Case Title Date Ponente Facts Issues Ruling

G.R. No. L-29673 Nov. 12, J. Narvasa SUMMARY: WON the CA erred YES,
1987 in not dismissing the
REPACOM sold to 2nd case because of A compulsory
VISPAC several the pendency of the counterclaim cannot be
THE VISAYAN properties on installment 1st case made the subject of a
PACKING basis. VISPAC filed a separate action but
CORPORATION, case alleging ambiguity should be asserted in
petitioner, on the terms of payment. the same suit involving
REPACOM filed a the same transaction or
vs. separate case for occurrence giving rise
collection on the 1st to it.
THE REPARATIONS
installment. The SC said
COMMISSION and Section 4, Rule 9
THE COURT OF REPACOM should have
filed an answer to the 1st (1985 ROC) states that
APPEALS,
respondents. case but still found a counterclaim not set
VISPAC liable to pay the up shall be barred if it
1st installment. arises out of or is
necessarily connected
HOW THE CASE with the transaction or
REACHED THE SC: occurrence that is the
Petition for certiorari on a subject matter of the
decision of CA. (RULE opposing party's claim
65) (INFERRED only by and does not require
having CA as respondent for its adjudication the
because the case did not presence of third
say anything). parties of whom the
court cannot acquire
FACTS: jurisdiction. However,
Sec. 3, Rule 9 (1985
Through a Contract of
ROC) provide that
Conditional Purchase and
when a pleader fails to
Sale of Reparation
set up a counterclaim
Goods, Reparations
through oversight,
Commission
inadvertence, or
(REPACOM) sold a
excusable negligence,
cannery plant, a tin
or when justice
manufacturing plant, and
requires, he may, by
3 fishing boats to Visayan
leave of court, set up
Packing Corp. (VISPAC)
the counterclaim or
for P1,135,712.47 in 10
crossclaim by
equal yearly installments
amendment before
with interest.
judgment.
Prior to the due date of
Where the
the 1st installment,
counterclaim is made
RECPACOM sent
the subject of a
VISPAC a written
separate suit, it may be
reminder. In response,
abated upon a plea of
VISPAC filed a special
another action pendant
civil action for declaratory
or litis pendentia,
relief in CFI Manila (1st
and/or dismissed on
case) alleging an
the ground of res
ambiguity on the precise
adjudicata. There is
time the obligation to pay
nothing in the nature of
the first installment.
a special civil action
For VISPACs failure to for declaratory relief
pay despite several that proscribes the
demands for the 1st filing of a counterclaim
installment based on the same
(P135,712.47), transaction, deed or
REPACOM filed an contract subject of the
ordinary civil action for complaint.
collection (2nd case).
A special civil action
VISPAC moved to is not essentially
dismiss the 2nd case on different from all
the ground of pendency of ordinary civil action,
 the declaratory relief which is generally
actions. governed by Rules 1 to
56 of the Rules of
Oct. 9, 1962: In the 1st Court, except that the
case, CFI dismissed the former deals with a
complaint, holding that special subject matter
the issues raised would be which makes
necessarily threshed out in necessary some special
the collection suit.The SC regulation. The
affirmed the CFI, holding Identity between their
the clarity of terms of the fundamental nature is
contract. such that the same
rules governing
March 27, 1963: In the
ordinary civil suits
2nd case, CFI denied the
may and do apply to
motion to dismiss and
special civil actions if
ordered VISPAC to pay
not inconsistent with or
the 1st installment.
if they may serve to
VISPAC appealed to the supplement the
CA stating that the TC provisions of the
erred in not holding the peculiar rules
collection suit (2nd case) governing special civil
was barred by the actions. The separate
pendency of the action for collection
declaratory relief cases should have been
(1st case). CA affirmed dismissed and set up as
CFI. a compulsory
counterclaim in the
declaratory relief suits,
by way of an amended
answer.

BUT it appears
VISPAC initiated the
1st case merely to
obstruct and delay the
payment of the
installments. Under
the circumstances, and
taking account of the
not inconsiderable
length of time that the
case at bar has been
pending, it would be to
do violence to
substantial justice to
pronounce the
proceedings fatally
defective for breach of
the rule on compulsory
counterclaims. Form
cannot prevail over
substance.

G.R. No. August LEONARDO- The instant cases are WON Declaratory NO.
149664 11, 2010 DE CASTRO consolidated Petitions for Relief is a proper
Declaratory Relief, remedy The first paragraph of
ERLINDA REYES and Certiorari, and Section 1 of Rule 63
ROSEMARIE Prohibition. The parcels enumerates the subject
MATIENZO, of land which are the matter to be inquired
subject matter of these upon in a declaratory
Petitioners, relief namely, deed,
cases are part of the Tala
Estate, situated between will, contract or other
the boundaries of written instrument, a
- versus - Caloocan City and statute, executive
Quezon City. order or regulation, or
any government
regulation. Any other
matter not mentioned
HON. JUDGE BELEN -(1st case) December 11,
B. ORTIZ, Presiding, 1996Respondent Segundo
Branch 49, Bautista, registered owner
Metropolitan Trial of a parcel of land, filed a
Court, Caloocan City; complaint for Recovery of
SPOUSES BERNARD Possession and/or
and FLORENCIA Ownership of Real
PERL, represented by Property (Recovery case)
Attorney-in-Fact with the RTC of Caloocan
BENJAMIN MUCIO; against the occupants,
HON. JUDGE spouses Rene and
VICTORIA ISABEL Rosemarie Matienzo.
A. PAREDES,
Presiding, Branch 124,
Regional Trial Court,
December 27, 1996- A
Caloocan City and
separate but related action
SEGUNDO
was initiated by the
BAUTISTA,
Republic of the
Respondents. Philippines, represented
by the Director of Lands
x--------------- before the Quezon City
--------x RTC, Branch 85. The
complaint was for the
SPS. ALBERTO Annulment of
EMBORES and Title/Reversion
LOURDES (Annulment/Reversion
EMBORES, SPS. case) against Biyaya
ROBERTO AND Corporation and the
EVELYN PALAD, Register of Deeds of the
DENNIS HENOSA
Cities of Pasig, Caloocan,
and CORAZON
and Quezon, the City of
LAURENTE,
Manila, and the
Administrator of the Land
Petitioners,
Registration Authority
involving the Tala Estate.
- versus -
The
(Annulment/Reversion
HON. RAYMUNDO case) sought to declare
G. VALLEGA, null and void the transfer
Presiding Judge, certificates of title issued
Branch 52, in the name of Biyaya
Metropolitan Trial Corporation, and all
Court, Caloocan City; derivative titles emanating
HON. ELEANOR R. therefrom, and to revert
KWONG, Presiding the land as part of the
Judge, Branch 51, patrimonial property of
Metropolitan Trial the State, and awarded to
Court, Caloocan City; the actual occupants. One
HON. JUDGE BELEN of the intervenors therein
B. ORTIZ, Presiding is Samahan ng Maliliit na
Judge, Branch 49, Magkakapitbahay
Metropolitan Trial (SAMAKABA) of which
Court, Caloocan City; petitioners Erlinda Reyes
VICTORIA C. and Rosemarie Matienzo
SALIRE-ALBIS, are members.
represented by her
attorney-in-fact MR.
MENELIO C.
- Quezon City RTC (in
SALIRE; MA. FE R.
Annulment/Reversion
ROCO, ALFREDO
case )issued a Preliminary
TAN, MANUELITO
Injunction freezing all
ESTRELLA; and
ejectment cases involving
HON. JUDGE
the Tala Estate pending in
ANTONIO FINEZA,
Presiding Judge,
therein is deemed
excluded. This is
under the principle of
expressio unius est
exclussio alterius.
In a recent ruling of
this Court, it was
emphasized that a
petition for declaratory
relief cannot properly
have a court decision
as its subject matter
for the simple reason
that the Rules of Court
already provide for the
ways by which an
ambiguous or doubtful
decision may be
corrected or clarified
without need of
resorting to the
expedient prescribed
by Rule 66 [now Rule
64].
The proper remedy
that petitioner Erlinda
Reyes could have
utilized from the
denial of her motion to
suspend proceedings
in the Caloocan City
MeTC was to file a
motion for
reconsideration and, if
it is denied, to file a
petition for certiorari
before the RTC
pursuant to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. On
the other hand,
petitioner Matienzo
should have filed a
special civil action on
certiorari also under
Rule 65 with the Court
of Appeals from the
denial of her motion
by the Caloocan City
RTC.The necessity of
filing the petition to
the RTC in the case of
Erlinda Reyes and to
the Court of Appeals
in the case of
Matienzo is dictated
by the principle of the
hierarchy of courts.
Bereft of merit too is
petitioners argument
that the Caloocan City
MeTC cannot
Branch 131, Regional the MeTCs of Quezon
Trial Court, Caloocan City and Caloocan City.
City,
Respondents.
-Believing that the
Injunction issued can be
beneficial to them in the
Recovery case, spouses
Matienzo filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings
of the Recovery case but
denied.
-(2nd case) June 25, 1997-
spouses Bernard and
Florencia Perl filed an
ejectment complaint
against Erlinda Reyes
before the Caloocan City
MeTC.
-(3rd case) July 8, 1997-
spouses Perl filed an
ejectment action against
Sergio Abejero with
Caloocan City MeTC. The
cases were consolidated.
disregard the
injunction order of the
Quezon City RTC
hearing the
Annulment/Reversion
case. The established
rule is that a pending
civil action for
ownership such as
annulment of title shall
not ipso facto suspend
an ejectment
proceeding. The Court
explained that the
rationale for this is
that in an ejectment
case, the issue is
possession, while in an
annulment case the
issue is ownership. In
fact, an ejectment case
can be tried apart from
an annulment case.

- Erlinda Reyes moved for

the suspension of the
proceedings and/or for the
dismissal of these cases
citing the Injunction
issued in the RTC of
Quezon. The motion was
not entertained.
Eventually, the court
issued a Decision ordering
Erlinda to vacate the
contested property.

- Petitioners Rosemarie
Matienzo and Erlinda
Reyes, joined on March
25, 1999 in filing directly
with the Supreme Court
the instant petition
denominated as
Declaratory Relief,
Certiorari, and
Prohibition, mainly
assailing the denial of
their respective motions
for suspension.

-Petitioners asked that the

proceedings in the
Ejectment cases and the
Recovery case be declared
null and void for violating
the Injunction order of the
Quezon City RTC. That
 the refusal to suspend the
Ejectment cases is
tantamount or amounting
to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction.

Respondent Segundo
Bautista contends that
petitioners resorted to a
wrong remedy. He argues
that the action for
declaratory relief can
only prosper if the statute,
deed, or contract has not
been violated. Since the
Injunction order of the
Quezon City RTC had
already been violated
before the filing of this
instant petition, resort to
Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court would not lie.

G.R. No. L-29673

THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Nov. 12, 1987

J. Narvasa

SUMMARY:

REPACOM sold to VISPAC several properties on installment basis. VISPAC filed a case alleging ambiguity on the terms of payment.
REPACOM filed a separate case for collection on the 1st installment. The SC said REPACOM should have filed an answer to the 1st
case but still found VISPAC liable to pay the 1st installment.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari on a decision of CA. (RULE 65) (INFERRED only by having CA as
respondent because the case did not say anything).

FACTS:

Through a Contract of Conditional Purchase and Sale of Reparation Goods, Reparations Commission (REPACOM) sold a cannery
plant, a tin manufacturing plant, and 3 fishing boats to Visayan Packing Corp. (VISPAC) for P1,135,712.47 in 10 equal yearly
installments with interest.

Prior to the due date of the 1st installment, RECPACOM sent VISPAC a written reminder. In response, VISPAC filed a special
civil action for declaratory relief in CFI Manila (1st case) alleging an ambiguity on the precise time the obligation to pay the first
installment.

For VISPACs failure to pay despite several demands for the 1st installment (P135,712.47), REPACOM filed an ordinary civil
action for collection (2nd case).
 VISPAC moved to dismiss the 2nd case on the ground of pendency of the declaratory relief actions.

Oct. 9, 1962: In the 1st case, CFI dismissed the complaint, holding that the issues raised would be necessarily threshed out in the
collection suit.The SC affirmed the CFI, holding the clarity of terms of the contract.

March 27, 1963: In the 2nd case, CFI denied the motion to dismiss and ordered VISPAC to pay the 1st installment.

VISPAC appealed to the CA stating that the TC erred in not holding the collection suit (2nd case) was barred by the pendency of the
declaratory relief cases (1st case). CA affirmed CFI

Issue: WON the CA erred in not dismissing the 2nd case because of the pendency of the 1st case

Ruling:

YES,

A compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted in the same suit involving the same
transaction or occurrence giving rise to it.

Section 4, Rule 9 (1985 ROC) states that a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. However, Sec. 3, Rule 9 (1985 ROC) provide that when a
pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable negligence, or when justice requires, he may, by
leave of court, set up the counterclaim or crossclaim by amendment before judgment.

Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it may be abated upon a plea of another action pendant or litis
pendentia, and/or dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata. There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory
relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint.

A special civil action is not essentially different from all ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the
Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. The Identity
between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if
not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions. The
separate action for collection should have been dismissed and set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits, by
way of an amended answer.

BUT it appears VISPAC initiated the 1st case merely to obstruct and delay the payment of the installments. Under the circumstances,
and taking account of the not inconsiderable length of time that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do violence to
substantial justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of the rule on compulsory counterclaims. Form cannot
prevail over substance.

G.R. No. 149664

ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO,

Petitioners,

- versus -

HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; SPOUSES BERNARD and
FLORENCIA PERL, represented by Attorney-in-Fact BENJAMIN MUCIO; HON. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES,
Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and SEGUNDO BAUTISTA,

Respondents.

x-----------------------x

SPS. ALBERTO EMBORES and LOURDES EMBORES, SPS. ROBERTO AND EVELYN PALAD, DENNIS HENOSA and CORAZON
LAURENTE,
Petitioners,

- versus -

HON. RAYMUNDO G. VALLEGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; HON. ELEANOR R.
KWONG, Presiding Judge, Branch 51, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding
Judge, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; VICTORIA C. SALIRE-ALBIS, represented by her attorney-in-fact
MR. MENELIO C. SALIRE; MA. FE R. ROCO, ALFREDO TAN, MANUELITO ESTRELLA; and HON. JUDGE ANTONIO FINEZA,
Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City,

Respondents.

August 11, 2010

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Facts:

The instant cases are consolidated Petitions for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition. The parcels of land which
are the subject matter of these cases are part of the Tala Estate, situated between the boundaries of Caloocan City and
Quezon City.

-(1st case) December 11, 1996Respondent Segundo Bautista, registered owner of a parcel of land, filed a complaint for
Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property (Recovery case) with the RTC of Caloocan against the
occupants, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo.

December 27, 1996- A separate but related action was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of Lands before the Quezon City RTC, Branch 85. The complaint was for the Annulment of Title/Reversion
(Annulment/Reversion case) against Biyaya Corporation and the Register of Deeds of the Cities of Pasig, Caloocan, and
Quezon, the City of Manila, and the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority involving the Tala Estate.

The (Annulment/Reversion case) sought to declare null and void the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of
Biyaya Corporation, and all derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to revert the land as part of the patrimonial
property of the State, and awarded to the actual occupants. One of the intervenors therein is Samahan ng Maliliit na
Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA) of which petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo are members.

- Quezon City RTC (in Annulment/Reversion case )issued a Preliminary Injunction freezing all ejectment cases involving
the Tala Estate pending in the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City.

-Believing that the Injunction issued can be beneficial to them in the Recovery case, spouses Matienzo filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of the Recovery case but denied.

-(2nd case) June 25, 1997- spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl filed an ejectment complaint against Erlinda Reyes before
the Caloocan City MeTC.
-(3rd case) July 8, 1997- spouses Perl filed an ejectment action against Sergio Abejero with Caloocan City MeTC. The
cases were consolidated.

- Erlinda Reyes moved for the suspension of the proceedings and/or for the dismissal of these cases citing the Injunction
issued in the RTC of Quezon. The motion was not entertained. Eventually, the court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to
vacate the contested property.

- Petitioners Rosemarie Matienzo and Erlinda Reyes, joined on March 25, 1999 in filing directly with the Supreme Court
the instant petition denominated as Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition, mainly assailing the denial of their
respective motions for suspension.

-Petitioners asked that the proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null and void for
violating the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC. That the refusal to suspend the Ejectment cases is tantamount or
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction.

Respondent Segundo Bautista contends that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy. He argues that the action for
declaratory relief can only prosper if the statute, deed, or contract has not been violated. Since the Injunction order of
the Quezon City RTC had already been violated before the filing of this instant petition, resort to Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court would not lie.

Issue:

WON Declaratory Relief is a proper remedy

Ruling:

NO.

The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief
namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a statute, executive order or regulation, or any government
regulation. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius
est exclussio alterius.

In a recent ruling of this Court, it was emphasized that a petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court
decision as its subject matter for the simple reason that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an
ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the expedient prescribed by
Rule 66 [now Rule 64].

The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized from the denial of her motion to suspend
proceedings in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for
certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should have
filed a special civil action on certiorari also under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals from the denial of her motion by the
Caloocan City RTC.The necessity of filing the petition to the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals
in the case of Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of courts.

Bereft of merit too is petitioners argument that the Caloocan City MeTC cannot disregard the injunction order of the
Quezon City RTC hearing the Annulment/Reversion case. The established rule is that a pending civil action for ownership
such as annulment of title shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. The Court explained that the rationale
for this is that in an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an annulment case the issue is ownership. In fact, an
ejectment case can be tried apart from an annulment case.