, caritate diligitur Deus sicut diligendus est; sed Deus a
nobis est diligendus in infinitum, et non sine caritate quia natura
non se extendit ad Deum sic diligendum; ergo caritas non est
virtus creata. Patet minor, quia illud a nobis est diligendum in
infinitum cui nihil aequaliter est diligendum. Nam si esset
secundum gradum finitum diligendum, aliud secundum proporti-
onem aliquam ut mille gradus augmentatum in diligente,
posset ei aequaliter diligi, quia omni dilectioni finitae per
proportionem aliquam poterit alia finita dilectio adaequari et
quod tantum diligitur sicut ipsum. Sed Deus est diligibilis a nobis
super omnem proportionem qua diligimus creaturam quamcum-
que. Ergo est diligendus a nobis in infintum.
7 Item, tertio sic: natura perfectior perfectius tend it in suam
operationem. Sed natura rationalis est perfectior quacumque
irrationali natura et inanimata, quae cum influentia Dei generali
possunt in suas operationes; ergo et voluntas potest in suam
operationem sine aliquo tali habitu inhaerente, et hoc mediante
assistentia immediata Spiritus Sancti et tunc superfluit
habitus vel cum generali influentia, quia natura non minus
deficit sibi quam aliis inferioribus creaturis.
8 Contra:
Augustinus, De moribus Ecclesiae post medium,6 tractans
illud Apostoli Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per
Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis; caritas diffusa non est
Spiritus Sanctus.
r> Ibid., c. 17, n. 27 (CCSL 50A, 502; PL 42, 1080).

6 Cf. August., De moribus Eccl. cath. I. c. 11, n. 19 (PL 32, 1319). Non autem
textum allegatum ibi tractat, sed potius in De Trin. XV, cc. 17-18. nn. 31-32.
4 Also, in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 17: "God is love" and

it is not said of his causality as is this "God is my hope or my
faith." Indeed it is formal* predication,* as is this "God is
wisdom," etc.
5 Also an argument from reason: every creature, if it is good,
can be understood to be 'not-good,' because it is [such] only
through participation, and as a participant it can be thought of
without the participated. But love cannot be thought to be 'not-
good,' because it is good by reason of its essence. Therefore, it is
not a creature.
6 Also, by charity, God is loved as he should be loved; but we
should love God infinitely and not without charity, because
nature* does not extend to having to love God in this way;
therefore, charity is not a created virtue. The minor is evident,
because if something must be loved by us 'infinitely,' it means
that nothing [else] should be loved equally. For if it were to be
loved according to a finite degree, something else in the one who
loves, increased according to some proportion, e.g., by a thousand
degrees, could be loved equally, because some finite love could
[always] be proportionate to any other finite love, [and some finite
lovable object can be proportionate to any other such object,] and
could be loved as much as it. But God is lovable by us beyond any
proportion by which we love any creature whatsoever. Therefore,
he ought to be loved by us to an infinite degree.
7 Also, thirdly in this way: a more perfect nature is more
perfectly adapted to its operation. But a rational nature is more
perfect than any irrational or inanimate nature, which [both] are
capable of their operations with the general influence of God.
Therefore, the will* is also capable of its operation without some
such habit* inhering, and [it is capable of] this through the
immediate assistance of the Holy Spiritand then the habit is
superfluousor with the general influence [of God], because
nature is no less deficient in it [i.e., a rational creature] than in
other inferior creatures.
8 To the contrary, Augustine, De moribus Ecclesiae, after the
middle, interpreting the text from the Apostle: "The charity of
God is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, which is
given to us." But 'diffused love' is not the Holy Spirit.
9 Item, super illud Ad Romanos 5: Quis nos separabit a

caritate Christi etc., dicit quod caritas Christi est non qua nos
eum diligimus, sed illa est qua dilexit nos; ergo sunt alia et alia
caritas.
10 Item, dicit XV De Trinitate, cap. 277 de parvis.8
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio aliorum]
11 Hic communiter imponitur Magistro quod non est ponendus

aliquis talis habitus inhaerens animae, sed quod Spiritus Sanctus
immediate eliceret omnes tales actus caritatis circa Deum et
proximum, et quod ipse sit formaliter caritas.
12 Pro hac opinione sunt rationes ad partem negativam quod
non sit talis habitus in anima, sic: habitu convenit habentem uti
cum voluerit, ex Commentatore super III De anima;9 sed nullo
habitu infuso convenit uti cum voluerit: non caritate, quia non
convenit semper cum aequali conatu aequalem actum diligendi
elicere per caritatem circa Deum, sicut experiuntur qui sunt
devoti, quia non semper experiuntur devotionis dulcedinem
aequaliter etsi aequaliter conentur diligere ex caritate.
13 Item, delectabiliter et expedite operari signum est generati
habitus, II Ethicorum.i0 Sed caritas vel fides non tribuit
delectabiliter operari. Patet de noviter converso ad poenitentiam
per gratiam sive de converso ad gratiam per poenitentiam qui ita
difficilis est ad operandum meritorie acsi non haberet eam. Qui
autem habet habitum vitiosum, habet oppositum, qui non statim
aufertur per caritatem, qui fuit generatus ex actibus prioribus
vitiosis: omnis enim habitus tribuit delectabiliter operari. In tali
ergo de novo converso, licet remittatur peccatum, non tamen
corrumpitur habitus vitiosus, nec est ibi aliqua facilitas in eo
tunc, nisi ratione primi velle bonum; sed in aliis sentit magnam
difficultatem.
7 '27' in uno cod. tantum legitur, sed lectio recta videtur.

8 Cf August., De Trin. XV, c. 17, n. 27 (CCSL 50A. 501; PL 42, 1080).
D Averroes, De anima III, com. 18 (ed. F.S. Crawford, CCAA 6.1, 438).
i0 Aristot., Eth. Nic. II, c. 6 (1106o 15-7).
9 Also, on that text from Romans, chapter 5:2 "Who will

separate us from the love of Christ," etc., he says that the love of
Christ is not that by which we love him, but that by which he
loves us; therefore it is different from the other charity.
10 Also, he says in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 27 of the
lesser headings, [namely, "He insinuates to us the common love"].
To the Question
11 Here the opinion is commonly attributed to the Master,*

that some such habit inhering in the soul should not be posited,
but that the Holy Spirit immediately elicits all such acts of love
about God and neighbor, and that he is formally charity.
12 For this opinion there are reasons of a negative kind,
namely, that there is no such habit in the soul. The one who has a
habit can use it at will, according to the Commentator in Bk. IIl
of the De anima. However, one can use no infused habit at will,
including charity, because it does not always allow one to elicit an
act of charitable love of God that is adequate to the effort [put
into it], as the devout know from experience, because they do not
always experience the sweetness of devotion equally, although
they try equally hard to love out of charity.
13 Also, 'to be operating with ease and expeditiously' is a sign
that a habit has been generated, according to Bk. II of the Ethics.
But charity or faith does not contribute to acting with ease. It is
evident in one newly converted to penitence through grace or in
one converted to grace through penitence, who finds it as difficult
to act meritoriously as if one did not have it. For whoever has a
vicious habit, has an opposing [tendency] generated by prior
vicious acts that is not immediately taken away through charity
[i.e., such can easily turn bad again]; for every habit, [even a bad
one,] contributes to acting with ease. In such a one, newly
converted, therefore, although sin is remitted, the vicious habit is
not corrupted, nor is there a facility in such a one then, save that
caused by the first good act of willing; but in other [kinds of good
acts] great difficulty is felt.
2 Rom. 8:35-39.
14 Secundo probatur hoc affirmative scilicet quod Spiritus

Sanctus sit quo immediate elicitur actus meritorius, primo sic.
Spiritus Sanctus est causa prima; et causa prima cum causa
secunda, quae non est de essentia rei, aequaliter agit sine ea et
cum ea. Caritas autem non est materia nec forma quae sit pars
compositi essentialis ut pars hominis elicientis actum meritorium;
ergo etc.
15 Item, Filius Dei operatur operationes naturae assumptae et
tamen nihil propter hoc derogatur illi naturae assumptae. Ergo a
simili, si Spiritus Sanctus uniretur immediate voluntati et
operaretur illa opera, nihil propter hoc aufertur a voluntate, et sic
Spiritus Sanctus haberet actionem diligendi, et tamen voluntas
nihil minus diligeret.
[B. Contra opinionem supra dictam]
16 Contra hanc opinionem arguo dupliciter, supponendo duo

quae sunt ab omnibus concessa tanquam articuli fidei. Primum
est iustificatio peccatoris. In Symbolo enim ponitur remissio
peccatorum, et Ezech. 12 cap. per totum capitulum. Secundo
supponendo actionem meritoriam posse a nobis elici et quod iuxta
merita retributio fiat sicut continetur in Symbolo: "exspecto
resurrectionem mortuorum et vitam venturi saeculi" etc.
17 Ex prima via arguitur quattuor rationibus.
Primo sic: volitio divina, quae in se est unica et simplex, non
habet in se rationem volitionum oppositarum, ut velle et nolle,
nisi sit aliqua distinctio ex parte obiecti, aliter enim
contradictoria essent simul vera de aliquo, nulla facta distinctione
circa illud, quod est impossibile. Nam 'velle istum salvari' et nolle
istum salvari' secundum eundem includunt contradictionem et
sunt unus actus ex parte Dei. Quia non potest voluntas sua
mutari a velle in nolle. Si ergo volitione divina salvatur iste et
acceptatur ad vitam aeternam, idem in peccato non acceptatur
nisi ad poenam aeternam. Non potest autem hoc esse sine
14 Secondly, this factnamely, that the Holy Spirit is the one

by which a meritorious act is immediately elicitedis first proved
affirmatively in this way. The Holy Spirit is the first cause; and
the first cause acts equally [well] with or without the second
cause, which is not something pertaining to the essence of the
thing.* However, charityas the part of a person who elicits the
meritorious actis not matter nor is it the form that is an
essential part of a composite; therefore, etc.
15 Also, the Son of God performs the operations of his assumed
nature and nevertheless nothing because of this is taken away
from his assumed nature. Therefore, if in a similar way the Holy
Spirit were immediately to unite with the will and be operating
those works, nothing would be removed from the will on this
account, and thus the Holy Spirit would have an act of loving, and
nevertheless the will would love no less.
16 Against this opinion I argue in two ways, by presupposing

two things that are conceded by all to be articles of faith. The first
is the justification of the sinner. For the remission of sin is cited
in the Creed and in the entire chapter 12 of Ezechiel. Secondly, I
presuppose meritorious action can be elicited by us and that
retribution will occur according to merit, as is contained in the
Creed: "I look to the resurrection of the dead and the life of the
world to come."
17 From the first way, four arguments are presented. The first
goes like this: divine volition, which in itself is unique and simple,
in itself has no basis for the opposite volition, as willing and
nilling, unless there is some distinction on the part of the object,
for otherwise contradictories would be simultaneously true of
something, with no distinction made in its regard, which is
impossible. For 'to will this one be saved' and 'will this one not to
be saved' at the same time both include a contradiction and
constitute one act on the part of God. For his will cannot be
changed from 'to will' into 'to nill.' Hence, if by divine volition this
one is saved and accepted for eternal life, the same one in sin is
only accepted for eternal punishment. But this cannot be without
distinctione aliqua ex parte obiecti sic iustificati et non-iustificati

sine contradictione. Ergo oportet ponere ex parte illius aliquem
habitum quo nunc acceptetur et prius non. Non enim est necesse
ponere varietatem in naturalibus, nec in actibus talis iustificati,
scilicet in actibus secundis, ut patet in puero baptizato et
iustificato, nec quantum ad fidem et spem, qui actus manent et
habitus quando non est acceptus Deo. Ergo tantum propter
habitum caritatis oportet esse distinctionem et variationem.
Alioquin contradictoria erunt vera de eodem.
18 Item, Deus vult iustum salvari et acceptat eum ad vitam
aeternam; iniustum non sic acceptat. Tunc quaero: quid est
iustum sic acceptari a Deo ad vitam aeternam? Hoc enim non est
ipsum velle pro tunc beatificare, quia tunc statim beatificaret
eum. Hoc autem non est velle voluntate beneplaciti, quia sic
omnia vult Deus. Ergo hoc est velle istum secundum disposi-
tionem quam nunc habet esse dignum tali praemio quem prius
iniustum exsistentem non voluit esse dignum tali praemio. Ista
diversitas non est ponenda in voluntate divina, quia non est
mutabilis, ergo propter diversitatem in isto, quia isto omnino
eodem modo se habente, voluntas divina vult eum eodem modo se
habere. Ergo in isto est aliquid nunc inhaerens ex quo habet
ordinem ad vitam aeternam.
19 Item, privatio circa aptum natum non aufertur nisi per
habitum, cum sint circa aptum natum immediate opposita, X
Metaphysicae.ii Sed anima iniusta modo est apta nata ad
iustitiam secundum primam suppositionem. Ergo non aufertur ab
ea iniustitia nisi per habitum iustitiae et oppositum iniustitiae
quo dicatur cara sicut prius inimica. Si enim nihil formaliter aliud
sibi modo inesset quami2 prius infuit, non magis diceretur modo
amica Deo et cara quam prius, immo simul posset dici amica et
ii Aristot.. Metaph X (I), c. 5 (1056a 15-30).

v1 Ixge: quam quod prius infuit.
contradiction without some distinction on the part of the object

justified and not-justified in this way. Therefore, it is necessary to
posit, on the part of the latter, some habit by which he may be
accepted now and not before. For it is not necessary to posit
variety in natural* [principles], nor acts of the one justified
namely in second acts,* as is evident in a child baptized and
justifiednor as regards faith and hope, which acts and habits
remain [even] when one is not accepted by God [i.e., when one
sins]. Therefore, distinction and variety must only be due to the
habit of charity. Otherwise contradictories would be true of the
same thing.
18 Also, God wishes to save the just man and accept him for
eternal life; he does not accept the unjust in this way. Then I ask:
What does it entail, for the just to be accepted by God for eternal
life? For it does not amount to God willing at that point that this
[one] be beatified, because then he would immediately beatify
him. Nor does this happen by willing one well, because God wills
all things in this way. Therefore, this means to will that this one,
due to the disposition he now has, be worthy of such a reward: the
one who beforehand, being unjust, was not willed to be worthy of
such a reward. This diversity must not be postulated in the divine
will, because it is not changeable. Hence, it is because of the
diversity in this [subject], because as long as this [subject]
remains the same, the divine will is disposed towards it in the
same way. Therefore, there is something presently inhering in
this one, which enables him to be ordered to eternal life.
19 Also, privation in respect to an [act] 'suited by nature' [to be
there] is only removed by a habit, since they [i.e., privation and
habit] are immediately opposed in respect to an [act] 'suited by
nature' [to be there], according to Bk. X of the Metaphysics. But
the unjust soul is now suited by nature to act justly, according to
the first supposition. Therefore injustice is only removed from it
by a habit of justice, the opposite of injustice: thanks to which it
may be called 'dear,' whereas before it was 'unfriendly.' For if
there is nothing formally other in it now, compared to what was
in it before, it would not be called a friend of, and dear to God now
any more than it was before: indeed, it could be simultaneously
called friendly and unfriendly, and dear and not dear, just as
inimica, cara et non-cara, ut prius. Cum ergo peccatores nihil

fiant cum peccant, sequitur quod ablata iniustitia ponatur
habitus iustificans, et hunc voco caritatem, et sic potest lustificari
sine actu secundo.
20 Item, quarto sic: non aliter se habent extrema aliqua ad
invicem nunc quam prius, nisi propter mutationem aliquam in
aliquo extremorum. Sed in Deo nulla est facta mutatio, patet. Nec
in creatura, secundum negantes habitum caritatis, quia fides et
spes possunt stare cum peccato mortali, nec propter istos habitus
fidei et spei dicitur anima imph se habere aliter nunc quam prius.
Ergo eodem modo se habet anima poenitens ad Deum et Deus ad
ipsam sicut ante poenitentiam, quod est haereticum. Aliter enim
non plus inhabitaret Deus in anima quam in ligno vel lapide nisi
in anima aliquis habitus poneretur.
21 Ex via secunda arguo quadrupliciter. Primo sic: nihil dicitur
formaliter agere nisi principium actionis sit forma agentis. Hoc
patet, nam Philosophus II De anima,i3 volens probare intel-
lectum, sensum, et vitam esse animam ipsam vel formas animae,
dicit quo intelligimus, sentimus, et vivimus est intellectus,
sensus, et vita, quae sunt vel ipsa anima essentialiter vel formae
animae. Ergo cum anima dicatur elicere opera meritoria, habebit
principium meriti ut formam eius. Hoc voco caritatem. Si autem
actio meritoria est suppositi merentis, ergo principium formale
talis actionis non est voluntas sola, quia tunc esset error Pelagii,
nec est actio Spiritus Sancti quia non est forma animae; ergo
voluntas cum forma gratificante, scilicet cum caritate, est
principium formale talis actionis.
22 Item, nulla actio est in potestate agentis nisi principium
formale illius actionis sit in potestate eius ut illo possit uti vel non
uti. Actio autem meritoria est in potestate nostra et non meremur
naturalibus, libro Ethicorum.u Ergo necessario eius principium
i:i Aristot., De anima II, c. 2 (414a 12-27).

l4 Aristot., Eth. Nic. II, c. 1 (\\Q.\a 17-20).
before. Since sinners, therefore, become nothing [essentially

different] when they sin,3 it follows that once injustice is removed,
a [positive] justifying habit may be posited, and this I call charity,
and so it [i.e., the soul] can be justified without a second act.4
20 Also fourthly in this way: some extremes are no different
from one another now than before, unless there is some change in
the extremes. But in God, it is evident, no change has occurred.
Neither has one occurred in the creature, according to those who
deny any habit of charity, because faith and hope can coexist with
mortal sin. Neither is the soul of the wicked, because of those
habits of faith and hope, said to be now any different than it was
before. Hence, the penitent soul is related to God, and God to it,
in the same way as it was before penitence was there, which is
heretical. For otherwise God would not dwell in the soul any more
than in wood or a stone unless in the soul some habit is posited.
21 From the second way, I argue in four ways, the first of
which is this. Nothing is said to act formally unless it is a form of
the agent that is its principle* of action. This is evident, because
the Philosopher in Bk. II of De anima, wishing to prove that the
intellect, the sense, and the life is the soul itself or forms of the
soul, says that that by which we understand, sense and live, is
the intellect, sense and life, which are either the soul essentially
or forms of the soul. Therefore, since the soul may be said to elicit
meritorious acts, it will have a principle of merit as its form. This
I call charity. But if a meritorious action pertains to the supposit*
[or person] meriting, the formal* principle of such an action is not
the will alone, for that would be the error of Pelagius. Neither is
it an action of the Holy Spirit, since he is not a form of the soul.
Therefore, it is together with the form that makes it gracious,
namely charity, that the will is the formal principle of such an
action.
22 Also, no action is in the power of the agent unless the formal
principle of that action is in its power so that it could be used or
not used. But a meritorious action is in our power, and we do not
merit by what we have that is natural, according to the Ethics.
Therefore, its principle is necessarily in our power. But the Holy
3 I.e., sin is pure privation.

1 That is, without any action by the soul itself.
est in potestate nostra. Sed Spiritus Sanctus non est huiusmodi

principium, ergo caritas. Causa enim prima nunquam est in
potestate secundae, sed e converso.
23 Item, tertio sic: si Spiritus Sanctus moveat voluntatem ad
actum diligendi, cum haec motio sit ipsius actio realis, quaero
terminum realem istius actionis. Non potest dici quod dilectio sit
terminus, quia tunc anima tantum passive se habebit in diligendo
Deum et per consequens dilectio non erit in potestate diligentis.
Si sit aliquid praecedens dilectionem tanquam dispositio ad eam,
hoc voco habitum caritatis, quae est in continua gignitione
secundum Augustinum. Sicut aer semper fit lucidus, sic anima
grata semper sit magis cara; non sic de fide et spe; ergo etc.
24 Item, quarto sic: potentia habitualis non potest aeque
operari sine habitu sicut cum habitu, quia habitus dat aliquam
perfectionem, cum habentem perficiat et opus eius bonum reddat.
Sed voluntas est habitualis respectu diligibilis vel dilectionis
meritoriae, quia quod potentia non sit habitualis, hoc est aut
propter inclinationem determinatam in oppositumi5 ad quod
habitus inclinaret, aut propter determinatam inclinationem in
propositum, ut naturalia determinantur ad sua loca sicut grave
deorsum. Sed nullo istorum modorum se habet voluntas nostra
respectu diligibilis vel dilectionis, quia tunc semper diligeret illud
vel nunquam diligeret illud, et sic sequitur quod sit indifferens.
Ergo respectu diligibilis necessarius est habitus aliquis in
voluntate.
[II. Solutio Scoti

A. Art. 1: De necessitate caritatis]
25 Respondeo ad quaestionem; et primo ad rem, secundo ad

intentionem Magistri.
26 Quantum ad primum dico quod sicut in Deo ponitur duplex
potentia, ordinata scilicet et absoluta, ita proportionaliter ponitur
in eo duplex necessitas. Deus autem, de potentia absoluta, non
5 Lege: in oppositum <ei> ad quod.

Spirit is not such a principle, hence charity is. For the first cause
is never in the power of the second, but vice versa.
23 Also, thirdly in this way: if the Holy Spirit would move the
will to the act of loving, since this motion is his real action, I ask:
what is the real term of this action? It cannot be claimed that love
is the term, because then the soul will be only passive in loving
God, and as a consequence, love will not be in the power of the
one loving. But if it is something preceding the act of loving that
is a disposition towards it, I call this the habit of charity, which is
in the process of continual birth, according to Augustine. Just as
air is always becoming lucid, so the soul made gracious is always
more dear [to God]; it is not this way with faith and hope;
therefore, etc.
24 Also, fourthly in this way: a habitual potency* can not be
equally operating without a habit the way it can with a habit,
because the habit contributes some perfection, since it perfects
one who has it and makes his work something good. But the will
is habitual with regard to what is lovable, or towards meritorious
love. For the fact that the potency is not habitual is either due to
a determinate inclination towards the opposite of what the habit
inclines one to, or due to a determinate inclination towards the
act in question, just as natural things are determined as to their
place, as, e.g., a heavy thing to move downward. But in neither of
these ways is our will disposed with respect to what is lovable or
towards love, because then it would always love that or never love
that, and thus it would follow that it is indifferent. Therefore, it is
necessary for some habit to be present in the will with respect to
what is lovable.

Article One
The necessity* of charity
25 I respond to the question; and first to the matter itself,

secondly to the intention of the Master.
26 As to the first, I say that just as in God a double potency is
posited, namely an ordered one and an absolute one, so
proportionately a double necessity is posited in him. God,
necessitatis ut infundat caritatem ad hoc quod anima formaliter

sit sibi accepta et ordinetur ad vitam aeternara, quia potentiam
suam non alligavit sacramentis, nec per consequens aliis formis
creatis, quin de potentia absoluta posset illam naturam in se sine
aliquo habitu formaliter inhaerente vel quocumque alio ut merito
acceptare, si vellet, ad vitam aeternam. Nec si hoc vellet, male
vellet, nec inordinate vellet. Sed ex hoc quod sic vellet, bene
vellet. Nam quidquid potest cum causa secunda quae non est de
essentia rei hoc addo propter materiam et formam, quia non
potest facere compositum sine istis causis hoc potest per se
immediate, et ita potest iustificare vel salvare nudam naturam in
se sicut informatam caritate, loquendo de potentia absoluta.
27 Potentia tamen ordinata qua secundum legem sapientiae
suae statuit ut nunquam aliquis acceptaretur nisi tali habitu
animae inhaerente, quo anima meretur vitam aeternam, quem
conferret sibi et quo formaliter anima esset sibi grata, non posset
aliquem acceptare, ista lege stante, sine habitu tali quo meretur
et ex illo praemiaretur. Sed de potentia absoluta posset sine
meritis acceptare si vellet et tali voluntate posset aliam legem
ordinare qua aliter homo salvaretur tunc quam modo. Verbi
gratia, si principia practica, secundum quae agit modo Deus,
essent necessaria ex terminis sicut in nobis, tunc omnis habens
gratiam salvabitur et nihil habens non salvabitur. Leges autem
istae sunt ex gratia et libertate, non necessariae ex terminis, sed
secundum acceptationem divinam sic quod habens gratiam
salvabitur et non habens non salvabitur, et haec est potentia
ordinata quam habemus ex Scriptura, scilicet quod Deus non
acceptat personam eodem modo se habentem sine gratia, et sic
idem homo in puris naturalibus habens actum aeque intensum.
however, according to his absolute potency is not necessitated to

infuse charity for the specific purpose that the soul formally be
accepted by him and ordered to eternal life. For his power is not
bound by sacraments, nor as a consequence by any other created
forms, so as to hinder his ability, by his absolute power, if he
willed, to accept that nature for eternal life as it is in itself
without some formally inhering habit or anything else
whatsoever, such as merit. Nor, if he willed this, would he will
badly or inordinately. But from the [mere] fact that he so willed,
his willing would be good. For whatever he could do with [the
help of] a secondary cause that is not of the essence of a thingI
add this on account of matter and form, because he could not
make a composite without these causeshe could do
immediately, and so he could justify or save a bare nature in itself
just as one informed by charity, speaking of his absolute power.
27 But by his ordered power, according to his law of wisdom, he
has established that never will someone be accepted unless such a
habit inheres in the soul, whereby the soul will merit the eternal
life: the habit that he would confer on it, and whereby the soul
formally would be pleasing to him. So long as this law is standing,
he could not accept someone, apart from one having such a habit
whereby one merits and as a consequence of which one might be
rewarded. But by absolute power he could accept without merits,
if he willed this; and by such a will he could ordain another law,
whereby a man could be then saved in a way different from the
present. For example, if the practical principles, according to
which God now acts, were necessary by reason of their terms, just
as [practical principles are] in us, then everyone having grace will
be saved and one having no [grace] will not be saved. These laws,
however, are based on grace and free will,* and are not necessary
from their terms, but according to divine acceptance, so that one
having grace will be saved and one not having it will not be
saved. And this is ordered power, that we have from Scripture,
namely that God may not accept a person in the same situation
without grace [as he would with grace], and thus if the same
person, due to purely natural factors, will have an act of equal
intensity, this act will not be meritorious without a habit making
him pleasing [just as an equal act will be if the person has the
non habet actum illum meritorium sine habitu gratificante. Et

istae leges sunt ordinatae a divina voluntate quod talis actus sine
tali habitu non est dignus nec acceptus Deo ad vitam aeternam.
[B. Art. 2: Opinio Petri Lombardi de caritate exponitur]
28 Quantum ad intentionem Magistri, dico quod tripliciter

potest intelligi ipsum sensisse Spiritum Sanctum esse caritatem.
Uno modo quod non sit aliquis habitus caritatis inform ans
animam, sed quod immediate omnis actus meritorius sit a Spiritu
Sancto, sicut intelligunt eum plurimi.
29 Alio modo, quod posuerit caritatem in anima non propter
actum secundum, sed propter actum primum. Sicut anima
rationalis corpori, sic gratia dat vitam supernaturalem animae et
in hac gratia vel caritate Spiritus Sanctus inhabitat, quae gratia
dat esse primo. Sed Spiritus Sanctus movet ad diligere et movet
alias potentias ut in illo habitu inhabitet animam Spiritus
Sanctus, et tamen immediate eliciat omnes actus meritorios. sicut
prius, quasi non posset inhabitare animam sine tali caritate.
30 Tertio modo, quod posuerit caritatem informantem animam
ut actum primum et propter actum secundum, quia concurrit et
inclinat ad actum secundum, ut Spiritus Sanctus immediate et
sine aliquo alio habitu medio per caritatem inhabitet animam
sicut templum suum, et mediante eodem habitu Spiritus Sanctus
moveat voluntatem ut eliciat actum meritorium, et sic moveat
diversimode ad actum sperandi et credendi et diligendi. Quia ad
actum credendi et sperandi movet immediate per istos habitus
fidem et spem, non autem per habitum immediate per quem
inhabitat. Quia potest homo in istos actus, exsistens in mortali
peccato quando non est templum Dei. Sed movet ad actum
amandi meritorie et per istum habitum immediate, ut caritate,
quo animam Deus inhabitat.
habit]. And these laws are ordered by the divine will in such a
way that such act without such a habit is not worthy nor accepted
by God for eternal life.
Article Two
The opinion of Peter Lombard explained
28 As for the intention of the Master, I say there is a threefold

way he can be understood to be of the opinion that the Holy Spirit
is charity. One way is that there is no habit of charity informing
the soul, but that the Holy Spirit produces every meritorious act
immediately, as several teachers understand him.
29 Another way, that he has postulated charity in the soul, not
for the sake of its second act, but for the sake of its first act. Just
as the rational soul [gives life] to the body, in this way grace gives
a supernatural life to the soul and the Holy Spirit dwells in this
grace or charity, which primarily gives it [i.e., the soul] its
existence. But the Holy Spirit moves it to love and moves other
potencies so that it may dwell in the soul in this habit, and
nevertheless may immediately elicit all meritorious acts, just as
before, as if he could not inhabit the soul without such charity.
30 In a third way, that he has postulated charity informing the
soul as a first act for the sake of a second act, since it concurs
with, and inclines [the soul] to a second act, so that the Holy
Spirit might inhabit the soul as his temple immediately through
charity, and without another intermediate habit; and so that by
means of that same habit5 the Holy Spirit might move the will in
order to elicit a meritorious act, and so might move [it] to the act
of hope, belief, and love in diverse ways. For he moves
immediately through those habits of faith and hope to acts of
belief and of hope, but not [necessarily] immediately through a
habit whereby he dwells [in the soul], because someone can have
those acts [even] when he is not a temple of God, but existing in
mortal sin. However, in the case when someone merits it, he
moves to the act of loving immediately even through this habit,
i.e., charity, through which God inhabits the soul.
Namely, charity as a first act.

31 Duobus primis modis non potest salvari Magister, sed tertio

modo. Et quod contrarium dixerit huic tertio modo, non inve-
nietur ex verbis suis in toto libro Sententiarum. In illo enim
habitu Deus continue inhabitat animam, nam illum conservando
continue in illum influit.
32 Sic ergo iste intellectus Magistri non est contra Symbolum
nec contra fidem. Et hic videtur fuisse intellectus suus, II libro
distinctione 26 et 27, ubi allegat auctoritatem Augustini, I Ad
Dardanumi6 de pueris et prophetis qui prius quam baptismum
habuerunt Spiritum Sanctum ut inhabitantem, ita quod aliud est
in anima parvuli etc. Unde manifestat ibi quod non habuit istum
intellectum qui sibi imponitur. Sed tamen quaerit ibi utrum
gratia sit virtus vel non, et neutrum determinat.
33 Potest etiam teneri quod secundus fuit intellectus suus, ita
quod ad actum diligendi secundum non concurrit caritas sed
tantum Spiritus Sanctus, non tamen quin concurrat ad esse sive
ad primum actum, sed non in movere, sicut non negat de
sapientia quin sit aliquis habitus alius ab illo qui inhabitat, et sic
de caritate potest intelligi, secundum eum.
34 Et tunc dubium est quomodo per habitum gratiflcantem

acceptatur persona, sive quomodo caritas creata est ratio
gratificandi personam et actum simul, quia non est aliquid
acceptum Deo nisi quia Deus acceptat, et sic nulla forma creata
potest esse ratio formalis acceptationis divinae.
35 Ad auctoritatesi7 dico concedendo omnes auctoritates

Augustini quia caritas perficit simpliciter, sicut sapientia et
caritas dicitur de omnibus tribus, tamen Filio appropriatur
sapientia et caritas Spiritui Sancto. Et patet quod haec est
i Cf. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 37, c. 3, n. 3 (SB IV. 267).

i7 Cf. supra nn. 1-4. Hoc loco ordo paragraphorum in codd. turbatus est, sed
in textu praesenti restitutus.
31 In the first two ways, one cannot save the Master, but one
can in the third way. And [any evidence] that he may have said
the contrary to this third way will not be found from his words in
the whole book of the Sentences. For in that habit [of charity] God
continuously inhabits the soul, for he flows into it continuously
conserving it.
32 Therefore, in this understanding of the Master there is
nothing contrary to the Creed or to faith. And this seems to have
been his understanding, in Bk. II, distinction 26 and 27 where he
cites the authoritative statement of Augustine, I Ad Dardanum
about boys and prophets, who had the Holy Spirit as dwelling in
them [even] before baptism, so that it is otherwise in the soul of a
very small child, etc. Hence, it is clear there that he6 does not
have the interpretation that is imputed to him. But nevertheless
he asks there whether grace is a virtue or not, and decides on
neither.
33 One can also hold that he held the second understanding as
his opinion, so that for the second act* of loving, charity does not
concur, but only the Holy Spirit: not, however, without concurring
with the being or first act, but not in moving, just as he [the
Master] does not deny about wisdom that it is some habit
different from the one that inhabits. In this way, according to
him, one can understand about charity.
34 And then there is a doubt how a person is accepted through
the habit that makes one gracious, or how created charity is the
basis of making the person and the act gracious at the same time,
for nothing is accepted by God, except because God has accepted
it, and in this way no created form can be the formal reason for
divine acceptance.
35 I reply to the authoritative statements, [nn. 1-4] conceding

all the statements of Augustine, because charity perfects in an
unqualified sense, just as wisdom and charity is affirmed of all
three [divine persons]. Nevertheless wisdom is attributed to the
Son and charity to the Holy Spirit. And it is evident that this is
The Master.
intentio Augustini, quia omnia dicta in libro VIII De Trinitate

exponuntur per XV librum. Unde ibi dicit quod in divinis non est
proprie Verbum nisi sapientia nec amor nisi Spiritus Sanctus.
Sed sicut non sequitur quod sapientia increata inhabitans noni8
est immediata forma intellectus, praecipue si sit activus, sic nec
caritas increata erit immediata ratio movendi voluntatem ad
actum meritorium.
36 Sed quando quaeris de qua dilectione intendit Augustinusi9
quando dicit "consequens est ut qui diligit Deum, diligat
dilectionem" dico quod de formali. Quia si reflexio est, sequitur
dilectio actus, id est ut mihi placeat talis actus dilectionis. Et
quando dicis ultra quod est fallacia consequentis, dico quod
debent fieri duo syllogismi, sive sunt ibi duo syllogismi. Primus
est 'dilectio actus est dilectio per participationem; dilectio Dei est
per essentiam dilectio; ergo Deus est magis diligendus quam
dilectio-actus'. Secundus est 'diligens proximum diligit dilectio-
nem-actum, et diligit dilectionem per essentiam'; sed sic debet
formari: 'diligens proximum diligit dilectionem per essentiam'
(haec est maior); 'sed Deus est dilectio per essentiam; ergo etc'. Ex
quo enim diligit ordinate, nunquam dilectio Dei est ratio diligendi
aliam nisi diligat dilectionem-actum.
37 Ad illud20 de dilectione fraterna, dico quod est qua nos
diligimus formaliter et est actus noster formaliter, sed effective a
Deo sive est actus Dei.
38 Ad illud2i de XV De Trinitate, dico quod verum est quod
nullum donum creatum est excellentius Spiritu Sancto qui facit
me amare, sed non nisi formali dilectione qua diligimus vel
sumus invicem diligentes; et patet quod ibi est intellectus suus
iste quia dicit amator etc.
iH Non: sic codd.

i!l Cf. supra n. 1.
Cf. supra n. 2.
2i Cf. supra n. 3.
the intention of Augustine, because all that he says in Bk. VIII of

The Trinity is explained in Bk. XV. Hence he says there that in
the divine wisdom is proper only to the Word* and love only to
the Holy Spirit. But just as it does not follow that indwelling
uncreated wisdom is7 immediately a form of the intellect,
especially if it is active, so neither will uncreated charity be
immediately the reason why our will is moved to a meritorious
act.
36 But when you ask about what love Augustine intended (n. 1]
when he said 'The consequent is that one who loves God loves
love itself,' I say that it is about what is formal,8 because if there
is reflection, the love of the act follows, i.e.. that such an act of
love pleases me. And when you say further that it is a fallacy
of the consequent, I say that there should be two syllogisms, or
that there are two syllogisms here. The first is 'the love of the act
[of love] is the love by participation; the love of God is the love of
an essential kind; therefore God is more to be loved than the love-
act.' The second is 'one who loves one's neighbor loves the love-
act: moreover, loves the love of an essential kind'; but it must be
formulated in this way: 'loving the neighbor is loving the love of
an essential kind' (this is the major); 'but God is the love of an
essential kind; therefore, etc' For if one loves in an orderly way,
never is the love of God the reason for loving another [action],
except if one may love the love-act.
37 To the other [n. 2] about fraternal love, I say that it is that
by which we love each other formally and it is our act formally
but effectively from God or is an act of God.
38 To the other [n. 3] about Bk. XV of The Trinity, I say that it
is true that no created gift is more excellent than the Holy Spirit
who makes me love, but not unless [there is] formal love9 whereby
we love or are lovers of one another. And it is evident that this is
hisi0 understanding here, because he says 'the lover,' etc.
7 The MSS insert 'not' (;io;i) at this point, which does not seem to make
much sense.
H By 'formal love' Scotus means charity, as a habit, which inheres in the soul
as an accidental form.
9 See note to n. 36 above.
i0 Augustine's.
39 Ad aliud22 concedo quod non est praedicatio per causalita-

tem, sicut aliae quando dicitur fides mea vel spes mea, et hoc est
solum ratione imperfectionis in eis; sed caritas dicit perfectionem
simpliciter sicut sapientia.
40 Ad primum23 dico quod creaturam bonam intelligi non-
bonam potest dupliciter intelligi: aut abstractive aut circumscrip
tive. Non enim idem est abstrahere et circumscribere. Abstrahere
enim est intelligendo hoc, non intelligendo illud. Circumscribere
est aliquid quod sibi inest essentialiter auferre, et intelligere
ipsum sub opposito illius quod sibi inest. Primo modo verum est
quod creatura bona potest intelligi, non cointelligendo bonitatem
eius, quia alia est ratio quiditatis et alia est ratio bonitatis, et isto
modo "abstrahentium non est mendacium". Secundo modo non
potest intelligi 'non-bona' circumscribendo vel dividendo per
intellectum hoc quod sibi essentialiter convenit et intelligendo
eam sub opposito illius, quia tunc esset commutatio veracis
abstractionis in mendacem.
41 Ad probationem24 dico quod caritas non dicitur participare
bonitatem sicut subiectum participat formam sine qua subiectum
potest esse, sed participat sicut quaedam participatio bonitatis
per essentiam, ut radius dicitur participare lucem quae est
quaedam lux per essentiam, participative tamen, et non tota lux
quae dicitur participatio non subiectiva sed obiectiva. Sicut
radius non potest intelligi non luminosus et tamen participat
obiective lucem; et quod sic participat non potest esse sine
participato, immo est ipsum, ab alio tamen, ut a sole radius.
42 Ad secundum25, quando dicitur quod Deus est diligibilis a
nobis in infinitum, concedo. Sed ista infinitas potest referri ad
intensionem actus quo ipsum diligimus, aut quantum26 ad
appretiabilitatem obiecti quo est a nobis appretiabilis. Primo
modo non est verum, scilicet quod Deus sit diligendus a nobis in
infinitum actu modo infinito, quia non potest habere natura finita
actum infinitum. Et cum dicis quod actus noster diligendi Deum
secundum omnem proportionem positam vel possibilem excedit
" Cf. supra n. 4.

a Cf. supra n. 5.
** Cf. supra n. 5.
2r> Cf. supra n. 6.
M Quantum ad: lege ad.
39 To the other [n. 4] I concede that it is not a predication by

virtue of causality, as in the other cases when it is said 'my faith'
or 'my hope.' And this is only by reason of the imperfection in
these; but charity asserts unqualified perfection just as wisdom
does.
40 To the first [argument] [n. 5] I say that created good can be
understood to be non-good in two ways: either abstractly* or
circumscriptively. For 'to abstract' and 'to circumscribe' is not the
same thing. For 'to abstract' is thinking of this and not thinking of
that. 'To circumscribe' is to take away something that is
essentially in a thing, and to think of this thing as distinct from
that which is in it. In the first way it is true that a good creature
can be thought without thinking of its goodness, because the
notion of the quiddity* is other than the notion of goodness, and
in this way 'abstractions do not create a lie.' In the second way it
cannot be thought of as 'non-good' by the intellect circumscribing
or separating that which essentially pertains to something and
thinking of the latter as opposed to the former, because then
there would be a commutation of what is a true abstraction into a
lie.
41 To the proof [n. 5] I say that charity is not said to participate
in goodness in the same way as a subject participates a form
without which the subject can exist, but it participates in
goodness, as it were, by a certain essential participation, as a
raywhich is essentially a certain light, but in a participative
way, and not the entire lightis said to participate light. This is
called not subjective, but objective participation. Indeed, a ray
cannot be thought of as non-luminous, and nevertheless it
participates light objectively. And what participates in this way
cannot exist without that which is participated; indeed it is by
itself, and nevertheless it is from another, as a ray from the Sun.
42 To the second [n. 6] when it is said that God is lovable by us
to an infinite degree, I concede. But this infinity* can refer either
to the intensity of the act by which we love him or to the ability of
the object through which we esteem him to be appreciated by us.
In the first way it is not true, namely that God ought to be loved
by us to an infinite degree by an infinite act, because a finite
nature cannot have an infinite act. And when you say that our act
illum actum quo diligimus creaturam, falsum est, comparando

proportionem ad actum nostrum quo diligimus Deum et
creaturam. Quia aliquando habet peccator ita intensum actum
unum circa aliquod appetibile creatum etiam inordinatum, quem
si haberet aeque intensum circa Deum, sufficeret ei ad salutem.
Multi enim actus meritorii sunt magis remissi quam non-
meritorii, quia ex conatu naturali possunt esse magis intensi in
uno peccatore etiam. Propter enim naturalem ordinem poten-
tiarum magis inclinat et intensius agit circa obiecta inferiora
circa quae est maxima sensibilis delectatio quam circa Deum.
Comparando tamen proportionem et actum ad appretiabilitatem
obiecti, in infinitum excedit eius appretiabilitas omnem
appretiabilitatem cuiuscumque alterius diligibilis. Sed actus
elicitus non est infinite intensus.
43 Ad tertium27 dicendum quod ex perfectione naturae
rationalis est quod non possit ad omnem actum ad quem
ordinatur nisi fuerit habituata, ex quo natura rationalis est
ordinata ad habendum actum circa obiectum nobilissimum in
natura in quo finaliter quietetur, cum non possit in illum propter
perfectionem eius nisi aliqualiter per habitum informetur; et
propter magnitudinem perfectionis obiecti in quod tendit,
sequitur quod si posset in illum per habitum quo modo non posset
aliqua natura inferior, etiam si haberet eundem habitum, erit
nobilior et perfectior quacumque alia natura inferiori. Quod enim
natura inferior sufficit sibi ad operandum, hoc est propter
imperfectionem talis operationis. Et ideo si voluntas non possit
modo speciali se movere meritorie in obiectum summum et finem
ultimum, hoc maxime arguit eius perfectionem, quod scilicet
voluntas non possit in illam ex suis naturalibus, et sic deficit a
natura inferiori, quae plus potest, proportione arithmetica, et hoc
imperfectionis est in natura inferiori, quia non est habitualis aut
habituabilis. Sed natura intellectualis quae est superior omni alia
inferiori natura plus quam potest secundum proportionem
11 Cf. supra n. 7.
of loving God according to any existing or possible comparison

exceeds that act by which we love a creature, it is false,
establishing a correspondence between our acts by which we love
God and creature. For at some time or another a sinner has an
act regarding some desirable created thing that is so intense,
although inordinate, that were he to have one equally intense
regarding God, it would suffice for his salvation. For many
meritorious acts are much less intense than ones that are non-
meritohous, because by natural effort they could be more intense
even in a sinner. For on account of the natural order of potencies
one is more inclined and acts more intensely about things here
below that yield the greatest enjoyment of the senses, than one
does about God. Nevertheless, by establishing a correspondence
as regards the ability of the object to be appreciated as compared
to the act [itself], its capability exceeds infinitely that of any other
lovable object. But the elicited act is not infinitely intense.
43 To the third [n. 7] it must be said that the perfection of a
rational nature is such that it cannot produce every act to which
it is ordered unless it acquires a habit. Hence a rational nature is
ordered to have an act in regard to the noblest object in nature in
which it will finally come to rest, while at the same time such is
its perfection that it cannot do so unless in someway it is
informed by a habit. And because of the great perfection of the
object towards which it tends, it follows that if it could be [in act]
as regards this [object] through some habit that any lesser nature
is incapable of having, even if it [merely] had that habit, it will be
nobler and more perfect than any other inferior nature. For the
fact that a lesser nature suffices of itself for its functions is the
evidence of the imperfection of such a function. And therefore if
the will, by the way specific to it, could not function meritoriously
in relation to the highest object and its ultimate end, this above
all proves its perfection, namely, that the will could not do this by
its natural powers, and thusaccording to an arithmetic
proportionit falls behind a lesser nature that could do more.
And this is a matter of imperfection in an inferior nature, because
it has no such habit or the ability to have it. But an intellectual
nature, which is superior to any other inferior nature, is to the
greatest degree capable according to a geometric proportion, and
geometricam, et ideo aliquid requirit plus quam natura inferior

quia est natura habitualis.
[IV. Ad argumenta pro opinione quae imponitur

Magistro]
44 Ad rationem primam28 pro opinione quae imponitur

Magistro, dico quod contingit uti illo habitu cum volumus et cum
aequali conatu, ex quo actus est in potestate nostra, ceteris
paribus, ut passionibus appetitus inferioris sedatis et voluntate
aequaliter inclinata ad idem et intellectu exsistente in eadem vel
aequali dispositione a quibus dependet motus et actus aequalitas
sicut et actus simpliciter. Et cum dicit quod devoti experiuntur
contrarium, quia cum aequali conatu non possunt semper in
aequalem delectationem et devotionem, dicendum quod aequalem
actum diligendi Deum cum aequali conatu possunt habere, ceteris
paribus. Sed non semper cum aequali conatu habent aequalem
delectationem, quae est quaedam passio causata ab obiecto
apprehenso; immo quandoque cum minori conatu dat Deus
maiorem delectationem vel degustationem dulcedinis. Unde
magis alliciuntur devoti ad appetendum vitam aeternam, sicut
experiuntur noviter conversi ad Deum, qui tanquam pueri in
moribus et fide nutriendi sunt lacte delectationis ne deficiant. Qui
magis radicati sunt in Deum, illam non aequaliter sentiant, licet
magis mereantur. Quidam enim homines non semper habent
aequalem delectationem. Hoc etiam potest contingere propter
fatigationem potentiae circa idem delectabile. Nam secundum
Philosophum nova magis delectant animam, quia apprehensio
obiecti quod natum est causare in principio maximam
delectationem, si actus continuatur fastidit potentiam, vel non
tantam sicut prius causat delectationem. Et hoc est signum quod
in nullum citra primum infinitum potest anima quietari, quia
circa quodcumque finitum actus continuatus potest minus
delectare et potentiam vel animam fastidire.
45 Ad secundum29 dico quod habitus infusus non habet
rationem delectabiliter vel faciliter inclinandi potentiam ad
*M Cf. supra n. 12.

Cf. supra n. 13.
therefore it requires something more than an inferior nature,

because it is a nature capable of having such a habit.
To the arguments for the opinion attributed to the Master
44 To the first reason [n. 12] for the opinion attributed to the
Master, I say that it so happens that we can use this habit when
we wish and with equal effort. Hence, its act is in our power,
other conditions being equal, i.e., the passions* of the inferior
appetite being sedated, and the will being equally inclined to the
same thing, and the intellect being in the same or equal
disposition, on all of which the intensity of act and movement, as
well as the act itself, depends. And when it says that the devout
experience the contrary, because with equal effort they cannot
always have equal delight and devotion, it must be said that they
can have with equal effort, other conditions being equal, an equal
act of loving God. But not always with equal effort do they have
equal delight, which is a sort of a condition caused by the object
apprehended; indeed at times with less effort God bestows
greater delight or taste of sweetness. Due to this, the devout are
more drawn to desire eternal life, as those experience who are
newly converted to God, who as children in faith and morals must
be nourished with the milk of delight lest they fall away. Those
who are more rooted in God do not equally feel that [delight],
although they may merit more. For certain human beings do not
always have equal delight. Also it can happen because one grows
tired of the same delightful object. For according to the
Philosopher new things delight the soul more, because the
[process of the] apprehension of the object which is suited by
nature to cause the greatest delight in the beginning, if the act
continues, tires the faculty or does not cause as much enjoyment
as before. And this is a sign that in nothing besides the first
infinite being can the soul come to rest, because in regard to
anything finite a continued act can delight less and tire out the
faculty or the soul.
45 To the second [n. 13] I say that an infused habit does not
have the characteristic of delightfully or easily inclining the
potency to act, as does an acquired habit that is produced by
actum, sicut habitus acquisitus qui generatur ex multis actibus,

ita quod potentia in acquirendo habitum habilitatur per
exercitium actuum. Habitus autem infusus non sic generatur ex
actibus qui nati essent generare aliquam habilitatem in potentia
ad agendum, sed inest animae ab extrinseco et non tribuit
potentiae facilitatem vel facilitationem nec delectationem, nec
huiusmodi condiciones quas tribuit habitus acquisitus, quia
habitus caritatis non ponitur propter delectabiliter operari sed
propter acceptari a Deo.
46 Ad tertium30 potest dici quod Spiritus Sanctus de potentia
absoluta potest causare actum in voluntate alium, nec est necesse
ut caritas sit ratio acceptandi. Si enim vellet ponere aliam legem,
tunc non oportet dedisse caritatem.
47 Ad quartum3i dicendum quod Verbum assumpsit naturam
humanam, et ideo opera naturae humanae dicuntur de eo per
communicationem idiomatum, quia Dei Filius merebatur. Opera
etiam divinae personae dicuntur de natura in illo supposito, quia
Christus homo creavit animas, non tamen per huiusmodi actum
meruit, quia non erat in potestate eius ut homo, sed ut erat
suppositum naturae divinae. Sed in proposito, si Spiritus Sanctus
immediate eliceret in voluntate actum diligendi, esset quidem
actus voluntatis sed non meritorius, quia non in potestate eius. Et
si assumpsisset voluntatem, opera voluntatis vere dicerentur de
eo, sed tunc ipse mereretur et non voluntas.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum habens caritatem creatam sit formaliter
acceptatus Deo
tanquam dignus vita aeterna]
48 Quia supponitur hic quod caritas necessario sit ponenda

propter iustificationem peccatoris et ad salvandum meritum quo
quis acceptatur ad vitam aeternam, ideo consequenter quaero
utrum habens caritatem creatam sit formaliter acceptatus Deo
tanquam dignus vita aeterna.
i0 Cf supra n. 14.
:li Cf. supra n. 15.
many acts, so that the potency in acquiring the habit is made fit
through the exercise of the acts. But an infused habit is not
generated in this fashion from acts that are suited by nature to
generate skillfulness in the faculty for acting. Rather it is in the
soul extrinsically and does not give to the faculty a facility or
dexterity or any enjoyment, or the sort of conditions an acquired
habit does, because the habit of charity is not posited because one
is to operate with ease, but so that one is accepted by God.
46 To the third [n. 14], it can be said that the Holy Spirit, by
absolute power, can cause another act in the will, nor is it
necessary that charity be the reason why one is accepted. For if
[God] willed to set down another law, it would not be necessary
that charity be given.
47 To the fourth [n. 15] it must be said that the Word assumed
a human nature, and therefore the works of a human nature are
affirmed of him by changing to an imprecise way of speaking,
because the Son of God merited. In addition, the works of a divine
person are affirmed of the nature in that person, because Christ
the man has created souls, although he has not merited by such
an act. For it was not in his power as a man, but as he was a
supposit [or person] of a divine nature. But in the case at hand, if
the Holy Spirit were immediately to elicit in the will an act of
loving God, it would indeed be an act of the will, but not
meritorious, because it was not in one's power. And if he were to
assume a will, the works of the will would be truly predicated of
him, but then he [i.e., the Holy Spirit] would be meriting and not
the will.
Question Two
Is the one who has created charity formally accepted by
God as worthy of eternal life?
48 Because it is accepted here that charity must necessarily be

posited because of the justification of a sinner and to save merit
by which one is accepted to eternal life, therefore as a
consequence I ask whether one having created charity is formally
accepted by God as worthy of eternal life.
Videtur quod non:

Primo ex parte acceptantis sic: nihil aliud est personam esse
acceptatara Deo quam Deum acceptare eum; sed nihil in creaturis
potest esse ratio quare Deus acceptet aliquam personam, cum
'acceptare divinum' dicat actum intrinsecum Deo, et nihil
creatum possit esse ratio formalis actus intrinseci in Deo; ergo
etc.
49 Item, ex parte personae acceptatae arguitur sic: illud non
est formalis ratio acceptati ut acceptatum est quod sequitur eius
acceptationem; sed persona prius acceptatur quam caritas
conferatur, quia enim istam personam acceptat et illam non, ideo
infundit isti caritatem et non illi; unde unam personam acceptat
ad gratiam et aliam non.
50 Item, tertio sic, ex parte actus meritorii: actus debet esse
acceptatus per aliquid formale in eo exsistens; sed caritas non est
forma actus; ergo per caritatem non potest actus voluntatis
formaliter esse acceptatus.
51 Item, si caritas sit formalis ratio quare actus voluntatis sit
acceptatus, ergo non potest esse actus a caritate et non acceptatus
Deo. Consequens est falsum, quia non est necesse Deum pro
minori bono dare maius bonum ut eius praemium. Consequentia
patet, quia posita ratione formali alicuius, ponitur ipsum; ergo
etc. Nec est necesse secundum iustitiam distributivam vel com-
mutativam Deum acceptare illud ad praemium.
52 Contra:
Per illud unumquodque est formaliter tale per quod
distinguitur formaliter ab omni alio non-tali. Sed per solam
caritatem distinguitur acceptus a non-accepto, dicente Augustino,
XV De Trinitate, cap. 18. 32 Loquens de caritate, dicit quod solum
hoc donum est quod dividit inter filios regni et filios perditionis
aeternae, quia ipsa posita omnibus aliis ablatis ponitur
acceptatio, et ipsa ablata etiam omnibus aliis remanentibus
removetur acceptatio; ergo etc. Et eodem modo arguitur de actu
quia positis omnibus condicionibus in actu tolle gratiam non
sunt digni vita aeterna; sed caritate et actu eius positis sunt digni
vita aeterna.
m August.. De Trin. XV, c. 18. n. 32 (CCSL 50A. 507; PL 42. 1082)

It seems one is not:

First on the part of the one accepting in this way: For a
person to be accepted by God' is nothing more than for God to
accept him. Nothing in a creature, however, can be the reason
why God accepts some person, since 'divine acceptance' asserts an
intrinsic act by God, and nothing created can be the formal reason
why there is an intrinsic act in God; therefore, etc.
49 Also on the part of the person accepted it is argued in this
way: What follows his acceptance is not the formal reason why
one accepted is accepted; but a person is accepted before charity
may be conferred. For since this person is accepted and that one
is not, therefore he infuses charity in this one and not in that;
hence he accepts one person to grace and another not.
50 Also, thirdly in this way, on the part of the meritorious act:
the act ought to be accepted through something formally existing
in it; but charity is not the form of an act; therefore, an act of the
will cannot formally be accepted through charity.
51 Also, if charity is the formal reason why an act of the will is
accepted, therefore the act resulting from charity must always be
accepted by God. The consequent is false; because it is not
necessary that God for a minor good give a greater good as a
reward. The implication* is evident, because if the formal reason
for something is posited, the thing itself is posited; therefore, etc.
Neither is it necessary according to distributive or commutative
justice that God accept this [as a basis] for a reward.
52 To the contrary: Any single thing is formally such through

that whereby it is formally distinguished from every other thing
that is not such. But it is only through charity that the accepted is
distinguished from the non-accepted, according to Augustine in
Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 18. Speaking of charity he says
that only this gift separates the children of the kingdom from the
children of eternal perdition, because if it is there and everything
else is lacking, there is acceptance; and if it is not there and all
other things remain, there is no acceptance; therefore, etc. And in
the same way it is argued about the act, because, given all the
conditions in the act, minus grace, none are worthy of eternal life;
but given charity and its act, they are worthy of eternal life.
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Art. 1: Praenotationes aliquae]
53 Circa solutionem istius quaestionis aliqua sunt praemit-

tenda, postea ad propositum applicanda. Praemitto enim primo
quod voluntas divina habet aliquod primum obiectum, ut
essentiam divinam solam a qua est omnis perfectio intrinseca
sibi, nam omnis potentia operativa habet et exigit necessario
aliquod primum obiectum. Ergo intellectus et voluntas divina
habent aliquid pro suo obiecto primo; nam voluntas divina non
exigit necessario aliquid aliud a Deo, ut obiectum secundarium, a
quo sit eius perfectio intrinseca. Nec aliqua perfectio intrinseca
hoc exigit, quia nulla perfectio divina minor esset in se si nullum
tale obiectum esset in quocumque esse. Et sic suppono quod
intrinsecum obiectum et primum voluntatis divinae est essentia
divina sicut est obiectum intellectus, et quod nihil extrinsecum
exigit ad actum, quia actus et essentia sunt idem. Et ulterius.
sicut intellectus divinus omnia alia a se intelligit, sic et voluntas
respectu sui et respectu aliorum a se omnia vult.
54 Ex his habetur triplex differentia in voluntate divina. Primo
quod voluntas divina potest esse ratio volendi se et alia
secundario volita.
55 Secundo est quod istud primum obiectum est necessarium
vel necessario volendum. Et iste actus nullo modo potest esse
non-rectus; sed nihil aliud ab isto primo obiecto potest esse
necessario volendum, sicut supra ostensum est distinctione 10.
Sed omne aliud est contingenter volendum.
56 Item tertio: primum obiectum est obiectum ex natura rei
actualiter exsistens respectu intellectus et voluntatis divinae, ita
quod non sunt fictiones circa tale obiectum. Sed obiecta extrinseca
et secundaria non obiciuntur intellectui divino vel voluntati in
tempore et in esse actuali sed ab aeterno, quia Deus de novo nihil
potest velle.
To the Question
Article One
Some preliminary notions
53 Regarding the solution of this question some things need to

be set forth in advance, and afterwards applied to the proposition
at hand. For I first set forth that the divine will has some first
object, such as the divine essence alone, from which all its
intrinsic perfection is derived, for every operative potency
necessarily has and requires a primary object. Hence, the divine
intellect and will have something for their first object; for the
divine will does not require anything other than God, e.g., a
secondary object, from which its intrinsic perfection may come.
Neither does any intrinsic perfection require this, because no
divine perfection would be less in itself, [even] if no such object
were in any being whatsoever. And thus I presuppose that the
intrinsic first object of the divine will is the divine essence, just as
it is the object of the intellect, and [I presuppose] that nothing
outside is required for the act, because the act and the essence
are the same thing. And further, just as the divine intellect of
itself understands everything else, so the will with respect to
itself and with respect to other things wills all things of itself.
54 And from this there is a threefold distinction in the divine
will. First that the divine will can be the reason for willing itself
and other things that are willed secondarily.
55 Secondly that this first object is necessary or is necessarily
willed. And this act in no way can fail to be upright; but nothing
other than this first object can be something that necessarily has
to be willed, as was shown above in distinction ten. But every
other thing is willed contingently.
56 Also thirdly, the first object is from the nature of things an
object actually existing with respect to the divine intellect and
will, so that there is nothing fictitious about such an object. But
extrinsic and secondary objects are not set before the divine
intellect and will in the course of time and as actually existing,
but from eternity, for God cannot will something anew.
[B. Art. 2: Responsio ad quaestionem]
57 Secundo, applicando ad propositum dico quod acceptatio

divina potest accipi multipliciter: vel simpliciter vel respectu
personae. Simplex acceptatio dicitur multipliciter. Primo, simplex
complacentia respectu cuiuscumque volitionis rerum in quantum
imitantur perfectionem divinam sive in quantum res omnes
participant bonitatem divinam. Et ista acceptatio est respectu
obiecti necessarii, sive est necessaria respectu cuiuscumque non
includentis contradictionem divinam sicut intellectus eam videt.
58 Secunda acceptatio est voluntatem Dei esse efficacem sicut
recte in nobis dicitur voluntas esse efficax qua quis vult rem esse
in effectu et necessarium necessario esse in effectu. Et hoc modo
vult Deus rem aliquando esse futuram. Sed de prima
acceptatione, nec de secunda loquor hic. Isto enim modo vult
angelum malum puniri; isto etiam modo vult actum substratum
peccato esse.
59 Alia est acceptatio qua acceptat unum bonum in ordine ad
maius bonum, et illud est respectu creaturae rationalis tantum.
Et ista acceptatio dicitur quaedam volitio ordinata, scilicet meriti
ad praemium et completiva minoris boni. Et dicitur esse
cuiusdam recompensationis, in quantum scilicet ordinat actum
sive volitionem ordinatam, sine usu suo, ad praemium. De hac
ergo acceptatione est dubium quid sit ratio formalis talis
acceptationis.
60 Dico ergo quod caritas non est formalis ratio acceptationis
elicitiva respectu acceptantis sed voluntas divina.
61 Sed intentio quaestionis est non de formali ratione
acceptationis elicitiva sed obiectiva. Non primo modo nec secundo
sed tertio, ut dictum est. Estne igitur caritas ratio formalis
acceptationis? Dico quod sic, non tamen ratio obiectiva prima sed
Article Two
57 Secondly, applying this to the proposition at hand, I say that

divine acceptance can be understood in several ways: either
simply in itself or as regards the person. Simple acceptance is
understood in several ways. First, there is simple complacency as
regards any willing whatsoever in respect to things, either
inasmuch as they imitate the divine perfection or inasmuch as all
things participate in divine goodness. And this acceptance is in
regard to a necessary object, or it is necessary as regards
whatever is not inconsistent with the idea of God as the intellect
sees it.
58 The second acceptance is the will of God being efficacious,
just as in us the will is rightly said to be efficacious whereby
someone wills a thing to be in effect and wills the necessary to be
necessarily in effect. And in this way God wills a thing to exist at
some time in the future. But I do not speak here about the first
acceptance, nor about the second. For in this way he wills the bad
angel to be punished; and also in this way he wills the underlying
act that is in a sin.
59 The other is the acceptance by which he wills one good as
ordered to a greater good, and this happens only with respect to a
rational creature. And this acceptance is called a certain ordered
volition, namely of merit leading to a reward, and of that which
tends to complete a lesser good. And it is said to be [a volition] of
a certain compensation, namely to the extent that it orders an
act, or an ordered volition, without interfering [with that will], to
a reward. It is about this acceptance, therefore, that there is a
doubt as to what the formal reason for it is.
60 I say, therefore, that it is not charity that is the formal
elective reason of acceptance as regards the one accepting but the
divine will.
61 But the intent of the question is not the formal elective
reason of acceptance, but the [formal] objective reason: not in the
first sense, nor in the second sense, but in the third sense, as has
been said. So is charity the formal reason of acceptance? I say
that it is, not however as the first objective reason but the
secundaria. Hoc patet ex prima differentia; nec ratio obiectiva ex

tempore, nec in actuali exsistentia; sed apprehensa in aeternitate;
nec ratio necessaria acceptandi, sed tantum ratio habilitans ut
terminet terminum acceptationis divinae. Et ideo non acceptatur
per caritatem tanquam dignus secundum iustitiam.
62 Sed quomodo caritas dicitur ratio habilitans in ordine ad
iustitiam? Respondeo distinguendo de voluntate divina.
Possumus enim intelligere voluntatem divinam ut obicitur sibi
ratio iusti vel beatitudinis, sicut principia practica non necessaria
ex terminis. Unde ista propositio potest obici intellectui suo
'iustus finaliter debet beatificari', et sic potuit ordinasse
subiectum istud ut sibi non competeret praedicatum, quia in
ratione 'iusti' non includitur quod debeat sibi reddi vita aeterna,
sicut scit astra esse paria, non enim est de ratione astrorum quod
sint paria vel imparia. Sed in subiecto, scilicet in ratione iusti,
includitur habilitas quae est caritas. Et sic Deus ordinavit per
intellectum practicum quod talis beatificaretur secundum hoc
principium practicum constitutum secundum istam legem: scilicet
omni gratiae finaliter est retribuendum. Et tunc voluntas divina
acceptat iustum ut libera per nullam iustitiam determinantem.
63 In secundo vero instanti possumus intelligere aliquod
acceptatum ut particulare et posterius oblatum, illa lege posita, et
haec est ratio acceptationis non necessaria respectu acceptabi-
lium qua voluntas divina prius acceptat universaliter quia illa
lex est universalis antequam applicetur per iudicium ad
aliquod singulare. Iustitia enim divina est secundum leges
universales practicas ab eo ordinatas et institutas. Sed iudicium
divinum est expletio iustitiae in particulari aliquo; et haec dicitur
iustitia Dei particularis. Sic ergo caritas est habilitas acceptandi
sive divinae acceptationis secundum iustitiam in particulari.
64 Quod autem caritas posset esse secunda ratio obiectiva
acceptabilis in vita aeterna, ostendo per rationem sic. Sicut
secondary one. This is evident from the first distinction. It is not

the objective reason in time, nor in actual existence, but as
apprehended in eternity. Neither is it the necessary reason of
acceptance, but only the reason that facilitates providing the term
for divine acceptance. And therefore one is not accepted through
charity as worthy according to [the order of] justice.
62 But how is charity said to be the facilitating reason in the
order of justice? I respond by making a distinction in the divine
will. For we can think of the divine will, insofar as the notions of
the just or of beatitude are set before it as practical principles
that are not necessary in virtue of their terms. Hence, this
proposition can occur to his [God's] intellect: 'the just one ought to
be finally beatified.' And this subject could be [understood to be]
in such a position that the predicate did not [necessarily]
correspond to it, because the notion of just' does not include that
one ought to receive such eternal life, just as 'to know stars to be
equal' does not imply that they are equal or unequal as to their
notion. However, the suitability that is charity is included in the
subject [itself], namely, in the notion of a just person. And in this
way God has ordained through his practical intellect that such be
beatified according to this practical principle constituted
according to this law: namely to every grace there is to be finally
repayment. And then, the divine will as free, with not limiting
justice, accepts the just.
63 In the second instance, however, we can think of something
accepted as a particular [case], and later, after that law had been
passed, offered [a legal status], and this is the reason of
acceptance that is not necessarily as regards what is acceptable:
[as opposed to that,] by which the divine will first accepts
universallybecause that law is universalbefore it may apply
[this general case] through judgment to some particular. For
divine justice is according to universal practical laws ordained
and instituted by him. But divine judgment is the discharge of
justice regarding some particular; and this is called the particular
justice of God. In this way, then, charity is the facility of the
divine acceptance according to justice in particular.
64 The fact that charity could be the second type of objective
reason of being accepted for eternal life, however, I show by
habitus intellectualis includit obiectum in se sub ratione mtel-

ligibilis, ita habitus appetitus intellectualis sive voluntatis inclu
dit in se obiectum sub ratione diligibilis. Et sicut primus habitus,
scilicet intellectus, inclinat ad ostendendum obiectum, ita habitus
voluntatis inclinat et facit potentiam quasi connaturalem illi
obiecto. Et sicut intellectus inclinatur per habitum in obiectum
vel ad obiectum videndum, ita voluntas per suum habitum ad
aliquid appetendum. Sed diligens amore naturali aliquid propter
se, sicut Deus, vult se sive illud diligi ab aliis potentibus diligere,
et sic cum Deus velit se summe propter se, vult quod aha
rationalia eum diligant. Et acceptat alios ad se in quantum
diligentes sunt illud obiectum, scilicet Deum. Cum igitur iste
habitus caritatis sit ratio formalis diligentis, ista erit ratio
formalis obiectiva secundaria acceptationis. Ratio ergo stat in hoc
quod habitus voluntatis potest esse naturaliter inclinans ad
obiectum dilectum et sic iste habitus, scilicet caritas, potest esse
ratio formalis quare iste diligitur a Deo sub ratione qua ipse est
diligibilis.
65 Exemplum ad hoc est supra in quaestione 'De frui', ubi
dictum fuit qualiter Deus est sphaera intelligibilis cuius centrum
est ubique et circumferentia nusquam.33 Si centrum amaret se
propter se, amaret quidlibet tendens in centrum. Ergo et gravitas
quae est principium tendendi in centrum, esset ratio formalis
quare centrum diligeret omne grave et de levibus non curaret.
66 Sic in proposito loco centri est Deus, loco ponderis caritas
quae inclinat in Deum; sed pondus allevans, secundum
Augustinum, XI Confessionum:34 "Pondus meum, amor meus" etc.
Et sic patet quod ratio naturalis potest arguere quod habitus
dilectionis est inclinans et habilitans in obiectum summe
diligibile.
67 Aliud exemplum est de pulchritudine secundum Augus
tinum, VIII De Trinitate, cap. 10.35 Iustitia namque magna animi
i:i Cf. supra Dist. 1, p. 3, q. 1-3. n. 94.

" August., Conf. XIII, c. 9, n. 10 (CCSL 27, 246; PL 32, 849): "Pondus meum
amor meus; eo feror quocumque feror".
:lr> August., De Trin. VIII, c. 6, n 9 (CCSL 50. 281; PL 42, 954): "Est quaedam
pulchritudo ammi justitia".
reason in this way. Just as an intellectual habit includes an object

in itself under an intelligible aspect, so the habit of an intellectual
appetite or of the will includes in itself the object under the aspect
of lovable. And just as the first habit, namely of the intellect, is
inclined to show the object, so the habit of the will inclines the
faculty and makes it as it were connatural with its object. And
just as the intellect is inclined through the habit towards its
object or to seeing its object, so the will through its habit is
inclined to seek it. But the one loving by natural love something
for its own sake, like God does, wills himself or that [object] to be
loved by others capable of loving [it], and thus since God wills
himself to the highest degree for his own sake, he wills that other
rational things love him. And he accepts others to himself
inasmuch as they are the ones loving this object, namely God.
Therefore, since this habit of charity is the formal reason for
loving, so it will be a formal secondary objective reason of
acceptance. Therefore, the reason pursuades us that a habit of the
will can be naturally inclining to an object loved, and in this way
this habit, namely charity, can be a formal reason why this
person is loved by God under the [same] aspect, under which he is
himself lovable.
65 An example of this is found above in the question 'about
enjoyment [of God],' where it was said how God is like an
intelligible sphere whose center is everywhere and whose
circumference is nowhere. If the center loved itself for its own
sake, it would love whatever tends towards the center. Therefore,
also heaviness, which is a principle tending to the center, would
be the formal reason why the center would love every heavy thing
and might not care about light things.
66 It is so in the case at hand: in place of the center we have
God, and in place of heaviness, charity that inclines one towards
God. But it is an uplifting heaviness, according to Augustine in
Bk. XI of The Confessions: "My weight is my love," etc. and so it is
evident that natural reason can argue that the habit of love is
inclining and facilitating towards the object as the highest
lovable.
67 Another example is about beauty according to Augustine in
Bk. VIII, chapter 10 of The Trinity. For justice is the great beauty
pulchritudo qua scilicet distinguitur iustus a peccatore. Sicut in

Veteri Testamento distinguitur sapiens ab insipiente, sic in Novo
per gratiam distinguitur iustus a peccatore. Sic iustitia est
quaedam pulchritudo et similitudo deiformis, sed omnis
similitudo et pulchritudo est ratio diligibilitatis in qualibet re;
ergo etc.
68 Sicut patet de pulchritudine in corporalibus et de similitu-
dine in animabus, sic ergo animi pulchritudo est propria ratio
ulterioris diligibilitatis qua Deus diligit alia a se. Eodem modo
dico de actu caritatis in quantum inclinat in actum ex habitu;
sicut habitus est ratio diligibilitatis obiecti in quantum inclinat in
actum, sic de actu. Unde sicut ponderositas est ratio acceptandi
ponderosum, quod correspondet personae acceptatae, et ratio
acceptandi actum, id est descensum gravis vel ponderosi, cui
correspondet actus caritatis, ita caritas est ratio acceptandi non
tantum personam, sed actum, non intrinsece sed extrinsece.
69 Sed exemplum de pulchritudine non est sic ad propositum.
quia pulchritudo dilecti non est ratio acceptandi, nec intrinseca
nec extrinseca, propter hoc quod persona placet; nec est ratio
acceptandi respectu cuiuscumque; unde nec respectu pecudis etc.
Sed de gravi et centro est magis ad propositum secundum quod
ista persona tendit ad Deum sicut ad centrum ex illo habitu
caritatis sicut ex pondere.
70 Ad primum in oppositum,36 quando dicitur quod nihil

formale est in persona quare Deus acceptet eam, quia acceptatio
dicit actum intrinsecum, dicendum quod acceptatio personae nihil
aliud est realiter quam quod Deus acceptet, sed in comparatione
ad obiectum. Unde non sequitur conclusio, quia in una
propositione ponitur comparatio ad obiectum, et in alia e
converse
i6 Cf. supra n. 48.

of the soul, namely which distinguishes the just from the sinner.
As in the Old Testament the wise is distinguished from the fool,
so in the New Testament the just is distinguished from the sinner
by grace. In this way justice is a certain beauty and godlike
likeness. All likeness and beauty, however, is a reason for loving
in any thing; therefore, etc.
68 Just as this is evident in the case of beauty in bodily things
and likeness in the souls, in the same way the beauty of the soul
is a proper reason for further love by which God loves others than
himself. In the same way, I say, the act of charity [functions],
inasmuch as it inclines to an act through the habit; just as the
habit is the reason for the lovability of the object inasmuch as it
inclines to the act, so also about the act [of charity]. Hence, just as
heaviness is a reason for accepting the heavy (that corresponds to
the person accepted) and accepting the act, i.e., the descent of the
heavy or weighty thing (to which corresponds the act of charity),
so charity is the reason for accepting not only the person but also
the act, not intrinsically but extrinsically.
69 But the example of beauty is not relevant in this way to the
case at hand, because the beauty of the beloved, neither intrinsic
nor extrinsic, is not the reason for its acceptance, on account of
the fact that the person is pleasing; neither is it the reason for
acceptance as regards anyone whatsoever; hence neither as
regards a beast, etc. But [the example] of the heavy and the
center is more like the case at hand, as this person by virtue of
that habit of charity, as by the force of gravitation, tends to God
as to the center [of gravity].
70 To the first argument for the opposite [n. 48], when it is said
that nothing formal in a person is the reason why God accepts
him, because acceptance refers to an intrinsic act [of God], it must
be said that the acceptance of a person is nothing other in reality
than that God accepts, but taking into consideration the object.
Hence the conclusion does not follow, because one proposition
does include considering the object, and the other does not.
71 Ad minorem, quando dicitur quod nihil formale est per quod

Deus acceptet, dicendum quod caritas est ratio formalis obiectiva
secundaria acceptationis. Sed in creaturis nihil est ratio quare
Deus acceptet elicitive, nec ut ratio obiectiva primo. Sed aliquid in
creatura, non exsistens sed aeternaliter apprehensum, potest esse
ratio obiectiva acceptandi secundario.
72 Ad secundum,37 quando dicitur quod acceptatio praecedit
caritatem, ergo non est ratio eius, dicendum quod duplex est
acceptatio: una secundum quid et alia simpliciter. Prima est
praevia ad secundam sicut quando sunt duo peccatores quorum
unum acceptat Deus ad gratiam, alium non nisi ad gratiam gratis
datam quae est acceptatio secundum quid. Alia autem acceptatio
simpliciter est ad bonum simpliciter, scilicet ad vitam ae tern am
Et ista sequitur caritatem vel semper concomitatur, et alia
praecedit.
73 Ad tertium38 quando dicitur quod actus debet esse acceptus
per quid formale in eo, respondeo quod caritas non est ratio
formalis intrinseca nec obiectiva primo, ut dictum est.
74 Ad quartum,39 quando dicitur 'si caritas esset formalis ratio
acceptandi, Deus non posset non acceptare personam', dicendum
quod consequentia est nulla. Non enim est necesse quod Deus
acceptet illam; Deus enim aliter posset illam acceptare si vellet
quam per caritatem.
[Pars II
Quaestio 1
Utrum in augmentatione caritatis tota caritas
praeexsistens corrumpatur]
75 Supposito quod caritas possit augmentari quia secundum

Augustinum, VI De Trinitate, cap. 7, 40 "in his quae non sunt mole
" Cf. supra n 49.

:lH Cf. supra n. 50.
i9 Cf. supra n. 51.
i0 August., De Trin. VI, c. 8, n. 9 (CCSL 50, 238; PL 42, 929)
71 To the minor, when it is said that there is no formal

[created] thing through which God accepts, it must be said that
charity is the formal secondary objective reason of acceptance.
But in creatures there is no reason that would elicit God's
acceptance, nor is there any primary objective reason. But there
is something in creatures, not existing, but eternally
apprehended, that can be a secondary objective reason for
acceptance.
72 To the second [n. 49], when it says that acceptance precedes
charity, therefore the latter is not the reason of the former, it
must be said that acceptance is twofold: one in a qualified sense
and another in an unqualified sense. The first is before the second
just as when there are two sinners, one of whom God accepts to
grace, and the other only to the grace given undeservedly, which
is acceptance in a qualified sense. The acceptance [from the]
former [example], however, is unqualified as regards the good in
an unqualified sense, namely to eternal life, and it follows charity
or is always concomitant with it, and the other precedes.
73 To the third [n. 50] when it is said that the act must be
accepted through something formal in it, I respond that charity is
not the formal intrinsic reason nor is it the primary objective one,
as has been said.
74 To the fourth [n. 51] when it is said that if charity were the
formal reason of acceptance, God could not possibly fail to accept
a person, it must be said that there is no logical connection. For it
is not necessary that God accept that one, for God could accept
one in a way other than through charity if he willed.
Part II
Question One
Is the whole of the preexisting charity corrupted
when charity is increased?
75 Assuming charity can be increased, because according to

Augustine in Bk. VI of The Trinity, chapter 7, "among those
things which are not great in bulk, being better is the criterion of
greatness," it is asked about the manner of augmentation and
first whether in the augmentation of charity the whole of the
magna, hoc est maius quod melius", quaeritur de modo augmen

tationis et primo utrum in augmentatione caritatis tota caritas
praeexsistens corrumpatur et alia numero nova inducatur
perfection
Videtur quod sic: Quia si non corrumperetur, tunc forma

caritatis mutaretur de minori ad magis. Consequens est falsum,
quia forma simplex non potest esse subiectum transmutationis.
76 Contra: Philosophus, I De generatione:4i oportet auctum

manere sive formam; ergo et caritatem praeexsistentem augmen-
tatam per novum gradum caritatis sequentis oportet manere et
non corrumpi.
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio Godefridi]
77 Hic dicit unus doctor42 quod in intensione cuiuscumque

formae gradus formae praecedentis corrumpitur in adventu
gradus sequentis, quia "termini motus sunt incompossibiles", V
Physicorum.43 Sed ille gradus praecedens et iste de novo
adveniens in ista mutatione augmentations formae sunt termini
mutationis istius. Ergo non sunt simul, et sic una corrumpitur in
adventu alterius.
78 Huic opinioni addo duas rationes. Prima sit ista: eodem
modo se habent maius et minus in eadem specie quomodo se
habent maius et minus in diversis speciebus proportionaliter. Sed
in diversis speciebus quanto una species est perfectior alia, tanto
perfectius continet eam et modo simpliciori, ita quod secunda
species contenta non facit additionem ad ipsam, quia superior non
habet speciem inferiorem realiter. Sed simplicius ens est absque
re addita, ergo cum simplicitas sit perfectio in omnibus formis,
videtur quod in eadem specie forma simplicior sit perfectior, non
habens formam vel gradum sibi additum.
4i Aristot., Degener. et corrupt. I, c. 5 (3216 10-3).

M Godefridus de Font., Quodl. II, q. 10 in corp. (PhB II, 145).
Cf. Aristot., Physica V, c. 3 (227a 7-10).
preexisting charity is corrupted and another more perfect that is

numerically new is introduced.
It seems that it is: for if it were not corrupted, then the form
of charity would be changed from less to greater. The consequent
is false, because a simple form cannot be the subject of change.
76 To the contrary:
The Philosopher in Bk. I of On generation: it is necessary
that the form or what is increased remains; therefore preexisting
charity augmented through the new degree of charity that follows
must remain and not be corrupted.
To the Question
The opinion of Godfrey of Fontaine
77 Here one doctor says that in intensification of any form

whatsoever the degree of the preceding form is corrupted with the
coming of the degree of the following form, because 'the terms of
motion" are incompatible,' according to Bk. V of the Physics. But
in this change of the form by increase, this preceding degree [of
charity] and that degree coming to be are the terms of this
[motion or] mutation. Therefore, they do not exist at the same
time, and thus one is corrupted with the advent of the other.
78 To this opinion I add two [confirming] reasons. The first is
this: the greater and the less in the same species are
proportionately related in the same way as the greater and less in
diverse species. But in diverse species the more perfect one
species is, in comparison to another, the more perfect and simple
is the way in which it contains the latter, so that the second
species that is contained does not produce an addition to it, since
the superior species in reality does not retain the inferior species.
A 'simpler being' means 'containing nothing added.' Since
simplicity, then, is a perfection in all forms, it seems that, in the
same species, the simpler form that does not have a form or
degree added to it is more perfect.
i : That is, the beginning and the end of the motion.

79 Item, consimili modo se habent magis et minus in formis

accidentalibus et in substantia, si in substantia esset magis et
minus. Sed secundum omnes ponentes magis et minus in
substantia sive in forma substantiali, substantia perfectior etiam
in eadem specie est simplicior alia, non faciens additionem cum
minus perfecta sed continens eam modo simplici. Quia perfectio
unius individui non est in alio individuo, ut ponitur de anima
Christi, quae non fuit compositior quam anima Petri, sed
simplicior, et tamen perfectior in esse animae. Ergo eodem modo
erit de forma accidentali.
[B. Contra opinionem Godefridi]
80 Sed contra istam opinionem arguitur sic. Supposito quod

possibile sit Deum posse augere caritatem in illo instanti in quo
elicitur actus meritorius ponatur ergo in esse quaero a qua
caritate elicitur actus ille meritorius, quia necessario ab aliqua
caritate elicitur, ut prius ostensum est.44 Non a caritate infusa de
novo quae augebat caritatem quia est praemium talis actus et
sequitur quodammodo sive aliquo ordine illum actum meritorium.
Nec elicitur a caritate praecedente quia, secundum te, illa
corrumpitur, nam in infusione posterioris caritatis corrumpitur
prior. Ergo in illo instanti in quo caritas augetur, erit actus
meritorius et tamen a nulla caritate, quod est impossibile.
81 Sed dices quod Deus non auget caritatem in illo instanti quo
elicit actum meritorium. Sed actus caritatis transit et stat in
acceptatione divina tanquam quoddam remunerabile. Et tunc
Deus, acceptando actum meritorium, dat post augmentum
caritati praeexsistenti ut quoddam praemium actus, et non dat
simul in eodem instanti praemium cum merito, sicut non dedit
angelis bonis in primo instanti quo meruerunt beatitudinem, sed
in quodam instanti naturae posteriori.
82 Contra: licet istud posset dici in proposito de virtutibus
infusis, non tamen potest dici in augmentatione virtutum
naturalium moralium et intellectualium, et maxime moralium.
Nam virtus moralis augetur per actus morales sicut generatur ex
44 Cf. supra Dist. 17, p. 1, q. 1, a. 30.

79 Also, the way in which the greater and the less are [related]
in accidental forms is similar to [the way they are] in substance, if
a greater and a less were in substance. But according to all who
assume greater and less in substance or in a substantial form, the
more perfect substance, even in the same species, is the one that
is simpler than another and does not accept the less perfect as an
addition, but contains it in a simple manner. For the perfection of
one individual is not found in anothera claim made about the
soul of Christ, which was not more complex than the soul of
Peter, but simpler, and nevertheless more perfect in its being as a
soul. Therefore, the same will hold for an accidental form.
Against the opinion of Godfrey.
80 But against this opinion I argue in this way. Given the

possibility that God could increase charity at the moment a
meritorious act is elicitedthis is assumed to be the caseI ask
by what charity this meritorious act is elicited, because it
necessarily is elicited by some charity, as was shown previously.
Not by the newly infused charity, which is an augmented charity,
because this was a reward for such an act and follows that
meritorious act somehow according to some order. Neither is it
elicited by the previous charity, because according to you that is
corrupted, for in the infusion of the later charity the prior is
corrupted. Therefore in that instant in which charity is
augmented there will be a meritorious act and still it will not be
elicited by any charity, which is impossible.
81 You may say that God does not augment charity in that
instant in which the meritorious act is elicited. But the act of
charity itself [at the same time] passes away and remainsby
divine acceptanceas something to be rewarded. And then God,
by accepting the meritorious act, produces an augmentation of
the preexisting charity afterwards as a kind of reward for the act,
and does not give the reward at the same instant with the merit,
as he does not beatify the good angels in the first instant they
merit beatitude, but in a certain subsequent instant* of nature.
82 To the contrary: although this could be said in the case at
hand about infused virtues, nevertheless it could not be said
eis, II Ethicorum.45 Actus ergo qui auget virtutem moralem, non

auget nisi quando est.
83 Tunc quaero utrum actus ille sit ab aliqua virtute vel non. Si
sic, quaero a qua virtute? Non a praecedente quia corrumpitur,
nec a gradu quem facit, quia ille est posterior sicut effectus sua
causa. Ergo quando auget non est ab aliqua virtute, quod est
impossibile, quia tunc non esset actus virtuosus, et tamen
generaret virtutem, quod est contra Philosophum, II Ethicorum,46
et contra omnem intellectum, quia ex similibus actibus similes
habitus generantur.
84 Eodem modo posset argui de habitu intellectuali et de actu
eius; dum enim est actus speculandi, augmentatur habitus
intellectualis vel speculativus, quia quando non est, nihil facit.
Sed iste actus non est ab habitu praecedente, quia tunc non est
talis habitus sed corrumpitur, nec a gradu sequenti, ergo talis
actus non auget quia nullus est terminus ad quem fiat
augmentatio.
85 Confirmatur hoc, quia in omni actu intelligence, si sit
conversio ad phantasmata, semper phantasma intendit speciem
et actum intelligendi, si non sit summe intensus. Sed non
praeexigit speciem praecedentem, quia illa non est, secundum te,
nec speciem intensam, quia sequitur; ergo aliquis actus
intelligendi erit sine phantasmate.
86 Item, voluntas potest remittere actum intelligendi, quia
potest per suum nolle omnino actum eius corrumpere, avertendo
ipsum a consideratione omnis obiecti secundarii ne ipsum
determinate consideret. Sed omnem actum voluntatis naturaliter
praecedit actus intellectus. In illo ergo instanti in quo voluntas
Aristot., Eth. Nic. II, c. 1 (11036 21-2).

4 Ibid.
about the augmentation of natural moral and intellectual virtues,

and especially of moral ones. For moral virtue is augmented
through moral acts, just as it is generated by such acts, according
to Bk. II of the Ethics. Therefore the act that augments a moral
virtue does so only if it exists.
83 Then I ask whether this act proceeds from some virtue or
not. If it does, I ask from which virtue? Not from what was there
before, since that is corrupted, nor from the new degree produced,
for that follows like an effect follows its cause. And hence, when it
augments, it does not stem from some virtuewhich is
impossible, for then it wouldn't be a virtuous act, and
nevertheless would generate virtue, which is contrary to what the
Philosopher says in Bk. II of the Ethics and unintelligible,
because the like habit is generated from the like acts.
84 In the same way one could argue about an intellectual habit
and its act; for as long as an act of thinking persists, the
intellectual or contemplative habit [it generates] is augmented,
because nothing is produced when it is not going on. This act,
however, is not elicited by the preceding habit, since such a habit,
having been corrupted, no longer exists. Neither is the increase
produced by the degree that follows. Therefore there is nothing to
which an increased degree can be added.
85 This is confirmed, because in every act of understanding
that involves a conversion to the phantasm* or sense image, there
is always an intensification of the object (species)i2 and act of
understanding, unless it is already the most intense. But it does
not pre-require the preceding object or knowledge, since that
according to youno longer exists, nor the intensified object
(species) since it follows later. Therefore, some act of
understanding will be without a sense image or phantasm [i.e.,
without the object of understanding].
86 Also, the will can weaken an act of understanding, because
it can corrupt the intellect's act entirely by not willing it, turning
the mind away from the consideration of any secondary object lest
it consider it specifically. But an act of the intellect naturally
precedes every act of the will. In that instant, therefore, in which
i2 Species here is best understood as what is known (the object, shape, or

form), as opposed to the act of understanding itself.
remittit actum intellectus per actum suum imperativum, oportet

esse intellectum in actu suo. Non in actu intenso praecedenti,
quia ille actus non manet intensus quando voluntas sic eum
remittit; nec in actu remisso, quia ille naturaliter sequitur actum
voluntatis et est terminus alterius volitionis, et sic semper fit
novum individuum. Ergo si actus remissus non sit aliquid
realitatis actus intensi, sequitur quod in illo instanti in quo
voluntas est in actu suo respectu alicuius obiecti, quod47 respectu
illius48 non sit naturaliter prius intellectum in actu, et tunc
voluntas vult aliquid incognitum quod est impossible.
87 Item, secundo arguitur sic, supponendo quod actus secundus
vel tertius possit intendere habitum, licet non sit perfectior nec
intensior primo actu; tunc arguo sic: si actus posterior sit
intendens habitum, et tamen non est necessario intensior nec
perfectior quocumque actu praecedente, non ergo generat novum
individuum caritatis perfectius, quod est contra te.
88 Probatio consequentiae: quia actus generans habitum non
potest ipsum generare nisi secundum proportionem suae virtutis.
Si ergo iste actus, qui est imperfectior primo actu, generat
individuum caritatis perfectius: vel hoc erit in virtute actuum
praecedentium, et tunc manent et non corrumpuntur, contra
opinionem istam; vel virtute propria, et tunc effectus erit
perfectior sua causa totali in virtute, quod est falsum, quia tunc
posset generare aliquid perfectius se seorsum accepto.
89 Item, tertio sic, et est via in naturalibus: calidum corrum-
pens frigidum prius remittit frigidum. Currunt enim duo motus
simul, scilicet intensio sive augmentatio in calore et remissio in
frigiditate. Ergo, secundum hanc opinionem, generatur novum
individuum frigidi.
90 Quaero tunc terminum a quo istius motus ad frigiditatem.
Non potest dici quod frigus maius praecedens, quia illa frigiditas
corrumpitur, nec sequens gradus frigiditatis remissior, quia tunc
47 Quod superfine dictum.

iH Supple: hoc obiectum.
the will weakens an act of the intellect through its imperative act,
it is necessary that the intellect be acting. [However, it would not]
not [act] by the intense act that preceded, because that act does
not remain intense when the will weakens it in this way; nor by
the less intense act because that naturally follows the act of the
will and is the term of another volition, and thus a new individual
[act] always comes to exist. Therefore if the remiss act is not
something of the reality of the intense act, it follows that in that
instant in which the will is acting as regards some object, with
regard to it [this object willed] would not be first actually
understood, and then the will wills something unknown, which is
impossible.
87 Also, secondly it is argued in this way, by presupposing that
the second or third act could increase the habit, although it is not
more perfect or more intense than the first act. Then I argue in
this way: if the posterior act increases the habit and nevertheless
is not necessarily more intense or more perfect than any
preceding act, therefore it will not generate a new individual
instance of more perfect charity, which is against what you hold.
88 Proof of the implication: for an act generating a habit cannot
produce it except in proportion to its strength. Therefore if this
act, which is less perfect than the first act, generates an
individual instance of more perfect charity, either this will be in
virtue of the preceding acts, and then they will remain
uncorrupted, which is contrary to this opinion, or it will be in
virtue of itself, and then the effect will be more perfect in power
than its entire cause, which is false. For then it could generate
something more perfect than itself, contrary to what is
[commonly] accepted.
89 Also, thirdly in this way, and it is the way things occur in
what is natural: what is hot corrupting what is cold first remits
the cold. For there are two movements running simultaneously,
namely an increase or augmentation in heat and a remission in
coldness. Therefore, according to this opinion, a new individual
coldness is generated.
90 Then I look for the term from which this movement towards
coldness began. It cannot be claimed that the greater cold went
before, because this coldness is corrupted. Neither is this the
effectus esset excedens suam causam in entitate et perfectione,

quod non est intelligibile secundum Augustinum, Super Genesim,
et 83 Questionum quaestione 2. 49
91 Item, omne quod movetur dum movetur partim est in
termino a quo et partim in termino ad quem, V et VI Physico-
rum.m Si ergo calidum agat in frigidum in toto motu, frigidum
habet aliquid de calido. Si ergo in toto motu non remittitur
frigidum antequam corrumpatur sequitur quod contrarium in
summo et non remissum sit cum aliquo gradu sui contrarii. Et
cum istae formae non habeant latitudinem, sequitur quod
contraria in summo possunt esse simul vera. Remittitur ergo
frigidum. Ergo secundum hanc opinionem generatur aliud
suppositum frigidi. Sed illud non generatur ex frigido praecedente
quia illud corruptum est. Ergo generatur ex calido et ita calidum
generaret frigidum quod est impossibile.
92 Item, quarto sic: si semper corrumpitur forma praecedens,
sequitur quod non possit esse motus secundum gradus formae
qualitatis, quia statim quando receditur a termino a quo,
generatur alia forma. Ergo tantum erit motus in qualitate
secundum gradus mobilis. Sed hoc est falsum, quia tunc esset
motus continuus, cuius tamen partes non copularentur ad
aliquem terminum communem, quia quaero: in quo est mutatio
copulans? Aut est in aliquo divisibili, et hoc non potest esse, quia
nulla pars tota simul alteratur, sed pars ante partem, secundum
i!l August, De Genesi ad litt. libri 12, XII. c. 16. n. 33 (CSEL 28.1, 402; PL 34,
467); De diversis qq. 83, q. 2 (CCSL 44A, 11; PL 40, 11).
5n Aristot., Physica V, c. 1 (2246 7-10); ibid., VI, c. 4 (2346 10-22).
following less intense degree of cold, for then the effect13 would be
exceeding its cause in being and perfection, which is unthinkable
according to Augustine, On Genesis, and 83 Questions, question
two.
91 Also, everything that moves while it is moving is partly in
its term 'from which' and partly in its term to which,' according to
Bk. V and VI of the Physics. If therefore the hot acts on the cold,
considering the entire motion, the cold has something from the
hot. If therefore in the entire motion the cold is not remitted
before it is corrupted, it follows that a contrary in the highest
[degree]14and not remittedcoexists with some grade of its
contrary.15 And since these forms do not have any leeway, it
follows that contraries in the highest degree can be simul
taneously true. Therefore, the frigid is remitted. Hence according
to this opinion some supposit16 for the frigid is generated. But
that is not generated from a preceding coldness, since that is
corrupted. Therefore it is generated from what is hot and thus the
frigid would be generated from the hot, which is impossible.
92 Also, fourthly in this way: if the preceding form is always
corrupted, it follows that there cannot be motion according to the
degree of a quality-form,17 because immediately when it recedes
from its term from which,' another form is generated. Therefore,
there will only be alteration according to the degree of the
mobile.18 But this is false, because then there will be continuous
motion, whose parts, nevertheless, are not connected to some
common term, because I ask: where is the source of unity in this
mutation? Let us suppose that it is in something divisible:19
however, this cannot be because no part of the whole is altered at
the same time [with other parts], but one part is altered before
the other, according to this opinion. Therefore the mutation will
13 Namely, the corresponding 'greater heat,' since the cold is less intense.
14 Namely, the most intense cold.
15 Namely, the increased heat.
10 Namely, some subject or substance that can be either hot or cold.
17 A quality is an accidental form that, unlike the substance in which it
inheres, can exist in various degrees (cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 8 [106 26ff|).
18 On the kinds of change in the mobile, see Aristotle, Physics V, ch. 1 (2246
35ff).
19 Whatever is moved is divisible (Aristotle, Physics VI, ch. 4 (2346 21-235a
13).
istam opinionem. Ergo esset illa mutatio in indivisibili et ita

subito51 fieret calidus.
93 Item, sequitur quod omne califactibile, dum calefit erit
calidum infinitis calefactionibus, vel calefiat infinitis caloribus.
Quia si fiat motus praecise secundum gradus mobilis successive,
cum infinitae partes sint in mobili ut in calefactibili, saltem in
potentia, et nulla pars mobilis in eodem gradu caloris calefieret
cum alia, sed alio calore cum alio gradu, sequitur quod totum fiat
calidum inflnitis gradibus caloris, quod est impossible.
94 Prima ratio non valet, quia tunc concluderet universaliter

de omni augmento, et ita in augmento corporali terminus praece-
dens et gradus sequens augmentans essent incompossibiles, quod
est destruere augmentum.
[C. Alia responsio secundum opinionem Godefredi]
95 Respondetur secundum istam viam,52 concedendo conclusio-

nem, quod ita est novum individuum quanti molis quando aliquid
fit maius, sicut quando aliquid fit intensius secundum virtutem,
fit novum individuum intensionis.
[D. Haec responsio habet duo inconvenientia]
96 Sed contra: ex hoc videntur sequi duo inconvenientia.

Primum, quia si rarefiat species vini in sacramento altaris, erit
quantitas maior secundum molem quam prius, quia talem rare-
factionem necessario concomitatur maior quantitas. Sed illa
quantitas quae fuit vini ante rarefactionem non manet post
rarefactionem ibi, sed corrumpitur, secundum istam opinionem.
Ergo nec manet ibi sanguis post rarefactionem speciei vini, quia
non tenetur communiter quod sanguis ibi maneat nisi quamdiu
51 Subito: aliae lectiones penitus (V) et in instanti (T).

5* Godefridus de Font., Quodl. II, q. 10 in corp. (PhB II. 145).
be in what is not divisible, and thus it will instantaneously

become hot in its entirety.20
93 Also, it follows that every thing able to become hot, while it
is the process of becoming hot, will be heated by an infinity of
applications of heat, or it will become hot by an infinity of
heatings. Because if motion comes into existence precisely by a
succession of degrees in the mobilesince there are infinite parts
in the mobile, e.g., in what is able to become hot, at least in
potency, and no part of the mobile will be heated with the same
degree of heat as another, but with another heat and in another
degreeit follows that the whole will become hot by infinite
degrees of heat, which is impossible.
94 The first reason is not valid, because then one would
conclude that it was always the case in every augmentation, and
so in corporeal augmentation the preceding term and the
following augmented degree would be incompatible, which
destroys the augmentation.
Another reply according to the opinion of Godfrey
95 Another answer is to concede the conclusion that when

something becomes greater, there is a new individual amount of
mass, in the same way as when something becomes more intense,
as to its strength, a new individual instance of intensity occurs.
This reply has two incongruities
96 To the contrary: two incongruities seem to follow from this.

The first, because if the outward apparent body (species)* of wine
in the sacrament* of the altar is rarefied, its quantity* in terms of
its mass will be greater than before, since a greater quantity
necessarily accompanies such a rarefaction. But the quantity of
the wine as it was before it was rarefied does not remain once it is
rarefied, but according to this opinion that quantity is corrupted.
Therefore, neither does there remain blood after the outward
apparent body of wine is rarefied, because the common
[theological] opinion is that the blood remains only as long as the
m Reading subito together with penitus and in instanti: see note to the Latin.
manent ibi accidentia et species accidentium quae afficiunt vinum

conversum in sanguinem.
97 Aliud inconveniens sequitur quia tunc videretur quod talis
rarefactio non possit esse agentis naturalis vel quod agens natu-
rale ageret de nihilo nulla praesupposita materia vel substantia,
quod videtur impossible. Consequentia patet, quia in tali rare-
factione non praesupponitur materia substantialis, quia
substantia non est ibi alterabilis, nec etiam praesupponitur
eadem quantitas manens eadem, scilicet numero, ante rare-
factionem.53 Et tamen agens naturale potest ita rarefacere istas
species et condensare, et sic agens naturale potest agere nihil
praesupponendo suae actioni. Quid ergo erit in rarefactione ubi
quaelibet pars rarefacti est maior? Sequitur enim maior
difficultas principali, scilicet de speciebus sacramenti quae tacta
est,54 quod ibi erit individuum novum in quantitate quod poterit
generari virtute naturali sine subiecto. Sed ipsi respondent ad hoc
sicut patebit in IV libro.55
[II. Solutio Scoti]
98 Dico ergo concedendo conclusionem istarum rationum,56 et

quod ista realitas positiva, quae est in caritate minore, manet
realiter in caritate maiore ita quod illa praeexsistens nihil perdit
positivum nec corrumpitur nisi quantum ad esse prius quod
habuit per se et in se et modo manet in alio ut pars in toto, et sic
non corrumpitur esse prius nisi quantum ad negationem
perseitatis, quia habet esse partis, et ita in alio acquirit aliud
esse, scilicet partis et etiam esse totius, et hoc non tollit esse sed
praecisionem eius, scilicet modum essendi. Exemplum est de
materia per se vel de forma per se, quae non corrumpuntur ut
sunt in toto, sed manent perfectius in toto quam quando
habuerunt esse per se. Sicut ergo de augmento in quantitate
molis intelligo, scilicet quod pars quae praefuit, est pars quantita-
tis sequentis et non tollitur, immo perfectius esse acquiritur, ita
r,:i T addit: et post.

M Cf. supra n. 96.
'r> Cf. Oxon. IV, d. 12, q. 4, n. 7 (ed. Vives, XVII, 618-9).
r, Cf. supra nn. 80-94.
accidents and outward appearances remain that were attached to

the wine before it is changed into blood.
97 Another incongruity follows, because then it would seem
that such a rarefaction could not be attributed to a natural agent
or that a natural agent could act on nothing, where no matter or
substance is presupposed, which seems impossible. The
implication is evident, because in such a rarefaction no material
substance is presupposed, since the substance there cannot be
altered, nor is the quantity there presumed to remain the same
before and after2i rarefaction. Nevertheless a natural agent can
rarefy and condense these outward apparent bodies (species), and
thus a natural agent can act where nothing on which it is acting
is presumed to exist. What will be there, then, where each part of
what is rarefied is greater? Here a greater difficulty than the first
(namely of the outward appearances of the sacrament that has
been touched on [in n. 96]) follows, the fact that there will be a
quantitatively new individual that could be generated by natural
power without a subject. But these22 respond to this, as will be
made clear in Bk. IV.
98 By conceding the conclusion of these arguments [n. 80-94],

therefore, I say that this positive reality that exists in lesser
charity really remains in the greater charity, so that nothing
positive preexisting perishes or is corrupted except to the extent
that what before existed per se in itself, now remains in another
as a part in the whole. And in this way its prior being is not
corrupted except inasmuch as its existence per se is negated,
since it has existence as a part, and so it acquires another being
in another, namely that of a part and also that of being in a
whole, and this does not destroy its being but the precise mode of
being. An example is matter per se and form per se, which are not
corrupted as they exist in a whole, but remain more perfect in the
whole than when they had being per se. Therefore just as I think
about the augmentation in quantity, namely that a part which
2i Reading after T: see note to the Latin.

22 Godfrey, and those who follow him.
intelligo hic de quantitate virtutis, sive de intensione in

qualitatibus.
[III. Ad rationem Godefridi]
99 Ad rationem57 istius opinionis dico quod termini motus per

se, cuiusmodi sunt forma et privatio, sunt incompossibiles. Sed
forma remissa et ipsa intensa non sunt per se huiusmodi termini
motus, quia forma remissa non est privatio, sed positio quaedam.
Sunt ergo termini motus per accidens, in quantum forma remissa
coniungitur cum per se termino, quae est privatio. Unde licet per
se 'terminus a quo' motus corrumpatur in adventu termini ad
quem, ut privatio, non tamen oportet quod forma quae
concomitatur per accidens talem terminum a quo per se
corrumpatur. Facis ergo fallaciam consequentis, quia forma
remissa est terminus a quo ut coniungitur privationi in quantum
est praecise ens per se, et hoc non manet. Sed ut ens in alio, non
est coniuncta privationi, sed termino ad quem, et sic manet
eadem numero quae prius, sed intensior et magis perfecta.
100 Ad confirmationem primam58 dico quod est ad oppositum,
quia ordo specierum est secundum essentias et quiditates, et ideo
una non continet quiditatem nec essentiam alterius. Sed ordo
secundum gradus eiusdem formae est secundum partes
materiales quae possunt esse simul. Et forma quanto sub pluribus
talibus gradibus formae est, tanto perfectior et intensior forma
est. Opposito ergo modo est hic et ibi, quia omnes gradus
materiales, scilicet eiusdem formae numero, sunt potentiales
respectu essentiae, et ideo opposito modo est maioritas utrobique.
101 Ad secundam confirmationem59 dico quod est ad oppositum,
quia Philosophus eo modo quo concedit magis et minus in
accidentibus, negat in substantiis; non negat in substantiis maius
" Cf. supra n. 77.

r>H Cf. supra n. 78.
59 Cf. supra n. 79.
existed before is a part of the quantity that follows, and is not

destroyed, indeed it acquires more perfect being, so I think of the
quantity of a virtue here, or about the intensification of qualities.
To the arguments of Godfrey
99 To the argumentation [n. 77] of this opinion, I say that the

per se terms of motion, which are form and privation, are
incompatibles. But a form remitted and the same form intensified
are not such per se terms of motion, since the form remitted is not
a privation, but a certain state [of the form]. Hence these are
accidental terms of movement, insofar as the remitted form is
joined with the term per se, which is a privation. Whence,
although the per se term 'from which' of motion is corrupted with
the coming of the term 'to which,' as privation, nevertheless it is
not necessary that the form that accidentally accompanies such a
term 'from which' is corrupted per se. Therefore you commit a
fallacy of consequent, because the remiss form is the term 'from
which' [only] inasmuch as it is precisely a being per se, as it is
joined to a privation, and this does not remain. But as a being in
another it is not joined to a privation, but to the term 'to which,'
and qua such it remains the same numerically as before, but it is
more intense and more perfect.
100 To the first confirmation [n. 78], I say that it [is an
argument] for the opposite [opinion], because the order of species
is according to essences and quiddities, and therefore one
[species] does not contain the quiddity or essence of the other. But
the order according to degrees of the same form is according to
material parts, which can exist simultaneously. And to the extent
that the form is under several such degrees, to that extent it is
more perfect and more intense. Hence, the situation is entirely
different in one and another case, because all material degrees,
namely, of the numerically same form, are potential with respect
to the essence, and therefore 'being greater' in each case is
something completely different.
101 To the second confirmation [n. 79] I say that it leads to the
opposite conclusion, because the Philosopher denies that a
greater and less are in the same way in substances as they are in
et minus secundum partes mobilis, immo concedit. Ergo isto modo

negat maius et minus in accidentibus, scilicet secundum partes
mobilis; negat autem maius et minus in substantiis secundum
partes vel gradus formae; ergo isto modo concedit in accidentibus.
Unde quia Philosophus ponit formam substantialem indivisibilem
in se, ideo nullum gradum formae ponit cum alio. Sed modo
opposito est in accidentibus, quia forma accidentalis est divisibilis
secundum gradus, ideo quilibet gradus compatitur secum alium
et perficitur eo.
[IV. Ad argumentum principale]
102 Ad rationem principalem60 quando dicitur quod forma

caritatis mutaretur etc., dico quod forma non est subiectum
mutationis, sed habet se respectu diversorum graduum eius, sicut
forma speciei ad duo individua quae de novo habent esse speciei.
Et non est subiectum eius, sed sequitur quod species habet aliud
esse in uno individuo et aliud in alio, quia cum individua
multiplicantur de novo, species modo incipit esse in uno individuo
et modo in alio. Unde non est motus formae secundum istos
gradus, quia non sunt accidentia superaddita naturae formae, sed
sunt modi intrinseci dicentes certum gradum quantitatis virtualis
illius formae.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum illud positivum praeexsistens et manens sit tota
essentia caritatis augmentatae]
103 Supposito quod caritas prior non corrumpatur quando

augmentatur caritas, est quaestio propter aliam opinionem de
augmento caritatis, utrum illud positivum praeexsistens et
manens sit tota essentia caritatis augmentatae, ita quod si
m Cf. supra n. 75.

accidents, but he does not deny that there is a greater and less in
substance according to the parts of the mobile, [or degrees of
substance]; indeed he concedes it. Therefore in this way he denies
that there is greater and less in accidents, namely, according to
the parts of the mobile. At the same time, he denies that there is
a greater or less in substances according to parts or degrees of
form; therefore in this way he concedes it in accidents. Hence,
since the Philosopher assumes substantial form to be indivisible
in itself, he posits no degree of [such] form to be with another
[degree]. But in accidents it is in the opposite way, because
accidental form is divisible according to degrees, therefore each
degree is compatible with another and is perfected by it.
102 To the initial argument [n. 75] when it is said that the form
of charity would be changed, etc., I say that the form is not the
subject of change, but the form is [differently] positioned in
regard to its diverse degrees, just as the form of the species in
regard to two individuals, which give the species a new being.
And [the species] is not a subject of [change], but it follows that
the species has one being in one individual and another being in
another, because when individuals are multiplied anew, the
species begins to be now in one individual and now in another.
Hence there is not a movement of form according to those
degrees, because they are not accidents superadded to the nature
of the form, but are intrinsic* modes affirming a certain degree of
virtual quantity of that form.
Question Two
Is that positive preexisting and remaining thing
the entire essence of the augmented charity?
103 Supposing that the prior charity is not corrupted when

charity is augmented, a question arises in connection with
another opinion about the increase in charity: Is that positive
preexisting and remaining thing the entire essence of the
increased charity, so that if the augmented charity were to be
poneretur caritas augmentata sine subiecto, nullam realitatem

positivam haberet in se essentialiter aliam ab illa quae praefuit in
caritate remissa.
Videtur quod non:

Philosophus, VIII Metaphysicae:61 "formae se habent sicut
numeri", quoad hoc quod sicut quilibet numerus additus variat
numerum, ita quilibet gradus in forma additus variat speciem.
Ergo in essentia huius formae non potest aliquid addi, manente
eadem specie. Sed supponitur quod caritas intensa et remissa sint
eiusdem speciei. Ergo non additur ibi aliquis gradus ultra
realitatem illius formae.
104 Item, X Metaphysicae, cap. paenultimo,62 dicit Philosophus
quod differentiae formales mutant speciem; sed differentia
graduum in esse formae si esset esset differentia formalis; ergo
etc.
105 Item, Porphyrius63 dicit quod differentia formalis non recipit
maius et minus. Nam esse, inquit, est unum et idem, neque
intensionem recipiens neque remissionem.
106 Item, auctor Sex Principiorum:64 "Forma est in simplici et
invariabili essentia consistens".
107 Item, per rationem: si aliqua realitas est in caritate de novo
adveniente alia quam in praeexsistenti, ergo caritas aucta non
erit in specie, quia includit aliquid accidentale naturae specificae;
vel si ipsa sit perfecta in specie, habet quidquid requiritur ad
naturam speciei, et per consequens nihil includit nisi per se
pertinens ad naturam speciei. Sed cum ultra caritatem minorem
habeat unum per se pertinentem, et praecise, ad naturam speciei,
sequitur quod caritas minor non includens illum gradum non erit
in specie.
108 Contra:
Si caritas maior non plus haberet realitatis quam caritas
minor, tunc caritas cuiuslibet beati in natura esset aequalis in
lii Aristot., Metaph. VIII (H), c. 3 (1044a 10-1).

Aristot., Metaph. X (I), c. 9 (10586 1-2).
63 Porphyrius, Isagoge (AL I.6, 16).
M Liber Sex Principiorum, c. 1, n. 1 (AL 1.7, 35).
posited without a subject, it would have essentially no positive

reality in itself other than that which was there before in the
charity remitted?
It seems not:
The Philosopher in Bk. VIII of the Metaphysics: "forms are
like numbers" in this that just as any added number varies the
number, so each degree added in the form varies the species.
Therefore in the essence of this form nothing can be added, if it is
to remain the same species. But it is supposed that intense
charity and weakened charity are of the same species. Therefore
no degree beyond the reality of that form is added there.
104 Also, in Bk. X of the Metaphysics, the penultimate chapter,
the Philosopher says that the formal differences change the
species; but if the difference of degrees in the being of the form
existed, it would be a formal difference; therefore etc.
105 Also, Porphyry says that a formal difference does not
become greater or less. For [its] being, he says, is one and the
same, and does not suffer intensification or remission.
106 Also, the author of The Six Categories: "A form consists of a
simple and invariable essence."
107 Also, through a rational argument: if in charity that is
newly added there is some reality that is other than in [the
charity] that preexisted, then the increased charity will not be in
its species, because it includes something accidental to the
specific nature; or if it23 is perfect in its species, it has whatever is
required for the nature of the species, and as a consequence it
includes only what pertains to the nature of that species. But
since it has one [degree] beyond the lesser charity, pertaining per
se and precisely to the nature of the species, it follows that the
lesser charity, not including that degree, will not be in the species
[represented fully by the increased charity].
If the greater charity had no greater reality than the lesser
charity, then the charity of any blessed person whatsoever would
n Namely, the increased charity.

natura caritatis caritati Christi. Et cum secundum Augustinum,

VI De Trinitate, cap. 7,65 "In rebus incorporeis idem sit maius esse
quod melius esse", caritas cuiuslibet beati esset aeque bona et
meritoria cum caritate animae Christi, et per consequens aeque
beatus,66 quia essentiale praemium correspondet merito et
quantitati caritatis, quod est impossible; ergo etc.

A. Opinio aliorum
109 Opinio67 innitens argumentis factis ad primam partem

videtur dicere quod praescindendo formam a subiecto non est
magis et minus in forma secundum se per realitatem aliquam
additam; quia tamen secundum auctoritates sanctorum oportet
salvare in caritate magis et minus, ideo oportet hoc esse
secundum inesse ipsius accidentis suo subiecto, quod quidem
inesse est suum esse, et ista maioritas accidentis quantum ad
inesse attribuitur vel maiori dispositioni subiecti vel minori
amotioni oppositae indispositionis. Et sic ista opinio est bifurcata.
[2. Contra hanc opinionem]
110 Sed contra istam opinionem famosam arguo primo sic:

contraria in summo sunt incompossibilia in eodem, ut calidum et
frigidum in summo, non autem sub gradibus remissis. Patet: dum
enim remittitur motus calidi vel caloris, intenditur motus
frigiditatis et e converso. Hoc autem non est nisi quia aliquid est
in contrario intenso quod non est in remisso. Si enim tota realitas
est in intenso quae est in remisso non est repugnantia intensi ad
remissum. Sed ista incompossibilitas non est habitudo ad
subiectum, nec ex aliqua habitudine ad subiectum; prior enim est
(w August., De Trin. VI, c. 8, n. 9 (CCSL 50, 238; PL -12. 929).

l;|' Supple: quilibet beatus esset.
67 Godefridus de Font., Quodl. II, q. 10 (PhB II. 139-46).
be naturally equal in the nature of charity to the charity of

Christ. And since according to Augustine in Bk. VI of The Trinity,
chapter 7, "In incorporeal things to be greater is to be better," the
charity of any blessed person whatsoever is equally good and
meritorious with the charity of the soul of Christ, and as a
consequence [any blessed person must be] equally blessed,
because the essential reward corresponds to the merit and the
quantity of charity, which is impossible; therefore, etc.
The status of the question

109 The opinion relying upon arguments made for the first part
seems to say that if the form is separated from the subject there
is no greater or less in the form itself through something added to
it; because of authoritative statements of Fathers of the Church,
however, it is necessary to preserve a greater and a lesser
[degree] in charity, and therefore it is necessary that this be
based on the inherence of the accident itself in its subject, which
inherence indeed is its being, and thus the degree of inherence of
the accident is attributed either to the greater disposition of its
subject or to a failure to remove the opposite indisposition. And
thus this opinion has two parts.
110 But against this famous opinion I argue first in this way:
contraries in the highest degree are incompatibles in the same
thing, such as the highest heat and coldness, but not in lesser
degrees. This is evident, for a shift in the degree of the hot or the
heat tends to a shift in the degree of the cold, and vice versa. But
this is only because there is something in the intense contrary
that is not in what is mild. For if both the mild and the intense
include the same reality in its entirety, there is no repugnance
between the intense and the remiss. But where such an
incompatibility exists, this is not just a relation to a subject;
neither does it stem from some relationship to the subject, for
incompossibilitas formarum in se quam eorum in tertio, ut in

subiecto recipiente. Quia enim sunt in se incompossibiles, ideo
non possunt recipi in eodem, et non e converso. Ergo illud quod
est ratio incompossibilitatis in formis contrariis intensis, sive in
summo, est aliquid positivum in eis secundum se et non tantum
in ordine ad subiectum.
111 Item, idem non potest bis produci, hoc suppono. Item,
suppono quod impossibile est esse motum vel mutationem realem
sine termino reali.
112 Ex hoc arguitur sic: in augmentatione caritatis, caritas
minor est terminus a quo et caritas maior est terminus ad quem;
et ista est productio realis; ergo necessario est ad aliquem
terminum realem ex secunda suppositione, non ad realitatem
quae praecessit praecise, quia idem non potest bis produci ex
prima suppositione;68 sed realitas praecedens fuit terminus
alterius productionis; ergo erit ad alteram realitatem.
113 Exemplum: si continuaretur calefactio, aliquid inducitur in
calefactibili. Dividatur igitur motus. Secunda pars motus est
realis; motus ergo, secundum eum, inducit aliquam formam
realem. Ergo prima caliditas non inducitur. Ergo non manet etsi
aliquid aliud realiter mobile movetur.
114 Item, si forma est indivisibilis, dat subiecto esse indivisibile
et indivisibiliter. Non enim aliquid est tale secundum formam nisi
quia forma est talis in se, et secundum hoc habens formam dicitur
tale secundum eam. Ergo si forma sit indivisibilis secundum se,
impossibile est quod subiectum posset maius et minus dici
secundum eam. Contradictio enim est quod forma secundum se
sit indivisibilis et subiectum sit divisibile secundum eam.
(M Cf. supra n. 111.

there is an incompatibility in the forms themselves before it is

[manifested] in some third, such as a receptive subject. For these
forms are incompatible in themselves and therefore cannot be
received in the same thing, nor is the converse the case. Therefore
the reason for the incompatibility of contrary forms that are
intense, or exist in the highest degree, is something positive in
the forms themselves, and does not stem merely from a
relationship to their subject.
111 [Two presuppositions] [1] Also, I propose that the same
thing cannot be produced twice; [2] also I presuppose that it is
impossible that the motion or mutation be real without a real
term.
112 From this I argue in this way: in the augmentation of
charity, the lesser charity is the term 'from which' and the greater
charity is the term 'to which'; and this is a real production;*
therefore there is necessarily some real term [of production],
according to the second supposition; [this term is] not the reality
which precisely preceded, because the same thing cannot be
produced twice, from the first proposition; [n. 111] but the reality
preceding was the term of the other production; therefore [this
term] will be another reality.
113 For example: if heating were to continue, something would
be induced in what can be heated. Therefore the movement may
be divided. The second part of motion is real; therefore, according
to him,24 some real form is induced; hence it is not the prior
heating that is induced. Therefore it does not remain, although
something else that is really mobile is moved.
114 Also, if the form is indivisible, it gives the subject indivisibly
a being that is indivisible. For nothing is such according to form
except because such form is in it, and, according to this, whatever
has a form is said to be such according to it. Therefore, if the form
is indivisible in itself, it is impossible that the subject can be said
to be greater or lesser according to it; for it is a contradiction that
a form according to itself is indivisible and the subject is divisible
according to that form.
24 Namely, Godfrey.
115 Sed haec ratio, quae est cuiusdam doctoris, non valet, quia
in quarta specie qualitatis non est maius et minus.
116 Nec valet evasio de dispositione. Et arguo contra modum
ponendi istorum maius et minus in forma. Et primo contra illum
modum de dispositione subiecti propter quam dicetur forma69
suscipere maius et minus. Illa enim dispositio aut est aliqua
forma aut non. Si sit forma, et secundum illam dicitur subiectum
magis et minus dispositum, sequitur propositum, scilicet quod in
aliqua forma est maius et minus. Si dicas quod illa dispositio non
sit forma secundum quam dicitur subiectum magis tale sed alia
forma, ergo subiectum dicetur magis tale secundum illam formam
propter aliquam dispositionem praecedentem, et tunc quaeren-
dum est de illa dispositione ut prius. Et sic vel erit processus in
infinitum in dispositionibus, vel oportet dare maius et minus in
aliqua forma secundum se.
117 Item, prius oportet habere subiectum dispositum antequam
moveatur ad terminum motus, quia nihil movetur ad aliquid nisi
prius disponatur ad susceptionem eius. Cum ergo in omni
termino motus acquiratur aliquid quod non praefuit in principio
motus, sequitur quod aliquid aliud acquiratur in termino motus
quam illa sola ratio dispositionis.
118 Dices quod maius et minus est in diversis subiectis propter

diversas dispositiones, non eiusdem rationis, sed contrariae, sicut
ignis dicitur magis calidus quam aer quia in aere humiditas est
dispositio ad minorem caliditatem aeris, et siccitas in igne est
dispositio ad maiorem caliditatem, et ideo non est ista maioritas
in aliqua una dispositione.
119 Contra: una species secundum se totam videtur habere in
susceptivo rationem unius dispositionis, sicut subiectum est unius
rationis et unius dispositionis. Unde omnia individua unius
speciei accidentis habent dispositionem unius rationis sicut et
formam eiusdem rationis. Ergo, circumscripto omni alio quod non
9 Forma suscipere: sic codd.; lege: formam suscipere (sc. subiectum) iW

forma suscipi.
115 But this argument, which is that of a certain doctor,25 is

invalid, because in the fourth species of quality* there is no
greater or less.
116 Neither is the evasion about the disposition valid. And I
argue against the way of postulating this greater and less in a
form. And I argue first against this claim about the disposition of
the subject, because of which the form is said to be received to a
greater or lesser degree. For that disposition is either some form
or not. If it is a form, and according to it the subject is said to be
disposed more or less, what is proposed follows, namely that in
some form there is more or less. You may say that this disposition
is not a form according to which the subject may be said to be
such in a greater degree, but it is another form. Then, the subject
may be said to be such in a greater degree according to that form
because of some previous disposition, and then one must ask
about that [previous] disposition, as before. And in this way
either there will be a progression to infinity regarding
dispositions, or one must admit that there is a greater or lesser
degree in some form itself.
117 Also, it is necessary beforehand to have a subject disposed
before it may be moved to the terminus of the motion, because
nothing is moved to something unless it is first predisposed to
receive such. Hence, when at the end of every motion something
is acquired that was not there beforehand at the beginning of the
motion, it follows that something other than a disposition is
acquired at the end of the motion.
118 You may say that the greater and less are in diverse
subjects because of diverse dispositionsnot of the same type, but
of contrary typesjust as fire is said to be hotter than air,
because the humidity in moist air is a disposition for lesser heat,
and dryness in fire is a disposition for greater heat, and therefore
this pre-eminence [of degree] is not due to one disposition.
119 To the contrary: one species considered as a whole seems to
have a receptivity to but one disposition, just as a subject is of one
sort and one disposition. Wherefore all individuals of one species
of accident have one sort of disposition, just as [they have] a form
of the same sort. Therefore, [even] excluding everything else that
1r, Namely, Godfrey.

est dispositio propria, potest esse maius et minus in individuis

eiusdem speciei, et ita intensio et remissio secundum formam
illius speciei, absque hoc quod praecedant tales dispositiones
contrariae et oppositae in subiectis. Et tunc quaeritur ut prius:
quare est aliquid magis dispositum nunc quam prius? ut prius
argutum est.
120 Item, si praecedant tales dispositiones oppositae ad magis et
minus, tunc nunquam erit unus motus ab intenso ad remissum,
nec e converso. Nihil enim movebitur ad remissum nisi quod
habet convenientem receptionem remissionis. Intensum autem
non habet illam dispositionem convenientem remissioni. Ergo,
per te, oportet quod ad hoc quod subiectum possit moveri ab
intenso ad remissum quod prius moveatur ad dispositionem
convenientem gradui remisso, et ita oportet quod fiat prius motus
a dispositione quae est in intenso ad dispositionem convenientem
gradui remisso quam ex intenso fieret remissum et e converso
quod est impossibile, quia tunc nunquam esset unus motus ab
intenso ad remissum nec e converso, quia non habent idem
subiectum sive susceptivum immediatum conveniens utrique
dispositioni.
[B. Opinio alia eiusque improbatio]
121 Alia etiam opinio, quae dicit de indispositione vel amotione

contrarii disponentis, videtur improbari per hoc quod in angelis in
statu innocentiae non erat aliqua indispositio maior vel minor ad
caritatem, ergo omnes recepissent aequalem caritatem, quod non
tenetur.
122 Item, angeli boni non habuerunt in merendo aliquam
indispositionem, et tamen non habuerunt aequalem caritatem.
Unde non sequitur 'quilibet angelus in eadem specie aequaliter
disponitur ad gratiam, ergo quilibet aequaliter habet gratiam'.
is not a proper disposition, there can be a greater and less in

individuals of the same species, and thus [there can be] an
increase and remission according to the form of that species,
without such contrary and opposed dispositions being present in
the subjects beforehand. And then this question is raised as
before: Why is something more disposed now than it was before?
As was previously argued.
120 Also, if such opposed dispositions to greater and less were
there before, then there will never be one movement from more
intense to less intense, nor vice versa. For nothing will be moved
to a lesser intensity unless it has an aptitude to receive some
remission. But what is intense will lack this disposition suited to
a remission. Therefore, according to you, it will be necessary that
before any subject could be moved from a greater to a lesser
intensity, it must first acquire a disposition suited to receive a
lesser degree of intensity. And then it is necessary that there be a
motion from the disposition that is in what is intense to the
disposition suited to receive a lesser degree of intensity, before
what is remiss comes out of what is intense, and vice versa. This
is impossible, because then there will never be one movement
from what is intense to what is remiss, nor vice versa, because
these states do not have the same subject that is immediately
receptive to both dispositions.
Another opinion and its refutation
121 There is also another opinion that speaks about an

indisposition or a removal of a contrary disposition. This seems to
be disproved from the fact that the angels in a state of innocence
were not more or less indisposed towards charity; therefore all
would have received equal degrees of charity, which cannot be
maintained.
122 Also, the good angels had no indisposition to merit, and
nevertheless did not have equal charity. Hence, this does not
follow "each angel in the same species is equally disposed to
grace, therefore each has equal grace."
[C. Opinio Godefridi de Fontibus et reprobatio eiusdem]
123 Tertia via de radicatione formae in subiecto, quae tenetur a

quodam,70 ut habitus est magis radicatus in subiecto et dispositio
minus
124 videtur improbari, quia ista radicatio aut est aliqua forma
absoluta et habeo propositum, quia in tali est magis et minus; aut
non est absoluta, sed respectus, et sic videtur quod non possit
habere magis et minus nisi per magis et minus in fundamento,
sicut illa absoluta non conveniunt in respectu nisi per
fundamentum.
125 Item, iste modus non salvat unam formam esse intensiorem
alia; non autem sic est in proposito. Forma enim unius diei non
est minus forma quam mille etc., quia una forma aliquando minus
radicata in subiecto potest esse in se intensior, sicut rubor ex
verecundia quae est passio in tertia specie qualitatis, potest esse
aliquando intensior rubore quae est passibilis qualitas et minus
radicari in subiecto. Si autem dicat radicationem respectum ad
subiectum, in respectibus autem non est intensio et remissio nisi
prius sit in absoluto et in fundamento; ergo etc. Similiter non
video quod esse sit aliud ab essentia.
[II. Responsio propria Scoti]
126 Dico ergo quod sicut quantitas molis praeexsistens non est
tota extensio, sed alia cum ea, realiter differens sicut pars, sic in
proposito. Concedo ergo conclusionem istarum rationum, et
praecipue quattuor primas rationes adductas contra primam
Godefridus de Font., Quodl. II, q. 10 in corp. (PhB II, 146).

Opinion of Godfrey and its refutation
123 There is a third view about how the form is grounded in a

subject, which a certain teacher holds: a habit is more firmly
grounded in a subject and a disposition is less firmly rooted.26
124 This is disproved, it seems, because this grounding is either
some absolute* form, and then you have what I propose, because
in such there is the greater and less; or it is not an absolute form
but a relationship, and thus it seems that there could not be a
greater or less unless there is a greater or less in the foundation,
just as those absolutes could not come together in a relationship
except through [their] foundation.
125 Also, this way does not preserve the fact that one form could
be more intense than another; it is not this way, however, in what
is proposed. For a form that lasts but a day is no less a form than
one that endures for a thousand, since sometimes one form less
firmly grounded in a subject can be itself more intense, just as
blush from shame[only] a variation in the third species of
qualitycan at times be more intense than the redness that is
[actually] a transient quality [in another], despite being less
firmly grounded27 in a subject. But if it be claimed that this
grounding is only a relationship to the subject, there is no
intensity and remission in a relationship unless it be first
grounded in something absolute and has some basis; therefore,
etc. Likewise, I do not see that [its] being is something other than
the essence.
Scotus's own reply to the question
126 I say, therefore, that just as the quantity of the mass that
preexisted is not the whole of [increased] extension, but differs
from it as part, so it is in what we propose.28 Hence, I concede the
conclusion of these arguments, and especially the first four
w On the distinction between a habit and a disposition see Aristotle,

Categories, ch. 8 (86 26-9a 13).
21 Less, that is, than a natural redness, e.g., of a rose. Cf. the parallel
passages in the Lectura (XVII, 236) or the Ordinatio (V, 259).
2H Namely, about the lesser and greater degrees of charity.
opinionem;7i et est contra conclusiones omnium istarum
opinionum,72 et dico quod realitas positiva quae praeexsistit in
caritati minori non est tota realitas positiva quae est in caritate
maiori; immo si essent maior et minor caritas ab invicem
separatae a subiecto, maior caritas haberet in se realitatem
positivam minoris, et aliam superadditam, si per impossibile
tolleretur omnis habitudo eorum ad subiectum. Sicut quantitas
molis, si esset separata a subiecto et per impossibile non haberet
inclinationem ad subiectum, una tamen esset maior alia, et illa
per se haberet totam realitatem positivam minoris et aliquid
additum.
127 Ad argumenta in oppositum.

Ad primum73 dico quod procedit ex defectu intentionis
Philosophi. Comparat enim ibi Philosophus quiditates ad nume-
ros in quantum sunt definibiles eo modo quo Plato loquebatur de
quiditatibus, ponendo quiditates substantias separatas. Substan-
tiae quidem hoc modo acceptae, id est, quiditates rerum, numeris
comparantur secundum illas quattuor proprietates quas ponit ibi
Philosophus,74 quarum una est ista quod quidlibet additum variat
speciem. Et intelligo sic quod de una specie faciat aliam, vel quod
de non-specie numeri faciat speciem, ut de unitate binarium.
Quaelibet enim differentia addita definitioni aut indicat
quiditatem, aut speciem aliam a praeexsistente constituit, aut si
praeexsistens fuit ratio generis, determinat illud ad rationem
7i Cf. supra nn. 110-113.

72 Cf. supra nn. 109, 121, 123.
7:i Cf. supra n. 103.
74 Cf. I. Duns Scotus, Expositio in XII libros Metaph. Aristot. VIII, c. 4, n. 22-
5 (ed. Vives, VI, 291a-294b).
brought against the first opinion [n. 110-113], which is against

the conclusions of all these opinions [n. 109, 121, 123]. And I
declare that the positive reality, which preexisted in the lesser
charity, is not the entire positive reality that is in the greater
charity. Indeed if the greater and lesser charity could be
separated from its subject, the greater charity would have in
itself the positive reality of the lesser, plus something in addition,
on the impossible assumption that any relationship to the subject
could be removed. Just as with the quantity of the mass, if it were
separated from the subject, andto assume the impossibleit
had no inclination to be in a subject, the one quantity would be
greater than the other, and the former would have the whole
positive reality of the lesser quantity, plus something added.
127 To the arguments for the opposite opinion: I say to the first
[n. 103] that it is based on an erroneous view of the Philosopher's
intention. For the Philosopher there compares the essences29 to
numbers insofar as they are able to be defined in the way Plato
speaks of them by assuming them to be separate* substances.
Indeed, substances, that is, the essences of things, taken in this
way, can be compared to numbers according to those four
properties that the Philosopher posits there. One of the properties
is that if any thing is added, it varies the species. And I
understand in this way that from one species another comes to be,
or from what is not a species of number,30 there comes to be a
species [of number], as a binary comes from a unit. For each
difference added to the definition, either [a] indicates a quiddity,
or [b] constitutes another species in respect to the one that
preexisted, or [c] if it is the notion of a genus that preexisted,
[further] determines it through the notion of a species, which
[determination] was not there before the addition of a difference:
2!l Quiddity is best translated here as 'essence.'

m Aristotle did not consider one or the unit to be a number itself, but rather
the measure of other numbers. Gottlob Frege was one of the first to challenge
this medieval assumption, arguing that zero and one were as much an answer to
'how many?' as any higher number is.
speciei, quae non habebatur ante additionem differentiae. Exem-

plum de intellectiva addita ut differentia animae sensitivae.
128 Dico igitur quod additum quiditati acceptae secundum
rationem quiditatis alterat et variat speciem altero dictorum
modorum. Sed quod additur quiditati, non ut quiditas est, non
mutat speciem. Gradus autem indivisibiles sicut et differentia
individualis est contrahens ad esse hoc, sive unitas et pluralitas
indivisibilis; et breviter quaecumque condicio individualis addita
naturae specificae non additur sibi quantum ad rationem
quiditativam ita quod secundum illam rationem determinet eam,
et propter hoc non mutat speciem cui additur. Non enim potest
neque in aliam speciem praeexsistentem mutare, neque de non-
specie in aliam speciem mutare nisi ipsum additum sit ratio
speciei, et tale non est aliqua condicio individualis.
129 Ad formam argumenti tunc dico quod si adderetur aliquid
quod esset pars quiditativa quiditati praeexsistenti mutaret
speciem; sicut si addatur aliquid quod est per se unum numero
praeexsistenti, mutatur necessario species numeri. Si autem
addatur aliquid quod non est natum esse pars numeri, puta
aliquod accidens vel pars numeri materialis, ut si intelligeretur
una unitas ternarii fieri intensior nunc quam prius in se, non
mutaretur specie, sed secundum aliquem gradum individualem.
Ita in proposito, quaecumque differentia individualis vel gradus
additur quiditati, non est nata esse pars quiditatis.
130 Per idem apparet ad Porphyrium75 quod simili modo
loquitur de differentia in quantum est per se pars definitionis.
Hoc modo consistit in indivisibili, hoc est accipiendo secundum
illam indifferentiam secundum quam abstrahitur ab individuis,
quae indifferentia totalis est gradus eius ut est differentia

for example, intellection is added as a difference to 'sensitive

soul.'
128 I say therefore that what is added to a quiddity taken in the
sense of a quiddity, alters and varies the species in one of the
aforementioned ways. But what is added to a quiddity not as a
quiddity,31 does not change the species. But an indivisible degree,
just as an individual difference, contracts [an essence] to being
just 'this,' just as an individual unity and plurality [does], and in
short any individual condition, added to a specific nature, is not
added to it in a quidditative sense, so that it would change the
sort of thing it is. And because of this, it does not change the
species to which it is added. For it cannot change [it] into another
preexisting species, nor change from non-species into a species,
unless what is added is a specific difference, and an individuating
condition is not such a thing.
129 To the form of the argument, then, I say that if something
were added to a preexistent quiddity that was a quidditative part,
it would change the species, just as, if something that is per se
one were added to a preexisting number, it would necessarily
change the species of the number; but if something were added
which is not suited to be a part of a number, for instance, some
accident or material part of a numbere.g., if the unity of a
ternary became more intense in itself now than it was before, if it
could be thought to do sothis would not bring about a change in
species but [only a change] according to some individuating
degree. So it is in what we propose: each individual difference or
degree added to a quiddity is not suited to be a part of the
quiddity.
130 The same thing could be said of Porphyry [n. 105], that he is
speaking in a similar way of the difference, insofar as it is a per
se part of a definition. And in this way [the difference in question]
consists in what is indivisible, that is, by understanding [this
difference] in terms of that indifference32 that governs abstraction
from individuals [of the same species]. This indifference, as much
as the specific differencethat does not [otherwise] suffer any
31 Namely, what is added as an accident, not as something essential.

32 I.e., "indifference" as the difference between particular individualizations
of the same species that is insufficient to qualify as a "specific difference."
specifica quae non recipit magis et minus, quia cuicumque magis

et minus possunt competere in individuis et concurrere. Hoc modo
sunt omnia intra illam indifferentiam differentiae specificae, et
non addunt differentiam secundum hanc indifferentiam.
131 Ad aliud76 de X Metaphysicae potest responderi per idem,
vocando differentiam formalem specificam et quiditativam.
132 Potest tamen dici ad formam quod non omnis differentia
formarum est formalis, proprie loquendo de formali, prout scilicet
differentia formalis est differentia secundum formas. Sicut non
omnis differentia hominum est differentia in humanitate. Cuius
ratio assignatur dupliciter: realiter et logice. Realiter sic: duo
homines possunt habere humanitatem et differe, licet non per
humanitatem. Ita possunt formae pure77 differre et non per
formalem differentiam et ita nec differre formaliter, quia idem est
differre formaliter quod differre in forma vel secundum formam.
Logice hoc probatur sic: quia terminus differentiae intelligitur per
negationem inclusam in differentia respectu illius negationis
accipi confuse et distributive, scilicet 'differre formaliter'; ita
etiam illud quod denominatur esse ratio formalis differentiae,
quale est illud quod construitur cum 'differre', ut in quo vel
secundum quod denominatur, [quod]78 posset confundi a
negatione. Nunc autem ad negationem inferioris non sequitur
negatio superioris, sed est destructio antecedentis, et ideo fallacia
consequentis.
133 Ad illud de Sex principiorum:19 sicut probat simplicitatem
formae, ita concedenda est conclusio. Probat autem simplicitatem
oppositam quantitati molis, quia ipsa addita non facit maius
secundum molem. Forma enim posita in subiecto non est aliquid
maius mole quam prius fuit. Concedatur igitur simplicitas formae
7 Cf. supra n. 104.

77 Vel purae.
7H Quod hoc loco bene intelligi non potest. Cf. Ord. I, d. 17, p. 2, q. 2, n. 255
(V, 252).
7!l Cf. supra n. 106.
increase or decreaseis susceptible of a degree, because increase

or decrease could pertain and occur to any [species] as regards its
individual instances. In this way they all fall within that
indifference of the specific difference, and do not add a difference
according to this indifference.
131 To the other from Bk. X of the Metaphysics [n. 104], one can
reply in the same way, speaking of the formal and quidditative
specific difference.
132 However, it can be said regarding the form that not every
difference in the form is formal, properly speaking, namely
insofar as a formal* difference is a difference based on forms, just
as one can say that not every difference in human beings is a
difference in humanity. The reason for this is twofold: one real,
the other logical. A real difference is that two humans can have
humanity and be different but not in humanity. Thus pure forms
could differ and not because of some formal difference, and thus
they would not differ formally, because 'to differ formally' is the
same thing as 'to differ in form and according to form.' Logically
this is proved in the following way: the term of the difference is
understood, due to the negation included in the difference, to be
taken indistinctly and distributively in respect to this negation,
namely to differ formally.' In the same way even that which is
named as the notion or principle of a formal differencei.e., the
sort of thing that is construed with 'to differ' as with that by
which and according to which [it] is namedcould be confused by
a negation [i.e., taken indistinctly in this respect]. Now the
negation of what is above [or more general], however, does not
follow from the negation of what is below [or more specific], but it
is a denial of the antecedent, and therefore is a fallacy of the
consequent.
133 To that about The Six Categories [n. 106], to the extent that
it proves the simplicity of the form, the conclusion must be
conceded. But it proves the simplicity in comparison to quantity
of mass, because when it is added, it does not make [something]
greater in mass. For the form posited in the subject does not
make something greater in mass than it was before. Therefore,
simplicity of form, as opposed to quantity of mass is conceded. But
opposita quantitati molis. Sed hoc nihil facit contra intensionem

formae secundum magis, quae pertinet ad propositum.
134 Ad rationem80 dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur 'aliquid
accidere naturae speciei' potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo
quod sit extra rationem quiditativam speciei, quo modo dicitur
differentia excedere genus, et sic accipitur accidens in fallacia
accidentis pro extraneo, quod scilicet est extra rationem alterius.
Alio modo dicitur accidens quod non facit per se unum cum eo cui
accidit, sicut albedo cum corpore. Primo modo dico quod albedo
intensa aliquid habet quod accidit naturae speciei, et ita etiam
habet albedo remissa esse per se individuum alicuius speciei. Isto
modo habet aliquid quod accidit naturae speciei; alias enim non
contrahetur per illud natura speciei ad hoc individuum vel ad
illud. Secundo modo dico quod albedo intensa non habet aliquid
quod accidat naturae speciei, quia ille gradus qui intelligitur addi
naturae secundum se facit unum per se cum natura, sicut et
quaecumque differentia individualis addita naturae facit unum
per se cum natura. Quando ergo dicis 'si intensum addit aliquid
quod accidit naturae speciei, ergo remissum quod non includit
illud non est in specie' dico quod non valet consequentia, loquendo
de 'accidere' primo modo sumpto, quo etiam modo antecedens non
est verum. Non ergo valet inferre 'ergo non est in specie talis
gradus', sed debet inferri 'ergo talis gradus non est species'. Est
igitur in specie ut contentum sub ea. Nec sequitur 'ergo alia non
erit in specie'. Non enim sequitur 'non habet quidquid pertinens
ad speciem, ergo non est in specie'. Vel potest dici quod
'pertinere aliquid ad speciem' est dupliciter: vel quiditative, vel
subiective. Partes quiditativae sunt de per se intellectu speciei,
Ho Cf. supra n. 107.

this says nothing contrary to an intensity of the form being

greater, which is relevant to what is proposed.
134 To the argument from reason [n. 107] it must be said that
'something is added to the nature of the species' can be
understood in two ways. One way is that it is outside the
quidditative notion of the species, in the way the [specific]
difference goes beyond the genus, and it is in this way that
'accident' is understood in the 'fallacy of accident': as that which is
outside the notion of the other. In another sense, 'accident' is that
which does not form something per se one with that to which it
accrues, just as whiteness with a body. In the first sense, I say
that intense whiteness [simply] has something that is added to
the nature of the species. And in this way even a less intense
whiteness represents a per se individual existence of some
species. In this way [every individual] has something that is
added to the nature of a species, for otherwise the nature of the
species would not be contracted to this or that individual.
[However,] I say that intense whiteness does not have something
that is added to the nature of the species in the second way,
because that degree which is understood to be added to the
nature itself forms something that is one per se with the nature,
just as each individual difference added to a nature forms
something that is one per se with that nature. Therefore when
you say 'if what is intense adds something that accrues to the
nature of the species, therefore what is remiss, which does not
include that, is not in the species,' I say that the inference is
invalid, if 'to be added to' is taken in the first sense, and in this
way the antecedent is not true. Hence it is not valid to infer
'therefore such a degree is not in the species,' but one ought to
infer 'therefore such a degree does not constitute a species.'
Therefore [the degree] is in the species as contained in it. Nor
does it follow 'therefore another [degree] will not be in the
species.' For it does not follow 'it does not have whatever pertains
to the species, therefore it is not in the species.' Or it could be
said that 'something pertains to the species' has a twofold
meaning: either being part of the quiddity, or being in the species
as a subject [is]. Quidditative parts pertain to the per se notion of
the species, but subjective parts do not; they are like remote
sed non subiectivae, sed sunt sicut partes remotae. Sic in

proposito nullus gradus formalis pertinet ad speciem ut pars per
se et essentialis speciei, quia sine quocumque dato potest intelligi
species, sed bene pertinet ad speciem ut contentum sub specie.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum caritas augeatur per extractionem partis novae de
potentia ad actum]
135 Propter tertiam opinionem8i de augmento caritatis quaero

utrum caritas augeatur per extractionem partis novae de potentia
ad actum.
Videtur quod sic:

Quia ubicumque est mutatio, ibi est extractio alicuius de
potentia ad actum; augmentatio caritatis est mutatio; ergo in
augmentatione caritatis oportet ponere extractionem alicuius de
potentia ad actum. Sed non est exitus de potentia ad actum nisi
actus educatur. Ergo caritas sic educitur.
136 Item, caritas intenditur sicut concedit iste; ergo mutatur.
Ergo, ut prius, pars nova extrahitur de potentia praecedentis ad
actum. Consequentia patet, quia 'intendi' includit 'mutari'.
137 Item, si caritas augeatur, ergo ibi est generatio alicuius
compositi, quia omnem mutationem concomitatur generatio
aliqua. Sed omnis generatio est primo compositi, Philosophus, VII
Metaphysicae et V.82 Ergo in augmentatione caritatis generatur
aliquod compositum. Non compositum ex anima et caritate, quia
tunc non crearetur. Creatio enim non requirit aliquod subiectum.
Ergo generatur compositum ex parte praecedente et sequente, et
per consequens illa extrahitur de potentia ad actum.
138 Contra:
Si caritas augeatur per extractionem partis vel alicuius de
potentia ad actum, aut ergo per extractionem de potentia subiecti,
scilicet animae vel voluntatis; aut caritatis praeexsistentis. Non
primo modo, quia tunc esset forma naturaliter educta et ita forma
8i Cf. supra q. 2, n. 123.

m Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 8 (10336 5-18).
parts. So in what we propose no formal degree pertains to the

species as a part that is per se and essential, because the species
can be thought of without any given [individual], but it does
pertain to the species as something contained under the species.
Question Three
Is charity increased by a new part being drawn forth
from potency to act?
135 Because of the third opinion [q. 2, n. 123] about the

augmentation of charity I ask whether charity is increased by a
new part being drawn forth from potency to act.
Because wherever there is a mutation, there is something
drawn forth from the potency to act; the increase of charity is
mutation; therefore in the increase of charity one has to postulate
that something is drawn forth from potency to act. But there is no
egress from potency to act unless an act is educed. Therefore
charity is educed in this way.
136 Also, charity is intensified, as this [doctor] concedes;
therefore it is changed. Hence, as before, the new part is drawn
forth from the preceding potency to act. The implication is
evident, because 'to be intensified' includes 'to be changed.'
137 Also, if charity is increased, therefore something composed
is generated, because some generation* accompanies all
mutation. But every generation is primarily of a composite,
according to the Philosopher in Bk. VII and Bk. V of The
Metaphysics. Therefore in the increase in charity some composite
is generated. It is not a composite of charity and the soul, because
then it would not be created. For creation does not require any
subject. Therefore, the composite is generated from the preceding
part and the following part, and as a consequence the latter is
drawn forth from potency to act.
If drawing forth a part or something from potency to act
increased charity, either this drawing forth is from the potency of
the subject (namely of the soul or of the will); or it is from [the
potency] of some preexisting charity. But it is not in the first way,
naturalis, quod est falsum et contra fidem. Nec secundo modo.

quia forma caritatis praecedens et sequens sunt formae eiusdem
rationis. Ergo una non est principium materiale respectu alterius
de quo educitur. Confirmatur hoc quia, secundum Boethium,
forma simplex subiectum esse non potest.
[I. Ad quaestionem
139 Responsio de intensione in generali habituum dicetur in III

libro. Sed de caritate dico quod est virtus infusa augmentabilis.
140 Dicit autem hic unus magister83 tria. Primum quod possibili-
tas ad augmentationem in forma infusa non est accipienda ex
parte subiecti vel materiae, cum non sit educta de potentia
materiae, sed est accipienda ex parte ipsius formae in se, quae in
sua essentia habet partes. Nam ut est sub minori quantitate. est
in potentia ut deducatur ad actum quantitatis maioris.
141 Secundo dicit quod haec augmentatio non est per aliquid
eiusdem naturae appositum, quia augmentatio in formis non est
per partium appositionem in substantia vel in essentia ipsarum.
sed in virtute per quam augmentum efficacius potest in suam
propriam operationem, quod non faceret si simile apponeretur
simili, quia tepidum additum tepido in aequali gradu non facit
magis calidum.
142 Tertio concludit quod sit augmentatio per extractionem
talium partium virtualium in substantia habitus in actu quarum
quaelibet educta de potentia partis non solum ponit augmentum
in substantia habitus sed etiam in virtute, quia substantia et
virtus in forma idem sunt. Sic ergo pars extracta facit
augmentum et in virtute caritatis praecedentis quae est in
M Henricus Gand.. Quodl. V, q. 19 in corp.(f. 195vS-T).

because then this would be a naturally educed form and thus a

natural form, which is false and opposed to faith. Neither is it in
the second way, because the preceding form and that which
follows are the same sort of forms. Hence, one as regards the
other is not a material principle from which the other is educed.
This is confirmed because, according to Boethius, a simple form
cannot be a subject.
To the Question
139 Response about the intensification of habits in general will

be discussed in Bk. III. But about charity I say that it is an
infused virtue that can be increased.
140 But here one master here makes three statements. First
that the possibility of an increase in an infused form must not be
taken [as proceeding] from a part of the subject or matter, since
[the form] is not educed from the potency of matter. Rather it
must be taken [as proceeding] from a part of the form itself,
which has parts in its essence. For as it is under a lesser quantity,
it is in potency as regards being lead to the act of the greater
quantity.
141 Secondly he says that this increase [in form] is not through
some added thing of the same nature, because an increase in
forms is not through the addition of parts as regards their
substance or essence, but as regards [their] power or intensity
(virtus), through which the increase can be more efficacious in its
proper operation. This would not occur if what is similar were
added to what is similar; because the tepid added to the tepid in
an equal degree will not make it hotter.
142 Thirdly he concludes that the augmentation happens
through drawing into act of such virtual parts in the substance of
the habit, each of which, when it is educed from the potency of a
part, not only posits an increase in the substance of the habit, but
also in the power, since the substance and the power are the same
thing in the form. Hence, in this way the drawn-out part also
produces an augmentation in the power of the preceding charity
potentia non ratione sui subiecti sed suae naturae ad actum

vel gradum extractum.
143 Sed contra istam opinionem: videtur enim quod contradicat

sibi. Nam iungendo primum dictum cum tertio, et e converse
sequitur oppositum secundi. Quia si fiat augmentatio in caritate
per extractionem partium virtualium, tunc aut per istam
extractionem habetur aliqua entitas realis nova, aut non. Si non,
ergo ista extractio non erit aliqua actio, et per consequens
augmentabitur caritas sine actione divina. Si autem est aliqua
realitas ad quam terminatur ista extractio, quae non est praecise
realitas prior quia concedit latitudinem in essentia formae, nec
prior realitas corrumpitur, secundum sic opinantem, ergo
terminatur ad aliquam realitatem aliam a priori, et tamen faciat
unum per se cum priori. Aliter autem non esset augmentatio.
Sequitur quod hoc est per appositionem unius realitatis ad aliam.
Ergo ponere augmentationem caritatis fieri per extractionem est
ponere eam fieri per appositionem.
144 Item, sic opinans, in quantum distinguitur a ponente
augmentationem fieri per appositionem, minus rationabiliter dicit
quam ille, quia ab eodem generatur habitus et augmentatur, II
Ethicorum.84 Sed habitus caritatis generatur a Deo, ergo et
augmentatur ab ipso. Hoc autem non est secundum esse in
subiecto solum, sicut probatum est contra secundam opinionem;
nec quia prior gradus corrumpitur, sicut probatum est contra
primam opinionem. Ergo quia Deus apponit augendo, addit
aliquam realitatem aliam a praecedenti. Ergo non fit per
extractionem illius gradus a subiecto, sed per additionem novi
gradus ad gradum praecedentem. Magis ergo proprie dicitur ista
augmentatio fieri per appositionem quam per extractionem.
m Aristot., Eth. Nic. II, c. 1 (11036 21-2).

that is in potency to the act or degree drawn out, not by reason of

its subject but of its own nature.
143 But against this opinion: for it seems that it contradicts

itself. Indeed, by taking the first statement with the third, or vice
versa, the opposite of the second statement follows. For if the
augmentation in charity occurs through drawing out virtual
parts, then either some real new entity results or not. If none
does, therefore this drawing out will not be any action, and as a
consequence charity will be augmented without any divine action.
But if this drawing out ends with some reality which is not
precisely the prior realitybecause he admits that there is a
slack in the essence of the formand the prior reality is not
corrupted according to this opinion, therefore it ends with some
reality other than before, and nevertheless it forms one thing per
se with the prior. Otherwise it would not be an augmentation. It
follows that this is through the addition of one reality to the
other. Therefore to postulate that an augmentation of charity
occurs through a drawing forth is to posit that it occurs through
an addition.
144 Also, the one who thinks in this way, insofar as he disagrees
from the one who posits that augmentation occurs through an
addition, makes less sense than the latter. For a habit is
generated and augmented by the same thing,33 according to Bk. II
of the Ethics. But God generates the habit of charity; therefore he
also augments it. But this occurs not according to its existence in
the subject alone, as was proved against the second opinion, nor
because the prior grade is corrupted, as was proved against the
first opinion. Therefore, because God adds by augmenting, he
adds some reality to what preceded that is different from it.
Therefore, it does not occur through the extraction of that degree
from a subject, but through the addition of a new degree to that
which preceded. Hence, this augmentation is more properly said
to be through an addition than through an extraction.
M Namely, repeated actions.

145 Respondent isti quod haec extractio est virtualis et non

partis actualis. Contra: quia necessario est ibi aliqua actio
realis et passio quae terminatur ad aliquid, ergo vel ad aliquid
praeexsistens, quod non est verum, quia tunc idem bis capit esse;
vel ad aliquam realitatem novam, et sic appositio et compositio,
cum sint eiusdem rationis. Unde nulla differentia est nisi quod
prima opinio dicit aliquid apponi et ista dicit aliquid extrahi.
[II. Responsio Scoti ad quaestionem]
146 Dico ergo quod non est ibi extractio; nec istum modum
concipio, quia talis productio non esset creatio. Sed dico quod est
ibi nova realitas cum praeexsistente, sicut partes vel gradus non
quiditativi sed individuales et exsistentiae.
147 Ad primum85 dicendum quod non sequitur 'subiectum exit

de potentia ad actum, ergo forma educitur de potentia ad actum',
quia sive educatur naturaliter de potentia materiae sive
supernaturaliter infundatur, semper subiectum eius uniformiter
exit de potentia ad actum et non forma ipsa. Et ideo est ibi
fallacia consequents, quia non omnis mutatio subiecti est per
actionem naturalem educentem formam de potentia subiecti. Sed
subiectum uniformiter mutatur a privatione formae ad formam,
undecumque sit illa forma, sive naturaliter educta sive super
naturaliter immissa.
148 Ad secundum86 dico quod non sequitur 'caritas intenditur,
ergo caritas mutatur', sicut non sequitur 'quantitas molis augetur,
ergo mutatur'. Nam solum subiectum mutatur, et non forma nisi
metaphorice et improprie. Unde forma, quae dicitur augeri et
intendi, non mutatur nisi per accidens, in quantum eius
subiectum mutatur, sicut substantia mutatur, non quantitas, licet
>l5 Cf. supra n. 135.

H Cf. supra n. 136.
145 These34 respond that this extraction is of a virtual, not an

actual, part. To the contrary: because necessarily there is there
some real action and being acted upon that terminates in
something; hence [it terminates] either in something preexisting
(which is not true, because then something would receive
existence twice) or in some new reality. And in this way it is an
addition and composition, since [the components] are of the same
sort. The only difference is that one opinion declares that
something is added and the other that something is drawn forth.
Scotus's reply to the question
146 I declare, then, there is no drawing forth there; neither can I

conceive of such a thing, because such a production would not be
a creation. But I say that a new reality is there in addition to
what preexisted, such as parts or degrees that are not
quidditative but of an individual and existential kind.
Reply to the initial questions
147 To the first [n. 135] it must be said that this does not follow
'a subject goes from potency to act, therefore a form is led forth
from potency to act,' for whether it is educed naturally from the
potency of matter or supernaturally infused, it is its subject, and
not the form itself, that uniformly goes from potency to act. Hence
there is a fallacy of the consequent, because not every mutation of
the subject is through a natural action educing form from the
potency of the subject. But the subject is uniformly changed from
[the state of] privation of form to form, wherever that form comes
from, whether it is naturally educed or supernaturally infused.
148 To the second [n. 136] I say that it does not follow 'charity is
increased, therefore charity is changed,' just as it does not follow
'quantity of mass is increased, therefore it is changed.' For only a
subject is changed and not the form except metaphorically and
improperly. Hence the form, which is said to be augmented and
intensified, is only changed accidentally insofar as its subject is
changed, just as it is substance that is changed, and not quantity,
M Namely, those who hold Henry's view.

quantitas sit secundum quam substantia quanta mutatur vel

augetur, sumendo augere metaphorice. Nam habens formam
mutatur secundum eam, licet ipsa non mutetur.
149 Tenendo tamen quod ad intendi' sequitur 'mutari' proprie,
dico quod forma non intenditur nec augetur quia non mutatur.
Sed habens eam dicitur intendi et mutari secundum eam, et isto
modo caritatem intendi non est aliud quam subiectum eius, ut
animam, secundum eam intendi. Unde dicit Augustinus, et
habetur in littera, quod caritas non crescit sed homo habens eam
crescit secundum eam.
150 Nomen tamen mutationis attribuitur diversis diversimode.
Nam alicui attribuitur ut termino primo, sicut cum dicitur quod
compositum mutatur et generatur. Alicui etiam attribuitur ut
subiecto sicut cum dicitur 'materia generatur'. Ita in proposito
augmentatio dicitur quandoque de subiecto augmentationis,
quandoque de forma ut de proximo termino formali augmentatio
nis. Et isto secundo modo dicitur forma augeri et mutari; primo
modo subiectum eius.
151 Ad tertium87 concedo quod compositum primo generetur, ut
anima cara in augmentatione caritatis; quod compositum includit
subiectum et terminum. Et quando dicitur quod tunc non esset
creatio, dico quod in eodem instanti temporis in quo caritas vel
gratia creatur, infunditur animae, sed in alio et in alio instanti
naturae, licet totum sit simul in eodem instanti temporis. Unde
duplex est ibi mutatio: una a non-esse caritatis vel gratiae ad esse
eius, et hoc est mere mutatio quae dicitur creatio et non est
mutatio proprie dicta, quia nihil praesupponit nec materiam nec
subiectum eius, sicut susceptivum, sicut est propriae mutationis.
Alia est mutatio a subiecto non-caro ad esse-carum. Et sic
mutatur anima a non-caro ad esse-carum, et ista mutatio non est
B7 Cf. supra n. 137.

although quantity is that according to which quantified substance

is changed or increased, taking 'to increase' metaphorically. For
that which has form is changed according to it, although it itself
is not changed.
149 However, by holding that 'to be changed' follows 'to be
intensified,' I say that the form is not intensified nor augmented,
because it is not changed. But that which has it is said to be
intensified and to be changed according to it, and in this way
'charity is increased' actually means 'its subject, as the soul, is
increased according to it.' Hence, Augustine says, and it is cited in
the text,* that charity is not increased, but the man having it is
increased according to it.
150 Nevertheless the name 'mutation' is attributed to diverse
things in diverse ways. For it is attributed to something as to the
first term, e.g., when it is said that a composite changed and is
generated. Also, it is attributed to something as to a subject, as
when it is said that matter is generated. So in the case at hand
augmentation' refers at one time to the subject of the
augmentation and at another time to the form as the proximate
formal term of the augmentation. And in this second way it is the
form that is said to be augmented and changed, [and] in the first
way it is its subject.
151 To the third [n. 137] I concede that the composite is first
generated, as the dear soul in the augmentation of charity, which
composite includes the subject and term. And when it is said that
then there would not be a creation, I say that charity or grace are
infused into the soul in the same instant of time, in which they
are created, but in two different instants of nature, although the
whole is simultaneous in the same instant of time. Hence, there is
a double mutation here. One from non-existence of charity or
grace to its existence, and this is merely the mutation that is
called creation and is not a mutation properly speaking, because
nothing here presupposes neither matter nor its subject as
something susceptive, as is the case with mutation proper.
Another is the mutation from not-dear to 'being dear.' And in this
way the soul is changed from 'not-being dear' to 'being dear,' and
this mutation is not simply creation, because it presupposes
something that is accepting. And therefore this mutation can be
simpliciter creatio quia praesupponit susceptivum. Et ideo haec

mutatio secundum quid potest dici generatio et totum
compositum secundum quid tale generatur et non simpliciter,
quia substantia, quae est terminus generationis praefuit infusioni
gratiae et generatur secundum esse gratum et accidentale.
[Quaestio 4
Utrum augmentum caritatis fiat per appositionem
in essentia caritatis
ad gradum caritatis praeexsistentem]
153 Utrum augmentum caritatis fiat per appositionem in

essentia caritatis ad gradum caritatis praeexsistentem.
Videtur quod non:

Quia quod augetur secundum substantiam, mutatur secun
dum substantiam, et quod mutatur secundum substantiam, non
manet, sed primum corrumpitur quando alterum generatur.
154 Item, Philosophus, IV Physicorum:88 rarefactio est propter
hoc quia subiectum est in potentia ad utrumque terminum sine
appositione alicuius extrinseci ad hoc quod quantitas fiat maior.
Ergo multo magis est hoc ubi est augmentum in quantitate
virtutis.
155 Item, simile in forma appositum simili non facit magis tale,
sicut patet de tepido addito alteri tepido eiusdem gradus: non
facit magis calidum. Sed si caritas addita est similis et aequalis
gradus praeexsistenti, caritas erit semper augmentata in duplo.
156 Item, non potest intelligi gradus addi alteri gradui nisi sit
distinctio inter illos, non specifica quia tunc non essent eiusdem
rationis, nec numeralis quia hoc habent a subiecto sicut dicitur V
m Aristot.. Physica IV, c. 9 (217a 21-2176 11).

called a generation in a qualified sense, and the whole such

composite is generated in a qualified sense and not in a simple
unqualified sense, because the substance, which is the term of
generation, was there before the infusion of grace and it is
generated according to [some] gratuitous and acidental being.
Question Four
Does the augmentation of charity occur in the essence
through the addition of charity to the degree
of preexisting charity?
153 Does the augmentation of charity come about in the essence

through an addition to the preexisting degree of charity?
It seems not:
For, what is augmented according to substance, is changed
according to substance, and what is changed according to
substance, does not remain; but the first is corrupted when the
other is generated.
154 Also, the Philosopher in Bk. IV of the Physics: Rarefaction
occurs for this reason, because a subject is in potency to either
term, [but] without the addition of anything extrinsic [to it] for
quantity to become greater. Hence all the more so is this the case
where there is an augmentation in the quantity of virtue.
155 Also, something similar in form added to what is similar
does not make such greater, as is evident from adding to what is
tepid something that is tepid in the same degree: this does not
make it hotter. But if charity is addedthat is similar and of
equal degree compared to what was there beforethe [pre
existing] charity will always be doubled.35
156 Also, one cannot conceive of a degree [of charity] added to
another degree unless there be a distinction between them; [that
distinction is] not specific, because then they will not be of the
;!5 The difference is one of adding a certain quantity of matter at a certain

temperature to another quantity of matter at the same temperature (which does
not increase the overall temperature), as opposed to adding a certain quantity of
pure heat (e.g., in the form of radiation) to a quantity of matter already
containing the same quantity of heat (which doubles the temperature). Perhaps,
this is why Scotus later resorts to a comparison with fire (i.e., radiant heat, cf. n.
166 below).
Metaphysicae:89 plura numero dicuntur quae habent diversa vel

plura subiecta numero. Sed hic est unum subiectum omnium
graduum; ergo etc.
157 Contra:
Augustinus, XV De Trinitate, cap. 26:90 'Bis dabatur Spiritus
Sanctus: Christo exsistente in terra quando insufflavit, et ipso
exsistente in caelo in Pentecoste'. Ergo fuit appositio et
augmentum in essentia caritatis.
158 Item, Augustinus, Super Ioannem homilia 74,91 et ponitur in
littera: 'habenti promittitur Spiritus Sanctus ut plenius
habeatur'.
159 Item, Ecclesia orat in collecta gratiam nobis infundi quando
dicit "Gratiam tuam, quaesumus Domine, mentibus nostris
infunde".
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Art. 1: Caritas augetur
per additionem novi gradus]
160 Responsio. Dico quod caritas augetur per appositionem vel

infusionem alicuius gradus vel partis ad caritatem praeexsisten-
tem. Et primo probo quod ita est, secundo quare ita est. Licet
enim prima opinio sit subtilior et ista grossior, tamen tenet cum
Bonaventura, iuxta imaginationem meam, magis quam prima.
161 Probatio primi patet per destructionem aliarum opinionum
et per divisionem quia nescio invenire quintum modum. Tres
autem opiniones aliae fuerunt reprobatae in praecedentibus
tribus quaestionibus: quod non sit per corruptionem primae
caritatis, nec per dispositionem ex parte subiecti, nec per
extractionem partis sequentis de potentia primae.
162 Item, probo hoc per rationem contra oranes modos praedic-
tos. Quia si augmentatio est aliqua actio realis Dei, quaero ad
quid terminatur? Non ad aliquid praeexsistens, quia illud est, et
sic bis caperet esse, quod non est intelligibile: ergo entitas nova
*l Aristot, Metaph. V (A), c. 6 (1016b 31-3)

90 August., De Trin. XV, c. 26, n. 46 (CCSL 50A, 525; PL 42, 1093).
91 August., In Ioan. Evangelium, tr. 74, n. 2 (CCSL 36, 514; PL 35. 1828)
same sort, neither is the distinction numerical, for such stems

from the subject, as stated in Bk. V of the Metaphysics: 'Things
are said to be several by number which have diverse or several
subjects numerically.' But here there is one subject of all the
degrees; therefore, etc.
Augustine in Bk. XV of The Trinity, chapter 26: 'The Holy
Spirit was given twice: when Christ existed on earth and it was
breathed upon [him], and when he existed in heaven, at
Pentecost.' Therefore, there was an addition and increase in the
essence of charity.
158 Also, Augustine On the Gospel of John, homily 74, and it is
cited in the text: "[Not without cause] is the Holy Spirit promised
to one who has [him] that he may possesses [him] to a greater
extent."
159 Also, the Church prays in the Collect [of the Mass] that
grace be infused in us when it says "Infuse thy grace, we beseech
thee Lord, in our spirits."
To the Question
Article One
Charity is increased by a new degree
160 Reply: I say that charity is increased by addition or infusion

of some degree or part to the preexisting charity. And I first prove
that it is so and secondly I give the reason why. For although the
first opinion is subtler and this is grosser, nevertheless it is more
in line with Bonaventure, as I imagine, than the first.
161 Proof of the first is evident, from the refutation of the other
opinions and from [the adequacy of] the division, for I know not
how to find a fifth way. The three other opinions have been
refuted in the preceding three questions: [i] that it is not through
the corruption* of the first charity, nor [ii] through a disposition
on the part of the subject, nor [in] through the extraction of the
following part from the potency of the first.
162 Likewise, I prove this through a rational argument against
all the preceding ways, for if the increase is some real action of
God, I ask what it terminates in; not in something preexisting,
realis et sic contra tertiam opinionem. Et sic nulla thum

praedictarum opinionum potest stare, ergo oportet dare quod
haec realitas nova possit stare cum caritate praeexsistenti.
[1. Duae difficultates

a. Proponuntur difficultates]
163 Sed haec opinio habet difficultatem, quomodo possit fieri

intensio caritatis si sit caritas eiusdem rationis, ut si tepidum
addatur tepido, non videtur aliquid fieri intensius.
164 Secundo est difficultas: quomodo potest fieri unum ex
caritate praecedente et addita, cum una non sit in potentia
alterius?
[b. Solutio primae difficultatis]
165 Quantum ad primum: scilicet 'quomodo caritas potest fieri

intensior ex gradibus eiusdem rationis' (non tamen 'una est in
potentia respectu alterius'), dico quod, secundum Philosophum,
VIII Physicorum,92 quod sicut omnis potentia vel virtus in maiori
magnitudine maior est et efficacior quam in minori, et hoc saltem
verum est secundum efficaciam in operando, ut alias exposui, sic
est in proposito.
166 Similiter hoc etiam patet in duobus contiguis habentibus
eandem virtutem: sunt efficaciora in virtute duorum quam in uno
tantum, ut duo ignes contigui; idem enim est ac si essent
continuum. Sic enim effectus intensior est quando fit a duobus
agentibus quam ab uno tantum, et sic cum producant effectum
intensiorem, et causa erit intensior ad producendum; aliter
effectus excederet causam in efficacia et virtute. Ergo similiter est
in proposito in duobus gradibus eiusdem formae, praecipue cum
Aristot., Physica VIII, c. 10 (2666 7-8)

because that already exists and thus would receive existence

twice, which is unintelligible; therefore it is some new real entity
and thus is against the third opinion. And so none of the three
aforesaid opinions can stand, therefore it is necessary that this
new reality can coexist with the preexistent charity.
Two difficulties
Presenting the difficulties
163 But there is a difficulty about this opinion: how can the
intensification of charity come to be if charity is of the same sort?
It does not seem like anything more intense can come from
adding the tepid to the tepid.
164 Secondly, there is this difficulty: How can the preexisting
and the added charity become one, while one is not in the potency
to the other?
Solution of the first difficulty
165 As for the first, namely 'how charity can be intensified with
degrees of the same sort' (but not this: 'one is not in potency to the
other'), I say thataccording to the Philosopher, Bk. VIII of the
Physicsjust as any power or virtue in a greater magnitude* is
greater and more efficacious than in a lesser magnitude (and this
at least is true as regards its efficacy in operating, as I have
shown elsewhere), so it is in the case at hand.
166 Likewise, two contiguous things with the same power are
more efficacious [acting] as two than only one [of them] is, as is
evident in the case of two contiguous fires, for they behave in the
same way as though they were [one] continuous [fire]. For in this
way the effect is more intense when it comes from two agents
than when it stems from only one. And in this way, since they
produce a more intense effect, the cause will [also] have to be
more intense in producing; otherwise the effect would exceed the
cause in efficacy and power. It is similar, therefore, in what is
proposed in the case of two degrees of the same form, especially
when they exist in one and the same thing: they act more
intensely, just as [their action would have been] more extensive if
exsistant in uno: agent intensius sicut prius extensius si essent in

duobus subiectis ordinatis ad unum effectum.
167 Item, Augustinus, VII De Trinitate, cap. 12:93 Omnis forma
specifica perfectior est in duobus quam in uno (et ideo natura
divina non est species, quia non est perfectior deitas in duabus
personis quam in una); ergo caritas simili modo intensior et
perfectior erit secundum speciem in duobus quam in uno.
168 Item, exemplum est ad hoc de distinctione duorum lumi-
num: si concurrant in medio, illuminatur intensius, et tamen
unum lumen potest manere sine alio.
169 Et de duobus ponderosis similiter patet quod citius et
velocius moventur quam unum illorum. Si ergo ponderositas illa
esset intensa, esset in parte minori eodem modo, id est aeque
velociter moveretur sicut si esset in duobus ponderosis, sicut
patet VII Physicorum94 in fine. Si enim pars distingueretur a
parte illius mobilis velocioris, moveretur secundum aequalem
proportionem.
[B. Art. 2: Quomodo ex duobus gradibus fit unum

1. Proponitur difficultas secunda]
170 Secundo est difficultas: quomodo fit unum ex istis duobus

gradibus. Non enim videtur quod possit fieri ex eis unum, quia
scilicet unus gradus non est in potentia ad alium. Sed aliter non
potest fieri ex duobus unum, VII Metaphysicae.95 Quod autem
unus non sit in potentia ad alium patet, quia sunt eiusdem
rationis, et ideo neutra caritas est in potentia ad aliam.
93 August., De Trin. VII, c 6, n. 11 (CCSL 50, 265; PL 42, 944).

Aristot., Physica VII, c. 5 (250a 25-7).
95 Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 17 (10416 11-9).
they wereas was the case beforein two subjects ordered to

produce one effect.
167 Also, Augustine in Bk. VII of The Trinity, chapter 12: Every
specific form is more perfect in two than in one (and therefore the
divine nature is not a species, because deity in two persons is not
more perfect than in one); therefore charity in a similar way will
be more intense and perfect according to species in two than in
one.
168 Also, there is an example of this in the case of two distinct
lights; if they concur in the medium it is illuminated more
intensely and nevertheless one light can remain without the
other.
169 And it is evident that two heavy objects move more rapidly
and quickly than one of them.36 If, therefore, that [original]
heaviness were [already] intense [i.e., apart from those two
objects], it would be in the lesser part in the same way [as in two],
that is, it would move as fast [in one] as if it were in two heavy
things, as is evident from Bk. VII of the Physics, in the end. But if
[it would make a difference] to distinguish between the parts of
that faster mobile, [each] would move proportionately [fast].
Article Two
How something one comes from two degrees
Presenting the difficulty
170 Secondly, there is the difficulty of how these two degrees

become one. For it does not seem that one could come from them,
since one degree is not in potency as regards the other. But,
according to Bk. VII of the Metaphysics, one cannot come from
two otherwise. It is evident, however, that one degree is not in
potency to the other, because they are of the same sort, and
therefore neither charity is in potency as regards the other.
30 This is, of course, not true, from the point of view of Newton's physics.
[2. Opinio Godefridi de Fontibus

a. Expositio opinionis Godefridi]
171 Responsio. Hic est unus modus dicendi quod primus gradus
est imperfectior et ultimus magis perfectus;96 vel aliter, natura in
se est in potentia ad quemlibet gradum, ita quod natura sub uno
gradu est in potentia ad alium gradum.
[b. Contra opinionem Godefridi]
172 Sed hoc non capio, quia gradus et gradus non sunt
accidentia naturae, sed perfectio intrinseca naturae. Per gradum
enim in natura, non dico nisi naturam secundum illum gradum in
quo participatur ab individuo. In natura autem praeexsistente
sive in caritate praeexsistente fuit natura et fuit gradus
imperfectus. Tamen oportet ergo habere aliquid quod terminet
augmentationem sive adcreationem97 caritatis, et coniungi
praeexsistenti. Hoc autem erit aliquis alius gradus qui est
eiusdem rationis cum praecedenti. Et si crearetur in anima
absque alio gradu praeexsistenti, esset per se et non coniunge-
retur praeexsistenti nec per consequens adaugeretur prima
caritas.
173 Praeterea, si ultimus gradus esset perfectior, semper
augeretur in duplum. Sed non est intelligendum quod ultimum
complementum sit perfectius quam praecedentes gradus, sicut
dicit alia opinio.
[3. Solutio secundi articuli secundum Scotum]
174 Dico ergo quod fit unum ex istis gradibus, et tamen neuter
est in potentia ad alterum, sicut in quantitate molis sive continua
est quantitas tota de se una et seipsa, et tamen habet in se multas
M Godefridus de Font., Quodl. II, q. 10 (PhB II, 144-5).

" Adcreationem pro accretionem, ut videtur, sed manifeste pluribus locis (cf.
adgenerationem in M).
The opinion of Godfrey of Fontaine

Exposition of the opinion of Godfrey
171 Response. One way of putting this is that the first degree is
less perfect and the last more perfect; or, to put it in another way,
the nature itself is in potency to any degree, so that under one
degree the nature is in potency to the other degree.
Against the opinion of Godfrey
172 But I do not understand this, because this degree and that
degree are not accidents of the nature, but are an intrinsic
perfection of the nature. For while speaking of a degree in nature,
I assert nothing but nature [itself] according to that degree in
which it exists in the individual. Now in what preexisted or in the
preexisting charity there was nature, and the degree was
imperfect. But one still needs to have something as the term of
the increase or augmentation of charity, and it has to be joined to
what preexisted. But this will be some other degree that is of the
same sort as the preceding. And if it were created in the soul
without the other preexisting degree, it would exist per se and
would not be joined to what was there before and hence the initial
charity would not be increased.
173 Furthermore, if the final degree were more perfect, the
increase would always be by doubling. But one should not think
that the final complement is more perfect than the preceding
grades,37 as this other opinion believes.
Solution of the second article according to Scotus
174 I declare, therefore, that from these degrees one [entity]

results and nevertheless no degree is in potency to the other, just
as in a quantity of mass (or a continuous body) the entire
:17 One way of explaining this statement is by comparing an arithmetical

progression (e.g., increments 'plus one') to a geometrical one (e.g., increments 'by
doubling'): although the latter brings a much more dramatic increase with each
step, still any following step is not any more perfect than the previous one, for
each step brings about the same change (doubling).
partes, et sic est haec unitas non essentialis sed homogeneitatis,

quae unitas non est de ratione continui, et quaelibet pars de se
est eadem toti et alii parti, sicut quaelibet de se est haec, unde est
eiusdem rationis, et ideo de se haec; sic igitur est de quantitate
virtutis sicut de quantitate molis.
175 Haec autem primo probo de quantitate, quia in substantia
extensa pars extra partem substantiae est alia a quantitate; alias
substantia corporea esset ita simplex sub quantitate sicut anima
intellectiva. Hoc ergo suppono ad praesens, scilicet quod sit alia
pars substantiae a parte alia quantitatis. Impossibile etiam est
quod quantitas sit principium causativum substantiae in secunda
parte, quia non est forma activa. Et sic quaelibet pars substantiae
prius naturaliter est quam quaelibet pars quantitatis. Ergo
substantia ante quantitatem habet virtualiter partes homogeneas
et unius rationis, non autem unitatem compositionis sed
homogeneitatis; et illud universaliter verum est in omnibus
homogeneis. Unde quaelibet species unigenea, quantum est de se,
posset esse in uno individuo, ut omnis aqua in una aqua, et omne
continuum in quantum huiusmodi in uno continuo, secundum
istum, scilicet Henricum,98 et non esset maius et minus intensive
illud totum quam quodlibet per se.
98 Henricus Gand., Quodl. V, q. 22 (f. 200): "Et hoc quemadmodum cum

imaginatione mathematica linea moveatur ad latus in superficiem, augmentum
quod addit lineae in constitutione superficiei, omnino est alterius generis quam
sit augmentum quod convenit lineae in Iongum secundum se".
quantity of itself is one per se, and nevertheless it has many

parts. And in this way this unity is not essential38 but one of
homogeneity39which unity is not quite of the same sort as that
of a continuum40and each part of itself is [of] the same [sort] as
the whole and another part, just as each is of itself a 'this,'41
hence it is of the same sort, and [nevertheless] is of itself a this.'
Hence, the amount of virtue has the same qualities as the amount
of mass.
175 First I prove this about the quantity, because in an extended
substance [the existence of] parts [of the substance] side by side
with other parts of the substance42 is not the same as its
quantity.43 Otherwise the corporeal substance would be as simple
quantitatively as the intellective soul. Hence, I assume presently,
namely that a part of substance is something different from
[simply] another part of the quantity. Moreover, it is impossible
that quantity be the causative principle of substance in [that]
second part,41 because it45 is not an active form. And in this way
each part of the substance is naturally prior to each part of the
quantity. Therefore, the substance before quantity has virtually*
homogeneous parts and they are of the same sort, but the unity is
not that of composition but of homogeneity; and that is
universally true in all homogeneous things. Hence, each
homogeneous species, inasmuch as it is of itself, could be in one
individual, as all water in each drop of water, and all of the
continuum in every continuous thing, according to this one,
namely Henry, and this whole would not be more or less intensive
than any [part] per se.
38 That is, of essential parts like matter and form, or genus and specific
difference, which are unlike one another.
:,n The distinct parts are all of the same sort.
40 The continuum has only virtual parts. Scotus seems to assume the
degrees of charity are more like discrete but contiguous parts.
41 That is, individual.
12 Scotus distinguishes here between the integral parts of the substance qua
substance and its quantity or actual extension in space, which is an accident,
because of his theological view of how the body of Christ is present under the
appearance of bread in the sacrament of the altar.
43 Quantity is an accident of a corporeal substance.
44 That is, another part of quantity is not the cause of yet another part of the
substance.
45 I.e., quantity.
176 Sic igitur est de quantitate virtutis. Gradus enim qui per se
separati sunt nati essent esse in diversis individuis, quia in
quantum unigenei sunt possunt esse unum individuum sive in
uno individuo, et sic illud erit magis intensum quam quodlibet
per se.
177 Ad formam argumenti respondeo quod non posset fieri
unum compositum sive unum unitate compositionis ex partibus
essentialibus. Ratio est quia tales partes sunt diversarum
rationum, sicut sunt materia et forma, et ideo oportet quod
habeant quandam proportionem, scilicet quod unum sit in
potentia et reliquum in actu, et sic intendit Philosophus illam
proportionem, VII Metaphysicae." Sed hic ex gradibus non fit
unum compositione sicut ibi. Unde facta resolutione in unitate
compositionis ex materia et forma, adhuc praeintelligitur et est
ibi unitas sive unio homogeneitatis, et alia totalitas materiae a
totalitate formae, quia materia habebit alias partes eiusdem
rationis, quia est substantia subtracta quantitati; similiter forma
habebit plures partes alias eiusdem rationis. Ergo alia erit unio
ista et prior quam sit unio compositionis.
178 Ad argumenta in oppositum.

Ad primumi00 quando dicitur quod illud quod augetur
secundum substantiam, mutatur et generatur secundum substan-
tiam, dicendum quod essentia vel substantia potest accipi
quiditative, vel prout est participata ab individuis vel in
individuis.
179 Primo modo, scilicet ut abstrahitur ab omnibus individuis et
condicionibus individualibus, augmentatio vel intensio non est in
essentia nisi accipiendo 'in' pro 'sub', et est fallacia consequentis,
quia est mutatio in essentia.
180 Immoi0i non valet arguere sic 'aliter se habet essentia in
individuo, ergo in essentia est mutatio', secundo modo accipiendo
m Aristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 17 (10416 11-9).

i00 Cf. supra n. 153.
i0i Immo subiecto: nonnulli codd. hoc loco habent: Secundo modo gradus
enim llle prior.
176 In this way, then, it is about the quantity of virtue. For the
degrees which are separate per se are suited to be in diverse
individuals; however, inasmuch as they are homogeneous, they
can be one individual or in one individual, and thus [in the latter
situation] they will be more intense than each is per se.
177 To the form of the argument, I respond that it cannot be one
composite or one by a unity of composition from essential parts.
The reason is that such parts are of diverse sorts, just as matter
and form are, and therefore it is necessary that they have a
certain proportion, namely that one is in potency and the other
one is in act, and in this way the Philosopher understood that
proportion, in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics. But here from the
degrees we do not get one by composition, as is the case there.
Hence, the unity of composition from matter and form is
precededboth in the intellect and in realityby a unity of
homogeneity that is there, and a totality of matter is other than
the totality of form, because matter has other parts of the same
sort, because it is a substance considered apart from quantity;
similarly the form will have several parts of the same sort.
Therefore this union will be other and prior to that union of
composition.
178 To the arguments for the opposite view.

To the first [n. 153] when it is said that what is augmented
according to substance is changed and is generated according to
substance, it must be said that 'essence' or 'substance' can be
understood [a] in a quidditative way or [b] insofar as it is
participated by individuals or is in individuals.
179 In the first way, namely as it is abstracted from all
individuals and individuating conditions, the augmentation or
intensification is in the essence only if one assumes 'in' to mean
[in something] 'under' [the essence]. And it is the fallacy of the
consequent to assume [further] that there is change in the
essence.
180 Furthermore, it is not valid to argue in this way: 'The
essence exists in a different way in the individual, therefore there
essentiam sic, puta pro essentia in individuo. Sic non est aliud a
natura specifica in isto, et sic etiam in essentia augetur. Et non
sequitur quod mutatur in essentia absolute, sed secundum
subiectum. Unde secundum essentiam, id est in individuis, sit
mutatio et tamen manet quod praefuit. Unde gradus ille prior
augetur in essentia sive in subiecto, non accipiendo praecise quia
praecisio aufertur adveniente alio gradu. Ille igitur gradus nihil
aliud est realiter a natura in ipso sive quidam modus habendi
naturam, et iste augetur non proprie sicut prius, et sic non
includit mutari, sed est illud quo subiectum mutatur et sic nec
intenditur nec remittitur nec est mutatio in essentia.
181 Sic igitur debet inferri 'ergo est ibi mutatio in essentia ut est
participata individuis'. Ratio enim mutationis et augmentationis
convenit essentiae ut est in individuo. Nec propter hoc sequitur
quod sit in essentia secundum se, sed tantum ut natura habetur
ab ipso. Nec sequitur quod forma augeatur, nec mutetur, quia
augere improprie convenit formis et per consequens mutari. Sed
bene concedo quod secundum essentiam formae fiat mutatio in
individuo. Nec propter hoc sequitur 'ergo non manet prior', quia
mutatio potest esse ad tale vel ad magis tale. Primo modo quod
mutatur non manet, sed secundo modo manet idem.
182 Ad aliudi02 quando dicitur de rarefactione quod fit sine
additione, et de calido fit magis calidum, IV Physicorum, etc.
dicendum quod est pro ista positione, quia quaelibet pars fuit
"* Cf. supra n. 154.

is a change in the essence,' taking 'essence' in the second sense,

that is for 'the essence in the individual.' In this way it is nothing
other than 'the specific nature in that [individual],' and in this
way there is also an increase 'in the essence.' And it does not
follow that it is changed in the essence in an absolute sense, but
according to the subject. Hence, there is a change according to the
essence, that is, in the individuals, and nevertheless what was
there before remains. Hence that prior degree is augmented in
the essence or in the subject, [although] not by taking it precisely,
because the precision is removed by the advent of the other
degree. Therefore, that degree is really nothing other than the
nature in that [degree] or a certain way of having the nature,'
and this46 is augmented, [although] not properly as before,47 and
thus it does not include change, but it is that by which the subject
is changed and thus it48 is not intensified nor remitted, nor is
there change in the essence.
181 In this way therefore it must be inferred 'Therefore, there is
a change in the essence as it is participated by individuals' For
the notion of the change and augmentation pertains to the
essence as it is in the individual. Not because of this does it follow
that it is in the essence according to itself, but only insofar as the
nature is possessed by [the individual]. Neither does it follow that
the form is augmented or changed, because to be augmented'
and as a consequence 'to be changed'improperly pertains to
forms. But I do well to concede that according to the essence of
the form there is a change in the individual. But not on this
account does it follow 'therefore the prior does not remain,'
because the change can be to what is this sort of thing or to what
is more this sort of thing. In the first sense that which is
changed49 does not remain [the same], but in the second sense it
remains the same.
182 To the other [n. 154] when it is said about rarefaction that it
happens without [an extrinsic] addition [to the subject], and
about heat [that] it becomes hotter, according to Bk. IV of the
40 I.e., the degree or way of having the nature.

17 That is, taken in the first sense.
w 'It' refers to essence or substance.
49 Namely, the essence or substance.
calida ita quod nulla pars sit calida quin prius fuerit calida, et
postea quaelibet fit calidior. Unde Philosophus vult ibi dicere
quod per partem calefactibilis non fit calidius intensive, sed
tantum posset esse calidius extensive. Sic si anima animae
adderetur, esset extensio non intensio. Sed si auferretur calor ille
a parte sua et apponeretur alteri, illa cui additur esset calidior,
quia fit appositio gradus ad gradum eiusdem rationis, et sic fit
intensior. Quod autem haec sit intentio Philosophi patet, quia
idem dicit ibi de quantitate maiori et minori per rarefactionem, et
hoc non potest esse nisi quia substantia habet primo partes
eiusdem rationis de se.
183 Ad aliudi03 quando dicitur quod simile additum simili in
eodem gradu nihil intendit, aliter si intenderet, semper in duplo,
dicendum quod intensio fit per aequale adveniens vel minus vel
in quocumque gradu minimo, quando fit in eodem individuo. Sed
in diversis non esset verum quod fieret augmentum intensive, sed
tantum fierent plura extensive.
184 Si dicas quod minima caritas potest praeexsistere, dico quod

haec est unitas unigeneitatis, licet non sit minimum in toto per
se. Unde sicut nutritio est adgeneratio parti carnis praecedentis,
sic in proposito augmentatio caritatis non est nisi adcreatio
caritatis caritati praeexsistenti.
185 Ad aliudi04 quando dicitur quod non potest intelligi appositio
gradus ad gradum, nisi sit distinctio inter illos, ita quod non sunt
distincti specie nec numero, dico quod in primo instanti naturae
i0:i Cf. supra n. 155.

"l4 Cf. supra n. 156.
Physics, etc., it must be said that it is on the assumption that

each part was hot [in such a way] that no part was hot that had
not been hot before. Rather what was hot before afterwards
became hotter. Hence the Philosopher wishes to say there that
[each] part of what can be heated does not become hotter50
intensively [i.e., by altering its specific nature], but [the whole]
can only become hotter extensively [i.e., by increasing the extent
of heat]. In this way if a soul were added to a soul, it would be an
extension [i.e., an increase in number] not an intensification [i.e.,
a change in species]. But if that heat might be taken from a
portion [of a thing] and added to another [part], that [portion] to
which it would be added would be hotter, because the addition of
a degree happens to a degree of the same sort, and thus it
becomes more intense. It is clear that this is what the Philosopher
had in mind, because he says the same thing there about a
greater and lesser quantity through rarefaction, and this can only
be because the substance itself first has parts of the same sort.
183 To the other [n. 155], when it is said that something similar
added to what is similar in the same degree does not intensify
anything, or if it did, [then] always by doubling it, it must be said
that the intensity happens through what is equal or less or in any
minimal degree, when it occurs in the same individual. But in
diverse things it would not be true that the augmentation would
be in intensity, but it would only result in there being several
things extensively.
184 If you say that the minimal charity could preexist, I say that
this is a homogeneous unity, even though the whole per se may
not contain [anything] minimal. Hence just as nutrition is the
generation of an addition to the preceding part of flesh, so in what
is proposed the augmentation of charity is only the creation of an
additional charity to the preexisting charity.
185 To the other [n. 156] when it is said that one cannot
conceive of a degree [of charity] added to another degree unless
there be a distinction between them, but at the same time the
distinction can be neither specific nor numerical, I say that it is in
50 Scotus is contrasting what a notion includes essentially with the extension

or number of things to which it applies. He uses 'intensively' for the first, and
'extensively' for the second.
est distinctio, sicut prius dixi. Et si sic manerent per se, essent
duae caritates numero distinctae realiter, sicut duae aquae si
distinguerentur ab invicem. Sed non in eodem instanti temporis
caritas infunditur et distinguitur a caritate praeexsistenti; et hoc
est propter unitatem homogeneitatis. Caritas enim addita est
sicut pars homogenea, et ideo non est sic distincta. Iste igitur
gradus additus est idem seipso cum primo et distinctus seipso,
sed non eadem identitate et distinctione.
[Quaestio 5
Utrum caritas possit diminui]
186 Ultimo quaeritur utrum caritas possit diminui.
Videtur quod sic:

Primo arguendo in generali: contraria nata sunt fieri circa
idem; sed caritas, secundum praedicta, potest augeri; ergo
diminui.
187 Item, specialiter: quod possit diminui per peccatum veniale,
quia omne malum in quantum malum diminuit de bono,
secundum Augustinum in Enchiridion;i05 peccatum veniale est
malum; ergo aliquid diminuit de bono; sed nihil est bonum in
anima quod per peccatum veniale possit adimi nisi caritas quae
est contrarium sibi; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: quod peccatum
veniale sit malum, quia Deus punit pro eo quod non facit pro
bono.
188 Item, magis et minus sunt in eodem genere secundum
virtutem ut si unum possit diminuere et corrumpere, et aliud,
licet remissius. Sed peccatum mortale et veniale sic se habent in
genere mali. Ergo si peccatum mortale potest caritatem destruere
et corrumpere, videtur etiam quod peccatum veniale possit illam
diminuere.
189 Item, quarto sic: in diligendo Deum ultra omnem creaturam
augetur caritas; sed in diligendo Deum citra creaturam
' August., Enchirid. c. 4. n. 12 (CCSL 46, 54; PL 40. 236).

the first instance of nature that there is a distinction, just as I

have said before. And if in this way they remained per se, there
would have been two charities numerically distinct in reality, just
as two waters if they were distinguished from one another. But it
is not in the same instant of time that charity is infused and
distinguished from the preexisting charity, and this is because of
the unity of homogeneity. For charity is added as a homogeneous
part, and therefore it is not distinct in this way. Hence this added
degree is of itself the same thing as the first and [at the same
time is] distinct of itself, but not by the same identity and
distinction.
Question Five
Can charity be diminished?
186 Finally it is asked whether charity can be diminished.

It seems that it can:
First by arguing in general: contraries are by nature suited
to occur as regards the same thing; but charity, according to what
has been said, can be increased; therefore it can be diminished.
187 Also, in particular: [it seems] that it could be diminished by
venial sinbecause every evil inasmuch as it is evil results in a
diminution as regards the good, according to Augustine in the
Enchiridion: venial sin is an evil; therefore it is something that
results in a diminution as regards the good; but there is nothing
good in the soul that could be diminished though venial sin except
charity, which is its contrary; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor:
venial sin is an evil, because God punishes because of it, which he
does not do for what is good.
188 Also, more or less [of the same genus] are [also] in the same
genus as regards their capacity, so that just as one can diminish
and corrupt, so can the other, although to a lesser degree. But
mortal and venial sin are in the same genus of evil. Therefore if
mortal sin can destroy or corrupt charity, it seems that venial sin
could diminish it.
189 Also, fourthly, in this way: loving God more than any
creature increases charity; but in loving God less than a creature
corrumpitur totaliter; ergo diligendo eum aequaliter cum creatura

diminuitur caritas et non corrumpitur nec augetur.
190 Contra:
Augustinus, 83 Quaestionum, q. 21. i06 Probat Augustinus
quod Deus non est causa deficiendi, quia non est causa mali et
non-essendi; et malum est deficere vel tendere ad non-esse; ergo
cum caritatem diminui sit ipsam deficere et tendere ad non-esse,
hoc non esset a Deo; ergo etc.
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio antiqua]
191 Hic quandoque fuit opinio quod caritas diminuitur per

peccatum veniale.
192 Huius probatio est: quia profectus caritatis est diminutio
cupiditatis, loquendo de cupiditate quae est peccatum veniale,
quia alia cupiditas, scilicet mortalis in nullo eius gradu stat cum
caritate; ergo e converso profectus talis cupiditatis venialis erit
diminutio caritatis. Antecedens patet per Augustinum, 83
Quaestionum, q. 36: i07 "Caritatis venenum est spes retinendorum
aut adipiscendorum temporalium; nutrimentum autem eius est
diminutio cupiditatis". Consequentia patet in omnibus oppositis,
si profectus caloris est diminutio frigiditatis, et e converso. Ergo si
caritas multum intensa remittit cupiditatem, e contra cupiditas
intensa diminuit vel remittit caritatem.
193 Item, secundo sic: habens aequalem caritatem, aequaliter
est carus Deo et aequaliter acceptatur. Sed duorum sic aequalium
in caritate, peccat unus venialiter et alius non. Tunc quaero
utrum aequaliter acceptantur a Deo ut prius, aut non. Si non,
ergo non sunt aequales in caritate, et sic per veniale istius aliqua
pars caritatis eius diminuitur. Non potest dici quod aequaliter
diligat eos, quia unum vult punire ut peccantem venialiter, alium
non. Sed non aequaliter diligit quem vult punire, et quem non
vult.
i0 August., De diversis qq. 83, q. 21 (CCSL 44A. 26; PL 40, 16).

iil7 Ibid., q. 36 (CCSL 44A. 54: PL 40, 26).
it is corrupted totally; therefore loving God equally with a

creature diminishes charity and neither corrupts nor augments it.
Augustine, 83 Questions, question 21. Augustine proves that
God is not the cause of things becoming defective, because he is
not the cause of evil or non-being; and evil means to be defective
or to tend to non-being; therefore since a diminution of charity is
for it to become defective and to tend to non-being, this would not
be from God; therefore, etc.
To the Question
An old opinion
191 Once there was an opinion that charity is diminished by

venial sin.
192 Proof thereof is this: because progress in charity is a
diminution of cupidity, speaking of cupidity that is a venial sin,
because the other cupidity, namely mortal, in no degree is
consistent with charity; therefore conversely, an advance in such
venial cupidity will result in a diminution of charity. The
antecedent is evident from Augustine, 83 Questions, question 36:
"The hope of keeping or acquiring temporal things is what poisons
charity; the nourishment of charity is the diminution of cupidity."
The implication is evident in all opposites, if the advance of heat
is the diminution of coldness, and vice versa. Therefore if very
intense charity lessens cupidity, on the contrary intense cupidity
diminishes or lessens charity.
193 Also, secondly in this way: having equal charity, one is
equally dear to God and is accepted equally. But if one of the two
persons equal in charity sins venially and the other does not, then
I ask whether or not they are equally accepted by God as before.
If not, therefore they are not equal in charity, and thus through
the venial sin of this one some part of his charity is diminished. It
cannot be said that [God] loves them equally, because one he
wishes to punish for sinning venially, the other not. But he does
not equally love him whom he wishes to punish and him whom he
does not wish to punish.
194 Item, peccatum veniale impedit infusionem gratiae et

caritatis, ergo conservationem; vel si non impediat conservatio-
nem, nec infusionem.
195 Modus autem ponendi eorum est iste. Dicunt enim quod
cupiditas augmentatur per peccata venialia, et generatur tandem
in anima habitus malus qui remittit caritatem. Et si continuet
venialia, generatur habitus malus in summo. Et si, post talem
habitum in summo, elicit aliquem actum; aut erit actus caritatis,
et tunc per actum illum remittetur iste habitus vitiosus; aut si
secundum illum habitum vitiosum in summo eliciat aliquem
actum erit peccatum mortale quod totaliter corrumpet caritatem.
[B. Contra istam opinionem]
196 Sed contra: habens istum habitum vitiosum in summo, non

oportet quod necessario eliciat actum secundum totum conatum
et inclinationem ipsius habitus, quia tunc ille habitus non esset in
potestate eius. Ergo potest elicere aliquem actum citra inclinatio
nem summam eius. Iste autem actus erit peccatum veniale, non
autem mortale: tum quia non est necesse eum peccare mortaliter
nec mereri secundum caritatem, tum quia non est secundum
totam inclinationem habitus. Ergo, sicut prius fuit veniale
secundum habitum sibi proportionatum, ita et modo secundum
inclinationem illius habitus sibi proportionatam. Ille ergo actus
non corrumpit caritatem. Aut ergo diminuit, aut non. Si non,
habetur propositum; si sic, ergo ulterius potest illa diminui et
tandem totaliter destrui, quod falsum est; ergo etc.
197 Item, aliquis habens caritatem minimam, si peccet
venialiter, tunc quaero utrum eius caritas diminuatur aut non. Si
non, habetur propositum. Si sic, ergo vel destruetur totaliter, vel
contingit dare minus minimo, quorum utrumque falsum.
194 Also, venial sin impedes the infusion of grace and of charity,
therefore it impedes its conservation; or else if it did not impede
its conservation, neither would it impede its infusion.
195 But this is the way they explain it. For they say that
cupidity is augmented by venial sins, and finally it generates a
bad habit in the soul, which diminishes charity. And if one
continues to sin venially, the bad habit is developed in the highest
degree. And if after such a habit [has developed] in the highest
degree, one elicits some act, either it will be an act of charity, and
then through that act this vicious habit may diminish, or it will
be some act in according with this vicious habit that will be a
mortal sin and will totally corrupt charity.
196 To the contrary, however: one having this vicious habit in

the highest degree does not necessarily have to elicit an act
according to the complete entire strength and inclination of this
habit, otherwise this habit would not be in his power to control.
Therefore he can elicit some act without regard to this highest
inclination. But this act will be a venial sin, not a mortal one:
both because it is not necessary for him to sin mortally nor to
merit according to charity, and because it is not according to the
total inclination of the habit. Hence, just as before it was a venial
sin proportioned to the habit, so now it will be proportioned to the
inclination of that habit. Therefore that act will not corrupt
charity. Then, either it will, or will not, diminish it. If not, you
have what we propose. If it does, hence, it can be diminished
further and finally totally destroyed, which is false; therefore, etc.
197 Also, if someone having minimal charity sins venially, then
I ask whether his charity may be diminished or not. If not, you
have what we propose. If it does, therefore either it will be
destroyed totally, or it will become less minimal, each of which is
false.
198 Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem et dico quod diminutio

potest intelligi vel ex parte caritatis in se, vel secundum esse eius
in subiecto, vel comparando eum ad suam causam efficientem, ut
dictum est, vel ad causam demeritoriam.
199 Primo modo dico quod caritas potest diminui in se, sicut et
quantitas extensiva potest diminui. Nam una pars potest ab alia
auferri, et hic et ibi, et ita tota potest diminui. Sed per potentiam
divinam in proposito, et per creaturam in quantitate, quia
quidquid est divisibile secundum gradus intensionis, potest in eo
unus gradus auferri ab alio, et sic Deus unum gradum caritatis ab
alio dividere potest et totum diminuere. Et sic potest caritas
diminui quantum est ex parte formae in se.
200 Secundo modo etiam, scilicet secundum esse quod habet in
subiecto, est divisibilis et potest diminui, quia quaecumque forma
est divisibilis secundum se potest subiecto dare esse tale
divisibiliter; ergo etc.
201 Si autem comparetur tertio modo ad causam agentem, dico
quod nullum agens creatum potest diminui effective, quia
cuiuscumque entis productio est creatio, eius corruptio est versio
vel annihilatio. Sed nulla virtus creata potest aliquid annihilare,
sed semper relinquit aliquid post actionem suam quod
praesupponit. Et ideo non potest corrumpere quod de nihilo
produceretur et per consequens nec diminuere. Solus ergo Deus
potest caritatem diminuere et corrumpere, non per aliquam
actionem, sed subtrahendo suam manutenentiam et continuam
conservationem sive influentiam.
202 Si autem comparatur ad causam demeritoriam, ut ad
peccatum, dico quod licet de potentia sua absoluta posset Deus
non conservare caritatem, et ita corrumpere eam et diminuere
propter veniale sicut propter mortale, non tamen de potentia sua
ordinata. Quia statuit pro lege quod nunquam pro minori malo
auferret maius bonum. Sed sicut ex libertate sua dat maius
bonum pro minori bono, quia semper praemiat ultra condignum.
Reply of Scotus
198 I respond therefore to the question and I say that the

diminution can be conceived either on the part of the charity
itself, or according to how it is in the subject, or in respect to its
efficient cause, as has been said, or to a demeritorious cause.
199 In the first way I say that charity can be diminished in
itself, just as extensive quantity can be diminished. For one part
can be taken away from another both here and there and so the
whole can be diminished. But because anything whatsoever is
divisible according to degrees of intensity, one degree can be
taken away from anotherin our proposal by divine power, and
where quantity is concerned through a creatureand thus God
can divide one degree of charity from another and diminish the
whole. And so charity can be diminished inasmuch as it is on the
part of the form in itself.
200 In the second way also, namely according to the being it has
in a subject, it is divisible and can be diminished, because any
form that is divisible according to itself can give such being
divisibly to a subject; therefore, etc.
201 But if it is taken in the third sense in relation to the agent
cause, I say that no created agent can be effectively diminished,
because whatever being's production is a creation, its corruption
is the reverse or an annihilation. No created power, however, can
annihilate some thing, but after its action it always leaves
something behind that it presupposed. And therefore it cannot
corrupt what is produced from nothing and as a consequence, it
cannot diminish it either. Only God, then, can diminish or corrupt
charity, not through some action, but by withdrawing his
maintenance and continuous conservation and influence.
202 But if one takes it in relation to a demeritorious cause, as to
a sin, I say that although God by his absolute power could fail to
conserve charity, and so corrupt it and diminish it because of
venial sin, as he could because of mortal sin, he does not do so,
however, by his ordained power. Because he has established by
law that never for a lesser evil does he take away a greater good.
But just as he freely gives a greater good for a lesser good, since
he always rewards beyond deserved merit, so he punishes a major
ita pro maiori malo punit minori malo, quia semper punit citra
condignum. Omne enim demeritum veniale est minus malum
quam caritas sit bona. Ergo nunquam propter tale malum
subtrahit vel diminuit maius bonum et tantum, sicut est caritas.
Sed propter mortale totaliter corrumpit cari ta tern, non conser-
vando eam, quia illud malum est quodammodo infinitum.
[HI. Dubium circa auctoris solutionem]
203 Sed hic est unum dubium. Quia si secundum praedicta per
veniale non diminuitur caritas, dubium est an fervor caritatis
posset per veniale diminui.
[A. Opinio aliorum]
204 Hic dicitur quod caritas habet suum fervorem essentialem,

qui non potest diminui per venialia sicut nec ipsa caritas. Habet
etiam alium fervorem accidentalem sibi quem causat caritas et
fervor eius essentialis in anima, et iste potest per venialia
diminui.
[B. Contra opinionem supra dictam]
205 Sed hoc nihil est. Nam formae absolutae perficientes sua
subiecta in esse quieto non causant in subiectis aliquas formas
alias a se ipsis, sicut albedo perficiens parietem in esse albo. Ergo
nec caritas causat in anima aliquod esse aliud a se nisi actum
caritatis ad quem naturaliter inclinat, sed non aliquam aliam
formam mansivam sub esse quieto.
[C. Responsio Scoti ad dubium]
206 Respondeo ergo breviter et dico quod fervor caritatis

dupliciter potest diminui: uno modo per actionem positivam
alicuius habitus vitiosi; alio modo privative vel negative per
omissionem.
evil by a minor evil, since he always punishes less that what is

deserved. However, all venial demerit is less of a defect in
proportion to the goodness of charity. Therefore never because of
such an evil does he withdraw or diminish a greater good, and
[especially] one so great as that of charity. Because of mortal sin,
however, he corrupts charity entirely, not conserving it, since that
evil is in a certain measure infinite.
A doubt about the author's solution
203 But there is one doubt here. For, if according to what has
just been said, charity is not diminished through venial sin, a
doubt arises whether the fervor of charity could be diminished
through venial sin.
204 Here it is said that charity has its essential fervor, which
cannot be diminished through venial sin, just as charity itself
cannot. But there is also an accidental fervor that charity and its
essential fervor causes in the soul, and this can be diminished by
venial sin.
Against the aforesaid opinion
205 But there is nothing to this. For absolute forms perfecting

their subject while at rest do not cause any forms other than then-
own, like whiteness perfecting the wall in being white. Therefore
nor does charity cause some being other than itself in the soul,
unless it is an act of charity to which it naturally inclines, but not
some other continuing form when it is at rest.
Scotus's reply to the doubt
206 I respond briefly, then, that the fervor of charity can be

diminished in two ways: one way is by positive action of some
vicious habit; the other way is privative or negative by omission.
207 Primo modo dico quod sic: nam licet caritas sit "pondus
animae" qua faciliter tendit in Deum, et voluntas eius incline-
turi08 in finem ultimum naturaliter, quam plurimum consentiat
et sequatur, non tamen ita necessario sequitur eius inclinationem
ad diligendum Deum, sicut ferri deorsum sequitur formam gravis
in lapide, et ideo potest ex libertate eius agere contra et praeter
inclinationem eius. Sed agendo et eliciendo actus contra
inclinationem suam, peccat mortaliter. Sed eliciendo actus, non
secundum inclinationem eius, sed praeter inclinationem, potest
per frequentes actus huiusmodi generare sibi habitum consi-
milem actibus per quem redditur quasi tardus et ineptus ad
agendum secundum inclinationem caritatis. Qui quidem habitus,
licet non sit omnino contrarius caritati, quia stat cum ea nec eam
corrumpit, inclinat tamen ad alios actus quam sit caritas et quasi
in actus contrarios actibus caritatis, quia voluntas per illum
habitum redditur minus habilis et sic indisposita ad eliciendum
conformiter inclinationi caritatis. Secundum hoc ergo fervor
caritatis diminuitur, quia habilitas voluntatis secundum habitum
caritatis diminuitur ex actibus positive generantibus alium
habitum positivum qui delectabiliter inclinat ad alios actus quam
caritatis, et sic fervor caritatis tollitur aliqualiter per habitum
vitiosum sic generatum.
208 Alio etiam modo diminuitur per omissionem fervor caritatis
negative, omittendo elicere secundum habitum caritatis. Nam ex
actibus elicitis secundum habitum caritatis natus est generari in
anima quidam habitus amoris acquisiti quo anima vel voluntas
faciliter et delectabiliter possit in talia opera amoris.
209 Quod probatur: quia activo et passivo sufficienter
approximatis sequitur actio actus eliciti ex caritate. Non sunt
minus activi quam si elicerentur a sola voluntate sine caritate, et
anima vel voluntas est sufficienter disposita ad receptionem talis
ids noc [oco omnes codd. varias lectiones exhibent de quibus nulla optima
elegi potest. Sensus autem generate manet quacumque stante.
207 In the first way I say that it5i can be diminished, for
although charity is a 'heaviness of the soul,' by which it might
more readily tend to God, and the will is inclined naturally
towards its ultimate end, [which inclination,] for the most part,
the will consents to and follows, nevertheless it does not
necessarily follow its inclination to love God, as being borne
downward follows heaviness in a stone,52 and therefore the will
can exercise its liberty and act against or without its inclination.
But by acting and eliciting acts against its inclination, it can sin
mortally. But by eliciting acts, not in accord with its inclination,
but without it, the will through frequent acts of this kind can
generate a habit similar to the acts, a habit that causes it to
respond slowly and ineptly to the inclination of charity. This habit
indeed, though not entirely contrary to charity, since it coexists
with it and fails to corrupt it, nevertheless inclines [the will] to
acts other than charity and to acts that are, as it were, contrary to
the acts of charity, because through this habit the will is rendered
less able and thus indisposed to elicit [acts] in conformity to the
inclination of charity. Hence, the fervor of charity according to
this is diminished, because the ability of will [to act] according to
the habit of charity is diminished from acts positively generating
another positive habit, which enjoyably inclines to acts other than
those of charity, and thus the fervor of charity is somewhat
annulled through the vicious habit generated in this way.
208 Also in another way the fervor of charity is diminished
negatively, by a failure to elicit [acts] according to the habit of
charity. For from acts elicited according to the habit of charity a
certain habit of acquired love is apt by nature to be generated in
the soul whereby the soul or will can easily and delightfully
engage in such works of love.
209 This is proved, because the action of an elicited act of
charity follows from the agent and patient* being sufficiently
close. Nor are they53 less active than in the case if they were
elicited by the will alone without charity; and the soul or the will
5i The fervor of charity.

M This is a necessary inclination, whereas the will is free to follow or resist
charity's inclination.
r,:t Acts of the acquired habit.
actionis, ergo sicut actus illi, si essent a sola voluntate, nati

essent generare quendam habitum quo voluntas faciliter et
delectabiliter operaretur et cum maiori fervore quam si esset sine
illo, ita etiam quando elicitur a voluntate mediante habitu
caritatis, nati sunt consimilem habitum generare; et iste habitus
potest manere post caritatem corruptam per mortale. Et ideo
quando anima omittit elicere actus caritatis, qui de se generarent
talem habitum quo voluntas ferventius et delectabilius operare
tur, generaretur in ea quaedam tepiditas, quae negative et per
quandam omissionem diminuit habitum caritatis.
210 Sic ergo dupliciter anima fit minus fervens: et per habitum
acquisitum quasi contrarium qui non inclinat ad actus caritatis;
et per omissionem bene agere quae facit eam tepidam ad agen
dum. Si enim operaretur secundum habitum caritatis frequenter
eliciendo actus eius, generaret habitum amoris quo delectabiliter
operaretur consimilia opera operibus caritatis. Et propter istum
habitum, qui inclinat ad similes actus actibus caritatis, non potest
homo certitudinaliter scire se esse in caritate, quia habitus
amoris acquisitus et caritas videntur habere consimiles actus et
consimilem modum agendi et inclinandi; et ideo non faciliter
distinguuntur.
[IV. Ad argumenta pro alia opinione]
211 Ad rationes pro alia opinione. Ad primami09 dico quod

consequentia non valet. Quia quod una forma remittat aliam,
tenet in contrariis formaliter. Non autem sic contrariantur cupidi-
tas venialis et caritas. Consequentia tamen Augustini tenet, quia
augmentum caritatis sequitur actus meritorios, per quos
diminuitur cupiditas et actus eius; non autem sic potest cupiditas
diminuere caritatem.
i09 Cf. supra n. 191-192.

is sufficiently disposed to receive such an action; therefore, just as

these acts, if they were from the will alone without charity, would
be suited by nature to generate a certain habit by which the will
would act easily and delightfully and with greater fervor than if it
were without this, so also when it is elicited by the will by means
of the habit of charity, they are suited by nature to generate a
similar habit; and this habit can remain after charity is corrupted
through mortal sin. And therefore when the soul omits to elicit
acts of charity (acts, which of themselves would generate such a
habit whereby the will would operate more fervently and
delightfully), [this neglect] would generate in it a certain tepidity
that negatively and by way of a certain omission would diminish
the habit of charity.
210 In this twofold way, then, the soul becomes less fervent:
both through the acquired quasi-contrary habit which does not
incline to acts of charity and through failing to act well which
causes it to be tepid in acting. For if it were to operate according
to the habit of charity by eliciting acts of charity frequently, it
would generate a habit of love by which it would delightfully
produce works similar to the works of charity. And because of this
habit, which inclines to acts similar to those of charity, man could
not know certainly that he was in charity, because charity and
the acquired habit of love seem to produce similar acts and have a
similar mode of acting and inclining; and therefore they could not
easily be distinguished.
211 To the reasons for the other opinion. To the first [n. 191-192]
I say that the implication is not valid. Because the statement that
one form lessens the other holds [only] in the case where what is
formally contrary is present. Charity and venial cupidity,
however, are not contrarily related in this way. But the
implication of Augustine holds, because an augmentation of
charity follows meritorious acts by means of which cupidity and
its act is diminished; but cupidity can not diminish charity in this
way.
212 Ad secundumii0 dicendum quod aequales in caritate

aequaliter diliguntur a Deo, et ad aequale praemium, licet unus
sit in peccato veniali et alius non. Nec obstat quia istum qui est in
veniali, vult puniri, et alium non. Nam non omnis qui citius volat
ad caelum plus diligitur, sicut patet de parvulis baptizati9 qui
statim evolant; nec tamen magis diliguntur, nec magis beati, nec
magis praemiantur. Vult enim Deus istum vapulari ut suum
praemium correspondens suae caritati recipiat.
213 Ad tertiumiii dico quod per se veniale non impedit caritatis
infusionem. Immo duobus elicientibus aequalem actum
meritorium, licet actus unius sit cum peccato veniali et aliusii2
non, aequaliter infunditur caritas actui utriusque, et aequale
respondet praemium utrique actui, et si peccans venialiter habeat
maiorem caritatem quam alius qui non peccat, in ipso actu
peccandi magis meretur quam alius. Ut si unus det eleemosynam
ex maiori caritate quam alius, et in dando peccet venialiter ut per
vanam gloriam levem, magis meretur quam alius in minori
caritate dans eleemosynam sine veniali.
214 Similiter sustinens mortem pro Christo et in peccatis multis
venialibus et ex maiori caritate quam contemplans Deum sine
peccato aliquo, magis meretur et per consequens magis
praemiabitur.
215 Quod autem veniale impedit infusionem gratiae et caritatis,
hoc est per accidens in quantum aliquis cum peccato veniali non
habet actum meritorium; vel si habet, non tamen aeque intensum
meritorie, sicut si non peccaret venialiter, quia veniale sic impedit
quod si non peccaret sic posset eundem actum habere
intensiorem.
[V. Ad argumenta principalia]
216 Ad primum principaleii3 concedo quod contraria nata sunt

fieri circa idem in quantum est ex natura eorum, nisi alterum
determinate insit. Et ideo licet caritas in se sit ita diminuibilis
ii0 Cf. supra n. 193.

iii Cf. supra n. 194.
ii2 Melius lege: alterius.
212 To the second [n. 193] it must be said that equals in charity
are loved equally by God, and are rewarded equally, though one is
in venial sin and the other not. It doesn't matter that [God]
wishes to punish this person who is in venial sin, and he does not
wish to punish the other. For not all who pass more quickly to
heaven are loved more, as is evident about baptized infants who
immediately pass [to heaven if they die]; nevertheless they are
not loved more, nor are they more happy, nor are they rewarded
more. For God wills this one to be punished so that his reward
may correspond to the charity he has.
213 To the third [n. 194] I say that venial sin does not impede
the infusion of charity per se. Indeed if two persons elicit equal
meritorious acts, although the acts of one are with venial sin
present and those of the other are not, the charity is equally
infused in response to the acts of both, and an equal reward
corresponds to each act, and if the one sinning venially has a
greater charity than the other who did not sin, in that act of
sinning he may merit more than the other. For example if one
gives alms out of a greater love than the other, and sins venially
in giving by a little vainglory, he may merit more than the other
giving alms with less charity [but] without venial sin.
214 Similarly, one with many venial sins, undergoing death for
Christ with greater charity than one contemplating God without
any sin, merits more and as a consequence will be rewarded
more.
215 But as for the fact that venial sin does impede the infusion
of grace and charity, this is accidental inasmuch as someone with
venial sin does not have a meritorious act; or if he has, it is not as
intense, meritoriously, as it would be were he not sinning
venially, because venial sin impedes in such a way that, if he had
not sinned in this way, the same act could be more intense.
216 To the initial argument [n. 186] I concede that contraries

are suited by nature to occur in regard to the same thing insofar
as their [own] nature goes, unless one [of the contraries] is
determinately present. And therefore although charity in itself is
sicut augmentabilis, tamen ita est augmentabilis determinate per

actum meritorium ex statuto legis divinae, quod non diminuitur
per actum demeritorium, quia propter minus malum non aufert
Deus maius bonum. Est tamen per aliquem actum demeritorium
totaliter corruptibilis, ut dictum est.
217 Ad secundumii4 dico quod veniale non adimit aliquid de
bono secundum actum primum, quia actui primo non opponitur,
et ideo non tollit ipsum habitum. Sed adimit de bono in actu
secundo, et non de bono quod inest vel infuit, sed de bono quod
natum esset inesse per actum secundum. Unde tollit rectitudinem
actus quae nata esset inesse, si illa deformitas non inesset. Et sic
malus actus adimit bonitatem oppositam sibi. Illud autem quod
opponitur actui, non opponitur habitui; tamen hic est corruptio
habitus per dispositionem divinam.
218 Ad tertiumii5 dico quod veniale et mortale non sunt in
eodem genere mali propinquo, et ideo non sequitur quod habeant
eundem modum in agendo. Illud enim tantum est verum, ubi est
actio per naturam formae sicut calidum corrumpit frigidum; sed
hoc modo peccatum non agit in caritatem.
219 Item, peccatum mortale secundum suam formalitatem non
opponitur caritati, nec corrumpit eam. Sed Deus subtrahendo
influentiam continuam dimittit eam et ita corrumpit eam non
conservando eam. Sed mortale ita est causa demeritoria tantum
corruptionis caritatis, non quod formaliter contrariatur ei.
220 Ad quartumii6 dico quod caritas non solum tunc
corrumpitur quando Deus minus diligitur quam creatura, sed
etiam quando creatura aequaliter diligitur sicut Deus, quia
semper debet plus diligi quam creatura in infinitum, quantum
scilicet ad appretiabilitatem obiecti, quia voluntas magis debet

"Cf. supra n. 189.
just as able to be diminished as it is to be augmented,

nevertheless it is able to be increased determinately through a
meritorious act according to divine law in such a way that it is not
diminished through a demeritorious act, because God does not
take away a greater good due to a lesser evil. Nevertheless
through some demeritorious act it is able to be totally corrupted,
as has been said.
217 To the second [n. 187] I say that venial sin does not destroy
something of the good according to the first act,54 because it is not
opposed to the first act, and therefore it does not take away the
habit itself. But it destroys the good as regards the second act,55
and not the good that is in [something] or was in it, but the good
that is suited by nature to be in it through the second act. Hence
it destroys the rectitude of the act that is suited by nature to be in
it, if that deformity were not there instead. And thus an evil act
destroys the goodness opposed to it. But that which is opposed to
the act, is not opposed to the habit; nevertheless here there is a
corruption of the habit through divine disposition.
218 To the third [n. 188] I say that venial and mortal sin are not
in the same proximate genus of evil, and therefore it does not
follow that they have the same mode of acting. For that is only
true, where the action is in virtue of the nature of the form, just
as the hot corrupts the cold; but sin does not act this way on
charity.
219 Also, mortal sin according to its formality* is not opposed to
charity nor does it corrupt it. But God, by drawing away his
continued influence diminishes it and thus corrupts it by not
conserving it. But mortal sin thus is only the demeritorious cause
of the corruption of charity, not that it is formally contrarily
opposed to it.
220 To the fourth [n. 189] I say that charity is not only corrupted
when God is loved less than a creature, but also when a creature
is loved as much as God, since God always ought to be loved
infinitely more than a creature, namely insofar as the ability of
the object to be appreciated is concerned (for the will ought to
M The first act refers to the existence of the good or the habit of charity.
55 The second act refers to an act of charity that proceeds from the virtue or
habit.
appretiare bonitatem illius obiecti quam cuiuscumque alterius,

cum sit ratio appretiabilitatis in quocumque alio obiecto secundo,
licet non quantum ad intensionem actus in se, quia actus potest
esse ita intensus respectu alicuius creaturae sicut respectu Dei,
loquendo de actu in se, et sine peccato.
appreciate the goodness of this object more than any other, for it
is the principle of any other secondary object's ability to be
appreciated), however, not insofar as the intensity of the act itself
is concerned, for an act in regard to some creature can be as
intense as it can be in regard to God, and still be without sin,
speaking of the act in itself.
[Distinctio 18
Quaestio unica
Utrum donum dicat proprietatem personalem
Spiritus Sancti]
1 Circa distinctionem decimam octavam quaerit Magister

quinque quaestiones, ubi quaero unam quaestionem quae omnes
alias virtualiter comprehendit, scilicet utrum donum dicat
proprietatem personalem Spiritus Sancti.
Quod non videtur:

Quia, secundum Augustinum, XV De Trinitate, cap 19, i
"Spiritus Sanctus in tantum donum Dei est in quantum datur eis
quibus datur, apud se enim Deus est et nemini datur"; sed non
quia datur eis quibus datur habet suam proprietatem
personalem, quia sic datur ex tempore; ergo ex proprietate sua
personali non habet quod sit donum. Hoc sit quantum ad istam
quaestionem qua quaerit Magister utrum Spiritus Sanctus eadem
ratione dicatur donum et datum.
2 Item, secundo sic: si Spiritus Sanctus ex proprietate sua
personali dicatur donum, cum per Spiritum Sanctum dividantur
dona, per donum darentur dona. Sed hoc videtur impossible,
quia donum includit rationem donabilis, et si cum hoc includeret
rationem donantis, includeret simul rationes oppositas, scilicet
dantis et dati. Hoc sit quantum ad quaestionem primam Magistri,
an scilicet per donum dona donentur.
3 Item, tertio sic: si Spiritus Sanctus ex proprietate sua sit
donum, ergo donabile, quaero ergo cui sit donabilis, non Patri et
Filio certum est, ergo creaturae. Sed hoc est falsum, scilicet quod
dicatur donum ab aeterno ex sua proprietate personali, quia
donabilis creaturae, quia tunc eadem ratione Filius diceretur
donum ab aeterno, quia ab aeterno processit ut donabilis
creaturae. Unde dicitur Isaia 9, 6 quod Filius datus est nobis. Hoc
i August., De Trin. XV, c. 19, n. 36 (CCSL 50A, 513; PL 40, 1086).
525
Distinction 18
Sole Question
Is the gift the personal* property of the Holy Spirit?
1 Regarding distinction eighteen where the Master* asks five

questions, I ask one question that virtually comprehends all the
others, namely whether the gift is the personal property of the
Holy Spirit.
It seems not:
For according to Augustine, in Bk. XV of The Trinity,
chapter 19, "the Holy Spirit is only the gift of God inasmuch as he
is given to those to whom he is given, for in himself he is God, and
is given to no one." But it is not the fact that he is given to those
to whom he is given that determines his personal property,
because in this way he is given in time; therefore it is not on
account of his personal property that he has the characteristic of
being a gift. This is relevant to that question where the Master
asks: 'Is the Holy Spirit called a gift for the same reason that he is
said to be given?'
2 Also, secondly in this way: if the Holy Spirit on account of
his personal property were called a Gift, due to the fact that
through the Holy Spirit the gifts are divided, the gifts would have
been given through the Gift. But this seems impossible,
because gift includes the notion of donable,i and if the notion of
donor were included with this, opposite notions would be included
simultaneously, namely of giver and given. And this is relevant to
the first question the Master asks, namely, 'Are the gifts given
through the Gift?'
3 Also, thirdly in this way: if the Holy Spirit on account of his
personal property were a gift, [and] therefore donable, hence I
ask: "To whom is he donable?" Certainly not to the Father and the
Son, therefore to a creature. But this is false, namely that he be
called a gift from eternity by reason of his personal property due
to the fact that he is donable to a creature, since then for the
same reason the Son would be called a gift from eternity, because
from eternity he proceeds as donable to a creature. Hence Isaiah
says in 9:6: "A son is given to us.' This is relevant to the third
i Donable = capable of being given .
525
quantum ad tertiam quaestionem Magistri, utrum Spiritus

Sanctus sit donabilis Patri et Filio vel tantum nobis.
4 Item, quarto sic: proprietas personae procedentis dicit
processionem qua accipit essentiam; ergo si donum sit proprietas
personalis Spiritus Sancti, donum dicet processionem eius qua
accipit essentiam. Sed donum non dicit nisi donationem quae non
competebat Spiritui Sancto ab aeterno, quia non erat cui daretur.
Ergo processio eius non esset ab aeterno, quod falsum est.
5 Item, quinto sic: quo aliqua persona accipit essentiam, eo
habet essentiam. Sed Spiritus Sanctus processione accipit
essentiam, ergo processione est essentia; quia si habet essentiam,
est essentia, ergo eodem, addito utrobique, quo habet essentiam
est eo essentia. Sic ergo sequitur quod Spiritus Sanctus dono sit
essentia, quod est falsum, quia Spiritus Sanctus non eo donum
quo Deus', nec Filius eo Filius quo Deus, eo autem quo Deus est
essentia. Ergo non eo quo procedit est essentia, nec eo donum quo
Deus, sicut dicit Augustinus, VII De Trinitate, cap. 2:2 His
nominibus relativa eorum ostenduntur, non essentia; ergo etc.
6 Item, sexto sic: donum habet relationem ad illud cui datur.
Ergo si Spiritus Sanctus habet ex processione sua quod sit
donum, habet ex processione sua quod sit donum creaturae, et sic
esset spiritus creaturae, quod est falsum, quia eadem ratione
Filius esset filius creaturae, cum sit nobis datus. Et haec ratio
innuitur in quarta quaestione Magistri: an Filius possit dici
noster, cum sit nobis datus, sicut Spiritus Sanctus dicitur noster.
7 Item, septimo sic: inter dantem et datum est relatio; sed
Spiritus Sanctus dat donum; ergo refertur Spiritus Sanctus ad se
* August., De Trin. VII, c. 2, n. 3 (CCSL 50, 250; PL 42, 936).

question of the Master: 'Is the Holy Spirit donable to the Father
and Son or to us?'
4 Also, fourthly in this way: the property of the person
proceeding names the procession* by which he receives the
essence; therefore if Gift were the personal property of the Holy
Spirit, the gift would indicate his procession whereby he receives
the essence. But only a donation is called a gift, which it would
not be appropriate to [call] the Holy Spirit from all eternity,
because those persons to whom he was given did not exist.
Therefore his procession would not be from eternity, which is
false.
5 Also, fifth in this way: that by which some person receives
the essence, is that by which he has the essence. But the Holy
Spirit receives the essence by a procession; therefore it is by
virtue of the procession that he is the essence. For if he has the
essence, he is the essence. Thereforerephrasing both parts [of
the statement]that by which he has the essence, is [also]
responsible for him being the essence. In this way then it follows
that the Holy Spirit is the essence by virtue of a gift, which is
false, because the Holy Spirit 'is not God by the same thing by
which he is a gift,' nor is the Son God by virtue of the same thing
by which he is the Son, but he is the [divine] essence by virtue of
that by which he is God. Therefore, he is not the essence by virtue
of that by which he [i.e., the Holy Spirit] proceeds, nor is he the
gift by virtue of that by which he is God, just as Augustine says in
Bk. VII of The Trinity, chapter two: By these names the relational
aspects of these persons are shown, not their essence; therefore,
etc.
6 Also, sixth, in this way: the gift has a relation to that to
whom it is given. Therefore, if the procession of the Holy Spirit
makes him the gift, then it [also] makes him a gift to a creature,
and in this way he would be the spirit of a creature, which is
false, because by the same reason the Son would be the son of a
creature, since he is given to us. And this notion is hinted at in
the fourth question of the Master: 'Could the Son be called ours,
since he is given to us, just as the Holy Spirit is called ours?'
7 Also, seventh in this way: there is a relation between the
one giving and the given; but the Holy Spirit [also] gives the gift;
secundum rationem donantis et dati. Sed nulla relatio realis vel

personalis est eiusdem ad se; ergo etc. Hoc sit quantum ad
quintam quaestionem Magistri: Utrum Spiritus Sanctus referatur
ad seipsum.
8 Contra Augustinus, IV De Trinitate, cap. 18 vel 19,3 et

ponitur in littera: "sicut natum esse est Filio a Patre esse, ita
Spiritui Sancto donum Dei esse est ipsum a Patre Filioque
procedere". Ergo donum est proprietas personalis Spiritus Sancti.
9 Item, Augustinus, V De Trinitate, cap. 14,4 et ponitur in
littera: "Spiritus Sanctus qui non Trinitas, sed in Trinitate
intelligitur in eo quod proprie dicitur Spiritus Sanctus, relative
dicitur, cum et ad Patrem et ad Filium referatur, quia Spiritus
Sanctus Paths et Filii Spiritus Sanctus est. Sed ipsa relatio non
apparet in hoc nomine 'Spiritus', sed in hoc nomine donum Dei'.
Donum enim est Patris et Filii", ergo proprietas personalis eius.
10 Hic dicitur quod donum potest accipi tripliciter sive

aequivoce, sicut 'habere visum',5 ab Augustino in auctoritatibus
praedictis. Uno modo aptitudinaliter aliquid habet visum,
secundo habitualiter, tertio actualiter. Tertio modo loquitur
Augustinus in prima auctoritate praeallegata de dono.6 Secundo
modo loquitur Augustinus V De Trinitate, cap. 18 vel 19:7 donum
dicit quia dandus vel daturus erat. Primo modo, scilicet donum
aptitudinaliter ut detur vel donabile, licet non in futuro daretur,
sic loquitur Augustinus in auctoritatibus ad oppositum.8 Et isto
modo donum habet rationem proprietatis personalis ex
processione sua, scilicet in quantum donabilis.
11 Sed hoc non concedo, licet distinctionem approbem, quia
donabilitas illa non est ad intra, sed extra ad creaturam. Nulla
:l August., De Trin. IV, c. 20. n. 29 (CCSL 50, 199; PL 42, 908).

' Cf. Bonaventura, Sent. I, d. 18, a. un., q. 2 in corp. (1. 325b); Henricus
Gand., Summa a. 61, q. 8 in corp. (II, 184V).
Cf supra n. 8.
H Cf. supra n. 1-7.
therefore the Holy Spirit is referred [back] to himself according to

the notion of both the one giving and the given. But no real or
personal relation is of the same thing* to itself; therefore, etc.
This is relevant to the fifth question of the Master: 'Is the Holy
Spirit referred to himself?'
8 To the contrary: Augustine in Bk. IV of The Trinity,
chapters 18 or 19, and it is cited in the text:* "Just as to be born is
for the Son to be from the Father, so for the Holy Spirit to be the
gift of God is to proceed from the Father and Son." Therefore, the
gift is the personal property of the Holy Spirit.
9 Also, Augustine in Bk. V of The Trinity, chapter 14, and it is
cited in the text: "The Holy Spiritnot the Trinity but a person in
the Trinityinsofar as he is properly called 'Holy Spirit,' denotes
a relation. For he is referred to both the Father and the Son,
because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and the Son.
But this relationship is not apparent in this name 'Spirit' but in
this name 'Gift of God.' For he is the gift of Father and Son";
therefore this is his personal property.
10 Here it is said that, according to Augustine in the aforesaid

citations, one can take 'gift' in a threefold way or equivocally, like
'having vision.' One way to have vision is by way of aptitude; a
second is to have it habitually;* a third is to have it actually.
Augustine speaks of the third way in the first of the aforesaid
citations about the gift [n. 8]. Augustine speaks of the second way
in Bk. V of The Trinity, chapter 18 or 19: he is called a gift
because he is to be given or will be given. Of the first way
namely [that implies] a gift by way of aptitude, as one that may
be given, or can be given, although will not be given in the
futureAugustine speaks in negative authoritative statements
[n. 1-7]. And in this way 'gift' has the sense of a personal property
from his procession, namely insofar as he is donable.
11 But I do not concede this, although I approve of the
distinction, because that ability to be given is not internal but
external as regards a creature. But no relation to creatures,
whether it be by way of aptitude, or habitual,* or actual, is
autem relatio ad creaturas nec aptitudinalis nec habitualis nec

actualis est personalis nec inclusa in ea. Sed haec donabilitas,
secundum Magistrum, est ad creaturam, quia non ad Patrem nec
Filium, ergo etc.
12 Probatio maioris: quia persona divina habet perfectum esse
divinum et personale antequam fuerit aliqua creatura, quia ex se
est necesse esse. Creatura in nullo esse, nec intra nec extra, est
necesse esse, nec in esse essentiae deminuto sive ut intellecto,
quia hoc magis inconveniens esset quam si esset necesse esse in
esse reali. Sed quod est ex se necesse esse, prius est quam illud
quod non. Impossibile autem est intelligere aliquam relationem
ad creaturam nisi creatura sit vel intelligatur esse, quia relatio
requirit terminum secundum simile9 esse.
13 Item, probatio maioris: quia relatio rationis non per se
includitur in persona divina, quia est ens reale; et si includeret
relationem rationis, esset ens rationis. Sed quaelibet relatio Dei
ad creaturam est tantum rationis, sive habitualis sive actualis.
14 Item ad principale: una persona non constituitur formaliter
duabus relationibus distinctis. Sed Spiritus Sanctus spiratione
passiva quae dicit respectum ad spirantes constituitur in esse
personali. Sed si relatio aptitudinalis esset proprietas Spiritus
Sancti, tunc Spiritus Sanctus constitueretur alia relatione reali et
alia relatione rationis. Probatio quia sunt ad diversos terminos;
secundo quia una est relatio realis et alia relatio rationis.
[II. Responsio Scoti ad quaestionem]
15 Respondeo primo ad rem in se; secundo ad intentionem

Augustini.
Ad rem dico quod nulla persona divina constituitur in esse
personali per aliquem respectum ad creaturam, nec aliqua
proprietas personalis dicit respectum per se ad creaturam. Immo,
quidquid est intrinsecum in divinis, sive fuerit absolutum sive
respectivum, est prius in quocumque esse reali et intelligibili
omni respectu ad creaturam et quocumque esse creaturae, ita
!l Simile: pro similiter.

personal or included in the latter. But this ability to be given,

according to the Master, is in regard to a creature, because it is
not in relationship to the Father or the Son; therefore, etc.
12 Proof of the major: because the divine person has perfect
divine and personal being before there will be any creature,
because it is of itself necessary being. [However,] in no [type of]
being, whether it be within or without, is creature a necessary
being. Nor is it [a necessary being] in a diminished* being of the
essence, e.g., when it is understood, because this would be more
incongruous than if [a creature] were necessary being in real
being. But that which is of itself necessary being is prior to that
which is not [necessary being]. It is impossible, however, to
conceive of some relationship to a creature unless the creature
existed or were understood to exist, because a relation requires a
second term that equally exists.
13 Also, proof of the major: because a conceptual relationship is
not included per se in a divine person, since it is a real being; and
if it were to include a conceptual relationship it would be a
conceptual being. But any relationship of God to a creature,
either habitual, or actual, is only conceptual.
14 Also, to the main point: one person is not constituted
formally* by two distinct relationships. But the Holy Spirit is
constituted in personal being by passive spiration,* which asserts
a relationship to the persons spirating.* But if a relation by way
of aptitude were a property of the Holy Spirit, then another real
and another conceptual relation would have constituted the Holy
Spirit. Proof: they [i.e., relations] are to different terms; secondly,
one is a real relation,* the other a conceptual one.
Scotus's reply to the Question
15 I reply, first ad rem to the question itself; secondly to the

mind of Augustine. Ad rem I say that no divine person is
constituted in personal being through a relationship to creatures;
neither does some personal property assert per se a relationship
to a creature. Rather, whatever is intrinsic in the divine, whether
it be absolute or a relationship, is prior in any real or conceivable
being to every relation to a creature and to any being of a
quod si per impossibile vel incompossibile nihil aliud a Deo posset

esse in ullo esse, nihilominus esset in Deo essentiale vel perso-
nale, quia prius intelligitur tota Trinitas quocumque esse
creaturae, et ideo nihil intrinsecum in divinis includit necessario
respectum ad posterius. Et sic sequitur quod donum, quia non
dicitur nisi respectu creaturae cui datur, non sit proprietas
constitutiva Spiritus Sancti, sed tantum spiratio-passio qua
accipit esse a Patre et Filio quae proprie significatur hoc nomine
'Spiritus Sanctus' in sensu compositionis quidquid dicat
Augustinus, V De Trinitate, cap. 14, i0 quod scilicet eius relatio
magis apparet in hoc nomine 'donum' quam in hoc nomine
'Spiritus Sanctus'. Maxime enim dico quod apparet eius
proprietas constitutiva hoc nomine 'Spiritus Sanctus', non
intelligendo per 'spiritum' tantum naturam intellectualem vel
spiritualem, quia sic hoc nomen 'spiritus' est commune tribus
personis, sed accipiendo Spiritum Sanctum pro 'spirato' voluntate
sancta et casta Patris et Filii, quae voluntas habens obiectum
infinitum diligibile sibi praesens est principium spirandi
sufficienter amorem spiratum infinitum illius obiecti infiniti.
16 Propter tamen auctoritates Augustini est sciendum quod
donum multipliciter potest accipi. Uno modo potest dici donum
quodcumque liberaliter productum, et sic dare non est nisi
liberaliter producere et dari liberaliter produci. Et isto modo
potest concedi Spiritum Sanctum ab aeterno dari et esse donum,
quia ab aeterno spiratus. Et sic non dicit nisi proprietatem
personalem, quia ab aeterno Spiritus Sanctus in se est spiratus,
sed non alteri. Unde sic dare et dari non dicunt aliud quam
spirare et spirari, et sic non loquuntur sancti de dono, nam
concedunt Spiritum Sanctum esse donum ab aeterno, sed non
dari ab aeterno, quia ipsum dari ab aeterno includeret creaturam
cui datur ab aeterno.
17 Alio modo potest intelligi per donum amor concors Patris et
Filii quo Pater impendit amorem Filio et ille sibi rependit
eundem, quo modo loquitur Richardus III De Trinitateii de
amore. Et sic non intelligit Augustinus hic loqui de dono, quia sic
i0 Cf. supra n. 9.
ii Richardus de S. Victore, De Trin. lll, c. 3 (ed. J. Ribaillier, TPMA VI, 138;
PL 196, 922).
creature, so that if, to assume the impossible or incompatible,

nothing other than God could exist in any being, nevertheless in
God there would be the essential or the personal, because the
entire Trinity is understood to be prior to any being of a creature,
and therefore nothing intrinsic in the divine includes necessarily
a relation to what is posterior. And so it follows that 'Gift,'
because it only asserts a relationship to a creature to whom it is
given, is not a constitutive property of the Holy Spirit, but only
passive spiration [is], by which he receives being from the Father
and Son, which properly is signified by the name 'Holy Spirit' in
the composite senseno matter what Augustine says in Bk. V of
The Trinity, chapter 14, namely, that the relationship [that
characterizes him] appears more in the name Gift' than in the
name 'Holy Spirit.' For I claim that his constitutive property
appears most of all in the name 'Holy Spirit,' not understanding
'spirit' only as something intellectual or spiritual, because in this
way that name 'spirit' is common to the three persons, but by
taking 'Holy Spirit' for 'spirated' by the holy and chaste will of the
Father and Son. This will, having an infinite lovable object
present to itself, is sufficiently a principle* of spirating spirated
infinite love of that infinite object.
16 Because of the authoritative statement of Augustine,
however, one must understand that 'gift' can be taken in many
ways. In one way anything freely produced can be called a gift,
and in this way to give' is the same as to produce freely, and 'to
be given' [is the same as] to be freely produced. And in this way it
can be conceded that the Holy Spirit from eternity is given and is
a gift, because he is spirated from eternity. And only in this way
does it assert a personal property, because from eternity the Holy
Spirit is spirated in himself and is not [given] to another. Hence
in this way to give and be given asserts nothing other than to
spirate and be spirated, and the Fathers of the Church do not
speak of a gift in this way, for they concede that the Holy Spirit is
a gift from eternity, but is not given from eternity, because for
him to be given from eternity would include a creature to whom it
was given from eternity.
17 In another way 'gift' can be understood as the concordant
love of the Father and Son, by which the Father bestows love on
donum vel amor est mere essentiale secundum unam opinionem,

vel mere personale secundum aliam.
18 Ideo dico quod donum unum per se significat et aliud ex

consequenti connotat, si sit unicum. Donum enim per se significat
respectum rationis ad creaturam, et sic per se significat aliquid
essentiale et non proprietatem alicuius personae notionalem.
Connotat tamen notionale, ut superius dictum est de dari. Vel si
dicatur quod significat utrumque per se tunc est aequivocum et
non significat aliquid per se.
19 Supponendo tamen quod significet aliquid per se, dico quod
primo et per se significat respectum donabilitatis ad creaturam
vel donati, prout tripliciter potest accipi respectu creaturae, ut
dicit prior opinio. Et in hoc bene connotat terminum et non
significat per se processionem Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio, qui
est amor utriusque ex vi processionis suae. Inter omnia enim
dona dantis, primum donum quod dat est amor eius quem primo
dat amato qui est ratio cuiuslibet alterius doni. Nihil enim habet
rationem doni nisi in quantum cadit sub actu amoris. Non enim
cultellus nec roba nec aliquid exterius habet rationem doni nisi
quia communicatum amicabiliter actu amatorio voluntatis. Et
ideo omnia communicata dicuntur dona ratione amoris
voluntatis. Spiritus autem Sanctus ex vi processionis suae est
amor infinite procedens per actum amoris a Patre et Filio eum
liberaliter producentis. Et ita donum, si sit essentiale per se
dicens respectum ad creaturam, connotabit tamen necessario
proprietatem Spiritus Sancti qui est primus amor essentiae
procedens a Patre et Filio liberaliter per actum amoris. Et sic
intelligendae sunt auctoritates Augustini superius ad partem
oppositam allegatae quod donum dicat proprietatem personalem
the Son and the latter returns the same, in the way that Richard
of St. Victor speaks of love in Bk. IIl of The Trinity. And
Augustine does not understand it in this way here when he
speaks2 of gift, because in this way a gift or love is exclusively an
essential characteristic according to one opinion, or exclusively a
personal property according to another.
18 Therefore I say that 'gift' signifies one [thing] per se, if it is
unique, and connotes the other as a consequence. For 'gift' per se
signifies a conceptual relationship to a creature, and thus it
signifies per se something essential, and not a notional* property
of a person. Nevertheless, it connotes the notional, as was said
above about to be given.' Or if it be said that it signifies both per
se, then it is equivocal and does not signify any thing per se.
19 I presuppose, however, that it may signify something per se,
and I say that primarily and per se it signifies a relationship of
being donable or given to a creature, insofar as it can be
understood in a threefold way with respect to a creature, as the
prior opinion claims. And in this way it does indeed connote a
term and does not signify per se the procession of the Holy Spirit
from the Father and Son, who is the love of both by reason of its
procession. For among all gifts of the giver, the first gift that he
gives is his love that is first given to the beloved, and is the
reason why every other gift is given. For nothing has the
character of a gift except insofar as it falls under the act of love.
For no small knife nor garment nor anything external has the
aspect of a gift unless it is given lovingly in the amorous act of the
will.* And indeed all things given are said to be gifts because of
the love of the will. But the Holy Spirit by reason of his procession
is love proceeding infinitely through the act of love of the Father
and Son that freely produces him. And thus the gift, if it is
essential per se, is asserting a relationship to a creature;
nevertheless it necessarily will connote a property of the Holy
Spirit, who is the first love of the essence proceeding freely from
the Father and the Son through an act of love. And it is in this
way that one should understand the authoritative statements of
Augustine cited above for the opposite view, [namely in the sense]
2 A more precise translation would be: "does not understand ... one to be
speaking of...."
Spiritus Sancti per connotationem et non secundum suam

principalem significationem.
20 Exemplum: hoc nomen 'dator' non significat primo respec-
tum virtutis spirativae Patris et Filii, sed primo significat
respectum rationis ad creaturam, connotando tamen respectum
ad virtutem spirativam spirantis per quam producitur primus
amor spiratus. Eodem modo donum non primo modo significat
processionem passivam vel proprietatem personalem Spiritus
Sancti, sed primo significat respectum ad creaturam, connotando
ex consequenti proprietatem personalem Spiritus Sancti.
21 Ad primam rationem principalem12 patet responsio per ea

quae dicta sunt, quia donum non primo significat proprietatem
personalem Spiritus Sancti. Nam in tantum est donum, in
quantum datur eis quibus datur, et ita per se significat respectum
ad creaturam, connotat tamen proprietatem Spiritus Sancti.
22 Ad secundum13 concedo quod per donum dona dentur, quia
per amorem qui est primum donum dantur cetera alia dona, sicut
dictum est. Ad probationem dico quod non est oppositio in
relativis nisi accipiantur respectu eiusdem. Non enim est
inconveniens nec opponitur in eodem paternitas et filiatio, ita
quod idem respectu diversorum sit pater et filius, quia potest esse
filius patris sui et tamen pater filii sui quem generat, non tamen
potest esse sui ipsius pater, quia idem produceret se, quod est
inconveniens, I De Trinitate, [cap.] 1.14 Spiritus autem Sanctus
est donum a Patre et Filio secundum quod donum connotat
processionem eius personalem, et est simul cum Patre et Filio
dator vel donator cuiuslibet doni quod datur creaturae. Nec hoc
est inconveniens quod sit dans et donum vel datum respectu
diversorum; etc.
23 Ad tertium15 dicendum quod donabile dicitur uno modo quod
est aptum natum donari; alio modo dicit idem quod est possibile
12 Cf. supra n. 1.
13 Cf. supra n. 2.
14 August., De Trin. I, c. 1, n. 1 (CCSL 50, 28; PL 42. 820).
15 Cf. supra n. 3.
that gift asserts the personal property of the Holy Spirit [only]
through a connotation, and it is not its principal signification.
20 An example: this name giver' does not signify primarily the
relation to the power of spiration of the Father and Son, but
primarily signifies a conceptual relationship to a creature. At the
same time, it does connote a relationship to the power of spiration
of the ones spirating, through which the first spirated love is
produced. In the same way gift does not in the first sense signify
a passive procession or personal property of the Holy Spirit, but
primarily indicates a relation to a creature, by connoting as a
consequence the personal property of the Holy Spirit.
21 To the first initial argument [n. 1] the reply is evident

through what has been said, because gift does not primarily
signify the personal property of the Holy Spirit. For it is only a
gift to the extent that it is given to those to whom it is given, and
thus signifies per se a relationship to a creature, and at the same
time connotes a property of the Holy Spirit.
22 To the second [n. 2] I concede that through the Gift gifts
may be given, because through the love, which is the first gift, the
rest of the other gifts are given, as has been pointed out. To the
proof I say that relatives* are only opposed in regard to the same
thing. For paternity is not opposed to filiation in the same
individual, nor is this incongruous, so that the same individual as
regards diverse [persons] is a father and a son, because he can be
the son of his father and nevertheless the father of his son whom
he procreates. He cannot, however, be his own father, because the
same thing would produce itself, which is incongruous, according
to Bk. I of The Trinity, chapter 1. The Holy Spirit, however, is the
gift of the Father and the Son, for which reason 'gift' connotes his
personal procession, and at the same time he istogether with
the Father and Sona giver or donator of every gift that is given
to a creature. Nor is this incongruous that he is giving and is a
gift or given with respect to different ones; etc.
23 To the third [n. 3] it must be said that donable in one sense
means to be suited by nature* to be given, and in another sense it
dari. Nec sunt ista idem, quia aliquid est possibile esse, quod
tamen non est aptum natum esse tale. Lapidem enim possibile est
ferri sursum et deorsum, et tamen non habet aptitudinem ut
feratur sursum. Corpus etiam neutrum quod nec de se est natum
ferri sursum nec deorsum, ut corpus circulare, possibile est per
aliud determinari et deferri et sursum et deorsum. Nunc autem
nulla alia persona a Spiritu Sancto habet ex processione sua et a
proprietate personali aptitudinem ut detur. Quia Spiritus
Sanctus procedit ut amor donabilis, non sic Filius sed ut Verbum
declarativum essentiae Patris, et ideo non procedit Filius ex
proprietate personali ut habens aptitudinem ut detur. Procedit
tamen ut possibilis dari a Patre et se et Spiritu Sancto. Et ista
non sunt idem, ut patet in exemplo praeallegato.
24 Ad quartumi6 concedendum est quod Spiritui Sancto
praestat essentiam sine ullo temporis initio de Patre Filioque
processio, sicut dicit Augustinus XV De Trinitate, et quod ista
processio includatur in hoc nomine 'donum' non ut principale
significatum sed ut connotatum.
25 Ad quintumi7 dicendum quod haec est falsa 'quo Spiritus
Sanctus habet essentiam eo est Deus', quia processione habet
essentiam, non tamen eo est Deus, sed deitate est Deus. Nam non
eo Pater quo Deus, nec eo Spiritus Sanctus quo Deus, sicut patet
superius per Augustinum. Filius etiam nativitate habet essen
tiam, non tamen nativitate est Deus, sed deitate.
26 Et cum probatur personam habere essentiam est ipsam esse
Deum, "ergo eodem, addito utrobique, quo persona habet essen
tiam eo est Deus", nego consequentiam, sed est fallacia figurae
dictionis penes primum modum. Nam ablativus, quando
construitur cum verbo, construitur in ratione principii activi vel
in ratione actionis vel fieri, ut lignum est calidum calore vel igne,
et iste ablativus 'calore' significat quod calor habitus in ligno sit
principium calefactionis in ligno. Cum vero dicitur 'lignum habet
i6 Cf. supra n. 4.
i7 Cf. supra n. 5.
asserts the same as 'possible to be given.' These are not the same,
because there is something capable [of being in a certain way],
which is not, however, suited by nature to be such. For it is
possible to carry a stone up and down, and nevertheless it has no
aptitude to be carried up. Also for a neutral body which of itself is
suited by nature to be carried neither up nor down, such as a
body that is moving in circles, it is possible that it be determined
by another and be carried both up and down. But now there is no
other person, except the Holy Spirit, that has from his procession
and from his personal property the aptitude to be given. For the
Holy Spirit proceeds as love that is donable; not so the Son but as
the declarative* Word* of the essence of the Father, and therefore
the Son does not have from his personal property an aptitude to
be given. Nevertheless, he proceeds as capable of being given by
the Father and himself and by the Holy Spirit. And these are not
the same thing, as is evident from the example cited before.
24 To the fourth [n. 4] it must be conceded that a procession
from the Father and Son gives the essence to the Holy Spirit
before the beginning of time, as Augustine says in Bk. XV of The
Trinity, and that this procession may be included in this name
'gift' not as the principal thing signified but as what is connoted.
25 To the fifth [n. 5] it must be said that this is false 'that by
which the Holy Spirit has the essence is that by which he is God,'
because he has the essence by procession, but it is by deity [and
not by procession] that he is God. For it is not the same thing that
makes the Father Father and God, neither is it the same thing
that makes the Holy Spirit Holy Spirit and God, as is evident
above from Augustine. For the Son also has the essence by
nativity, but it is not by nativity that he is God, but by deity.
26 And when he proves that for a person to have the essence is
the same as for it to be God, "thereforerephrasing both parts [of
the statement]that by which the person has the essence is [also]
responsible for it being God," I deny the implication,* but it is a
fallacy of the figure of speech according to the first mode.* For the
ablative, when it is construed with a verb, signifies either an
active principle, or action or coming to be. For example, in 'wood
heats by fire or heat' this ablative 'by heat' signifies that the heat
that is in the wood is the principle of heating in the wood. But
esse calidum calefactione', ibi construitur ablativus in ratione

actionis et fieri. Sed quando ablativus construitur cum nomine
substantivo, construitur cum eo in ratione principii formalis
essendi, ut cum dicitur 'lignum est calidum calore'. Ita in
proposito, 'Spiritus Sanctus habet essentiam processione'; hic
construitur ablativus cum verbo in ratione actionis, vel quasi viae
in fieri. Sed cum dicitur 'ergo processione est essentia et Deus', ibi
significatur quod processio sit ratio formalis qua est Deus, quod
non est verum. Et sic est ibi figura dictionis ex simili
terminatione, non ex similitudine vocis, quia hoc nihil est, sed
cum tali simili terminatione vocis alio modo et alio construitur.
27 Ad sextum18 dicendum quod Spiritus Sanctus dicitur
spiritus creaturae et spiritus noster propter illum respectum
quem connotat ex processione sua nomine 'doni ad creaturam';
non sic Filius, quia ex processione sua non connotat nec
principaliter significat respectum ad creaturam.
28 Ad septimum19 patet responsio quod Spiritus Sanctus est
dativus sui quantum ad extra, sed iste respectus non est
proprietas eius personalis nec inclusus in ea sed tantum
connotatus.
18 Cf. supra n. 6.
19 Cf. supra n. 7.
when it is said 'the wood is in its hot state by heating,' the

ablative there signifies action and coming to be. But when the
ablative is construed with a noun, it signifies a formal* principle
of being, as when it is said 'wood is hot by heat.' And so it is in the
case at hand: 'the Holy Spirit has the essence by procession'; here
the ablative is construed with a verb and signifies action or the
process, as it were, of coming to be. But when it is said 'therefore
by procession he is the essence and is God,' there it is signified
that the procession is the formal* reason by which he is God,
which is not true. And thus it is [the fallacy of] a figure of speech
resulting from a similar [grammatical] construction, but not from
a similar meaning, because such [similarity of construction
means] nothing, but such a similar construction can be
understood in one way or another.
27 To the sixth [n. 6] it must be said that Holy Spirit is called
the spirit of a creature and our spirit, because his procession
connotes that relationship, named 'gift to a creature.' And the Son
is not [a gift] in this way, because his procession does not connote,
nor principally signify a relationship to a creature.
28 To the seventh [n. 7] the reply is evident, that the Holy
Spirit is capable of giving himself to what is outside, but this
relationship is not his personal property nor is it included in this
notion, but it is only connoted.
[Distinctio 19
Pars I
Quaestio 1
Utrum personae divinae sint aequales
secundum magnitudinem]
1 Circa distinctionem undevigesimam quaero primo utrum

personae divinae sint aequales secundum magnitudinem.
Videtur quod non:

Secundum Augustinum, V De Trinitate,i in Deo non est
quantitas. "Est enim sine quantitate magnus, sine qualitate
bonus"; sed aequalitas est proprietas quantitatis sicut patet in
Praedicamentis:2 "Quantitas est secundum quam aequales vel
inaequales dicuntur"; ergo etc.
2 Item, aequalitas non est perfectio simpliciter, ergo non est
ponenda in Deo. Consequentia patet; antecedens probatur per
Augustinum, 83 Quaestionum, q. 18:3 "Si omnia, inquit, essent
aequalia, omnia non essent omnia". Et ita destrueretur ordo et
perfectio universi.
3 Item, perfecta aequalitas est mutua; haec non est mutua
inter personas. Secundum Augustinum, VI De Trinitate, cap.
ultimo:4 "Imago, si perfecta est, coaequatur ei cuius est imago";
non autem illud suae imagini.
4 Contra:
Athanasius in Symbolo: "Personae coaeternae sibi sunt et
coaequales". Et Magister in littera hoc specialiter probat per
Augustinum, De fide ad Petrum, cap. 2. 5
i August, DeTrin. V, c. 1, n. 2 (CCSL, 50, 207; PL 42, 912).

1 Aristot., Praedic. c. 6 (6a 26-7)
i August., De diversis qq. 83, q. 41 (CCSL 44A, 63; PL 40, 27).
1 August., De Trin. VI, c. 10, n. 11 (CCSL 50, 241; PL 42, 931).
5 Ps.-August. (opus Fulgentii), De fide ad Petrum, [c. 1], n. 4 (CCSL 91A, 714;
PL 65, 674 [cf. PL 40, 754-5]).
534
Distinction 19
Parti
Question One
Are the divine persons* equal in magnitude*?
1 Regarding distinction nineteen I ask first whether the

divine persons are equal in magnitude.
It seems not:
For according to Augustine, in Bk. V of The Trinity: in God
there is no quantity,* 'For [we understand him to be] great
without quantity'; but equality is a property of quantity as is
evident in Categories: "Quantity is that according to which
something is called equal or unequal"; therefore, etc.
2 Also, equality is not an unqualified perfection; therefore it
must not be posited in God. The implication* is evident; the
antecedent is proved through Augustine, 83 Questions, question
eighteen: "If all things were equal," he says, "all would not be all."
And so the orderi and perfection of the universe [i.e., the whole]
would be destroyed.
3 Also, perfect equality is mutual; [but equality] is not mutual
among the persons. According to Augustine in Bk. VI of The
Trinity, last chapter: "The image, if it were perfect, would be
made equal to that of which it is the image", not, however, the
[prototype made equal] to its image.
4 To the contrary:
Athanasius in the Creed: "The persons are coeternal and
coequal with each other." And the Master* in the text* proves
this especially through Augustine in De fide ad Petrum, ch. 2.
i Order here refers to the hierarchy of created things from the first down to
the level of the last.
534
[Quaestio 2
Utrum aequalitas divinarum personarum praecise
attendatur penes magnitudinem, potentiam,
et aeternitatem]
5 Iuxta hoc quaero secundo utrum aequalitas divinarum

personarum praecise attendatur penes magnitudinem, potentiam,
et aeternitatem.
Videtur quod non:

Quia aequalitas est proprietas quantitatis, patet supra; non
sic potentia, sed potius qualitatis in secunda eius specie;
secundum ergo potentiam non attenditur aliqua aequalitas.
6 Item, personae divinae, sicut habent eandem magnitudi
nem, potentiam et aeternitatem, ita sapientiam, iustitiam, et
bonitatem. Ergo sicut sunt aequales in illis tribus, sic in sapien-
tia, iustitia et bonitate. Non igitur magis praecise attendenda est
aequalitas secundum illas proprietates quam secundum istas.
7 Oppositum patet per Augustinum, De fide ad Petrum, cap

2,6 et ponitur in littera: "Nullus horum", et loquitur de personis
divinis, "alium praecedit aut aeternitate vel excedit magnitudine
aut superat potestate", etc.; quaere ibi. Per hoc enim probat
aequalitatem inter istas personas divinas.
[Quaestio 3
Utrum in divinis personis relatio aequalitatis
distinguatur a relatione similitudinis et identitatis]
8 Utrum in divinis personis relatio aequalitatis distinguatur a

relatione similitudinis et identitatis.
Et videtur quod non:

Augustinus, V De Trinitate, cap. 12:7 "Non est aliud Deo esse
et aliud magnum esse". Sed "hoc idem est illi esse quod magnum
esse", per quod "sicut non dicimus tres essentias sic nec dicimus
Cf. supra n. 4.
7 August, De Trin. V, c. 10, n. 1 1 (CCSL 50, 218; PL 42, 918).
Question Two
Is the equality of the divine persons taken into account
precisely through the notions magnitude, power and
eternity?
5 According to this I ask secondly whether equality of the

divine persons is taken into account precisely through the notions
magnitude, power, and eternity.
It seems it does not:
For equality is a property of quantity, as is evident above;
power is not this way, but rather [is a property of] quality* in its
second species2; therefore, speaking of power, no equality is
observed.
6 Also, just as the divine persons have the same magnitude,
power, and eternity, so [they have the same] wisdom, justice and
goodness. Therefore, just as they are equal in these three, so they
are in wisdom, justice and goodness. Therefore, equality is not
taken into account more precisely according to the former
properties than according to the latter.
7 The opposite is evident through Augustine, De fide ad
Petrum, ch. 2 [n. 4] and is posited in the text: "None of these," and
this is said of the divine persons, "precedes another in eternity, or
exceeds in magnitude, or has more power," etc. Look it up there.
For it is through this that he proves the equality between these
divine persons.
Question Three
In the divine persons is the relation of equality
distinguished from the relation of likeness and identity*?
8 In the divine persons is the relation of equality

distinguished from the relation of likeness and identity?
And it seems it is not:
Augustine in Bk. V of The Trinity, chapter 12, "In God being
is not one thing and being great another." But "this is the same
thing, that he is and that he is great," for "just as we do not speak
of three essences, so neither do we speak of three greatnesses."
2 That is, as being potent, and not impotent.

tres magnitudines", ergo non distinguitur magnitudo in divinis ab

essentia. Ergo nec relatio aequalitatis fundata super magnitu-
dinem distinguitur a relatione fundata super essentiam et
substantiam.
9 Idem potest argui de similitudine, quia non est aliud Deo
sapientem esse et Deum esse; ergo relatio similitudinis fundata
super sapientiam non distinguitur a relatione identitatis fundata
super essentiam.
10 Contra:
Philosophus V Metaphysicae8 probat quod sunt distinctae
relationes, quia aequalitas est unitas fundata super magnitu-
dinem in genere quantitatis, et similitudo unitas in qualitate, et
identitas est unitas fundata in substantia. Ergo in divinis non
erunt omnino eadem relatio, sed distinguuntur.
[I. Status quaestionum]
11 Hic praemitto in generali aliqua circa relationes communes;

deinde applicabo ea ad propositum et solutiones pertinentes
istarum quaestionum.
12 Primo enim sciendum est quod secundum Philosophum, V
Metaphysicae, istae tres relationes communes distinctae habent
tria fundamenta trium generum distincta formaliter et realiter
cum quibus concurrit unitas cuilibet fundamento propria, sive
autem concurrat unitas in quolibet istorum generum ut
proximum fundamentum istarum relationum, sive ut proxima
ratio fundandi; de hoc nihil ad praesens. Quodlibet autem
fundamentum istarum relationum potest accipi dupliciter:
communiter et stricte. Stricte ut tantum pro re generis substan-
tiae, qualitatis vel quantitatis. Sed communiter et extensive
possunt accipi pro aliis quae non sunt formaliter in istis gene-
ribus.
13 Et quod ista distinctio sit bona, patet per Philosophum, I
Posteriorum,9 ubi dicit quod substantia enim lineae ex his est, id
est ex punctis; et tamen certum est quod nec linea nec puncta
H Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 13-4 (1020a 7-6 25).

!l Aristot., Post. Anal. I, c. 4 (73a 36-7).
Therefore, magnitude in the divine is not distinguished from the

essence. Hence, neither is the relation of equality founded on
greatness distinguished from the relation founded on the essence
and substance.
9 The same thing can be argued about similarity, because
being wise in God is not other from being God; therefore the
relation of similarity founded on wisdom is not distinguished from
the relation of identity founded on the essence.
10 To the contrary:
The Philosopher in Bk. V of the Metaphysics proved that
these are distinct relations, because equality is unity founded on
magnitude in the category of quantity, and similarity is unity in
quality, and identity is unity founded on substance. Therefore in
the divine they are not entirely the same relation, but are
distinguished.
Status of the Questions
11 Here I first present some things in general about common

relations;* then I shall apply them to the case at hand and the
solutions pertaining to this question.
12 For first it must be known that, according to the Philosopher
in Bk. V of the Metaphysics, these three distinct common
relations3 have three formally* and really distinct foundations
belonging to three categories,* each with a unity proper to each
foundation, whether the unity in each of the categories is the
proximate foundation of these relations, or the proximate reason
for basing them; I do not determine about this at the present
time. However, each of the foundations of these relations can be
taken in a twofold sense: commonly or strictly. Strictly, as
belonging only to the categories of substance, quality or quantity.
But commonly and extensively they can be other things, which
are not formally in these genera.
13 And that this is a good distinction is evident from the
Philosopher in Bk. I of the Posterior analytics, where he says that
substance of a line is from these, i.e. from points; and
nevertheless, it is certain that neither a line nor a point are in the
3 Namely, equality, similarity, and identity.

sunt in genere substantiae, sed in genere quantitatis; sed accipit

substantiam pro essentia.
14 Quod etiam quantitas et passiones eius, ut magnum et
parvum, transferantur ad alia quam ad ista quae sunt in genere
quantitatis, patet per Philosophum, V Metaphysicae, cap. de
quantitate,i0 ubi vult quod magnum et parvum secundum se sunt
in quantitate, sed transferuntur ad alia haec nomina. Patet hoc
idem per Augustinum, VI De Trinitate, [cap.] 7:ii "In his quae non
mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse quod melius esse".
15 Idem etiam de qualitate patet, V Metaphysicae, cap. de
qualitate,i2 ubi vult quod differentia substantialis cuiuslibet rei
uno modo dicatur qualitas eius.
16 Certum etiam est quod 'idem' dicitur de aliis quam de istis
tribus generibus, quia convertitur cum ente. Ergo fundamenta
trium relationum istarum possunt esse communia aliis quam his
quae formaliter et realiter sunt in istis tribus generibus. Ita
relationes fundatae ex natura rei super ista fundamenta commu
nia possunt esse communes.
17 Unde sciendum quod quaelibet res potest considerari ut
quid est, id est secundum quiditatem suam, et sic potest esse
fundamentum relationis identitatis vel diversitatis. Sed ut con-
sideratur secundum quod habet certum gradum perfectionis suae
essentialis et determinatum gradum suae quiditatis virtualis, sic
potest esse fundamentum communis relationis aequalitatis vel
inaequalitatis. Vel potest considerari ut habet formam aliquam
vel perfectionem aliquam per modum formae informantis
secundum quam dicitur qualis. Et sic potest fundare relationem
communem similitudinis vel dissimilitudinis.
18 Et isto modo, sicut sunt tria fundamenta transcendentia,
quia non in aliquo genere, sic et relationes istae fundatae sunt
transcendentes et ideo communes, quia essei3 potest considerari
"l Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 13 (1020a 24-5).

" August., De Trin. VI, c. 8. n. 9 (CCSL 50. 238; PL 42, 929).
i2 Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 14 (1020a 34-6 2).
i3 Esse: essentia nonnulli codd.
category of substance, but are in that of quantity; but he takes

substance here for essence.
14 Also that quantity and its attributes, like great and small,
are transferred to other things than to those that are in the
category of the quantity, is evident from Bk. V of the Metaphysics,
in the chapter on quantity, where he has in mind that great and
small are themselves in quantity, but these names are
transferred to other things. The same thing is evident from
Augustine in Bk. VI of The Trinity, chapter 7: "In those things
that are not great in mass, to be greater means to be better."
15 Also, the same thing is evident about the quality from Bk. V
of the Metaphysics, the chapter on quality, where he has in mind
that the substantial difference of any thing in one way is called
its quality.
16 It is also certain that identity* is predicated of things other
than those in these three genera,4 because it is interchangeable
with being. Therefore the foundations of these three relations can
belong to things other than those that are formally and really in
these three genera. Thus there can be common relations founded
on these [other types of] common foundations resulting from the
nature* of a thing.
17 Hence, it must be known that each thing* can be considered
as a 'what,' that is according to its quiddity,* and thus it can be a
foundation of a relation of identity or diversity. But insofar as it is
considered as having a certain degree of its essential perfection
and a determinate degree of its virtual quiddity, in this way it can
be a foundation of a common relation of equality or inequality. Or
one can consider it as having some form or some perfection under
the aspect of an informing form, according to which it is said to be
of such a kind. And in this way it can be the basis of a common
relation of similarity or dissimilarity.
18 And in this way, just as there are [also] three
transcendental*5 foundations, because they are not in any genus,
4 That is, substance, quantity and quality.

5 Scotus takes 'transcendental' or 'transcendent' in the sense of being more
general than any genera or category, or as characteristic of 'unlimited'. For
'being' can be divided first into 'limited and unlimited' and 'limited being' into the
ten categories. See the concluding sentence in n. 19 below.
per modum quid et ut habens certum gradum quiditatis, et ut

forma non informans, sed ut est purus actus; sic potest fundare
istas relationes. non tamen alicuius generis sed tamquam
relationes transcendentes. Hoc autem patet per Philosophum, IV
Metaphysicae:14 quodlibet ens comparatur cuilibet enti in hoc
quod est idem sibi vel diversum, et sicut dicit de identitate et
diversitate, ita possumus de aequalitate et inaequalitate,
similitudine et dissimilitudine dicere.
19 Et si quaeratur: Quomodo potest esse magnitudo vel

aequalitas transcendens, et sic de aliis relationibus communibus
et earum fundamentis sic communibus, cum non convertantur
cum ente? dicendum quod sicut superius dictum est,
distinctione 8 quaestione illa: 'Utrum Deus sit in genere', quod
non solum passio convertibilis cum ente est transcendens, ut
bonum, unum, verum et huiusmodi, sed etiam passio disiuncta et
utraque pars eius, ut actus vel potentia, necessarium vel pos
sible, et ideo, cum quodlibet ens comparatum alii sit idem vel
diversum, simile vel dissimile, et aequale vel inaequale, ut osten-
sum est, omnia erunt transcendentia et prius enti convenientia
quam dividatur in decem genera nisi secundum illud ens quod
dividitur contra transcendens ens ut secundum limitatum.
H Cf. Aristot., Metaph. IV (T), c. 2 (1033a 32-6 20).

so the relations founded [on these] are transcendentals,* and

therefore common. Indeed, being or essence can be considered
under the aspect of a 'what' (quid), and as having a certain degree
of quiddity, and [also] as a form: not informing, but as a pure act;
in this way it can be the foundation of these relations, not
however belonging to some genus, but, as it were, of relations
transcending [genera]. But this is evident through the
Philosopher in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics: any being whatsoever
may be compared to whatsoever being in this, that it is the same
as it, or is diverse; and just as he speaks of identity and diversity,
so we can speak about equality and inequality, similarity and
dissimilarity.
19 But suppose that it is asked: How can there be
transcendent*6 magnitude or equality, and so about the other
common relations and their common foundations, since they are
not coextensive with being? It must be said, just as it was said
earlier in distinction 8 (in the question 'Is God in a genus?'), that
not only is an attribute coextensive with being transcendent, such
as good, one, and true, but also a disjunctive attribute, and each
part of it, such as 'act or potency,*' 'necessary or possible,' and
thereforesince any being compared to another is the 'same or
diverse,' 'similar or dissimilar,' and 'equal and unequal,' as has
been shownall of these are transcendentals. That is, they are
proper to being before it is divided into the ten categories, unless
[they are taken] in relation to that being that is distinguished
from transcendent being, e.g., in relation to limited [being]. 7
I.e., the one that transcends all categories; a more common term is 'a
transcendental': see the Glossary.
7 In other words, they are proper to 'unlimited being,' since the categories
can be said to be a division of 'limited being.' Magnitude and equality, in short,
are among the proper attributes before being is divided into the ten categories. Is
this an attempt to distinguish convertible or coextensive attributes as 'proper'
and disjunctive attributes of being as 'improper' attributes of being? If so, not all
the transcendentals are proper attributes, since 'limited' or 'finite being' is a
transcendental, since it has only 'being' above it, and is not determined or limited
to a certain genus, but common to all ten categories.
[II. Distinctiones ad singulas quaestiones applicandae]
20 Secundo principali applico ea quae dicta sunt ad propositum

et ad singulas quaestiones et dico secundum hoc ad primam
quaestionem quod in divinis nullum est genus nec ratio nec
modus alicuius generis propter rationem limitationis quam
importat ratio generis, et omnia quae fundantur in eo. Nam
impossibile est genus esse limitatum, et tamen aliquem modum
vel rationem eius vel aliquid fundatum in eo non esse limitatum,
quia non excedunt illud cui essentialiter conveniunt. Et ideo
praedictae relationes, ut fundantur super fundamenta et res
istorum trium generum, nullo modo sunt in divinis, sicut nec
eorum fundamenta. Prout tamen eorum fundamenta sunt
transcendentia, et eorum relationes transcendentes, sic sunt in
divinis.
21 Quod patet primo ex hoc quod in omni divisione entis,
alterum dividentium est imperfectum, alterum perfectum vel
saltem non formaliter imperfectum. Tale autem quod dicit
perfectionem, vel non dicit imperfectionem, potest dici in divinis.
Igitur cum diversitas in natura, inaequalitas et dissimilitudo
dicant formaliter imperfectionem, opposita istorum dicent
formaliter perfectionem vel saltem non imperfectionem, et ita ut
transcendentia possunt poni in Deo.
22 Hoc idem secundo probatur sic: habita ratione fundamenti
ut fundamentum est et extremis relationis, necessario
habetur relatio, quia non dependet nisi ex istis ut per se causis
eius. Ergo habita magnitudine cum unitate et extremis distinctis,
habetur relatio aequalitatis. Sed in divinis essentia correspondet
magnitudini habens omnem gradum perfectionis simpliciter ut
pelagus infinitum, secundum Damascenum,i5 et ista magnitudo
est communis omnibus personis cum summa unitate, quae non
est divisa in suppositis. Et supposita sunt distincta secundum
i5 Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 9 (I, c. 9] (ed. Buytaert, 49: PG 94, 836).

Application of these distinctions

to the individual questions
20 Secondly I apply what has been said to the issue at hand

and to the individual questions, and I say according to this to the
first question that in the divine there is no genus, nor aspect or
mode8 of any genus, because of the limitation the notion of a
genus, as well as all that is based in it, implies. For it is
impossible that a genus be limited and at the same time any of its
modes or aspects, or anything based on it not be limited, because
they do not exceed that to which they essentially pertain. And
therefore the aforesaid relations, as founded upon the
foundations, as well as what belongs to these three categories, are
in no way in the divine, just as their foundations are not.
However, insofar as their foundations are transcendentals, and
their relationships are transcendent, in this way they are in the
divine.
21 This fact is evident primarily from this that in every
division of being, though one member of the division is imperfect,
the other is perfect, or at least not formally imperfect. The latter,
however, can be predicated of the divine. Therefore since
diversity, inequality, and dissimilarity in nature formally express
imperfection, their opposites formally express perfection, or at
least not imperfection, and thus as transcendentals they can be
posited in God.
22 This same point is proved secondly in this way: having a
notion of a foundation, functioning as a foundation, as well as the
terms of the relation, necessarily implies a relation, because it
only depends on these as its per se causes. Therefore, 'having
magnitude with unity and the distinct terms' implies a relation of
equality. But in the divine the essence does correspond to
magnitude having every degree of unqualified perfection as an
infinite sea, according to Damascene, and this magnitude is
common to all the persons with the highest unity, which is not
divided in the supposits.* And the supposits are distinct
according to faith. Therefore the supposits in the divine have the
8 This seems to be the intrinsic degree or finitude common to every genus.

fidem. Ergo supposita in divinis maximam et verissimam habent

aequalitatem in magnitudine. Et sic patet solutio ad primam
quaestionem.
[III. Ad secundam quaestionem]
23 Ad secundam quaestionem, cum quaeritur an praecise

secundum magnitudinem, potentiam et aeternitatem sit atten-
denda aequalitas in divinis, dico quod est ut sic, est ut non. In
creatura est duplex quantitas, scilicet continua et discreta. De
quantitate autem discreta, quomodo ponenda sit in divinis, nihil
ad praesens. Quantitas vero continua duplex est, scilicet per-
manens et successiva. Quantitati vero successivae in creaturis
correspondet aeternitas in divinis, quae est mensura tota simul.
Omnibus autem quantitatibus permanentibus in creaturis
correspondet magnitudo in Deo, eo quod omnes tales quantitates
continuae important magnitudinem. Patet de linea, superficie et
corpore, et etiam de loco, licet non dicat aliam magnitudinem a
superficie.
24 Sed quomodo tunc ponetur in divinis magnitudo secundum
potentiam, cum potentia in creaturis non dicat quantitatem?
Responsio: in divinis magnitudo virtualis non tantum habet
intelligi ut comparatur ad intrinseca, sed ut comparatur ad
obiecta extrinseca respectu quorum dicitur habere vigorem, et
unum sequitur ex alio. Quia enim virtus magna est, ideo
comparata ad obiecta extrinseca dicitur esse magna et virtuosa.
Unde potentia non importat fundamentum alterius aequalitatis
quam magnitudo, sed tantum apponitur hic ad exprimendum
quantitatem magnitudinis in divinis, et non dicit aliam quantita
tem a magnitudine, sed eandem alio modo comparatam.
25 Sed hic est unum dubium: cum magnitudo transeat in

essentiam, et sit intrinsecus gradus quantitatis eius virtualis, non
videtur quod relatio fundata super magnitudinem sit alia a
relatione fundata super essentiam. Similiter, cum magnitudo
dicat in divinis illimitationem perfectionis, et hoc includat
quaelibet perfectio simpliciter, non videtur quod sit relatio [alia]16
i6 Hoc alia redundans videtur, vel lege aliqua.

greatest and truest equality in magnitude. And in this way the

answer to the first question is evident.
To the second question
23 To the second question, since it is asked whether divine

equality in the divine is taken into account precisely as regards
magnitude, power, and eternity, I say that it is and it is not. In
creatures there is a twofold quantity, namely continuous and
discrete. But nothing will be said at present about how discrete
quantity must be posited in the divine. Continuous quantity,
however, is twofold, namely permanent* and successive.*
Eternity in the divine, which is the measure of the whole at the
same time, corresponds to successive quantity in creatures. But
magnitude in God corresponds to all the permanent quantities in
creatures, for all such continuous quantities imply magnitude.
This is evident about a line, a surface and a body, and also about
place,* although the latter does not imply any magnitude other
than that of a surface.
24 But how, then, is magnitude posited in the divine in regard
to power, since power in creatures does not imply quantity?
Response: virtual magnitude in the divine need not be understood
only as related to what is intrinsic, but also can be understood as
related to external objects, in relation to which it is said to have
strength, and one follows from another. For, because it is great
power, therefore compared to extrinsic objects it is said to be
great and powerful. Hence power does not imply a foundation of
equality that is different from that of magnitude, except that here
it is applied to express only the quantity of magnitude in the
divine, and it does not assert any other quantity than magnitude,
but presents it in a different relationship.
25 But here there is one doubt: since magnitude passes into the
essence, and is an intrinsic degree of its virtual quantity, it does
not seem that a relationship based on magnitude is anything
other than a relation based on the essence. Likewise, since
magnitude asserts the unlimited character of perfection in the
divine, and every unqualified perfection includes this, it does not
fundata super magnitudinem alia a similitudine quae fundatur

super alias perfectiones.
26 Responsio: magnitudo in divinis non dicit attributum
distinctum ab aliis, sicut dictum est prius de infinitate, sed
gradum intrinsecum cuiuslibet etiam perfectionis essentiae ut
distinguitur contra attributum, quia nullum est ita simplex
attributum in divinis de quo non sit quaerere quantitatem
virtutis eius. Si enim non esset in divinis nisi unicum attributum.
ut sapientia, adhuc contingeret quaerere de gradu virtutis eius
quantus est. Unde si quaelibet esset sine alia, adhuc quaelibet
haberet certum gradum quantitatis eius virtualis, quia quaelibet
esset infinita et haberet magnitudinem formaliter infinitam. Et
ideo magnitudo non est unum fundamentum aequalitatis in
divinis tantum, sed est indifferens fundamentum unum, quod
salvatur in omni perfectione simpliciter et includitur in ea,
quarum quaelibet potest esse fundamentum aequalitatis, quia
quaelibet habet propriam magnitudinem. Unde si in divinis sunt
perfectiones simpliciter infinitae et magnitudines similiter et
aequalitates correspondentes. In essentia autem, ut quiditas,
fundatur identitas, et ut dicit magnitudinem infinitam pro
quantitate sua virtuali super eam fundatur aequalitas inter
personas habentes illam essentiam.
27 Patet igitur solutio ad secundam quaestionem quod
aequalitas in divinis sufficienter consistit in duobus, scilicet in
magnitudine et aeternitate, cointelligendo potentiam tamquam
quoddam expressivum magnitudinis ad obiecta extrinseca, sicut
dictum est.
28 Sed hic est aliud dubium. Si enim tot sunt magnitudines et
aequalitates in divinis quot perfectiones simpliciter, cum
magnitudo de se sit unius rationis, sequitur quod aliquid unius
rationis in divinis non sit de se hoc, et tunc non valet illa ratio
superius, distinctione 2, quare non possunt esse in divinis plura
supposita eiusdem rationis quia quodlibet est de se hoc et
quaelibet productio est de se haec. Huius autem contrarium
videtur de magnitudine et de aequalitate in divinis.
seem that relation based on magnitude, is different from a

similarity based on the other perfections.
26 Response: magnitude in the divine does not assert an
attribute distinct from the others, as was said earlier about
infinity, but an intrinsic degree of any perfection of the essence as
distinguished from an attribute, because no attribute is so simple
in the divine that one could not inquire about the quantity of this
asset. For if there were in the divine only one attribute such as
wisdom, one could still ask about the degree of this desirable
quality: How great is it? Hence, if each perfection were without
the other, each would still have a set degree of its virtual
quantity, because each would be infinite and have a magnitude
that is formally infinite. And therefore magnitude is not the only
[thing that forms] a foundation of equality in the divine, but there
is one foundation indifferent [as to individual perfections], that is,
preserved in every unqualified [or pure] perfection and included
in it, of which each could be the basis for equality, because each
perfection has its own magnitude. Hence, if in the divine pure*
perfections are infinite, so are also magnitudes and corresponding
equalities. Identity, however, is founded in the essence as a
quiddity. And as it asserts infinite magnitude as its virtual
quantity, the equality of the persons possessing that essence is
based upon this.
27 Thus the solution to the second question is evident, that
equality in the divine consists sufficiently in two things, namely
magnitude and eternity, understanding at the same time power
as a certain expression of magnitude as regards extrinsic objects,
as has been said.
28 But here there is another doubt. For if there are as many
magnitudes and equalities in the divine as there are pure
perfections, since magnitude itself is of one sort, it follows that
something of one sort in the divine is not of itself just this, and
then invalid is that reason above in distinction two [that explains]
why there cannot be several supposits in the divine of the same
sort, because [there] each is of itself a this, and each production*
is of itself a this. About magnitude and equality in the divine,
however, the contrary seems to be true.
29 Ad hoc potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo sic: quod nihil unius
rationis in divinis potest plurificari nisi praeexigat plura alterius
rationis, per quorum pluralitatem determinentur illa quae sunt
unius rationis ad suam pluralitatem. Hoc autem non contingit de
personis, ut patet ibidem, distinctione 2. Sed in proposito
aequalitas requirit distinctionem personarum et perfectionum
simpliciter, quarum quaelibet habet suam magnitudinem, et sunt
distinctae formaliter et secundum rationem; patet de iustitia,
sapientia et veritate quae sunt alterius rationis.
30 Alio modo potest dici et aeque bene quod licet unitas cum
fundamento aequalitatis concurrat, non tamen est fundamentum
ita remotum aequalitatis, quin ex eius diversitate plurificetur
aequalitas. Quod patet in relatione similitudinis: sicut enim
scientia distinguitur a calore, ita similitudo quae fundatur super
unitatem in calore distinguitur et est alterius rationis ab illa quae
fundatur super unitatem in scientia.
31 Et tunc ad propositum est dicendum quod istae aequalitates
fundatae super magnitudines diversarum perfectionum non sunt
eiusdem rationis formaliter, sicut nec illa super quae fundantur
sunt eiusdem rationis, sed alterius et alterius. Et ideo sicut
magnitudo in sapientia est alterius rationis a magnitudine in
bonitate, et unitas ab unitate, ita aequalitas est alterius rationis
in uno et in alio. Et tunc non est concedendum quod aliquid unius
rationis plurificetur in divinis.
[IV. Ad tertiam quaestionem]
32 Ex dictis patet solutio ad tertiam quaestionem qua

quaeritur utrum relatio aequalitatis distinguatur a relatione
similitudinis et identitatis, quia est ut sic et est ut non. Non enim
29 This can be answered in two ways. One way is this: that

nothing of one sort can be multiplied in the divine unless several
things of different sort are first presupposed, through whose
plurality those things which are of one sort are determined to
their plurality. But this does not happen where the persons are
concerned, as is evident there in distinction two. But in the case
at issue here equality requires a distinction of persons, as well as
pure perfections, of which each has its magnitude, and they are
formally and conceptually distinct; it is evident about justice,
wisdom and truth, which are of different sorts.
30 It can be put in another way, and one equally good:
although unity concurs with the foundation of equality, it is not a
foundation of equality that is removed far enough [i.e., it is not
general or common enough]9 to prevent variation or diversity
within itself that results in the multiplication of [the sorts of]
equality.10 This is evident in the relation of similarity: for just as
a science is distinguished from heat, so the similarity founded on
unity in heat is distinguished, and is of another sort, from that
founded on unity in a science.
31 And then to the issue at hand it must be said that these
equalities founded on the magnitudes of diverse perfections are
not of the same sort formally, just as those things on which they
are founded are not of the same sort, but of different sorts. And
therefore, just as magnitude in wisdom is of another sort than
magnitude in goodness and [one's] unity [is of another sort than
another's] unity, so equality is of another sort in one as opposed to
the other. And thus it must not be conceded that something of one
sort is multiplied in the divine.
To the third question
32 From what has been said the solution to the third question
is evident, where it is asked whether the relation of equality is
distinguished from the relation of similarity and identity, for it
9 As the following example shows, it is specific to particular cases.

10 The last part of this sentence is loosely translated ad sensum to preserve
its intelligibility.
tantum distinguitur aequalitas a similitudine et identitate

quantum similitudo et identitas distinguuntur inter se, quia nec
fundamentum eius ut magnitudo tantum distinguitur a funda-
mentis illarum quantum fundamenta istarum distinguuntur inter
se. Quia magnitudo super quam fundatur aequalitas non dicit nisi
modum vel gradum intrinsecum fundamentorum identitatis et
similitudinis, et non distingitur ab eis formaliter ut quid vel
quale, sicut illa distinguuntur inter se. Unde aequalitas non
videtur dicere in divinis aliam relationem simpliciter a simili
tudine et identitate, sed tantum dicit perfectum modum
utriusque relationis.
33 Quod potest declarari in creaturis: si enim sunt duo alba
quorum unum est albius alio, illa utique sunt similia licet non
aequalia (non autem perfecte sunt similia nisi sint in albedine
aequalia), ita quod aequalitas non dicit quasi simpliciter aliam
relationem a similitudine istorum, sed perfectionem similitudinis
in utroque extremorum et ita modum perfectum exsistentiae
fundamenti penes quod est similitudo in utroque.
34 Ita si in Patre, secundum errorem Arii, esset maior deitas et
in Filio minor, Filius utique esset similis Patri sed non aequalis,
quia non haberet ita perfecte illam formam deitatis sicut Pater.
Ponendo tamen, sicut nos ponimus ex fide, quod nihil ibi est
minus alio in deitate, Filius est perfecte similis, quia in
fundamento similitudinis omnino et perfecte sunt aequales. Unde
sicut magnitudo non dicit nisi modum intrinsecum perfectum
cuiuslibet essentialis perfectionis ut fundamentorum identitatis
both is and it is not." For equality is not distinguished from

similarity and identity as much as similarity and identity are
distinguished among themselves (since neither is its foundation,
such as magnitude, distinguished from their foundations as much
as these foundations are distinguished among themselves). For
the magnitude upon which equality is based only refers to the
mode and intrinsic degree of the foundations of identity and
similarity. It is not distinguished from them formally as a
something (quid) and a quality (quale), as these are distinguished
among themselves. Hence in the divine equality does not seem
to assert a relation in an unqualified sense that is different from
similarity and identity, but only asserts a perfect degree of each
relation.
33 This can be made clear in respect to creatures: for if there
are two white things, one of which is whiter than the other, they
are indeed similar, though not equal, for they are not perfectly
similar unless they are equal in whiteness, so that equality does
not, as it were, assert a relation simply other than that of their
similarity, but expresses the perfection of the similarity in both
terms, and thus the perfect way foundation exists, which is the
basis of similarity in each.
34 Thus if in the Father, according to the error of Arius, deity
were greater and in the Son less, the Son would indeed be similar
to the Father, but not equal, because he would not have that form
of deity as perfectly as the Father. Nevertheless, by postulating,
as we do from faith, that nothing there is less than another as
regards deity, the Son is perfectly similar, because in respect to
the foundation of similarity they are completely and perfectly
equal. Whence, just as magnitude only expresses a perfect
intrinsic* mode of all essential perfections, e.g., of the foundations
for identity and similarity in the divine, so equality expresses the
ii The apparent contradictory answer is Scotus's attempt to indicate in brief

the difference between the way (1) an intrinsic mode or degree qualifies its
subject, and (2) a substantial form qualifies matter, or an accident qualifies a
substance. The qualification in the first case is not really distinct from what it
qualifies, whereas it is in the second. Equality expresses an intrinsic mode or
degree of what is said to be equal. It adds to what we know of a thing, not to what
it really is. Hence, there is a distinction in the first case; but not in the second.
et similitudinis in divinis, ita aequalitas dicit modum perfectum

huius et illius, et ita non dicit simpliciter aliam relationem ab eis.
(V. Ad rationes principales primae quaestionis]
35 Ad primam rationemi7 dicitur quod species transfertur ad

divina, quia non dicit imperfectionem sicut genus; et ideo
magnitudo transfertur ad divina, licet non quantitas.
36 Istud nihil est dictu. Si species maneat secundum suam
rationem formalem in divinis, oportet necessario dicere quod
quidquid est de ratione eius et de intellectu essentiali, quod
maneat ibidem. Quia dicere aliquid manere et non illud quod
includitur in intellectu essentiali eius, est dicere contradictoria.
Ergo cum genus sit de per se intellectu speciei et de ea
praedicatur essentialiter et in quid, sequitur quod unum non
transfertur sine alio ad divina. Nec valet dicere quod species
potest manere in divinis ratione differentiae quae non includit
necessario imperfectionem.
37 Contra: sicut genus imponitur per se a ratione potentiae et a
parte potentiali, ita differentia a ratione actus et a parte actuali,
quarum quaelibet est extra rationem alterius, et quaelibet ratio
dicit partem speciei primo diversam ab alia, et per consequens
limitationem. Ergo sicut constituitur ex istis, ut probatum est,
non potest manere in divinis; sic nec multo magis aliquid
constitutum formaliter, quia omnia sunt formaliter limitata.
38 Ideo respondeo breviter quod magnitudo et quantitas
virtualis, ut ponitur in Deo, est transcendens: non species vel
modus vel proprietas alicuius generis, quia omnia sunt limitata,
ipsa autem est infinitas et modus intrinsecus cuiuslibet infiniti.
i7 Cf. supra n. 1.
perfect mode of this and that, and thus does not simply assert
another relationship in addition to these.
Reply to the initial arguments of the first question
35 To the first initial argument [n. 1] it is said that the species

is transferred into the divine, because it does not express
imperfection like genus does; and therefore magnitude is
transferred to the divine, but not quantity.
36 But this is no answer. If the species should remain
according to its formal* notion in the divine, one must necessarily
admit that whatever belongs to its notion and its essential
meaning should remain there as well. For to say that something
remains and that which is included in its essential meaning does
not is to assert a contradiction. Therefore, since the genus is a
part of what the species means and is predicated of it essentially,
it follows that one is not transferred to the divine without the
other. Neither is it valid to say that the species can remain in the
divine under the aspect of a difference that does not include
necessarily imperfection.
37 To the contrary: just as genus per se is imposed with a
potential aspect and potentiality in view, so the difference [is
imposed] with an actual aspect and actuality in view. Neither [of
these aspects] is included in the notion of the other, and each
notion expresses a radically different aspect of the species, and as
a consequence a limitation. Therefore insofar as it [i.e., the
species] is constituted from these, as has been proved, it cannot
remain in the divine. But even less so can something formally
constituted [remain there], because from the formal point of view
all are limited.
38 Therefore I respond briefly that magnitude and virtual
quantity, as posited in God, is something transcending [the
categories]: not a species or mode or property of some genus,
because all these are limited, but it itselfi2 is infinity and an
intrinsic mode of somethingi3 infinite.
Magnitude or virtual quantity.

The essence and the perfections or attributes it contains.
39 Ad secundumi8 dico quod aequalitas dicit perfectionem vel

praesupponit perfectionem in natura, et ita aequalitas dicit
perfectionem concomitanter non formaliter, vel saltem non dicit
formaliter imperfectionem; inaequalitas enim dicit formaliter
imperfectionem. Si enim duorum habentium eandem naturam
unus habeat eam perfecte et alius deficiat, [et]i9 sic habendo eam,
istorum est inaequalitas quae necessario includit imperfectionem
in aliquo extremorum ut modum imperfectum habendi naturam
ab aliquo eorum. Sed si haberetur ab utroque aequaliter,
haberetur perfecte, quia nulla deminutio est in natura per hoc
quod sic perfecte habetur ab utroque.
40 Contra: dicit Augustinus libro De quantitate animae.20 Vide

auctoritatem.
41 Ad probationem Augustini: 'si omnia essent aequalia, non
essent omnia'. Dico quod inaequalitas in entibus universi est
perfectio secundum quid, quia supplens imperfectionem, et ideo
habet in universo imperfectionem annexam. Quia enim
universum non est capax tantae perfectionis in una natura sicut
in diversis naturis (quia si non esset nisi unica natura, non esset
nisi unica species, et tunc non esset perfectio tanta in universo
quantam posset capere), et species universi se habent in quodam
ordine secundum prius et posterius, perfectius et imperfectius,
quia sunt in universo essentialiter ordinatae, ideo propter
imperfectionem talium entium universi sic limitatorum et
ordinatorum, est necessario inaequalitas tamquam perfectio
supplens imperfectionem naturarum ordinatarum et limitatarum
universi. Sed ubi est perfectio tota in uno ordine sicut est in
omnibus personis divinis respectu omnium perfectionum
simpliciter, ibi nulla est inaequalitas, sed omnimoda aequalitas.
42 Ad aliud2i dico quod coaequari dicit duas relationes: unam
aequiparantiae, quae fundatur super eandem magnitudinem in
eis; aliam disquiparantiae quae importatur per verbum passivum
et activum sibi correspondens, quae22 fundatur super potentiam
iH Cf. supra n. 2.
i9 Non est usus hoc 'et' hoc loco.
10 August., De quant, animae c. 9, n. 15 (PL 32, 1044).
2i Cf. supra n. 3.
22 Melius: et quae vel quaeque.
39 To the second [n. 2] I say that equality expresses a

perfection or presupposes a perfection in nature, and so equality
asserts a perfection concomitantly and not formally, or at least it
does not express formally imperfection; for inequality does assert
formally imperfection. For if of two having the same nature one
possesses it more perfectly and another less so, and they have it
in this way, their inequality necessarily includes imperfection in
one of the terms as a less perfect way of having the nature by one
of them. But if it were possessed by both equally, it would be
possessed perfectly, because there is no diminution in the nature
through the fact that it is possessed perfectly by both.
40 Augustine says the contrary in his book, On the Greatness of
the Soul. Look at the authoritative statement.
41 To the proof of Augustine: 'if all things were equal, they
would not be all,' I say that the inequality of things in the
universe is a perfection in a qualified sense, because it makes up
for imperfection, and therefore imperfection in the universe
accompanies it. For since the universe is not capable of such
perfection in one nature as in diverse natures (because if there
were only one nature, there would only be one species, and then
there would not be as much perfection in the universe as it could
contain), and the species of the universe are in a certain order
from prior to posterior, from more perfect to less perfect, because
[the species are] essentially* ordered in the universe; therefore,
because of the imperfection of such beings of the universe, limited
and ordered in this way, inequality necessarily is, as it were,
perfection making up for the imperfection of the ordered and
limited natures of the universe. But where the whole perfection is
in one order, just as is the case in all divine persons as regards all
unqualified perfections, in such case there is no inequality, but all
sorts of equality.
42 To the other [n. 3] I say that to be made mutually equal
asserts two relations: one of equipollence (aequiparantia), which
is based upon the same magnitude in them; the other of
inequality, implied in the passive verb and the active [verb]
corresponding to it, which [relation] is based upon the active
potency of the one producing and the passive potency of the
product.* And it is in this way that Augustine thinks about the
activam producentis et potentiam passivam producti. Et sic intel-

ligit Augustinus de imagine et coaequatione, quia in illa relatione
fundata quasi super potentiam activam in Patre, et quasi super
potentiam passivam in Filio, non coaequantur Pater et Filius.
Quia licet Pater illam potentiam communicet Filio, non tamen ut
est principium productivum Filii, quia praeintelligitur ut in Patre
habere terminum adaequatum. Sic tamen coaequantur istae
relationes disquiparantiae in Patre et Filio quia sicut Pater habet
unam relationem, ita Filius habet aliam quae est aequalis
perfectionis, quia utraque est infinita per identitatem.
43 Exemplum huius duplicis relationis patet cum dicitur 'Pater
assimilat sibi Filium'. Pater enim producendo Filium communicat
sibi omnem perfectionem simpliciter, quae est fundamentum
assimilationis perfectae, et ita aequalitatis, ut prius dictum est; et
quantum ad relationem aequiparantiae est mutuitas, non autem
quantum ad aliam.
[VI. Ad argumenta principalia secundae quaestionis]
44 Ad primam23 rationem secundae quaestionis, patet per iam

dicta quod aequalitas secundum potentiam non est tertia
aequalitas, alia ab aequalitate secundum magnitudinem, sed
explicat virtutem magnitudinis agentis in comparatione ad extra.
45 Ad secundum,24 patet per iam dicta quod aequalitas in
magnitudine non est ita una relatio sicut similitudo, nec funda
mentum eius simpliciter distinguitur a fundamento alterius; nec
tamen fundamentum aequalitatis, quod est magnitudo, est ita
unum sicut scientia aut sapientia vel sicut aliae perfectiones, quia
ultra istas simpliciter conceptas, magnitudo dicit modum
intrinsecum quantitatis virtualis earum.
[VII. Ad argument um principale tertiae quaestionis]
46 Ad rationem tertiae25 quaestionis patet per iam dicta, quod

aequalitas non est omnino alia relatio ab identitate et
" Cf. supra n. 5.

24 Cf. supra n. 6.
1r> Cf. supra n. 8-9.
image and its being made mutually equal, because in that

relation founded, as it were, upon the active potency in the
Father, and the quasi-passive potency in the Son, the Father and
the Son are not made mutually equal. For, though Father
communicates that potency to the Son, [he] does not, however,
[communicate it] as a principle* productive of the Son, because
the latter is presupposed to have an adequate term in the Father.
But in this way these relations of inequality are made mutually
equal in the Father and Son, because just as the Father has one
relation, so the Son has another that is of equal perfection, since
each is infinite through identity.
43 An example of this double relation is evident when it is said:
'The Father assimilates the Son to himself.' For the Father by
producing the Son communicates to him all pure perfection,
which is the basis of perfect assimilation, and thus of equality, as
was stated before; and there is mutuality as regards the
relationship of equipollence, but not as regards the other.
To the initial arguments of the second question
44 To the first argument of the second question [n. 5] the

answer is evident from what has been said already, [namely] that
equality according to power is not a third equality, other than the
equality of magnitude, but it explains the power of the magnitude
of the agent in comparison to what is outside.
45 To the second [n. 6], it is clear from what has already been
said that equality in magnitude is not a relation that is uniform
to the same degree as similarity, nor is its foundation simply
distinguished from the foundation of the other. But neither is the
foundation of equality, which is magnitude, uniform to the same
degree as science or wisdom or the other perfections, because in
addition to these conceived simply, magnitude expresses an
intrinsic mode of their virtual quantity.
To the initial argument for the third question
46 To the argument of the third question [n. 8 & 9] the answer

is evident from what has been said, i.e., that equality is not a
relationship that is totally different from identity and similarity,
similitudine, quia nec fundamentum unius simpliciter distingui-

tur a fundamento alterius.
[Pars II
Quaestio 1
Utrum personae divinae sint in se invicem
per circumincessionem]
47 Utrum personae divinae sint in se invicem per circuminces

sionem.
Videtur quod non:

Sicut arguit Philosophus contra Anaxagoram, I
Physicorum 26 si quodlibet esset in quolibet, tunc entia essent
maxime confusa et indistincta. Ergo sic in proposito, si quaelibet
persona esset mutuo in alia, esset confusio personarum, contra
Athanasium:27 "neque confundentes personas" etc.
48 Item, indivisibile non distinguitur ab indivisibili nisi sit
extra ipsum, VI Physicorum;28 sed quaelibet persona est
indivisibilis; ergo si una sit in alia, mutuo erunt indistinctae. Hoc
autem impossibile, ergo necessario una est extra aliam.
49 Item, si una esset in alia, ergo est compositio aliqua in
personis. Probatio consequentiae; si essentia est in alio et
distiguitur realiter, ergo compositio.
50 Item, in quo est filius, in eo est filiatio; sed per te in Patre
est Filius; ergo in Patre est filiatio, quod est falsum.
51 Item, si Pater est in Filio, et Filius in Patre, ergo Pater est
in Patre. Probatio consequentiae: IV Physicorum:29 Si aer est in
igne et ignis in aere, ergo aer est in aere, quod falsum est, quia
nihil est proprie in se ipso.
52 Item, Exivi a Patre et veni etc., ergo non est in Patre.
*0 Aristot., Physica I, c. 4 (187a 26-6 15).

27 Ps.-Athanasius, Symbolum 'Quicunque' (ed. H Denzinger, n 39).
Aristot., Physica VI, c. 1 (2316 3-4. 6-17).
*l Cf. Henricus Gand., Summa a. 53, q. 10 (II, 73M, 75C). Cf. Aristot .
Physica IV, c. 2 (209o 33-5) cit. in Lectura I, d. 19. q. 1 (XVII. 268)
since neither is the foundation of one distinguished simply from

that of the other.
Part II
Question One
Are the divine persons themselves in one another
through cirumincession?
47 Are the divine persons themselves in one another through

circumincession14?
It seems not:
Just as the Philosopher argues against Anaxagoras, in Bk. I
of the Physics, if each were in each, then these beings would be
maximally confused and indistinct. Therefore, it is this way in the
case at hand, if each person were mutually in the other, there
would be a confusion of persons, which is against what
Athanasius says: "Never are the persons confused," etc.
48 Also, the indivisible is not distinguished from [another]
indivisible unless one is outside the other, according to Bk. VI of
the Physics; but each person is indivisible; therefore if one were in
another, they would be mutually indistinct. But this is
impossible; therefore necessarily one is outside the other.
49 Also, if one person were in another person, the person would
be composed. Proof of the implication; if the essence is in another
and is really distinguished, there is a composition.
50 Also, in whom is the son, in him is filiation. But, according
to you, in the Father there is the Son. Therefore, there would be
filiation in the Father, which is false.
51 Also, if the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father,
therefore, the Father would be in the Father. Proof of the
implication; for the Philosopher argues in Bk. IV of the Physics:
"If air is in fire and fire in the air, then the air is in the air,"
which is false, because 'nothing is properly in itself.'
52 Also, "I have come from15 the Father, and come [into the
world]."16 Therefore, he is not in the Father.
14 A theological term expressing the reciprocal existence in each other of the

three persons in the Trinity.
15 The Latin can also be understood as "come out of the Father."
l John 16:28.
53 Contra:
Magister in littera, et in loan.: Ego in Patre et Pater in me
est.
[I. Ad quaestionem]
54 Responsio: haec quaestio plana est quantum ad dictum sive

quantum ad conclusionem, sed de modo 'essendi in' est difficultas.
Et ideo tria sunt hic videnda per ordinem: primo de modo 'essendi
in'; secundo assignanda est ratio quare una persona est in alia:
tertio utrum iste modus 'essendi in' habeat aliquam
convenientiam cum aliquo illorum octo in IV Physicorum,30 sive
an sit similis modus 'essendi in' creaturis vel possibilis esse.
[A. Art. 1
55 Quantum ad primum, quidam doctor distinguit modos

'essendi in', et inter alios ponit tres.3i Primus est quo aliquid est
in aliquo primo, quia secundum se totum sicut aer est in igne.
Alius modus 'essendi in' est quando aliquid est in aliquo
secundum partem, et hoc dupliciter. Vel quod pars nihil sit eius in
quo est, sicut avis dicitur in laqueo, quia per pedem, qui non est
pars laquei. Vel sic quod pars sit aliquid illius in quo est, sicut si
quoddam membrum esset constitutum ex diversis partibus,
quaelibet pars esset aliquid illius.
56 Ad propositum: personam esse in persona primo modo
impossibile est, ut quod Pater sic primo est in Filio.
57 Quod probat dupliciter. Primo sic: quando aliquid secundum
se totum est in alio primo, quidlibet eius est aeque primo in eo.
lo Aristot., Physica IV, c. 3 (210a 14-24).

" Henricus Gand., Summa a. 53, q. 10 (II, 74).
53 To the contrary: The Master in the text, and in John:17 "I am

in the Father and the Father is in me."
54 Response: this question is clear as to what it asks or as to

[why its answer is affirmative], but there is a difficulty as to what
'being in' [another means]. And therefore, there are three points
that we must look into sequentially: first, as to the manner of
'being in'; secondly, a reason must be assigned why one person is
in another; thirdly, whether this way of 'being in' has some
affinity with those eight ways [mentioned] in Bk. IV of the
Physics, or whether there is a similar way of 'being in' creature,
or whether there can be.
Article One
55 As to the first, a certain doctor distinguishes the ways of

'being in,' and among others he gives three. The first is that by
which something is in something primarily, because it is there
entirely as air is in fire. Another way of 'being in' is when
something is partially in something, and this is twofold. Either
the part is nothing of that in which it is, just as a bird is said to be
in a snare, because of its foot, which is not part of the snare. Or in
such a way that a part of it pertains to that in which it is, e.g., if
there were a certain limb constituted of diverse parts, each of
these parts would be something pertaining to it.
56 As to the case at hand: it is impossible that a person be in a
person in the first way, e.g., that the Father is in the Son in this
way.
57 He proves this in two ways. First in this way: when
something itself is entirely in another, whatever belongs to it is
primarily in the other as well. But not everything of the Father is
primarily in the Son as well, because then paternity would be
17 John 14:10-11.
Sed non quidlibet Patris est aeque primo in Filio, quia tunc
paternitas esset aeque primo in Filio sicut in Patre sicut essentia
est in Filio, et tunc pater formaliter esset Filius.
58 Item secundo sic: quod est primo in aliquo videtur contineri
et ambiri ab eo. Sed quod duae personae secundum setotas32
ambiant se mutuo et ambiantur, intellectus non capit. Ergo una
non est in alia secundum se totum. Ergo reliquitur ut sit una in
alia secundum partem. Non primo modo, quia relatio quae est
sicut pars formalis in constitutione personae, non est ratio
'essendi in'. Pater enim non est in Filio nisi quia essentia est in
Filio, non autem relatio paternitatis, quia est modus essendi 'ad',
non 'in'. Ergo tertio modo 'essendi in' Pater erit in Filio et e
converso, ita quod essentia erit quasi pars in quo exsistit sive cui
inexsistit, et sic Pater in Filio est, quia essentia, quae est aliquid
eius, est in eo.
59 Sed si persona est illud in quo est alia, ut Pater in quo est
Filius, quaero: Estne Pater in quo est Filius sicut pars?
60 Respondet quod prima persona in qua est alia, ut habet
rationem continentis, est secundum totum continens, et alia
secundum partem continetur, scilicet ex una parte qua est
essentia.
61 Sed contra: quando aliquod totum est in aliquo secundum
partem, idem modus 'essendi in' convenit parti primo et toti per
partem. Sed, per te, Pater est in Filio sive Filius est in Patre
secundum aliquid Patris, scilicet per essentiam quae est aliquid
eius. Ergo totus Filius erit eodem modo 'essendi in' Patre, id est
per modum inhaerentis vel informantis sive formaliter. Hoc
autem est impossibile, sicut impossibile est quod Pater sit sapiens
sapientia genita.
62 Respondebitur quod maior est vera universaliter de eo quod
est proxima ratio 'essendi in'. Tunc enim pars et totum habent
eundem modum 'essendi in', sed primo convenit parti et toti per
i2 Cf. infra notam ad n. 66.

primarily in the Son, in the same manner as it is in the Father,

just as the essence is in the Son, and then the Son would be
formally a father.
58 Also secondly in this way: that which is primarily in
something seems to be contained and embraced by it. But that
two persons according to their whole being mutually embrace,
and are embraced by themselves is inconceivable. Therefore one
is not in another according to his entire being. Hence, what
remains is that one is partially in another. Not in the first way,
because a relation, which is just like a formal part in the
constitution of a person, is not a reason for 'being in.' For the
Father is only in the Son because it is the essence that is in the
Son, but not the relation of paternity, for it is a manner of being
'towards' another, and not that of being 'in' another. Therefore, it
will be according to the third way of 'being in' that the Father will
be in the Son and vice versa, so that the essence would be, as it
were, a part, in which [a person] exists or dwells in, and in this
way the Father is in the Son, because the essence, which is
something of him, is in [the Son].
59 But if 'person' is that in which another is, as the Father in
whom the Son is, I ask: Is it not that the Father is that, in which
the Son is as a part?
60 It is answered that the first person in which the other is,
insofar as it is taken as containing, is containing as a whole, and
the other is contained only as a part, namely that part which is
the essence in it.
61 But against this: when something whole is in something as
a part, this mode of 'being in' pertains to the part primarily and to
the whole [only] by way of a part. But according to you, the
Father is in the Son, or the Son is in the Father according to
something of the Father, namely through the essence which is
something of him. Therefore, the entire Son will be in the same
way [i.e., the essence's] of 'being in' the Father, that is, by way of
inhering or informing or formally. But this is impossible, as it is
impossible that the Father is wise by a wisdom that is begotten.
62 It will be countered that the major is true universally of that
which is the proximate reason for 'being in.' For then a part and
the whole have the same mode of 'being in,' but primarily it
partem. Sed haec essentia non est ratio formalis 'essendi in'
quod33 una persona sit in alia, sed essentia cum proprietate
personali; et illa sunt in, id est, una persona est in alia non
formaliter sed praesentialiter.
63 Sed haec responsio destruit principale propositum sive

dictum, quia quando aliquid est in alio, non secundum partem sed
per totam entitatem eius primo, tunc est primo in illo. Patet in
omnibus ut risibile in homine primo, quia non convenit ei
secundum aliquam eius partem. Ergo si tota essentia est ratio
'essendi in' primo, ut dicis, sequitur quod Filius primo erit in
essentia quam in Patre; sed per essentiam erit in Patre.
64 Item, 'esse in' non potest intelligi ad se sed ad aliquid; ergo
ad relationem. Non ad relationem originis, quia non est eiusdem
rationis in utroque extremo. Alia enim relatione originis dicitur
Pater ad Filium et e converso; ergo est relatio communis. Ergo
per eandem relationem convenit utrique extremo, et sic 'esse in'
convenit personae inexsistenti et personae continenti eodem
modo. Exemplum: sicut per eandem rationem a est simul cum b
et e converso, si simultas sit unius rationis in eis.
65 Item, proprietas personae secundum quod est incommunica-
bilis, non potest dici de essentia formaliter. Similiter, e converso
proprietas essentiae, ut communicabilis, non dicitur de persona,
licet una sit in alia. Sed essentiam esse in Filio, ut aliquid eius,
convenit essentiae ut communicabilis tribus personis. Ergo non
convenit Patri ut persona nec Filio.
" Melius lege: quare.

pertains to a part and to the whole through the part. But it is not
this essence that is the formal reason of 'being in' that accounts
for one person being in another, but the essence with the personal
property; and 'these are in' means that one person is in another
not formally, but as being present.
63 But this reply destroys the principal proposal or dictum,

because when something is in another, not according to a part,
but through his entire entity primarily, then he is primarily in
another. It is evident in all cases, as risible is primarily in man,
because it does not pertain to him according to some part of him.
Therefore, if the entire essence is the reason of 'being in,' as you
say, it follows that the Son primarily will be in the essence, rather
than in the Father, but through the essence he will be in the
Father.
64 Also, 'to be in' cannot be understood in relation to oneself,
but only in relation to something; therefore it involves a
relationship. Not one of origin,* because it is not of the same sort
in both terms. For the Father is referred to the Son, and vice
versa, by different relations* of origin; therefore it is a common
relation. Hence, [in this case something] pertains to both terms
through the same relationship, and thus 'to be in' pertains in the
same way both to the person 'existing in' and to the person
containing. An example: a is simultaneous with band the
conversefor the same reason, if simultaneity in them is of one
sort.
65 Also, the property of 'person' as it is incommunicable,*
cannot be predicated formally of the essence. Likewise,
conversely, the property of essence as communicable* is not
predicated about the person, although one is in the other. But for
the essence 'to be in the Son, as something of him' pertains to the
essence insofar as it is communicable to three persons. Therefore
it does not pertain to the Father as person, or to the Son.
[3. Opinio Scoti]
66 Quantum ergo ad istum articulum pertinet quomodo una

persona est in alia, sciendum est, secundum Hilarium, VII De
Trinitate, versus finem,34 quod una persona est in alia, non ut
aliud in alio ut corpus in corpore, sed ita sibi convenit inesse et
subsistere ut subsistens in subsistente. Subsistere vero primo
competit personae, ut generare et generari primo conveniunt
supposito et toti, non quia alicui parti primo. Et sic subsistere
primo convenit toti personae et non toti per se. Sed e converso,
primo convenit toti per se et primo, et parti, sed non primo. Sic
persona setota35 producitur: non essentia, non relatio. Esse ergo
in alio ex parte utriusque extremi primo convenit toti personae, et
non primo alicui quod est in persona.
67 Dico ergo quod una persona non est in alia per informatio-
nem, quo modo aliquid cui sic aliquid inest denominatur ab
inexsistente, sed per mutuam praesentiam spiritualem qua
subsistens est in subsistente distincte. Non autem est modus
'essendi in' per aliquam informationem formae in materia, vel
suppositi a natura vel quasi aliquo modo quo insistens dicitur
aliquale ab exsistenti vel e converso, quia persona est in alia ut
distinguitur. Et sicut setota subsistit, sic tota praesens est alteri
personae intimate et e converso mutua praesentialitate et
intimata in utroque. Non enim una est in alia per continentiam
sed per mutuam praesentiam.
[4. Notabile respectu solutionis Henrici]
68 Notandum tamen pro solutione primae rationis Gandaven-

sis quod praedicatum quod primo convenit toti quandoque est
homogeneum et eiusdem rationis in omnibus partibus et in toto,
* Hilarius, De Trin. VII, n. 41 (CCSL 62, 310; PL 10, 234).

3r> 'Setota' (se tota = 'in se tota' vel 'absolute tota') contra usum
grammaticalem classicum occurrit, sicut 'seipsa' supra, e.g., cf. Dist. 13, q. un.. n.
4ff.
Scotus's opinion
66 Hence, so far as it pertains to this article [to know] how one

person is in another, it must be known, according to Hilary in Bk.
VII of The Trinity, towards the end, that one person is in another,
not as something is in another as one body in a body, but it 'is in'
and 'subsists' as one subsisting in a subsistent.18 However, 'to
subsist' pertains primarily to a person, just as 'to generate' and 'to
be generated' pertain primarily to a suppositmoreover, to the
whole [supposit], not primarily to some part [of it]. And in this
way to subsist pertains primarily to the whole person, though not
to the whole per se. On the other hand, [if we take 'whole' to
mean in particular 'whole person'], it does pertain first to the
whole per se and primarily, and to a part [per se], but not
primarily. In this way a person is produced as a whole: not [just]
the essence, and not a relation. Therefore, to be in anotheron
the part of both extremespertains primarily to the whole
person, and not primarily to something in that person.
67 I say, therefore, that one person is not in another through
informingin such a way that that which is in it denominates
itbut through mutual spiritual presence, by which one
subsisting is distinctly in another one subsisting. Not, however, is
the mode of 'existing in' alike to some informing, as when form is
in matter, or nature is in a supposit, or like some way, as it were,
when a subject is qualified in some manner by what exists in it,
or vice versa. For a person is in another as distinguished. And,
just as the whole [person] subsists [in itself], so the whole
[person] is present to another person intimately, and vice versa,
by mutual and intimate presence in both. For one is not in
another through containing, but through mutual presence.
What ought to be noted about Henry's solution
68 It must be noted however, in connection to the solution of

the first opinion of the Ghentian that what is predicated, when it
pertains primarily to the whole, is sometimes homogeneous and
18 'Subsistent' here has the meaning of 'person,' namely as an individual

intelligent subject supporting or standing beneath a nature or essence.
et tunc convenit cuilibet parti per se, quia quaelibet pars est
eiusdem naturae cum toto. Et sic loquitur Philosophus VII
Physicorum36 de moveri primo quod ita convenit uni parti mobilis
sicut alteri, et nulla de se potest primo moveri nec totum, nec
quaelibet pars eius primo quiesceret etc. Exemplum de
passione homogenea: sicut ignis est totus calidus et ideo quaelibet
pars eius est calida.
69 Aliquando illud praedicatum, vel passio quae sic primo
convenit toti, est heterogeneum. Et tunc convenit toti et non
alicui parti. Vel si conveniat parti, magis convenit illi parti quae
est magis ratio quare talis passio convenit primo toti quam sit
aliqua alia pars. Exemplum primi, quod non convenit parti: ut
risibile homini et 'triangulus habet tres'; istae enim passiones ita
conveniunt et insunt totis quod nullo modo partibus.
Exemplum secundi est de actione quae primo convenit toti, tamen
magis ratione formae quam materiae, sicut intelligere magis
convenit homini ratione animae quam ratione corporis.
70 Per hoc igitur patet quod ratio illa ter deficit. Maior enim
eius est falsa dupliciter: quando dicit quod si aliquid secundum se
totum est in alio primo, tunc quidlibet illius esset aeque primo in
illo,37 non valet. Primo quia non potest convenire alicui parti eius,
quia nihil adaequate est idem cum eo, nec aliquid convenit
adaequate parti et toti. Secundo, quia ambobus convenit non
aequaliter, scilicet partibus, sed uni principaliter. Non enim
ambae partes sunt causa eodem modo quare conveniat talis
modus 'essendi in' ipsi toti, sed essentia magis est causa,
secundum eum, quam relatio. Unde ibi accipitur primitas
aequivoce quando dicitur 'ergo quidlibet eius est aeque primo in
eo'. Posito etiam quod detur conclusio in proposito, non valet, quia
Aristot., Physica VII, c. 1 (2-116 33-234a 15).

i7 Cf. supra n. 57.
of the same sort in all the parts and in the whole, and pertains
then to each part per se, because each part is of the same nature
as the whole. And the Philosopher in Bk. VII of the Physics,
speaking in this way about being moved primarily, says that
[motion] pertains to one part of the mobile as well as to another,
and no part of itself nor the whole can be moved primarily, nor
each part of it primarily can come to rest, etc. An example is a
homogeneous attribute: just as fire as a whole is hot and
therefore each part of it is hot.
69 Sometimes that predicate or attribute, which primarily
pertains to the whole, is heterogeneous. And then it pertains to
the whole, but not to some part. Or if it pertains to a part, it
pertains to that part, which is more the sort of thing that is the
reason why that attribute pertains primarily to the whole, than is
some other part. The example of the first, i.e., when it does not
pertain to the part: as risible to man and 'triangle having three';
for these attributes pertain to, and are in the wholes in such a
way that they are in no way in their parts. And the example of
the second is an action which primarily pertains to the whole, and
nevertheless more by reason of the form than of the matter, just
as 'to understand' pertains more to a man by reason of his soul
than by reason of his body.
70 Through this, then, it is evident that that explanation [of
Henry] is deficient in three ways. For his major [premise] is false
in two ways: when he says that if something as a whole is in
another primarily, then whatever belongs to the former is equally
primarily in the latter; [n. 57] this is invalid. First because [such
ability to be in another primarily] cannot pertain to some part of
that [something], because nothing [i.e., no part] is adequately the
same with that [something], nor does something pertain
adequately both to a part and to the whole. Secondly, because [if
there are two parts, such ability] does not pertain equally to both
parts, but to one primarily. For each part is not in the same way
the reason why such a way of 'being in' pertains to the whole, but
the essence, for him, is more a cause than is the relation. Hence,
'primacy' is taken equivocally when it is said 'therefore whatever
belongs to it is equally primarily in it.' Also, the conclusion of [his]
proposal, if it is posited, is not valid, because, though one [part] is
licet una sit in alia primo, tamen inaequaliter ratione utriusque

partis, et sic aequivoce. Nec probat quod per circumincessionem,
sed magis quod una est in alia quasi per informationem; et hoc
nihil ad b.
71 Ad secundum38 quando dicit 'quod est in aliquo primo
videtur contineri et ambiri ab illo' etc. dicendum quod ratio
concludit quod Pater non possit esse in Filio nec e converso, quia
tunc pars esset primo contenta. Hoc autem non capit intellectus
quod pars sit primo contenta et post cum alia parte continente sic
continens primo. Dico ergo quod hic modus 'essendi in' non est per
continentiam, sed sicut duo angeli simul praesentes sibi
praesentia mutua spirituali. Unde haec inexsistentia non est
aliud quam simultas praesentiae spiritualis duorum subsisten-
tium sive subsistentis distincti cum subsistente distincto.
[B. Art. 2]
72 Quantum ad secundum principale, scilicet quae ratio quare

una persona est in alia sive quis modus 'essendi in', dico quod non
est sicut relatio in subiecto. Non enim est sola relatio rationis,
quia tunc Pater esset in se, sicut patet de amphora vini; licet sit
difficile argumentum ad probandum quod aliquid sit in se. Nec
est relatio realis: non originis, quia tales relationes sunt alterius
et alterius rationis in extremis, sed modus 'essendi in' quo est
Pater in Filio et e converso, est uniformis et mutuus.
73 Item, si per impossibile Deus generaret alium Deum, non

tamen unus esset in alio nec cum alio, sed distincti sicut duo
individua. Ideo enim ponitur positio impossibilis ut videatur quid
sit ratio formalis essendi unam personam in altera. Similiter in
proposito, si una persona non esset ab alia, et tamen eadem
M Cf. supra n. 58.

in another primarily, nevertheless it is there unequally in respect

to both parts, and thus equivocally. Neither does it prove
circumincession, but rather that one is in another, as it were, by
way of informing, and this says nothing about b. 19
71 To the second, [n. 58] when it is said 'what is in something
primarily seems to be contained and embraced by it,' etc., it must
be said that this reason implies that the Father cannot be in the
Son, nor vice versa, because then a part would be primarily
contained. But this is inconceivable that a part [viz. the essence]
is both primarily contained and, afterwards, while another part
[viz. the relation, still continues to] contain, is primarily
containing. I say therefore that this mode of 'being in' is not
through containing, but as two angels are simultaneously present
to each other by a mutual spiritual presence. Hence this 'existing
in' is nothing other than the simultaneity of spiritual presence of
two subsistents or of a distinct subsistent with a distinct
subsistent.
Article Two
72 As for the second [article], namely the reason why one

person is in another, or what is the mode of 'being in,' I say that it
is not as a relation in a subject. For it is not only a conceptual
relation, because then the Father would be in himself, as is
evident in the case of the amphora of wine; although it is a
difficult argument to prove that something is in itself. Neither is
it a real relation* of origin,* because such relation is of a different
sort in each term, but the mode of 'being in,' in which the Father
is in the Son and vice versa, is uniform and mutual.
73 Also, let us assume the impossible: that God were to
generate another god, not, however, so that one would be in
another or with another, but so that they would be two distinct
individuals. This impossible situation is posited in order to see
what the formal reason for one person being in another is.20
Likewise, in the case at hand, if one person were not from
10 'b' is that in which the other is. Cf. n. 64 above.

20 I.e., 'originating in' does not imply 'being in,' nor does the absence of
origination imply an impossibility of 'being in.'
deitas esset in duabus personis non per originem, adhuc una esset
in alia, quia ubi est fundamentum, ibi est relatio. Ergo utraque
esset in alia mutuo. Sic igitur patet quod relatio originis non est
causa quare una persona est in alia et e converso.
74 Item, in creaturis invenitur ratio producentis et producti, et
effectus et causae, et tamen neutra est ratio mutua 'essendi in'.
75 Si arguatur quod relatio est sufficiens ratio 'essendi in'

propter mutuitatem quia "relativa sunt simul natura" et propter
hoc personae sunt in se invicem non valet, quia si unum
relativum esset hic et aliud Romae, simul natura essent simultate
relativorum, non tamen unum esset in alio aliquo modo 'essendi
in', quia non est ibi mutuitas praesentialitatis sive praesentiae.
76 Si arguatur iterum quod ideo Filius est in Patre, quia Pater
generat Filium et generatio est actus vel actio immanens, et ubi
est talis actio, ibi est terminus, ergo terminus est immanens et
per consequens Filius est in Patre sicut actus generandi haec
ratio non valet. Licet enim concludat Filium esse in Patre, non
tamen concludit Patrem esse in Filio, cum non sit terminus
immanentis actionis Filii, nec Spiritus Sanctus esset in Patre et
Filio sed tantum esset e converso.
77 Secunda etiam ratio in se non valet. Dictum est enim supra
distinctione 7, ubi respondi quomodo actus quo Filius producitur
habet unam condicionem actionis immanentis, quia non recipitur
in aliquo passo mobili extra, sed non habet rationem immanentis
actionis quantum ad terminum, quia actio immanens non habet
alium terminum productum a se nisi obiectum. Sed actus
productivus generationis in Patre habet Filium productum pro
termino, et sic magis convenit cum actione transeunte, ut
another, and nevertheless the same deity were in two persons not
by way of origin, one would still be in the other, because where
there is a foundation, there is a relation. Therefore, each would be
mutually in the other. In this way, then, it is evident that the
relation of origin is not the reason why one person is in another
and vice versa.
74 Also, in creatures one finds the aspect of producer and
product, and effect and cause, and nevertheless neither is the
reason for being mutually in [another].
75 If it may be argued that the relationship is a sufficient
reason for 'being in' because of the mutuality, because 'relatives*
are simultaneous in nature' and, because of this, the persons
themselves are in one anotherthis is not valid, because if one
relative were here and another in Rome, they would be
simultaneous by nature by the simultaneity of the relatives, but
one would not be in the other in any manner of 'being in,' since
there is no mutuality of presentness or presence there.
76 If one argues further that the Son is in the Father for the
reason that the father generated the Son, and generation* is an
immanent act* or action,* and where there is such an action
there is a term, and the term therefore is immanent, and as a
consequence the Son is in the Father in the manner of an act of
generationthis reason has no value. For even though it
concluded that the Son was in the Father, it could not infer that
the Father was in the Son, since he is not the term of an
immanent action of the Son. Nor would the Holy Spirit be in the
Father and Son, but only the converse will be the case.2i
77 Also the second reason is not valid in itself. For it was stated
in distinction seven, where the question is answered how the act
by which the Son is produced has one feature of an immanent
action (because it is not received in some mobile patient* outside),
but it does not fit the notion of an immanent action so far as its
term goes (since the immanent action has no other term produced
by itself except the object). But a productive act of generation in
the Father has the Son produced as a term, and so it agrees more
with a transient action,* as was stated there. For it is not
It seems that the last statement should be reversed.

dictum est ibi. Non enim sic est immanens quod terminus
informet agens a quo est.
78 Sic igitur dico quod essentia cum relatione sive tota entitas
personae est ratio essendi unam personam in alia et e converso.
Quod declaro sic: in creaturis similitudo requirit distinctionem
similium. Nihil enim idem sibi simile, sed cum aliqua unitate. Et
ideo est completa ratio huius in hoc, sicut patebit distinctione 31
per Hilarium etc. Ergo distinctio est de ratione similitudinis, ita
quod distinctio non est completa ratio similitudinis nec
fundamentum similitudinis, nec completa ratio similitudinis est
unum aliqua unitate exsistens in distinctis suppositis.
79 Sed quae est principalis ratio quare una persona est in alia,
sicut de actione in supposito? Dico quod essentia, quia propter
eius unitatem non potest non inesse relatio illi in quo est essentia
sic una; et sic formalis ratio generationis.
[C. Art. 3]
80 Quantum ad tertium principale dico quod nullus modus

illorum octo in IV Physicorum39 comprehendit istum modum
essendi in. Quattuor enim modi sunt de parte et de toto: in Deo
autem non est pars nec totum. Tres alii modi sunt ratione alicuius
causalitatis quae non invenitur in Deo. Ultimus modus est de
mensura, et iste tantum invenitur in divinis, tollendo quod
imperfectionis est in creaturis, scilicet esse in aeternitate cui
correspondet esse in tempore.
81 Sic igitur iste modus quo una persona est in alia non est
aliquis illorum octo. Unde bene dixit Hilarius quod hoc non capit
intellectus noster. Tamen si auferamus a creaturis imperfectio-
nes, tunc aliquid poterimus intelligere de isto modo 'essendi in'.
39 Cf. supra n. 54.

immanent in such a way that the term would inform the agent
from which it is.
78 In this way I say that it is the essence with the relation, or
the whole entity of the person, that is the reason why one person
exists in another, and vice versa. Which I clarify in this way: in
creatures similarity requires a distinction of the similar [things].
For one and the same thing is not [called] similar to itself, but
[several distinct things] with some unity [between them]. And
therefore this is the complete reason of this [i.e., similarity], as
will be evident in distinction 31 through Hilary, etc. Therefore the
notion of similarity includes distinction, in such a way that the
distinction is not the complete reason of similarity, nor the
foundation of similarity, nor is [some] one [element] by some
unity existing in distinct supposits the complete reason for
similarity.
79 But what is the principal reason why one person is in
another, as in the case of action in the supposit? I say that it is
the essence, because of its unity; relative things cannot be
identified with one simple essence without [in some way] being in
one another; and in this way essence is the formal reason of
generation.
Article Three
80 As to the third main point, I say that none of those eight

modes in Bk. IV of the Physics, [n. 54] comprehend this way of
being in. Indeed, four modes involve part and whole. In God,
however, there is neither part nor whole. Three other modes deal
with some causality, which is not found in God. The final mode is
about measure, and it is only this that is found in the divine, by
taking away that which is a matter of imperfection in creatures,
namely by [substituting] eternal being for the corresponding
being in time.
81 Hence, in this way this mode of one person being in another
is not any of those eight. Hence Hilary says well that our intellect
does not grasp this. However, if we take away the imperfections
of creatures, then we could understand something about this
mode of 'being in.'
82 Ut igitur hoc intelligamus, primum exemplum sit de illapsu

quo Deus est in creatura per potentiam, praesentiam et
essentiam. Praesentia autem in idem incidit cum essentia, quia
ita est Deus praesens hic sicut in caelo. Potentia vero dicit
manutenentiam. Tollamus igitur manutenentiam et considere-
mus illapsum. Erit igitur Deus vere sine actione. Similiter,
tollamus quod sit diversitas in natura et ponatur identitas; illa
requireret quod Deus esset praesens in lapide sicut in se ipso
absque causalitate.
83 Aliud exemplum: unus angelus est cum corpore et corpus
cum alio; et pone eandem naturam et mutuam praesentiam inter
se, sic unum in alio.
84 Ultimatum exemplum est: si ponantur duo angeli eiusdem
subtilitatis habentes distincta supposita et essent eiusdem
naturae et circumscriberem omnem locum sive omnem situm et
omne continens, esset simplex praesentia mutua subsistentis ad
subsistens in eadem natura.
85 Exemplum familiare similiter est de potentiis animae: si
sint idem re et tamen distinctae secundum rationem vel ratione
reali quod magis credo tunc proprius diceretur imago
Trinitatis quam circumincessionis. Ergo si in memoria est
intelligentia et voluntas, et addatur quod quaelibet est subsistens
per se, tunc haberemus propositum, et esset similis modus
'essendi in' ei qui est in divinis.
86 Ad primum40 de Anaxagora quod confusio et indistinctio

sequitur etc., dico quod in creaturis sequitur confusio quia est ibi
pars inexsistens alicui, nec esset pars ita parva ibi si quodlibet
40 Cf. supra n. 47.

82 In order that we may understand this, let the first example

be about 'flowing in,' by which God is in a creature by his power,
presence and essence. However, presence amounts to the same
thing as the essence, because God is present here in the same way
as he is in heaven. Power, however, implies maintaining
[something]. Therefore, let us take away maintenance, and
consider 'flowing into.' God, therefore, will be truly without
action. Similarly, let us take away diversity in nature and posit
identity; that would require that God be present in a stone just as
he is in himself without causality.
83 Another example: one angel is with a body and the body [is]
with something else; in addition, posit the same nature and
mutual presence between them, and thus one is in another.
84 The final example: if two angels of the same subtlety are
posited having distinct supposits and being of the same nature,
and I were to write off every place or every local position or any
container, there would be simple mutual presence, one subsisting
[being present] to another subsisting in the same nature.
85 Similarly, a familiar example would be the potencies of the
soul: if they are the same thing in reality and nevertheless
distinct conceptually and by a 'real reason'22which seems more
believable to methen there would be a more proper expression
of the image of the Trinity than that of circumincession.
Therefore if intelligence and will are in the memory,* and if it be
added that each is subsisting per se, then we have what we
propose, and it will be a mode of 'being in' similar to that which is
in the divine.
86 To the first [n. 47] about Anaxagoras that it follows that

confusion and indistinctness [would be characteristic of the divine
persons], I say that in creatures confusion would follow, because
they have parts inhering in other [parts], nor would there be a
11 That is, a formality (also called a ratio iealis), for Scotus postulates a
formal distinction between a divine person's personality and the divine essence,
and a similar distinction between the powers of the soul and the substance of the
soul, which is one simple real thing.
esset in quolibet, de qua non posset extrahi maior. Hic autem in

divinis nec partialitas aliqua nec maioritas est nec aliquid
inexsistenter.
87 Ad secundum,4i quando dicitur de indivisibili, dicendum
quod non est simile, quia aliqua sunt quae per se respiciunt situm
determinatum, ut magnitudo et indivisibilia quae sunt termini
partium magnitudinis, ut puncta; et in talibus oportet, si sit
distinctio, quod unum sit extra aliud indivisibile secundum situm.
Sed indivisibilia in spiritualibus non respiciunt situm; quare non
oportet quod unum sit extra aliud.
88 Ad aliud,42 quando dicitur quod si una persona est in alia,
esset quaelibet compositior, dicendum quod consequentia non
valet, quia deitas in nullo est nisi formaliter. Et ideo si est in
aliquo est aliquid eius; sed persona est in alia, et non est aliquid
eius in quo est, quia sic est in alia quod est ab ea distincta.
89 Ad aliud,43 quando dicitur 'in quo est Filius, in eo est
filiatio', dicendum quod secundum logicam, I Elenchorum,*4
posset dici quod illa distinctio est superflua, quando oratio
determinat sibi sensum in quo est congrua. Sed hic 'in quo est
Filius' non determinat sibi aliquem modum 'essendi in'. Sed hic
quod 'filiatio sit in aliquo' determinat et significat de se quod est
in aliquo formaliter. Si igitur 'in alio esse' dicit esse abstractum
informative, non construitur de vi vocis nisi in uno sensu, scilicet
quod est in alio ut in materia. Et ideo haec est falsa 'in quo est
filiatio, Filius est in eo', quia in primo modo est 'esse in' formaliter
quo filiatio est in aliquo, sed in secundo non est modus distinctus
quo sit Filius in alio. Si autem possit salvari sensus, tunc non
4i Cf. supra n. 48.

4* Cf. supra n. 49.
43 Cf. supra n. 50.
44 Cf. Aristot., De soph, elench. c. 11 (172a 33-5).
part so small there, if each were in each, that a greater could not
be extracted from it. But in the divine there is neither something
that is a part, nor something that is greater; neither is something
there inherently.23
87 To the second [n. 48], when it is said about the indivisible
[that it is only distinguishable if it is without], it must be said
that it24 is not similar, because some things per se have to do with
a determinate local position, such as magnitude and the
indivisibles that are the terms of parts of magnitude, as points;
and in such it is necessary, if there be a distinction, that one be
outside another indivisible according to their local positions. But
indivisibles in spiritual things do not regard local position;
wherefore it is unnecessary that one be outside the other.
88 To the other [n. 49], when it is said that if one person is in
another, each would be more composed, it must be said that the
implication is invalid, because deity is only in something
formally.25 And therefore if it is in something, it is something of
it. However, a person is in another, and it is not something of that
in which it is, because it is in another in such a way that it is
distinct [as a person].
89 To the other [n. 50] when it is said 'in whom the Son is, in
him is filiation,' it must be said that according to logic, in Bk. I of
the Sophistical Refutations, it could be said that this distinction is
superfluous when the sentence itself determines the sense in
which it is congruous. But here 'in whom the Son is' does not
determine for itself some manner of 'being in.' At the same time,
however, the phrase 'filiation is in something' does determine and
signify about itself that [it speaks of] being in something formally.
If therefore 'to exist in another' asserts abstract existence as a
form, it is construed, by virtue of the words, only in one sense,
namely that it is in another as in matter. And, therefore, this is
false 'in whom is filiation, in him the Son exists,' because in the
first way 'being in' is formally that by which filiation is in
another, but the second way does not [determine] a distinct mode
by which the Son is in another. But if one could preserve the
2:i The persons are not in one another as attributes are in a subject.
u Namely, the indivisibility of the Trinity.
25 See note to n. 85 above.
sequitur: 'in Patre est filiatio, ergo Pater est Filius'; non valet,
quia haec habet alium sensum, 'filiatio est in Patre', et
determinatum. Sed haec 'Filius est in Patre' non habet
determinatum sensum, et ideo est ibi fallacia consequentis
procedere ab uno determinato ad illud quod potest habere plures
causas veritatis.
90 Ad aliud,45 quando dicitur quod si Pater esset in Filio et e
converso quod Pater esset in se, dico quod aliquando tenet
argumentum, aliquando non. Universaliter in relativis
aequiparantiae non tenet nisi procedendo sic: 'Socrates est similis
b et b c, ergo Socrates est similis c' bene sequitur ratione
materiae. Sed convertendo non tenet ut 'a est simile b et b a, ergo
a est simile a. Quando enim dicitur quod si aliquid est simile
alicui, quidquid est simile uni, et alteri, non tenet nisi intelligatur
quod quidquid aliud praeter se ipsum est simile sibi. Sic tenet
quod quicumque alius a Patre, ut Filius, est in Patre. Per hoc
patet ad consequentiam Aristotelis, quando arguit IV Physico-
rum, quia in procedendo arguit 'si ignis esset in aere, et aer in
aqua, et aqua in terra et e converso, esset aer in aere'. Non autem
sic est hic; sed quidquid est in Patre, scilicet qualecumque aliud,
etc.
91 Ad aliud46 quando dicitur Exivi a Patre, etc. dicendum quod
iste exitus non est nisi generatio passiva, et illa oportet esse ubi
essentia est, et sic exire est inesse quia se habet per modum
immanentis sed distincti.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum in Deo sit aliqua ratio totalitatis vel maioritatis]
92 Utrum in Deo sit aliqua ratio totalitatis vel maioritatis.
Videtur quod sic:

Damascenus, 50 cap. primi:47 "confitemur omnem deitatem".
Non autem accipit ibi 'omnem' syncatgorematice, quia non sunt
ibi plures deitates, ergo categorematice, pro toto, ut sit sensus
45 Cf. supra n. 51.

"' Cf. supra n. 52.
47 Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 50 [III, c. 6] (ed. Buytaert, 187; PG 94. 1004)
sense, then it would not follow that 'filiation is in the Father,

therefore the Father is the Son.' This is not valid, because the
phrase 'filiation is in the Father' has another, and determined
meaning, but the phrase 'the Son is in the Father' does not have a
determined sense, and therefore there is a fallacy of consequent
there to proceed from one that is determined to another that can
have several causes of truth.
90 To the other [n. 51], when it is said that if the Father were
in the Son and vice versa, the Father would be in himself, I say
that sometimes the argument holds, at other times it does not.
Generally in relatives of [the relationship] of equality this is the
only way of proceeding that holds: "Socrates is similar to b and b
to c, therefore Socrates is similar to c." This indeed follows by
reason of the matter. But turning around [the argument,] this
does not hold: "a is similar to b and b to a, therefore a is similar to
a.' For when it is said 'if something is similar to something,
whatever is similar to one is similar to another,' it only holds if
one understands that something other, besides itself, is similar to
that [thing]. In this way it holds that whoever is other than the
Father, as the Son, is in the Father. Through this the inference of
Aristotle is evident, when he argues in Bk. IV of the Physics,
because in proceeding he argues 'if fire were in air, and air in
water, and water in earth, and vice versa, air would be in air.' But
it is not that way here; but 'whatever is in the Father, namely,
some other [thing] of some sort,' etc.
91 To the other, when it is said [n. 52] "I have come from the
Father," etc., it must be said that this 'coming from' is nothing
other than passive generation, and that it is necessary for it to be
where the essence is, and in this way 'to have come forth' is 'to be
in,' for there is an aspect of immanence but [also of persons that
are] distinct.
Question Two
In God is there some aspect of wholeness or superiority?
92 In God is there some aspect of wholeness or superiority?

It seems so:
Damascene in chapter 50: "We acknowledge all deity." But
he does not take 'all' there syncategorematically,* because there
'confitemur omnem deitatem' id est, totam deitatem; ergo est ibi

ratio totius.
93 Item, in Symbolo Athanasii:48 "Totae tres personae
coaeternae sibi sunt et coaequales".
94 Item, Ambrosius in hymno49 "Totus in Patre Filius et totus
in Verbo Pater". Ista auctoritas est pro solutione praecedentis
quaestionis et pro confirmatione Hilarii.
95 Item, quod in divinis sit maioritas arguitur per Hilarium qui
dicit quod in Deo est maioritas intrinseca; et est in littera.50
96 Item, omne infinitum est maius finito vel non-infinito; sed
essentia divina est infinita, relatio non est infinita; igitur cum in
divinis sit utrumque ex natura rei, ibi est aliquid maius alio.
97 Item, quod in Deo sit specialiter totum universale arguitur
sic: tum quia 'Deus' praedicatur de pluribus personis quod est
proprium totius universalis; tum quia per Damascenum, cap.
50,5i commune in divinis est substantia, particulare autem
hypostases.
98 Item, ibidem:52 numero et non natura dicuntur difjferre
sanctae tres hypostases; et ponitur in littera.53
99 Item, quod ibi sit totum essentiale patet, quia distinctum
quod ibi producitur de aliquo, ut indistincto, producitur de eo ut
quasi de principio materiali; Filius producitur de essentia Patris
indistincta; ergo producitur de ea sicut de quasi materia, et ita
quaelibet persona est quasi totum quoddam essentiale.
100 Contra primum: Omne totum est maius sua parte; sed in
divinis nihil maius aut minus, secundum Athanasium.54
101 Contra secundum: quod non sit ibi maioritas, patet per
Augustinum, VIII De Trinitate, et ponitur in littera:55 'Non solum
48 Ps.-Athanasius, Symbolum 'Quicunque' (ed. H. Denzinger, n. 39).

43 Potius Ambrosiaster, cf. Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 19, c. 4, n. 5 (SB IV,
163).
50 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 19, c. 4 (SB IV, 162-3).
5i Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 50 [III, c. 6] (ed. Buytaert, 186, 190; PG 94,
1003, 1008).
Ibid. (ed. Buytaert, 186; PG 94, 1003).
Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 19, c. 10 (SB IV, 169).
r"l Cf. supra n. 93.
M August, De Trin. VIII, prooem., n. 1 (CCSL 50, 268; PL 42. 947); Petrus
Lombardus. Sent. I, d. 19, c. 11 (SB IV, 170).
are not several deities there; therefore it is taken categorema-

tically,* for a whole, and the meaning is, 'we acknowledge all
deity,' that is, deity as a whole; therefore the notion of a whole is
here.
93 Also, in the Athanasian Creed: "All three persons [i.e., as a
whole] are coeternal and co-equal to themselves."
94 Also, Ambrose in the hymn: "The whole Son is in the Father,
and the whole Father is in the Son." This authoritative statement
[also] counts for the solution of the preceding question and the
confirmation of Hilary.
95 Also, that there is superiority in the divine is argued
through Hilary, who says that in God there is intrinsic
superiority and it is cited in the text.
96 Also, everything infinite is greater than what is finite or not
infinite; but the divine essence is infinite, and a relation is not
infinite; therefore since both are in the divine from the nature* of
the thing, there is something greater than another there.
97 Also, that in God especially there is a universal whole [i.e.,
of the type 'universal and particular'] is argued in this way: both
because 'God' is predicated of three persons, which is a property
of a universal whole; and because according to Damascence in
chapter 50: "The common in the divine is substance, the
particular however the hypostases*."
98 Also in the same place: "By number, not by nature, the three
holy hypostases are said to differ"; and it is cited in the text.
99 Also, it is evident that an essential whole [i.e., of the type
matter-form composite'] is there, because something distinct, that
is produced there from something indistinct, is produced from the
latter as if [that indistinct] were a material principle; the Son is
produced from the indistinct essence of the Father; therefore, it is
produced from it as if [that essence] were quasi-matter, and thus
each person is, as it were, a certain essential whole.
100 Against the first point: Every whole is greater than its part;
but in the divine nothing is greater or less, according to
Athanasius [n. 93].
101 Against the second: that there is no superiority there, as is
evident from Augustine in Bk. VIII of The Trinity, and it is cited
in the text: 'Not only is the Father not greater than the Son, but
Pater non est maior quam Filius, sed nec Pater et Filius sunt
aliquid maius quam Spiritus Sanctus'.
102 Item contra tertium: quod ibi non sit totum universale patet
per Augustinum, VII De Trinitate,56 et ponitur in littera.
103 Item, contra quartum: de toto essentiali dicit Augustinus
VII De Trinitate, et ponitur in littera:57 "Essentia divina non est
materia trium personarum tamquam secundum communem
eandemque materiam tres personae dicantur esse una natura".
[I. Ad quaestionem]
104 Responsio: hic sunt quattuor declaranda sicut quattour

proponuntur in quaestione.
[A. Art. 1
De totalitate in generali]
105 Quantum ad primum articulum de totalitate in generali

dicit Philosophus IV Physicorum58 quod totum et perfectum idem
sunt vel consequuntur se. Differunt tamen in hoc quod res dicitur
perfecta tunc quando non caret aliquo pertinente ad suam
perfectionem, sed est in termino suae perfectionis. Unde dicitur
perfectum sic quod est prope finem. Totum autem non dicitur
habere finem, sed quia continet illa respectu quorum dicitur
totale, et sic accipiendo totum stricte, illa quae continet sunt suae
partes; et sic totum habet partem pro suo correlativo proprio.
106 Verumtamen totum includens rationem perfecti non dicit de
se imperfectionem sicut pars, et ideo accipiendo totum generalius
quam ut habet partem pro correlativo, non solum continet alia ut
partes, sed dicitur totum in continendo alia quomodocumque
5 August., De Trin. VII, c. 6, n. 11 (CCSL 50, 264-5; PL 42, 944); Petrus

Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 19, c. 8 (SB IV, 166).
r>7 Cf. supra notam ad n. 102.
r>H Aristot.. Physica III, c. 6 (207a 13).
neither are Father and Son something greater than the Holy
Spirit.'
102 Also against the third: that there is no universal whole
there is evident from Augustine in Bk. VII of The Trinity, and it is
cited in the text.
103 Also, against the fourth: about an essential whole Augustine
says in VII of The Trinity, and it is cited in the text: "The divine
essence is not matter of the three persons, as if according to the
same common matter the three persons were said to be one
nature."
To the Question
104 Response: Here four points must be explained, as four are

proposed in the question.
Article One
About wholeness in general
105 As for the first article about wholeness in general, the

Philosopher in Bk. IV of the Physics says that the whole and the
perfect are the same or they accompany one another. They are
different, however, in this that a thing is then called perfect when
it is not lacking something pertaining to its perfection, but is in
the finished state of its perfection. Hence, perfect in this way is
what is close to its end. A whole, however, is not something that
has an end, but what contains those things in regard to which it
is called such, and in this way by taking 'whole' strictly, what it
contains are its parts, and in this way whole' has 'part' as its
proper correlative.
106 Nevertheless 'whole,' as including the notion of perfect,
implies no imperfection, the way 'part' does, and therefore if one
takes 'whole' more generally than insofar as it has 'part' for a
correlative, ['whole' so understood] not only contains other things
as parts, but can be understood as 'whole' in containing other
[sorts of things and in other ways]: howsoever they may be in
itself and howsoever they are something of itself, whether they
sint in eo et quomodocumque sint aliquid eius, sive sint partes

quae non sunt idem quod ipsum sive non sint partes quae tamen
sunt ipsum.
107 Et isto modo totum potest transferri ad divina, habens pro
correlativo non partem sed aliquid generalius quod non dicit
imperfectionem. Relativa enim quae non dicunt imperfectionem
dicuntur de Deo, licet non eorum opposita. Patet. Nam ratio
prioris transfertur ad divina; dicitur enim Pater prior origine
Filio; sed non ita conceditur conversim quod Filius sit posterior
Patre origine. Concedit autem sic Hilarius Patrem esse maiorem
Filio, non autem Filium esse minorem Patre concedit.
108 Sed totum primo modo sumptum, scilicet ut habet partem
pro correlativo, dicit limitationem et compositionem ex partibus
et dependentiam respectu eorum quae continet, quarum nulla
pars est ipsum. Non sic conceditur totum in divinis, sed in
quantum dicit continentiam aliquorum quorum quodlibet est
ipsum propter infinitatem ipsius, quia est pelagus infinitum
omnia continens quae sunt in eo per identitatem. Et ratio est quia
Deus simplex est simplicitate non punctuali, sed immensitatis. Et
ideo est quidquid est in ipso, quia est hoc quod habet, et quia eius
simplicitas est immensitas, ideo continet omnia quae sunt in ipso
per identitatem, ita quod contenta sunt ipsum totum eo modo quo
dicit Dionysius quod Deus est totum, continens omnem
perfectionem unitive cui assimilatur anima, ut sic correlativum
eius non sit pars sed aliquid totius; nam totum, qualitercumque
acceptum, refertur ad aliquid sui necessario. Sed quod illud sit
pars eius, hoc accidit ex imperfectione totius in continendo illud.
109 Assimilatur autem totum in divinis toti virtuali in creaturis,
quale totum est in anima respectu suarum potentiarum, quia
quaelibet ipsarum quas continet est ipsa anima per identitatem,
sicut credo et alias probabitur. Hoc autem vult dicere, ut videtur,
bonae memoriae Bonaventura in ista distinctione. Nam quaerens
utrum sit ponere rationem totius integralis in divinis, dicit in
are parts that are not the same thing as itself, or are not parts
that nevertheless are itself.
107 And in this way 'whole' can be transferred to the divine,
having for a correlative not 'part' but something more general
that does not imply imperfection. For the relatives that do not
imply imperfection are predicated of God, although not the
opposites of them. It is evident. For the notion of prior is
transferred to the divine; for the Father is prior in origin to the
Son, but the converse is not conceded in the same way, i.e., that
the Son is posterior to the Father in origin. Indeed, Hilary
concedes in this way 'the Father is greater than the Son,' but he
does not concede 'the Son is less than the Father.'
108 But 'whole' taken in the first way, namely as having 'part' as
its correlative, implies limitation and being composed of parts, as
well as dependence as regards those that it contains, of which no
part is [the whole thing] itself. [And] 'whole' is conceded to be in
the divine not in this way, but inasmuch as it implies containing
the sort of things, of which each is [the whole thing] itself, on
account of its infinity, since it is an 'infinite sea' containing all
things that are in it through identity. And the reason is because
God is simple by a simplicity of immensity, not that characteristic
of a point. And therefore he is whatever is in him, since he is that
which he has. And because his simplicity is immensity, therefore
he contains all those that are in him by identity, so that what are
contained are the whole [thing] itself in the way that Dionysius
says that God is a whole, containing all perfection unitively, to
which the soul is likened, so that its correlative in this way is not
a part but something of a whole. For a whole, howsoever it is
taken, is necessarily referred to something of itself. But [the
situation] that this [something] should be a part of it, occurs to it
from the imperfection of the whole in containing that.
109 But the whole in the divine is similar to a virtual whole in
creatures; such a whole is in the soul as regards its powers,
because each of these, which it contains, is the soul itself through
identity, as I believe and will prove elsewhere. Indeed,
Bonaventure of happy memory, it seems, in this distinction meant
to assert this. For, asking whether to postulate the notion of an
integral whole in the divine, he says at the foot of the question
pede quaestionis59 quod "dicitur totum uno modo absolute, et sic

idem est quod perfectum; alio modo per respectum ad partem.
Primo modo est totum in divinis; secundo modo non". Non autem
intelligo quod velit totum dici absolute ita quod non referatur ad
aliquid, quia sic non esset totum, quia essentialiter est relativum,
sed dicit absolute absolvendo ab eo respectum ad partem.
[B. Art. 2
In divinis nulla persona est maior alia]
110 Quantum ad secundum articulum dico quod in divinis nulla

persona est maior alia. Nam, secundum Hilarium, III De
Trinitate, in principio,60 Pater dat Filio totam essentiam quia si
daret partem, aliquid amitteret, et est argumentum Extra De fide
catholica Innocentii6i ergo et omnem perfectionem quae
fundatur in essentia. Nulla igitur persona est maior alia in
perfectione.
111 Item, secundo sic: persona non distinguitur a persona nisi
relatione, quia ratione essentiae non est una persona perfectior
alia; sed propter relationem non potest dici una persona perfectior
alia, quia habere aliam relationem non est habere aliam
perfectionem, cum relatio non sit perfectio simpliciter. Cuius
probatio est duplex: tum quia secundum Anselmum, Monologion,
5:62 "Perfectio simpliciter in quolibet: melius est ipsum esse quam
non-ipsum", id est, melius est ipsum in quolibet supposito non
determinato ad naturam in qua sit quocumque sibi
incompossibili. Sed non est melius in Patre filiatio vel spiratio-
passio quam non ipsum, nec paternitas in Filio et Spiritu Sancto,
quia tunc nulla persona esset perfecta. Tum etiam quia si ita
esset, aliqua perfectio simpliciter esset in una persona quae non
in alia, et tunc non essent aequales.
112 Sed dices quod hoc non sequitur, quia quaelibet persona
habet relationem propriam aequivalentem relationi alterius
Bonaventura, Sent. I, d. 19, p. 2, a. un. q. 1 resp.

r'0 Cf. Hilarius, De Trin. IIl, n. 4 (CCSL 62, 75; PL 10, 77-8).
6l Decretales Gregorii IX, lib. I, tit. I, c. 2 (ed. A. Friedberg, II, 6-7)
M Anselmus, Monologion, c. 15 (ed. F.S. Schmitt I, 28-9; PL 158, 163).
that whole is said in one way absolutely, and in this way it is the
same thing as what is perfect; in another way it is in relationship
to a part. In the first way, whole is in the divine, but not in the
second way. But I do not think that he wishes whole' to be
predicated so absolutely that it may not be referred to something,
because in this way it would not be a whole, because whole
essentially is relative; but he says 'absolutely' as being without
any relationship to a part.
Article Two
In the divine no person is greater than another
1 10 As for the second article I say that in the divine no person is

greater than another. For according to Hilary in Bk. IIl of The
Trinity, at the beginning, the Father gives to the Son the whole
essence, because if he gave a part, something would be lost, and it
is the argument of Innocent, De fide catholica. Therefore, [he
gives] also all the perfection that is based in the essence. Hence,
no person is greater than another in perfection.
111 Also, secondly in this way: a person is distinguished from a
person only by a relation, because by reason of the essence one
person is not more perfect than another. But because of a relation
one person cannot be said to be more perfect than another,
because to have another relation is not to have another
perfection, since a relation is not an unqualified perfection. Proof
of this is twofold: (1) first, because according to Anselm, in the
Monologion, chapter [15], "In anything an unqualified perfection
is what it is better to be than not to be," that is, it is better [to be]
it, rather than anything incompatible with it, in any supposit not
determined to a nature in which it is. But filiation, or passive-
spiration,* is not better for the Father to have than not to have,
nor is paternity for the Son and Holy Spirit, because then no
person would be perfect. (2) Also, because if it were so, some
unqualified perfection would be in one person that is not in
another, and then they would not be equal.
112 But you would say that this does not follow, because each
person has his own relation equivalent to that of another person,
and thus it does not follow that one person would be more perfect
personae, et ita non sequitur unam personam esse perfectiorem

alia, licet quaelibet relatio fuerit perfectio simpliciter.
113 Contra: si essent duo dii, neuter esset perfectus, secundum
Damascenum, quia aliquam perfectionem haberet unus quam non
alius.
114 Ista ratio non valet secundum rationem praedictam quia
diceretur ei quod unus deus habet perfectionem aequivalentem
perfectioni alterius, licet non eandem, et ideo non sequitur
neutrum esse perfectum, sed ratio Damasceni63 est optima, quia
unus deus careret perfectione alterius. Si enim haberet
perfectionem alterius, esset perfectior quam modo quando non
habet eam; vel si non, tunc non est perfectio. Eodem modo
arguendum est in proposito de relationibus si sint perfectiones
simpliciter.
115 Item, qui habet omnia paria cum alio, et cum hoc
perfectionem infinitam ultra illud, est perfectius64 illo. Sed Pater
habet omnia essentialia aequaliter cum Filio et Spiritu Sancto et
cum hoc generationem activam et spirationem activam, quae non
habet aliqua alia persona, quae per te sunt perfectiones. Ergo
Pater est simpliciter perfectior Filio et Spiritu Sancto.
Confirmatur hoc: quia, secundum omnes, Pater habet quattuor
relationes quod non habet aliqua alia persona; ergo est perfectior
aliis personis. Similiter, tota Trinitas esset perfectior quam aliqua
persona. Si autem aliquis doctor diceret hoc, non vidi tamen
aliquem qui diceret quod relatio dicit perfectionem infinitam
formaliter nisi tantum identice.
116 Item, facta summa abstractione, in divinis non praedicatur
unum de alio, nisi vel alterum vel utrumque sit infinitum et
perfectio simpliciter. Sic enim unum praedicatur de altero in
abstracto in divinis, ut 'deitas est sapientia' vel 'essentia est
generatio vel paternitas', sed aliter non. Unde haec est falsa
'generatio est spiratio' vel 'paternitas est filiatio'. Ergo neuter
3 Damasc.. De fide orthod. c. 5 [T, c. 5] (ed. Buytaert, 22-3: PG 94, 801).

M Perfectius: sic codd.; lege: perfectior.
than another, although each relation would be an unqualified

perfection.
113 To the contrary: if there were two gods, neither would be
perfect, according to Damascene, because one would have some
perfection which the other would not.
114 This reason is not valid according to the aforesaid
argument, because one would answer to it that one God has a
perfection equivalent to the perfection of the other, although they
are not the same, and therefore it does not follow that neither is
perfect, and Damascene's argument is the best one, because one
god would [simply] lack the perfection of the other. For if he did
have the perfection of the other, he would be more perfect than
now when he does not have it; or if not, then that would not be a
perfection. In the same way it must be argued in the case at hand
about relationships if they were simply perfections.
115 Also, one who has all things on a par with another and, in
addition to all this, infinite perfection, is more perfect than this
other. But the Father has all essentials on a par with the Son and
the Holy Spirit, and in addition to this, active generation and
active spiration, which, according to you, are [two] perfections,
not had by some other person. Therefore, the Father is simply
more perfect than the Son and Holy Spirit. This is confirmed,
because, according to all, the Father has four relations, something
no other person has; therefore he is more perfect than the other
persons. Likewise, the whole Trinity would be more perfect than
another person. If some doctor might have said this, however, I
know of no one who would claim that a relation expresses infinite
perfection formally, except by identity.26
116 Also, at the highest level of abstraction, in the divine one is
not predicated of another unless either one of them or both are
infinite and unqualified perfections. For it is in this way that in
the divine one is predicated of the other in the abstract, e.g.,
'deity is wisdom' or 'the essence is generation or paternity,' but
not in any other way. Hence, this is false 'generation is spiration'
or 'paternity is filiation.' Therefore neither of the terms [in the
2lI Namely, as identical in reality with what is formally infinitely perfect. The
personal relationships in the divine are only a perfection inasmuch as they are
only formally, not really, distinct from the divine essence.
extremorum est simpliciter perfectio infinita. Omnis a utem

perfectio simpliciter est infinita, quia infinitas est eius gradus
intrinsecus virtualis. Nec credo aliquem doctorem dixisse
oppositum quin isto modo possit exponi. Sic igitur nulla persona
est maior alia. Hoc de secundo.
[C. Art. 3
In divinis non est totum universale]
117 Quantum ad tertium articulum dico quod in divinis non est

totum universale, quia quod est commune realiter sine sui
divisione habens idem esse in eis, non est universale. Sed Deus et
forma deitatis est realiter communis tribus personis. Addo
enim 'commune realiter' propter personam, quae si sit communis
secundum rationem pluribus vel non, dicetur distinctione 23.
118 Maior probatur: universale enim habet duas condiciones
quae sunt perfectionis et duas quae sunt imperfectionis.
Universale enim dicit esse communicabile multis et esse
illimitatum respectu illorum quibus communicatur, sicut per
oppositum singulare suppositum est incommunicabile et limita-
tum, et hae sunt duae condiciones perfectionis in universali. Sed
quod universale est divisibile et potentiale quia determinabile,
hoc importat imperfectionem in eo. Est enim determinabile in hoc
supposito ad hoc suppositum et non ad aliud; et utraque condicio
istius imperfectionis est de per se ratione eius.
119 Ex hoc arguitur sic: nullum universale est de se hoc; sed
quodlibet essentiale in divinis est de se hoc; ergo nullum
essentiale in divinis est universale. Maior est manifesta. quia
quod est de se hoc est determinatum ultima determinatione; sed
universale in quantum tale natum est deteminari in supposito et
ad suppositum; ergo de se non est hoc.
120 Minor patet superius, quia omne essentiale est de se hoc, et
non potest amplius determinari. Dicit enim Damascenus cap.
50,65 quod proprietates determinant hypostases, non naturam.
lIr> Cf. supra n. 97 & 98

latter case] is an unqualified infinite perfection. But every

unqualified perfection is infinite, because infinity is a virtual
intrinsic degree it has. Neither do I believe that some doctor has
stated the opposite without it being able to be explained in this
way. Therefore, no person in this way is greater than another.
And this [is what is to be said] about the second [article].
Article Three
In the divine there is no universal whole
117 As for the third article, I say that in the divine there is no
universal whole, because what is really common without it being
divided, having the same being in them [i.e., persons, in this
case], is not a universal. But 'God and the form of deity' is really
common to the three persons. For I add 'really common' on
account of 'person': [for] whether the latter is common to several
conceptually or not, will be discussed in distinction 23.
118 The major is proved: for the universal has two conditions
that are perfections and two that are imperfections. For the
universal asserts being communicable to many, and is unlimited
as regards those to which it is communicated (just as, as opposed
to this, the singular supposit is incommunicable and limited), and
these are the two conditions that are matters of perfection in the
universal. But that the universal is divisible and potential,
because it is determinable, implies imperfection in it. For it is
determinable in this supposit to just this supposit and not to any
other; and each of these conditions of imperfection is a per se
characteristic of its notion.
119 From this it is argued in this way: no universal is of itself
'this' [i.e. singular]; but each essential in the divine is of itself
'this'; therefore nothing essential in the divine is universal. The
major is manifest, because what is of itself 'this,' is determined by
a final determination; but a universal as such is suited by nature
to be determined in a supposit and to a supposit: therefore of
itself it is not 'this.'
120 The minor is evident from the above, because every
essential is of itself a this, and it cannot be determined further.
For Damascene says in chapter 50 that properties determine the
565 John Duns Scotus, Refortatio I-A
nec relationes advenientes naturae faciunt naturam esse minus

communem. Exemplum: si Socrates haberet tres albedines et
esset constitutus in triplici supposito per accidens in genere
qualitatis, esset de se unum simplex et de se hoc commune tribus.
Sic in proposito relationes aliquo modo quasi per accidens sunt
constitutiva suppositorum in hac deitate. Omni enim 'quo'
correspondet 'quis', ita quod istae proprietates, scilicet 'a se' vel
ab alio' quae sunt ulteriores determinationes, non faciunt Deum
magis hunc, quia sine his est hoc, sicut nec tres albedines faciunt
Socratem plus hunc in genere substantiae, licet determinent eum
in genere qualitatis. Quia sicut albedo adveniens Socrati
constituit ipsum in genere qualitatis et in quantitate per quanti-
tatem etc., Socrates tamen in se non est communior quam prius,
ita relationes advenientes essentiae nullam communitatem sibi
tribuunt, quia prius quodammodo, quam relationes sibi
adveniant, est de se hoc hac deitate et est proprius 'quis' huius
entitatis formalis, scilicet deitatis, quam66 sit sub relationibus.
Nec propter hoc pono suppositum absolutum, quia non omnis
'quis' aliqua entitate formali est suppositum. Est enim homo
proprius 'quis' humanitatis ut propriae entitatis formalis et non
Socrates vel Plato, quia entitas formalis Socratis vel Platonis, qua
uterque est 'quis', est Socrateitas vel Platoneitas, quae sunt
entitates individuales correspondentes suis propriis individuis.
66 Sc. priusquam.
hypostases, and do not determine the nature; neither do the

relations coming to the nature make the nature less common. For
example: if Socrates had three [instantiations] of whiteness and
were constituted accidentallyin the category of qualityin
three supposits, he would be in himself one simple thing and of
himself common to three. In this way relations in the case at
hand in some way quasi-accidentally are constitutive of supposits
in this deity. For to each [instance of] 'where from' corresponds a
'who,' so that these properties, namely 'from himself or 'from
another,' which are further determinations, do not make God
more a 'this,' because [already] without these he is a 'this,' just as
neither do three [instantiations] of whiteness make Socrates more
a 'this' in the category of substance, although they determine him
in the category of quality. Because just as the whiteness coming
to Socrates constitutes him in the category of quality and in that
of quantity through quantity, etc., although Socrates in himself is
not more common than he was before, so the relations coming to
the essence do not contribute any universality to it, because, in a
certain way, [already] before the relations come to it, it is of itself
a this' by 'this deity' and is the proper 'who'27 of this formal
entity, namely of deity, before it is under these relationships.
Neither because of this do I posit an absolute supposit,28 because
not every 'who' is a supposit by some formal entity. For it is 'man.'
and not Socrates or Plato, that is the proper 'who' of humanity
qua proper formal entity, because the formal entity of Socrates or
Plato, by which each is a 'who,'29 is 'Socrateity' or 'Platoneity,'
which are individual entities corresponding to their proper
individuals.
27 Scotus uses the indefinite pronoun quis that can mean either 'someone' or
'one.'
28 That is, a person or complete individual substance with no further
addition. In other words, the divine essence is a complete individual substance,
but not a person as such if God is triune.
20 Quis here has the sense of a 'who' or complete person.
[D. Art. 4
In divinis non est totum essentiale
ex partibus essentialibus]
121 Quantum ad quartum articulum, dico quod non est ibi totum
essentiale ex partibus essentialibus, ut ex materia et forma, quia
essentia divina non est formabilis nec in potentia ad aliquem
actum, quia hoc poneret in ea limitationem et compositionem.
Ipsa autem est de se infinite perfecta, et ita non potest ulterius
perfici nec actuari, et sic non est in potentia ad aliquid
recipiendum, quia nihil est in divinis per modum inhaerentis vel
informantis.
122 Contra: omne absolutum secundum se praeconceptum

aptum natum habere relationem videtur esse in potentia secun
dum se ad talem relationem; sed essentia divina est huiusmodi ex
natura rei et non per actum intellectus; ergo videtur in potentia
ad talem relationem.
123 Respondeo secundum praedicta, distinctione 5, quod in Deo
non est materia nec quasi materia, nec ratio materiae transfertur
ad divina. Unde Bonaventura67 in hac distinctione, quaestione
qua quaeritur utrum in divinis sit materiale principium,
respondet in pede quaestionis68 quod in Deo "nec proprie nec
transumptive est materia sive principium materiale". Concedit
tamen in quaestione sequenti quod sit proprie quis vel quo.69
124 Ad rationem in contrarium dico quod maior est falsa, scilicet
ista 'quod est aptum natum habere relationem, est in potentia ad
illam', nisi sic accipiatur: 'quod est aptum natum recipere
relationem, est in potentia ad illam'. Sed minor sic sumpta sub ea.
scilicet 'quod essentia divina est apta nata recipere relationem',
est falsa; et ideo non sequitur conclusio. Essentia enim divina non
est in potentia receptiva relationis nec habet eam ut potentia
passiva perfecta per eam, sed habet eam tamquam illud cui dat
esse et subsistere in persona, sicut anima intellectiva in illo
instanti in quo infunditur corpori organico non intelligitur aliquid
67 'Albanensis' in tribus codd.

IiH Bonaventura, Sent. I, d. 19, p. 2, a. un., q. 3 resp.
Il!l Ibid., q. 4 resp.
Article Four
In the divine there is no essential whole
composed of essential parts
121 As for the fourth article, I say that there is no essential

whole there composed of essential parts, like matter and form,
because the divine essence is not able to be formed nor in potency
to some action, because this would posit limitation and
composition in it. But it is of itself infinitely perfect, and so
cannot be perfected further nor actuated and thus is not in
potency to receive something, because nothing exists in the divine
as something inhering or informing.
122 To the contrary: every absolute as such presupposed to be
apt by nature to have a relationship seems to be in potency in
itself to such a relation. But the divine essence is of such a kind
by nature and not by the act of the intellect; therefore it seems to
be in potency to such a relation
123 I respond according to what was said before in distinction
five, that in God there is neither matter nor quasi-matter, neither
is the notion of matter transferred to the divine. Hence,
Bonaventure, in this distinction, in the question in which it is
asked whether there is a material principle in the divine, replies
at the foot of the question that in God "there is no matter or
material principle in either a proper or transferred sense." He
concedes, however, in the following question that there is a quis
['who'] and a quo ['where from,' or 'by virtue of what'].30
124 To the argument to the contrary, I say that the major is
false, namely this 'what is suited by nature to have a relationship,
is in potency to it,' unless one interprets in this way: 'what is
suited by nature to receive a relation, is in potency to it.' But the
minor, taken in this form, namely 'that the divine essence is apt
by nature to receive a relation' is false; and therefore, the
conclusion does not follow. For the divine essence is not in
potency to receive a relation, neither does it have [the relation] as
a passive potency perfected through it, but it possesses it as that
to which it gives 'existence and subsistence* in a person,' just as
the intellective soul in that instant in which it is infused in an
For Bonaventure quo is the essence, and quis a person.

recipere a corpore vel a partibus, sed est apta nata habere illas ut
quibus det suum esse simplex et perfectum. Unde est in qualibet
parte tota et tota in toto. Et si essent quasi infinitae partes
corporis et sui perfectibilis, omnibus daret esse tale. Unde non
debet intelligi essentia sub relationibus, ut superficies substrata
albedini, sed ut anima si esset infinita dans esse omnibus
partibus sine informatione omni, quae est aptitudo ad dare esse,
non per informationem nec ut fundamentum, sed ut apta nata
fundare partes corporis tamquam in quodam supposito quiditati-
vo sive in forma quiditativa. Et sic est essentia respectu
relationum divinarum dans esse omnibus partibus sine tamen
omni informatione.
125 Et quod dicunt illi70 de essentia quod non est in potentia
obiectiva vel subiectiva sed relativa, hoc nihil est dictu, quia si
relatio est aliquis actus, quod est in potentia ad eam, est vel in
potentia obiectiva ad eam, vel subiectiva. Si subiectiva, ergo vel
est materia vel quasi materia et potentia reali. Si obiectiva,
nullum inconveniens, quia essentia divina in alia persona potest
terminare relationem eius. Sed ex illa non sequitur potentia
subiectiva vel passiva propria. Primo concedunt quod in Deo est
quasi materia, modo quod non est ibi potentia subiectiva. Quae
concordia? Ubicumque est enim materia, ibi est potentia
subiectiva et subiectum alicuius formae. Patet per Philosophum,
VIII Metaphysicae.1i
126 Ad argumenta principalia:

Ad primum72 cum dicit 'omne infinitum est maius finito'.
concedo; 'relatio est finita' falsum est. Omne enim finitum est
Cf. supra n. 122.

7i Cf. Aristot., Metaph. VIII (H), c. 1 (1042a 25-32); c. 2 (10426 9-11); c. 5
(10446 27-9); cf. Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. J. Hamesse, 132).
72 Cf. supra n. 96.
organic body is not understood to receive something from the

body or from [its] parts, but is suited by nature to have these as
that to which it gives its simple and perfect being. Hence, it is in
each part as a whole and in the whole [body] as a whole. And if
there were quasi-infinite parts of the body that can be perfected
by it, it [i.e., the soul] would give such being to all.3i Wherefore
the essence must not be thought of being under the relations, as a
surface beneath whiteness, but as the soul, if it were infinite,
giving being to all the parts without any informing.32 This is an
aptitude to give being, and not through informing nor as a
foundation, but as being suited by nature to ground the parts of
the body as in a certain quidditative supposit or in a quidditative
form. And in this way the essence with respect to the divine
relations gives being to all the parts without, however, any
informing.
125 And that these [n. 122] assert this about the essence that it
is not in objective potency or subjective potency but relative
potency, this does nothing to [correct] the statement, because if a
relation is some act, that [the essence] is in potency to it can be
taken either in an objective sense, or in a subjective sense. If
subjective, therefore it is either matter or quasi-matter and in
real potency. If objective, [this would] not be incongruous, because
the divine essence could terminate its relation in another person.
But from this subjective potency or proper passive potency does
not follow. [Thus] first they concede that in God there is quasi-
matter, now that there is no subjective potency there. Where is
the consistency? For wherever there is matter, there is subjective
potency and subject of some form. It is evident from the
Philosopher in Bk. VIII of the Metaphysics.
126 To the initial arguments: to the first [n. 96] when it is said
that 'every infinite is greater than the finite,' I concede; 'a relation
3i That is, the soul would be whole and entire in each of its infinite parts.
:l2 The way in which an accidental or substantial form informs substance or
matter respectively is that it is incomplete in itself, which implies imperfection.
Scotus wishes to eliminate this aspect of imperfection.
imperfectum et limitatum; relatio autem de se nec est finita, nec

infinita. Non infinita, propter rationes praedictas; nec finita, quia
impossibile est aliquid formaliter finitum esse realiter idem cum
infinite- vel limitatum cum illimitato. Quod enim includit aliquid
formaliter in se finitum, non potest esse de se infinitum; relatio in
divinis est per identitatem infinita. Sed non sequitur 'si non est
infinitum formaliter, ergo est finitum'. Quia quando est idem cum
finito, est finita; quando est idem cum infinito, est infinita. Ex
ratione sua tamen formali, ex quo potest reperiri cum utroque,
nec est finita nec infinita, quia si esset in se finita, non posset
esse idem cum infinito, nec si esset infinita ex se posset esse idem
cum finito. Si autem accipiatur quod omne infinitum est maius
non-finito', falsum est. Quia non est comparatio secundum
maioritatem nisi inter illa quae sunt quanta mole vel virtute. Sed
relatio nullam rationem perfectionis virtualis importat, ut dictum
est.
127 Quod ultra73 dicitur quod illud quod dicitur de pluribus est
universale, verum est, si sit unum secundum rationem aptum
natum determinari in eis, quod non convenit in proposito de
essentia quae est commune secundum rem, ut dicit ibi
Damascenus,74 et de se est haec.
128 Quod enim dicitur secundum Augustinum quod Filius est de
essentia: dicendum secundum eum, quod haec non est
recipienda 'Filius est de essentia vel de substantia' sine aliqua
determinatione, quia dicit, VII De Trinitate,75 quod tres personas
ex eadem essentia non dicimus; sed bene concedit istam 'Filius est
de substantia Patris' ubi non notatur materia sed consubstanti-
alitas cum origine, ut dictum est prius distinctione 5.
129 Ad alia patet responsio per iam dicta. Ad illud enim de
Hilario,76 patet quod accipit maioritatem in Patre pro auctoritate
et minoritatem in Filio pro subauctoritate.
7:i Cf. supra n. 97.

7" Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 50 [III, c. 6] (ed. Buytaert, 190; PG 94, 1008)
7r> August., De Trin. VII, c. 6, n. 11 (CCSL 50, 265; PL 42, 945).
Cf. supra n. 95.
is finite' is false. For every finite is imperfect and limited; but a

relation as such is neither finite nor infinite. It is not infinite,
because of the aforesaid reasons; it is not finite, because it is
impossible for something formally finite to be really the same
thing with the infinite, or the limited with the unlimited. For
what includes something formally finite in itself, cannot be of
itself infinite; [so] a relationship in the divine is infinite by
identity. But it does not follow 'if it is not formally infinite, it is
finite.' For when it is the same thing with the finite, it is finite;
when it is the same thing with the infinite, it is infinite. From its
formal notion, however, from which it can be found with either, it
is neither finite nor infinite. Because if it were in itself finite, it
could not be the same thing as the infinite. Neither, if it were of
itself infinite, could it be the same thing as the finite; but if it be
accepted that 'every infinite is greater than the non-finite,' it is
false, because there is no comparison according to greatness
except between those things that are such by mass or power. But
a relation implies no notion of virtual perfection, as has been said.
127 What is said further [n. 97] that what is predicable of many
is the universal33, this is true, if it is one suited by nature to be
determined in them conceptually. This does not happen in the
case at hand with the essence, which is common according to
reality, as is stated there by Damascene; and it is of itself just a
'this.'
128 As for what is said according to Augustine, i.e., that the Son
is of the essence, it must be said according to him that this
statement 'the Son is of the essence or of the substance' must not
be accepted without some qualification, because he says in Bk.
VII of The Trinity, that we must not say that the three persons
[are] of the same essence, but he does indeed concede this, "The
Son is of the substance of the Father," where it is not matter, but
consubstantiality with origin, that is signified, as has been stated
earlier in distinction 5.
129 To the other the reply is evident from what has been said.
For to that about Hilary [n. 95], it is evident that he takes
'superiority' in the Father for authority and minority in the Son
for sub-authority.
The universal, namely 'God' that is predicated of many persons.

130 Ad Ulud etiam Damasceni,77 dicendum quod ponit speciem

in divinis quantum ad duas condiciones perfectionis78 quas habet
universale vel species, non quantum ad aliquas condiciones quae
sunt imperfectionis, ut patet in cap. 8.79 Et hoc declarabitur magis
in dubitationibus super litteram.80 Modo enim contrario est
commune in divinis et in creaturis, secundum Damascenum
ibidem.81
131 Ad aliud82 quando dicitur quod distinctum de aliquo ut in-
distincto producitur de eo ut quasi de materia, verum est quando
illud indistinctum natum est recipere distinctionem aliquam vel
determinationem. Sed essentia divina non est apta nata aliquid
recipere; quare nec se habet quasi materia, ut dictum est.
77 Cf. supra n. 97.

Cf. supra n. 118.
7n Damasc., De fide orthod. c. 8 [I, c. 8] (ed. Buytaert. 41; PG 94, 825).
<*l Cf. supra n 25 & 28
Ml Damasc.. ibid.
M Cf. supra n. 99.
130 To that of Damascene [n. 97], it must be said that he posits

species in the divine as regards the two conditions for perfection
[n. 118] that a universal or species has, and not as regards some
conditions that are imperfections [divisible and potential], as is
evident in chapter 8, and this will be clarified more in the
[discussion of] doubts to the text. For 'common' in the divine and
in creatures is understood completely differently, according to
Damascene in the same place.
131 To the other [n. 99], when it is said that what is distinct
from something, as it were, indistinct, is produced from it as from
matter, it is true when what is indistinct is suited by nature to
receive some distinction or determinations. But the divine
essence is not suited by nature to receive anything; wherefore
neither does it behave as quasi-matter, as has been said.
[Distinctio 20
Quaestio 1
Utrum personae divinae sint aequales in potentia]
1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam primo quaeritur utrum

personae divinae sint aequales in potentia.
Videtur quod non:

Richardus, I De Trinitate, cap. ultimo,i dicit quod si essent
plures dii, unus faceret alium nullipotentem per hoc quod
prohiberet aliqua esse subiecta suae omnipotentiae. A simili
arguo in proposito: si sint plures personae aeque omnipotentes.
ergo unus potest facere aliam non-omnipotentem. Probatio
consequentiae: quia si esset una persona omnipotens, posset
ponere aliam in esse, et quamlibet. Igitur illa non esset
omnipotens.
2 Si dicas quod tres personae simul sunt omnipotentes, et sic

una non potest aliquam creaturam producere quin alia simul
posset producere illam, quia non potest facere aliam
nullipotentem contra: Pater prius origine habet quemcumque
actum volendi quam Filius, igitur potest per suum velle
sufficienter ponere quamcumque creaturam in esse prius origine
quam Filius illud ponat. Si ergo Filius illo velle vel alio possit
producere creaturas, hoc non est nisi in quantum praeintelligitur
illas velle producere, et ita voluntas Patris determinat Filium ad
volendum illud esse. Ergo in illo instanti quo possent produci a
Filio, omnia prius origine essent producta a Patre.
3 Item, sicut duo dii, si essent, possent se impedire invicem,
non concordando, si unus vellet illud quod nollet alius, sic et
personae. Probatio: quia uterque deus haberet voluntatem
contingenter respectu aliorum a se, et sic non esset necessarium
ut semper essent Concordes in voluntate. Ergo sic de personis, et
sic aliqua potest fieri nullipotens.
4 Confirmatur hoc, quia forma, quae est principium agendi,
eodem modo est principium in duobus sicut in uno. Exemplum de
i Richardus de S. Victore, De Trin. I, c. 25 (ed. J. Ribaillier, TPMA VI, 105-6;

PL 196, 902).
570
Distinction 20
Question One
Are the divine persons* equal in power?
1 In regard to distinction twenty it is asked first whether the

divine persons are equal in power.
It seems not:
Richard in Bk. I of The Trinity, last chapter, proves that if
there were several gods, one would render the other impotent
through this that he would prevent some things* from being
subject to his omnipotence. In a similar way I argue in the case at
hand: if several persons were equally omnipotent, therefore one
could make another not omnipotent. Proof of the implication:*
because if one person were omnipotent, he could make another, of
whatever sort. Therefore, that person would not be omnipotent.
2 Also, if you say that the three persons together are
omnipotent, and thus one could not produce some creature,
without the other simultaneously being able to produce it,
because he could not make another impotent, to the contrary: the
Father by [his priority* of] origin* has any act of willing
whatsoever before the Son, therefore he can through his willing
sufficiently posit any creature in existence by [his priority of]
origin before the Son posits it. Therefore, if the Son by that
willing or another could produce creatures, this is only insofar as
he is presupposed to will to produce them, and thus the will* of
the Father determines the Son to will that to be. Therefore, in
that instant in which the Son could produce them, the Father
would have produced all [already] beforehand through his
priority of origin.
3 Also, just as two gods, if they existed, could impede one
another by disagreeing, if one willed what another did not, in this
way also could two persons. Proof: because each god would
have the will contingently with respect to things other than
himself, and thus it would not be necessary for them always to
agree in will. Therefore, [it would be] this way about the persons,
and thus some could become impotent.
4 This is confirmed, because the form, which is the principle*
of acting, as a principle behaves in the same way in two persons
570
albedine, si esset in duabus superficiebus, disgregaret in qualibet.

Sed voluntas est principium agendi in divinis. Ergo sicut in una
persona, ita in duabus. Sed in una persona voluntas se habet
contingenter ad velle et nolle producere extra. Igitur in duabus
voluntas erit eodem modo principium contingenter agendi, et per
consequens poterunt se mutuo impedire.
5 Item, confirmatur hoc sic: si Pater determinaret per suum
velle voluntatem Filii ad concorditer agendum vel producendum,
ergo necessitaret Filium, et sic non libere vult Filius nec
contingenter sed necessario et determinatur ab alio, quod est
falsum, ergo etc.
Contra: Augustinus, De fide ad Petrum, et ponitur dist. 19.2

6 Item, per tres rationes Augustini, Contra Maximinum,3 quas
ponit Magister in littera:4 Omnia enim quae habet Pater mea sunt
etc. Secunda ratio: quia vel potuit et noluit, vel voluit et non
potuit et utroque modo est inconveniens. Tertia ratio est ibidem,
vide eas ibi diligenter.
[Quaestio 2
Utrum potentia generandi Filium
per se pertineat ad omnipotentiam]
7 Iuxta hoc quaeritur utrum potentia generandi Filium per se

pertineat ad omnipotentiam.
Videtur quod sic:

Augustinus, III Contra Maximinum,5 et est in littera: si
Pater non potuit gignere sibi aequalem Filium, ergo impotens
fuit. Ergo per oppositum Pater est potens quia genuit Filium
aequalem.
1 Cf. supra Dist. 19, n. 4 et 7.

:l August., Contra Maximinum II, c. 14, n. 7 (PL 42, 774), ibid., c. 7 (PL 12.
762).
1 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 20, c. 2-3 (SB IV, 172-4).
r> Cf. August., Contra Maximinum II, c. 7 (PL 42, 762); Petrus Lombardus.
ibid.
Dist. 20, Questions One-Two 571
as it does in one. An example about whiteness: if it were in two

surfaces, it would dilate [the visual medium] in each. But the will
is the principle of acting in the divine. Therefore, just as [it is] in
one person, so it is in two. But in one person the will is
contingently related to willing or nilling to produce outside.
Therefore, in two the will would be in the same way a principle of
acting contingently, and as a consequence each could impede the
other.
5 Also, it is confirmed in this way: if the Father by his willing
determined the will of the Son to act or produce concurrently,
therefore, he would force the Son, and the Son could not will
freely or contingently, but only necessarily, as determined by the
other, which is false.
The contraryi says Augustine in De fide ad Petrum, and it is

cited in distinction 19.
6 Also, there are the three reasons of Augustine, in Contra
Maximinum, which the Master* cites in the text:* [First]: "For all
things which the Father has are mine,"2 etc. The second reason:
because either he could and did not will, or he willed but he could
not [produce a Son equal to himself], and either alternative is
incongruous. The third reason is in the same place. Look for these
there carefully.
Question Two
Does the power of generating the Son
per se pertain to omnipotence?
7 Next to this it is asked whether the power of generating the

Son per se pertains to omnipotence.
It seems that it does:
Augustine in Bk. IIl Contra Maximinum and it is cited in
the text: 'If the Father could not generate a Son equal to himself,
therefore he would be impotent.' Therefore, by contrast, the
Father is potent because he could generate a Son equal to
himself.
i This Contrary is missing in two MSS.

John 16:15.
8 Item, ad omniscientiam pertinet scire generationem Filii,

ergo ad omnipotentiam pertinet potentia generandi filium.
9 Contra:
"Omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius" etc., Athanasius in
Symbolo;6 sed Filius non habet potentiam generandi; ergo
potentia generandi non pertinet ad omnipotentiam.
[I. Ad primam quaestionem]
10 Responsio ad primam quaestionem. Dico quod potentia quae

ponitur in Deo non est potentia passiva, sicut prius ostensum est
distinctione 5 et distinctione 7 ubi probatur quod Deus est virtutis
activae respectu omnium possibilium, sed est potentia activa.
Aequalitas autem in potentia activa potest intelligi esse in
personis divinis vel intensive vel extensive. Utraque enim potest
esse sine alia, licet in multis concomitantur se. Aequalitas
secundum extensionem sine aequalitate secundum intensionem
est in caritate magna et parva, magis intensa et minus intensa,
quarum quaelibet extenditur ad omnia diligibilia ex caritate.
Aequalitas secundum intensionem et non secundum extensionem
patet de calore generato virtute caloris generantis, quorum
uterque secundum intensionem potest esse aeque perfectus, non
tamen sunt aeque perfecti secundum extensionem, quia non
potest calor genitus nec in generationem sui, nec in generationem
caloris ipsum generantis.
11 Ad propositum igitur dico quod personae divinae sunt
aequales in potentia secundum intensionem et extensionem.
Secundum intensionem, quia quidquid potest sic potentia activa
in divinis qua aliquid producitur, secundum eandem virtutem et
magnitudinem ponitur in omnibus personis aequaliter, ut patet
distinctione 19. Sunt etiam aequales secundum extensionem, quia
obiecta et subiecta istius potentiae activae sunt ipsa effectibilia et
producibilia extra, respectu quorum omnes personae uniformiter
agunt et essentialiter producunt, secundum Augustinum. Patet
Ps. -Athanasius, Symbolum 'Quicunque' (ed. H. Denzinger, n. 39).

8 Also, it pertains to omniscience to know the generation* of

the Son, therefore, the power to generate a son pertains to
omnipotence.
9 To the contrary:
"The Father is omnipotent, the Son is omnipotent," etc.,
[according to] Athanasius in the Creed; but the Son does not have
the power to generate; therefore the latter does not pertain to
omnipotence.
To the First Question
10 Response to the first question: I say that the power that is

posited in God is not passive potency*as has been shown in
distinction five and distinction seven where it is proved that God
functions as active power as regards all possiblesbut is active
potency. But equality in active power can be understood to be in
the divine persons either in an intensive or in an extensive sense.
For each [type of equality] can be without the other, although in
many cases they accompany one another. Equality according to
extension without equality according to intensity is in charity
great and small, more intense and less intense, of which each is
extended to all able to be loved by charity. Equality according to
intensity and not according to extension is evident in the case of
heat generated by the power of heat that is generating, of which
[types of heat] both can be equally perfect according to intensity;
however, they are not equally perfect according to extension,
because the heat generated cannot generate itself, nor generate
the heat that generated it.
11 To the issue at hand, therefore, I say that the divine persons
are equal in power according to both intensity and extension.
According to intensity, because whatever can be [accomplished] in
this way by active potency in the divine, by which something is
produced, is equally posited in all the persons according to the
same power and magnitude,* as is shown in distinction nineteen.
Also they are equal according to extension, because the objects
and subjects of this active power are precisely those outside
things that can be effected and produced, in regard to which all
persons act uniformly and produce essentially, according to
distinctione 13. Et hoc habet probari in II libro in quaestione

productionum, comparando productionem ad intra productioni
quae est ad extra.
12 Probatur tamen ad praesens sic: principium perfectum per
se agendi in quocumque supposito et convenienti actioni prius est
quam terminus intelligatur produci, prout est principium agendi
illi supposito, et potest tale suppositum agere illo principio. Sed
principium perfectum producendi quamcumque creaturam prius
est in tribus personis quam intelligatur aliquod effectibile sive
aliqua creatura produci. Ergo quaelibet persona aeque potest
agere illo principio.
13 Minor istius rationis habetur supra in principio satis
declarata. Probatur tamen modo sic: necessarium ex se prius est
non-necessario ex se; quidquid est in divinis est necessarium ex se
formaliter; nihil in creaturis est ex se necessarium formaliter,
quia quaelibet capit esse post non esse, et ita possibilis; ergo etc.
[II. Ad argumenta principalia primae quaestionis]
14 Ad primam7 rationem dico quod consequentia est necessaria

de duobus diis, quia non possunt ponere duos effectus eadem
actione. Impossibile est autem quod duo agentia perfecta
producant unum perfectum effectum. Nec sequitur quod effectus
bis ponatur in esse, quia ad unum esse non sequitur nisi una
actio. Personae autem non habent nisi unum esse. Dico autem,
quantum ad rationem, quod demonstratio est ad probandum quod
non sunt plures dii a posteriori quia quilibet deus singillatim
impediret omnia possibilia fieri ab alio eorum, et ita faceret alium
nullipotentem, quia omnipotentia non esset in eis tunc nisi
respectu possibilium, sicut nec modo in uno deo, quia ex quo non
haberent eandem deitatem nec eandem essentiam, non necessario
volunt idem, nec voluntas unius necessario ordinatur ad
voluntatem alterius, quia tunc non esset deus, sed contingenter
potest velle illud vel oppositum eius. Sed in proposito non est
7 Cf. supra n. 1.
Augustine. This is shown in distinction thirteen. And this has to

be proved in book two in the question on productions,* by
comparing the internal production to the external production.
12 It is proved, however, at present in this way: a perfect
principle of acting per se in any supposit* whatsoever that is,
moreover, suitable for [this] action, comes before the term is
understood to be produced, inasmuch as it is a principle of acting
in that supposit, and such a supposit can act by that principle.
But a perfect principle of producing any creature whatsoever in
the three persons comes before some effectible or some creature is
understood to be produced. Therefore, each person equally can act
by that principle.
13 The minor of this argument is found, sufficiently clarified,
above in the beginning. However, it is proved now in this way:
'necessary of itself is prior to 'not necessary of itself; whatever is
in the divine is formally* necessary of itself; nothing in creatures
is formally necessary of itself, because each has 'being after non-
being,' and so is possible; therefore, etc.
Reply to the Initial Arguments of the First Question
14 To the first argument [n. 1] I say that the implication about

two gods is [logically] necessary, because they cannot posit two
effects through the same action. It is equally impossible that two
perfect agents produce one perfect effect. Neither does it follow
that an effect is twice given existence, for one existence logically
implies but one action. The persons, however, have but one
existence. I say, however, to the argument, that [this]
demonstration is to prove a posteriori* that there are not several
gods, because each god individually would prevent all possible
things from coming to be by any other of these, and thus render
another impotent, because omnipotence would not be in them
except in regard to what are possible, just as is the case now in
one God, because from the fact that they would not have the same
deity nor the same essence, they would not necessarily will the
same thing, nor would the will of one necessarily be ordered to
the will of another, because then that one would not be god, but
[each one] could contingently will that or the opposite of it. But it
simile, quia Pater et Filius habent eandem voluntatem et eodem

velle numero producunt simul omnes personae quodcumque
producibile vel effectibile extra. Unde concedo quod cuilibet
personae voluntas sit principium liberum agendi, et cum libertate
non potest stare quod in eadem voluntate simul sit velle et
proximum nolle. Et ideo non potest velle ut in Patre prius origine
quam in Filio vel Spiritu Sancto esset principium producendi
quodcumque effectibile in quocumque esse (nisi idem principium
sit pro tunc in Filio et in Spiritu Sancto, ita quod in illo priori, in
quo est Pater, non intelligitur creatura esse), sed ut8 idem
principium exsistens in tribus est principium unius actionis, et
creatura terminus posterior illo principio ut est in tribus, ita quod
prioritas actionis est comparando res extra ad personas, non
respectu termini ad intra, sicut alias dixi in simili de Spiritu
Sancto.9
15 Ad secundami0 rationem dico quod velle quo producitur
creatura prius habetur in tribus personis quam transeat super
quodcumque obiectum extra, ut iam probatum est. Et ideo
quaelibet persona aeque libere producit, non determinata aliunde
quam ex sua propria libertate. Et quando dicitur quod Pater
prius habet velle, verum est respectu obiecti primi et essentiae
suae, et illud postea communicat Filio, et uterque Spiritui Sancto.
Prius enim Pater habet velle respectu creaturae quam Filius, non
tamen in priori illo ponitur creatura in esse per illud velle, quia
respectu omnium obiectorum secundorum prius habetur velle a
qualibet persona quam transeat super quodcumque tale obiectum
extra effectibile, quia prius personae divinae producuntur per
actum intellectus et voluntatis et sunt in se istis actibus vere
priusquam producatur creatura secundum quodcumque esse eius,
quia secundum quodcumque esse eius producitur ab omnibus
personis simul et uniformiter. Non ergo valet quando dicitur quod
8 'Ut ... est': melius lege 'ut ... sit' (vel 'ut ...esset').
3 Cf. supra Dist. 18, n. 17.
i0 Cf. supra n. 2.
is not like this in the case at hand, because the Father and the
Son have the same will and by the numerically same willing all
the persons simultaneously produce whatever is producible or
effectible outside. Hence, I concede that to each person the will is
a free principle of acting, and it is inconsistent with that liberty
[in them] that the same will could will [in one] and not will in the
next. And therefore, one cannot wish that the principle of
producing any effectible in any existence were in the Father, by
priority of origin, before it is in the Son and Holy Spirit, unless an
identical principle is at the same time in the latter two, so that it
is inconceivable that a creature should exist beforehand in the
Father's priority [of origin]. Indeed, [it should be understood] that
the same principle existing in the three is the principle of one
action, and a creature [is] the term [of this action] posterior to
that principle as it is in the three, so that [one can speak of] the
priority of the action [only] while comparing a thing outside with
the three persons [together], not as regards a [particular] term
within, [i.e., one or the other person within the Trinity,] just as
elsewhere I have said the like about the Holy Spirit.
15 To the second reason [n. 2] I say that 'to will' by which a
creature is produced is first possessed within the three persons
before it is directed at any object whatsoever outside, as has
already been proved. And therefore each person produces equally
freely, and is not determined by anything other than his own
liberty. And when it is said that the Father has [the ability] to
will first, this is true as regards his first object and his essence,
and afterwards he communicates it to the Son, and they both
communicate it to the Holy Spirit. For the Father has [the ability]
'to will as regards a creature' before the Son has it, but not in that
prior [instant] does the Father produce the creature in existence
by that willing, because as regards all secondary objects willing is
first possessed by each person before it acts upon any such
effectible object outside, because the divine persons are first
produced through an act of the intellect and will, and they are in
themselves truly through these acts before a creature may be
produced according to whatever being it has, because according to
whatever being it has it is produced by all the persons
simultaneously and uniformly. Therefore, it is not valid when it is
Pater in illo priori quo habet velle posset creaturam producere,

quia velle divinum, ut est actus absolutus, est idem quod essentia,
et hoc est necessarium velle. Sed velle ut in persona ad
creaturam, contingens. Hoc autem magis solvetur in materia de
contingentibus futuris.
16 Dico igitur quod velle ut velle, et ut est primi obiecti
necessario voliti, habetur, sicut dixi, in tribus personis antequam
transeat in obiecta secundaria contingenter, ut patet in solutione
quaestionis. Et ideo quaelibet persona determinat voluntatem ut
eius ad quodlibet obiectum contingenter. Quod autem voluntas in
Filio determinetur a Patre ad primum volitum, non est
inconveniens, quia ibi est necessitas. Quaelibet enim persona
habet illud velle necessario; sed secundum velle habet
contingenter in quo nulla determinatur ab alia, eo modo quo
dictum est.
[III. Ad secundam quaestionem

A. Opinio Aegidii Romani
1. Exprimitur opinio]
17 Ad secundam quaestionem diciturii quod ad omnipotentiam

in Patre pertinet potentia generandi, non autem in Filio, quia in
Patre includit contradictionem si non haberet omnipotentiam; in
Filio autem non includit contradictionem.
18 Item, actiones transeuntes habent possibilitatem ex termi-
no, sed immanentes ex agente in quo sunt. Unde ad actionem
immanentem non sufficit quod sit possibilis in se sed in tali
agente; sed haec actio non est possibilis in Filio, quia Filius non
est tale agens scilicet, generans; ergo etc.
19 Hoc autem confirmatur, quia illud dicitur simpliciter pot ens
quod habet actiones convenientes suae formae, quae est
principium agendi. Sed Patri contingit generare ratione formae,
non autem Filio.
ii Aegidius Rom., Sent. I, d. 20, princ. 1, q. 1 in corp. (f. 114G-K); q. 2 in corp

et adarg. 1-4 (f. 115B, D-E).
said that the Father in that prior [instant* of nature] in which he

has [the ability] 'to will' could produce a creature, because the
divine willing, insofar as it is an absolute act, is identical with the
essence, and is necessary willing. But the willing, as it is in a
[divine] person as regards the creature, is contingent. This,
however, will be solved to a greater extent during the discussion
of future contingents.
16 I say, therefore, that 'to will' as willing, and as it pertains to
the first object that is necessarily willed, as I have said, is in the
three persons before it is directed contingently at secondary
objects, as is evident in the solution to the question. And therefore
each person determines the will as his to each object contingently.
But that the will in the Son may be determined by the Father to
the first thing willed is not incongruous, because there necessity*
exists. For each person has that willing necessarily; but the
second willing it has contingently in which no person is
determined by another, in the way it has been explained.
To the Second Question

The opinion of Giles of Rome
17 To the second question, it is said that the potency of

generating pertains to omnipotence in the Father but not in the
Son, because in the Father not having omnipotence includes a
contradiction; in the Son, however, it does not include a
contradiction.
18 Also, transient actions* draw their possibility from their
terms [or objects], but immanent actions*from the agent in
which they are. Hence, it does not suffice for an immanent action
to be possible in itself but in such an agent; but this action is not
possible in the Son, because the Son is not such an agent, namely,
generating; therefore, etc.
19 This is confirmed, because it is that which has actions
appropriate to its formwhich is the principle of actionthat is
said to be simply potent. But it is the Father that happens to
generate by reason of the form, but not the Son.
[2. Contra opinionem Aegidii]
20 Sed hoc non capio, quia generare, ut tendit in Filium ut in

terminum, aut est ad ipsum per se omnipotentia, aut non. Si sic.
tunc in nullo est omnipotentia, quia respicit tantum hunc actum
vel terminum et non aliquid extra. Ergo in quocumque est
omnipotentia, non est ad hunc terminum. Si enim omnipotentia
esset ad hunc terminum, ergo in quocumque non est actus
respectu huius termini, non esset omnipotentia, et sic in Filio non
erit omnipotentia, quod falsum est.
[3. Responsio Scoti]
21 Dico igitur ad istam quaestionem breviter quod ad illum

actum sive ad illum terminum est per se omnipotentia, qui
secundum se est possibilis in quocumque sit omnipotentia. Quod
autem in hoc et non in illo, hoc accidit. Nam si ad actum currendi
causandum requiritur potentia aliqua, illa potentia quae non
potest causare cursum, non esset omnipotentia, ex quo currere est
quoddam possibile. Si autem non potest causare actum in eo quod
non est aptum natum currere, non propter hoc dicetur impotens
vel non habere omnipotentiam. Ut si Deus non potest causare in
se actum cursus vel in lapide actum intelligendi, non propter hoc
esset impotens. Sed si non posset causare istos actus in
habentibus aptitudinem ad illos, ut si non posset causare cursum
in animali et intelligere in intellectu, esset impotens.
Omnipotentia ergo est respectu cuiuslibet possibilis produci. sicut
aptum natum est produci, ut si illud possibile sit aptum natum
esse per se, omnipotentia producit illud in se ut substantias. Si sit
aptum natum esse in alio, omnipotenta est respectu lllius in alio,
ut accidentia producuntur in substantiis. Filius autem in divinis
non est terminus possibilis, quia est ex se necesse esse. Ergo
potentia productiva eius non est ad omnipotentiam pertinens
quae solum respicit possibilia. Si tamen Filius esset terminus
possibilis et potentia generationis eius esset potentia simphciter,
tunc persona quae non posset in actum generandi, non esset
omnipotens, quod est falsum.
Against the opinion of Giles
20 But I do not understand this, because to generate,' as it is

directed at the Son as at its term, either is per se omnipotence
towards him [as its object] or not. If it is, then in none is it
omnipotence, because it regards only this action or term, and not
anything beside [it]. Therefore, in whatever there is omnipotence,
it is not to this term. For if omnipotence were only as regards this
term, therefore whatever lacks the act that regards this term,
would lack omnipotence [as well], and thus the Son would lack
omnipotence, which is false.
Reply of Scotus
21 I say briefly to this question, therefore, that there is per se

omnipotence in respect to that act or that term, which as such is
possible in whoever omnipotence exists. But that it is in this and
not in that, is accidental. For if some power were required for
causing an act of running, that power that could not cause one to
run, would not be omnipotence: hence 'to run' is a particular
possible. But if it could not cause an act in one that by nature* is
incapable of running, it would not on this account be impotent, or
not have omnipotence. For example, if God could not cause in
himself an act of running or in a stone an act of understanding,
he would not be impotent on this account. But if it could not cause
those acts in things that have an aptitude for them, e.g., if he
could not cause running in an animal and understanding in an
intellect, he would be impotent. Omnipotence, therefore, is in
regard to anything that could possibly be produced, in the way in
which it is suited to be produced. E.g., if this possible is suited by
nature to be per se, omnipotence produces such things as per se,
e.g., substances. If it is something suited by nature to be in
another, omnipotence produces such as what is in another, e.g.,
accidents in substances. But the Son in the divine is not a
possible term, because it is necessary being as such. Therefore,
power that produces him does not pertain to omnipotence that
only regards what is possible. But if the Son were a possible term
and the power to generate him were an unqualified potency, then
[4. Ad rationes Aegidii]
22 Ad rationem primam12 quando dicit in minori si

omnipotentia non esset in Patre includit contradictionem, sed non
in Filio', dico quod illa contradictio non est ex actione ut termini
sed ut subiecti in quo recipitur. In Patre vero non recipitur actio.
23 Similiter ad aliud13 de actione immanente et transeunte.
dico si generare natum est esse in Patre, non potest causari a
quocumque in illo in quo immanet, et sic non est omnipotens, si
causatur in illo generatio in respectu ad alium.
24 Ad confirmationem14 per exemplum de igne, dico quod est ad
oppositum, quia licet forma ignis, quae est limitata respectu
alicuius actionis vel potentiae, dicat potentiam, tamen quia
limitata tollit omnipotentiam, unde ignis per formam caloris non
potest frigefacere, quia est limitatae potentiae.
[B. Responsio Scoti ad quaestionem]
25 Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem et declaro primo quod

generare Filium non sit actus omnipotentiae, nec Filius productus
est terminus eius; secundo quod ad actum generandi et ad Filium
producendum est aliqua potential tertio ostendo quod non
obstante quod illa potentia sit in Patre et non in Filio, adhuc
Pater et Filius sunt aequales in omnipotentia.
1* Cf. supra n. 17.

13 Cf. supra n. 18.
" Cf. supra n. 19.
a person in whom there was no power to generate [him], would

not be omnipotent, which is false.
To the reasons of Giles
22 To the first reason [n. 17] when he says in the minor 'not
having omnipotence in the Father would include a contradiction,
but not if it were not in the Son,' I say that this contradiction does
not result from the action qua in a term but qua in a subject in
which it is received. In the Father, however, an action is not
received.
23 Likewise to the other [n. 18] about immanent and transient
action, I say that if to generate is suited by nature to be in the
Father, it cannot be caused by anything in that in which it is
immanent, and thus he is not omnipotent if generation in him as
regards another is caused.
24 To the confirmation [n. 19] by the example of fire,3 I say that
it proves the opposite, because although the form of fire, which is
limited with respect to some action or potency, asserts power,
nevertheless the fact that it is limited destroys omnipotence.
Hence fire through the form of heat cannot chill, because it is a
limited power.
Scotus's reply to the question
25 I reply, therefore, to the question and clarify first that to

generate the Son is not an act of omnipotence, nor is the 'Son
produced' its term; secondly that some ability does correspond to
the act of generating and to producing the Son; thirdly I show
that notwithstanding that this ability is in the Father and not in
the Son, still the Father and the Son are equal in omnipotence.
:1 It is Ordinatio I, d. 20, n. 20 (V, 311) that gives this example.

[1. Art. 1
Potentia generandi Filium
non pertinet ad omnipotentiam]
26 De primo dico quod potentia generandi Filium non pertinet

ad omnipotentiam, quia Filius, ut dictum est, non est possibilis.
Probatio: cum dicitur 'omnipotentia' non fit ibi distributio
potentiae universaliter; tunc enim distribueretur pro potentia
bovis et canis et lapidis, et tunc omnipotentia staret pro potentia
omnium istorum. Et ita cum in Deo non sit formaliter potentia
bovis et lapidis et huiusmodi, cum quaelibet dicat formaliter
imperfectionem et limitationem, Deus non esset formaliter
omnipotens, quod falsum est. Distribuitur ergo omnipotentia non
respectu potentiae universaliter, sed respectu possibilis obiecti
universaliter. Unde omnipotentia, id est potentia omnium
possibilium, est una singularis potentia sub potentia universaliter
distributa contra alias potentias distincta, sicut Socrates est unus
homo distinctus a Platone contentus sub homine distributo. Ergo
cum Filius non sit possibilis sed ex se necesse esse, sequitur quod
non sit terminus omnipotentiae; nec generare Filium est actus
omnipotentiae. Est tamen actus alicuius potentiae, sed alterius
potentiae distinctae contra eam, ut una species ponitur distincta
ab alia vel individuum ab alio.
[2. Art. 2
Filius est terminus alicuius potentiae]
27 Secundo ostendo quod licet Filius non sit terminus

omnipotentiae nec actus generandi actus omnipotentiae, est
tamen actus alicuius potentiae, et Filius terminus illius potentiae.
Potentia enim stricte sumpta est potentia transmutativa, V et IX
Article One
The ability to generate the Son
does not pertain to omnipotence
26 About the first I say that the ability4 to generate the Son
does not pertain to omnipotence, because the Son, as had been
said, is not a possible. Proof: when one mentions 'omnipotence,'
one does not include there all ability in its totality, for then it
would include the 'ability of a cow,' dog, and stone, and then
omnipotence' would mean 'having the ability of all these.' And so,
since God formally does not possess the ability of a cow, stone and
the like, because each of these formally asserts imperfection and
limitation, God would not be formally omnipotent, which is false.
Therefore, omnipotence is not what includes [just any] ability
universally, but [an ability to act] on any possible object
universally. Hence omnipotence, that is ability towards all that is
possible,' is one individual abilityas distinguished from other
abilitiesthat falls under 'ability' in the most general sense, as
'Socrates' is one man distinct from 'Plato' under 'man' in the most
general sense. Therefore, since the Son is not a possible but of
himself a necessary being, it follows that he is not a term of
omnipotence, nor is 'to generate the Son' an act of omnipotence.
Nevertheless, it is the act of some ability distinct from it, as one
species is posited as distinct from another, or one individual [as
distinct] from another.
Article Two
The Son is the term of some potency
27 Secondly I show that, although the Son is not the term of

omnipotence, nor is the act of generating an act of omnipotence,
nevertheless [the act of generating] is the act of some potency,
and the Son is the term of that potency. For 'potency' taken
strictly is 'transmutative potency'according to Bks. V and IX of
4 The meaning of potentia here is closer to 'ability': hence a different term

used to translate this word, as opposed to, e.g., the next paragraph (n. 27) where
the use of potentia is closer to its habitual technical meaning ('potency' as
opposed to 'act').
Metaphysicae,15 quae est principium transmutandi aliud in

quantum aliud. Ab ista autem potentia transmutativa abstrahi-
mus potentiam activam in quantum activam, quae de se est
alicuius possibilis sine transmutatione, quaei6 non importat
imperfectionem aliquam de se sicut potentia transmutativa, quia
ipsa ponitur rei possibilis obiective in esse secundum totum esse
sui, secundum Avicennam, VI Metaphysicae,i1 ut patet in
creatione. Sed nos ponentes productionem ad intra in divinis et
ad terminum necessarium, non mutabilem vel transmutabilem
sed nec etiam possibilem, oportet ulterius abstrahere ab utraque
potentia potentiam productivam qua persona aliqua producitur in
eadem natura necessaria ex se et per consequens sine transmuta
tione et motu vel possibilitate ex parte termini. Et haec potentia
est ad Filium ut ad terminum mediante actu notionali, qui est
actus generationis. Nec ista potentia clauditur sub omnipotentia,
sicut dictum est, quia per omnipotentiam non distribuitur poten
tia universaliter, sed obiectum possibile potentiae. Distribuitur
autem potentia productiva ab illa sicut activa productiva, et una
potentia singularis ab alia, ut dictum est.
28 Et si obicitur quod si potentia activa, quae est respectu

omnium possibilium omnipotentia, transfertur ad divina; ergo et
suum correlativum similiter transferetur, scilicet possibile
potentia passiva, et per consequens potentia activa productiva
continebitur sub omnipotentia, quae primo modo est respectu
possibilium; et ita potentia productiva est respectu alicuius
possibilis, Respondeo dupliciter. Uno modo sic, sicut dictum est
l5 Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 12 (1019a 15-6); ibid., IX (6), c. 1 (1046a 10-2).

i Melius: quaeque vel et quae.
i7 Cf. Avicenna, Metaph. VI, c. 1 (AviL, 291-300); ibid., c. 3 (AviL, 307-19)
the Metaphysicswhich is a principle of transmuting something

else insofar as it is other. But from this transmutative potency we
separate active potency insofar as it is activewhich is of itself
directed at something possible without transmutationthat does
not imply any imperfection as such, as transmutative potency,
because it is understood as directed at [some] thing objectively
capable of existing as regards its whole being, according to
Avicenna, in Bk. VI of the Metaphysics, as is evident in the case of
creation. But, positing production internally in the divine, which
is directed at a necessary termnot mutable or transmutable,
and not even a possible onewe must abstract further from both
potencies the productive potency by which some person is
produced: in the same necessary nature, of itself and, as a
consequence, without transmutation and motion or possibility on
the part of the term. And this potency is directed at the Son as at
its term, through the mediation of a notional* act, which is the
act of generation. Nor is this potency enclosed under
omnipotence, as has been said, because omnipotence is not [the
term for] including 'universally any potency,' but an 'ability [to
act] on [any] possible object.' However, 'productive potency' partly
overlaps5 with that one [i.e., omnipotence, or 'active potency']as
one individual potency with another, as has been saidinsofar as
it [i.e., 'productive potency'] is 'active-productive'.6
28 And if it be objected that if active potencythe one that is
as regards all possibles, [i.e.,] omnipotenceis transferred to the
divine, therefore also its correlative is likewise transferred,
namely the possible, [or] passive potency, and as a consequence
active-productive potencycontained under omnipotence, which
is primarily in regard to possibles[will be there]; and thus [a
5 A free rendering of distribuitur, which here seems to indicate overlapping

of concepts, as opposed to one concept including another entirely (clauditur).
The reading activa productive contained in V is chosen over activa a
productiva (in the rest of the MSS) for the purpose of clarity, in order to explain
beforehand the term activa productiva that is used regularly in the following n.
28 where 'active-productive potency' is understood not as contained under
'omnipotence' but as partly overlapping with it (otherwise some statements in n.
28 will become incomprehensible). Activa a productiva also makes sense and
could be translated as follows: "...overlaps with that one [i.e., omnipotence] as
'active' [overlaps] with 'productive,' and [in general] one individual potency with
another...".
in quaestione praecedente: quando in creaturis alterum relativum

dicit perfectionem et alterum correlativum dicit imperfectionem,
semper illud quod dicit perfectionem sine imperfectione
cuiusmodi sunt perfectiones limitatae creaturarum ut sic
potest transferri ad divina, et aliud correlativum nullo modo, si
formaliter dicat imperfectionem, sed aliquid communius suo
correlativo proprio quod non dicit imperfectionem, ut prius
dictum est de parte et toto. Quod pars dicit imperfectionem non
conceditur in divinis, et tamen proprium correlativum totius
conceditur, scilicet aliquid communius parte quod non includit
imperfectionem formaliter ut esse ad aliquid. Potentia autem
activa productiva dicit perfectionem et ideo potest transferri. Sed
possibile non, quia dicit imperfectionem, ut habens esse post non
esse non ponitur secundum se in divinis. In suo tamen
communiori potest concedi ibi, ut producible, quia sic non
includit imperfectionem praedictam; producibile enim non habet
esse post non esse, sed semper habens esse ab alio, habet esse,
non tamen post non esse.
29 Aliter potest dici quod cum duplex sit possibile, subiectivum
et obiectivum licet in divinis non sit potentia subiectiva est
tamen ibi potentia obiectiva qua aliquis potest produci et
terminare potentiam productivam. Et isto modo potest concedi
Filium esse possibilem obiective, et Spiritum Sanctum similiter,
in quantum terminat actionem spirationis Patris et Filii. Et istud
possibile non repugnat necessario ex se, quia non est possibile
creabile; sed tali possibili repugnat esse a se necessarium, quia
quod est necessarium a se nullo modo potest esse terminus
alicuius potentiae.
certain type of] productive potency [in the divine] is in regard to

some possible I respond in two ways. One way is this, as just
has been said in the previous question: when in creature one
relative* asserts perfection and its correlative imperfection,
always that which asserts perfection without imperfectionthe
limited perfections of creatures are of this sortin this way can
be transferred to the divine, and not the other correlative in any
way, if formally it implies imperfection, but something more
common than its proper correlative, which does not include
imperfection. As was said above about the part and the whole,
because 'part' implies imperfection it is not conceded in the
divine, and nevertheless a proper correlative of 'whole' is
conceded, namely, something more common than a part that does
not formally include imperfection, such as 'being towards
something.' But active-productive potency asserts perfection and
therefore it can be transferred. However, not the possible,
because it implies imperfection, as something having being after
non-being is not posited as such in the divine. At the same time,
in its more abstract form, as a producible, it can be conceded
there, because in this way it does not include the aforesaid
imperfection. For a producible does not have being after non-
being, but it has existence, always receiving being from another,
and yet not after non-existence.
29 Otherwise, it could be said that since the possible is
twofoldsubjective and objectivealthough in the divine there is
no subjective potency, there is, however, objective potency by
which someone can be produced and can terminate productive
potency. And in this manner it can be conceded that the Son is
possible objectively, and the Holy Spirit likewise, inasmuch as it
terminates the action of spiration* of the Father and Son. And
this possible of itself is not opposed to being necessary, because it
is not a creatable possible; at the same time, such a possible is
repugnant to being 'necessary by itself,' since what is necessary
by itself in no way can be the term of some potency.
[3. Art. 3
Pater et Filius sunt aequales in potential
30 Quantum ad tertium dico quod etsi in Patre sit ista potentia

productiva et generativa respectu Filii, quae tamen non est in
Filio, adhuc Pater et Filius sunt aequales in potentia. Nam si
potentia accipitur pro illo quod formaliter importatur et
significatur nomine potentiae, cum illud sit relatio quaedam et
secundum relationem non importatur aliqua perfectio virtualis,
ut dictum est, secundum illam non attenditur inter Patrem et
Filium aliqua aequalitas vel inaequalitas. Si autem accipiatur pro
fundamento relationis talis, ut accipitur communiter ut cum
dicitur quod potentia est principium transmutandi aliud in
quantum aliud, quod non est verum de relatione sed de
fundamento eius, sic potentia est aliqua magnitudo virtualis
aequalis in Patre et Filio.
31 Unde licet nec Filius nec Spiritus Sanctus sint aequales
Patri in potentia generandi et spirandi, quae non est potentia
aliqua sed relatio quaedam penes quam non attenditur aequali
tas, quia non est perfectio formaliter, ut dictum est, accipiendo
tamen potentiam pro fundamento talium relationum, omnes
personae sunt aequales in potentia. Et secundum hoc faciliter
potest salvari dictum Magistri, distinctione 7, ubi dicit quod
eadem est potentia qua Pater potest gignere et Filius gigni, et
multa alia dicta sanctorum ibi, quae vera sunt loquendo de
fundamento relationis importatae per potentiam, et non de ipsa
relatione.
32 Patet ergo conclusio principalis quod potentia generandi non
pertinet ad omnipotentiam in quacumque persona. Et hoc
dicerent philosophi si concederent generationem in divinis.
Article Three
The Father and Son are equal in potency
30 As for the third, I say that although the Father possesses

this productive and generative potency as regards the Sonthat
the Son does notstill the Father and the Son are equal in
potency. For if potency be taken for what formally is implied and
signified by the name 'potency,' since this is a certain relation,
and in connection with a relation no virtual perfection is implied,
as has been said, on this basis no equality or inequality between
Father and Son is taken into account. But if it may be taken in
the sense of the foundation of such a relation, as it is commonly
taken when it is said that the potency is a principle of
transmuting something insofar as it is other, which is not true
about a relation but is true about its foundation, in this way
potency is some virtual magnitude that is equal in the Father and
Son.
31 Hence, indeed, neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit are equal
to the Father as regards the potency of generating and spirating,*
which is not some potency, but a certain relationship in which
equality is not taken into account, because it is not formally a
perfection, as has been said. But by taking potency as the
foundation of such relations, all the persons are equal in potency.
And according to this what the Master says in the distinction 7
can easily be preserved, where he says that it is the same potency
whereby the Father generates and the Son is generated. And
many other assertions of the Fathers of the Church there [can be
accepted], which are true, speaking about the foundation of the
relationship implied by 'potency,' though not about the relation
itself.
32 Therefore the main conclusion is evident, that the potency of
generation does not pertain to omnipotence in any person. And
this the philosophers would say if they were to concede
generation in the divine.
[IV. Ad argumenta principalia secundae quaestionis]
33 Ad primam rationemi8 potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo quod

consequentia illa tenet gratia materiae qua dicitur 'Pater est
omnipotens, ergo potest generare Filium'. Unde si omnipotentia
dat intelligere omnem perfectionem quae est in divinis simplici-
ter, tunc vera est gratia materiae. Si autem intelligitur
omnipotentia quia habet proprietatem convenientem actioni
notionali, sic non tenet consequentia; nec ratione omnipotentiae
quae est ad extra, quia illa non convenit actioni notionali sed
essentiali; nec ratione proprietatis ad intra, quia non est in Filio
talis omnipotentia ut sit principium generandi. Et patet simile
istius, si diceretur 'Pater potuit generare Filium, ergo potuit
intelligere', quia si non potuit intelligere ipsum, non habuit in se
omnem perfectionem.
34 Vel dicendum quod Augustinus probat contra Maximinum
quod Pater possit generare Filium sibi aequalem. Supponit
tamquam ab illo concessum, quod Pater genuit Filium, quia hoc
concessit Maximinus, sed ponit ipsum minorem Patre. Non
sequitur quod si Pater generat Filium et non potest generare
Filium sibi aequalem, quod sit impotens. Et ideo ex opposite
consequents cum eodem addito, sequitur oppositum antecedents
sic: 'si Pater non est impotens et potest generare Filium, ergo
potest generare Filium sibi aequalem'. Et ita sequeretur eadem
consequentia de Filio, si suppositum esset concessum de eo,
scilicet quod possit generare; sed hoc non conceditur.
35 Ad secundam rationemi9 quando dicitur quod ad omnisci-
entiam pertinet scire generationem Filii, ergo ad omnipotentiam
potentia generandi Filium, dico quod non valet consequentia, quia
scire non habet prioritatem realem nec posterioritatem ad scibile,
1H Cf. supra n. 7.
i9 Cf. supra n. 8.
Reply to the Initial Arguments for the Second Question
33 To the first argument [n. 7] a twofold answer can be given.

One way is that the implication holds by reason of the matter
when it is said "The Father is omnipotent; therefore he can
generate the Son [who is equal]." Hence, if omnipotence leads one
to think of all perfection that in an unqualified sense is in the
divine, then it is true by reason of the matter. But if omnipotence
is thought of because it has the property that pertains to the
notional [or personal] action, the implication does not hold, nor
does it if omnipotence is understood in the sense that it has to do
with what is external, because that does not pertain to the
notional, but to the essential; neither does it by reason of an
internal property, because the Son does not possess omnipotence
in the sense of the principle of generating. It is also clear
regarding a similar case, if one were to say: "the Father could
generate the Son, therefore he could understand," because if he
could not have knowledge of him, he would not have in himself all
perfection.
34 Or one must say that Augustine proves against Maximin
that the Father could generate a Son equal to himself. He
presupposes as something conceded by [Maximin] that the Father
has generated the Son, because Maximin concedes this, but
claims he is less than the Father. It does not follow that if the
Father generates the Son and cannot generate a son equal to
himself, he is impotent. And therefore from the opposite of the
consequent with the same addition7 the opposite of the
antecedent follows in this way: 'if the Father is not impotent and
can generate a Son, therefore he can generate a Son equal to
himself.' And so the same implication would follow about the Son,
if the supposition would be conceded about him, namely that he
could generate; but this is not conceded.
35 To the second argument [n. 8] when it is said that if it
pertains to omniscience to know the generation of the Son,
therefore to omnipotence pertains the potency of generating the
Son, I say that the implication does not hold, because to know
does not have any real priority nor posteriority as regards what is
7 That is, the same sentence structure.

eo quod scientia est sui ipsius, scilicet scientis, sed potentia elicit
rationem prioritatis ad actum cuius est. Et ideo amotio in scientia
destruit omniscientem, non autem sic est de omnipotentia, quae
non est nisi respectu possibilium extra.
knowable, from the fact that knowledge pertains to the one who
has it, namely the one knowing, but potency asserts an aspect of
priority to the act that pertains to it. Therefore, a removal in
knowledge destroys one's omniscience, but it is not this way with
omnipotence, which is only in regard to what is possible
externally.
[Distinctio 21
Quaestio unica
Utrum solus Pater sit Deus]
1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam primam quaeritur unum

utrum haec sit vera 'solus Pater est Deus'.
Videtur quod sic: Solus Deus, qui est Pater, est Deus. ergo
solus Pater est Deus. Probatio consequentiae: solum animal, quod
est homo, est rationale; ergo solus homo est rationalis.
2 Item, solus Deus est Pater, ergo solus Pater est Deus.
Probatio consequentiae: per conversionem de terminis transpo
ses.
3 Item, 'Solus Deus est Deus, ergo solus Pater est Deus'. Pro
batio consequentiae: 'Deus est Deus' aequivalet particulari huic
'hic Deus est Deus', ergo stat pro supposito et per consequens
addita dictione exclusiva potest exprimi de supposito. Sed suppo-
situm eadem ratione invenitur in Patre et Filio, et sic si solus
Deus est Deus, solus Pater est Deus, et solus Filius est Deus.
4 Item, ad universalem negativam exceptivam sequitur
affirmativa exclusiva de parte excepta, et convertuntur. 1 Sequitur
enim 'nihil praeter hominem currit, ergo solus homo currit'. et per
consequens exponentes. Sed Matth. 11, [27] dicitur quod Nemo
novit Filium nisi Pater. Ergo solus Pater novit Filium; notitia
Patris est essentialis et Deus; ergo sicut haec est vera 'solus Pater
novit Filium', ita haec 'solus Pater est Deus', igitur sic hoc est de
omnibus essentialibus respectu exclusionis.
5 Item, Augustinus, VI De Trinitate, cap. 7:2 "Solus Pater est
tantus quantus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus". Sed,
secundum ipsum "eo magnus quo Deus". Ergo si solus Pater sine
aliis est magnus magnitudine deitatis, solus Pater sine aliis est
Deus.
6 Contra: Augustinus, VI De Trinitate, cap. 8. et ponitur in
littera.3 Filius est Deus, ergo alius a Patre est Deus, et sic non
solus Pater est Deus.
1 Cf. Gualterus Burleigh, De puritate artts logicae. Tractatus brevior, pars 1,

partic 1 (ed. Ph. Boehner. 213-7).
* August., De Trin. VI. c 8, n. 9 (CCSL 50. 238; PL 42, 929).
1 August , De Trin. VI, c. 9, n. 10 (CCSL 50. 239; PL 42, 930); Petrus Lom-
bardus, Sent. I, d. 21, c. 2 (SB IV. 176).
584
Distinction 21
Sole Question
Is only the Father God?
1 In regard to distinction twenty-one one question is asked

whether this is true, 'Is only the Father God?'
It seems he is:
'Only God, who is the Father, is God'; therefore only the
Father is God. Proof of the implication:* 'Only an animal that is
man, is rational; therefore only man is rational.'
2 Also, Only God is Father, therefore only the Father is God.'
Proof of the implication: by the conversion of the terms
transposed.
3 Also, 'Only God is God, therefore only the Father is God.'
Proof of the implication: 'God is God' is equivalent to this
particular proposition 'This God is God,' hence this stands for a
supposit* and as a consequence, exclusive statement having been
added, it can be expressed of that supposit. But the supposit by
the same reason is found in the Father and Son, and so if only
God is God, only the Father is God, and only the Son is God.
4 Also, to a universal exceptive negative follows an exclusive
affirmative proposition about the part excepted, and they are
converted. For it follows: 'Nothing beside man runs, therefore
only man runs,' and as a consequence [follow] expository
inferences. But Matthew 11:[27] says: "No one knows the Son
except the Father." Therefore, only the Father knows the
Son,and knowledge of the Father is essential and is God
therefore, just as this is true, 'Only the Father knows the Son,' so
is this, 'Only the Father is God,' therefore in this way this is
about all essentials as regards exclusion.
5 Also, Augustine in Bk. VI of The Trinity, chapter 7: "The
Father alone is as great as the Father and Son and Holy Spirit."
But according to him 'by which he is great, by that he is God.'
Therefore, if only the Father without the others is great with the
greatness of deity, only the Father without the others is God.
6 To the contrary: Augustine, in Bk. VI of The Trinity, chapter
8, and it is cited in the text.* The Son is God, therefore another,
other than the Father, is God, and thus not only the Father is
God.
584
[I. Ad quaestionem
A. Opinio aliorum]
7 Hic dicitur quod haec absolute est vera 'solus Pater est Deus'
quia si esset falsa, hoc non esset nisi quia ly solus ex parte
subiecti excludit respectu praedicati omne aliud vel omnem alium
a Patre, et ita excludit tam Filium quam Spiritum Sanctum.
8 Sed hoc non est verum. Primo quia unum correlativorum

includit aliud, eo quod est de per se intellectu eius, nam 'posita se
ponunt' etc. Ergo dictio exclusiva addita uni correlativorum non
excludit reliquum. Sed Pater includit Filium, ergo 'solus' additum
Patri non excludit Filium.
9 Item, sequitur 'solus Pater est, ergo Pater est'; et si Pater

est, Filius est, quia relativa sunt simul natura. Ergo si solus Pater
est, Filius est. Respectu igitur esse non excluditur Filius per
dictionem exclusivam additam Patri. Sed idem est Patrem esse et
Deum esse. Ergo in hac propositione 'solus Pater est Deus', non
excluditur Filius.
10 Tertio sic: dictio exclusiva addita accidenti non excludit
subiectum, sed includit necessario. Unde non sequitur tantum
album est, ergo substantia non est', sed sequitur oppositum; patet
To the Question
7 Here it is saidi that this is true absolutely 'only the Father

is God'2 because if it were false, this would be only because the
word 'only' on the part of the subject excludes in regard to the
predicate, everything other or everyone other than the Father,
and thus it excludes both the Son and the Holy Spirit.
8 But this is not true. First because one correlative includes
the other, by the fact that it pertains essentially to its notion, for
'they assume each other as given' etc. Therefore, the exclusive
addition to one of the correlatives does not exclude the rest. But
the Father includes the Son, therefore 'only' added to the Father
does not exclude the Son.
9 Also, it follows 'the Father alone exists, therefore the Father
exists'; and if the Father exists, the Son exists, because relatives*
are simultaneous by nature. Therefore, if the Father alone exists,
the Son exists. Therefore, as regards existence the Son is not
excluded through the exclusive assertion added to the Father. But
that the Father exists and God exists are the same thing.
Therefore, in this proposition 'only the Father is God,' the Son is
not excluded.
10 Thirdly, in this way: an exclusive addition added to an
accident does not exclude its subject, but includes it necessarily.
i Cf. n. 2 above; this is being proposed and refuted in the next two para
graphs by the other doctor or doctors who hold this other opinion Scotus refers to.
We have not identified its author.
2 Here one must note the two different meanings of the Latin adjective solus
(the peculiarity that is not translatable into English by one term): 'only' (which
can also appear in the neuter as the adverb solum) and 'alone' (Scotus is aware of
these two meanings: see below n. 21 and especially n. 34ff.) While in order to
express either of these notions one can use solus in Latin, the statements that
are true for its meaning 'alone' may not be true for its meaning 'only.' Cf.: 'Alone,
Peter (i.e., on his own, without others, solus Petrus) cannot accomplish this task'
and 'Only Peter (i.e., exclusively, one out of all the rest, solus Petrus or solum
Petrus) cannot accomplish this task.' Some subtle points of the following
argument are based on the possibility of this other meaning of solus Calone' as
'taken by himself, on his own'), and even on the attempts to read some profound
truths into the grammatical 'neutrality' of one usage (solus as synonymous with
solum) as opposed to the 'masculinity' of the other. The term solus in what
follows is rendered as either 'only' or 'alone,' depending on the context.
per Philosophum, I Physicorum .4 Sed accidens ad subiectum non

habet essentialiorem vel necessariorem habitudinem quam unum
relativum ad suum correlativum, quia invicem se definiunt, ergo
etc.
[B. Contra opinionem]
11 Contra istam opinionem directe est Philosophus, I Physico

rum,5 ubi dicit quod si tantum principium est, principiatum non
est.
12 Item, unum6 oppositorum, quod non praedicatur de alio per
dictionem exclusivam additam sibi, excluditur ab alio, quia
universaliter excluditur omne illud quod non est de per se
intellectu eius, ut superius est de intellectu inferioris essentiali-
ter. Hoc enim apparet per negativam exponentem exclusivam
affirmativam. Quia sequitur 'solus homo currit, ergo nihil aliud
ab homine currit'. Ergo cum Filius non sit Pater formaliter,
loquendo per hanc 'tantum Pater est Deus' excluditur Filius.
13 Item, contingit intelligere vere et praecise aliquid inesse uni
correlativo ut sua propria differentia vel passio. Sed data hac
responsione, hoc esset impossibile, quia 'necessario' includeretur
in suo correlativo, et per consequens vere posset aliquid intelligi
ut uni relativo proprium, non enim posset per aliquam
propositionem vere significari esse illud sibi proprium quin statim
competeret suo correlativo. Filius ergo generaret, si solus Pater
generaret, quod est inconveniens.
[II. Responsio ad articulum]
14 Propter hoc igitur quantum ad istum articulum, dico quod

tanta est incompossibilitas inter opposita relativa respectu
eiusdem, sicut inter alia opposita. Et ideo sicut dictio exclusiva
* Aristot., Physica I, c. 3 (I860 25-30).

5 Cf. Aristot., ibid., c. 2 (185a 1-5).
r> Melius lege: respectu unius.
Hence, it does not follow 'only white exists, therefore substance

does not exist,' but the opposite follows; this is evident through
the Philosopher in Bk. I of the Physics. But an accident's
relationship to its subject is not more essential or necessary than
that of one relative to its correlative, because they define one
another; therefore etc.
Against the opinion of others
11 Against this opinion directly is what the Philosopher says in

Bk. I of the Physics, where he says that if only the principle*
exists, what issues from it does not exist.
12 Also, [regarding] one of two opposites, that which is not
predicated of the other, [due to being already exclusively predi
cated] of the [first] through the exclusive assertion, is excluded
from the other, because universally everything is excluded that
does not pertain to its per se meaning (as 'higher' is essentially
about what 'lower' means). For this becomes clear through the
negative explaining the exclusive affirmative. For this follows
'only man is running, therefore nothing other than man is
running.' Therefore, since the Son is not the Father formally,*
speaking of this 'only the Father is God,' the Son is excluded.
13 Also, it can happen that one is thinking about something
existing truly and precisely in one correlative as its proper
difference or attribute. But given this reply, this3 would be
impossible, because its correlative would be 'necessarily' included.
As a consequence something could be truly understood as proper
to one correlative, but it could not be expressed in some
proposition truly as proper to it without immediately pertaining
to its correlative. Therefore, the Son would generate, if only the
Father generated, which is incongruous.
Reply to the first article
14 Because of this, therefore, as to this article I say that such is

the incompatibility between opposite relatives as regards the
same thing as between other opposites. And therefore just as an
Namely, only the Father is God.

addita uni oppositorum aliquo genere oppositionis excludit

reliquum ut 'si solum album currit, nullum nigrum currit' et
ita dictio exclusiva addita uni relativorum excludit reliquum.
[III. Ad argumenta opinionis aliorum]
15 Ad primum argumentum7 pro opinione opposita, dico quod

sicut unum correlativorum est de intellectu alterius, vel sicut
includit illud, ita dictio exclusiva addita uni non excludit alterum.
Sed unum relativum non est de intellectu alterius, nec includit
illud, ut 'hoc hoc', ut superius est de intellectu inferioris
essentialiter, et ideo 'hoc est hoc' ut 'homo est animal'. Sed
relativum unum includit aliud ut 'hoc huius' genetive vel
secundum aliquam aliam habitudinem casualem quomodocumque
relativa diversimode referantur ad invicem, sive secundum
habitudinem genetivi vel ablativi vel accusativi. Et hoc modo
dictio exclusiva addita uni relativo non excludit reliquum quin sit
vel illius vel illo vel ad illum. Unde haec 'solus Pater generat'
includit quod Pater alicuius filii generat, sed non quod filius
generat, quia pater non est filius, sed est alicuius filii pater.
16 Ad aliud,8 cum dicitur 'solus Pater est, ergo Pater est', dico
quod ly Pater distrahitur et deminuitur, quia 'solus' est talis
determinatio distrahens et deminuens, et 'Pater', quantum est ex
se, includit associationem filii quam tamen privat dictio exclusiva
'solus', et ideo non sequitur 'tantum Pater est, ergo Pater est',
sicut nec sequitur 'est albus secundum dentes, ergo albus', sed est
fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, quia dictio exclusiva
repugnat intellectui patris et ideo deminuit a significato eius.
17 Sed contra: dictio syncategorematica numquam deminuit a

significato sui disponibilis, sed praesupponit significatum eius, eo
quod dicit modum determinandi eum respectu alterius extremi, et
modus semper praesupponit significatum eius quod modificat vel
disponit, aliter non modificaret rationem sed destrueret. Sed
7 Cf. supra n. 8.
8 Cf. supra n. 9.
exclusive word or phrase added to one of the opposites, in some

genus of opposition, excludes the rest, as 'if only a white one is
running, no black is running,' also in this way the exclusive word
added to one relative excludes all the rest.
To the arguments of the opinion of others
15 To the first argument for the opposite opinion [n. 8], I say
that just as one of the correlatives is about the notion of the other,
or, as it were, includes that, so an exclusive added to one does not
exclude the other. But one relative is not about the conception of
the other, nor does it include that as 'this this,' as 'higher' is about
the notion of 'lower' essentially, and therefore 'this is this' as 'man
is animal.' But the one relative includes the other as 'this is of
that'genitive caseor according to some other case-relationship
in howsoever diverse way relatives refer to one another: according
to a genitive or ablative or accusative relation. And in this way
speaking exclusively of one relative does not preclude the rest
from being either 'of that' or 'by that' or 'to that.' Hence, this 'the
Father alone generates' includes that 'the Father of some Son
generates,' but not that the son generates, because the father is
not the son, but is the father of some son.
16 To the other [n. 9], when it is said that 'the Father alone
exists, therefore the Father exists,' I say that the word 'Father' is
contracted and decreased by 'alone,' and 'Father,' inasmuch as it
is of itself, includes association with a son, which, however, the
exclusive word 'alone' removes. And therefore this does not follow
the Father alone exists, therefore the Father exists,' just as
neither does this 'he is white [only] as far as his teeth are
concerned, therefore [he is] white,' but it is a fallacy of the
qualified and unqualified. For the exclusive word is repugnant to
the notion of 'father,' and therefore it decreases what it signifies.
17 But against this: a syncategorematic* word never removes
anything from the signification of what it modifies, but
presupposes its meaning in that it speaks of the mode of
determining it with respect to the other term [it relates to], and
the mode always presupposes what it signifies, which it modifies
and arranges; otherwise it would not modify the notion but
dictio vel determinatio categorematica, quae dicit dispositionem

realem vel oppositum eius, potest distrahere et deminuere, ut
mortuum additum homini; numquam tamen syncategorema, quia
tunc omnis propositio universalis esset de subiecto deminuto ut
'omne totum est maius sua parte' vel 'de quolibet esse affirmatio
vel negatio'. Sed cum hoc sit falsum, quia tales propositiones de
subiecto modificato sunt prima principia in qualibet scientia quae
continent virtualiter omnes conclusiones, sequitur quod conse-
quentia haec sit bona 'solus Pater est, ergo Pater est', et non est
ibi fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.
18 Item, si 'solus' deminueret de significato Patris, ergo et in
hac solus Pater est Pater' similiter deminueret, et sic haec est
falsa 'solus Pater est Pater', sicut haec 'homo mortuus est homo'.
Probatio consequentiae: comparatio subiecti ad praedicatum non
variat comparationem inter se, nec aufertur per comparationem
inter se. Ergo si in ista 'solus Pater est', ly Pater deminueretur,
ubicumque ly solus adderetur ad Patrem deminueret de significa
to eius, quia semper possunt inter se comparari. Hoc autem est
falsum, ergo illud ex quo sequitur.
19 Respondeo ad rationem et dico quod sequitur formaliter si
solus Pater est, Filius non est'; sed gratia materiae potest sequi 'si
solus Pater est, ergo Filius est', quia gratia materiae Pater est
alicuius filii pater. Unde respectu alterius praedicati quam
correlativi, scilicet in quo unum relativum non dependet ab alio,
non tenet consequentia. Non enim sequitur 'si solus pater est
albus, ergo filius est albus'. Concedo ergo quod in hac propositione
'solus Pater est' formaliter excluditur Filius sed non materialiter:
immo includitur, et ideo antecedens includit opposita et
contradictoria, et ideo utrumque sequitur. Unde si solus Pater
est, Filius non est, et quia Pater est Filii, et ideo si Pater est,
destroy it. But a categorematic* word or determination, which

asserts a real disposition or its opposite, can distract and
decrease, as 'dead' added to 'man.' But never one that is
syncategorematic, because then all universal propositions would
be subject to diminution as 'every whole is greater than its part,'
or 'about anything existing there is affirmation or negation.' But
since this is false, because such propositions about a modified
subject are first principles in every science that contain virtually*
all their conclusions, it follows that this implication is valid 'the
Father alone exists, therefore the Father exists,' and there is no
fallacy there of substituting a qualified for an unqualified or vice
versa.
18 Also, if 'alone' would diminish what Father signifies, 'the
Father alone is Father' would likewise diminish, and thus this is
false 'the Father alone is Father,' just as this 'a dead man is a
man.' Proof of the implication: a relation of the subject to the
predicate does not vary the relation within [the subject] itself, nor
is it taken away through a relation within [the subject] itself.
Therefore, if in this 'the Father alone exists,' the word 'Father'
would be diminished, wherever the word 'alone' is added to the
Father, it would diminish what it signifies, because they [i.e., the
words within the subject] could always be related to one another.
But this is false, therefore that also from which it follows.
19 I reply to the argument and say that 'if only the Father
exists, the Son does not' follows formally; but by reason of the
matter it can follow 'if only the Father exists, therefore the Son
exists,' because by reason of the matter 'Father is the father of
some son.' Hence, with respect to a predicate other than a
correlative, namely in which one relative does not depend upon
the other, the implication does not follow. For it does not follow 'if
only the father is white, therefore the son is white.' I concede
therefore, that in this proposition 'only the Father exists' the Son
is formally excluded, but not materially, indeed, he is included,
and therefore the antecedent includes opposites and
contradictories, and therefore both follow. Hence if only the
Father exists, the Son does not exist, and because he is the
Father of a Son, therefore if the Father exists, the Son exists, and
Filius est; et sic ex antecedente includente contradictoria

sequuntur contradictoria.
20 Ad aliud9 dico quod si dictio exclusiva addatur accidenti in
abstracto sub quo modo non datur intelligere 'inesse subiecto',
excludit subiectum, unde sequitur 'sola albedo est, ergo
substantia non est vel superficies'. Et etiam sequitur oppositum
respectu esse quod ponitur, quia accidens non potest esse sine suo
subiecto, et ideo tale antecedens includit opposita, et sequuntur
opposita. Sed si accidens accipitur in concreto, non excludit
subiectum, quia dictio exclusiva non excludit illud quod vere
dicitur de subiecto. Sic autem non est de oppositis relativis, quia
neuter relativorum dicitur de alio.
21 Aliter dicitur quod cum 'solus' significet idem quod 'non cum
alio', nota alietatis potest sumi neutraliter vel masculine. Primo
modo est propositio vera, secundo modo est falsa.
22 Sed contra: adiectivum habet suum modum significandi a
substantivo. Ergo si substantivum potest sumi neutraliter et
masculine, et adiectivum similiter, per te. Ergo unum sequitur ad
aliud in suo aequipollente, quod est falsum, eo quod adiectivum
habet modos significandi conformes cum substantivo. Sic ergo
dicto 'solus Pater', 'solus' habet modum significandi Patris.i0
Unde exponens istam propositionem est haec 'nullus alius a
Patre' vel 'nullus non-pater est Deus' et haec convertibilis est cum
3 Cf. supra n. 10.

i0 Hoc loco nonnulli codd. addunt aliquod (et illud dicit quis sustentavit a
suo substantivo vel ut dicit quis substantiavit a suo substantivo), quod bene
interpretari non potest.
thus from the antecedent including contradictories, contradicto

ries follow.
20 To the other [n. 10] I say that if the exclusive expression is
added to an accident in the abstract, under which mode it is not
given to comprehend 'it exists in a subject,' it excludes the subject,
hence it follows that 'only whiteness exists, therefore the
substance or surface does not exist.' And its opposite also follows
as regards the existence that is posited, because an accident
cannot be without its subject, and therefore such an antecedent
includes opposites, and opposites follow. But if accident is taken
in the concrete it does not exclude its subject, because an
exclusive expression does not exclude that which is truly said of
the subject. Such, however, is not the case with opposed relatives,
because neither one can be said of the other.
21 In another way, it is said that while 'only' or 'alone' signifies
the same thing as 'not with another,' the note of 'otherness' can be
taken either in a neuter or in a masculine form.4 In the first way,
the proposition is true, in the second way it is false.
22 To the contrary, however: an adjective has its way of
signifying from a substantive. Therefore, if the substantive can be
taken in a neuter or masculine form [i.e., in some absolute sense,
and not as part of the immediate and changing grammatical
environment], also the adjective can, according to you. Therefore,
the latter follows the former [in its form also] in an expression
equivalent [to the former], which is false, for the adjective has a
mode of signification that conforms with its [immediate]
substantive. In this way in the phrase 'the Father alone,' 'alone'
has the mode of signifying of the 'Father,' [and preserves its
masculine form from its substantive].5 Hence, an expression that
explains this proposition is this: 'no one other than the Father' or
'no non-father is God,' and this is convertible with that: 'the
4 Regarding the forms and meanings of 'only,' as well as other issues of

grammar and interpretation see note to n. 7 above. In general, both this and the
following (n. 22) paragraph are difficult or even impossible to understand
properly without reading the argument in the Latin and paying attention to the
Latin grammatical forms.
r' The final addition to this sentence in the English is a loose rendering of the
two alternative readings that exist in some Latin MSS but are too unclear
grammatically to be included in the Latin version. See note to the Latin text.
ista 'solus Pater est Deus', et idem est dicere 'nullus non-pater' et
sic: 'nihil aliud est Deus nisi Pater'.
23 Alii autem distinguunt hanc 'solus Pater est Deus' secun
dum compositionem et divisionem, quia inter adiectivum et
substantivum cadit 'qui est' medium iuxta illud Prisciani, II
Constructionumii: inter exigens et exactum cadit 'qui est'
medium, ut cappa Socratis, id est, cappa quae est Socratis. Et
tunc valet haec 'solus Pater est Deus' id est 'solus ille qui est
Pater est Deus', quae est vera in sensu divisionis, et falsa in sensu
compositionis.
24 Sed contra: si ita esset quod inter adiectivum et substanti

vum caderet medium semper 'qui est', non esset possibile habere
conceptum determinatum nec aliqua propositio universalis ubi
adderetur signum universale quod proprie est adiectivum
subiecto communi esset de conceptu determinato. Sed semper
talis propositio esset distinguenda secundum compositionem et
divisionem. Ubi tamen non esset aliqua multiplicitas, et tunc
idem esset dicere 'omnis homo est animal' et 'omnis ille, qui est
homo, est animal', et iterum, cum inter adiectivum et substanti
vum cadat 'qui est' medium, ulterius diceretur 'omnis ille, qui est
ille qui est homo, est animal', et sic in infinitum.
25 Nec est verum quod omnis propositio talis sit distinguenda
secundum compositionem et divisionem, quia numquam docuit
talem distinctionem Philosophus I Elenchorum,i2 nisi propter
multiplicitatem a parte subiecti vel praedicati propter quam
potest haberi diversus sensus ex compositione illius ad subiectum
vel praedicatum, sicut hic 'homo albus est animal'. Non sic est de
adiectivo et substantivo, signo universali in termino communi,
quia non est distinguenda propositio ratione adiectivi vel
substantivi.
26 Ad illudi3 dico quod non dicit quod inter exigens et exactum
cadat 'qui est' medium nisi quando unum regit aliud, sicut cum
" Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae, XVIII, c. 1, n. 6-7 (ed. A. Krehl. II,

109-10).
i2 Aristot., De soph, elench. c. 4 (1656 25-6, 166a 23-37).
" Cf. supra n. 23.
Father alone is God,' and it is the same to say 'no (nullus) non-
father' and 'nothing (nihil)6 other is God except the Father.'
23 But others distinguish this 'only the Father is God'
according to the sense of composition* and division,* because
between an adjective and the noun falls the middle 'who is' (or
'that is') according to that [statement] of Priscian in Bk. II of
Constructions: between what is 'exacting' and 'exact' falls the
middle 'that is,' as the cape of Socrates, that is, the cape that is of
Socrates. And then this is valid 'only the Father is God,' that is,
'only he who is Father is God,' which is true in the sense of
division, and false in the sense of composition.
24 To the contrary: if it were so that between an adjective and
the noun there always falls that intermediate phrase, 'that is,' it
would not be possible to have a determinate concept. Nor
would any universal proposition, where a sign of universality
would be added that is an adjunct to the common subject, be
about a determined concept. But such a proposition would always
be distinguished according to composition and division. Even
where no multiplicity would be present, still to say 'every man is
an animal' would be the same as saying 'every he, who is a man,
is an animal.' And again, since between an adjective and noun
there falls an intermediate 'that is,' it would be said further 'every
he, who is he, who is a man, is an animal,' and so ad infinitum.
25 Neither is it true that every such proposition must be
distinguished according to composition and division, because the
Philosopher in Bk. I of On Sophistical Refutations taught such a
distinction only on account of many significations on the part of
the subject or predicate on account of which one could have
diverse senses from its composition with the subject or predicate,
just as this 'a white man is an animal.' It is not this way about an
adjective and substantive, a universal sign in a common term,
because the proposition need not be distinguished by reason of
the adjective or noun.
26 To the other [n. 23] I say that he [Priscian] asserts that
between 'exacting' and 'exact' falls the middle expression 'who or
that is' only when one governs the other, just as when it is said
the cape of Socrates.' For here falls the intermediate 'that is,'
6 I.e., at this time in the neuter.

dicitur 'cappa Socratis', hic enim cadit 'qui est' medium, quia
'cappa' regit hoc genetivum 'Socratis' ex vi possessionis.
[IV. Responsio ad quaestionem]
27 Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem sicut tenetur et dicitur

communiter quod 'solus' importat privationem associationis ad
aliud, I Elenchorum.i4
[V. Ad argumenta supra]
28 Quod potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo prout determinat

illud praecise cui additur in se et absolute ponens tantummodo
significatum suum circa illud, et sic est categorema quae de se
significat solitudinem. Et sic non conceditur in divinis quia,
secundum Hilarium, Deus non est solitarius; immo sic negaret
Hilarius solitudinem in divinis.
29 Alio modo potest intelligi determinare suum determinabile
in comparatione ad aliud, et sic est syncategorema.
Syncategoremata sunt compraedicativa quia non sunt subicibilia
et praedicabilia, ita quod per se significatum eius est dicere
modum alterius extremi, modo intellectus componentis et
dividentis, sicut in quantum est dictio syncategorematica, quia
dicit modum determinabilis, scilicet praecisionem in subiecto.
30 Sed quod syncategorema dicat praecisionem circa subiectum
potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo denotando subiectum
praecise in se subici respectu praedicati. Alio modo potest
denotare subiectum esse praecisum et praecisam rationem
inhaerentiae praedicati, et tunc dicit modum praecisum subiecti
in comparatione ad praedicatum, ut cui praedicatum praecise
conveniat et non alteri.
31 Et quod haec distinctio sit bona, patet in distinctione
termini reduplicativi 'in quantum', quae est dictio syncategorema
tica, quae uno modo dicit habitudinem subiecti ad praedicatum
specificando subiectum, ut cum dico 'ens in quantum ens est
H Aristot., De soph, elench. c. 22 (178a 39-6 1).

because 'cape' governs this genitive 'of Socrates' by reason of his

possessing it.
27 I reply, therefore, to the question as it is commonly held and

said that 'only' implies a privation of association with another, as
in Bk. I Of Sophistical Refutations.
To the arguments above
28 This can be understood in two ways. One way as it

determines precisely that, to which it is added 'in itself,' asserting
what is signified in regard only to that in an absolute way, and
thus we have a predicate (categorema) which of itself signifies
solitude. And thus it is not conceded in the divine, because
according to Hilary, God is not solitary; indeed Hilary denies
solitude in the divine.
29 In the other way it can be understood to determine its
determinable in comparison to another, and thus it is
syncategorematic. Syncategorematics are co-predicative, because
they are not able to be subjects and predicates, so that what they
signify per se signifies the mode of the other term, by way of the
intellect composing and dividing, just inasmuch as the saying is
syncategorematic, because it speaks of the determinable mode,
namely of precision in the subject.
30 But there are two ways in which a syncategorematic term
may speak of a precision about the subject: one way by denoting
the subject precisely in itself to be subject as regards the
predicate. In the other way it can denote the subject to be precise
and the precise reason of the predicate's inherence, and then it
asserts the precise mode of the subject in comparison to the
predicate, as that to which the predicate pertains precisely and
not to another.
31 And that this distinction is good, is evident in the distinction
of the reduplicative* term 'inasmuch,' which is syncategorematic
diction, which, in one way, asserts a relationship of the subject to
the predicate by specifying the subject, as when I say 'being
subiectum metaphysicae'; vel specificando praedicatum, ut 'motus

est actus entis in potentia secundum quod est in potentia'. Et sic
non tenetur reduplicative, quia tunc diceret habitudinem
causalitatis universaliter respectu praedicati, ut cum dico 'homo
est animal in quantum homo', ly homo dicit causam formalem
inhaerentiae praedicati, quia omnis homo est animal.
32 Sed tenetur tantum specificative in primo exemplo, secun
dum quam rationem ens sit subiectum metaphysicae, quia
secundum entitatem non sub ratione mobilis, quanti vel
huiusmodi rationibus partialibus, sub qua ratione est subiectum
aliarum scientiarum. Si enim 'ens' staret reduplicative, cum
dicitur 'ens in quantum ens est subiectum metaphysicae',
sequitur quod quodlibet ens esset subiectum huius libri vel
scientiae, sicut secundum Philosophum, I Priorum:i5 "Si iustitia
est bonum in quantum bonum, iustitia est omne bonum".
33 Similiter in secundo exemplo cum dicitur 'motus est entis in
potentia secundum quod est in potentia', ly 'secundum quod'
specificat rationem subiecti secundum quam convenit sibi
praedicatum, ut rationem potentiae qua movetur omne quod
movetur, et est formalis ratio mobilis, quia si 'secundum quod
movetur ad aliquid' esset in actu illius, iam moveretur ad nihil. Si
autem potentia hic tenetur reduplicative, sequeretur quod omne
quod est in potentia moveretur, et sic materia prima ad formam
omnem moveretur, quod est falsum, quia omne mobile est ens
actu compositum, Vi6 et VII Metaphysicae. Unde potentia non est
ratio quare motus inest, et ideo non dicit modum subiecti, sed
"> Aristot, Anal, priora I, c. 38 (49a 12-25).

i Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 12 (1019a 15-6).
inasmuch as it is being is the subject of metaphysics'; or by

specifying the predicate, as 'motion is an act of a being in
potency* insofar as it is in potency.' And in this way it is not held
as reduplicative, because then it would assert a relationship of
causality universally as regards the predicate, as when I say 'a
man is an animal inasmuch as he is a man,' the word 'man'
expresses the formal* cause of the inherence of the predicate,
because every man is an animal.
32 But it is held only in a specific sense in the first example,
'according to which notion being is the subject of metaphysics,'
because [it is] according to entity [and] not under the notion of
mobile, of how much, or such partial notions, under which it is
the subject of other sciences. But if 'being' were to stand in a
reduplicative sense, when it is said 'being qua being is the subject
of metaphysics,' it would follow that every being would be a
subject of this book or this science, just as according to the
Philosopher in Bk. I of the Prior Analytics: "If good qua good is
justice, every good is justice."
33 Similarly in the second example, when it is said that 'motion
is [an act] of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency,' the
word 'insofar as' specifies the reason why the predicate pertains
to the subject, as the reason of 'potency,' which moves everything
that is moved, and it is the formal reason of the mobile, because if
'that according to which it is moved to something' were in its act,
it could already be moved to nothing. But if potency here is held
in a reduplicative sense it would follow that all that is in potency
would be moved, and thus prime matter would be moved to all
forms, which is false, because every mobile is a being that is
actually composed, according to Bks. V and VII of the
Metaphysics.1 Hence, potency is not the reason why motion is in
[something], and therefore it does not assert the mode of the
subject, but it speaks of the precise specification of the subject, in
order to eliminate every notion extraneous to the subject, as the
7 Cf. Physics where there are many statements to the effect that what is in
motion or capable of being in motion changes and that everything that changes
must be divisible and to that extent has parts and that which has parts is a
composite of accidental or substantial parts. See, for example, Bk. VI, c. 4 (2346
10-235o 10).
dicit specificationem praecisam subiecti, et ut praescindatur

omnis ratio extranea subiecti, et ut habetur subiectum praecise in
se, et sic est de 'solo' et 'per se'.
34 Sic in proposito 'solus' uno modo dicit praecise rationem
subiecti respectu praedicati, quia modum praecisionis cuiuslibet
alterius a subiecto respectu praedicati, et denotat subiectum
praecise subici respectu talis praedicati. Alio modo, ut dictum est
supra, dicit praecisionem subiecti in se secundum unam
rationem, praescindendo alias in comparatione praedicati et
denotat subiectum esse praecisum cui secundum illam rationem
inest praedicatum.
35 Exemplum utriusque in communi modo loquendi, ut homo
praecise est grammaticus excludendo praedicatum ab omni alio
ab nomine, et tunc haec est vera 'solus homo est grammaticus';
vel quod ratio hominis secundum se sit praecisa ratio
inhaerentiae praedicati, et sic est falsa. Et primo modo haec est
vera 'solus Pater est Deus', quia Pater praecise, secundum
rationem suam, est Deus, non excludendo praedicatum a
quocumque alio cui non inest praecise ratio subiecti secundum
alium modum, quia tunc nec Filius nec Spiritus Sanctus essent
Deus, quod est falsum.
36 Et ita intelligenda est auctoritas Augustinii7 quod solus
Pater est tantus quantae sunt omnes tres personae, quia Patri, ut
praecise accipitur, convenit hoc praedicatum 'deitas' sicut
omnibus, quia Pater est principium deitatis aliis personis. Et sic
accipitur illud dictum de David: Tu solus computaberis pro mille.
Non quod ly solus teneatur categorematice et dicat solitudinem et
excludat associationem cum alio. Quia licet fuisset cum toto
populo suo, adhuc esset vera propositio illa et dicit praecisam
rationem in subiecto sub qua convenit sibi praedicatum,
i7 Cf. supra n. 5.
subject is had precisely in itself, and in this way is considered

alone' and 'per se.'
34 In this way in the case at hand 'only' or 'alone' in one mode
asserts precisely the notion of the subject as regards the
predicate, because [it asserts] a cutting off anything [or anyone]
else from the subject as regards the predicate and it denotes the
subject precisely as being the subject in reference to the
predicate. In the other, as has been said above, it asserts the
precision of the subject in itself according to one notion, by
prescinding from others in comparison to the predicate and
denotes the subject, to which the predicate is present under this
aspect, to be precise.8
35 An example of both according to the common way of
speaking: e.g., [if one says] 'man precisely is grammarian,'
meaning that one excludes the predicate from everything other
than man, then this is true 'A man alone is a grammarian.' Or
[meaning] that the notion of man according to itself is the precise
reason of the inherence of the predicate, in this way it is false.
And in the first9 way this is true 'Alone, the Father is God,'
because the Father precisely under this notion of him is God, not
excluding the predicate from anyone other to whom that precise
notion of the subject by reason of another mode is not present.
For then neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit would be God, which
is false.
36 And in this way the authoritative statement of Augustine
should be understood that alone the Father is as great as all three
persons,* because this predicate 'deity' pertains to the Father,
taken precisely, just as it does to all, because the Father is the
principle of the deity of the other persons. And in this way is
understood that dictum about David:10 "Alone you are equal to a
thousand." Not that the word 'alone' would hold categorematically
and assert isolation and exclude association with another.
Because even if he were with his entire populace, still that
8 Re. the two meanings of solus see note to n. 7 above.

9 Apparently in this and the following paragraph the 'second' meaning of
solus Calone' as 'sufficient by itself, without the others') is called 'first.' However,
it is absolutely clear which one is meant.
1o 2 Samuel 18: 3
excludendo praedicatum a quocumque alio quod non importat

rationem subiecti, quia alius quam David, si placuisset Deo, illo
modo quo David pro tot computaretur sicut ipse David. Est ergo
haec vera 'solus Pater est Deus', scilicet primo modo ut dicit
praecisionis modum vel praecisionem circa subiectum absolute.
37 Si autem secundo modo acciperetur, ut dicit praecisionem in
subiecto respectu inhaerentiae praedicati a quocumque alio a
subiecto, tunc est falsa, quia denotaret omnem, qui est Deus, esse
Patrem.
38 Probatio logice eo quod ad exclusivam affirmativam sequitur
universalis affirmativa de terminis transpositis.
39 Quod probatur dupliciter. A priori sic: dictio exclusiva deno-
tat praecisionem subiecti et adaequationem et commensuratio-
nem praedicati ad subiectum, ita quod nec ipsum excedit nec
exceditur, et nihil aliud importat vel notat universalis affirmativa
de terminis transpositis.
40 Item, probo hoc realiter a posteriori per consequentias
medias et per exponentes. Sequitur enim 'tantum animal est
homo, igitur nullum non-animal est homo', et ista est una
exponens quia 'non-animal' est commune ad ens et ad non-ens.
Ergo nullus homo est non-animal, ergo nullus non-homo est
animal, ergo omnis homo est animal. Similiter in proposito:
'nullus non-pater est Deus', sufficienter exponit hanc 'solus Pater
est Deus', ex qua ulterius arguitur per conversionem de terminis
transpositis, et ulterius ad negativam de praedicato infinito
sequitur affirmativa de praedicato finito.
41 Sed hic est instantia sophistarum qui sic arguunt: 'non est
non-homo, ergo non est homo' accipiendo non-homo infinite, tunc
ultra ex consequente 'non est homo et nihil aliud ab homine vel
non-homine est homo' et tamen non sequitur ' ergo non est homo'.
proposition would be true, and it gives the precise reason in the

subject under which the predicate pertains to it, by excluding the
predicate from any other that did not imply the notion of the
subject. For if others than David had pleased God, they would be
counted for as many as David himself in the way in which David
[was]. Therefore, this is true alone the Father is God,' namely in
the firstii way as it asserts the mode of precision or the precision
about the subject absolutely.
37 But if it is taken in the second mode, as it asserts precision
in the subject with respect to the inherence of the predicate to the
exclusion of anything other than the subject, then it is false,
because it would denote everyone, who is God, to be the Father.
38 The proof logically [is] from the fact that a universal
affirmative about the terms transposed follows from an exclusive
affirmation.
39 That is proved in two ways. A priori* in this way: an
exclusive affirmation denotes a precision of the subject, and
indicates the predicate is adequate and commensurate to the
subject so that it neither exceeds it nor is exceeded by it, and a
universal affirmative implies or expresses nothing else about
transposed terms.
40 Also, I prove this really a posteriori* through mediate and
expository inferences. For it follows 'Only an animal is man,
therefore no non-animal is man,' and this is one clarification
because 'non-animal' is common to 'being' and 'non-being.'
Therefore, 'no man is a non-animal, hence no non-man is an
animal, and therefore every man is an animal.' Similarly in the
case at hand: 'no non-father is God' sufficiently explains this 'only
Father is God,' from which further it is argued by a conversion
about the transposed terms, and further to the negative of an
unlimited (infinitum) predicate follows an affirmation about a
limited predicate.
41 But here there is an objection of the sophists, who argue in
this way: 'there is no non-man, therefore there is not a man,' by
taking 'non-man' as unlimited, then further, as a consequent,
'there is no man and nothing other than man or non-man is man,'
and nevertheless it does not follow "therefore there is no man.'
i i See note to n. 35 above.

42 Hic consuevit dici communiter quod ad negativam de

praedicato finito sequitur affirmativa de praedicato infinito.
43 Sed contra istam consequentiam arguitur quod non sequitur
'nihil aliud ab homine vel non-homine est homo, ergo aliud ab
homine vel non-homine est non-homo', quia antecedens est verum
et consequens falsum; ergo nec e converso, ex opposito unius
sequitur oppositum alterius.
44 Solet hic dici quod ad negativam de praedicato finito sequi
tur affirmativa de praedicato infinito cum constantia subiecti.
45 Sed hanc constantiam subiecti non intelligo esse accidenta-
lem exsistentiam subiecti quia, sive subiectum sit sive non,
alterum contradictoriorum dicitur de eodem, et ita ad negativam
de praedicato finito sequitur affirmativa de praedicato infinito,
quia idem praedicatum non potest simul affirmari et negari de
eodem.
46 Intelligo ergo per constantiam subiecti aptitudinem et
convenientiam quae requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum,
ita quod non sit in se falsum includens repugnantia simul et
incompossibilia, ut 'homo irrationalis' quia de tali nihil est
negative vel affirmative verum, quia quod est in se falsum, de
nullo est verum, V Metaphysicae, cap. 'De falso'.i8 Exemplum:
'homo irrationalis est rationalis vel homo'. Ista est falsa ratione
'irrationalis' quod repugnat homini. Similiter haec est falsa 'homo
irrationalis est irrationalis' ratione 'hominis' quod repugnat
irrationali. Ergo quidquid praedicatur de tali subiecto pertinens
ad hominem vel irrationale est falsum, quia oppositum
praedicatur de opposito, cum utraque debet negari et nulla
affirmativa dari.
47 Sed contra hoc dicetur: quia sic negativa erit absque

affirmativa. Responsio: dico quod negativa cuius subiectum
includit contradictoria, non habet affirmativam, quia contra-
dictionem includit aliquid esse aliud ab utroque extremorum,
sicut arguendo cum dicitur 'nihil aliud ab homine vel non-homine
1H Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 29 (10246 17-32).

42 Here it used to be said commonly that 'to the negative of a

finite predicate follows the affirmative of an unlimited predicate.'
43 But against this implication it is argued that this does not
follow 'Nothing other than man or non-man is man, therefore
something other than man or non-man is non-man,' because the
antecedent is true and the consequent false; therefore neither
from the converse follows the opposite of the other from the
opposite of one.
44 Here it is used to be said that to the negative of a limited
predicate followed the affirmative about an unlimited predicate
with the subject remaining the same.
45 But I do not understand this constancy of the subject to be
the accidental existence of the subject, because whether the
subject exists or not, the other of the contradictories is affirmed of
the same thing, and thus to a negative of limited predicate follows
the affirmative of an unlimited predicate, because the same
predicate cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied of the
same thing.
46 Therefore, I understand by the constancy of the subject the
aptitude and suitability which is required for something to be a
subject, so that it might not be what is 'false in itself including
simultaneously what is opposed and incompatible, such as 'a non-
rational man,' because about such, nothing is negatively or
affirmatively true, because nothing is true about what is in itself
false, according to Bk. V of the Metaphysics, in the chapter 'about
the false.' An example: 'a non-rational man is rational or man.'
This is false by reason of 'irrational' that is repugnant to man.
Similarly this is false 'an non-rational man is non-rational' by
reason of 'man,' which is repugnant to 'non-rational.' Therefore,
whatever is predicated about such a subject pertaining to 'man' or
'irrational' is false, because the opposite is predicated about the
opposite, since both must be denied and no affirmative should be
given.
47 But against this an objection may be raised, since in this
way there will be a negative without an affirmative. Reply: I
say that the negative whose subject includes contradictories, has
no affirmative, because something that is other than both of the
terms includes a contradiction, just as by arguing when it is said
est homo'. Et ideo cum tali subiecto includente contradictoria non

tenet consequentia. Et ideo si consequentia debet tenere, requi-
ritur constantia subiecti, quod scilicet subiectum non includat
contradictoria; tunc enim non haberet rationem subicibilis. Tale
enim subiectum quod includit contradictoria non habet referri ad
intellectum componentem et dividentem, quia nihil verum est de
tali ratione subiecti et ideo ratio quae in se falsa est et includit
contradictoria, nihil est verum de eo.
48 Ad propositum ergo dico quod non-idem homini et non-
homini includit contradictoria, scilicet quod aliquid non sit idem
toti disiuncto ex contradictoriis. Dico igitur quod in simplicibus
vera est nisi includatur contradictio. Accipiendo igitur 'solus' ut
dicit praecisionem subiecti in se, sic est vera, quia de ipso sic
praeciso est praedicatum verum, sicut si dicerem 'solus Socrates
est homo' secundum quod 'solus' est dictio categorematica. Sic
enim homo verificatur de Socrate absque hoc quod subiectum
dicat praecisionem respectu inhaerentiae hominis ad Socratem.
Sed si includeret praecisionem inhaerentiae praedicati ab alio,
tunc esset falsa, quia tunc Plato non esset homo, et sic haec est
falsa 'solus Pater est Deus' secundum quod ly solus est dictio
syncategorematica.
[VI. Ad argumenta principalia]
49 Ad primum principalei9 quando dicitur 'solus Deus, qui est

Pater, est Deus', distinguenda est secundum compositionem et
divisionem, sicut haec 'omnis homo, qui est albus, est homo'.
Unde prima propositio in sensu compositionis tantum valet 'sola
persona Patris est Deus' et ideo est falsa. Sed in sensu divisionis
tantum valet 'solus Deus, qui Deus est Pater, est Deus', et sic est
vera prima propositio, et sunt hic duae compositiones et duo
praedicata 'solus Deus, qui est Pater, est Deus'; tamen non
i9 Cf. supra n. 1.
'Nothing other than man or non-man is man.' And therefore, with

such a subject including contradictories the implication does not
hold. And therefore if the inference must hold, constancy is
required of the subject, namely that the subject not include
contradictories; for then it would not be able to be subject. For
such a subject that includes contradictories does not have to be
referred to composition and division, because nothing is true of
such a subject-notion and therefore it is a notion that is false in
itself and includes contradictories; nothing about it is true.
48 To the issue at hand, therefore, I say that 'not the same as
man and non-man' includes contradictories, namely that
something is not the same as a total disjunction of contra
dictories. Hence, I say that in simples it is true unless a
contradiction is included. By accepting 'only,' therefore, as it
asserts a precision of the subject in itself, in this way it is true.i2
Just as if I were to say 'Alonei3 Socrates is a man,' 'alone' is a
categorical assertion. For in this way 'man' is verified of Socrates,
without the subject asserting precisely that the predicate inheres
only in Socrates. But, if it included a precision of the predicate in
respect to another, it would then be false, because then Plato
would not be a man, and so this is false 'Only the Father is God'
where the word 'only' is a syncategorematic expression.
49 To the first of the initial arguments [n. 1], when it is said

that 'only God, who is the Father, is God,' it must be
distinguished according to composition and division, just as this
'every man, who is white, is a man.' Hence the first proposition
'only the person of the Father is God'is only true in the sense of
composition, and therefore it is false. But it is true only in the
sense of division: 'Only God, who [as] God is a Father, is God,' and
in this way the first proposition is true, and there are two
compositions here and two predicates 'Only God, who is a Father,
is God'; nevertheless it does not follow 'therefore only the Father
i2 The end of this sentence is omitted as repetitive.

i3 That is, considered -solely in himself, Socrates is a man.
sequitur 'ergo solus Pater est Deus', sed est fallacia compositionis,
quia non sic concedebatur in antecedente.
50 Ad probationem consequentiae quando arguitur 'solum
animal, quod est homo, est rationale, ergo solus homo est
rationalis', hoc tenet gratia materiae, quia animal numeratur in
eis. Unde si non numeraretur, sicut nec Deus in suis suppositis,
ita bene teneret, sicut hic, gratia materiae, si dicitur 'solus Deus,
qui est Pater, est Deus, ergo solus Pater est Deus'; sed non tenet
quia Deus non numeratur in personis, ut dictum est; quare
consequentia nulla.
51 Ad aliud20 quando dicitur 'solus Deus est Pater, ergo solus
Pater est Deus', dico et concedo quod solus Deus est Pater, sed
non est conversa sua 'solus Pater est Deus', quia primum
antecedens est aequipollens huic 'omnis Pater est Deus', et alia
aequipollet huic 'omnis Deus est Pater'. Sed ista non est conversa
alterius, sed debet converti universalis affirmativa in
particularem affirmativam secundum regulam Philosophi, I
Priorum.21
52 Si autem quaeras quomodo debet converti, quidam magnus
dicit quod nulla propositio exclusiva convertitur, quia
Philosophus non determinat de conversionibus nisi ubi ponuntur
termini simplices: Dico quod nihil aliud est propositionem
converti nisi necessaria consequentia quam capit intellectus per
explicationem convertentis. Unde explicativa istius propositionis
convertitur in universalem affirmativam de terminis transpositis.
53 Et si diceres 'ergo debet converti universalis affirmativa in
exclusivam', Responsio: concedo; et maxime exclusiva in
universalem affirmativam de terminis transpositis,22 ut haec
'solus Deus Pater est Deus' convertitur in istam 'ergo omne, quod
*! Cf. supra n. 2.
2i Aristot, Anal. Priora I, c. 2 (25a 5-7).
22 Adde: convertitur.
is God,' but it is a fallacy of composition, because in this manner

it is not conceded in the antecedent.
50 To the proof of the consequence, when it is argued that 'only
an animal that is man, is rational; therefore, only man is
rational,' this holds by reason of the matter, [but also] because
'animal' is numbered among these.i4 Hence, if it were not
numbered, just as God is not [numbered] among his supposits, it
would still hold good, just as here, by virtue of its matter, if it
were said "only 'God who is Father' is God, therefore only Father
is God"; however, it does not hold because God is not numbered
among persons, as was said; wherefore there is no valid inference.
51 To the other [n. 2], when it is said 'only God is Father,
therefore only the Father is God,' I say and concede that 'only God
is Father,' but not its converse, 'only the Father is God,' because
the first antecedent is equipollent with this 'the entire Father is
God'; and the other equipollent with this 'the entire God is the
Father.' But this is not the converse of the other, but the
universal affirmative must be converted into a particular
affirmative,i5 according to the rule of the Philosopher in Bk. I of
the Prior Analytics.
52 But if you ask how must iti6 be converted, a certain great
one says that no exclusive proposition is converted, because the
Philosopher only determines conversions where simple terms are
postulated I say that 'to convert a proposition' is only the
necessary implication that the intellect grasps through an
explanation of the one converting. Hence the explanation of this
propositioni7 is converted into a universal affirmation about
transposed terms.i8
53 And if you were to say 'therefore, one should convert a
universal affirmative into an exclusive,' reply: I concede, and
the most exclusive [is converted] into a universal affirmative
about transferred terms, as this 'only God the Father is God' is
converted into this, 'therefore, everything that is God, is the
M Namely, among those who are rational.

i5 That is, 'the entire Father is God' (the universal affirmative) must be con
verted to a particular affirmative, 'the Father is God.'
That is, how must an exclusive expression like 'only ' be converted?
i7 That is, 'only God is Father.'
i8 That is, 'all the [i.e. the entire] Father is God.'
est Deus, est Pater'. Sed Philosophus non fecit mentionem de ista
conversione, quia nihil facit ad reducendum syllogismos perfectos,
et ita bene sufficit conversio quam docet sine conversione
exceptivae sicut cum ea.
54 Ad aliud23 quando dicitur quod 'solus Deus est Deus, ergo
solus Pater est Deus', solebat hic dici quod dictio exclusiva habet
duplicem expositionem. Sed contra: quia unum extremum vel
terminus acceptus sub uno actu componendi et uno modo et non
sub oppositis modis, si propositio sit una, non habet nisi unicam
suppositionem. Sed ita est hic.
55 Et quae est ista suppositio? Dico quod est personalis et
confusa tantum.
56 Contra: quia non sequitur immediate signum universale, eo

quod non descendit sicut confusa, Responsio: dico quod
exclusiva propositio et universalis affirmativa est convertibilis.
Ergo sicut in una stat confuse, ita et in alia. Ergo sequitur 'animal
est omnis homo', quod concedo.
57 Ad aliud24 quando dicitur quod ad universalem negativam
exceptivam etc., dico quod convertuntur. Et haec propositio 'Nemo
novit Filium nisi Pater' est simpliciter vera sine glossa; sed non
sequitur 'ergo solus Filius non novit', quia 'nemo', id est, nullus
subsistens intellectualis alius in intellectualitate a Patre, novit
Filium; sed Filius non est aliud subsistens in intellectualitate. Et
ita dico quod 'nemo' non stat ibi solum confuse et distributive
respectu naturae humanae, sed respectu cuiuslibet naturae
intellectualis habentis vim cognitivam.
58 Quae veritas magis apparet si loco exceptionis ponatur nota
alietatis quae convertitur cum ea. Haec enim est vera 'nullus in
natura intellectuali alius a Patre novit Filium', et haec non est
falsa pro Filio et Spiritu Sancto, quia sunt idem cum Patre in
natura intellectuali. Et sic sunt omnia talia vera in divinis, ut
23 Cf. supra n. 3.
M Cf. supra n. 4.
Father.' But the Philosopher does not mention this conversion,

because he does nothing about reducing perfect syllogisms, and
thus the conversion, which he teaches, suffices satisfactorily
without the conversion of exceptive [propositions] just as with
this.
54 To the other [n. 3], when it is said that 'Only God is God,
therefore only the Father is God,' it is usually said here that an
exclusive statement has a double exposition. But this is not so,
because one extreme or term, taken under one act of
compounding, and not under the opposite mode, if the proposition
is one, has only one sole supposition. But it is this way here.
55 And what is this supposition? I say that it is only personal
and indistinct.
56 To the contrary: because the universal sign does not follow
immediately from the fact that it does not descend,i9 just as the
indistinct. Response: I say that an exclusive and universal
affirmative proposition is convertible. Therefore, just as in one it
stands indistinctly, so it does in the other. Hence, it follows 'every
man is an animal,' which I concede.
57 To the other [n. 4], when it is said that 'to universal
exceptive negative [follows an exclusive affirmative proposition
about the part excepted, and they are converted],' I admit they
are convertible. And this proposition, "No one knows the Son
except the Father," is simply true without a gloss. But it does not
follow, 'therefore, the Son alone does not know,' because 'no one,'
that is, 'no subsisting intellectual [being] other than the Father in
intellectuality knows the Son'; but the Son is not 'subsisting [as]
other than the Father in intellectuality.' And so I say that 'no one'
does not stand there only indistinctly and distributively as
regards human nature,* but as regards any intellectual nature
having cognitive power.
58 This truth is more apparent if in the place of 'exception'
were posited the note of 'otherness', which is converted with it.
For this is true 'no other than the Father in the intellectual
nature knows the Son,' and this is not false for the Son and Holy
Spirit, because they are the same thing with the Father in the
intellectual nature. And in this way all such [statements] are true
That is, descend to what is specific, or particular.

haec Gyrum caeli circuivi sola, et Haec est vita aeterna ut

cognoscant te solum Deum. Sic igitur dico quod nota alietatis
ponit in dicta propositione suum significatum circa substantivum,
scilicet 'alius in intellectualitate', et tunc sequitur 'nullus alius in
intellectualitate'. Unde istae dictiones 'praeter', 'solus', 'nisi aliud',
vel 'alius', vel 'nullus alius', quod idem est quod 'solus', quando
additur ad substantivum, tunc propositio est vera sine glossa, ut
haec Gyrum caeli circuivi sola, id est sapientia, non alius in
sapientia, ita quod sit substantivum commune determinatum per
'solum'; tunc semper vera.
59 Ad aliud25 quando dicitur 'solus Pater est tantus' etc., dico
quod in antecedente intendit ly tantum vel solum in extremo
tantum, non autem praecisionem subiecti in comparatione ad
praedicatum, sed in consequente concluditur in comparando vel
componendo ad praedicatum, ut patet ex dictis.
25 Cf. supra n. 5.
in the divine, as this, "The vault of the heavens I compassed

alone."20 And this, "Eternal life is this: to know you the only true
God."21 And hence in this way I say that the note of 'otherness' in
the aforesaid proposition, namely 'other in intellectuality,' posits
what it signifies around the substantive, and then it follows 'no
one else in intellectuality.' Hence when these words 'besides,'
'alone,' 'except another,' or 'another,' or 'no other,' which express
the same thing as 'only,' are added to a substantive, then the
proposition is true without a gloss, as this, "The vault of the
heavens I have compassed alone," that is wisdom, not an 'other in
wisdom,' so that it is a common substantive determined through
alone'; then it is always true.
59 To the other [n. 5], when it is said 'the Father alone is as
great,' etc., I say that in the antecedent the word 'alone' or 'only'
holds good exclusively in the extreme, but does not [imply]
precision of the subject in comparison to the predicate, but in the
consequent it is concluded in comparison or by compounding to
the predicate, as is evident from what has been said.
*0 Sirach 24:5.
*l John 17:3
Glossary
References in the text to terms explained in the glossary are

marked with an asterisk as are cross references within the
glossary itself.
a posteriori proof: An argument from what is posterior logically or
ontologically to what is prior, such as from effect to cause, or
from an agent's functions or operations to the nature
underlying such behavior. If the proof fulfills Aristotle's
definition of epistemic* or demonstrative knowledge, an a
posteriori proof is equivalent to his demonstration of simple
fact.* Since such arguments usually begin with empirical data,
such as observed effects or behavior patterns, a posteriori
proofs are often said to be based upon experience, in contrast
to a priori arguments.
a priori proof: An argument that proceeds from what is prior
logically or ontologically to what is posterior, such as from
cause to effect, from the nature of an agent to its function. If
couched in the form of an Aristotelian syllogistic
demonstration, an a priori proof is equivalent to a
demonstration of the reasoned fact* where the middle term
gives the cause, reason, or explanation why the predicate of
the conclusion is universally characteristic of the subject. As
such it is contrasted with an a posteriori proof or a
demonstration of simple fact.* Inasmuch as such a proof
indicates not just that something is so, but explains why it
must be so, an a priori proof is sometimes said to be
independent of experience, viz., that the conclusion is a fact.
absolute form: In terms of the ten Aristotelian categories,* Scotus
adopts the view common among his contemporaries that only
the first three categories involve an absolute entity or thing*
in contradistinction to the remaining seven. Thus, in addition
to the substantial form, any accidental form falling under the
two categories of quality or quantity would be absolute forms.
Some later scholastics like William Ockham restricted
absolute forms to substance or quality.
abstractive cognition, see cognition, intuitive and abstract
601
accidens per accidens: The five predicables of Porphyry expressed

the five relations in which a universal term may stand to the
subject of which it is predicated. They are genus, specific
difference, species, proprium (property), and contingent
accident. The first three represented the essence as a whole
(species) or a part thereof (genus, difference) and were said to
be necessarily connected with the essence and predicable of it
in the first mode of per se predication. Thus, since the defining
characteristics of Socrates, Plato, etc., would be, according to
Aristotle, "rational animal," both notions, either singly or
conjointly, are predicable of these individuals per se primo
modo. A property (or proprium), though it is not part of the
essential definition of the subject, is nevertheless inseparable
from the essence and can in fact be shown to follow from the
definition as a logical consequence. It is predicable of the
subject, therefore, per se or necessarily, but in the second
mode. Examples as regards man would be "risible,"
"teachable," etc. Scholastics sometimes called such properties
per se accidents (accidens per se) where accident is contrasted
with essence. Those predicates which did not express
necessary features of the individual, such as "ruddy,"
"bearded," "musical," etc., were said to be predicated per
accidens or contingently. In contrast to per se accidents, they
were called accidens per accidens or simply accidents. Scotus
usually prefers the latter usage.
accidental potency, proximate, see proximate potency
act, immanent and transient, see action, immanent and transient
act, second, see in actu primo, in actu secundo
act and potency, see potency and act
action, immanent and transient: Immanent activity is that which
has its principle or source and its term or effect within the
agent and which represents a perfection of the agent and not
that of some external patient. Vital activities are instances of
immanent actions. Transient (transitive), by contrast, are
actions which have their term outside the causal agent in
some other being that is changed by the agent.
ad extra, ad intra: As applied to divine relationships, attributes,
or operations, these Latin expressions designate what is
Glossary 603
exterior or interior respectively to the Godhead itself. Scotus

adopts the common theological view that a monotheistic
interpretation of the Christian Trinity implies that all ad extra
effects, such as creation, conservation, or direct divine
intervention with creatures, must stem causally from the
divine nature as a whole and hence are the common voluntary
and contingent effect of all three divine persons. What is ad
intra, by contrast, may be either common to all (e.g., God's
self-knowledge and love) or proper to one person to the
exclusion of the others (e.g., the Father's eternal generation of
the Son or Word). However, a unique personal relationship
between a single divine person and a creature is not ruled out
by this commonness of ad extra operations. Thus, for example,
while the Incarnation of the Word in terms of efficient
causality is ascribed to all three divine persons, only the Son,
and not the Father or Holy Spirit, is said to be personally or
hypostatically united to the human nature of Jesus Christ.
Though this nature qua nature is perfect, theologians argued,
it lacks a distinct human personality. Hence the effect of such
a hypostatic union is that Christ's human actions can be
ascribed exclusively to the second divine person. See
hypostatic union,
advenient intrinsically and extrinsically (adveniens intrinsecus et
extrinsecus): Webster's New International Dictionary (2nd ed.)
defines "advene" as "to be added to something or become a part
of it, though not essential," and "advenient" as "coming from
outward causes; superadded." Scotus uses the terms to
describe how the category of relation* differs from the
remaining six categories,* which also involve some sort of
relation. Since he does not consider any relationship to form a
per se or essential unity with its foundation or with the terms
said to be related, all relations are in that sense "advenient."
However, those belonging to the category "relation," e.g.,
similarity based on equality in size, or the same shade of color,
etc., are said to be "intrinsically advenient" in that they follow
necessarily given the existence of the two relata and the
foundation, e.g., the quantity or color. So far as the remaining
six categories are concerned, however, the relationship does
not arise automatically given the existence of the relata and

the foundation for the relationship, but an additional extrinsic
factor is required. Thus, for instance, the category of "action"
or "passion" is not the result of the existence of agent and
patient and the foundation for the respective relationships
(the active and passive potencies), but something more is
required, e.g., volition in a free agent, the lack of impeding
factors, etc., etc. In discussing ubiety* he also shows that the
existence of a body and place and the foundation for being
circumscriptively in place (viz., the extension of quantity of the
body) is not sufficient to have ubiety, but the body must be put
into place either by itself or another agent.
agent intellect: Medieval philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition
considered the intellect as playing a dual role, one active
(which was ascribed to the agent intellect), the other passive
(attributed to the possible intellect*). This division is based on
an obscure passage in Aristotle's De anima III, c. 5 (430a 18)
and underwent a variety of interpretations. Though Aristotle
compares the active factor to a light (to fyox), he never uses the
term (vovc, TtoiTynlcoq, agent intellect). With Alexander of
Aphrodisias, as well as with some scholastic interpretations of
Augustinian illumination, the active intellect is identified with
God. With Alfarabi and Avicenna, it is a subordinate
intelligence or "angel" somehow connected with the moon.
Aquinas considers the active intellect to be a faculty of the soul
really distinct from the possible intellect. Scotus also considers
it to be a property of the soul, but regards it as only formally
distinct from, but really identical with, the possible intellect
and the soul's substance. The general function of the agent
intellect is to render the potentially intelligible in the sense
image or phantasm* actually intelligible.
appropriation, appropriated: In theological usage, appropriation
denotes the attribution of some characteristic common in fact
to all three divine persons to one person in particular. The
basis for the ascription is some degree of affinity, according to
our way of thinking, between the attribute in question (usually
some divine action ad extra*) and the notional* or personal
characteristics peculiar to one divine person in particular.
Glossary 605
Thus in both the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, God, the

Father, is described as "Almighty, maker of heaven and earth"
because power and creativity seem peculiarly appropriate to
him as the first productive principle from whom the other
persons proceed. Similarly because the Son or Word* (Aoyoq),
according to Augustine, proceeds from the intellectual
memory* of the Father (even as the Holy Spirit proceeds from
the will they share as the principle of active love), whatever
pertains to knowledge, truth, or wisdom is appropriated to the
Son whereas charity and holiness are attributed especially to
the Holy Spirit. In addition to the four Aristotelian "causes"
(viz., material, formal, efficient, and final), medieval
philosophers commonly spoke of an exemplar cause, where the
"exemplar" referred to the idea in the artisan's mind that he
planned to embody in the artefact. Since Christian
Neoplatonists identified the Platonic archetypal ideas with the
"blueprint" of the creature in the mind of the Creator, on the
one hand, and spoke of the divine Son as the Logos or Word of
the Father, on the other, it seemed particularly appropriate to
associate the divine exemplars of creatures with the second
person of the Trinity.
categorematic. Logic: Webster defines it as 'capable of being
employed by itself as a term: significant in itself, as not
involving by its nature a reference to anything else; as man is
a categorematic word1opposed to syncategorematic*
categories, the ten (decem praedicamenta): According to Aristotle
(Categories c. 4 [la 25]) they are (1) substance, (2) quantity, (3)
quality, (4) relation, (5) action, (6) passion, (7) place, (8) time,
(9) position or posture, (10) state. Scotus often refers to them
as genera geiteralissima, i.e., the most universal genera.
cause, equivocal, see equivocal principle or cause
cause, essential (per se) vs. incidental (per accidens): Scotus
speaks of nature (natura) and will (voluntas) as per se causes
in contrast to chance (casus) and fortune or misfortune
(fortuna). Nature embraces all natural causes, i.e., those which
produce their proper effect without deliberation. Will is
regarded as the essential cause of all effects deliberately
intended by a voluntary agent. Incidental or chance effects
result from the interference of two or more mutually

independent causal sequences. Where a voluntary agent is
involved, the effects he causes unintentionally are called luck
or fortune. Scotus follows Aristotle here (cf. Physics II, c. 5
[1966 17-22]).
causes, essential order of: In his proofs for God's existence (e.g.,
Ordinatio I, d. 2, nn. 47-55 and the parallel passage in the
Lectura), Scotus is especially concerned with spelling out the
difference between an essential versus an accidental
concatenation of causes. A series of generative causes such as
that of grandparents, parents and child, or any sequence of
events such as those later analyzed by Hume, would be causes
only accidentally ordered to one another in producing the final
effect of the series. Where an essential ordering or
concatenation exists, all the causal factors must coexist both to
produce and conserve their effect. This is true whether they be
of different types (such as material, formal, efficient, and final)
or a chain of the same type, e.g., efficient or final causes, as
Avicenna postulated for the hierarchy of Intelligences*
between God and the material world. While infinite regress in
accidentally ordered causes may be possible, Scotus claimed
the chain as a whole must be essentially ordered to some
coexisting cause which guarantees the perpetuity of what is
constant or cyclic about such repetitive productivity, for no
philosopher postulates an infinite regress where the
concatenation of causes is essential and all must coexist. To
assume an infinity of links upon which a possible effect is
conserved, for example, is not to explain its actual
conservation. See also essential order.
cognition, intuitive and abstract: By intuitive knowledge is meant
the simple (non-judgmental) awareness of something as
existing here and now. Not only are the senses capable of such
knowledge, Scotus argues, but the intellect possesses such a
capacity as well. He argued this on the theological ground that
if our simple intellection was limited only to abstract
conceptswhat can be abstracted from sense encounters in
the way described by Aristotlethen the face-to-face vision of
God promised to humans in the afterlife becomes impossible.
Glossary 607
But Scotus also believed rational considerations required some

measure of intellectual intuition. There are many primary
contingent propositions that are indubitable (such as "I doubt
such and such" or "I am thinking of such and such"). Since this
certitude cannot be accounted for by any amount of conceptual
analysis of the propositional terms, some simple awareness of
the existential situation verifying the proposition is required.
This cannot be purely sensory knowledge, since the existential
judgment often involves conceptual or nonsensory meanings.
Nor can this awareness of existence be something that is
known only in and through the judgment itself, since
judgment, as the second act of the intellect, always
presupposes logically, if not necessarily psychologically or
temporally, prior acts of simple awareness, called the "first
acts" of the intellect. And in the case of primary contingent
truth, this awareness cannot be limited simply to abstract
conceptual meanings.
communicable: Whatever can be given to more than one subject
(individual or person) is said to be communicable. In creatures,
this includes every positive trait or perfection they possess
except that unique individuating feature called haecceity.* In
God, however, it includes the unique divine nature or essence
with all its perfection. Only the positive features formally
constituting each divine person as Father, Son (or Word), and
Holy Spirit, respectively, are said to be incommunicable. In
begetting the Son, the Father communicates the divine nature
to the Son; the Father and Son jointly communicate it to the
Holy Spirit. Thus Scotus discusses various ways in which one
thing can be said to be communicated to another. See also
hypostatic union.
complex expression or statement vs. incomplex expression or
statement. The former is a linguistic expression involving more
than a single term or word, e.g., a proposition or sentence. The
latter is a single word or term, e.g., the subject or predicate of
a proposition.
composition and division, see in sensu composito et diviso
confused concept, see confused knowledge
confused knowledge /apprehension /conception: "Confused" is

usually used in a technical sense. As a noun (confusum) it
means any universal notion with respect to what falls under it
extensively. Thus Scotus speaks of ens, which is a primitively
simple (simpliciter simplex) term, as a confusum (in virtue of
its universal extension) but which, if known at all, can only be
known distinctly. As an adverb (confuse) it expresses the way
in which one knows an object, viz., by name. As such it is
contrasted with distinct knowledge,* viz., knowledge by way of
definition. Thus he speaks of knowing something in a quasi-
confused manner.
corruption: The perishing of the substantial form upon the
generation of the new form. One of the most characteristic
marks of terrestrial or sublunary substances, according to
Aristotle, was their capacity to undergo substantial change.
Celestial bodies, by contrast, were incapable of substantial
change and subject only to rotary motion or change of place.
Many commentators explained the incorruptibility of the
heavens not only on the grounds that the form of celestial
bodies was incorruptible but also because the ethereal matter
of which they were composed was essentially different from
the primary matter characteristic of terrestrial elements
(earth, water, air, and fire) and their various compounds.
Scotus, on the contrary, argues that primary matter
throughout the universe is essentially the same and that the
difference between celestial and terrestrial bodies stems from
the different nature of their forms. Terrestrial forms are such
that the natural causes operative throughout the realm of the
four elements cause the corruption of one form in generating
its contrary. This is not the case with the more perfect celestial
form, which has no proper contrary. Nevertheless, the celestial
body is not something absolutely necessary or intrinsically
incorruptible, since God, for instance, could by direct action
cause its form to perish and convert the heavens into fire or
water. Cf. Ordinatio II, d. 14, q. 1.
declarative knowledge: Following St. Augustine, the scholastics
spoke of actual knowledge not only as a child conceived or
begotten by the mind, but as revealing or declaring what lay
Glossary 609
hidden in the memory. In God, declarative knowledge was

considered to be involved in some way with the production of
the Word or second person of the Trinity, but theologians
interpreted this in different ways. Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 32, n. 23;
Ord. IIl, d. 32.
demonstration of simple fact (demonstratio quia), see epistemic
knowledge
demonstration of the reasoned fact (demonstratio propter quid),
see epistemic knowledge
diminished being or diminution of being (ens diminutum): This
expression, which had its origins in the Arabian translation of
Aristotle's Metaphysics VI (E), c. 4 and Averroes' Commentary
on it, is used exclusively by Scotus to express the sort of being
a thing acquires in the mind or intellect (created or divine) by
being known or thought of.
distinct knowledge: Distinct knowledge in a technical sense is
contrasted with confused knowledge.* As Scotus explains
(Ord. I, d. 3, n. 72) we know something confusedly when our
concept stands for the object in much the same way as a name
does; we know it distinctly when we are able to define it.
Following Avicenna, Scotus argues that being (ens) is the first
primitive or undefined element in every real definition. Like
all irreducibly simple concepts it can only be known distinctly
and in toto if it is known at all. All other distinct knowledge of
real things includes being as part of their essential definition.
division and composition, see in sensu composito et diviso
eminently, eminent way: In a higher or more perfect way or even
in a supreme or infinite way. It is often contrasted with
formally* or virtually.*
epistemic knowledge: The conclusion of a demonstration in the
technical sense defined by Aristotle in Analytica posteriora I,
c. 13-14 is called e7iio~trmTi in Greek and scientia (science) in
Latin. Scotus cites four basic conditions for such scientific or
epistemic knowledge: (1) it must be certain and not just an
opinion; (2) it must be a necessary truth, not just a contingent
one; (3) it must not be immediately evident but it is known by
means of other evident and necessary truths; (4) it is derived
from these latter truths by way of some form of syllogistic or
discursive reasoning process. Cf. Ordinatio, prol., n. 41; ibid.,

I, d. 2, n. 39; ibid., d. 3, nn. 230ff. Demonstratio propter quid,
or 8i6ti, uses as its middle term something which expresses an
ontological cause or reason why the predicate of the conclusion
inheres in the subject. The essential definition of the subject or
any one of its four Aristotelian causes might serve as the
middle term. Following the Oxford translation of Aristotle, we
have called a syllogism of this sort a "demonstration of the
reasoned fact" and the conclusion it yields "knowledge of the
reasoned fact." Demonstratio quia, or on, which we have
translated as "demonstration of the simple fact," uses as a
middle term something that logically connects the predicate to
the subject, but does not give what Aristotle or the Scholastics
would consider to be the real reason or the ontological cause
why the subject in question has such a predicate. It is not clear
whether Scotus equates propter quid and a priori on the one
hand, and quia and a posteriori on the other, as Ockham
expressly does (cf. Ockham's Summa Logicae III, pars. 2, c.
17). For Aristotle, demonstration through a remote cause (an a
priori principle), however, is only a demonstratio quia.
equivocal effect: One that is of a nature specifically different from
that of its cause, as, for instance, a creature as caused by God,
or a painting as caused by the artist. Equivocal effects are
contrasted with univocal effects, such as fire producing fire, or
like begetting like. See also equivocal principle or cause.
equivocal principle or cause: One that produces an effect or
product specifically different from its own nature. Sometimes
called an analogous cause.
essential order: Order exists between two or more things if one
can be said to be either prior or posterior to the other. If this is
based on something accidental such as time, motion, place,
size, etc., the order is accidental. If the priority or posteriority
relationship stems from the nature or essence, it is essential.
Though Scotus treats of essential order in all of his works, only
in the De Primo Principio is there an attempt to treat the
various types of essential order exhaustively under the two
headings of eminence and dependence. The first obtains if one
essence is more perfect than another; the second holds if one
Glossary 611
essence can exist without the other, but not vice versa. This
may be because the first is the efficient, final, formal, or
material cause of the second; or because of two effects of a
common cause, the existence of the first is a precondition for
that of the second. Where several causes are required to
produce a particular effect, they may not be essentially
ordered to one another in producing that effect. In this
connection, see causes, essential order of. Because of the
special theological problem of the hypostatic union* in Christ
where a human nature depends on the person, but not on the
divine nature of the Word in a special way, Scotus speaks of an
extended sense of "essential dependence."
essential priority /posteriority, see essential order
eucharistic species: The whole Christ, body, blood, soul, and
divinity, is said to be present under the appearances of bread
and wine after the consecration in the mass. Species was the
name given by the theologians to these appearances, which
were conceived as having an objective status or reality that
enabled them to act directly on the senses. As Aristotle's
philosophy came into general acceptance, medieval
theologians developed various theories to explain the
continued existence of the species after consecration, usually
identifying them with the accidental categories of Aristotle, as
distinct from substance. Hence the species came to be called
commonly the "accidents of bread and wine" and since Christ's
presence under these appearances was obviously not that of a
normal material body, these accidents were not said to be
inhering in the substance of Christ's body. Rather they were
considered to be miraculously supported by divine power,
which played the role or, better, took the place of the support
ordinarily supplied by the substance. Hence they were
referred to as "separated accidents."
exemplar: A model, idea, or exemplary cause. In Neoplatonic
philosophy it is regarded as a distinct form of causality;
Aristotlelian philosophers, on the contrary, usually reduce it to
some form of efficient, formal, or final causality. As something
the artisan intends to realize, it falls under final causality; as
a preconception in the mind of the artisan, it is characteristic
of an intelligent efficient cause (Scotus adopts this version); as

that eventually impressed on the material by the efficient
cause, it is identified with the formal Ideas* or ideal types that
form the intelligible world and which the sensible world
imitates. In Christian Neoplatonism, these archetypal
exemplars are identified with the ideas of possible creatures in
the divine mind and are often associated in a special way with
the Word or second person of the Trinity. See appropriation.
exteriorly attached vs. interiorly attached. See advenient
intrinsically and extrinsically.
extramentally (ex natura rei): In contrast to what exists only as
the content of a concept or object of thought (i.e., an ens
diminutum, or diminished being*), Scotus uses the expression
ex natura rei to indicate something that exists in reality or has
real being. Hence the English term "what exists outside the
mind" or "extramentally" seems to come closest to expressing
his meaning. This may be either a thing* (res) or some real
aspect of a thing (i.e., a formality* or reality). See formal
distinction.
faith, acquired vs. infused: Medieval theologians generally
considered the supernatural virtue of faith (like hope and
charity) to be directly infused in the human soul, for instance,
at baptism. As such it differed from the acquired inclination or
disposition to believe the testimony of a reliable witness. See
also habits.
formal: What pertains to the essential nature or constitutive
essence of a thing is called a formal characteristic of the same
and is said to be predicated of it formally. Formal is often
contrasted with what something contains or possesses only
virtually* or eminently.* See also formal predication vs.
predication by identity.
formal distinction, formally distinct: Scotus's theological
colleagues were commonly concerned with the problem of how
to distinguish God's various attributes without prejudice to his
real and essential simplicity. On the one hand, they argued
that knowledge, volition, goodness, justice, and love express
pure perfections* or formal* characteristics essential to the
Godhead. On the other hand, "knowledge" is no synonym for
Glossary 613
"volition" nor are their formal definitions the same. Even the
mode of infinity does not seem to erase their formal non-
identity. For knowledge as such does not become formally
volition, justice, or goodness, simply because it embraces all
that can be known. Notional* characteristics like "paternity,"
"filiation," etc., posed similar problems with respect to the
numerically identical essence, for while Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit were admittedly really distinct persons with respect to
each other, no theologian would go so far as to claim the
notional or personal features proper to each represented
something really distinct from the essence they shared in
common. All agreed on the need for some distinction that
would be intermediary between one that is simply or
unqualifiedly real (distinctio realis) and one that is merely
mental or conceptual (distinctio rationis). But because
"reason" (or ratio), like the Avicennian term intentio* could
express an intelligible feature or essential characteristic of a
real or extramental thing (ens reale) as well as the formal
content of the concept used to think about it (ens rationis),
most of Scotus's contemporaries were content to call it a
special type of distinctio rationis, namely, one that existed
only potentially or virtually in the thing (a parte rei) and
became an actual distinction only when a created or divine
mind reflected on its direct (or first intentional) knowledge* of
the deity, either with reference to its discrete mirror images in
creatures or to the really distinct relationships of origin* that
characterized the divine person. Qua actually distinct, then,
such rationes were the result of a kind of second intentional
knowledge* and would have only diminished being* or esse
diminutuin, namely, as entities created, as it were, in the very
act of being known. Scotus argues that this interpretation will
not do, especially as regards the distinction between the
notional and the essential elements in God. What God knows
about himself ad intra he knows directly and intuitively, and
this holds not only for his self-knowledge of the divine nature,
which is communicable, but also for "paternity," "filiation,"
etc., which are personal and incommunicable. Knowledge of
"paternity" as something other than "deity" is direct or first
intentional knowledge. Some non-identity a parte rei would

seem to be a logical precondition for conceiving "paternity" as
formally distinct from "deity," for the eternal generation of the
Son by the Father and their "breathing" of the Holy Spirit in
love represent a very real and objective production or
communication of the divine nature no matter how
metaphorically expressed. Yet if the distinction or non-identity
of "paternity" and "deity" is created only by the mind in
reflecting on the Father and divine nature and is not ex parte
rei logically prior to any actual knowledge of this sort, it is
impossible to see how the divine nature is communicated
without the paternity. Similarly, even if one divine perfection
is not actually separable from the other in reality, some actual
non-identity a parte rei is required as a logical presupposition
for separating first intentional objects even conceptually, to
say nothing of sharing or imitating only some of the divine
perfection with one creature and other formal perfection with
another. Cf. Ordinatio I, d. 2, nn. 388-410; d. 8, nn. 191-217.
The objective correlate of a distinct formal concept Scotus calls
a "reality" (from realitas) or "formality" (from formalitas),
since, in Aristotelian terminology, "form," in contrast to
matter, represents the quiddity* or what is essentially
intelligible about a thing. Hence he calls the distinction
formalis a parte rei (i.e., a formal distinction on the part of the
thing), though he admits it could also be called a distinctio
virtualis (virtual distinction), since one and the same simple
thing or res is virtually many things and has the power or
virtue (virtus) of producing objective notions or natural signs
of itself that are conceptually separable, just as if they were
produced by distinct things. It can even be called a distinctio
rationis (distinction of reason), if ratio be understood not as
something created by the mind, but insofar as ratio expresses
the quiddity of the object, namely, what is known about the
object through a first intention. (See also intention.) Though
Scotus is most impressed with the need for postulating the
formal distinction in the Trinity, as a metaphysician he also
finds it useful for explaining how first intentional
characteristics can be ascribed to one and the same physically
Glossary 615
simple thing. Thus he employs it between being and its

attributes, the soul and its powers, the nature an individual
shares with others of his species on the one hand and his
unique individuality or haecceity* on the other, or between
"animality," a generic perfection, and "rationality," the aspect
that differentiates the human being as a rational animal from
the brute beast. Though all composition is ruled out by God's
simplicity, some form of metaphysical, if not real, composition
is possible in these other cases. See formality,
formal predication vs. predication by identity: Theologians
introduced this distinction to explain why abstract predication
of certain attributes of one another (e.g., "wisdom is goodness")
could be true when speaking of God whereas statements of
this sort in other cases would be false. Since "wisdom" and
"goodness" are not synonymous terms, even when applied to
God, a statement such as the above cannot be true according
to formal predication, for this is possible only when the
predicate expresses an essential or constitutive element of the
subject. Nevertheless, since "wisdom," "goodness," "paternity"
and "deity" are not really distinct from each other,
predications of the type "wisdom is goodness" and "paternity is
deity," though false according to formal predication, are said to
be true "by identity." Whereas other scholastics used some
form of virtual, or intentional or conceptual distinction, all
with a foundation of sorts in reality, to justify formal
predication, Scotus links it with his explanation of formal non-
identity or distinction a parte rei. See formal distinction;
formality, intention. On the other hand, he argues that there is
no formal difference a parte rei between a formality and its
intrinsic mode* (the degree in which a formal perfection, like
being, wisdom, or goodness, exists in reality). While pure
perfections* like these may be found in some finite degree in
creatures, they are all present in an intensively infinite*
degree in God. It is this infinity that rules out any
perfectibility of one formality by another, as is sometimes the
case in creatures which may lack any real or physical
composition, but are at least metaphysically composed (viz., of
formalities related to each other as potential and actual). See
formality. Hence there is an even greater real identity among

God's attributes than that which holds between "animality"
and "rationality" in the humans, or between the essential
nature of the soul and its faculties, though a human is
substantially one, and the soul with its powers a simple
substance, according to Scotus. At the same time, the notional
features like "paternity" or "filiation" are neither formally nor
really identical with one another, and hence can give rise to a
real distinction of persons. On the other hand, even though
"paternity" is not infinitely perfect, formally speaking, for
otherwise the Son would be imperfect in lacking this
characteristic, still the divine nature which the three divine
persons possess in common is infinitely perfect and hence is
really identical with, but formally distinct from, "paternity,"
"filiation," "active and passive spiration." Hence Scotus argues
that statements of the type "paternity is deity" or "deity is
paternity," though false according to formal predication, are
true by identity. Similarly, "paternity is infinite" can be true in
virtue of paternity's real identity with an infinitely perfect
essence, but paternity is not formally infinite in the way divine
goodness, for instance, is.
formality: The objective correlate of a distinct formal object. See
formal distinction. Scotus identifies a formality with
Avicenna's intentio (see intention) inasmuch as an intention
represents a characteristic of an extramental thing, though
not the whole of its intelligible essence. Hence a formal
distinction on the part of the thing (a parte rei) is compatible
with its physical or real simplicity. That is to say, though the
formalities are always conceptually separable, one formal
reality may be inseparable from the other so far as the
concrete individual thing is concerned. The reason for this real
simplicity in the things, however, may be different. In God,
where each formality is infinite, since there is no formal
distinction between a formality and its intrinsic mode (see
intrinsic mode), all composition in the sense of one part
perfecting another formally is excluded. For composition
occurs only where there is potentiality, and hence limitation or
finitude, in the parts as such, a potentiality which is
Glossary 617
actualized only when one part is combined with another to

form something that is one per se. But because each divine
attribute exists in an infinite degree, Scotus argues, the
highest form of real identity compatible with a formal
distinction is present in God. In the case of the soul and its
powers, or an "animality" and "rationality" in a human, or
between the specific nature (natura communis) of an
individual and his haecceity,* there is usually some form of
metaphysical composition present in the sense that the
formalities in question mutually perfect each other and hence
have the aspect of parts, for a given formality may be present
in different natures in different degrees (and hence with
different intrinsic modes). Thus the creative imagination of the
human artist in which intelligence and sensitivity are blended
is something that neither the brute beast endowed with sense
perception nor the angel with its intellectual life possesses.
formally, see formal
fortune: According to Aristotle, what happened to a rational agent
unintentionally, but as the result of some free decision on his
part, was ascribed philosophically to luck or fortune. Chance,
on the other hand, was an accidental effect involving natural
or non-rational causes, an effect, namely, that they were not
intended or designed by nature to produce, for Aristotle
considered all of nature to act for the sake of an end. Theistic
interpreters usually explained his teleological description of
inanimate agents in terms of the result of the intrinsic design
built into their natures by an omniscient creator. Effects
intended either by nature or by deliberation were said to be
the result of per se causes, whereas those not intended in this
way were called coincidents or the result of per accidens
causalityeither chance or fortune or a combination of both.
Theologians who stressed the belief that all worldly events, if
not directly intended, were at least permitted by God, were
constrained to modify Aristotle's conception of fortune and
chance. Usually they retained these notions, but restricted the
scope of their activity. With the prominence given to the
Arabic-Aristotelian conception of an eternal world in the last
half of the thirteenth century, medieval philosophers were
concerned with the problem of whether good fortune,

providential or otherwise, was philosophically compatible with
the philosophers' theory of the eternity of the world. See cause,
essential vs. incidental.
generation: Scotus defines generation as "the production of a
suppositum* so far as the being of its substantial nature is
concerned." This is an extended sense of what Aristotle meant
by the term. See generation and corruption.
generation and corruption: Aristotle analyzed all natural change
in terms of the four categories of quantity, place, quality, and
substance. Quantitative change he called growth or
diminution; change of place, motion; change in quality,
alteration. When change can no longer be accounted for in
terms of these three accidental categories but involves
substance itself, it is called "coming-to-be" (generation) and its
converse, "passing-away" (corruption). Confer De generatione
et corruptione I, c. 4. Since he went on to say that matter in
the proper sense of the term is the substrate receptive of
coming-to-be and passing-away, generation came to be denned
as the acquisition of a substantial form and corruption as the
loss of one substantial form upon the acquisition of another
Though Aristotle's analysis did not cover all types of
supernatural transformations discussed by medieval
theologians, his description suggested fruitful analogies that
might be employed to give a more rational account of what the
schoolmen believed such changes involved.
habit, habitual, habitually (habitus, from the Latin habere, to
have): According to Aristotle, an acquired disposition or
tendency of a natural agent made constant and fixed by use
(ei<;). A habit once acquired becomes itself the principle of
activity, a kind of second nature, so that acts corresponding to
it are produced readily, easily, and with pleasure; once
acquired it is with difficulty lost, and in this it is opposed to a
mere disposition that is readily lost. Knowledge once acquired,
for instance, like the moral virtues, represents a habit in this
sense. Both habits and dispositions fall under the first species
or type of the category of quality* according to Aristotle.
Medieval theologians adapted this philosophical notion to
Glossary 619
explain not only acquired virtues, but also those

supernaturally infused, like faith, hope, and charity. However,
to the extent that they denied that any supernatural quality in
the soul could be detected by natural reason alone, theologians
argued that infused virtues give only the possibility of acting
supernaturally, not necessarily an ease or facility such as that
acquired by repeated actions.
haecceity (haecceitas [in the Reportatio I-A MSS actually
haeccitas, hoccitas], from the Latin haec, this): The term
means literally "thisness." It designates the unique formal
principle of individuation that makes the nature, which all
individuals of the same species have in common, to be just this
or that individual and no other. Scotus regards it as a distinct
positive formality* over and above the common nature of the
individual (natura communis). Petrinity, for instance, would
represent the "haecceity" of Peter; Paulinity, that of Paul, and
so on.
happiness: Though Aristotle uses the term in the general sense of
well-being, the scholastics, following St. Augustine, usually
employ it in some ultimate sense as involving the knowledge
and the love of God as the end of man. This may refer to such
knowledge and love as is possible for a human either in this
life (beatitudo viae) or in the next (beatitudo patriae).
hypostasis; hypostatic (from the Greek, wio, under; oxdoiq,
position): Though hypostasis corresponds more or less
perfectly to the Latin term suppositum * it came to mean more
specifically a "rational suppositum" or person, in contrast to
animals, trees, stones, etc., which are irrational or simple
supposita. Among the Greek theologians hypostasis came to be
used to distinguish the three divine persons as distinct from
the essence or nature common to all. A similar usage
developed among Latin theologians. Thus "hypostatic" referred
to some personal or notional* aspect of the Trinity. See
hypostatic union.
hypostatic union: The union of the divine nature and the human
nature in the second divine person or Word. In reaction to the
early Trinitarian and Christological heresies, condemned by
various Church councils, the generally accepted theological
view arose that in Christ there were two distinct natures, in

no way fused as natures, one divine, shared also by Father and
Holy Spirit, and one human, which belonged to the person of
the Son alone. Since the human nature was complete as a
nature, there were two wills in Christ, two types of operations,
one divine, the other human, etc. However, the only thing
lacking to the human nature in Christ was a human
personality. Thus the effect of the hypostatic union is that
though there is but one person or personality in Jesus Christ,
that of the second person of the Trinity, there are two natures,
wills, operations, etc. While what Christ did through his divine
nature was also attributable to the Father and Holy Spirit as
well, what he did through his human nature was attributable
personally to the Son alone. The distinction between the
person, nature, and operative faculty was expressed by saying
the person is the one who acts (principium quod), the nature,
or operative faculty, by contrast represents that by which
(principium quo) the person acts. See principium quo and
quod.
ideas: In Platonic philosophy an eternally existing pattern or
archetype of any class of things of which the individual things
in nature are but imperfect copies. Among Neoplatonic
Christians the ideas were identified with the exemplars of
creatures in the mind of God. See exemplar.
identity, formal and real: Identity is inversely related to
distinction. To the extent that two aspects are formally
indistinguishable, they are said to be formally identical.
Where two such characteristics are really indistinguishable in
the sense that this individual cannot possess one of the two
without the other, the two are said to be really identical with
the subject though they may still be formally distinct from
each other as well as from the essential or defining
characteristics of the subject. Thus the faculties of intellect
and will are said to be formally distinct from each other and
from their subject. At the same time they are one by a real
identity with each other and with the substance of the angel or
human soul. See also formal distinction and formality.
Glossary 621
identity, predication by, see formal predication vs. predication by

identity
immanent, see action, immanent and transient
impassibility: The inability to undergo suffering, death, or
corruption. So far as man is concerned, theologians attributed
this quality to the risen body of Christ, to Adam and Eve
before the fall, and to the bodies of the saints after the general
resurrection.
implication (consequentia): The logical connection between the
antecedent proposition or set of propositions and the
consequent, such that the latter is entailed by the former, is
called in medieval logic consequentia. One would normally
tend to render this as "consequence," as some translators have
done, but since this word in normal English usage refers not so
much to the logical connection as to the proposition entailed
(i.e., the conclusion or consequent), we have used implication
consistently wherever consequentia occurs in Latin.
imposition, names of first and second: Names which do not signify
parts or qualifications of our spoken or written language are
called words (or names) of first imposition, whereas words
which do signify such are called names of second imposition.
Thus "man," "stone," "white," etc. are words of first imposition,
whereas "substantive," "adjective," "nominative case," etc., are
words of second imposition. Hence words of second imposition
always signify words of first imposition. This distinction
between words is analogous to that between first and second
intentional concepts or mental terms in that first intentions
signify objects which are not intentions or concepts whereas
second intentions signify first intentions. See intentions, first
and second.
in actu prima, in actu secundo: From the Latin meaning "in the
state of primary actualization and secondary actualization,"
respectively. Though the operative faculties of an active
substance are formally distinct from each other and from that
which formally constitutes its essence or nature, according to
Scotus, they are actually inseparable from the concrete
substance or existing thing. (See formal distinction.) Hence a
substance is said to be in actu primo with respect to a given
operation or actualization simply by being what it is, namely,

by having the nature it has with its corresponding faculties.
When the agent is actually operating it is said to be in actu
secundo. In God, where every possible operation ad intra is
fully actualized, the operation is only conceptually
distinguished from the operative faculty or power. In this
sense, Scotus claims that God the Father is omniscient not
only because he has such knowledge in actu primo in the sense
that he possesses the divine essence or nature with its
intellectual memory, but also in actu secundo in the sense that
he actually knows or understands the divine nature and all
that this necessarily entails.
in quid predication: In quid and in quale are two basic modes of
predication. They refer primarily to the five predicables of
Porphyry, namely, the genus, species, specific difference,
property, and accident, though Scotus extends the idea of in
quid and in quale predication to the transcendental order.
Briefly, the difference between the two is this: To predicate in
quid means to predicate either the entire essence (i.e., the
species) or at least the determinable part of the essence (e.g.,
the genus). The term is derived from quiddity* or essence, and
such predication represents an answer to the question: What
is it? (Quid est?). To predicate in quale means to predicate a
further determination or qualification of the essence. This
qualification (quale) may be either essential (e.g., a specific
difference) or non-essential (e.g., a property or accident). Since
the specific difference is really a part of the essence or
quiddity, it is sometimes said to be predicated in quale quid or
in quale substantiate in order to distinguish it from properties
or accidents which are said to be predicated either in quale
accidentale or simply in quale. In order to predicate something
in quid, it is not enough that the predicate be an essential note
but that it be predicated per modum subsistentis, which from
the viewpoint of grammar means that it must be predicated as
a noun, not as an adjective or participle or adverb. Predication
in quale, whether it be an essential qualification or not, is
always predicated per modum denominantis, which from the
viewpoint of grammar means it is predicated as a modifier.
Glossary 623
"Substance," "whiteness," "rationality," "rational animal,"

"life," "truth," "goodness," if used as predicates, would be
predicated in quid, whereas "substantial," "white," "rational,"
"living," "true," "good," if used as predicates, would be
predicated in quale,
in sensu composito et diviso: In the composite sense and in the
divided sense. When a complex expression is taken in a
composite sense both parts of the expression must be
understood as applying simultaneously to the same subject,
whereas if it is taken in a divided sense both parts of the
expression apply to the subject separately. "The blind do not
see," for example, is true in the composite sense, whereas "the
blind see, the lame walk . . . the deaf hear, the dead rise"
(Matt. 11:5) must be understood in a divided sense. Failure to
distinguish the two senses leads to the well-known fallacies of
composition and division, for instance, "five is three and two,
three and two are odd and even, therefore, five is odd and
even."
incommunicable, see communicable
infinity, intensive, or infinite, intensively: An unlimited degree
with respect to the same formal perfection; it refers to the
intrinsic mode* of a pure perfection.* Thus God's knowledge is
intrinsically infinite if it is without limitation qua knowledge,
i.e., if it extends to all that is knowable. As applied to God,
intrinsic infinity is sometimes contrasted with his extensive
infinity. God is extensively infinite if there is no pure
perfection of any sort lacking in him.
instant (or instance) of nature or origin, see sign of nature or
origin
intelligences: The pure spirits such as God and the intelligent
beings postulated by the philosophers as responsible in some
way for the regularity of movement characteristic of the
heavens and celestial bodies. They were also called "separate
substances"* inasmuch as they existed apart from all matter,
unlike the human soul, which, though spiritual substantially,
was the form of a material body. The angels of Judeo-Christian
theology were sometimes identified with these Intelligences of
the philosophers as were the Greco-Roman gods of pagan

mythology.
intelligible species: A likeness or representation of what is
intelligible about an object, especially one perceived by the
senses. Various interpretations were given to Aristotle's
account in the De anima of how the soul is only potentially
knowledge and sensation, and becomes aware of an external
thing by taking its form or likeness (species) into itself. At the
level of the external senses, like vision or hearing, or the
internal sense of imagination or memory, sensible species were
involved. But there was a problem as to how this sensory
information was conveyed to the intellective or non-material
part of the soul, inasmuch as its conceptual notions as to what
the object was were incorporeal and universal. How the mind
as essentially only potential knowledge (i.e., as the possible
intellect*) becomes fully actualized through understanding
was only vaguely explained by Aristotle. Two factors at least
were involved. One was an active agency which, like a light
that brings out the potential colors of a darkened object,
transformed the phantasm* or sensible species in the
imagination by making its potential intelligibility actually
intelligible. This mysterious "light" of Aristotle came to be
called the agent intellect,* and dozens of theories were
proposed to explain its precise nature and function. The
second factor was the presence of the potential object in the
mind itself that enabled one who had once acquired knowledge
of a thing to draw upon this potential knowledge at will. As
the storehouse of this virtual or habitual information, the
intellect was described by Aristotle as "the place of the forms"
(De anima III, c. 4 [429a 27-8]). His scholastic followers gave
the name "intelligible species" to these distinct universal forms
in the possible intellect. Almost every prominent theologian
among them had his own personal theory as to how these
"species" were formed and functioned. Underlying their
accounts was often the desire to reconcile their basically
Aristotelian epistemology with certain insights of Augustine.
One of theje was his conviction that knowledge was more an
activity of the soul than a purely passive reception of
Glossary 625
impressions from external objects. The other was his

contention that the human soul is an image of the Trinity in
that its superior part is characterized by intellection, memory,
and volition. Among these three, memory (memoria) was of
special importance. It included not only the power of recalling
things and events of past experience, but also that of
producing mental concepts of objects not actually present to
the senses. Among these were included such transcendent
notions as had no strict counterpart in the sensible world but,
like the Platonic ideas, were explained in terms of some
illumination of the human mind by the divine archetypal
ideas. (See also memory.) While the more "Augustinian"
epistemologies of the last half of the thirteenth century
retained some form of special illumination, their account of it
was always integrated in some way with the explanations of
how the agent intellect illumined the phantasm. By Scotus's
time, most scholastics denied that anything more than the
general "illumination" of the agent intellect was needed to
account for our natural knowledge of the world about us.
Similarly, though they retained the Augustinian notion of
"memory" as the source of the "word" or mental concept of a
thing in the mind, mainly because of its analogical explanatory
value in accounting for the eternal generation of the Word by
the Father, "memory" became a synonym for the intellect,
usually insofar as it contained the latent image of the object as
an ens diminutum (see diminished being) in the form of an
intelligible species. Depending on how they interpreted the
various functions of agent and possible intellects, Scotus's
contemporaries assigned various roles to the intelligible
species. Those who held that the intellect was purely passive
in conceiving the object, maintained the simple impression of
the intelligible species (called then the "impressed species") as
the form of the object, sufficed to produce actual knowledge
(the expressed species or word). Others, stressing the activity
of the intellect, even denied the need of an intelligible species
distinct from the sensible species in the phantasm. Scotus,
while rejecting the need of an intelligible species for intuitive
cognition, required it to go proxy for the object in abstractive
cognition in order to explain why our conceptual knowledge,

that is a result of a cocausality of intellect (agent or possible)
and intelligible species as essentially ordered causes, reflects
only the universal characteristics or common nature of the
object and not its haecceity.* (See cognition, intuitive and
abstract.) Scotus's own account of the origin and function of
the intelligible species is colored by his conception that
throughout the cognitive process, be it at the sensory or
intellective level, the cocausality of mind and object are
required. That is to say, the soul, which is really identical and
only formally distinct from its cognitive faculties (see formal
distinction), functions as one active but partial cause, whereas
the object, or some species that goes proxy for it, is the other
partial cause. As he explains in the Ord. I, d. 3, nn. 496-503,
this co-causality is that of essentially ordered causes which are
related to each other. In this way agent intellect and
phantasm produce the intelligible species. The intelligible
species and the intellect (call it active or possible intellect as
you will) in turn produce the actual knowledge or mental
word. The intellect with respect to this latter role is called
"memory," to use Augustine's terminology. If actually informed
by the intelligible species, the memory passes from the state of
essential or remote potency with respect to actual knowledge
to one of accidental or proximate potency and in that state is
called "perfect memory." Theologians also discussed how the
immortal soul after death might acquire intelligible species of
things not experienced in the present life. Scotus's questions
on this subject are to be found in Ord. IV, d. 45.
intensively, intensively infinite, see infinity, intensive
intention (intentio), intentional: In medieval epistemology, an
intention came to acquire the technical sense of a "natural sign
in the soul." In the Latin translation of Avicenna, intentio was
used to render the term ma'na (viz., a notion or meaning),
which referred to intelligible form (species) of an extramental
thing (extra animam) insofar as it existed in the soul (intra
animam). Now the form, in contrast to matter, was for
Aristotle the essence, quiddity,* or intelligible part of a thing.
But any given notion or conceptual meaning, though
Glossary 627
expressing part of the quiddity of a thing, usually did not

exhaust its essential intelligibility, so that intention took on
the character of a formal aspect of the thing (formalitas), as it
were, and like ratio or logos was used not only for the formal
concept in the mind but also for its precise objective correlate.
Since these formal aspects, though found inseparably united in
the thing, were separable in thought or as intentions in the
mind, the intentional distinction became one way of describing
the virtual distinction or distinctio rationis insofar as it was
used to explain the plurality of divine attributes, for example.
One and the same indivisible thing had the power or virtue
(virtus) of producing in a created mind several objective
concepts of itself. Scotus, on the other hand, reduces the
virtual or intentional distinction to his formal distinction* a
parte rei and the objective correlate of distinct formal concepts
to what he calls a ratio realis, a reality (realitas) or formality*
(formalitas). Insofar as intention is considered as an
intelligible aspect of the thing, it too can be identified with
Scotus's formality. See his remark: "What Avicenna himself
understands by a different intention is the same thing as I
mean by another formality" (Rep. II, d. I, q. 6, n. 20). See also
intentions, first and second.
intentions, first and second: As Porphyry had distinguished
between words of first and second imposition* (viz., words that
refer respectively to things or to other words), so Avicenna
distinguished between first and second intentions. First
intentions as natural signs in the soul referred to things and
expressed some intelligible aspect or essential characteristic to
be found in them (see intention), whereas second intentions
referred to first intentions or concepts in the mind. They
included such logical notion as genus, species, etc., which the
mind discovers by reflecting on how the formal content of one
intention relates to that of another. Logic, he claimed, was
concerned only with second intentions whereas a real science,
like metaphysics, was concerned with first intentional aspects
of things.
interiorly attached see advenient
intrinsic mode: A qualification so identified with the subject it

modifies that it is neither really nor formally distinct from it.
yet it is possible to conceive the subject without the mode as a
first intention* at the level of abstract cognition.* Though
Scotus speaks of contingency and necessity as positive modes
of entity, his only discussion of intrinsic modes in any detail is
in connection with magnitude* as a transcendental attribute
of being. As an intrinsic mode, magnitude is the degree of
intensity or measure of intrinsic excellence characteristic of
some formal perfection as it exists extramentally in a
particular subject. The most fundamental or basic division of
magnitude is into the mode of infinity on the one hand and the
various degrees of finitude on the other. Infinity is that mode
which transcends every finite mode by a non-finite degree.
From Scotus s discussion of magnitude two characteristics of
an intrinsic mode emerge. First, it exists extramentally (ex
natura rei) in the thing (in re). Hence notions like "being."
"good," or "wise," which prescind from the mode as well as the
modal notions themselves, viz., "finite" or "infinite," and
composite concepts like "infinite being" and "finite goodness."
are all first intentions or real concepts when predicated of
either God or creatures. Second, the fact that the mode
represents something real or actually present in the thing does
not entail that it is present in the thing as actually distinct
from that of which it is the mode. Though Scotus makes it
clear there is no real distinction a parte rei between the two,
the discussion in Ord. I, d. 8, nn. 137-50 indicates that Scotus
does not consider the distinction between God's being and his
infinity to be even as radical or basic as that between two
formalities. In fact intuitive cognition* or the face-to-face
vision of God would erase the distinction entirely, which would
not be the case with two formally distinct perfections such as
divine wisdom and divine power (cf. ibid.). Only at the level of
abstract cognition is it possible to conceive the formalities of
being or goodness apart from their intrinsic mode. If there is
any objective basis for the distinction, it is to be found not so
much in the thing itself as in the different way in which the
object known presents itself to the intellect. For the intuitive
Glossary 629
cognition of the formality and its mode as a single formal

object, the actual presence of the existing thing is required.
For the abstract conception that prescinds from the mode, an
intelligible species* is needed to present the object as an ens
diminutum (see diminished being). This is not to say that
"being" and "infinite" are not first intentions when one asserts
propositions like "God is a being" or "The divine being is
infinite," for the intelligible species is not that which is known
but that by which something is known. What Scotus is
claiming is that as first intentions, "being" and "infinite being"
refer to the same divine formality, viz., infinite being. They
differ, however, in their conceptual content and in the
information they convey, in that the first notion is imperfect
and does not serve to distinguish God from creatures, whereas
the second is a perfect and proper concept, applicable to God
alone. The same could be said of "good" and "infinite goodness"
or "wise" and "infinite wisdom."
Scotus considers "finite" and "infinite" to be transcendental
modes of being, that is to say, they divide being before its
division into the ten categories.* This suggests a solution to
two related problems: (1) Why does God not fall under a genus
if the common concept ens (a being) is univocally predicable of
him and creatures? (2) Why does the formal distinction of
attributes not introduce some kind of composition in God? His
answer to the first is that God's being is formally infinite
whereas a being must be finite to fall into a category or genus.
For the constitutive perfections that correspond to "genus" and
"specific difference" are related respectively as potency to act.
In the human being, the "rational animal," for instance,
rationality is not only formally distinct from animality, but the
very potential of the human being as an animal is increased
and heightened by the fact that he has a rational mind. And
this provides an answer to the second question. In God, where
every attribute is formally infinite, no composition is possible,
for all composition, even that between generic and differential
formalities, implies that one reality is perfected by another,
and hence it is imperfect or finite in itself. In short, Scotus
thinks it is precisely because of his infinity that God has the
highest degree of real identity consistent with formal

diversity.
introductory citation (littera), see text
intuitive cognition, see cognition, intuitive and abstract
knowledge, abstract, see cognition, intuitive and abstract
knowledge, confused, see confused knowledge
knowledge, declarative, see declarative knowledge
knowledge, distinct, see distinct knowledge
knowledge, epistemic, see epistemic knowledge
knowledge, intuitive, see cognition, intuitive and abstract
living reasons /ideas, see ideas and exemplar
magnitude: The degree of intrinsic excellence or measure of
greatness characteristic of a given nature, perfection, or
formality. So defined, magnitude is used in a transcendental
sense (i.e., it is not limited to the Aristotelian category of
quantity). In this sense various properties that are not strictly
quantitative can be arranged in some hierarchic fashion. Thus
the brightness or intensity of a given color, the relative
strength of some virtue or vice, the degree of wisdom or
intelligence can be correlated with some fixed scale of values,
in which each higher degree contains the lower degree
virtually* or eminently.* In modern terminology, such
properties are called intensive or nonadditive in contrast to
additive or extensive properties like length, mass, or tune.
Nevertheless, magnitude could be called a quantitative rather
than a qualitative characteristic of a thing inasmuch as it
represents a reply to a question of the form: "How great is this
perfection?" or "To what extent is such and such a
characteristic present?" rather than an answer to a query of
the form: "What kind of perfection is this?" or "What type of
thing would this be?" As Scotus himself argues, both Aristotle
and St. Augustine distinguished between the strict and
transferred sense of such quantitative terms as "great and
small," and that "in their transferred sense at least, they are
transcendentals and proper attributes of the whole realm of
being." Thus he shows how this transcendental notion of
"quantity" can be extended to form a notion of the "infinite"
itself as a kind of limit that the various finite magnitudes
Glossary 631
approach but never reach. Though in this sense magnitude (be

it finite or infinite) is a real or extra-mental characteristic of
its respective subject, it is neither really nor formally distinct
from it, but is related to the entity or perfection in question as
its intrinsic mode.* The distinction between a formality* and
its intrinsic magnitude is already implicit in the very notion of
a pure perfection,* since creatures are found to possess
intelligence, goodness, wisdom, power, and the like in varying
degrees, yet the degree as such does not enter into the formal
notion or essential definition of these attributes and hence
they are said to be perfection purely and simply, and are
ascribed to God in an infinite or unlimited degree.
Master: unless expressly indicated otherwise, this refers to Peter
Lombard.
memory (memoria): Though Scotus employs this term in its more
customary sense as that by which we recall or remember the
past (cf. Ord. IV, d. 45, q. 2), his usage of the word throughout
the present work reflects the influence of St. Augustine, who
had gradually extended the common-sense notion of memory
until it came to include everything the individual mind is
capable of knowing or thinking about, whether previously
experienced or not. Every concept we form is a kind of "child"
born of this memory, and every thought we bring to mind
reveals or declares what is hidden in its depths. As he puts it
in De Trinitate XV, c. 10, "The thought formed from that thing
which we know is the word which we speak in our heart, and
it is neither Greek, nor Latin, nor any other language." (See
declarative knowledge.) This notion of our memory as speaking
its "word" provided him with a useful analogy for explaining
the eternal generation of the Word* by the Father in the
Trinity. He also argued that the soul is an image of the Trinity
in that its superior part contained memory, intelligence, and
volition. Scotus adapted both of these analogies to his own
conception as to how the intellect functions in producing
actual knowledge as a concept or quality within the soul. In
Ord. I, d. 3, nn. 58ff. he explains how this trinitarian image
could be understood. There are three perfections in the
intellective portion of the human soul. The first is its power to
produce knowledge in itself and this is called memoria. The

second is its passive ability to receive the knowledge thus
produced and this is called intelligentia or intellection. The
third is its capacity to have volition as such and this is called
voluntas or will. In short, memory represents the productive
aspect of man's mind whereby he forms a concept or mental
word. But according to his theory of knowledge, which is
neither purely Augustinian nor purely Aristotelian, the
intellect is only the partial efficient cause of its own concepts.
The other partial cause is the intelligible species,* which
informs the intellect, reducing it from remote potency to
proximate potency with respect to actual knowledge. Thus
"perfect memory," as the total cause of the concept, includes
both the intellect and the intelligible species which function as
a single principle or as essentially ordered causes of the
mental word. "Perfect memory," however, can be denned even
more generally as a pure perfection so that it would also apply
to God, in whom there is no real distinction between nature,
intellective power, and actual knowledge, nor is any
intelligible species derived from some extrinsic object required.
In this sense, perfect memory is denned as "an intellect having
actually present an intelligible object proportionate to itself."
Scotus also adopts Augustine's other analogy. As perfect
memory in us begets our thoughts or mental words by a kind
of internal speech act, so the Father's "memory" begets his Son
or Word by a kind of eternal speech act. Thus the mystery of
how the Son proceeds from the Father is described in alternate
ways as a "speaking of the Word," as an eternal generation of
the Son, as a communication of the divine nature to the second
person, or as an act of declarative knowledge, in that the
Word, as the image of the Father, is a kind of eternal
expression of what the Father is in himself.
modes of per se predication, see predication, per se.
natural, naturality: In general, whatever is in accord with the
nature or essence of a thing is said to be "natural." More
specifically, these terms refer to an action which proceeds from
an active power or agent without deliberation and in a manner
determined by the nature of the agent. Such an action is said
Glossary 633
to occur "after the manner of nature" (per modum naturae).

Even actions that are essentially free, and hence do not occur
simply per modum naturae, may be said to have a certain
"naturality" about them, in that some measure of natural
determinism accompanies the rational self-determination on
the part of the will. See nature and will as primary divisions of
active powers.
natural will: Either (1) that principle of action called the will,
insofar as it is the seat of the affection for what is to the
advantage of the agent, or (2) an act freely elicited by the will
that is in accord with this inclination or affection. See will and
will as nature.
nature: In a broad sense "nature" designates simply what a thing
is, viz., its essence or quiddity, and as such would apply not
only to positive things but also to such things as privations or
negations, as when one inquires about the nature of blindness.
In a strict sense, however, nature refers to those causes or
agents that do not act with knowledge and deliberation.
Aristotle had already divided all active potencies into either
rational or irrational. It is clear from his questions on
Aristotle's Metaphysics (Bk. IX, q. 15, nn. 4-7), that Scotus
considered his own basic division of nature (natura) and will
(voluntas) to be equivalent to irrational and rational principles
of action. The will is a rational faculty inasmuch as it acts with
reason; that is to say, a free agent after deliberate
consideration of various alternatives freely determines his
course of action. All other agents, including the intellect itself,
except where their actions are subject to voluntary control, act
naturally, that is to say, their mode of activity is determined
by their respective natures and when all external conditions
for action are present, these agents must act and to the utmost
of their ability. Unlike some of his contemporaries who
admitted that certain acts of the will were necessary whereas
others were free, Scotus denies that any elicited act of the will
proceeds from that faculty or power naturally (per modum
naturae); all the will's actions, by contrast, are elicited freely
and as an agent, the will is said to be essentially free and can
be equated with liberty as opposed to nature. That is to say,
the will is essentially that potency or faculty that can act

rationally or with reason. This means first of all that a free
agent does not act blindly but has prior knowledge of what can
be loved or willed. While such knowledge is a necessary
condition, a logical presupposition, for volition, it is not of itself
a sufficient condition for the same, for the will must determine
itself to love or will the object. Furthermore, the will is
rational in another more interesting sense, viz., it has an
inborn inclination to act in accord with right reason. Though
not an elicited act, this affection for justice, as it is called,
represents a positive bias in the will that inclines it to love the
good in terms of its objective worth or intrinsic value
regardless of how this happens to be related to what is good or
advantageous for the agent. See will and will as free.
nature of the thing, from the, see extramentally
necessity: The correlative of contingency. As a positive state of
being or action, it expressed not only what can be but what
must be. The contingent, by contrast, is what can, but need
not, be. As a positive state, contingency, as Scotus understands
the term, is a logically complex notion. If it refers to something
actual, it means that what exists now need not have existed
now and that a contrary state could have existed in its place.
Such a contingent state is possible only if the cause does not
act of necessity, that is to say, the cause was free to cause or
not to cause the effect with respect to that moment when the
effect will begin to exist. Necessity also has a variety of
connotations. Scotus, in connection with the question of God s
foreknowledge of contingent events, singles out necessity of
inevitability, which applies to what is not only the case but
could not have been otherwise, and even here he distinguishes
between what is inevitable of itself and what is an inevitable
consequence of something other than itself. (See necessity of
inevitability.) He also refers to a necessity of immutability,*
viz., something which must be so only because God is not
intrinsically mutable, since this would imply imperfection.
necessity of immutability: Though Scotus regarded the will of God
to be the contingent cause of all created events, his volition
with respect to creatures, like his foreknowledge of their free
Glossary 635
actions, was not something he has at one moment of time but

not at another. On the contrary, he freely chose from all
eternity to create what would begin to exist at that point in
time that he wanted it to. Similarly, what he knows to be true
of a free agent, he knows from all eternity, but he knows it as
a contingent truth, one which might not have been the case
and hence was not something inevitable.
necessity of inevitability: A necessity that is completely and
absolutely deterministic, stemming as it does from a nature
whose actions are not subject to any inhibitive conditions or
external restraints. Unlike the natural actions of created
agencies which can always be impeded, only the divine nature
itself and what is a necessary consequence of that nature
possesses inevitability in this sense. Other things are
inevitable only conditionally, namely, on the assumption that
something else is the case, or has been the case, or will be the
case.
notionalflyj: "Notional" (from notio, a sign or distinguishing mark,
developed from the classical meaning "knowledge," "concept")
refers to any characteristic peculiar to any one or, at most, to
any two divine persons. As such it is contrasted with those
divine properties all three persons have in common. The latter
are called "essentials."
obediential potency: The capability or potentiality, inherent in
every creature in view of its complete dependence upon the
will of God, to be elevated to a supernatural state or condition
that transcends any natural exigency, inclination, or potency,
for instance, that of hypostatic union* with a divine person or
persons.
origin, relations of: The relationships that arise between things in
virtue of the fact that one originates from another; in its
specifically theological and trinitarian usage, the relationship
of the principle (principium) to what proceeds from a principle
(principiatum) and vice versa. The divine persons are
commonly held to be constituted by that relationship of origin
that is proper to each. Thus the Father is said to be
constituted by the fact that he begets, or generates, the Son or
"speaks the Word." Conversely, the Son is constituted by the
fact that he is begotten, or generated, or "spoken" by the

Father. The Holy Spirit is constituted by passive spiration.*
viz., his relationship to the active spiration of Father and Son
as a joint productive principle. According to an oft-repeated
theological principle, in the Trinity there is no real distinction
except that which arises in virtue of the diametric opposition
between the relata or terms related by the relationships of
origin. Thus Father is really distinct from the Son and vice
versa; the Holy Spirit (passive spiration) is really distinct from
active spiration and vice versa. But because Father and Son
are not really distinct from the principle of active spiration,
nor is active spiration as a principle really distinct from
Father or Son, the two types of production in the Trinity give
rise to only three rather than four persons that are really and
mutually distinct from each other.
origination, active and passive; originate, originating: That
relationship of origin that is active or passive respectively.
Active origination is a notional* characteristic of the Father;
passive origination on the other hand is a notional
characteristic of the Son. The Holy Spirit also has the notional
characteristic of passive origination with respect to the active
spiration* on the part of Father and Son.
passion (passio): (1) One of the ten categories* of Aristotle, viz.,
that which consists of the state of being acted upon. Passion
and its correlative category, action or the state of acting upon
some patient or recipient, are regarded as extrinsically
advenient relationships. (See advenient intrinsically and
extrinsically.) (2) Among the third class of qualities Aristotle
cites in the Categories, c. 8 (9a 29- 10a 10), are what the
Oxford translation calls "affections" (passiones). These are
transitory sensible qualities which are affected by or affect the
senses or sensitive appetite. Examples are the blush of
embarrassment, the pallor caused by fear, a passing irritation,
as opposed to the more permanent affective qualities such as
the natural color of the skin, or a chronic bad temper. (3) A
transcendental attribute of being such as true (verum) or good
(bonum), considered to be formally distinct from being (ens).
(4) A state of suffering, as the passion of Christ.
Glossary 637
patient (Latin possum): one that is the recipient of an action.

perfection, pure and mixed, see pure perfection
permanent vs. successive creature: Some things are successive or
in process, like a melody, a game of tennis, a walk, or a
journey. They are of such a nature that temporal succession
enters into the very idea or definition of what they are. Such
things are said to have their being sequentially, or to be in a
state of becoming (in fieri), in contrast to such relatively
permanent things as a man, a mountain, or a house, which
have being complete and are said to be in fact (in facto esse).
See Aristotle, Physics III, c. 6 (206a 20-6 2). The second class
of things Scotus calls the permanent or enduring creatures
even though, with respect to God, who creates and conserves
them in being, they are in a quasi state of becoming.
perseity: abstract form of 'per se.'
person, personal, see hypostasis and suppositum
phantasm: The sense image or sensible species of the object as
present in the internal sense or imagination; also spelled
"fantasm." According to Scotus it is the product of (a) the
sensible species in an external sense such as sight, hearing,
etc., and (b) the internal sense acting as a single principle or
as two essentially ordered efficient causes. The phantasm in
turn acts in similar fashion with the agent intellect to produce
the intelligible species. See agent intellect and intelligible
species.
pilgrim: A person who journeys through this life as an exile on the
way (in statu viae) to his heavenly home (patria).
place: The whereabouts of a body; one of the ten categories* of
Aristotle. It is essentially a relationship between the body and
that which surrounds or contains it. (See advenient
intrinsically and extrinsically.) In contrast to space, which
may or may not be empty, place is regarded as something
positive, namely, the boundary of the containing body or
bodies considered as immovable and immediately contiguous
to the body located there. Confer Aristotle, Physics IV, cc. 4-5.
Also called technically, in English, ubiety*
place, types of presence in: Circumscriptive presence is the natural
way in which bodies are in place or space, viz., such that each
part of the body occupies its own place distinct from that
occupied by other parts; each part, then, has one restricted or
circumscribed location. Circumscriptive presence is contrasted
with definitive presence, which is said to be characteristic of an
immaterial or spiritual substance, or of the soul (with respect
to the place occupied by the body it informs). In this case, since
the spiritual substance does not have organic or distinct parts
like a body does, it is said to be whole and entire in each part
of the space or place that defines it, as well as in the entire
area. Since place (in contrast to empty space) is the containing
surface of surrounding body, place is, according to Aristotelian
philosophy, something real and finite. Since God is everywhere
by reason of his omnipresence, according to the theologians.
God is said to be neither circumscriptively nor definitively in
place, since, though he is whole and entire everywhere in
place, he is not defined or restricted by it, but rather
comprehends it. Hence he is said to be comprehensively present
in place or to have repletive presence there, inasmuch as he
fills the whole of it.
possible intellect: The mind or intellective portion of the soul
insofar as it is potentially knowledge, and the recipient of
intellectual information. This faculty passes from a state of
remote potency to proximate potency by the reception of the
(impressed) intelligible species. When fully actualized, the
possible intellect is that by which the soul is formally* said to
know, apprehend, or grasp the meaning of its conceptual
notions or mental "words." See agent intellect; intelligible
species; memory; word.
postpredicaments: Those general notions such as opposition,
privation, simultaneity, posteriority, possession, and the like
which are discussed in Aristotle's Categories, cc. 10-15, after
the treatment of the predicaments or ten categories.*
potency and act: Aristotle's basic modalities of being, where "act"
denotes what exists or is the case, whereas "potency" expresses
what can be. But since "is" and "can be" have many linguistic
usages, both act and potency took on various shades of
meaning in philosophy that bear only a family resemblance to
each other (Cf. Scotus, Qnaestiones subtilissimae in Aristotelis
Glossary 639
Metaphysicam IX, qq. 1-2). Thus the following pairs of

opposites are often related respectively as act to potency by
medieval philosophers: actual vs. potential, real vs. possible,
form vs. matter, existence vs. essence, agent vs. patient,
operation vs. operative faculty, what is complete, finished, or
perfect vs. what is incomplete, not fully actualized, or
imperfect. Potencies are further classified as active powers or
passive capacities depending on whether they refer to what a
subject or agent can do (operative faculties) or what can be
done to or in a subject (receptive capacities). An active
potency, argued the scholastics, unlike a passive potency, does
not necessarily imply imperfection. Consequently, though God
is called "pure act" inasmuch as there is no ad intra*
possibility in the divine that is not fully actualized, not all
possible relationships ad extra* to creatures need be realized
since their actualization is contingent upon his free will as
Creator. It is in this sense that we attribute "omnipotence" to
God as a perfection. Various acts or degrees of actualization
also are distinguished. If God as pure act lies at one end of the
spectrum, primary matter as "pure potency to form" has the
least degree of actuality, according to Scotus. In between God
and prime matter come: (1) The "separate substances"* (i.e.,
the Intelligences* postulated by the philosophers, or the
angels of Judeo-Christian theology), so-called because they
exist in separation from all matter. As spiritual or immaterial
substances they are only in accidental potency to change such
as that involving new knowledge or voluntary actions. (2) The
celestial bodies which, though they contain prime matter, are
substantially immutable in virtue of their incorruptible form.
They are only in potency to motion or change of place. (3)
Corporeal or bodily substances, ranging from the human
being, the most complex, to the four elemental substances
(fire, air, water, earth), are all composed of primary matter
and one (or more) substantial forms, and as such are in
potency to substantial changes (generation and corruption*) as
well as to accidental ones. Generation of one substance from
another or others represents a major actualization, and the
new form matter receives is called a substantial act.* New
qualities or a change in size or quantity, by contrast, involve

the actualization of accidental potentialities and the new form
acquired is called an accidental act. See also in actu primo, in
actu, secundo.
potency, accidental and substantial: Anything, be it substance or
accident, is said to be in objective potency if it has no real or
actual being, but has only virtual existence as a possible object
of God's creative power. In this sense, the essence of a possible
substance is said to be in substantial objective potency; the
essence of a possible accident, in accidental objective potency.
More frequently, however, accidental and substantial potency
are subjective, that is to say, it is some existing subject that is
in potency to some substantial or accidental change
respectively. Thus matter is in substantial potency to such
substantial forms as it can receive but does not have as yet.
Similarly, a substance can be in accidental potency to some
further accidental perfection or modification. Both substantial
and accidental (subjective) potency are further subdivided into
proximate and remote potentiality. A subject in proximate
potency is reduced to act by one single change or actualization,
whereas one in remote potency can be actualized in stages or
through a gradated series of changes. Thus the intellective
soul is said to be in remote accidental potency to intellection
by the very fact that it exists. But to be in proximate
accidental potency, the intellect must have the intelligible
object present to it, either in its actual existence, if the
intellection in question is intuitive cognition, or as presented
to the intellect in the form of an intelligible species.* Confer
Scotus, QQ. in Metaphysicam IX, q. 2, nn. 8-9.
potency, proximate accidental, see potency, accidental and
substantial
predication, formal, see formal predication vs. predication by
identity
predication, in quid, in quale, see in quid predication
predicatwn, per se: Necessary predication, either (1) because the
predicate gives the whole of the essential definition (species) or
a part thereof (genus or specific difference), which is the first
mode of per se predication, or (2) because the notion of the
Glossary 641
subject enters into the definition of the predicate. This is the

case when the predicate is a proper accident or proprium* of
the subject. Confer Aristotle, Analytica posteriora I, c. 4 (73a
34-6 2). See accidens per accidens.
principiate (principiare): to produce as a principle rather than as
a cause. Principiation (noun); principians (participle). See the
following note.
principiated (principiatum): That which proceeds from a
principle. Because the Son receives the divine nature from the
Father as a source or productive principle, he can be called a
principiatum, but not an "effect" of the Father, according to
scholastic theologians. See productions.
principiating see principiate
principiation see principiate
principle (principium): A beginning, source, or cause of something
other than itself, a logical principle. As the originative source
of some actually existing entity, principle is used in a more
general sense than a cause in any of its Aristotelian
connotations. Thus, in speaking of the Trinity, theologians call
the Father the originative principle, but not the cause, of the
Son. (See productions.) Also, in regard to an action, there are
various ways in which an agent is said to be the principle of
the action. The person or suppositum is the principium quod
(that which acts, i.e., the one who or the one which acts). The
nature is the remote principle by which the person acts, and
the faculty is the proximate principle by which it acts. See
principium quo and quod,
principle whereby or 'by which, ' see principium quo
principium quo and quod: In the case of a person (i.e., a rational
suppositum*) the person is the one who acts (principium quod
agit); the nature of the person is the remote principle by which
the person acts (principium quo remotum), whereas the faculty
or active potency rooted in the nature is the proximate
principle by which the act is elicited (principium quo
proximum). In the case of an irrational suppositurn, such as a
stone or a dog, the suppositum as the ultimate subject is the
principium quod agit. Thus it is the stone that rolls and the
horse that kicks.
priority of nature: A priority based on an order of nature, in

contrast to a temporal order or an order of origin. If any two
distinguishable elements are so related in virtue of what they
are that the very notion or existence of one, call it B, entails
the notion or existence of the other, call it A, but not vice
versa, then A is prior by nature to B even if neither is
temporally prior to the other. If A entails B and B entails A.
however, the two are said to be simultaneous by nature; such
for instance would be the case with true correlatives (cf.
Aristotle, Categories c. 7 [76 15]). See also sign of nature.
priority of origin: A priority based on the order that exists among
the divine persons in virtue of the way one person proceeds
from another. Since the three divine persons share the same
divine nature or essence from all eternity, there is no one
person prior in time or nature to another. In virtue of origin,
the Father as eternally generating the Son is prior in origin to
the Son who proceeds from him eternally. Similarly, the Holy
Spirit is posterior in origin, though not in nature or in time, to
both Father and Son. See processions, divine; productions and
sign of origin.
processions, divine: The process whereby the Son proceeds from
the Father and the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son
as from a single principle. Though the process can be called a
production, theologians argue it is essentially different from
any causal production. See productions, speaking, and
spirating.
product see productions
productions: As applied to the inner life of God, the divine
productions refer to the eternal generation of the Son by the
Father, and the eternal spiration of the Holy Spirit by the
Father and Son acting as a single principle. Because the end
result of these productions or divine processions of one person
from another or others is that one and the same numerical
nature is shared equally by all three persons, theologians felt
justified in distinguishing such a "production" from a causal
production where not only is the cause really distinct from the
effect, but the effect has a nature or essence that is
numerically distinct from that of the cause. According to this
Glossary 643
technical usage, the Father can be called a "producer"

(producens) or a "principle or source" (principium) but not a
"cause" (causa). The Son and Holy Spirit conversely cannot be
called "effects" or said to be "caused" but they can be called
"producibles" or principiata (singular principiatum) in the
sense that they proceed from a principle.
proprium: One of the five predicables of Porphyry; a property.
Though it is not part of the essential definition of the subject,
it is inseparable from the essence and can be shown to follow
from the definition as a logical consequence. Hence, in contrast
to the genus, difference, and species which are predicated in
the first mode of necessary or per se predication,* the
proprium is also predicable per se but in the second mode.
Examples as regards the human being would be the properties
of "teachable," "risible," etc. See also accidens per accidens.
pure perfection (perfectio simpliciter): Anything that is purely and
simply perfection. The scholastic conception of the term goes
back to St. Anselm of Canterbury (cf. Monologion, c. 15), who
distinguishes among the various names, which designate
perfections in creatures, those which seem to imply no
imperfection as such and which, absolutely speaking, it would
be better to have than not to have. Such, for instance, would
be "being," "living," "wise," "powerful," "just," "blessed," etc.
"Man," "gold," "lead," by contrast, represent perfection not
simply, but in a qualified sense. The distinction between
unqualified and qualified perfection corresponds to what are
often called pure and mixed perfection. Consequently we have
translated perfectio simpliciter uniformly as "pure perfection."
Since the notion of a limited degree does not enter into the
formal definition of a pure perfection, Scotus argues that pure
perfection is compatible with the intrinsic mode of infinity. See
intrinsic mode.
quality: A quality is any attribute that expresses the kind of thing
the subject is (cf. Aristotle's Metaphysics V (A), c. 14). As such
it would include first of all the substantial or specific
difference itself, which is predicated in quale quid of the
subject. (See in quid predication.) More often, however, quality
refers to one of the ten categories.* Under this heading,
Aristotle enumerates four distinct types: (1) habit and

disposition, (2) inborn capacities or incapacities, (3) affective
qualities and affections (passiones), (4) form and figure.
Though he admits there may be other sorts, he believes these
four cover what are most properly called qualities (Categories
c. 8 [8o 25- 10a 25]). Habit differs from a mere disposition, he
tells us, in that it is more lasting and firmly established. It
includes various kinds of knowledge or virtues like justice,
self-restraint, and so on, that are not easily dislodged, whereas
heat, cold, disease, and health represent dispositions which
can quickly change. While habits are at the same time
dispositions, not all dispositions are necessarily habits. This
notion of habit was extended by medieval theologians to
include also supernaturally infused habits, like faith, hope and
charity. (See habit.) For Aristotle, the second class of qualities
seemed to differ from the first largely in that they were native
abilities whereas the first were acquired in the course of time.
Scholastics were not in agreement as to how this second class
of "accidental" qualities were to be understood, especially in
regard to the powers of the soul. The third class of qualities
are those which proceed or result from some accidental
sensible change. If this is relatively permanent, the alteration
is an affective quality, whereas if it is more ephemeral in
nature, it is called an affection or passion.* "Affection"which
is the standard translation of 7td0oqin this context does not
mean love or attachment, but is rather used in the sense of
"affecting" or "being affected by" something in which the
senses or sense appetites are involved. Thus such sensible
qualities of a thing as its color, flavor, sound, temperature are
listed among this third class because they affect the senses.
Since the natural color of one's skin is permanent, Aristotle
calls it an affective quality, whereas the passing blush of
shame or embarrassment, the pallor of fear, a feverish
temperature, or other such transient qualities are called
affections or passions. Not only the body but also the soul has
affections and affective qualities, he explains. For instance, we
speak of people who are bad-tempered, irascible, or mad, in
virtue of a more or less permanent condition in contrast to the
Glossary 645
even-tempered person, who may nevertheless occasionally lose

his temper. Such a flash of vexation would be an affection,
whereas the more or less permanent temperament would
represent an affective quality. The fourth quality involves such
things as shape or configuration, which result from the
arrangement of the quantitative parts of a body.
quantity: Though Scotus is well aware of the usual sense of this
term as an Aristotelian category, he turns to the extended or
transferred meaning of the term that had been employed by
theologians since the time of St. Augustine. See intrinsic mode
and magnitude.
quiddity (from the Latin quid, "what"): The real nature or essence
of a thing; literally, it means the "whatness" as an answer to
the question Quid est? (What is it?). Quidditative: adjective
form of quiddity.
real relation, see relations, real
reasoned fact: the conclusion of a syllogistic demonstration
(demonstratio propter quid) in which the middle term cites the
precise cause of why the predicate inheres in the subject.
Opposed to simple fact: where the middle term does not give
precise cause or reason why the predicate inheres in the
subject. Confer Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, chapter 13.
See also epistemic knowledge.
reduplicated (reduplicatus): An expression in which the notion
itself or some aspect thereof is repeated after some connective
as qua, as, under the aspect of, etc.; for example, being qua
being, will as nature, or will as free.
reduplicative (reduplicativus), see reduplicated.
relations, common: Those relationships between the divine
persons that are symmetrical and hence do not distinguish one
person from the other in the way that the relations of origin*
do. The only common relationship of this sort that Scotus
considers to be real is that of equality.
relations, real: A relation is real, according to Scotus, if these
three conditions obtain: (1) its foundation is some extramental
reality or formal characteristic of a thing; (2) the related terms
are themselves things* (res) and are really distinct from each
other; (3) the relationship is extramental, that is to say, it

holds independently of any intellectual consideration.
relations of origin, see origin, relations of
relatives, three types of: In the Metaphysics V (A), c. 15, Aristotle
enumerates three kinds of relative things on the basis of the
foundation for the relationship. The first is founded on number
or quantity, as double to half or treble to a third, or in general
that which is contained many times to its multiple and that
which exceeds to that which is exceeded. Equal, like, and the
same are included under this heading inasmuch as they all
refer to unity. Those are equal whose quantity is one; those are
alike whose quality is one; and those are the same whose
substance is one. The second class of relatives is based on their
acting or being acted upon, that is to say, on their active or
passive potencies; for example, the relationship of what can
heat to what can be heated; or of what can cut to what can be
cut, and in general of everything active to everything passive.
The third class includes such things as the knowable, the
thinkable, the visible and the like, which are described in
relative terms only because something else is related to them,
namely knowledge, thought or sight.
sacrament of the altar: The Eucharist or the consecrated elements
of bread and wine. See eucharistic species.
science, subordinate, see subordinate science
scientific knowledge, see epistemic knowledge
separate substance: A substance which exists apart from all
matter; a pure spirit such as God or the intelligent beings
postulated by the philosophers as responsible in some way for
the regularity or movement characteristic of the heavens and
celestial bodies. These were called Intelligences* and Judeo-
Christian theologians considered them as angels.
sign (signum): In De quantitate animae, c. 11, St. Augustine
defines a sign as "a mark without parts." Examples would be a
geometric point, a particular point in time, or a logical
"moment." As a temporal sequence of events can be described
in terms of the point in time when each occurred, so a
nontemporal ordered sequence can be distinguished according
Glossary 647
to different "signs" indicating priority or posteriority according

to that order. See sign of nature and sign of origin,
sign of nature: Though Scotus does not admit any temporal
sequence or priority among the various essential or notional
attributes that God has from all eternity, he does believe one
can distinguish a certain order of nature among these
attributes or properties in virtue of what they are. Knowledge
of a creature's possibility, for instance, does not logically entail
a decision to create, but God's decision to create (made from all
eternity) does entail knowledge of this possibility. If B entails
A, but not vice versa, A is said to be prior by nature to B even
when there is no temporal precedence. As one may number
various moments of time to distinguish the order of temporal
events, so Scotus distinguishes various instants or logically
discrete moments to show the logical sequence of such non-
mutual entailments. "Sign" in this context has the meaning of
"a mark without parts" (confer St. Augustine, De quantitate
animae, c. 11).
sign of origin: A discrete instance in a sequence of elements
ordered according to a priority-posteriority relationship on the
basis of how one divine person proceeds eternally from
another. See sign.
simple fact: see reasoned fact.
simply simple (simpliciter simplex): A primitive or irreducibly
simple concept. Simple concepts are those which can be
grasped in a single act of understanding. Some simple
concepts, like that of human, for instance, can be analyzed in
terms of two simpler concepts, one of which is determinable,
e.g., "animal," the other determining, e.g., "rational." Such a
process of analysis, however, must eventually end up with
irreducibly simple notions which are known in toto if they are
known at all. Such, Scotus claims, are the concepts of "being"
and its ultimate differences. In contrast to simple concepts,
Scotus calls concepts that have no per se unity, but only an
accidental unity, e.g., a white man, composite concepts,
because several distinct acts are required to grasp their
meaning. Confer Lectura I, d. 3, n. 68; Ord. I, d. 3, n. 71.
singularity, determinate: The haecceity* of a particular

individual; individuality as something unique and proper, in
contradistinction to "individuality" as the common or general
characteristic of all individuals (indeterminate singularity).
speaking, speak (dicere): The act of producing a "word."* Because
the second person of the Trinity is called the Logos or Word of
the Father, St. Augustine describes the eternal generation or
production of the Son by the Father as "speaking the Word."
The force of the analogy springs from his peculiar conception
of our "memory," which is a kind of intellectual storehouse or
reservoir of all that we can know or think about. From it every
thought we have is born, or brought to light, being given
conceptual expression as a kind of mental "word spoken in the
heart" that declares to our mind what is hidden within it. See
declarative knowledge and memory.
species, eucharistic, see eucharistic species
spirating, spiration (Latin spirare, "to breathe"): The manner in
which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son.
Following St. Augustine, theologians regard it as an act of love
involving the will, shared as a single principle (sometimes
called "active spiration" in contrast to the Holy Spirit as
"passive spiration") by both Father and Son.
subordinate science: A science which draws its principles from a
higher science. If science be taken as a demonstrated
conclusion (see epistemic knowledge) or a body of such
conclusions, then some of the conclusions demonstrated in the
higher science become premises for demonstration in the
subalternate science.
subsistence: The perfection whereby a being is capable of existing
in itself or per se. Thus Scotus enumerates some of the various
senses in which a thing could be said to be per se or subsistent.
They range from that minimal degree of subsistence
characteristic of a separated accident* miraculously supported
apart from its connatural substrate, to that of substances.
supposita, or persons.
substantial act: In material or bodily substances, composed of
matter and form, the substantial form, which unites with the
material component to form a single complete substance or
Glossary 649
nature, is called the substantial act, in contrast to further

accidental modifications of the substance, called accidental
forms or acts. See act and potency.
successive, see permanent vs. successive creature
sun: According to Aristotle, not only is the parent an efficient
cause of generation, especially in the case of plants, animals,
and humans, but the movement of the sun along the ecliptic is
given as reason why the cycle of generation and corruption is
perpetuated (cf. De generatione et corruptione II, c. 10). The
sun functions as a general cause, whereas the nature of the
parent is the specifying factor in generation. Scotus alludes to
this view of Aristotle and discusses his own views about the
effects of the heavenly bodies on various types of change
including generation and corruption in Ord. II, d. 14.
supposit (suppositum): The general name for a being that is per se
in the third sense defined by Scotus. If the suppositum is of a
rational or intellectual nature, it is called a person.
Suppositum is a close Latin parallel to hypostasis, the term
Greek theologians used to designate a divine person in the
Trinity. The Latin form is retained in the second edition of
Webster's New International Dictionary and is translated as
"supposit" in the third. Because of their interest in explaining
the union of Christ's human nature and his divinity in the
person of the Word (see hypostatic union), theologians were
forced to develop some clear idea of what constituted a person,
be he human, angelic, or divine. In this connection they went
on to determine the analogue of person in a nonrational
subsistent, and retained suppositum as a general designation
for any fully subsistent individual, be it rational or not.
Boethius had defined a person as "an individual substance of a
rational nature" (confer De persona et duabus naturis, c. 3 [PL
64, 1343]). Those who accepted this definition pointed out that
"substance" was not to be taken in a categorical sense but as
equivalent to a distinct subsistent, in the sense that Scotus
seeks to clarify in discussing the various meanings of
subsistent or per se being. Others stressed that "rational" was
equivalent to "intellectual" in its most general sense, viz., as
applicable also to the divine nature as well as to one which
reasoned in the discursive manner characteristic of humans.

Others, who unlike Scotus made matter the basis for
individuality, had to qualify the term "individual." Richard of
St. Victor, in his De Trinitate IV, cc. 21-22, called attention to
what seemed to be an even more serious drawback of the
Boethian definition, namely, that, according to it, the divine
nature itself would be a person in its own right. Hence he
suggested an alternate definition, viz., that a person is "the
incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature"
(intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia).
"Existence" here seems to be simply the abstract form for "the
existent" or "the subsistent." It implies that the subject
characterized by it has substantial being (esse) in a
transcendental or non-categorical sense, and that this being is
complete and individual. It also connotes, says Richard, that
this existent has this being in virtue of some property that
indicates something of its origins, that is to say, it has this
being of itself, or by creation, or by propagation, etc. In God
the divine nature itself has such existentia, for it has
substantial being of itself. Now the three divine persons share
this existentia commonly and hence indistinguishably. but
each person also has his own incommunicable existence in
virtue of which he is a discrete and unique individual. It is this
incommunicable existentia in the divine intellectual nature
that best defines what a divine person is. And more generally,
it is the incommunicable existence of any intellectual nature
that commonly defines a person, be he divine, angelic, or
human. On this Richardian definition, which Scotus accepts
and develops, a suppositum would seem to be the
incommunicable existence of any nature, and a person would
be an intellectual suppositum.
syncategorematic. Logic: implying another term to complete its
full sense: opposed to categorematic.*
terminus a quo: The initial state or starting-point of change, from
the Latin, the "terminus from which." Since change was
described as the passage of some subject from one state or
condition to another, scholastics distinguished three elements
involved in change: (1) the underlying substrate or subject of
Glossary 651
the change, (2) the initial terminus, and (3) the final state or
terminus ad quem (literally, the "terminus to which") the
process of change proceeds and with which it ends.
terminus ad quem: A goal, object, or purpose; the final state, for
instance, of a process of change.
text (littera): the text of Peter Lombard's Sentences.
thing (res): Whatever exists or is conceived to exist as a really
distinct entity, be it a substance or accident, or a really
distinct constituent of substance such as matter and
substantial form. As such it is distinguished from a formality
or reality which is an intelligible aspect, several of which can
be distinguished within a single thing. (See formality.) It is
also used as a synonym for ens (a being) and in addition to the
above meaning it is used in the broader as well as the more
restricted sense.
transcendental, transcendent: In the medieval usage, anything
that transcendes the ten categories of Aristotle. It is a more
general notion that has wider extension or applicability. Such
is the notion of 'being,' 'thing,' 'one,' 'true,' 'good,' etc.
transient action, see action, immanent and transient
transubstantiation: The term coined by Catholic theologians to
indicate the change involved when, at the consecration in the
mass, the substances of bread or wine are converted into the
body and blood of Christ. The accidents (called Eucharistic
Species*) of the bread and winethe sensible qualities that
one can see, taste, and touchremain, but conversion is called
total because, unlike the generation and corruption* involved
in the ordinary changes of one substance into another, e.g.,
elements into chemical compounds, etc., in which some form of
matter or material cause serves as the underlying subject of
the change, in transubstantiation both the matter and
substantial form cease to exist and are replaced by the
presence of Christ. A common explanation adopted by
medieval theologians to explain how the Species, appearances,
or accidental features remained despite the absence of the
normal substantial substrate was that God miraculously
conserved the accident quantity* which in turn supported the
other accidental qualities. Accidents thus lacking substantial
support were called separated accidents.* Though they existed

in themselves after the manner of substance, their natural
inclination to inhere in a substance was sufficient to keep
them from being regarded as a substance in their own right.
ubiety (ubi): The relationship between a body and the place it
occupies; hence the presence of a body in a definite place:
sometimes called ubication. See place.
univocal principle or cause: One that produces a product or effect
specifically like itself. Living generation is of this type.
virtually: One thing is said to contain another virtually if it can
produce it, for example, as a cause or as a principle. Scotus
also uses the word in a special sense, namely, when two
distinct formalities are found in one and the same really
identical thing, one of the two formalities can be said to
contain the other virtually. Thus, for example, he explains
that the divine paternity, though formally distinct from the
divine essence, is contained virtually in the essence (cf.
Lectura I, d. 2, n. 272).
will: That faculty or active principle whereby an agent acts freely
and not per modum naturae (i.e., in the way or manner that
nature does). Whereas Aristotle divided all active powers or
potencies into rational or irrational (cf. Metaphysics IX [6], c. 2
[1046b 1-2]), Scotus equates these with will (voluntas) and
nature (natura), respectively. The will is called a rational
faculty because it acts with reason, on two grounds: (1) After
deliberate consideration of what is good or bad, the agent
freely elicits an act of volition or nolition as the case may be.
(All other agents, including the intellect itself, except where
their actions are subject to voluntary control, act naturally or
per modum naturae, i.e., when all external conditions for
acting are present, the act is elicited necessarily and in a
manner determined by nature. See nature. Even the initial
acts of the intellect are natural or determined in this sense
Only those secondary acts of the intellect as fall under the
command of the will are rational in the strict sense of being
the result of a rational deliberation.) (2) But free will is
rational also in a further sense, viz.. that it has an inborn
inclination to love an object according to right reason, that is.
Glossary 653
for what it is in itself or for its intrinsic value. Following St.

Anselm of Canterbury, Scotus calls this inclination an
affection for what is just (affectio iustitiae) since it inclines the
will to love what is good objectively or justly. By contrast,
nature and all natural causes are inclined to seek their own
perfection, namely, what they were born to be (natura, from
nasci, to be born). Because the will, like other natural
faculties, is not indifferent to its own perfection, it also has
such an inborn inclination for the advantageous (affectio
commodi). As the seat of this inclination or affection, the will
is said to be voluntas ut natura. If this inclination went
unchecked it would incline the will to seek its own perfection
and happiness above all else. But because nature, in the case
of finite agents, is not the supreme good, either in itself or as a
potency perfected by its elicited act, the affectio iustitiae, or
inclination to love as right reason dictates, is the higher
inclination. It is the first checkrein or moderating influence on
the affectio iustitiae, freeing the will, as it were, from the need
to seek only itself and its own perfection above all else. Hence
it is called by Scotus the native freedom of the will, and, by
some commentators, a "freedom for values." According to
Scotus, neither the affectio commodi nor the affectio iustitiae
is an elicited act of the will, but when the will acts after
deliberation, it always elicits an act in accord with one or both
of these affections or inclinations. A created will is physically
free to follow either inclination, no matter how strong, and
though it has the capacity and inclination to follow reason, it
can love a good inordinately or unreasonably. In the case of
the supreme or infinite good, however, this is not possible.
Here our finite will can love God in three ways, viz., (1) as a
good in himself by an elicited act of friendship love in accord
with the affection for justice and this cannot be inordinate; (2)
as a good for us, inasmuch as the union with God through such
knowledge and love represents the ultimate perfection of our
nature; (3) the will can also want the delight or happiness that
is the natural concomitant of such a well-ordered love. Though
(2) and (3) are acts in accord with the affection of the
advantageous, they are well ordered, since they are recognized
as subordinate but inseparable consequences of (1). To will (2)

because it is intended by God and (3) because it enables us to
love God better in the first way incorporates these secondary
loves into the primary love so that all three can in some way
be said to be acts in accord with the affectio iustitiae.
will, natural: Either (1) that principle of action called the will,
insofar as it is the seat of the affection for what is to the
advantage of the agent, or (2) a freely elicited act in accord
with that inclination or affection.
will as free (voluntas ut libera): (1) The will as rational or as
voluntas (in contradistinction to natura as the common
designation of all nonrational agents, whose mode of action is
determined by their nature). (See nature.) (2) The will as the
seat of the affectio iustitiae in contradistinction to the will as
nature (voluntas ut natura), i.e., the will as the seat of the
affectio commodi. See will.
will as nature (voluntas ut natura): The will as a faculty or active
principle insofar as it is the seat for the affectio commodi and
is inclined, like all other faculties to seek what perfects and
hence is to the advantage of the agent. See will.
word (verbum): The divine Word or second person of the Trinity.
The concept or mental word in the soul. See memory.
UNIVERSITY OP MICHIGAN
3 9015 08085 6142

DUNS SCOTO, Reportatio Parisiensis PDF

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

DUNS SCOTO, Reportatio Parisiensis PDF

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized

by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the

OLEG V. BYCHKOV, Ph.D.

THE EXAMINED REPORT

THE PARIS LECTURE

THE EXAMINED REPORT

THE PARIS LECTURE

LATIN TEXT AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Allan B. Wolter, O.EM.

All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Control Number:

Printed in the United States of America

The present translation combines the efforts of two

This publication can be utilized as a tool both for schol

We are proud to present this volume as a complement

Margaret Carney, OSF, STD

The textual tradition1

John Major's (1469-1550) account of Scotus' career indicates that

1The most exhaustive discussion of the textual tradition of Scotus'

manuscript from the Staatsbibliothek of Vienna Gat. 1453, ff. lra-

112rb), listed by G. Pasini as fourteenth-century9 and dated as

Recreating and interpreting the text

The text of the Reportatio I-A presents a unique editorial and

'Codices manuscripti Bibliothecae Regit Taurinensis Athenaei: Pars altera

we have here, in addition to the scarcity of MSS, is a text that

understanding, in the process of a constant interaction or

">Even apart from contemporary theories of interpretation, if one reflects on

comments, that explains the reason for the choice of variants.

Allan B. Wolter, Oleg V. Bychkov

[] in the English text, indicates editorial

Additiones Magnae, see Ioannes Duns Scotus. Opera omnia.

1 Circa prologum libri Sententiarum primo quaeritur utrum

1 In regard to the prologue of the Book of the Sentences first it

4 Item, omne scibile de aliquo subiecto scitur per medium

7 Ad solutionem huius quaestionis quattuor sunt videnda.

8 De primo, non extendendo scientiam ad fidem, quomodo

5 August., De Trin. VIII, c. 1, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 269; PL 42, 947).

4 Also, every thing known scientifically about some subject is

7 There are four items to be investigated to solve this

8 About the first, not extending the meaning of science to

quomodo Augustinus distinguit, XII De Trinitate, cap. 36, 10 quod

as wisdom (distinguishing, as Augustine does in Bk. XII, chapter

11 Istae igitur duae condiciones communes sunt non tantum

11 These two conditions are common not only to science but

si sint immediata, cognoscuntur ex terminis, sicut dictum est.

[2. Instantiae contra solutionem]

18 [Prima instantia] Contra ista obicituri5 sic: sicut se habet

HAristot., Metaph. VII (Z), c. 5 (10306 14-27).

among themselves as to how they are able to be known, because

Two objections to this explanation of the object

18 [First objection] Against the above this sort of objection is

4 The phrase in brackets needs to be added, to distinguish the second from

se est commune ad omnia per se obiecta. Igitur similiter primum

first object of a faculty per se is common to all of its per se objects.

20 [Second objection] A second objection is of this sort. What

22 Illa autem propositio "Motivum et motum sunt distincta

[3. Responsio ad instantias

23 Ad primam instantiam22 respondeo. Concedo quod primum

22 As for the proposition, however, "The mover and the moved

Reply to the objections

23 To the first instance [in n. 18] I reply. I concede that the

25 Ad primum25 ergo respondeo quod dupliciter potest intelligi

Cf. supra n. 18.