Christ University Course Pack For MAIS Course

DEPARTMENT - INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND HISTORY
Course Pack
FOR
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY-MAIS135
MAIS135 - INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Total Teaching Hours For Semester : 60 Total Teaching Hours For Semester : 4
Max Marks : 100 Credits : 4
Course Objectives/Course Description:

Indian foreign policy reflects the perceptions and priorities of our political, economic and military
leaderships from time to time in relation to the neighbourhood, middle powers and superpowers. This is
evidenced from the continuity and change in Indian national security and foreign policy from the Cold War
period to the post-Cold War phase that manifests in various ways from encouraging FDI to joint military
exercises with Western powers. The objective of this course is to introduce students to the mechanics of
foreign policy making and the issues that influence the policy in order for them to develop a perspective
on the emerging trends in Indian foreign policy
Learning Outcome
1.Students will understand the influences on the basic features of Indian foreign policy that have evolved
over six decades of nationhood.2.Students will be able to understand of the mechanics of policy making
and appreciate the complexities involved in policy making.3.Students will be able to appreciate the role of
various Prime Ministers on the foreign policy making.4.Students will know the challenges that India faces
in its neighborhood the reasons behind the policy stances.5.Students will gain an understanding of the
history and current Indias policy with regards to our relations with important world players.6.Students will
understand the history and the current status of our relations with various regional powers.7.Students will
be exposed to the economic underpinnings for the foreign policy decision makings8.Students will be able
to analyze the reasons behind Indias nuclear policies.9.This module provides students the necessary
perspectives to comprehend the emerging trends in Indian foreign policy
Unit-1 Teaching Hours:4
Foundations of Indian Foreign Policy

Doctrinal Aspects; Determinants: domestic and international; Evolution of Indian foreign policy, pre-
Independence, post-Independence, Non Aligned Movement, Cold War and Security Politics
Making of India's Foreign Policy

Institutions, Structure, and Processes:Structure of Indian Government, Political System, Ministry of
External Affairs, Prime Ministers Office, Research & Analysis Wing, Role of Think Tanks, Media
The role of Prime Ministers

Jawaharlal Nehru, LalBahadurShastri, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao, Inder Kumar Gujral,
Atal Behari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh
India's Relations with its Neighbours

Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan and South-East Asia
India's Relations with World Powers

US, Russian Federation, PRC, Japan, and European Union
India's Relations with Regional Powers

Israel, East andWest Asia, African Countries, Australia and South America.
India's Foreign Economic Policy

Interaction with Global and Regional Institutionsand Grouping (UN, IMF & WB, WTO, ASEAN-ARF,
APEC, EU, IBSA, SAARC
India's Nuclear Policy

Genesis, Doctrines, Evolutionary Trajectory, Emerging Dimensions.
Continuity and Change in 21st Century

Non-Alignment,Terrorism, Energy Security, Indian Diaspora
Text Books And Reference Books:
Bajpai, Kanti, Basit, Saira, Krishnappa, V. eds., Indias grand Stategy: History, theory, cases (2014)J.
Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes,And
Personalities, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1970.C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of
India's New Foreign Policy, New Delhi:Penguin Books, 2005.J. N. Dixit, Indian Foreign Policy and its
Neighbours, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 2001.Ganguly, Sumit, ed., Indias foreign Policy (2010)Anjali
Ghosh, tridibChakrobroti, AnindyoJyotiMajumdar and Shibashis Chatterjee, eds.,Indias Foreign Policy,
New Delhi: Pearson, 2009.A. Kapoor and A. J. Wison, The Foreign Policy of India and her Neighbours.
1995.C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy, New
Delhi:Penguin Books, 2005.Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September
1946-April 1961, NewDelhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of
India,1961.Nancy Jetly and Rajendra Prasad, India's Foreign Policy: Challenges And Prospects, New
Delhi:Vikas Pub. House, 1999.Muni, S.D., Indias foreign Policy, The Democracy Dimension
(2009)Tharoor, Shashi Reasons of State: Political development and Indias foreign policy under Indira
Gandhi (1982)
Essential Reading / Recommended Reading:
Bajpai, Kanti, Basit, Saira, Krishnappa, V. eds., Indias grand Stategy: History, theory, cases (2014)J.
Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes,And
Personalities, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1970.C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of
India's New Foreign Policy, New Delhi:Penguin Books, 2005.J. N. Dixit, Indian Foreign Policy and its
Neighbours, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 2001.Ganguly, Sumit, ed., Indias foreign Policy (2010)Anjali
Ghosh, tridibChakrobroti, AnindyoJyotiMajumdar and Shibashis Chatterjee, eds.,Indias Foreign Policy,
New Delhi: Pearson, 2009.A. Kapoor and A. J. Wison, The Foreign Policy of India and her Neighbours.
1995.C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy, New
Delhi:Penguin Books, 2005.Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September
1946-April 1961, NewDelhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of
India,1961.Nancy Jetly and Rajendra Prasad, India's Foreign Policy: Challenges And Prospects, New
Delhi:Vikas Pub. House, 1999.Muni, S.D., Indias foreign Policy, The Democracy Dimension
(2009)Tharoor, Shashi Reasons of State: Political development and Indias foreign policy under Indira
Gandhi (1982)
Evaluation Pattern
SCHEME OF VALUATION CIA I Class Test / Assignment / Presentation 10% CIA II
Mid Semester Examination 25% CIA III Research Topic
10% Attendance
05% End Semester Examination
50% TOTAL 100%
Course Plan
Class Name : 1MAIS Subject Name : INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Subject Code : MAIS135 Teacher Name : MADHUMATI.DESHPANDE
No of
Planned Date Unit Heading Details Method Reading/Ref
Hours
CIA 1
Component/Task 1
CIA Details
What is the opinion of the foreigners about India?Design
1. Each student befriends an international student from CU.
2. Discusses their views about India
3. Finds out about their country
4. What was their opinion about India before coming here and what is it now?
What do they know about their countrys relationship with India?Based on the interview the students will
write a report of 800 to 1000 wordsSubmission date: July 8, 2017
CIA Details will display form 26/06/2017
Learning Objective
Assignment Learning Objectives:
- To understand the differences in perception about a given country's status in the world.
- To befriend and talk to a foreign national
- To understand the cultural differences
Assessment Strategies aligned to LO:Interview techinque, making of a questionnaire, writing a
report based on a conversation Technology Tools used along with their Purpose:LMS for
submission
Evaluation Rubrics
- Completion of the assignment- 5 marks
- Information gathered -5 marks
- Writing the assignment-5 marks
- Presentation-5 marks
CIA 3
Component/Task 1
CIA Details
Analysing continuity in Foreign policy based on the treaties and agreements signed by the Modi
government. Assignment details : 1) Each Student will be choosing one country that the Prime Minister
visited since taking office.2. Find and list all the treaties and agreements signed with that country.3.
Compare these with the previous government's policy 4. Write an analytical essay detailing the continuity
and change. The completed essay must be at least 2000 words.Submission details : The assignment
must be submitted in word form on to the LMS. The name of the student, classs and the register number
must be clearly mentioned in the document. All the assignments must be submitted on or before
September 5, 2017.
CIA Details will display form 10/07/2017
Learning Objective
Assignment Learning Objectives:To analyse the foreign policy shifts To read and understand the
technical writing of the treaties and agreementsTo compare policies . Assessment Strategies aligned to
LO:Writing skills, analytical skills Technology Tools used along with their Purpose: Internet based
search for primary sources and submission via LMS.
Evaluation Rubrics
50% of the marks is for analysis and interpretation. of the treaties and agreements30% of the marks for
sources used.20% is for overall writng and presentation.
Course Plan Reference Materials

1. UPA_foreign_policy_critique
UPA's Foreign Policy: A Critique
Author(s): Happymon Jacob and Kimberley Layton
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 25 (Jun. 20 - 26, 2009), pp. 13-15
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40279230
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
= COMMENTARY
UPA'sForeignPolicy:A Critique mustbe asked as to what circumstances

allowedforthisspecificcontemporary col-
lapse.Whatwentwrongpost-26/11?
One oftheimportant reasonswhynoth-
HAPPYMON JACOB, KIMBERLEY LAYTON ingwas achievedduringthefive-year peace
processwas India'sunwillingness to take
On mostforeign policyissues,the foreignpolicies of incumbent timelydecisions.WhenPervezMusharraf
UnitedProgressive Alliance regimesrepeatedly escape auditin heldpowertherewereampleopportunities
Indianelectiondebates,as was the to advancethepeace process.Yettheupa
government of2004-09 stuckto
case in therecently concludedelectionsto government failedto seize the initiative
thestatusquo ante.Itwas uneasy the 15thLok Sabha. Thistimeit was the and negotiateopportunedeals to resolve
aboutimplementing innovative United ProgressiveAlliance (upa) that outstanding conflicts
such as Jammuand
forIndian capitalised on the traditionaloversight, Kashmir, SiachenGlacierand SirCreek;it
options foreign policy,
despitethefactthatelectionsare logically failedto conceitedlyassistPakistanin its
shyofspellingouta coherent themostappropriate momentfora critical efforts to eradicateterrorism; and itfailed
setofpriorities, and ineptin analysisof a sittinggovernment's foreign tomakeallieswithin Pakistan,andwiththem
helpingtoestablishnormsforthe policy.At presenta critiqueof the upa's strategic inroadsintothePakistani state.
conductofgeopolitics inthe foreignpolicyis particularly important as Indeed,theIndiantendency to "waitfor
thereappearsto be a disturbing consensus Godot"forthe resolutionof its conflicts
regionalsubsystem.
amongthe "strategic elite"of New Delhi withPakistanis nothingnew.Insteadof
thatthepreviousUPA-Ied coalitionexcelled resolvingissuesthroughavailablemecha-
itself with a successfulforeignpolicy nisms,operativestructures and processes
performance. The argumentis seductive, intrinsic to the international system, India
but is it accurate?Recallthatthesesame often resortsto emptysymbolismand
pundits,in demonstration of the ever- delayed action in its quest forthe ideal
compliantnatureof our strategicelite, conditions.The historyof India-Pakistan
likewiseexpressed thesameopinionat the relations is riddledwithsuchinstances, like
conclusion of the Bjp-led National Indira Gandhi'sfailureto make use of
Democratic Alliancegovernment. However, India's post-1971positionof strength to
a briefscrutiny oftheCongress (1)-ledupa's finalisea deal on Kashmir. Morerecently,
initiatives(2004-09), experimentsand the dialogue withformerPakistanpresi-
engagements revealsthatitsforeign policy dentMusharraf on Kashmir, wherebymost
was notas adeptas itisproclaimed tobe. accountsIndia and Pakistancame very
Itis possibletousea criterion madeup of close to inkinga deal, butit amountedto
threeinterlinked questions to assessIndian nothingbecauseIndiawas waitingforthe
foreignpolicyunderthe upa: Shouldthe rightmomenttoarrive, trusttobe builtand
upa'sforeign policybecharacterised as status messyPakistani toimprove.
politics
quoist,tacticalor strategic?Did theIndian ThefailureofIndiatotakeadvantageof
statebehaveas a risinginternational power? historicopportunities to resolveitsmany
And,in acknowledgement ofthedirectand outstandingissues withPakistanis now
indirectimplications forthe country, has made additionally complicated due to the
Indiaasserted a positive
influence overdeve- extraordinary challengesthat the Paki-
lopments in itsneighbourhood? Employing stani state faces today. Indian policy-
these questionsas the conceptualframe- makers,while now slowlywakingup to
work, wewillhighlight fivekeyforeign policy the new realitiesin Pakistan,are notyet
oftheprevious
failings upagovernment. surehowto pushforconflict resolution at
a timewhenPakistanis facingthreatsto
Failed Pakistan Policy itsveryexistence.Thisobviousconfusion
The upa's singlemostsignificant foreign in contemporary governmental thinking
policyfailurewas itslossesvis--visPaki- about Pakistanhas resultedin fractious
Jacob(happymon@mail.jnu.ac.iri)
stan.Aftera five-year "irreversible" peace policies.Muchoftheupa'sactionsvis--vis
Happymon
is withtheSchoolofInternational
Studies, processwe arrivedon thebrinkofwaryet Pakistanwere apparently premisedon a
JawaharlalNehruUniversity,NewDelhi. again and now have virtually no contact flawed understanding of the country as a
Kimberley Layton(layton.kimberley@gmail. withone another. Thoughthisis hardlythe rationalactorthatunderstands its prefer-
com)isa researcherattheInstitute
ofPeace first
instanceofrelations betweenPakistan encesand is capableofmakingconsistent,
andConflict NewDelhi.
Studies, and India breakingdown, the question coherent foreign and defence policy
Economic& Politicalweekly GEC3 JUNE 20, 2009 vol xliv no 25 13
COMMENTARY - - :
decisions,and capableof luciddiplomacy.

However,contemporary Pakistanis not a
cohesivestateand is seenacutelylackingin
forthepoliticalturmoil
powerinNepalthrough
inKathmandu,
was seen eversincethe Maoistscame to
democratic
but
means.
MANOHAR
socialandelitecohesion;anditis thisdetail Binaryapproachesinthepursuitofforeign INVISIBLE WOMEN, VISIBLE
on whichthealternate analyticalemphasis policycan be counterproductive: this is HISTORIES
needstobe placed. precisely what India did when it assumed Gender, Society and Polity in
Moreover,an effective grand strategy that the Nepali Maoistsare pro-Chinese NorthIndia
demandsthe examinationof alternative and so Indianeednotdealwiththem. (Seventh to TwelfthCenturyAD)
Devika Rangachari
futures.In recognition ofthisIndiashould baskingintheglowof
Indiais currently
978-81-7304-808-1, 2009, 530p. Rs. 1295
and
consider, prepare itself
to face,Pakis- itsemergent greatpowerstatus.It findsit-
tan'svariouspossiblefutures. Thisrequires selfa keyplayerintheglobalwaron terror THE PURANIC WORLD
positivelyinteracting withit on multiple thanksto itsgeopolitical locationin south Environment,Gender, Ritual and Myth
Vljay Nath
levelsandthrough multiple channels.How- Asia,itsphysicalsize and itsstatusas the 978-81-7304-801-2, 2009, 31Op. Rs. 775
a
ever, uPA-style status quoist approach onlystabledemocracy there.It is also well
risksleavingIndiaa cluelessbystander. awareofthefactthatproblems inSouthAsia CHILD SPACING AND REPRODUCTIVE
are no longerjust headachesforregional HEALTH IN RURAL KARNATAKA,INDIA
Unwise NeighbourhoodPolicy From Research to Action
players.Indiaknowsitsopinionis respected
Inge Hutter,N.V Rajes hwan, J.S. Hallad
Embarrassingly, India was unpreparedto and soughtin Washington, it is regularly and B.M. Ramesh
engage the new Maoist regimein Kath- consultedoverthe"Af-Pak" imbroglio and 81-7304-714-6, 2007, 344p. Rs. 875
mandu,we seemoutoftouchwithevents its voice was heard when it demanded
inMyanmar and havebeen sluggishin re- Kashmirand Indiabe leftoffRichardHol- WOMEN'S POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION AND
spondingconcertedly and coherently to brooke'sregionalmandate (Wax 2009). EMPOWERMENT IN INDIA
theSriLankancrisis.TheSriLankanforces Curiously though,theupaforeign policyes- A Million Indiras Now?
haveoverpowered theltte, yetIndia has tablishment seems not to consideritself Evelin Hust
81-7304-264-0, 1999, 229p. Rs. 450
neglected to constructively argue for partof"messy"southAsiaand thishas re-
inclusivepower-sharing arrangements, or sultedin oddlydisconnected regionalpoli- RE-SEARCHING INDIANWOMEN
accommodation ofTamilaspirationsin a cies.A risingpowersuchas Indiashouldbe Vijaya Ramaswamy (ed)
post-LTTE Sri Lanka. This lacklustre,if eminently moreproactive in helpingstabi- 81-7304-496-1, 2003, 380p. Rs. 750
"politicallycorrect",reactionto the Sri lise the region,ratherthan shyingaway
FROM HEROINES TO BENEFICIARIES:
Lankanconflictmightappear pragmatic fromconfronting neighbourhood turmoil.
FROM BENEFICIARIES TO
intheshortterm,yetitmarginalises India HEROINES?
and dilutesitschancesforconcretecontri- Inabilityto Engage China The Impact of a Small-Scale
butionsin thelongterm.EnsuringIndia's The current upa government failedto take IrrigationProject on Gender in
ofestablishing actionto resolveIndia's West-Bengal Terai
objective peace and stability any noteworthy Loes Schenk-Sandbergenand
wouldrequirepushingColomboto clarify borderdisputewithitseasternneighbour. NirenChoudhury
howTamilsand theirgenuinegrievances RajivGandhi,P V Narashimha Rao andAtal 81-7304-423-6, 2003, 31 7p. Rs. 625
will be addressed in the post-conflict BehariVajpayeeall called forimmediate
FROM SACRED SERVANT TO
phase.Whileitis truethattoday'sfederal resolution oftheproblem, yetManmohan PROFANE PROSTITUTE
government in New Delhi cannot affordto Singhhas chosen a lacka-
characteristically A Historyof the Changing Legal Status
ignorepoliticalopinionsfromthe many daisicalapproach.Buildingon thefamiliar of the Devdasis in India, 1857-1947
politically and sensitive
significant regions, theme already establishedin the upa's Kay K. Jordan
81-7304-468-6, 2003, 184p. Rs. 500
powerfulcoalitionpartnersand genuine Pakistanpolicy,Singhchose to continue
demandsfromtheperiphery whilemaking trying to construct a relationshipbyfocus- DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE AMONG
the country's foreignpolicy, New Delhi's ing on alternate areas and ignoringthe MUSLIMS IN INDIA
foreignpolicies should not be a mere border issue.Rather than being a mature, ImtiazAhmad (ed)
reactionofconvenience tothosedemands. deliberateand measuredresponseto the 81-7304-493-7, 2003, 436p. Rs. 850
India's recentpolicies towardsNepal problem,as the upa has presentedit,this
DAUGHTERS OF THE EARTH
were neitherguidedby nationalinterest formof inactionis embarrassingly blithe. Women and Land in UttarPradesh
norhumanitarianaspirations:it was an Additionally, besidestheboundary question, Smita TewariJassal
undesirable combination ofmediocreanal- ourforeign policyestablishment has notse- 81-7304-375-2, 2001, 197p. Rs. 400
ysisand unwillingness to engageall actors riouslyconsideredthe need to cooperate forourcompletecatalogueplease writetous at:
in Nepal.Thispolicy,as manycommenta- withChinafora healthyAsianbalanceof
tors(Varadarajan 2009) havepointedout, power,themaintenance ofregional stability,
was notonlyevidentat thetimeofthere- or to addressissuessuchas terrorism, and
centresignation of Nepal's Maoistprime Pakistan.The "Chinathreat"notionhas
ministeraccusingIndiaofbeingresponsible givenwayto "Chinablindness" on thepart
14 June 20, 2009 vol xliv no 25 CEE3 Economic& Politicalweekly
_ = COMMENTARY
oftheupa whichundermines thepotential has a historicallydemonstrated adeptness A moresystematic approachto counter-

inherentin a positiveSino-Indian relation- at quicklyrevisingand recastingkey im- terrorism matters mighthavehelpedavoid
ship.Theupa'sstatus-quoist
approachmeans perativesof its foreignpolicy agenda. the muddlethatseems to have occurred
Indiaisnowlaggingbehinditsregionaland America'sextremely vibrantforeign policy due to theoverlapping dynamics ofdome-
internationalcounterparts in its coopera- community allowsa flexibilityand ingenu- stic,regionaland international terrorism.
tionandcommunication withChina. itythatis absentfromtheIndianestablish- Thisdoes notmeansimplysystematically
The historic2005 "Sino-IndianAgree- ment.Unfortunately, thismeansthatus al- reactingto attacks made on its anti-
ment on the Political Parametersand lies(usuallythoseinthedeveloping world) terrorism policiesbythebjp,whichalsohas
GuidingPrinciplesforthe Settlementof frequently findthemselvesabandonedto a spectacularly incoherent and puzzlingly
theIndia-ChinaBoundaryQuestion"may theirowndevices,leftin a quandarywhen one-dimensional anti-terrorism strategy.
have been signedunderthe upa, but the theAmericans inevitablymoveon.Thehis- Ultimately, therefore, one could argue
initiative
and groundwork forit was laid toryof Pakistan-usrelationsis a case in that the upa's experimentwith foreign
by the nda government; the upa simply point(Kux2001). Over-reliance on Ameri- policywas an exercisedevoidofthegrand
followedup. Today,manyChina experts can goodwillmay provecounter-produc-vision befittinga risingpower. Robust
in India,and India expertsin China,be- tive.Asa risingpower,Indiashouldfiercely foreignpolicymustbe locatedwithinthe
lieve thatthe CongressParty'shistorical preservethestrategic autonomy to choose appropriate structural conditions, such as
neurosisdraintheirpoliticalwillingness from a rangeofforeign policyoptions, rather the wider strategiccontext,frameworks
toconcertedly addresstheboundaryissue. thanattempting to growundertheshadow providedby international institutions and
Minus the necessarycourage, they are of us benevolence.The Indo-usstrategic learnedconflictresolutionpractices.It is
loathtotaketherequiredboldsteps. partnership seemspremisedmoreon tac- theseconditionsthatdefinethe possibili-
tics than strategy;hardlybefitting of a tiesoftherelevantagentsand theirobjec-
The US Trap country desiring majorpowerstatus. tives;theyexistto makethejob ofgovern-
Theupa government appearedtobe nego- mentseasierand yettheupa failedtocapi-
tiatinguncertain territory throughoutits Lack of Anti-terror Policy taliseon them,as thoughitdidnotrealise
tenure, unsureas towhethertoalignIndia Finally,whiletheinternational community that it could. It furtherfailed to take
more closelywith the us or to remain considersterrorism one of the mostseri- advantageofthepropitious circumstances
moreindependent. In theend,themuch- ous contemporary threats,India,located thatpresentedthemselves duringitsterm
hyped Indo-us Civilian NuclearDeal and directlyadjacentto its global epicentre, in office.Overall,the upa government of
strategicpartnershipwith the us was has failedto devise any strategyto deal 2004-09 was uneasyaboutimplementing
presented as thecrownjewel in the upa's withit.The upa'slackofpolicycoherence innovativeoptions,shyof spellingout a
foreignpolicydiadem; the government and failureto assumeappropriate respon- coherentset of foreignpolicypriorities,
clearlychose closerus-India alignment. sibilityforitsfailingsfrustrated theirabil- and ineptinhelpingestablishnormsinthe
Thoughitis yettobe seen ifthedeal is in- ityto respondappropriately to theterror- conductof geopoliticsin theregionalsub-
deed as goodas declared,thepartnership istthreat.India'sreluctance to initiateand system. The current government has stuck
has obviousshort- and long-term strategic lead regionalefforts againstterrorism is tothestatusquo ante,regrettably trapping
foreign policyimplications forIndiawhich even more puzzling because no other Indiainthestatusquo.
havenotbeenadequately considered.
Does country has suffered fromterrorism inthe
the Indo-us strategicpartnershipserve recentpast as muchas it has. Moreover, REFERENCES
India'svital long-term strategicinterests todayIndia is consideredto be the inter- Kux,Dennis (2001): The UnitedStatesand Pakistan,
1947-2000:Disenchanted Allies(Maryland:John
as a risingpower?Perhapsnot.Overthe nationalcommunity's greathope in south HopkinsUniversity Press).
pastdecade,and especiallyin thelastfive Asia. It is thereforeexpected, indeed Varadarajan,Siddharth(2009): "India'sNepal Policy
TheHindu,7 May.
in Disarray",
years,we have seen the us becomingthe required,to spearheadtheregion'sstrug-
Wax, Emily(2009): "India'sQuiet DiplomaticCoup:
pivotofIndia'sforeign policyimagination gle against terroi.Yet underthe upa, it KashmirEliminatedfrcmUS Envoy'sMandate",
aboutthe region,as well as the interna- failedto do so. TheWashington Post,30 January.
tionalsystem.Thereis an increasingten-
dencyin ourforeign policyestablishment
to view the geopoliticsof southernAsia
*___ -_
throughthe American strategiclens. ICMSAT &cmnc vftha human fncs
While this is more apparentindirectly Invitesapplicationsforthe positionof ScientificOfficer
thandirectly, ithas evidently contributed Responsibilities:Collecting,compiling and processingof secondaryand primary data;
to India'slimitedengagement withChina, analysis of data using standard statisticalpackages; design and use of surveys;
conducting focus groupmeetings with group of farmers.
its increasingrelianceon the us to deal
Requirements: PG degree in Economics/Agriculture Economics/Extension with2-3
withAf-Pakon itsbehalf,and it has also
years experiencein handlingdata sets, theirprocessingand analysis.
impacteduponIndia'srelationswithIran.
For moredetailsplease visitwww.careers.icrisat.org.ICRISAT is an equal opportunity
Indiacourtsnumerous dangersbydanc- of womenon itsstaff.
employer,and is especiallyinterestedin increasingparticipation
ingtoAmerica's foreign policytune.Theus
Economic& Politicalweekly GEES june 20, 2009 vol xliv no 25 15
2. FOREIGN_POLICY_MAKING
Need to Correct Some Debilitating Features of Foreign Policy Making in India
Author(s): P.M. Kamath
Source: Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2 (December 1997), pp. 17-30
Published by: Manju Jain
Accessed: 24-03-2015 10:16 UTC
Manju Jain is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Indian Journal of Asian Affairs.
Need to Correct Some Debilitating
Features of Foreign Policy
Making in India
P.M. Kamath
Indians by now have acquired fiftyyears collective

experience in foreign policy making. Indian foreign policy
makingcan claim a few success stories like acting as a midwife
in the birth of Bangladesh as an independent nation in 1971
in the erstwhileEast Pakistan. But if one looks at the problems
faced by the nation today in its defence and foreign policy
arenas many of these problems can be laid on the door of the
wrong policy decisions taken by the policy makers in the last
fiftyyears. These wrong decisions in turn were at least
partially due to an absence of proper mechanism to make
foreign policy.
What are these problems? Of the many problems, some
importantones may be listed here, merelyto help us to discuss
what really went wrong with them. Some of these are:
Kashmir dispute in the UN and outside with Pakistan, border
dispute with China, nuclear policy, decision to send Indian
Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka and permission to
United States Air Forces (USAF) planes to refuelin India. Some
of these failures in policy making, have still kept these
problemsas breaks on the India's natural aspirations to achieve
certain policy objectives.
What are these debilitating features of Indian foreign

policy making? This paper will try to discuss some of these
18 Some Debilitating Features of India's Foreign Policy
debilitatingfeaturesin the light of Indian policy objectives and

cases of failures listed earlier. Before we trybrieflyto analyse
them, it is necessary to know what have been the main
objectives of Indian foreign policy.
Like many other developing countries, we can see four
core objectives of Indian foreign policy. First, and the most
importantone is enhancing India's national security.Unlike in
the past, India can no longer ignore its security compulsions,
because of vast oceans on three sides and the formidable
Himalayas on the north. The experience shows, that despite
isolation, India was subjected to foreigninvasions, particularly
since the advent of Islam and later by the Europeans in search
of new colonies.
After independence, Pakistan on north west and China

on the North east, have emerged as twin security threats to
India. India thus not only has to spend on its defence,but also
cultivate international friendship to enhance security. During
the 1970s, India was very close to the then Soviet Union - a
security guarantor against China. This very reason also made
India to maintain close relations with Vietnam as that country
had its own border problems with China as India.
The second objective of Indian foreignpolicy is to achieve

an accelerated economic growth; if necessary with an
expansion of external economic relations. This objective has
assumed greater significance after the concepts like economic
liberalisation,and market economy have come to be the pillars
of economic thinkingin the post Cold War period. This was
also important as by 1991, socialist economy in India came to
a grindinghalt as India faced an economic crisis. India, by mid-
1991, had foreign exchange enough to last for the import of
essential commodities for only seven days. With opening up
of Indian economy, India is looking to the west for foreign
direct investment and introduction of the latest technology.
Third, assertion as a regional power as a first step

towards a great power status. Beginning with Indian victory
against Pakistan in the Bangladesh war of 1971, India clearly
Some Debilitating Features of India's Foreign Policy 19
emerged a a regional power in the South Asia. This was also

foreseen by Nehru. In his statement in Lok Sabha in 1954, he
had said, "If you peep in the future and if nothing goes
wrong - wars and like - the obvious fourth country in the
world (after US, Soviet Union and China) is India."
Then, this status of India as a regional power was

reluctantly,accepted by the US in 1974. However, India's rising
power is not acceptable to Pakistan for historicalreasons, going
to the very root of the creation of Pakistan. Thus, India has
to face internal security threats promoted by Pakistan. This is
obvious since the end of the cold war in 1991. Sometimes the
US too in pursuance of its policy of global hegemony, has
created hurdles for India.
Finally, India seeks to act as a spokesman of the third

world causes in the UN and other global fora. In the UN, in
the 1950s and the 1960s India always spoke on behalf of the
colonial people in Asia and Africa. If the UN perspective in
these two decades changed from one of security to economic
development, Indian contribution is not less significant in
bringingabout this change. India continues to performthis role
even after the change in the international environment. For
instance, in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meet
(CHOGM), held at Edinburgh in Scotland in the last week of
October 1997, Prime Minister Gujral lashed out at the
developed nations for their practice of double standards in
dealing with economic issues affectingdeveloping countries.
Prime Minister himself reportedly said, "It has been a good
meet. We have projected not only ours but also the views of
less privileged and developing nations at CHOGM."
What are the weaknesses of Indian foreign policy

making? How have they affected Indian foreign policy
objectives, resulting in policy failures? From time to time,
emphasis on the objectives has changed, depending upon the
political philosophy of the government, domestic and
internationalenvironment.Yet, the soul of the core objectives
has always remained intact, despite failures.
Debilitating Features
It is correct to say that often the foreignpolicy making
has been largely ad hoc, responding to given circumstances,
rather than pursuing well laid down objectives. A former
Foreign Minister (1967-1970), Dines Singh stated that foreign
policy making has been "one of carryingon, merelyresponding
to situations." The experience of Ministers of External Affairs
since then is not different.This tradition of ad hoc foreign
policy making of course has come down to Indian Prime
Ministers from the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.
Under him, he was the one man institutionwho decided policy
without much input from other sources even including the
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
Of course, such examples can be seen even in the
developed democracies like the US and UK. A Britishdiplomat
has said, "most important decisions are often made not as a
part of concerted and farsightedpolicy, but under the pressure
of some immediate crisis." But in India such ad hocism is the
rule and not an exception. Chandra Shekhar's government
during the Gulf War exhibited such ad hocism. His
government had permitted the USAF planes to refuel in
Mumbai. But when this became public, there was a hue and
cry in the Lok Sabha. Political parties competed with one
another to criticise the government and demanding a review
of the policy. Chandra Shekhar then said the issue could be
discussed and a decision could be taken. But if the original
decision was in national interest, a fresh discussion and
decision could not also be in national interest,as the Gulf War
was still going on.
This example might be dismissed by the supporters of

the government on the ground that the Chandra Shekhar
governmentitselfwas an ad hoc arrangement.But what about
the well established governmentsunder many Prime Ministers
of Congress Party?They were not without theirad hoc foreign
policy making. Mrs. Gandhi during her tenure as the Prime
Minister had many times followed ad hocism ir foreignpolicy
making. The best illustrationis her decision to send an Indian
delegation led by late Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed to attend Islamic

Conference at Rabat in 1969. The delegation was not even
allowed to go out from their hotel rooms; Fakhruddin Ali
Ahmed came back losing national prestige. It was not clear as
to the objective, Mrs. Gandhi desired to achieve or actually
achieved by this fiasco.
Rajiv Gandhi's period also shows many cases of ad hoc

decision making. He, for instance, decided to send the Indian
Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka without any proper
consideration either by the Cabinet or by the Committee on
Political Affairs(CCPA). The IPKF became a national disaster
where more than one thousand Indian soldiers lost their lives
without achieving the objectives, eitherof disarming the LTTE
or of protectingthe Sri Lankan Tamils. IPKF was also not able
to endear itself with Tamils/Tamils who were until then
looking at India as their only saviour, began to call IPKF as
Innocent Killing Force! India lost her leverage both with Sri
Lankans as well as Tamils. This was, because the decision was
taken by Rajiv Gandhi without proper consultations with the
CCPA or the Cabinet. That the decision was an ad hoc one is
clear, because, while the Indian soldiers were fighting the
LTTE in jungles, Indian intelligence agents were arming the
guerrillas,even treatingthe injured LTTE men in the hospitals
of Tamil Nadu! The same hospitals were also treatingthe IPKF
men!
Second, Indian foreign policy making is enveloped in

excessive secrecy. Of course a degree of secrecy is required
to maintain national objectives, particularly over national
security issues. But Indian policy making has raised
maintainingsecrecy itself into a policy. In the Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE) everythingmarked secret. As a former
director of Atomic Energy Regulatory Commission, Dr.
Gopalakrishnan said that everything inside the DAE,
"includingwaste paper is a secret. Its mystique which they are
tryingto perpetuate."
If nothing else, it helps policy makers to cover-up their
lapses and claim great statesmanship in implementingforeign
policy decisions, despite ad hocism and failure of the policy.

There are many instances of secrecy being carried to its
extremes in India. Thus, even system of classification of
papers - like secret, confidential,or top secret and eyes only-
itself is a classified secret. For instance, after the spy scandal
of 1985 in which some Embassies of East European countries
were involved in gathering secrets from Indian officials, the
then Home Minister S.B. Chavan said in Rajya Sabha, "fresh
instructions have been issued on the use of secret and top
secret classification.But he could not disclose those instructions
in the national interest."The members wanted to know, in the
same case, the names of countries involved in spying. But
Home Minister's reply was quite revealing of the nature
of secrecy. He said, "A particularofficerattached to a particular
foreign mission has been asked to leave at the instance of
government of India. It will not be in national interest to
disclose his identity as that will hamper investigations and
affect relations with a foreign power."
The press in India freely mentioned the names of

countries as Poland, Bulgaria and East Germany. But Home
Minister was not willing to disclose the names of these
countries. Often if members of parliament insist on the
disclosure. Government will question the patriotism of the
Member. This is evident from the fact when in 1987, Lok
Sabha Member, Jaswant Singh asked for the reasons to justify
the huge expenditure on defence,Prime Minister,Rajiv Gandhi
questioned his patriotism.
These instances also show a tendencyamongst the policy
makers to use the concepts like "national interest"or "national
security" to silence the critics and deny informationon vital
issues of foreign policy decision-making.
Third feature is over-centralisationof foreign decision-

making by the Prime Minister. A degree of centralisation is
inevitable both because of the nature of foreignpolicy making
as it involves the very survival of the nation state and also
because in a democracy, policy makers would like to retain
the control over crucial decisions in their own hands.
Ultimately,it is the policy makers who have to explain their

decisions to the people.
In western democracies like the US, centralisation of

decision making is tempered by a strongsense of responsibility
feltby the elected representatives to secure the accountability
of the policy makers. In India, such sense of commitment to
secure executive accountabilityis missing. Until recently,India
did not even constitute Parliamentary committee on defence
and foreignaffairs.Even now, in India the prevailing doctrine
is one of "Ma-Bap Sarkar," and that attitude is clearly evident
in foreignaffairs.
Mrs. Gandhi over-centralised foreign policy decision

makingin her-selfthrougha very few trustedaides in her own
office. In her second term she relied on G. Parthasarathy,
particularlyon Sri Lankan ethnic crisis that erupted in 1983.
Rajiv Gandhi, her successor, since Mrs. Gandhi was
assassinated in October 1984, though a novice in foreignpolicy,
centralised decision making. As stated earlier, he had over
confidence in himself being capable of taming the LTTE
guerrillas.He decided to send the IPKF without consulting the
cabinet or deliberating on it. The decision became a disaster
as India lost the leverage she enjoyed, prior to the induction
of the IPKF in July1987, as a honest broker between the two
Sri Lankan parties - the government and the LTTE by
becoming a party to the treaty.
Indian foreignpolicy making, fourthly,has remained an
elite functionfor all these fiftyyears. Foreign policy making
has remained an elite activityin even developed countries. But
in India societal inputs are almost absent except in rare cases
that too in a negative sense. The elite dominance in foreign
policy establishmentis clear fromthe fact that in many cases,
it is the relations of the foreign service officials who get
selected to foreign service. If Ambassadors' siblings wish to
join the service, it is very easy to get into the service as there
is a self perpetuating tendency in the service.
This is mainly because of high rate of illiteracy, and
economic poverty in addition to excessive secrecy practised

by the executive branch of the government. These factors are
furtherpropelled by the fact that normallyforeignpolicy issues
are extremely complex and they do not affectday-today life
of ordinary citizens. The public opinion is very inchoate as it
does not get all informationnecessary to form a constructive
public opinion. Given the information,public can be as good
and rational in decision making as the elite.
But there is a reluctance on the part of the ruling elite

to share information because it would minimise their
importance as well as role in decision making. This is evident
from the fact that for the past several years the government
has been speaking of legislating on freedom of informationact
or scrapping outdated officialsecrecy act. But nothinghas been
done so far.
Fifth, Indian foreign policy making has often suffered

because of domestic vote bank politics of the political parties.
Undoubtedly, there is the linkage between the foreign policy
and the domestic policy. The underlying fact of the foreign
policy making is that foreign policy is the external policy of
the state by looking internally. Hence internal political
dynamics is linked to the dynamics of external relations. But
policy makers have to explain external policies even though
they seem to go against apparent needs of internal politics.
But Indian policy makers have rarely been able to pursue
foreign policies in national interest when outwardly they
conflictwith the domestic compulsions. This is particularlytrue
in relations with Islamic countries.
This is illustrated by policy making during the Chandra

Shekhar government. The government had permitted US Air
Force planes to refuel in Mumbai as in the then unfolding
world scenario, it was necessary for India to come closer to
the US. Even the Soviet Union under Gorbachev had moved
into a co-operative relationship with the US. However,
Chandra Shekhar governmentwas dependent on the Congress
support. When the Gulf war began, it became evident that Iraq
would be beaten by the coalition of states led by the US.
Muslims every where turned in favour of Iraq. However, in

Iran, the then President, Rafsanjani stated that it was not a
religious war rather a political war. In Britain,Muslims were
up in arms against the government policy of supporting the
US. But government ignored the outcry, and continued to
support the US coalition prosecuting the war.
When the Indian support to the US became public,
Muslims in India were critical of the government.Their cause
was taken up by the Congress by demanding immediate
cancellation of USAF refullingirrespectivenational interest.All
political parties barring the BJP were concerned about the
Muslim vote bank. For Indian political parties,it was as though
a religious war! In reality,political parties and the government
failed to educate the public as to why it was necessary for the
government to support the US.
Sixth, Indian foreign policy and diplomacy has not
succeeded in overcoming sentimentalism in the decision-
making. In the beginning, we pronounced the policy of
Panchsheel(Five principles of peaceful coexistence). But even
after China did a stabbing at the back in October 1962, our
policy makers have not overcome their sentimentalism as
evident from Indian enthusiasm in celebrating fortieth
anniversary of Panchsheelin 1994
Seventh, there is an extremereluctance to modify policy
postures to adjust to changed circumstances in the policy
making. The love for status quo even .when the conditions
have radically changed, is very deep rooted in Indian foreign
policy establishment.Thus for instance, our clinging to policy
of non-alignment, as the gospel truth, even though
internationalenvironmenthas qualitatively changed. No longer
the world is divided by bipolarity. While for some, the world
is unipolar, for others it is multipolar. Non-alignmentwas an
effectivepolicy in the bipolar world. It was an intellectualcoup
by Nehru to have conceptualised it during the cold war. But
Nehru, in the face of Chinese aggression, wanted to stick to
non-alignmentwhile seeking military aid from the US.
However, when the world scene itselfhas changed, what

is the rationale in clinging to the non-alignment? Non-
alignmenthas lost its relevance as every one has emerged non-
aligned. Look at the developments in the period since 1995.
Russia and China speak of strategicco-operation,while China
and US also speak of the same. Naturally, each one is tied up
with the other without invitingthe suspicion of being targeted
by the other power.
There are many other illustrations to prove the point,
but sufficeit, if I give one more example. By August 1991, the
Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev had made it very clear that
he was taking the Soviet Union to the path of democracy.
Hence, for a democratic India, interest should have been to
invest in their democratic movement. But when the
conservative communists tried to take over power in the
Soviet Union through a coup in August 1991, the then Prime
Minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao stated publicly that the
coup was a clear warning to all those-in this case Gorbachev-
who pushed too hard for change. This cast India's democratic
Prime Minister on the side of status quoist conservative
communists!
National Security Council
What needs to be done to avoid these debilitatingeffects

on foreign policy making? Without claiming to be the only
solution, I may here suggest that establishinga well structured
and well planned National Security Council (NSC), could be
a part of the solution.
The NSC, first has to be constituted by a law of the

parliamentas a part of the governmentstructurewith the Prime
Ministeras the Chairman, Ministersof externalaffairs,defence,
commerce and trade as members. The three chiefs of armed
forces, secretaries of the ministers represented in the council,
and the director of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) as
advisers. The chairman can always invite other ministers to
attend the meeting of the NSC on the basis of the need on
particular issues.
Some DebilitatingFeatures of India's Foreign Policy TI
But members of the NSC or its advisers can not devote

theirentire time to the affairs of the NSC. Hence, the NSC
should be provided with a small staff.Consistingof a secretary
to the NSC who should be an expert on the security matters
and few other experts on differentregions of the world with
whichIndia has frequentinteractions,and expertson functional
issues like the nuclear or the UN.
Functions of the NSC
What could be the importantfunctionsof the NSC? The

NSC should perform several functions. First, to co-ordinate
policy inputs from various domestic policy ministries to the
extentthey affectmaking of foreign policy. Today issues like
agricultural policy or import of fertilisers etc. also have a
bearingon foreignpolicy making. Even in the area of internal
securitywhich is the task of Home Ministryand foreignpolicy
as in the case of Jammu & Kashmir, co-ordinationbetween the
ministriesis essential to avoid the situations like open feuding
between the ministers, as was the case between S.B. Chavan
and Rajesh Pilot in the Narasimha Rao Cabinet.
Second, it is the forum for co-ordinatingpolicy between

foreignpolicy and defence. Often, there is a differencein the
perceptionsof two ministries.During the period of Narasimha
Rao's tenure as the prime minister there were many issues
on which two ministries have had such differences.To give
one instance here, I may mention that on the question of
sending Indian troops to Somalia on UN Peace Keeping duties,
two ministries had differences. Under Gujral, for instance,
defencesecretarycalled off his visit to Washington,DC in the
last week of October 1997 on the grounds of protocol. This
was not liked by the MEA as it wanted to improve relations
with the US. Such public expression of differenceslowers the
prestige of nation's foreign policy making process.
Third, NSC will be charged with long term studies on
foreignpolicy planning and thinkinginto the future.The MEA
or the Defence Ministryofficialscharged with carryingout day
today issues would have no time Io think on long term
planning.
Thus, essentially the NSC is a single window clearance

for all issues affectingforeign and national security policies.
As such no ministry can make a public pronouncement on
foreign policy or national security issue unless the statement
has been cleared by the NSC. This will introduce a degree of
discipline in foreign policy decision making.
The need foran NSC has been expressed by the scholars
for a long time. Because of the public pressure, Janata Dal
under its 1989 manifestohad included the promise to establish
the NSC. It was established by the then Prime Minister, V.P.
Singh almost towards the end of his tenure in September 1989.
But it was more a shadow of the substantive NSC structure
demanded by the experts on national security. In reality,
foreign service bureaucracy does not want to share
responsibility in foreign policy decision making with others,
and it scuttled the idea.
His successor, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao also used

the NSC as a device to get every year the defence ministry's
demands approved. He used differentphrases at different
times, to say that his government had approved the idea in
principle or it was being reviewed or under serious
consideration without actually doing any thing on it.
In may 1996, India was blessed with multi-party

coalition governmentwith Deve Gowda as the Prime Minister.
He was a novice in foreign policy; but his expert ministerfor
external Affairs, I.K. Gujral on the very first day of his
appointment promised to establish NSC. But after he became
Prime Minister, in June 1997, what he did was to establish a
cabinet committee on security which is not even a diluted
version of the NSC as proposed by experts.
While we undertake a reform in executive branch to

make foreignpolicy effective,it is also necessary to strengthen
legislative input in making of foreignpolicy. Towards this end,
foreignpolicy experts have been suggesting the strengthening
of the parliamentary committees on defence and foreign
affairs.Afterthese committees were established in early 1991,
there is much to be desired in their working. First, the term

of these committees should be commensurate with that of the
Lok Sabha and not yearly basis; this is for the simple reason
that only a long term membership will help members to
develop expertise on foreign affairs. The committees should
also be empowered to investigate foreignpolicy lapses, if any.
It will help to secure executive accountability to the
parliament.
The committeeshould also be given expert staffto assist
the people's representatives to perform thier task effectively.
These could be drawn either from the regular foreign service
bureaucracy, as done in Germany or from the academia and
thinktanks as done in the US.
India has completed 50 years as an independent nation.

It is now poised to emerge as a major player in world affairs
as it entersinto the 21st century.But to performwell, we need
to remove the debilitating factors from our foreign policy
making and reform our foreign policy decision making
process.
Bibliography
1. P.M. Kamath,Foreign andInternational
Policy-Making Politics
(New
Delhi: RadiantPublishers,
1990).
2. K.D. Mathurand P.M. Kamath,ConductofIndians
ForeignPolicy
(New Delhi:SouthAsian Publishers,
1996).
3. HarishKapur,Indiai Foreign and Substance
Policy:Shadows (New
Delhi:Sage Publications,
1994).
4. P.M. Kamath, "Foreign Policymakingin India: Need for
Committee SystemtoStrengthentheRoleofParliament,"
Strategic
, XI,No. 2, May 1987.
Analysis
5. P.M.Kamath, Policyand theIndianParliament,"
"NationalSecurity
journalof and
Constitutional Studiesy
Parliamentary XXIV,Nos. 1-4,
1990.
Jan.-December,
6. P.M.Kamath,"IndianNation- buildingin the1990s:Explaining the

Declining Role of ForeignPolicyas a in
Factor/' K. Raghavendra
Rao etal (editors),
Fifty , (Allahabad:Indian
YearsofIndia'sFreedom
AcademyofSocialSciences,1997).
3. Historical_influences_on_India;'s_foreign_policy
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Table of contents
1. Historical influences on India's foreign policy............................................................................................... 1
Bibliography...................................................................................................................................................... 16
24 March 2015 ii ProQuest

Document 1 of 1
Historical influences on India's foreign policy

Author: Dalmia, Taru; Malone, David M
ProQuest document link
Abstract (Abstract): In the pre-colonization period of the early 1700s, India's economy likely accounted for
nearly one quarter of the world's economic output.37 As noted above, under the colonial regime, India's
commodities fed the industrial revolution in the United Kingdom, leading to the stagnation of India's own
economy. The relative weight of India in the world economy plummeted during the two centuries of British
colonial domination and the effective economic growth of the country was, on average, stagnant. As a result,
India's economy represented only a small fraction of its relative weight in the global economy in 1947,
compared to two centuries earlier.38 These circumstances induced skepticism in Indian leaders such as
Jawarharlal Nehru, the country's first prime minister (and foreign minister), of westernstyle capitalism, while also
starkly limiting India's post-independence policy options. Nehru and his colleagues inherited an economy that
was one of the poorest in the world per capita, with agricultural production unable to feed a rapidly growing
population.39 At independence, about 60 percent of India's GDP came from agricultural activities that were
mainly dependent on monsoon rains with no significant irrigation systems in place.40 Further, the partition had
caused widespread disruption to the economy, fracturing in India's north the infrastructural framework for
economic activity by way of road, railway, and sea.
1950S AND 1960S: IDEALISM CONTENDING WITH REALISM From independence through the 1950s and
1960s, India's foreign policy stance was framed by [Jawaharlal Nehru] as one of some idealism. The philosophy
embodied in the UN Charter resonated deeply with independent India. In September 1946, Nehru professed
"unreserved adherence, in both spirit and letter" to the UN Charter and committed to "play that role in [UN]
councils to which [India's] geographical position, population and contribution towards peaceful progress entitle
her."48 Internationally, as in domestic politics, Nehru chose the middle path of non-alignment in the bipolar
order of the Cold War, arguing that India would have to "plough a lonely furrow"49 Indian foreign policy of the
time seemed moralistic to outsiders, defining the national interest as congruent with "world co-operation and
world peace."50 In fact, it represented a defensive strategy at a time when foreign policy could not be allowed to
compete with domestic challenges for resource or political bandwidth.
India in the 1970s and 1980s showed a new inclination towards power politics. After Nehru's daughter Indira
Gandhi came to the helm in 1966, following a two-year interregnum under Lai Bahadur Shastri and an
expensive war with Pakistan in 1965, a new tone emerged in India's foreign policy.60 In August 1970, Mrs.
Gandhi, while paying tribute to her father's ideal of non-alignment, asserted that the problems of developing
countries needed to be faced "not merely by idealism, not merely by sentimentalism, but by very clear thinking
and hard-headed analysis of the situation."61 On the international stage, Delhi veered away from non-alignment
towards alliance with the Soviet Union, marked by the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971. Without a Soviet veto, the UN
security council would have condemned India for its intervention in the Bangladesh war later that year. The
judgment of history has been kind to India, because Pakistani atrocities sent an influx of Bangladeshi refugees
across the Indian border. India was able to shatter Pakistan, halving its weight and size. In the 1980s, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia created divisions within the NAM and estranged
India from several of its members. On the home front, an unproductive mix of military and political strategies
was deployed to counter the growing agitation in Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam. The "Free Khalistarf movement
seeking the independence of the Punjab provoked fierce opposition from Delhi, eventually claiming Mrs. Gandhi
- she was assassinated in 1984 by her Sikh bodyguards. Mrs. Gandhfs son, Rajiv Gandhi, took her assertive
style in Delhis unsuccessful military intervention in the Sri Lankan crisis of the mid-1980s.
24 March 2015 Page 1 of 16 ProQuest

Full text: India's international relations after independence in 1947 drew several of its principal characteristics
from earlier Indian history and, in particular, from India's painful colonial experience under the British Raj.1 One
that was largely dormant until quite recently is India's vocation, throughout most of its history, as a hub for
international trade.
This article traces key episodes in India's history and seeks to relate these to the country's foreign policy as it
has evolved since 1947. Particular themes relating to perceptions formed by Indians during the Raj include
India's overriding quest for autonomy and suspicion of all but the most necessary alliances, its commitment to
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, and its related attachment to the principle of state sovereignty,
all of which continue to strongly influence Indian policy today.
SOME HISTORICAL SIGNPOSTS
The question of what India represented in the pre-nation-state era is far from simple.2 At times, in both North
and South India, numerous kingdoms and other polities vied for recognition, respect, and space. And yet
"Indianness," a mostly pluralistic identity influenced by simultaneously contending and co-existing religions and
belief systems, as well as shared cultural heritage, coalesced into Indian civilization as we understand it today.
Two broad phenomena emerge as constants in the history of India. The first is the repeated influx of peoples
and ideas from the northwest (specifically from Afghanistan, Persia, and Central Asia), which occurred through
invasions, but more often through migration, pastoral circuits, trade, and missionary travel. Second, foreign
influences mostly were accommodated and assimilated, producing "cultural fusions."3
Modern writing on Indian history began with colonial accounts of the Indian past.4 Much colonial historiography
was preoccupied with the differentiation between indigenous and alien communities. Indian civilization came to
be seen as essentially Hindu and Sanskritic. Turkish, Afghan, and Mughal chronicles were perceived as alien
historiography.5 This preoccupation represented both a distortion and simplification of Indian history, which
defies organization along a simple timeline and according to the religion of the dominant ruling power.
The Indian nation-state is best seen as a modern construct that is not grounded in a defined territory (or
constant form of society) inherited from a pre-modern past.6 In the case of North India, a relatively continuous
sequence of polities based in or near Delhi evolved, but the polities' borders contracted and expanded
considerably over time, occasionally including Afghanistan, for example. Similarly, South India does not
constitute a homogenous cultural or regional unit throughout history.
Trade connected India to much of the known world millennia ago and has continued to do so ever since. At
various times, the southern part of the Indian subcontinent served as a link in the sea route connecting the
Mediterranean region and the Middle East with China and other Asian destinations. While the west coast
attracted ships from Africa and Arabia, on the east coast, ships docked from China, or the islands and
peninsulas of Indonesia, Malaysia, or Thailand.7 As far back as the Indus and Harappan civilization (2600-1700
BCE) extensive relationships based on trade and cultural contact existed with port cities in ancient
Mesopotamia.8 Trade with Babylon in the seventh and sixth centuries BCE involved gold, spices, and fragrant
woods from South India.9 During the Hellenic and Roman periods, Europe's trade with the subcontinent was
first documented.10
India through the ages attracted settlers from different parts of the world, many eventually melding into India's
syncretic whole. Some came to India as traders or soldiers; others, such as early Chinese pilgrim Fa Hsien,
were part of ongoing exchanges of scholars and embassies between India and China. Likewise, Indian cultural
and spiritual influence spread throughout Asia in varying forms of Buddhism but also of Hinduism, the latter still
represented in major archeological sites as far afield as Indonesia.
INDIA AS A SAGA OF EMPIRES?
The concept of "empire" as a defining category in Indian historiography became fashionable during the colonial
period, when a few empires of the past were helpful in presenting the Raj as part of an ongoing legacy." In fact,
India's openness to trade with distant coiners of the then known world was a more constant feature of the sub-

continent's development than were empires. Nevertheless, India was presented as a sequence of grand
ventures characterized by extensive territory, monumental architecture, and imperial ambitions, interrupted by
periods of atrophy and disintegration. These included the Mauryan Empire (approximately 32-185 BCE), whose
most prominent ruler Asoka is believed by some to have converted to Buddhism, which became actively
proselytized under his rule and began to spread throughout Asia.12
The Kushana State (100-300 CE) covered a vast area extending from the western part of Central Asia to North
India. Coins from that period ranging from Buddha and Shiva to the Persian gods Oado and Atash and the
Sumerian goddess Nana suggest extensive trade. Indian traders also functioned as middlemen in luxury trade
between China and the eastern Mediterranean and Byzantium.
The Gupta dynasty (320-550 CE), credited with the "classical age" of ancient India, rivaled that of the
Mauryas.'3 Signal advances in science and knowledge were made: mathematics and astronomy were highly
dynamic in this period. Indian merchants also increasingly relied upon and expanded trade with Southeast Asia,
since Rome was in decline. Large numbers of Indian Buddhists visited China, where Buddhism was declared
the state religion in 379 CE. In turn, Chinese Buddhists came to India to study original Buddhist scriptures.
Maritime trade between China and South India grew sizably, with large Indian merchant colonies residing at
Canton. Indian influence was also evident in Thailand, Java, and Cambodia.
The entry of Islam into India when the first Ummayid caliph conquered Sindh in 712 CE gave rise to a unique
Indo-Islamic cultural tradition, in the process establishing strong Indian political, economic, and cultural ties to
Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey, and the Arabian Peninsula. Trade with India was vital for the Islamic world, and
large numbers of Arab traders settled on India's western coast from the 8th century onwards.14 Significant
expansion of Islam in India, however, only occurred from the turn of the nth century onwards and attained its
apogee under the Mughal Empire after 1526.15
The expansion of the Mughal Empire was roughly coterminous with two other great Muslim empires, the Safavid
in Iran and the Ottoman in Turkey (controlling much of West Asia and northern Africa, respectively). It exceeded
both in population (roughly ioo million in 1700), wealth, and power.16 The court encouraged a diverse and
inclusive ruling elite. A considerable part of the nobility consisted of powerful non-Muslims, such as the Rajputs,
and a number of Brahmans.17
The political and economic success of the Mughals derived largely from the administrative reforms they initiated
to ensure the supply of armed forces and the collection of land tax revenue. Though primarily agrarian in nature,
the Mughal Empire also prospered from overland and oceanic trade, notably in textile exports. While
increasingly mercantilist and linked with the international economy, the Mughals, unlike the Ottomans, never
commanded a substantial navy, the absence of which allowed Europeans gradually to gain control of the Indian
Ocean's sea-lanes.
ENTER THE EUROPEANS
The Portuguese, under Vasco da Gama, landed on India's southwestern coast in 1510 and soon settled Goa.
Nevertheless, the Portuguese were not able to consolidate a monopoly over Indian Ocean sea trade, mostly still
conducted by Arab and Indian merchant communities. Dutch, Danish, and French trading posts also established
themselves along India's southern coasts. The English succeeded the Portuguese as the major European
power on the Indian Ocean through the East India Company, which obtained permission from Emperor Jahangir
to trade in India in 1619, 19 years after its formation.
The Raj in India
The period prior to the British conquest of large parts of India was seen by 19th century European historians as
a period of "anarchy between the age of Mughal hegemony and the imposition of pax Britannica."18 The
economy was generally buoyant, however, this was particularly attractive to European companies.
Until 1757, European traders had been forced to bring large amounts of bullion into India, as Indian cotton and
silk products had a well-established market in Europe, whereas no significant Indian demand existed for

western products. This pattern of exchange evolved after Britain's conquest of Bengal in the mid-eighteenth
century. The East India Company then set up an apparatus to capture land revenue in its Indian territories, in
turn investing in products for export to European markets. Thus the East India Company, originally established
to accumulate profits from oceanic trade, came to draw its basic sustenance from land revenue.
British involvement in India and its gradual appropriation of the subcontinent is best viewed as an economic
project. A mercantilist phase from 1757 up to 1813 was characterized by direct plunder and the East India
Company's monopoly trade. Subsequently, India evolved into a captive market for manufactured goods from
Britain while exporting, initially mainly to Britain, commodities and raw goods such as cotton, tea, and coffee. As
of the second half of the nineteenth century, finance-driven dominance emerged through the export of capital
and the establishment of sizeable British controlled banks, export-import firms, and agency houses. This period
witnessed a dramatic increase in trade between India and China.19
Patterns of trade had changed drastically with the Industrial Revolution in England, during and after which India
became a market for Manchester textiles (rather than an exporter of its own). Meanwhile, with growing
protectionism in America and continental Europe, Britairi s manufactured exports to its captive market in India
and its import of raw materials, including agricultural ones, from there, made the profitable economic
relationship with India indispensable to financing Britain's deficit with America and Europe.
Soon after the East India Company's monopoly of trade with India ended in 1813 because of pressure from new
economic actors in Britain, China tea took the place of Indian textiles as the company's most profitable item of
trade.20 Though British goods did not find a market in China, a solution to Britain's negative balance of trade
with China emerged when Indian opium was found to appeal there. Until the 1920s, 20 percent of India's
revenue was generated through the opium trade. Amitav Ghosh speculates that "this export of contraband may
have incalculably influenced the way the Chinese perceive India," none for the better.21
Land revenue remained the single largest source of income for the British East India Company and then the
Raj. Inflexible colonial demands for increased revenues provoked devastating famines in 189 o.22 Indeed,
famines became a frequent feature of life in colonial India. The great Bengal famine of 1770, in which one third
of the population is thought to have perished, occurred soon after the colonial conquest, while another
catastrophic famine there in 1943 marked the twilight of the Raj. As of the nineteenth century, and particularly
after 1857, Indian troops and treasure were deployed by Britain to buttress its own military and financial assets
throughout the globe.23
In 1857, a large-scale military mutiny and civilian uprising challenged colonial rule in India.24 The revolt failed
for a number of reasons, including inter- Indian rivalries. Famously hideous brutality was deployed to quell the
uprising, and the East India Company was abolished in its aftermath, as India came under direct rule of the
crown. The cost for suppressing the 1857 uprising was included in the Indian debt, which the new crown Raj
had to pay back to London as part of its annual home charges.
After 1857, Indians in the army were equipped with inferior weaponry and were strictly divided along religious
and ethnic fault lines, an approach that John Strachey described as a "policy of water-tight compartments... to
prevent the growth of any dangerous identity of feeling from race, religion, caste or local sympathies."25
Charles Wood, in 1862 commented, "I wish to have a different and rival spirit in different regiments, so that Sikh
might fire into Hindoo, Goorkha into either, without any scruples in time of need."26 Similar divisions were
encouraged among the civilian population and especially among Indian elite groups, predominantly along
religious lines but in many cases along the lines of caste or regional identities. The consequences of these
policies echo in Indian society and politics to this day. Secretary of state Hamiltor s confidential
correspondence with Lord Elgin in May 1897 illuminates British policy:
I am sorry to hear of the increasing friction between Hindus and Mohammedans in the North West and the
Punjab. One hardly knows what to wish for, unity of ideas and action would be very dangerous politically,
divergence of ideas and collision are administratively troublesome. Of the two, the latter is the least risky,

though it throws anxiety and responsibility upon those on the spot where the friction exists.27
THE INDIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT
The economic drain of wealth from India to Britain, as well as the continuing disruption by the British of Indian
cultural traditions, helped fuel the rise of nationalism among Indians, as did British racism, manifested in a
nearly infinite variety of ways while serving one general purpose. As Lord Curzon remarked when speaking of
British aims to white businessmen and government officials in India in 1903, "My work lies in administration,
yours in exploitation; but both are aspects of the same question and of the same duty."28
Anti-colonialism predated mass mobilization against British rule led by urban elites.29 Educated Indians formed
political associations at regional levels, and the Indian National Congress (INC), initially an association of city-
based professionals, came into being in 1885. The controversial partition of Bengal in 1905 proved a prelude to
the 1947 creation of Pakistan and the 1971 emergence of an independent Bangladesh.30 Due to widespread
agitation, the partition of Bengal had to be annulled by 1911, and the British shifted their capital from Calcutta to
Delhi, partly in order to operate from a less hostile political environment. The nationalist movement gained
considerable momentum in the 1920's from the social and economic dislocation brought about by World War
One, which impacted Indian lives through massive recruitments, heavy taxes, and sharp price increases.
The end of the Raj was largely ordained by World War One, which weakened Britain and brought about broad
challenges to the world order it had largely created. Britain increasingly strained to service the needs of the
metropolis while at the same time meeting the political and economic requirements of the administration of
India. Worse, the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s undermined India's export surplus with
the rest of the world, through which the transfer of wealth from the colony to Britain had been channeled.3' The
requirement for the colonial government to meet its obligatory home charges resulted in British disinvestment in
India, thereby contributing to the country's impoverishment.
In 1909, M.K. Gandhi, six years prior to his definitive return to India from South Africa, published Hind Swaraj
("Indian Home Rule"), a strong critique of British rule in its many dimensions. The book resonated deeply across
India.32 Gandhfs moral and political authority became a powerful political weapon fuelling agitation, strikes, and
other forms of non-cooperation, provoking repression (for example, 370 were killed and 1,200 were injured by
British soldiers in Amritsar in April 19 19) without denting the momentum for self-rule. The hostility and
condescension by some of the British elite toward India during the first half of the twentieth century, even as
India's eventual independence loomed, is encapsulated in Winston Churchill's famously visceral dislike of the
country, its people and its traditions.33
World War Two again witnessed the diversion of Indian resources to finance Britain's war effort. In 1942 Gandhi
issued a more radical resolution for the British to quit India, and in a sharp contrast to his earlier stance,
threatened violence.34 Indian political actors, however, were seriously divided over the political dispensation to
follow independence. Mistrust and tension grew between Congress and the Muslim League, intermediated
erratically by the British. A series of intrigues, political mistakes, and policy misfires led to the partition of India
along professed religious lines in 1947 at the time of (accelerated) independence, producing cataclysmic
violence. An estimated three million Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims lost their lives. Nine million Hindus and Sikhs
were displaced from the region that was to become Pakistan, and an estimated six million Indian Muslims
migrated to Pakistan. These circumstances attended India's assumption of sovereign powers; and their
consequences, notably in Kashmir, would bedevil Indian foreign policy for decades.
Meanwhile, India's foreign relations, while controlled completely by Britain, had increasingly assumed an Indian
face since the Versailles peace conference of 19 19, at which London was successful in securing a seat for
(British) India - in effect providing Britain with a second seat - occupied by the elegant but submissive
Maharajah of Bikaner, while Indian nationalists, clamoring for access, were kept at bay from the meeting.35
This led to Indian membership in the League of Nations (where India's delegation was headed by a succession
of Britons) and to founding membership of the United Nations even before India's independence. Britain

included Indian officials in some of its key diplomatic institutions, notably its embassy in Washington, where
Indian economic interests were recognized as relevant.36
THE LEGACY OF HISTORY IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY POST-INDEPENDENCE
In the pre-colonization period of the early 1700s, India's economy likely accounted for nearly one quarter of the
world's economic output.37 As noted above, under the colonial regime, India's commodities fed the industrial
revolution in the United Kingdom, leading to the stagnation of India's own economy. The relative weight of India
in the world economy plummeted during the two centuries of British colonial domination and the effective
economic growth of the country was, on average, stagnant. As a result, India's economy represented only a
small fraction of its relative weight in the global economy in 1947, compared to two centuries earlier.38 These
circumstances induced skepticism in Indian leaders such as Jawarharlal Nehru, the country's first prime minister
(and foreign minister), of westernstyle capitalism, while also starkly limiting India's post-independence policy
options. Nehru and his colleagues inherited an economy that was one of the poorest in the world per capita,
with agricultural production unable to feed a rapidly growing population.39 At independence, about 60 percent
of India's GDP came from agricultural activities that were mainly dependent on monsoon rains with no
significant irrigation systems in place.40 Further, the partition had caused widespread disruption to the
economy, fracturing in India's north the infrastructural framework for economic activity by way of road, railway,
and sea.
Nehru had been reflecting on international relations, and writing about them, at least since the 1920s. Naturally,
his primary impulse was antiimperialism.41 Even then, his analysis focused more on the US than on a Great
Britain in rapid decline. In 1927 he stated, "[The] great problem of the near future will be American imperialism,
even more than British imperialism."42 And, not surprisingly, he saw an independent India supporting the
struggle of other colonized people to achieve their freedom. As well, he viewed India primarily as an Asian
power.43 Even prior to independence, in March 1947 he convened in Delhi a conference of independent Asian
states and freedom movements, whose aspirations he wanted India to support.44
But because of India's economic plight, Nehru was cautious in articulating an expansive foreign policy early on,
for example in a speech at the Constituent Assembly on 4 December 1947:
Talking about foreign policies, the House must remember that these are not just empty struggles on a chess
board. Behind them lie all manner of things. Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, and
until India has propery evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and
mil be groping [emphasis added].45
Soon after independence, Prime Minister Nehru and other Indian Congress leaders introduced a modified
Indian version of state planning and control over the economy. These leaders believed a dominant role of the
state would be vital in ensuring rapid industrial and agricultural growth.46 In India, Congress appealed to a large
middle ground of interests and values that coalesced around its project of state nationalism which included a
strategy of import-substitution and discouraged foreign investment.47
Indians have tended to be generous in their assessment of some beneficial features of a Raj. They appreciate
the institutions of governance, not least the Westminster parliamentary system, and that of an independent
judiciary, bequeathed to them by the British and retained in contemporary India with local characteristics. But
not surprisingly, the legacy of the Raj left the newly independent state, still smarting from partition, looking for
fresh approaches to establishing an international personality and harbouring a deep mistrust of the west.
How did these impulses play out, and do they still?
1950S AND 1960S: IDEALISM CONTENDING WITH REALISM From independence through the 1950s and
1960s, India's foreign policy stance was framed by Nehru as one of some idealism. The philosophy embodied in
the UN Charter resonated deeply with independent India. In September 1946, Nehru professed "unreserved
adherence, in both spirit and letter" to the UN Charter and committed to "play that role in [UN] councils to which
[India's] geographical position, population and contribution towards peaceful progress entitle her."48

Internationally, as in domestic politics, Nehru chose the middle path of non-alignment in the bipolar order of the
Cold War, arguing that India would have to "plough a lonely furrow"49 Indian foreign policy of the time seemed
moralistic to outsiders, defining the national interest as congruent with "world co-operation and world peace."50
In fact, it represented a defensive strategy at a time when foreign policy could not be allowed to compete with
domestic challenges for resource or political bandwidth.
Meanwhile, Nehru had to tackle the tremendous domestic challenges of cohesion that the British Empire had
left behind. India's cohesion was tested not only by partition, but on its heels by the Kashmir crisis (which
dented India's faith in the UN), the resistance of several princely states, notably Hyderabad, to joining the Indian
union, and some left-over business with respect to decolonization (managed elegantly by France, which
negotiated the return of Pondicherry and other minor dependencies to Indian sovereignty, and less so by
Portugal, which had to be militarily expelled from Goa in 19 61). Even language politics threatened the Indian
union when the state of Tamil Nadu threatened secession rather than contemplate the imposition of Hindi as the
national language of India - in due course winning its point.
India's international actions during this period were consonant with its domestic situation and foreign policy
outlook, though its posture during several international crises (for example, Indochina and Hungary) was seen
by the west as inconsistent with its purported idealism. The dissonance was aggravated by the brilliant but often
grating (to western ears) sermonizing of Nehru's preferred envoy, V.K. Krishna Menon. Wherever possible,
India took sides with other "third world" countries against the real and perceived imperialist machinations of the
west, and eschewed multilateral arrangements promoted by western powers. This policy of international
autonomy, conforming to that of "non-alignment," was followed until external events in the form of cross-border
Chinese aggression in 1962 compelled the Indian establishment to face the realities of power politics in the
international system.
India and China started off on friendly footing when Delhi was quick in 1949 to recognize the People's Republic
of China, even while the latter was opposed by the west. At first, India and China shared the sense of having
cast off the imperialist yoke through long struggles. Proclamations by Indian and Chinese statesmen highlighted
shared responsibility in leading countries newly emerging from colonization in a quest for peace and prosperity
against the treacherous backdrop of the US-Soviet superpower rivalry.51 In 1950, despite China's military
takeover of Tibet, India opposed a US-sponsored attempt in the United Nations security council to label China
an aggressor in the Korean War, however, border disputes, differences in ideology, misunderstandings, and
miscalculations were to bedevil the relationship. By emphasizing their anti-imperialist credentials and suffering
under imperialist domination, both nations sought to "build solidarity and gain prestige" among third world
countries.52 In practice, competition developed between India and China to be viewed as vanguards of the
developing world. At the Bandung conference, Indonesia, in 1955, Nehru took great pride in introducing
Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai to other leaders, perhaps prompting Zhou's comment later that he had
"never met a more arrogant man."53 Because of mismanagement by both sides, the relationship rapidly went
downhill, culminating in a short, sharp border war in 1962 that India decisively lost.54 It remains the post-
independence humiliation uppermost in Indian minds. And China's enduring alliance with Pakistan since the
mid-1950s has rankled Delhi.
India's relationship with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) suffered a serious setback during the Sino- Indian
War. When China invaded, ostensibly to overturn India's border claims originating from the colonial era, there
was little overt support for India from the third world. Only 40 countries responded positively to Nehru's
international appeal for China to be declared an aggressor in November 1962, of which only three (Ethiopia,
Cyprus, and Sri Lanka) were from the group of 25 non-aligned countries at the time. Even more disorienting for
India's foreign policy was the immediate support from countries of the western block during this episode, with
the US dispatching an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal in support of Delhi.
During these decades, foreign aid played an important role in India's development process, and the need for it

influenced foreign policy to an extent. Nehru sought financial and technical help from most industrialized
countries, in addition to borrowing from the World Bank for long-term infrastructure development.55 Much of the
assistance was used to import food and other necessary items crucial to India's survival as a fragile and
potentially fractious new country.56 This aid was vital to India at the time.57
Commenting on the Nehruvian era, Siddharth Varadarajan reminds us that Nehru was not driven by "abstract
principles" alone, but rather was engaged in a quest for "strategic space," for which he was dealt a very weak
hand in 1947.58 Srinath Raghavaris important recent work on Nehru's strategic thought and foreign policy also
qualifies the view of Nehru as primarily an idealist.59 Nehru's economic policy has been much criticized in the
west, but it was largely a product of reaction against colonial depredations. Moreover, Nehru and his
contemporaries were startlingly successful in one respect: while great poverty continued to stalk India, the
country never again suffered a major famine - a tribute to the disciplining and ordering qualities of electoral
democracy.
1970S AND 1980S: INTERMITTENT REALISM
India in the 1970s and 1980s showed a new inclination towards power politics. After Nehru's daughter Indira
Gandhi came to the helm in 1966, following a two-year interregnum under Lai Bahadur Shastri and an
expensive war with Pakistan in 1965, a new tone emerged in India's foreign policy.60 In August 1970, Mrs.
Gandhi, while paying tribute to her father's ideal of non-alignment, asserted that the problems of developing
countries needed to be faced "not merely by idealism, not merely by sentimentalism, but by very clear thinking
and hard-headed analysis of the situation."61 On the international stage, Delhi veered away from non-alignment
towards alliance with the Soviet Union, marked by the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971. Without a Soviet veto, the UN
security council would have condemned India for its intervention in the Bangladesh war later that year. The
judgment of history has been kind to India, because Pakistani atrocities sent an influx of Bangladeshi refugees
across the Indian border. India was able to shatter Pakistan, halving its weight and size. In the 1980s, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia created divisions within the NAM and estranged
India from several of its members. On the home front, an unproductive mix of military and political strategies
was deployed to counter the growing agitation in Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam. The "Free Khalistarf movement
seeking the independence of the Punjab provoked fierce opposition from Delhi, eventually claiming Mrs. Gandhi
- she was assassinated in 1984 by her Sikh bodyguards. Mrs. Gandhfs son, Rajiv Gandhi, took her assertive
style in Delhis unsuccessful military intervention in the Sri Lankan crisis of the mid-1980s.
1990S AND ONWARD: THE BIRTH OF PRAGMATISM
The year 19 91 brought significant change for India. The end of the Cold War gave way to new configurations in
international relations. The Gulf War began with the invasion of one non-aligned country by another. In India,
over four decades of socialist economic policy and poor fiscal management culminated in a severe balance of
payments crisis, to which Delhi responded by instituting meaningful economic liberalization. During that year's
national election campaign, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a Tamil terrorist opposed to his policies in Sri
Lanka.
Most idealized conceptions of India's society, polity, and role in the world were gradually discarded. India's
foreign policy became more economically oriented, as India shed its non-aligned and anti-western ideologies to
adopt a more pragmatic international stance. This stance favoured the normalization of traditionally antagonistic
relationships with neighbouring countries; a greater interest in legitimizing India's emerging power status; a
more positive approach to relations with the world's remaining superpower, the US; and greater focus on
national defence.
Many in the Indian foreign policy establishment and intelligentsia found these transitions distasteful. But they
applauded calls for a multipolar world, a growing leitmotiv in Delhis global projection of Indian views.62
These shifts in India's foreign policy also led to better relations with China, after the initial hostility of India's new
government in 1998, which had justified its volley of nuclear tests (to which Pakistan responded in kind) that

year by citing to Washington a perceived threat from Beijing.63 Only a year later, during the Kargil conflict
between India and Pakistan, India was assured of Beijing's neutrality in the conflict.64 Indeed, China's
statements on the Kashmir issue and on India-Pakistan bilateral conflicts since the 1990s (such as the 1999
Kargil war) advocate bilateral resolution, in marked contrast to China's earlier stance of unqualified support for
Pakistan during the Indo- Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971.
India's "Look East" policy, first articulated clearly in 1994, aims at closer links with the rest of Asia. Though it did
not take off until 2004, today the policy is a principal pillar of Indian foreign policy. The establishment of
diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 led to booming defence procurement by both countries. Simultaneously,
Delhi enhanced its energy-driven diplomacy with Persian Gulf countries. India engaged assertively with the
post-Taliban government of President Karzai in Kabul, initiating an ambitious reconstruction program in
Afghanistan that irritated Pakistan. And, most importantly, after an extended but cautious mating dance, India
and the US in 2008 reached an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, freeing Delhi from the global nuclear
purdah to which its 1974 test had consigned it. The agreement, while greatly improving the tone of the bilateral
relationship between Washington and Delhi, remains largely unconsummated because of continuing
disagreement over modalities for actual nuclear commerce between them. The relationship with Pakistan
remains vexed, particularly since the potentially dangerous Kargil war of 1999, and was seriously challenged by
terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008 with which some Pakistani government agencies seemed to be involved.
Thus, Indian foreign policy in the 21st century is characterized by a marked shift towards pragmatism and a
willingness to do business with all, resembling in few of its important specifics that of Indira Gandhi in the mid-
1970s, and even less that of her father in the 1950s and '60s. Running in parallel with elements of real change,
however, were strong elements of continuity.
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY
As political fragmentation afflicts the domestic sphere, foreign-policymaking has suffered. Lacking a strategic
vision, Indian foreign policy is criticized for being largely reactive.65 The incentive for developing a strategic
vision is the attainment of "strategic autonomy," as Indian national security advisor Shiv Shankar Menon
recently stated.66 That goal reflects Nehru's emphasis on avoiding all unnecessary entanglements with major
powers that might risk a degree of subordination of India's national interests to those of others - India's plight
during two centuries as a colonized society.
The quest for autonomy in foreign policy formulation and execution was compromised for a time by the Treaty of
Friendship with the Soviet Union of 1971, to which India resorted at a time when balance of power politics and
impending war with Pakistan made alliance with one of the principal powers an urgent necessity. But overall,
India has sought to keep the major powers at some distance, and this remains the case today, even as India
and the US remain divided on policy issues such as Iran. Sovereignty ranks high in a hierarchy of Indian foreign
policy values. In practice, but not often, India has been prepared to override the sovereignty of other states,
particularly close neighbours. But, in principle and mostly in practice, deference to sovereignty prevails. This
theme has been a mainstay of India's advocacy during its current two-year (2011-2012) elected term on the UN
security council, as intervention in Libya and Syria have been discussed.67
India has mostly exercised considerable "strategic restraint," not just vis--vis Pakistan, but also more widely.
While India and China have continued to engage in controlled mutual provocations across their very long
border, tensions created by these incidents can now be addressed in a wide range of regularly scheduled
consultations and through a useful patchwork of institutional mechanisms (none of which, however, have
brought resolution of the underlying border disputes any closer). After its humbling experience with
peacekeeping in Sri Lanka, India is leery of unnecessary military entanglements in neighbouring countries. In
Afghanistan, for example, India has kept a low profile, aside from the security protection Delhi provided for
India's reconstruction program there.
"Strategic restraint" has come to be seen as a doctrine of Indian policy, having withstood several recent tests

emanating from Pakistan, notably terrorist attacks on India's parliament in 2001 and even more dramatically on
several sites in Mumbai in 2008. While domestic pressure to respond militarily was strong, so was the sense
across much of the political spectrum that escalation and reprisals were unlikely to yield a good outcome. In
2009, following a daring, if reckless, Pakistani move into territory nominally controlled by India in the Kargil
Heights of the Himalayas, India eschewed border escalation, instead absorbing considerable casualties by
seeking to flush out the Pakistani troops directly involved and advantageously located high up, while US
mediation sought to - and eventually did - secure a Pakistani climb-down.68 Indeed, the only clear case of
Indian aggression against Pakistan occurred in 1971, under provocation of the brutal military repression ordered
by Islamabad in East Pakistan.
Another enduring characteristic of Indian foreign policy is its attribution to economic factors. Since 1991, Indian
foreign policy has increasingly been shaped by domestic, regional and global economic objectives. Growth in
government revenue has allowed Delhi, without increasing the proportion of spending allocated to national
defence, to greatly increase military procurement in recent years, thus at times creating the impression that
India is primarily driven by geo-strategic considerations. In our view, this is not the case. Rather, India of late
has been playing catch-up on long-deferred military procurement.69
India continues to harbour hundreds of millions of ultra-poor citizens. Its politics revolve largely around the fight
against poverty. The economic advancement of the country, including at the international level, remains the
headline goal, however much and often non-economic issues intrude on its foreign policy agenda.
CONCLUSIONS
India's identity, current borders, and foreign policy preferences, while influenced by previous avatars, do not
descend in a straight line from ancient or colonial history. The British gave India a new territorial unity and
bequeathed to its " j e wel in the crown" a range of fledgling institutions centered on the Westminster
parliamentary system. But pre- and post-independence Indian distrust of the west, rooted in the colonial
experience, combined with Nehru's choice of a broadly socialist model of economic development and India's
struggle with Pakistan (long allied to both Washington and Beijing), lastingly shaped Indian foreign policy.
The path to international recognition and respect has not been an easy one for India, because of a lack of
material resources and military capacity. Today, rather than defining itself as aligned with this or that
international power, India seeks a degree of equidistance and promotes multi-polarity (which also highlights its
own emergence as a meaningful power). That the west has more to offer India in terms of economic
relationships than does the Russian Federation today is obvious to all. But Delhi continues to entertain a
constant, often high-level dialogue with Moscow, just as it works, much of the time, at improving its contentious
links with China.
From idealist moralizer to occasional pragmatic dealmaker, India's transition within multilateral diplomacy
mirrors its rise, second only to that of China. India's voice carries more weight today in multilateral forums
largely due to its enhanced economic performance, political stability - sometimes concealed by the roar of its
internal democratic debates - and nuclear capability. Although many of its internal problems - including ethnic
separatism, insurgency, poverty, inequality, minority rights, corruption, and poor governance - remain only
partially addressed, on the international stage India can now exert real, if still tentative, political and economic
influence.
India's growing predilection for global governance by oligarchy - be it as part of the five interested parties in the
World Trade Organization, the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) group at the Copenhagen climate
change negotiations of 2009, or the G4 coalition of countries (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) demanding
permanent membership in the United Nations security council - is at variance with its former non-aligned
identity, but not with the principle of autonomy. Self-interest now clearly trumps solidarity.
India's strategic restraint makes it a reassuring actor in foreign policy, if an exasperating one to the coterie of
geo-strategically-oriented minds. Optimistically for India, the relative decline of US predominance at the global

level and the emergence of a more genuinely multipolar world have encouraged India to develop much greater
openness to cooperation with the US. Meanwhile, as Sunil Khilnani states, India's greatest asset remains its
"accumulated political legitimacy," rather than any hypothetical or real accumulation of power.70 Indians see
this legitimacy as key to the country's autonomy as an international actor. The quest for this autonomy will
endure.
Footnote
1 See David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (London &New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 19-46.
Footnote
2 See Pavan K. Varma, Being Indian: Inside the Real India (London: William Heineman, 2005).
3 See Ayesha Jalal and Sugata Bose, Modern South Asia: History Culture, Political Economy (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 27.
4 Upinder Singh, A History of Ancient and Early Medieval India (New Delhi: Pearson Books, 2008), 7-8.
5 Romila Thapar, The Penguin History of Early India - From the Origins to AD 1300 (New Delhi: Penguin Books,
2002), ? and 206.
6 This notion helps explain why efforts to impose Hindi as the national language after independence failed
miserably, even threatening the cohesion of the new country.
Footnote
7 Janet L Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony - The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), 261-62.
8 For an excellent discussion on trade in the Harappan Civilization see Shereen Ratnagar, "Harappan Trade in
its 'World Context,'" in Ranabir Chakravarti, ed., Trade in Early india (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2001), 102-122. See also Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 262.
9 K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, A History of South India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1966), 71-72.
10 Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 265.
11 Ibid., 174.
Footnote
12 Sastri, History of South India, 76-77; Thapar, History of Early India, 184.
13 In central and southern parts of India, the post-Gupta period that saw the rise of high civilization, notably that
of the Cholas (around the 9* century CE), centered in today's Tamil Nadu.
14 See Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 270-274. The ports of Cambay and Saymurin Cujerat had
absorbed colonies of resident Arab merchants by the early days of Islam, as well as sailors from Siraf, Oman,
Basra, and Baghdad.
15 A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was India (London: SidgwickS. Jackson, 1954), 77.
Footnote
16 Barbara Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf, A Concise History of Modem India (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), ?.
17 Jalal and Bose, Modern South Asia, 31.
18 Ibid, 80.
Footnote
19 O m Prakash, The New Cambridge History of India - European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 287.
20 Michael Creenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1951), 8.
21 Kunal Diwan, "A seasoned Dilliwallah is back home," Hindu, i8June 2008.
Footnote

22 S. Sarkar, Modem India (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2001), 17.
23 Ibid., 15; See also Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, From Plassey to Partition - A History of Modern India (New
Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2008), 105.
24 Jalal and Bose, Modern South India, 31.
25 Sakar, Modern India, 16..
26 Hiralal Singh, Problems and Policies of the British in India 1885-1898, 140 in Sarkar, Modem India, 16.
Footnote
27 Sarkar, Modem India, 21.
28 J.R. McLane, Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress, 37, in Sarkar, 21.
29 See Ranajit Cuha, Subaltern Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Society, Vol. 7 (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1997).
30 The official rationale behind the partition was administrative efficiency, but as later declassified documents
showed, "our main objective is to split up and thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to our rule" (Sarkar,
Modern India, 95). See also Bandyopadhyay, Plassey to Partition, 253-254.
Footnote
31 Jalal and Bose, Modem South India, 106.
32 Ibid., 110.
33 These facets of Churchill are explored in depth in Richard Toye's Churchill's Empire: The World that Made
Him and the World He Made (New York: Henry Holt &Co, 2010.)
34 Ibid., 131.
Footnote
35 A fascinating account of the efforts of Indian nationalists to break into westerndominated international
diplomacy at the conclusion of World War One is found in Erez Manela's The Wilsonian Moment (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 7798 and 141-158.
36 Sir Cirija Shankar Bajpai was agent-general for India in the British Embassy in Washington during the early
1940s and later the first secretary general of the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi. His grandson, Kanti, who
obtained his first degree from the University of British Columbia, is today one of India's finest foreign policy
scholars.
37 See Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2003).
38 According to some estimates, Indian manufacturing as late as 1750 may have comprised as much as a
quarter of the world's output. See David Washbrook, "India in the early modern world economy: modes of
production, reproduction and exchange," Journal of Global History 2 (2007), 87-88.
Footnote
39 Tirthankar Roy, The Economic History of India, 1857-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), ?.
40 S. Mahendra Dev, 'Agriculture and Rural Development: Policy Issues forCrowth and Equity', in Manmohan
Malhoutra, ed., India: The Next Decade (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2006), 205; Also see C.S. Bhalla,
Indian Agriculture Since Independence (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 2007).
41 Beyond extensive correspondence on the topic, including with Gandhi, Nehru devoted a volume in excess of
900 pages to his analysis of international relations. He also devoted significant parts of his autobiography to
these issues. Both books were published in the 1930s. For recent editions, see Climpses of World History (New
Delhi: Penguin, 2004); and An Autobiography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990).
42 Jawaharlal Nehru, "Report to the All India Congress Committee on the International Congress against
Imperialism held at Brussels in February 1927," in Bimla Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The
Indian National Congress and World Affairs, 18857947 (North York, ON: Bookland, 1960), Appendix I, 265.
43 Pankaj Mishra's fascinating new book, From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Ciroux, 2012), documents how strongly anti-colonial Asians, from Istanbul to Tokyo,

felt during the first half of the twentieth century, and the varying forms that their anti-imperialist thought took.
Footnote
44 See Shahi Tharoor, Nehru: The invention of india (New York, NY, Arcade Books, 2003), 151-2. Nehru soon
broadened his focus to include freedom movements elsewhere, as reflected in his leading role at the Afro-Asian
conference in Bandung in 1955, itself the fore-runner of non-alignment.
45 Quoted in Sanjaya Baru, Strategic Consequences of India's Economic Performance (New Delhi: Academic
Foundation, 2006), 58.
46 Sanjaya Baru, 'Self-Reliance to Dependence in Indian Economic Development', Social Scientist n, no. 11
(November, 1983): 34-46.
47 Zoya Hasan, "Introduction," in Zoya Hasan, ed., Parties and Party Politics in India (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
Footnote
48 The Indian Annual Register: July-December 1946 (Calcutta: N.N. Mitra, 1947), 25253 in The Indian Council
of World Affairs, India and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957), 28.
49 Extracts from Nehru's speech to the Constituent Assembly of India on 4 December 1947, partially
reproduced in A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations ici4j^cij2 Volume I (New
Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), no.
50 Ibid.
Footnote
51 See, for example, Mao Zedong's 26 January 1951 speech in honor of the first anniversary of India's
Constitution in Shao Chuan Leng, "India and China," Far Eastern Survey2i, no. 8 (May, 1952), 73-78.
52 Manjari Chatterjee Miller, "Scars of Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology, Victimization, and Foreign Policy," Ph.D.
dissertation (Cambridge: Harvard University, August 2007), 98.
53 Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London: Cape, 1970), 261.
54 See David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, "India and China: Conflict and Cooperation," Survival 52,no. ?
(February-March 2010): 137-158.
Footnote
55 James Heitzman and Robert L Worden, eds., India: A Country Study (Washington: CPO for the Library of
Congress, 1995); Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Annua/ Report 1994-95 (New Delhi, 1994); Govern
ment of India, Planning Commission, Ninth Five Year Plan: Volume ? (New Delhi: Yojana Bhavan, 1992).
56 Paul Hallwood, "The Impact of Foreign Aid Upon India's International Trade 195165," Bulletin of Economic
Research 25, no. 2 (1973): 129-145.
57 See generally Jagdish Bhagwati, "The Tying of Aid" in J Bhagwati and R. S. Eckaus, eds., Foreign Aid
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970).
58 Conversation with the author, New Delhi, February 2010.
59 Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
Footnote
60 Defence spending in 1965-1966, of around 24.06 percent of total expenditure, was the highest in the period
from 1965101989. See Uma Kapila, ed., Indian Economy Since independence (New Delhi: Academic
Foundations, 2001), 195.
6i A. Appadorai, Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations, Tci4j-iciy2: Volume ? (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1982), 62.
Footnote
62 See, for example, Sitaram Yechury, "Back to basics," Seminar, ? January 2007.
63 "China is enemy no ?: George," Indian Express, 4 May 1998, www.expressindia.com.

64 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict (Boulder, CO, and
London, UK: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 32.
Footnote
65 See C. Raja Mohan, "Peaceful Periphery: India's New Regional Quest," University of Pennsylvania Center
for the Advanced Study of India, 24 May 2007.
66 See Shiv Shankar Menon, "India needs to develop its own doctrine for strategic autonomy: NSA," Economic
Times, 18 October 2012, www.economictimes.indiatimes.com.
Footnote
67 See Richard Cowan, "Missed Opportunities," Pragati (December 2011). Having abstained on security council
resolutions in 2011, vetoed by Russia and China, that sought greater international involvement in resolving
Syria's internal crisis, India shifted to a vote in favour of sanctions against the Syrian regime in July 2012, again
vetoed by Russia and China.
68 India's officiai casualty figures for the Kargil war were 527 dead and 1,363 wounded. Pakistan's were
probably greater.
Footnote
69 In 2006-2010, India became the world's foremost arms importer, according to the widely respected Swedish
research institute, SIPRI. See http://www.sipri.org/media/ pressreleases/2on/armstransfers.
Footnote
70 Correspondence with the author, 6 April 2010.
AuthorAffiliation
Taru Dalmia, a doctoral candidate In history at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, is also a leading
Indian musician and film-maker. David M. Malone, a former Canadian high commissioner in India, 2006-2008, is
president of the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa. They are very grateful to helpful
suggestions from anonymous peer reviewers. The views recorded here are their own alone.
Subject: Foreign policy; International trade; Human influences; Asian history; Public policy;
Location: India
Publication title: International Journal
Volume: 67
Issue: 4
Pages: 1029-1049
Number of pages: 21
Publication year: 2012
Publication date: Autumn 2012
Year: 2012
Publisher: Canadian International Council
Place of publication: Toronto
Country of publication: Canada
Publication subject: Political Science--International Relations
ISSN: 00207020
Source type: Scholarly Journals

Language of publication: English
Document type: Feature
ProQuest document ID: 1354339718
Document URL: http://search.proquest.com/docview/1354339718?accountid=38885
Copyright: Copyright Canadian International Council Autumn 2012
Last updated: 2013-12-05
Database: ProQuest Research Library

Bibliography
Citation style: APA 6th - American Psychological Association, 6th Edition
Dalmia, T., & David, M. M. (2012). Historical influences on india's foreign policy. International Journal, 67(4),
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4. FOREIGN_POLICY_MAKING_PROCESS
Indian Political Science Association
DOMESTIC MILIEU OF INDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING PROCESS: A THEORETICAL

PERSPECTIVE
Author(s): Sukhwant S. Bindra
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 65, No. 2 (April-June, 2004), pp. 245-258
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
Accessed: 24-03-2015 10:13 UTC
Indian Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Indian Journal
of Political Science.
TheIndianJournal Science
ofPolitical
2004
Vol.LXV,No.2,April-June,
DOMESTIC MILIEU OF INDIA AND FOREIGN
POLICY MAKING PROCESS: A THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE
S. Bindra
Sukhwant
Foreign anddomestic policyissuesareintegrated productsofthe

samepolitical system andaredesigned insucha waythatit
defineandimplement overallnational purposes. Nearlyall the
ecisionsaretaken withina vortex
of internal and
pressures policy
makers often donothavethefreedom tojustgoaheadandtake
whatever decisions
theyfeelwould bebest.There isnodenying
thefactthatinall thenations ofthe world the"official"
policy
maker is onlyonepartofthewhole policymaking process. A
largenumber of other also
parties are each
involved, attempting
toinfluence thecourseofactiononthebasisofself-interest.Asa
result"thepolicymaking processusuallyis muchmore
complicated than eventheadmitted complexitiesofinternational
relations would A staggering
dictates. quantityandvariety of
mutual interactionsoccur yieldinga very hazywebofcomplex,
reciprocal Because,in all political
relationships"1. systems
without thedomstic support,it is just notpossible forthe
leadership towork properly.They often takeandinitiative to
builda coalition thatwillultimately in
help providing a
consensual baseforthemselves andtheir policies.A number of
groups andindividuals whoarerequired andina position to
provide therequisitesupportthusautomatic energyas thetarget
ofa widerange ofrequests,promises, anddemands2
threats,
Foreignand domesticpolicyissuesare relatedproductsof the

samepoliticalsystems andareexpectedtodefineandimplement overall
national purpose. The most importantrequirementfor achieving
nationalpolicy aspirations,is to create an atmosphereof political
stabilityand close laisionbetweendomesticand foreignpolicy.The
development of nationalecnomiesneeds theassemblingof resources
fromotherstates,andtheexpansionandstrengthening ofmarkets across
internationalboarders.To fatherfortify themilitarycapabilityin the
pursuit of its foreignpolicy objectives, the strongrequirement is
diversifiedandsoundindustrial ofhelpfromthosewhoposses
structure-
such resources. Both sets of policies foreignand domestic, are
conditioned bytheideologies,popularattitudes,andbalanceofpolitical
powerthatexist,withinthentionalsystemat anygiventime3.
of Statestrongly
US Secretary
HenryA. Kissinger,a former
feelsthat"foreignpolicybeginswheredomesticpolicyends" while
TheIndianJournal
ofPolitical
Science 246
elaboratinghis argumentfuther he classifiedthatthisapproachwas

applicableonlyto stableperiodsbecause thantherole of thevarious
components oftheinternational systemwouldbe altogether differentas
theyhad similarconceptionsof the"ruleof thegame".If thedomestic
structureofa stateis based on commensurable nationsofwhatisjust or
unjust,thenthereis likelypossibilityof consensusaboutpermissible
aimsand methodsof foreignpolicy.If thedomesticstructure is byand
largestable then the attitudeof thepolicy makers would be different.
They would like to adopt adventurous foreignpolicy and ignorethe
domestic cohesion. But when the domestic structureis based on
fundamentally different conceptionsof whatis just thenitcomplicates
theconductof internaitonal affairs.Then it becomesdifficult even to
definethenatureofdiagreement because whatseemsmoreobviousto
one side appearsmostproblematicto the other.Generally,a policy
dilemmaarisesbecausetheprosandconsofa givencourseseemevenly
balanced.The dfinition ofwhatconstitutes a problemandwhatcriteria
are relevant in "solving" it reflectsto a consiberable extentthe
"domesticnationsofwhatisjust,thepressures producedbythedecision
makingprocessandtheexperiencewhichformstheleadersontheriseto
eminence".It is believedthatwhendeomesticstructure andtheconcept
oflegitmacy on whichtheyarebased-aredifferent stillthere
altogether,
existsa scope forthemeetingot thestatesman, butone shouldbe clear
that"theirabilityto persuadehasbeenreducedfortheyno longerspeak
thelanguage".
Thiscan occurwhennouniversalclaimsaremade.Kissingeris
of thestrongview that"incompatible domesticstructure can passively
generatea gulf,simplybecuseofthedifficulty inachievinga consensus
aboutthenatureof"reasonable"aimsandthemethods.Butwhenone or
morestatesclaimuniversalapplicability fortheirparticular structure,
schismsgrowdeep indeed.In such a situationthedomesticstrucute
becomesnotonlyan obstaclein understanding butone of theprinciple
alternatives,survivalscenes involvedin everydispute.The symbolic
aspect of foreignpolicy begins to overshadow the substantive
component. It becomesdifficult
to considerthedispute"on itsmerits"
becausethediagreement seemsfinallyto turnon a specificissuebuton
a set of values as expressed in domestic arrangements.5The
consequencesof such a stateof affairswere explainedby Edmund
BurkeduringtheFrenchRevolution:i neverthought we wouldmake
Domestic
MilieuofIndiaAndForeign
Policy Process
Making 247
peace withthesystem;becauseitwas notfor thesake of an objectwe

pursuedinrivalrywitheachother, butwiththesystemitselfthatwe were
at war.As I understoodthematter,we wereat warnotwithitsconduct
were
butwithits,existence;convincedthatits existenceanditshostility
thesame."6
Of course, the domesticstructureis not irrelevantin any

historicalperiod.At a minimum, thepolicy.The warsof
it determines
the kingswho governedby divine right could not incometaxes or
conscript theirsubjects.The FrenchRevolution,whichbased itspolicy
on a doctrineof popularwill,mobilizedresourceon a trulynational
scale forthefirsttime.Thiswas one of themaincauses forthestartling
successes of Frenchaims againsta hostileEurope whichpossessed
greaterover-allpower.The ideologicalregimesofthetwentieth centuty
This
haveutilizeda stilllargershareof thenationaleffort. has enabled
themto hold theirown againstan enviroment possessingforsuperior
resources.7
The architect of famouslinkageapproachJamesN. Rosenau

believedthatwe shouldnot"ignoretheexistenceof complexlinkage
betweennationaland international system".Thereis enoughscope in
investigating the relationbetween unitsand theenvironment in which
theywork.Thereis close linkbetweenforeignpolicyand international
politics.It willbe outofplace to studytheexternalbehaviourofnation
statesindependently ofthelargerinternationalcontextinwhichitoccurs
and towardswhichit is deirected.The focuson theprocessesof world
politics is must in order to develop balanced estimates of the
comparativestrength of domesticand international factors.It is not
feasibletostudyseparately theforeignpolicyofa countrywithout taking
intoconsideration thedomesticenvironment.8
Foreign affairsare consideredto be one of the principle

concernsofall states.Fora smallstatetheproblemmayinvolveno more
thanthebasic issueofsurvival,thelargerstatesusuallyadd a varietyof
positiveobjectivesthateach hopes to attainin its own behalf.Each
arena is peculiarto itselfbuttheyall
state'staskin the international
considerforeignpolicya matterof highpriority and majorimportant.
Thatis themainreason,all goverments organizethemselves forforeign
affairswithutmostcare. Howeverineffectively casuallydomestic
or
policy maybe made or executed,no countrycan affordto function
ofPolitical
TheIndianJournal Science 248
internationally foverylongexceptthemaximum levelof effectiveness.

Actuallyforeign policyimplementation instruments in anystatereflect
the best of which the society is capable. In all governments,the
establishments forforeign policyaremoreorless identical.The headof
thegovernment is boundto playan activeroleto thebasic significance
and relevanceofinternational He is directed,
affairs. guidedandhelped
by whatever close advisory and administratingapparatus the
"
governmentboasts, whethera "cabinet" of the Britis type a
Revolutionary Council"ofthemilitary regime,a "Presidium"as was in
theformer SovietUnion,or a less institutionalized "CabinetExecutive
Officer"arrangement, as is in theUS The principalforeign specialistin
thegovernment is theforeign whois supposedto lookafterthe
minister,
administrative department related with foreignpolicymakingprocess
and is widelyacceptedas thepricipalofficialadvisorto thehead of
government. In all states,otherdepartmentsparticipatedirectlyin
foreignpolicydecision,financialandmilitary expertsalmostalwaysdo
and financeministers (opn questionof tradeand development)have
becomeas critical,legislativebodiesplayrolesdependenton
virtually
theirconstitutional place, but foreignpolicyis primarily an executive
prerogative onlyoccasionallyinhabitedby legislativeinterference. A
real part,it is believed is assignedto the diplomaticrepresentatives
stationedabroad.Theyare ubiquitousin thecontemporary ' orld,the
numberand strengthof economic, cultural,militaryare scientific
representatives has grownmanifold.The foreignaffairsdepartment of
each stateis infactheavilydependenton them.The information they
relayto theirhomegovernments obviouslyaffectspolicy in addition
theyconductmanynegotiations themselves.9
But thenatureof a government in existencein a state,has its

own significanceas far as the foreignpolicy makingprocess is
concerned. In order to execute the vast numberof government
programmes whichare associatedwiththevariedcomplexproblemsof
modernsocieties, governmentsare compelled to establisha large
networkof organizationsconcerned with specific functionsand
interests.To achieve certainaims and objectives dealing withthe
countlessissues and claimingemanatingfromthe political system,
responsibility alongfunctional
has to be decentralized linesandactions
are initiatedto deal with recurring and
problems requirements. In the
hopeofmakingthetask ofnationalleadersmanageable, all butmostof
Domestic Policy Process
Making 249
issuesanddecisionsofthegovernment.10
theimportant
In theabsenceofa particularthreat oropportunity

topursueits
a nation'selites
foreigninterests, are in normalcircumstances would
desiretoturntheirheadtodomesticconcernsandentrust theoperational
organisationwiththeresponsibilityfordealingwiththeroutineactivities
involvingother The
nations. normal of
functioning diplomats,foreign
tradeexperts, The normalfunctioning
andmilitary. ofdiplomats,foreign
tradeexperts,and militaryplannerstendto concernrelativelyundate
mattersinnormaltimes,thenationalleaderswhosemajorproblemsand
are alwaysdomestic- such as economicproblemsor social
priorities
unrest- notat anycostdevotetheirtimeand energyon matters thatare
less importance.11
Decentralizationis ideal to deal withthe complexitiesof

moderngovernments and capacityof thepoliticalleadershipto state
policygoals explicityand unambiguously. As in mostof thepolitical
systems, subordinate officialsand agenciesare supposedto applyonly
the statedcriteriato specificsituationsto determine the components
decisionsand actions to achieve the nationalinterest.The officials
wouldneed clear instruction fromthe nationalleadersonlywhenan
issue involvedconflictbetweenstatesgoals or activitiesforwhichno
policyguidancehad been established.But thepictureis all together
different.In fact,thepolicystatements issuedbythenationalleadership
inmostcases do notprovideexplicit criteria thatcan be appliedtomost
issue thatemergewithinthe functional agencies of the government.
Some "butnotall, of thereasonsforthisare 1) theinability to foresee
whatspecificpolicy issues and problems likely arise; 2) the
are ot
difficultyof ofdefining foreign policygoalsintermsmorespecificthan
platitudessuchas thepreservation of worldorder";3) theinability to
achieve sufficient political consensus on the relative importance of
conflicting policy objectives both foreign and domestic; and 4) the
practicaltendency to avoid commitment to specificpoliciesand course
ofactionbeforeadequateinformations can be gathered and analysedto
assesstherelevantbenefitsand costs"12
The decisions-makersface a numberof problems when
thesituationis notclearand ambiguous.In fact,decision
particularly,
makingis dufficultwhentheultimate arenotclear.Takingthe
intentions
whenone's swornenemymobilizes
rightdecisionsis above all difficult
TheIndianJournal
ofPolitical
Science 250
and concentrateshis troops on theborder.Does he meantto attackor

just a threatening
move?The decisionto react-whether to fightor not
mustbe immediate. Ifhe meanswar,thenwhoso evergetsin firststrike
can achiece a militaryadvantageof such magnitudethatit may well
decide the outcomeof campaign.But if his intention was merelyto
threaten,reactingwith an attacklaunches a war thatcould have been
avoided. How thendo a country'sleadersdecide? It is clear thata
decisionnottoactmaybe a disastrous as a decisiontostrike.
Thereis no
scientificanswerto thisproblem.Nor is historyan effectiveguide
because circumstances areneverquitethesame.13
All governments,for examples, require some degree of

acceptancebytheirpopulacetoexitandso policymakersareconcerned
withwhatpeople think.This maybe less truein authoritarian systems
thanin democraciesbut it stillis a factorof some importance. If an
authoritariangovernment requiressome supportfromits people, then
the "people's opinion" makes some difference.Sometimes, an
authoritarianrulebythesword,of coursebutthisis notcommon.And
whenhe does itis onlya mixedblessingbecausethemorecostsincurred
indomesticpoliticalcontrol,thefewerresourcescanbe allocatedbyfiat
butifthisis necessaryitoftenleadsto,oris a symptom of,considerable
internal
unrest, Both authoritariangovernments as well as democracies
are composedof congeriesof people and interests thatbothcomplete
and cooperate in the policy makingprocess, and this can lead to
inefficiency,confuision,misdirectedpolicies and delays in both
systems.14
Aredemocracies morepeaceful?As theanswerofthisquestion
has a directbearingon theforeign policymakingprocess,and theco-
relationshipbetweendomesticenvironment and foreign policy.Quincy
Wright has examined this questionbut his results are mixed. The
summaryof his findings on thissubjectare: "statistics
can hardlybe
invokedto showthatdemocracieshavebeen less ofteninvolvedin war
than autocracies. France was almost as belligerentwhile it was a
republicas whileitwas a monarchy or empire.GreatBritainis highin
the list of belligerentcourtiers,though it has the longest time
approximaeddemocracyin its formof government. More convinving
statisticalco-relationcan be foundby comparingthe trendtowards
democracyin periodsof generalpeace and away fromdemocracyin
periodsofgeneralwar.Thisco-relations, however,mayprovethatpeace
Domestie Policy Process
Making 251
rather
producesdemocracy thandemocracy
producespeace."15
For stateswherethepoliticalprocessis moreauthoritarianor
closed,itwillbe moreusefulto look at features
ofgovernment's andits
structureratherthanat attributesof its societyto explain foreign
policyBeingclosedpoliticalparties,publicopinionandpoliticalintersts
willbe less effective.
These sortsof relationshipsbetweengovernment and society

are supportedin studiesof whetherconflictwithinstatesresultsin
externalor internationalconflictbehaviourby states(for perhaps
whether conflictresultsin internal
international strife
andconflict).16
The firstmajorempiricalresearchstudiesconcludedthatin
general,thereis no systematicrelationshipbetweenthedomesticand
foreignconflictbehaviourof states.Howeverwhenstateswerestudied
in termsof typeof government, it was foundthatinformation on
typesofinternal
particular helpedtopredicttwo
conflict different
forms
typesof government.
of externalconflictfordifferent Threecategories
wereused: 1) Polyarchicor democraticgoverments, 2) personalistor
militarytype authoritarian regimes, and 3) centralist
system.17The
differencesthatlattertwobeingclosed wereexplainablepartlyin terms
of howopenthedometicsystemwas.
Brieflydomesticconflictwas distinguished accordingto there

basic kinds: 1) turmoil(non-organized, spontaneousconflictsuch as
riotsor demonstrations 2)) revolutionaryconflict(overtandorganized)
and subersive conflict(secretly organized such guerrillawar or
assassinators).Foreignconflictwas also reducedto threedimensions:
(1) war (2) diplomaticconflict(measuredby such activitiesa non-
violent troop movementsor the expulsion of diplomats and (3)
"belligerentactivity"shortof militaryaction (such as breaking
diplomaticrelationsor ant foreigndemonstration). Differenttypesof
governments showed different relationshipsbetweendomesticand
foreignconflict. Forinstance, withpolyarchicstates,domesticturmoilis
relatedto all threetypesof foreignconflictgovernments, revolutionary
internalconflictis relatedto foreignwar.18
More important to our discussionof governmentand societal

influenceson foreignpolicyis a majordifference betweencentralist
government and othertwotypes.For personalistand polyarctic
states,
TheIndianJournal
ofPolitical
Science 252
theseare mutualrelationships in thatsome formsof internalconflict

appear to conflictas an excuse to rallytheirown people behindthe
government. In timesof domesticturmoilor conflict, theymaypick a
quarrel witha foreign enemy in an to
effort unifytheir
peopleanddivert
themfromtheirdomesticconflict. Afternatively,
sometime involvement
in foreign wars may create domestic protest and dissension.
Democracieswheregovernments maybe unwilling orunableto repress
dissenteffectively, are especiallyproneto foreignconflictleadingto
doemsticconflictratherthanvice versa.For centralist states,however,
externalconflict rarelyleads to overtdomesticconflictdissent can more
easily be controlled."On the one hand. We have highlycentralized
nations,in whichdecisionsconcerning foreignconflictbehaviourit is
experiencing, butin whichfrominternalreactionon theotherhandin
thepolarchicstates,and to a lesserextentin thepersonalist nations,
neitherinternalnoraretakenin isolationfromeach other.19
The domesticstructure has a verycrucialimpact,thewaythe

actionsand reactionsof otherstatesare interpreted.
To someextentof
courseeverysocietyfindsitselfin an environment notitsownmaking
and has some of themainpressureof theenvironment can growso
strongthatitpermitsonlyone interpretationofthesignificance.20
Indian Perpective:
In theIndiancontextthebasicdeterminants ofdomesticmilieu
areeconomicdevelopment andpoliticaltraditions,
butkeepingin mind
thescope ofthepaperpoliicaltraditions willbe briefly
examinedwhich
are mainly comprised of the role of the ruling elite, partyand
governmental strcutureat thecenter.India emergedas an independent
nationwitha broadlythree-tiered rulingelite.Thepoliticalleadership
of
the Congress,includingthe politicalexecutive,thepermanent civil
the the civil
services,including politicalexecutive, permanent services,
including theICS, thepoliceandforeign servcies,andtheofficersofthe
armedforces.Of thesethreebroad categoriesof therulingelite,the
politicalleadershipof theCongressalone was moreor less Indianin
outlook and had also definite opinions or foreign policy.
JBandhopadhaya, an eminent PoliticalScientist
believesthat:theruling
political elite was thereforea mixtureof differentsociological
categories,opposed to sharppolarizationof nationalor internaitonal
politicson the basis of doctrinaireideologiesor powergroupings and
Domestic Policy Process
Making 253
weddedto theindependent developedbythe

worldoutlookhistorically
congress.21
On theotherhand,theupperechelonsof thebureaucracy and
thearmedforces,however,werethinking in manywaysoppositethe
pole. Theyhad no particularideologicalcommitment, exceptperhaps
wantedIndiato be a fourthcarboncopyofBritainandto visitthelatter
countryonce in a while.It was thisgroupof civil servantsand army
affairswhichtookchargeofIndia's internal
administration,defenceand
after 22
diplomacy independence.
In a parliamentary systemofgovernment likeIndiathepartyor
partiesin power,are to madetheforeignpolicydecisions,theforeign
policyoutlookoftheoppositionpartiesis boundat affectsuchdecision
making, notonlybecauseoftherolethelatterplayintheparliament but
also because of theirprestigeand influenceover theIndianpolitical
systemas a whole.Even withintherulingparty(upto 1969, one party
dominanceof theIndianNationalCongress)(INC) or partiesin power
(thecoalitionerastarted attheendofthe20lhcentury), "thesemaybe no
unanimity opinion manyforeignpolicy issues,the task of the
of on
decision makers often involves the balancing of contraryand
pontradictory viewswithintherulinggroup".Keepingin viewtheclose
proximity betweenthedomesticpoliticalsystemand foreign policy, 'a
rationalforeing policymust,therefore, be basedonthebroadestpossible
consensus of the systemlike
politicalparties,especiallyin a multiparty
India23.The political hegemonyof 'the INC and Nehru's towering
personality and leadership gave a unique charcterto theprocessof
decisionmakingin foreign policyof India.24
WiththechangesinpoliticalperspectiveoftheIndianpolitical
partiesand theirleadership,the trend towardsthe growthof more
complexpolycentricpoliticalsystemin Indiaemergedandthepartyand
government hasemergedas one ofthebasicdeterminant
structure ofthe
Indianforeignpolicyovertheyears.
sincemorethanfiveand a
But all thisseemsto be theroetical
halfdecades of day-to-day of theIndianpoliticalsystem
functioning
has shownthatforeign policymaking,under different
governments,has
escaped theattention is thereal
of thecabinetwhichconstitutionally
executivepolicycentre inIndianperliamentarydemocracy. first
The and
theforemost in foreign
reason,perhaps,is thegrowinglack of interest
ofPolitical
TheIndianJournal Science 254
affairsamongpoliticalleaderswhofinallyendup in thecabinet.There
is lack of any greatintellectual
interestin the knowledgeof foreign
affair.25
Anotherreasonis institutional.
The decisionmakingprocess,
as in mostpoliticalsystemshas been shiftedaway from"Unwieldy
bodies to more infornai
and constricted groups".Thoughthe Indian
cabinetis not as unwieldyas the Indan Parliament,it is therefore,
nonteheless,large enough to slowdown the process. Many of the
decisionson defenceand foreignaffairs
havebeentherefore, shiftedto
more compact Defence and Foreign AffairsCommitteesthatare
generallycomposedofpowerful cabinateministers.
Thisshifttoa more
informaldecisionmakingprocesshas been futheraccentuated whenall
thedifferentcommittees and
(DefenceForeign internal) of theCabinet
have been replacedby an even morelimitedto the PrimeMinister,
Home Minister,MinisterforExternalAffairs,DefenceMinisterand
FinanceMinister.Butthereis another
viewpointalso.26Breacherwas of
theviewthat4bytheand largetheydid notshapepolicy'.27
HM Patel,a keenobserverof theIndiancabinetscene,wrote

that"thePrimeMinisterhimselfhas repeatedly takendecisionson his
owninrespecttomatters relatingtotheExternalAffairs
Ministry which
is in his directcharge.A special committeeof cabinetforForeign
Affairs has been inexistencealmostandinparticular,
all policymatters
havetobe brought beforethiscommittee,
andthedecisionstakenbythat
committeehave to be reportedto theentirecabinet.Time and again
however,decisionsof thegreatestimportance in thesphereof external
affairshave been taken and announcedto the public withoutthe
committee of thecabinetforForeignAffairsbeingawareof themThe
cabinetitselfhas beenignoredmorefrequently."28
The thirdreasonseemstobe thelackofpoliticalweightageof

manymembersofhe cabinet.In thecoalitionandminority governments
peoplewithless andless experienceandlowerandlowerstatusbecame
membersof the cabinet.They "hardlyhad any clout to challenge
decisions, thuspushingthe whole process, at least in foreignand
defence,matters,to becomemoreconstrictedandmoreinfornai."29
The fourthreason"was thechangingconstellationof political

forces". The Indian cabinet has, throughthe years becomes less
homogeneous.DuringNehruera,whentheCongresspartywas in full
Domestic
Policy Process
Making 255
command,factionalismand groupismand groupismbecame more

rempant,thusmakingcollectivedecision makingwithinthe cabinet
more problematic.Under non-CongresspartyPrimeMinisterand
minority governments(MorarjiDesai, CharanSingh,ChandraShekhar,
V.P. SinghNarasimhaRao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee,Deva Gauda, I.K.
Gujral) thingsbecame moreworse,since thegovernments have been
headedeitherby miniorityor by coalitioncabinetsthusrendering
the
taskofforeign policymakingprocessmorecomplexanddifficult.30
Logically,miniority or coalitiongovernments shouldkeeping

in mindthegroundrealitiesand constraints, thepowersand
strengthen
positionofthecabinetsincetheusuallyeffectively PrimeMinisterneeds
toobtainthesupport ofthecabinettoeffetely implementthedefenceand
foreign policies.But ifone has to see theother
sideofthewholepicture,
in all suchtypesofgovernments themembersofthecabinetusuallypay
more attentionto theirministries,theirpolitical aspirations,needs
franklyspeaking at the cost of seeking the cooperationof other
ministries.In otherwords in such situationsreal interministerial
cooperationis usuallymissing.
On the Indianpoliticalscenario,thetrustedand dependable
calleaguesofthePrimeMinister, theNationalDefencecouncilaretaken
intoconfidence.The ideologicalleaningsof themaincoalitionpartner,
ora particular
benttowardsa specialcountry orgroupofcountries, also
becomessometimesimportant As theera of minoritygovernments and
coalitiongovernments is boundto stayin India,shiftsin Indiandefene
andforeign policyobjectivesat themacrolevelcannotbe ruledout.
Since economydevelopmentof Indianis partand parcel of
domesticpoliticalset,inordergivea bastto industrialgrowthandGDP,
coalitionand minority governments can be morehelpfulbecauseone has
to choose fromvarietyof options. Moreover,the fearof frequent
electionsis also helpfulin streamliningthefuntions
ofthegovernments
in sensitiveissueofforeign and defencematters.
But the chargesin the configuration of forcesin the Indian

Parliamenthas increasedthe interestof the parliamentarian in the
international affairs.For as along as, the executivehad an absolute
majority,it was possibleforthegovernment to manageforeignpolicy
crisiswithintheparliament party.Butsince,thebeginningofthetrendof
minorityand coalition in
governments India, theexecutivebecamemore
TheIndianJournal
ofPolitical
Science 256
vulnerableto critcismand becamemoreattentions to themood of the

membersoftheparliament whileformulating
foreign policy,sometimes
evenafterhavinga decision.Theredose notappeartobe anydoubtthat
thereare moredebates,questionsand processand resolutionon the
subject thanduringthe Nehruperiod. One can easily assume that
throughthisinvolvement, IndianParliamenthas improvedhisposition
in foreignpolicymakingand thatit is consultedand heardmorethan
before.31
Thereare a numberof instanceswhenat theintervention of

Parliament,thegovernment was compelledtochangeoramenditsprime
policy.DuringtheAfghanistan crisis,whenMrs.IndiraGandiwas the
Prime Minister the furorethat was created because of India's
noncommittal positionon Soviet Intervention
finalllyresultedin a
changeintoIndianattitude. Indiandecisionnotto signtheN.P.T. and
CTBT is consideredtobe becauseoftheParliamentary Same
pressure.32
canbe said abouttheroleplayedbyIndiaduringtheEastPakistancrisis
in 197133andtheConfidence BuildingMeasures(CBMs) beingadopted
by theIndian Government to bringa rapprochement and thawin Indo-
Pak relations.
Notes:
1. RobertL. Wendzel,International Relations:A policymaker

process(New York,197 1), p. 24 1.
2. Ibid.
3. NormanJ.Pedelford,The Dynamicsof International

Politics
(New York,1947),p. 213
4. HeneryA. Kissinger,
"DomesticStructureand ForeignPolicy
in JamesN. Rosenau(ed.) Inernationai
Politicsand Foreign
Policy:A Readerin Researchand Theroy(New York,1969,
pp. 261-262).
5. Ibid.,p.262
6. EdmundBurke,Works(London, 19824). Vol.VIII, pp. 214-
2 15 as citedinIbid.
7. Ibid.,p. 262
Domestic
Policy Process
Making 257
8. JamesN. Rosenau,n. 4, pp. 368-373.
9. Charles O. Larche and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of

International
Politics(New Jersey,
1970),pp. 40-41
10. NormanJ.Padelford,
n. 3, pp. 214-215.
11. Ibid., pp.215-216.

12. Ibid.,pp. 215-216.
13. Shimon Peres and David's Sling. The Armingof Israel
(London 1970),pp. 165-66.
14. RobertL. Wendzel,n. 1,p. 124.
15. A StudyofWar(Chicago,1945),p. 841

QuincyWright,
16. Bruce Russetand HarveryStarr,WorldPolitics(New York,
1985),p.299.
17- The basic studies may be found in Rudolph Rummel,
"Dimensions of ConflictBehaviour Withinand Between
Nations".YearsBook ofthescoietyforGeneralSystems.Vol.
VIII, 1963, pp. 1-50, RaymondTanter,"Dimensions of
conflictBehaviourWithinand Between Nations".Journal of
Peace Research,Vol. V, 1968,pp. 56-69as citedinIbid., 209-
210
18. Ibid.,p.2'0.
19. For a generalreviewof therelationshipbetweeninternaland
externalconflictsee, MichaelStohi," The NexusofCiviland
InternationalConflict" in Red Gurr (ed.), Handbook of
PoliticalConflict(New York,1980).
20. HenryA. Kissinger,n. 4, p. 262.

21. J.Bandyopdhyaya The Making of India's Foreign Policy:
Determinants, Processesand Personalities
Institutions, (New
Delhi, 1987),p. 82.
22. Ibid.,
23 Ibid.,91
TheIndianJournal
ofPolitical
Science 258
24. Ibid.,
25. HarishKanpur,India'sForeignPolicy 1947-98:Shadowsand
Substance(New Delhi, 1994),pp. 158-159.
26. Ibid.,p. 159
27. Michael Breacher, Nehru: A Political Biography
(Boston,1959),p. 251 as citedin Ibid.,p. 160
28. H. M. Patel," CabinetGovernments inIndia",inS.P. Aiyarand
R. Srinivisan(eds.) Studiesin IndianDemocracy(Bombay,
1965),pp. 205-206.
29. HarishKanpur,n. 25, p. 160
30. Ibid.,
31. Ibid.,pp. 164-65.Also see formoredetailsand viewsJoseph
Frankel,The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of
DecisionMaking(London,1963); K.P. Misra,"ForeignPolicy
Planningin India", in K.P. Misra, (ed.) ForeignPolicy of
India:A Book of Readings(New Delhi, 1977).
32. M.S. Sondhi(ed.) IndianForeignPolicyandLegislatures: An

Analysisof serversParliaments(New Delhi, 1988), pp. 172-
177.
33. S.S. Bindra, Indo-Pk Relation : Tashkent to Simla

Agreement'(New Delhi 1981),pp. 119-144
5. political_parties_and_foreign_policy
Indian Political Science Association
THE INDIAN POLITICAL PARTIES, THEIR, FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGIC CONCERNS: AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE CONTENT OF THE ELECTION MANIFESTOS
Author(s): S.S. Patagundi and Raghavendra Rao
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 2 (April - June 1981), pp. 28-40
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
Accessed: 24-03-2015 10:27 UTC
Indian Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Indian Journal
of Political Science.
I.P.J.S. VOLX Lil No. 2
THE INDIAN POLITICAL PARTIES,

THEIR, FOREIGN POLICY AND STRATEGIC
CONCERNS : AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
CONTENT OF THE ELECTION MANIFESTOS
- S.S. Patagundi 8tRaghavendra Rao
The strategicconcerns of a politicalparty are logicallypart

of its foreignpolicy involvement. Therefore,any understanding
of such concerns can arise only in the contextof foreignpolicy
involvement. Foreign policy was never a dominant electoral
issue except in 1980 parlaimentaryelections. However, in the
1980 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections, Smt. IndiraGandhi,
for reasons betterknown to her, chose to make the Janata
government's foreign policy one of the electoral issues. She
alleged that the Janata Governmentdiluted non-allignmentand
lowered our status in the world. Smt Gandhi used the meeting
of Israel's then foreign minister, Moshe Dayan, with Morarji
Desai and Atal Behari Vajpayee as one of the instances to show
how India departed fromsupportto the Arab countries.
The purpose of this paper is to determine both quantitively

and quantitivelythe concern demonstrated by politicalparties
In India forthe foreignpolicy issues since the firstelections in
1952, withspecial referenceto the problemof strategy. In this
paper we have defindthis concern as the foreignpolicy involve-
mentand it may be demonstrated and studied in may different
ways. In this paper, however, we have chosen to consentrate
on only one way in which such involmentis exprassed. Speci-
ficallywe have chosen to concentrateon the expression of this
involvementduringthe elections. Our choice has been dictated
by the fact that the general elections are crucial and fundamen-
tal partof our politicalsystemand therefore, it ia importantto
study the relationship between foreign policy issues and the
election process. For this purpose we have taken the election
manifestoas unitof our analysis.
Foreign policy2 may be defined as the policy formulated

and persued by a political system in order to promote the
collective interest of that system in relation to other political
systems in the internationalenvironment. There fore, foreign
policycomprises the following components:
ELECTION
MANIFESTOS-FOREIGN
POLICY-STRATEGIC
CONCERNS 29
1. the interestof the political systemdefined

in relation to other political system and
2. means and measures employed to achieve
the foreignpolicyobjectives.
Therefore,the conception of foreignpolicy cannot be divor-

ced fromthe conception of national interest. One of the crucial
areas in which national interesthas acquired a paramountstatus
is the area of national defence and security. This area involves
a considerationof the problemsof defence and militarystrategy.
Though this is a highly technical and specialised area, the
foreignpolicy makersmust master it and take it into account in
making foreign policy. Therefore, we are not using the term
"strategic concerns" in the broader ar.d more general sense of
A.P. Rana who refersto what he calls foreignpolicy strategy".
In this paper we subsume the notion of defence strategy

under the notion of foreignpolice. Hence this paper makes the
theoretical assumption that foreign policy includes whether
explicitly or implicitlyconsiderations of defence and military
strategy.
General Elections, however, provide an opportunityto

differentcontendingpartiesto articulatetheirideas in the form
of an ideology and make it known to the people throughwhat
is called suggestively enough, a manifesto, The election mani-
festo of a politicalpartyhas two functions' The firstfunctionis
to define the position of a given partyon major domestic and
foreign policy issues and problems froma long range perspe-
ctive. The second function of the manifesto is to win the
elections and therefore,to produce a documenttecticallycalcu-
lated to gain the maximum numberof votes forthe party. The
manifesto is also an indication of what a given partymightdo
after the elections, whether in its role of the rulingpartyor as
an opposition party. These two functionsare complementaryin
the sense that a political party will attempt to compromise
between its basic policy position and the exigencies of the
electoral situation.
The methodology adopted in this paper is verysimple. In

the firstplaca we shall attemptto formulatethe foreignpolicy
involvement in broadly quantitative terms by calculating the
proportionof space alloted to foreignpolicy issues in manifestos
by differentpolitical parties. Secondly, we shall examine the
importancewhicha partyattaches to issues in termsof analysing
its substantivepolicy position. In general our methodologymay
be described as a simple content analysis of the manifestos.
30 THEINDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE
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ELECTION
MANIFESTOS POLICYSTRATEGIC
FOREIGN CONCERNS 31
+ Data is not available.

* Space is measured by counting the numberof words used to
state a policy position in a manifesto. Also to facilitatecom-
parabilitywe have used only the Englishlanguage textsof all
the parties.
** It should be noted that none of the manifesios mentions
militarystrategy, though the Jana Sangh and the Janata
Party do refer to defence policy. However, theirconcern is
not militarystrategyper se but it is, in effect,not distingui-
shable frombroad foreign policy.
These figures are expressed as percentages of the total
space.
Table-1 demonstrates thatthere is substantial continuityin
the allotment of the space to foreignpolicy as between the
parties in their manifestosand hence in the party systemas a
whole. Only the Swatantra party consistently increased its
space for foreign policy from one election to another. Soch
spatial disproportionmay be attributedto the changes and shifts
in the national and internationalpolitical environment.
The Indian National Congress :

The Congress party manifesto attempts to define foreign
policy in terms of economic development of our country and
world peace. The party believes that internationalpeace is a
pre-requisite for the rapid economic development of every
country in the world. No country can escape fromthe conse-
quences of the war in any part of the world. Peace, progress
and disarmamentare not possible untilthe ending of colonialism
and imperialisom.Partialdisarmamentneversecures worldpeace.
Therefore,itpleads forthe policyof non-alignment, disarmament,
anti-racial
peaceful co-existence, anti-imperial, policy,supportto
national liberationmovement,friendlyrelations with all countries
and independentforeign policy.
The subsequent breakaway Congress Parties, the Congress
<0) and the Congress (R) in 1969, the Congress (I) in 1978,
the Congress (U) in 1979 show no basic differenceson funda-
mentals of foreign policy of India. But the manifesto of the
Congress (0) in 1971 is criticalabout the stand of the ruling
party towards the Soviet Union. The Congress (0) held that
India had been weakened internallyand made to lean on the
Soviet Union whose interferencein our internalaffairswas used
to serve the ends of the rulingpartyand strengthencertainanti-
democraticforces.5
The Congress (R) welcomed the detente policy in its 1977
election manifesto. According to the Congress (I) manifesto
32 THEINDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE
of 1980, on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual respectand

non-interferencein internalaffairs,Congress will maintainand
strengthenfriendlyrelationswith all countries. Congress will :
i. safeguard the territorialintegrityand sovereigntyof India
against all externalthreats;
ii. strengthenthe defence capability of India commensurate
with her given natural resources, human talent, strategic
position and her long land, air and sea frontiers;
iii. maintainIndia's dignity,self-respect and national interest
at internationalforums;
iv. safeguard India's sovereign rightto use nuclear technology
forher developmenton peaceful lines ;
v. adhere firmlyto the policyof peaceful co-existence and
the concept of non-alignment as defined by Jawaharlal
Nehru;
vi. forgeclose relations among countriesof South Asia, the
Indo-China States, South East Asia, West Asia, Africaand
Latin America ;
vii. enter into bilateraland multi-lateralagreements with them
and help them to forgesimilar agreementsamongst them-
selves for:-
(a) peace, co-operation and non-aggression in orderto
keep the region as a zone of peace, free fromout-
side interference;
(b) strengtheningtheir collective self-reliance vis-a-vis
developed countries, in regard to terms of trade,
transfer of technology, capital goods and resources
etc,
(c) lending fullsupport to the struggle in these regions
against imperialism,colonialismand in supportof the
genuine demand of the Palestinian people for their
home land ;
(d) makinga concertated effortto counter any attempt
to destabilise the entire region from Suez to the
Far East ;
viii. recognise the new revolutionary Government of
Kampuchea.6
Commentingon the inclusion of recognitionof Kampuchea
in the Congress (I) manifesto Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the former
ExternalAffairsMinister,stated that "Kampuchea was probably
included to satisfy Bahuguna".7 The inclusion in the Congress
(U) manifestoof the need to maintainIndian Occan as a zone of
peace has no parallel in the manifestoof the Congress (I).
election manifestos-foreignpolicy-stratigic concerns 33
According to the commitmentof the Congress (I) n

its election manifesto Smt. Gandhi's government recogni-
sed the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea in July, 1980.
Both the Janata party and BJP reacted critically to
the recognition of Kampuchea while the CPI welcomed
this decision. Consequently this recognition displeased
the ASEAN nations which regarded Indian's recognitionas
a pro-Soviet tilt. Smt, Gandhi's government almost cer-
tainly delayed the fulfillingof its election pledge to recog-
nise the new Heng Samrin government because of the
Soviets in Afghanistan.8 This recognition of Kampuchea
is one of the fundamental decisive factors behind the
decision of indefinite post-ponement of the Chinese foreign
affairs minister Huang Hua's visitto India in October 1980.
The Communits Parties :
The CPI, right from the beginning, perceived that
imperialism was a threat to world peace and considered
the USA as imperialist. Therefore, the CPI attached more
importance to strengthening friendly relations with the
Soviet Union and the Socialist countries to attain world
peace. The CPI stood for peace, non-alignment, friendship
with all, particularly with the Soviet Union and Socialist
countries,disarmament,anti-imperialistand anti-colonial policy
and supportto national freedom struggles.
The CPI did not support the policy of non-alignment
earlier because the decision of Nehru to continuein the
Commonwealth, his visit to the USA and his action in
Korea displeased the CPI. The visit of Jawaharlal Nehru
to Russia in June 1955 and the visitof Bulganin and Khru-
shchev to India in October 1955 influenced to some extent
the change of the attitude of the CPI towards supporting
the policy of non-alignment. In the 1962 manifesto the
CPI warned against the forces within our country which
were giving only lip-serviceto the policy of non-alignment.
The condemnation of the CPI in 1971 manifesto was that
Syndicate-Swatantra-Jana-Sangh alliance was trying to
destroy the policy of peace, non-alignment, anti-imperia-
list and anti-colonial policies in the interests of the impe-
rialist power. Hence, the CPI wanted to strengthen the
non-alignmentpolicy based on anti-imperialist, anti-colo-
nial, friendly and cooperative relations with the Soviet
Union and the Socialist States.
The CPI criticised the American militaryaid to Pakis-
tan, and its militarybuild-up in South Vietnam. The view
of the CPI on the Indo-Pak disputes was that theyshould be
settled by peaceful means. In the 1952 manifesto, the
CPI assessing the achievements of China, held the opinion
34 THEINDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE
that what the people of China did, could be done here,

After Sion-lndian war, despite the Sion-lndian confronta-
tion,the CPI proposed the settlement of the problems by
peaceful means.
The highlights of the CPI election manifesto of 1980
were to maintainIndian Ocean as a zone of peace to extend
cooperative and friendly relations with Democratic
Republic of Afghanistanand the recognition of the Heng
Samrin government, in Kampuahea. It regarded the
genuine non-alignment, of the Janata government as
weakening the anti-imperialist content of our foreign
policy.
Fundamentally, between the CPI and the CPM, there
is no difference in foreign policy. More or less they hold
the same view but they differ inassessing specific inter-
national issues and the political characterisationof Smt.
Gandhi's government. It seems that the CPM is more
hostileto the Congress government and is more interested
in cordial relations with China. The CPM condemned the
dependence of the Congress government on the USA for
economic aid, militaryand, as it lowered India's prestiage
among the anti-imperialist forces and nations. The need
forspending Rs. 1,000 crores on defence arises only be-
cause of the wrong foreign policies pursued by the bour-
9
geois landlord government. The CPI (M) pointed out that
India was losing its independence as economic dependence
led to political dependence. The 1977 manifesto of the
CPM pleaded forfreedomfromeconomic dependence on imperi-
alist and capitalist world.
The CPM did not findany distinction between the
Congress (R) and Congress (0). Denouncing the Swatan-
tra party,the CPM states "the Swatantra manifesto does
not spell out the party's foreign policy, but then it is such
a well known pro-US imperialist policy". 10 The CPM'
reactingto the plea f the Jana Sangh for independent
foreign policy and special relationshipwith South Asia in
its 1971 manifesto, said that the inspiration they had been
receiving from these countries was not for any indepen-
dent fo/eign policy bu was made in Washingtog and taile-
red to suit the needs of US imperialists.
It held that the Congress leaders were dragging India
towards the camp of US imperialism in regard to Sino-
Indian disputes instead of helping to break the deadlock on
the basis of Colombo proposals, When almost every coun-
tryin the world was developing friendly ties with people's
China, which brought economic benefit,the Indira govern-
ment,frightenedby the reactionaries, was unable to take
ELECTION
MANIFESTO-FOREIGN
POLICY-STRATEGIC
CONCERNS 35
initial steps for bettering relations.12 The CPI (M) expres-

sed its happiness in the 1977 manifesto with the steps
taken by the Congress government to normalise relations
with China.
The CPI (M) in its 1980 manifesto felt that by insert-
a
ing fallacious and opportunistic slogan of 'genuine non-
alignment', the Janata government raised suspicions about
its real intention. It was critical of the unilateral decla-
ration by the Janata Prime MinisterMorarji Desai, to sur-
render the use of nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes,
as it compromised national honour and interests and expo-
sed the tilt of 'genuine non-alignment.'13 Besides, the CPI
(M) in its 1980 manifesto considered non-alignmentas
integral part of freedom, peace, democracy and socialism
and stood for strengthening relations with the Soviet
Union, China, Pakistan and other neighbours, support to
the Arab people in their struggle against Isreal, African
people against imperialism and recognition of the Heng
Samrin governmentin Kampuchea.
The Bharatiya Jana Sangh :
The Jana Sangh gave top priorityto defence in its
foreign policy and desired to promote the enlightenedself-
interest of the nation. The considered view of the Jana
Sangh was that ifone wanted to live freelyand honourably,
it was essential to have militaryand economic strength,14 In
1952, 1957 and 1962 manifestos,the Jana Sangh stood for
the introductionof conpulsory militarytrainingforall young
men and women.
The BJS condemned the militarypacts as they violated
the spirt of the UN charter. But its 1957 manifesto,con-
sidering the Sino-lndian war of 1962 and Indo-Pak war of
1965, pleaded for the need for change in defence and
foreign policy. The following steps were proposed to in-
crease the nation's defence potential:
a. increase in the strength of the Army, Navy and Air
Foice, equipping them with most modern weapons ;
and improvingthe efficiency and ensuring better co-
ordination among various branches of militaryand civil
intelligence;
b. constitutionof a vast TerritorialArmy;
c. intensive military training fortwo years in all colleges
and provisionof a course of 'militaryscience' in the uni-
versities;
d. development of defence industries and militaryresearch
to make the country self-reliant in arms ;
e. manufacture of nuclear weapons and missiles;
36 THEINDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE
f. creation of a permament Civil Defence Organisation;

g. special plans and facilities for the development and
administrationof and settlement of population in border
areas. 15
Apart from these steps, the 1971 manifesto urged the
development of the Indian Navy into the biggest in the
Indian ocean and to defend our vast coast-line and protect
our trade routes and in order to make the entire popula-
tion defence conscious, we should introduce defence studies
in all the universities and start rifle clubs all over the
country. The Jana Sangh wanted friendly relations with
all countries but not as a substitutefor defence capability.
Therefore,it reaffirmedthat we must be prepared for war.
The Jana Sangh believed in non- aligmment. It feltthat a
weak state could not be neutralin internationalpolitics Hence
the focus of the Jana Sangh was forconscriptionand economic
self-reliance.
The election manifesto of the 1967 makes clear the
change in the attitude of the Jana Sangh towards foreign
policy. In the previous three election manifestos, it had
supportedthe policy of non-alignment; but in 1967 manifesto
it said that non-alignmentcould be neithera creed nor a per-
manent basis of our foreign policy because of change in the
cold war situation. The criticism of the Jana Sangh in
1971 manifesto was that the governmentcontinued to pay
lip-service only to non-aligment. But the Jana Sangh
was concerned at the way New Delhi was becoming a
Russian satellite. 16 The plea of the Jana Sangh was to get a
permenentseat in the UNO.
The Jana Sangh regarded the decision of America to
rearm Pakistan as an act. Its generally pro-
unfriendly
American position was modifiedin late 1967 when the party
refused to support American actions in Vietnam' 17 The
Jana Sangh denouced the Soviet Union as it was inter-
feringin our internal affairs. As long as Pakistan conti-
nued as a separate entity it would stand for reciprocity
and not of appeasement policy. The dream of the Jana
Sangh was the establishment of Akhand Bharat which
could contribute to solve the problem of increasing the
defence expenditure. At the time of Pakistan's invasion,
India was left friendless because of unreal and unsound
foreign policy. The Jana Sangh would continue to oppose
the entryof China into the UNO as China had aggressive
intentions.
The Swatantra Party :
The attitude of the Swatantra Party on almost all
issues of foreign policy was influenced by its anti-commu-
ELECTION IFESTOS-
MAN FOREIGN
POLICY-STRATEGIC
CONCERNS 37
nist view. The party endeavoured to rectify the unfortu-

nate impression created in the world that India has a bias
in favour of communist block.18 According to Swatantra
party,non-alignmentlost its meaning after the Sino-lndian
and Indo-Pakistan war, and our foreign policy needed to be
reviewed in accordance with the' realities of international
situation. Therefore, in the face of the aggressive intensions
-and activities of some of our neighbours, proper defence
alliance with a realiable power was not only expedient but
legitimate.19
It regarded China as a menace to freedomin Asia. So
it appealed to build up a security pact between South and
Southeast Asian countries. The Swatantra party felt that
friendly relations between India and Pakistan were essen-
tial in the interest of security in the subcontinent.
The Socialist Parties :
The understanding of the socialist parties was based
on their desire to establish a world government. The
socialist party hoped to build a world of equality, freedom
and peace, a world where there was no domination and
exploitation of one nation by another. In order to realise
this ideal new world, the socialist party would :
1. abstain from involvement in the disputes between the
Russian and American camps, at the same time assur-
ing the United Nations that socialist India would in no
event assist an aggressor;
2. strengthen the United Nations and its various agencies
in all such efforts as might lead to a world of freedom,
equality and peace ;
3. endeavour to work for the collective security of that
region in the world, keep out of alliances of the Atlan-
tic and Soviet camps, in particular the belt that stret-
ches from Indonesia to Egypt;
4. strive for friendly relations with all people and
governments;
5. support freedom movements of the yet unfree peoples,
in particular those of Africa;
. seek to revise all treaties and agreements and charters
which have set up an international caste system of rich
and powerful nations on the one hand and of weak
and poor nations on the other, and thus establish the
principle of equality of all nations :
7. assist in all effortsto join the human race together,
politically in a world parliament, and economically
through agencies such as World Development Corpo-
ration and World Food Pool, so as to ensure that
38 THE INDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICALSCIENCE
every human being no matter what his country is,

assured of decent standrad of living;
8. extend its support to socialist movements all the world
over and to all other popular movements as are striv-
ing to combat hunger and war with the weapons of
socialism and democracy.20
The PSP reiterated its desire in its manifestos ta
strengthen the UNO as an instrument of collective secu-
rity,which might have been influenced by its dream of a
world government. The PSP deplored the nuclear test by
the two great powers. The PSP was critical of both
Russian and American blocs. The 1971 manifesto of the
PSP said that it would never allow the Indian Ocean to be
exploited by the big powers for their domination or poli-
tical interference.21 Therefore, the PSP stood for genuine
non-alignment disarmament, and independent foreign
policy. The PSP condemned the rightists anti-sovietism
and their opposition to improvement of Indo-Pakistan
relations. It favoured friendlyand cordinal relations with
Pakistan. The appeal of the PSP was to develop close
links with Asian countries against Chinese expansionism.
The PSP supported the Tibetan peoples' strugglefor freedom
against Red China's oppression.
The Janata Party :
The emergence of the Jahata Party in 1977 gave ai>
alternative to the Congress rule for the first time in India
since independence. The Janata party raised world-wide
anxiety about the continuation of Indian foreign policy
because the constituents of the Janata party had earlier
opposed the foreign policy of the Congress party. But the
Janata government continued the foreign policy of the
Congress government without any fundamental change,
which is described as a policy of "continuity and change"
This demonstrates the fact that exercises of power brings
responsibility. When the constituents of the Janata were
in opposition in one party-dominancemodel they held ex-
treme foreign policy positions. But after coming to power,
they had to accept the fundamentalpri'ciples of the Congress
foreign policy.
We do not find any difference between Lok Dai's-
foreign policy content in 1980 manifesto and the Janata
party manifesto of 1977. The Janata party stood for
genunie non-aligment, good neighbourly policy, friend-
ship with all, peaceful settlement of international disputes
and disarmament. The structure of national security res-
ted on the four pillars of national integration, economic
development,diplomacy and defence, 22 Claiming that th&
ELECTION
MANIFESTOS-FOREIGN CONCERNS
POLICY-STRATEGIC 39
Janata party had strengthened the above four,it held that

the aim of the Janata party was to improve relations with
neighbours along the path of genuine non-alignment, and
modernise the armed forces with self-sufficiencyand self-
reliance in equipments. The emphasis of the Janata party
in both 1977 and 1980 election manifestoswas on defence
and on a constructive and imaginative foreign policy pro-
moting country's defence.23 The aim of the Janata Party
was to give superior training to armed forces to enable
them to get the knowledge of modern equipments. The
Janata partywas of the opinion that emoluments, condi-
tions and the general welfare of the armed forces would
be reviewed for improvement; and that special attention
should be paid to ex-servicemen.
The Janata party opposed the presence of foreign
militaryforces in the Indian Ocean and it said that it would
work to maintain it as a zone of peace. The advocacy of
the Janata party in 1977 manifesto was for regional co-
operation to promote common good and detente to gain
freedom from influence of super power blocks.
The strategic Indian environmentand domestic politics
led to certain changes in the substances of Indian foreign
and defence policies in the seventies. While Nehru's policy
leaned towards the Soviet Union but did not involve
militarydependency and Mrs. Gandhi was both politically
inclined and militarilydependent on Moscow ; Desai's de-
clared policy suggested neutralityor equidistance.24
Our exploratory study very clearly indicates that the
Indian electoral political process has not generated any
significantand substantial debate on foreign policy, what-
ever the partisan controversies that may have taken place
or take in the inter-election periods. But our data
has also demonstrated beyond doubt that military strategy
erdefence strategy in the narrow, technical sense (as dis-
tinct from defence policy) has not even marginallyfigured
in the electoral fights between parties. This situation
needs furtherprobing. But we may be allowed to suggest
orne speculative hypotheses. Firstly, it is clear that the
Indian political elite is culturally non-militaristic and
therefore, not much concerned with these issues. Secondly,
it is also clear that none of the parties have militaryspe-
cialists in their ranks, while persons with general under-
standing of broad foreign policy may be there, designated
as experts.
Our brief survey is not conclusive but it points to the
need for a more extensive and intensive examination of
40 THEINDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
SCfENCE
the interaction between the foreign policy involvement,

strategic concern and our party system.
NOTESANDREFERENCES
1. Monthly PublicOpinion Survey 25 (7), April1980,p. 3.
2. For definitionssee : The International RelationsDictionary,New
York,Holt, Reinhartand Winston, 1969, p. 127, Joseph Frankel
" The making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-
making", London,Oxford UniversityPress, 1967, p. 1, and
Frederick H. Hartmann",''The Relationsof Nations",New York,
Macmillon, 1978,p. 69.
3. See H. J. Holsti,"International Politics' A framework for
Analysis",EnglewoodCliffs,NJ, PrenticeHall,1967,-p. 98, and
JohnP Lowell. "ForeignPolicy in Perspective : Strategy
, Adap-
tion, Decison making", New York, Holt Reinhartand Winston,
1970, pp. 65-66, cited in A. P. Rana, "The Imperatives of Non-
alignment . : A conceptual study of India'sForeignPeUey strategy
in the Nehruperiod ", Delhi,Macmillan, 1976,pp.2-3.
4. Hindustan Times(New Delhi),26 March1971.
5. The Congress (0) Electionmanifesto 1971, in SureshK. Tiwari
"The WonderElections1971 : Indira versusthe Right",Delhi,.
Vivek,1971, p. 106.
6. IndianNational Congress(I) Manifesto 1980.
7. IndianExpress(Bangalore),* 26 December 1979.
8, Editorial,Times of India (Bombay), 14 July 1980.
of
9. ElectionManifesto the CPM,1971. p. 9.
10. Peoples'Democracy 1 (6) Feb.1971. P. 3,
11, Ibid,p. 26.
1.2 ElectionManifesto of the CPI (M) 1971 p. 24,
13. ElectionManifesto of the CPI (M) 1980' p. 26.
14. ElectionManifestoof the Jana Sangh1957, in BJS Documents
1951-1972: Principlesand Policies,Manifestosand Constitution
Vol. I, NewDelhi,BJS Pub,,1973, p. 97,
15, ElectionManifesto of the JS 1967, Ibid,pp, 148-49,
16. ElectionManifesto of the JS 1971, Ibid.p. 185*
17. Devey Hampton,"Polarisationand Consensusin Indian party
Politics",AsianSurvey12 (8), Aug. 1972, p. 714,
18. The Swatantra Party Election Manifesto 1962. in Sriram
Maheswari,The General Election in India", Allahabad,Chai-
tanyaPub., 1963, p. 200
19. The SwatantraPartyEleetionManifesto 1967. p. 17.
20. Election Manifesto of the Socialist Party in G. D. Binaniand
T. V. Rama Reo (Ed), "India at a Glance": A Comprehensive
ReferenceBook on India, Bombay,OrientLongman,1954, p. 99
21. ElectionManifestoof the PSP 1971. in Suresh K. Tiwari,op,
cit, p. 143.
22. The JanataPartyElectionManifesto 1980. p, 27.
23. Text of the ElectionManifestoof the Janata Party,1977 in
S. L. Shakdher (Ed), "The Sixth General Electionto Lok Sabba'',
NewDelhi,Oxford andIBH Pubi,p. 44,
24. Raju G, & C. Thomas,"IndianDefencePolicy; Continuity and
Changeunderthe Janata Government'', "Pacific Affairs,53 (2}
Summer 1980, p, 236.

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DEPARTMENT - INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND HISTORY

MAIS135 - INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Max Marks : 100 Credits : 4

Course Objectives/Course Description:

Unit-1 Teaching Hours:4

Foundations of Indian Foreign Policy

Making of India's Foreign Policy

The role of Prime Ministers

India's Relations with its Neighbours

India's Relations with World Powers

India's Relations with Regional Powers

India's Foreign Economic Policy

India's Nuclear Policy

Continuity and Change in 21st Century

Subject Code : MAIS135 Teacher Name : MADHUMATI.DESHPANDE

Course Plan Reference Materials

UPA'sForeignPolicy:A Critique mustbe asked as to what circumstances

decisions,and capableof luciddiplomacy.

oftheupa whichundermines thepotential has a historicallydemonstrated adeptness A moresystematic approachto counter-

Indians by now have acquired fiftyyears collective

What are these debilitating features of Indian foreign

debilitatingfeaturesin the light of Indian policy objectives and

After independence, Pakistan on north west and China

The second objective of Indian foreignpolicy is to achieve

Third, assertion as a regional power as a first step

emerged a a regional power in the South Asia. This was also

Then, this status of India as a regional power was

Finally, India seeks to act as a spokesman of the third

What are the weaknesses of Indian foreign policy

This example might be dismissed by the supporters of

delegation led by late Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed to attend Islamic

Rajiv Gandhi's period also shows many cases of ad hoc

Second, Indian foreign policy making is enveloped in

policy decisions, despite ad hocism and failure of the policy.

The press in India freely mentioned the names of

Third feature is over-centralisationof foreign decision-

Ultimately,it is the policy makers who have to explain their

In western democracies like the US, centralisation of

Mrs. Gandhi over-centralised foreign policy decision

This is mainly because of high rate of illiteracy, and

economic poverty in addition to excessive secrecy practised

But there is a reluctance on the part of the ruling elite

Fifth, Indian foreign policy making has often suffered

This is illustrated by policy making during the Chandra

Muslims every where turned in favour of Iraq. However, in

However, when the world scene itselfhas changed, what

National Security Council

What needs to be done to avoid these debilitatingeffects

The NSC, first has to be constituted by a law of the

But members of the NSC or its advisers can not devote

Functions of the NSC

What could be the importantfunctionsof the NSC? The

Second, it is the forum for co-ordinatingpolicy between

Thus, essentially the NSC is a single window clearance

His successor, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao also used

In may 1996, India was blessed with multi-party

While we undertake a reform in executive branch to

there is much to be desired in their working. First, the term

India has completed 50 years as an independent nation.

6. P.M.Kamath,"IndianNation- buildingin the1990s:Explaining the

Report Information from ProQuest

24 March 2015 ProQuest

1. Historical influences on India's foreign policy............................................................................................... 1