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O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation vs.

Tan

For failure of petitioner to notify the Court of Appeals of the death of its counsel of record and have said
counsel substituted, then service of the Court of Appeals Decision at the place or law office designated by
its counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice.For failure of petitioner to notify the CA of the
death of its counsel of record and have said counsel substituted, then service of the CA Decision at the
place or law office designated by its counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice. The case then
became final and executory when no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed within the
reglementary period therefor.

SC: PET REV 45

CA: 1.) APPEAL FILED BY RESPONDENT FOR DECISION OF RTC CASE (CANCELLATION OF LEASE AGREEMENT)
FILED BY PETITIONER,

2.) OMNIBUS MOTION FILED BY PETITIONER RELATIVE TO MOTION FOR EXECUTION FILED BY RESPONDENT
AT THE RTC

RTC: COMPLAINT FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF LEASE

Facts: Petitioner leased out 2 properties to Alfredo Tan and, herein private respondent, Adelina S. Tan.
Due to the failure of sps Tan to comply with terms of the lease, a complaint was filed with the RTC for
termination of lease contract. The RTC rendered a decision in favour of petitioner. The Tans appealed
from the said decision to the CA but subsequently paid the amounts as ordered by the lower court.

The CA dismissed the appeal filed by Alfredo Tan but partially granted Adelinas appeal, deleting the
award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees and likewise reducing the liquidated damages by 25%
No further motions or appeals regarding this matter were filed. Private respondent subsequently filed a
motion for execution of the said decision with the RTC.

Petitioner thus filed an Omnibus Motion to allow for the said appeal to be reopened , which would allow it
to file an appeal brief. Petitioner argued, that its counsel, died during the said appeal, hence, any
notice sent to him must be deemed ineffective that the parties have arrived at a settlement of the
case, as shown by the fact that private respondent already paid P9,073,694.76 as complete and full
satisfaction of the adjudged obligations of the defendants to petitioner, and thus, the appeal should have
been deemed mooted. In the meantime, the RTC granted the motion of execution of the respondent of
the CA decision. To this, the petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion for recall and reconsideration of order
and quashal of alias writ of execution with the RTC and a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, which the
appellate court dismissed.

On the Omnibus Motion filed by the petitioner regarding the reopening of the case, the CA merely noted
that its decision pertaining to the appeal filed by respondent, has long become final and executory.
Undaunted, petitioner filed another manifestation praying that its Omnibus Motion be resolved on the
merits, and that the CA decision be annulled and set aside. In denying the petitioners motion, the CA
noted that the recall of the entry of judgment cannot be granted due to the assertion of petitioner that its
counsel died during the appeal .

Issue: Whether or not the assailed CA may be considered final and executory, despite service thereof to
the deceased counsel of petitioner.

Held. Yes, CA decision has become final and executory.

For failure of petitioner to notify the CA of the death of its counsel of record and have said counsel
substituted, then service of the CA Decision at the place or law office designated by its counsel of record
as his address, is sufficient notice. The case then became final and executory when no motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed within the reglementary period therefor.
Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and
await the outcome of their cases. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. The
circumstances of this case plainly show that petitioner only has himself to blame. Neither can he invoke
due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied
when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy. Where a party, such as petitioner, was afforded this opportunity to participate but failed to do
so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If said opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee .

RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING
FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC
A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC; August 19, 2009
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Facts:
Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi is the administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. In his
letter dated May 22, 2009, addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger asked the Courts to grant
their Foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same option of granting
free payment of legal fees granted to indigent people.
Issue:
Should the Courts grant Mr. Roger Prioreschis request?
Held:
No.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in
Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of
Court.
Sec. 21. Indigent party. A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an
indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one
who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for
himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of
the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on
any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise
provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as
an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within
the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to
such other sanctions as the court may impose
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court
indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. As a juridical person,
therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent
litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged
people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause
on a persons poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer. There are other reasons
that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one,
extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and
underprivileged people may be prone to abuse.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be
extended the exemption from legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and
underprivileged people.

Rule 3, Sections 13 to 19: Parties to a civil action

Judge Sumaljag v. Sps. Diosdidit

Petition for review on certiorari under rule 45

FACTS:

Josefa D. Maglasang filed with the RTC Leyte a complaint for the nullity of the deed of sale of
real property purportedly executed between her as vendor and the spouses Diosdidit and
Menendez Literato (the respondent spouses) as vendees for it was alleged that this deed of is
spurious.
Josefa was the sister of Menendez Maglasang Literato (Menendez). They were two (2) of the six
(6) heirs who inherited equal parts of a property passed on to them by their
parents Cristito and Inecita Diano Maglasang.
The respondent spouses denied the allegation and filed a counterclaim. They impleaded the
petitioner with Josefa as counterclaim defendant on the allegation that the petitioner, at the
instance of Josefa, occupied the without their (the respondent spouses) authority
They also alleged that the petitioner acted in bad faith in acquiring the two (2) lots because he
prepared and notarized the contract of lease over the whole Lot between all
the Maglasang heirs (but excluding Josefa) and Vicente Tolo, with the lease running from 1986
to 1991; thus, the petitioner then knew that Josefa no longer owned Lot alleged sold by Josefa
to them.
Menendez filed with the RTC for the declaration of the inexistence of lease contract, recovery of
possession of land, and damages against the petitioner and Josefa after the RTC dismissed the
respondent spouses counterclaim
The complaint alleged that when Josefa sold it to the spouses then she leased it with the
petitioner thus petitioner and Josefa were in bad faith in entering their contract of lease as they
both knew that Josefa did not own the leased lots
Josefa died on during the pendency of Civil Case
Atty. Puray, the petitioners and Josefas common counsel, asked the RTC to extend the time
period to file a formal notice of death and substitution of party
Atty. Puray filed with the RTC a notice of death and substitution of party praying that Josefa in
his capacity as plaintiff and third party counterclaim defendant be substituted by the petitioner.
The submission alleged that prior to Josefas death; she executed a Quitclaim Deed over Lot
allegedly sold by Josefa in favor of Remismundo Maglasang who in turn sold this property to the
petitioner.
Menendez, through counsel, objected to the proposed substitution, alleging that
Atty. Puray filed the notice of death and substitution of party beyond the thirty-day period
provided under Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. She
recommended instead that Josefa be substituted by the latters full-blood
sister, Michaeles Maglasang Rodrigo
The RTC denied Atty. Purays motion for substitution
The petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari but CA dismissed it for lack of merit

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is a valid substitute under the Rules of Court?

HELD:

NO. The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the litigation
who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is herself or himself protected as
he/she continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative
of his estate.

The duty of counsel under the aforecited provision is to inform the court within thirty (30) days after the
death of his client of the fact of death, and to give the name and address of the deceaseds legal
representative or representatives

In this case the late notification informed the lower court of the death of litigant Josefa but the Counsel
did not properly gave the court the name and address of the legal representative of the deceased that
Section 16, Rule 3 specifies. The legal representatives that the provision speaks of, refer to those
authorized by law the administrator, executor or guardian who, under the rule on settlement of estate
of deceased persons, is constituted to take over the estate of the deceased.

In this case, petitioner is a counterclaim co-defendant of the deceased whose proferred justification
for the requested substitution is the transfer to him of the interests of the deceased in the litigation
prior to her death.

The Notice that counsel filed reflects a claim against the interest of the deceased through the transfer of
her remaining interest in the litigation to another party. The suggested substitution effectively brings to
naught the protection that the Rules intend; the transferee who has his own interest to protect, cannot
at the same time represent and fully protect the interest of the deceased transferor. The SC also
reasoned that the fact that the alleged transfer may have actually taken place is immaterial as it is not
for counsel, after the death of his client, to make such manifestation because he then has lost the
authority to speak for and bind his client. At most, the co-defendant can be said to be a transferee
pendente lite whose status is pending with the lower court. Counsel should have manifested to the
court the changes in interest that transpired while the client-transferor was alive, pursuant to Section
19 of Rule 3.

Lastly, a close examination of the documents attached to the records disclose that the subject matter of
the Quitclaim allegedly executed by Josefa in favor of Remismundo is another lot, while the subject
matter of the deed of sale executed by Remismundo in the petitioners favor is the subject lot. This
circumstance alone raises the possibility that there is more than meets the eye in the transactions
related to this case.

Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, is clear - the heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator thus her heirs are her surviving sistersand the children of her deceased sister, Lourdes
who should be her legal representatives. Menendez, although also a sister, should be excluded for
being one of the adverse parties in the cases before the RTC.

HEIRS of the LATE FLORENTINA NUGUID VDA. DE HABERER


Vs.
COURT of APPEALS
This is a Petition for review by way of appeal from the Resolutions of respondent Court of
Appeals dismissing the appeal of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. De Haberer.

FACTS:
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the late Florentina Nuguid
Vda. de Haberer as the duly registered owner filed in 1964 and 1965 (11) complaints for
recovery of possession of the parcel of land, alleging that private respondents had
surreptitiously entered the land and built their houses thereon.
The lower court, after trial on the merits, rendered a consolidated decision, dated May 26,
197 l, dismissing all the complaints. On motion of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
the cases were reopened and retried on grounds of newly discovered evidence. On September
15, 1972, the lower court issued an order reviving its decision of May 26, 1971. The decision
was thus appealed to the Court of Appeals. In the Court of Appeals, the cases were erroneously
dismissed once before, on the ground that the appeal was allegedly filed out of time.
The issue was brought to this Court, and this Court rendered its judgment setting aside the
appellate court's dismissal of the appeal and ordering the reinstatement of the same for proper
disposition on the merits having found that petitioner duly and timely perfected her appeal within
the reglementary period.
The cases were remanded to the Court of Appeals where appellant was required to file
printed brief within forty-five days from her receipt of notice.
In the meantime, appellant Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer had died on May 26, 1975.
Appellant's counsel accordingly gave respondent court notice of the death of their client in their
motion of June 28, 1975 and asked for the suspension of the running of the period within which
to file the appellant's brief pending the appointment of an executor of the estate left by their
client in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where a petition for the probate of the alleged
will of the deceased had been filed by another lawyer.
Finally, acting on counsel's motion of November 14, 1975, respondent court denied the
request for extension and at the same time dismissed the appeal, ruling in its resolution, the
grounds therein stated, and considering that appellant has already been given a total of one
hundred ninety-five (195) days within which to file brief, the Court Resolved to deny the motion
for another extension to file brief and to dismiss the appeal.

ISSUE: W/N Court of Appeals erred in denying extension of time or suspension of proceedings
upon notice of Florentina Nuguid Vda. De Haberers death

HELD:
Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a party's death and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal representative of the
deceased to appear within a period of 30 days or such tlnie as it may grant. Since no
administrator of the estate of the deceased appellant had yet been appointed as the same was
still pending determination in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the motion of the
deceased's counsel for the suspension of the running of the period within which to file
appellant's brief was well-taken.
Respondent court gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the appearance of the
legal representative of the deceased and instead dismissing the appeal of the deceased who
yet had to be substituted in the pending appeal. Thus, it has been held that when a party dies in
an action that survives, and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal
representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of
fact no such substitution has ever been effected, the trial held by the court without such legal
representatives or heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void because
the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs
upon whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.
If at all, due to said death on May 25, 1975 and severance of the attorney-client relationship,
further proceedings and specifically the running of the original 45-day period for filing the
appellant's brief should be legally deemed as having been automatically suspended.
A final note: On March 19, 1976, counsels submitted with their Manifestation the written
authority dated January 20, 1976 individually signed by instituted heirs and/or legal
representatives of the testate estate of the deceased Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
granting said counsels full authority to file and prosecute the case and any other incidental
cases for and in their behalf. Such manifestation and authority may be deemed the formal
substitution of the deceased by her heirs, as in fact they appear as petitioners in the title of the
case at bar. Hence, the proper determination of the pending appeal may now proceed, as
herein directed. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and respondent court's resolutions of
November 24, 1975 and January 15, 1976 are set aside.

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