II.

DUE PROCESS laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to

A. PERSON
1. ROE VS. WADE
FACTS.
Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an
abortion except when medically advised for the purpose
of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe
sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were
unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent
defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing
the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and
pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal
abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not
threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that
she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction
to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming
that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and
abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
ISSUE.
Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed
by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy embodied in
the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth
Amendments Due Process Clause, in the personal
marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill
of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved
to the people by the Ninth Amendment?
HELD.
The right to personal privacy includes the abortion
decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be
considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States
are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory
changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th
century. At common law abortion performed before
quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus
in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful
that abortion was ever a firmly established common law
crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical
enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the
discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has
been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators.
The second reason is that the abortion procedure is
hazardous, therefore the States concern is to protect
pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques
have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively
safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is
the States interest is in protecting the prenatal life.
However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of
abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant womans attending physician,
and may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the
first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways
reasonably related to maternal health based upon the
States interest in promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may
regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where
necessary for the preservation of the mothers life, based
upon the States interest in the potential of the potential
life of the unborn child.
B. LIBERTY
2. REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN
3. US VS. WINDSOR
C. PROPERTY
4. QUIAO VS. QUIAO
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).
RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation
thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children
in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be
divided equally between the spouses subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of
the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and
appeal within the period 270 days later or after more
than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision,
the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net
Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED
denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts. It further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right to any share of
the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2)
and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when
it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of
Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102
applies because there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute
community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129
will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights
overof the properties in the conjugal partnership NO.
3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the
conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of net profits earned in the absolute
community? NO.
RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the
promulgation of the current family code, the default rule
is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when
the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the
spouses marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article
129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property
relations between the spouses is governed by the regime
of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code,
the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the
properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant
to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All
property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.
While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he
may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right
to due process. First, he was well-aware that the
respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the
conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his
Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide
the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after
the accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for
legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never
questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial
court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7)
of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute
community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever
property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common
mass of the couples properties. And when the couples
marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass
is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs,
equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
irrespective of the value each one may have originally
owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is
applicable, since it has been established that the spouses
have no separate properties, what will be divided equally
between them is simply the net profits. And since the
legal separationshare decision of Brigido states that the
in the net profits shall be awarded to the children,
Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of
conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the
Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common
fund the fruits of their separate property and income
from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either
spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing
provision, each of the couple has his and her own
property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a
mixture or merger of those debts or properties between
the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation
of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by
the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The
listed properties above are considered part of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in
the above-listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty
party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is
no separate property which may be accounted for in the
guilty partys favor.
5. TERMINAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES
CORPORATION VS PPA
6. BOARD OF MEDICINE VS. OTA
FACTS:
Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national,
married to a Filipina, who has continuously resided in the
Philippines for more than 10 years. He graduated from
Bicol Christian College of Medicine on April 21, 1991
with a degree of Doctor of Medicine. After successfully
completing a one-year post graduate internship training at
the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, he filed an
application to take the medical board examinations in
order to obtain a medical license. He was required by the
(PRC) to submit an affidavit of undertaking, stating
among others that should he successfully pass the same,
he would not practice medicine until he submits proof that
reciprocity exists between Japan and the Philippines in
admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine.
Respondent submitted a duly notarized English
translation of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan duly
authenticated by the Consul General of the Philippine
Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes; thus, he was allowed to
take the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992,
which he subsequently passed.
In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine
(Board) of the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993,
denied respondent's request for a license to practice
medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board
believes that no genuine reciprocity can be found in the
law of Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can
possibly practice there.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus against the Board before the RTC of
Manila. RTC ruled for the Yasuki.
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the
case to the CA, stating that while respondent submitted
documents showing that foreigners are allowed to
practice medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the
conditions for the practice of medicine there are practical
and attainable by a foreign applicant, hence, reciprocity
was not established; also, the power of the PRC and the
Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine is
discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable
by a writ of mandamus.
 The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling
of the RTC.
ISSUES:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THE
EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE PRACTICE
OF MEDICINE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND
JAPAN.
RULING:
The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.
There is no question that a license to practice medicine is
a privilege or franchise granted by the government. It is
a right that is earned through years of education and
training, and which requires that one must first secure a
license from the state through professional board
examinations.
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the
ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine
first to take and pass medical board examinations have
long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power.
As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a copy
of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, duly
authenticated by the Consul General of the Embassy of
the Philippines in Japan, which provides in Articles 2 and
11, thus:
Article 2. Anyone who wants to be medical practitioner
must pass the national examination for medical
practitioner and get license from the Minister of Health
and Welfare.
xxx
Article 11. No one can take the National Medical
Examination except persons who conform to one of the
following items:
1. Persons who finished regular medical courses at a
university based on the School Education Laws
(December 26, 1947) and graduated from said university.
2. Persons who passed the preparatory test for the
National Medical Examination and practiced clinics and
public sanitation more than one year after passing the said
test.
3. Persons who graduated from a foreign medical
school or acquired medical practitioner license in a
foreign country, and also are recognized to have the same
or more academic ability and techniques as persons stated
in item 1 and item 2 of this article.
R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates
for the medical board examinations, merely requires a
foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his countrys
existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice
medicine under the same rules and regulations governing
citizens thereof.
PRC is authorized to prescribe additional requirements or
grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking registration
in the Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or
some additional requirements are required of citizens of
the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his
country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the
foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the
practice of medicine in said country are practical and
attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must
first be proven that a Filipino has been granted license and
allowed to practice his profession in said country before a
foreign applicant may be given license to practice in the
Philippines.
It is enough that the laws in the foreign country
permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein.
Requiring respondent to prove first that a Filipino has
already been granted license and is actually practicing
therein unduly expands the requirements provided for
under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.
Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It
must also appear that he has fully complied with all the
conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the
licensing authority.
In this case, there is no doubt as to the
competence and qualifications of respondent. He finished
his medical degree from Bicol Christian College of
Medicine. He completed a one-year post graduate
internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical
Center, a government hospital. Then he passed the
Medical Board Examinations which was given on August
8, 1992 with a general average of 81.83, with scores
higher than 80 in 9 of the 12 subjects.
D. HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW OR LEVELS
OF SCRUTINY
7. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
EMPLOYEES ORAGANIZATION VS.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization
(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in
front of Malacaang to express their grievances
against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After
learning about the planned mass demonstration,
Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting
with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting,
the planned demonstration was confirmed by the
union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration
was not a strike against the company but was in fact
an exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional
right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and
freedom for petition for redress of grievances. The
company asked them to cancel the demonstration for
it would interrupt the normal course of their business
which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the
workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through
with the rally. A second meeting took place where the
company reiterated their appeal that while the
workers may be allowed to participate, those from the
1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to
participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed.
Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No
Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement. The lower court decided in favor of the
company and the officers of the PBMEO were found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court
of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike
violated the CBA.
HELD:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation
only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties,
the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy
a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions." The freedoms of speech and of the press
as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed
against public officials or "when exercised in relation
to our right to choose the men and women by whom
we shall be governed.
8. ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
9. WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY
OF MANILA
FACTS
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774
entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission
in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light
Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought
to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance
infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC
ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes
at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is
valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the
LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in
favor of the City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it
indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates
the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said
ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who
goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really
there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who
needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the
infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is
more or less subjected only to a limited group of people.
The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by
the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.
E. RELATIVITY OF DUE PROCESS
10. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION
11. CUDIA VS. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
PMA
F. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
12. MULLANE VS. CENTRAL HANOVER
TRUST CO
FACTS.
Defendant established a common trust fund in January,
1946. A total of 113 trusts participated in the common
trust fund. Some were not residents of the state of New
York. In March 1947, Defendant petitioned New Yorks
Surrogates Court for settlement of its first account as
common trustee. The only notice given beneficiaries of
Defendants application was by publication in a local
New York newspaper, which set forth merely the name
and address of the trust company, the name and the date
of establishment of the common trust fund, and a list of
all participating estates, trusts or funds. Plaintiff Mullane
made a special appearance, alleging that notice and the
statutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries were
inadequate, and thus that the court was unable to render
a binding decree.
ISSUE.
Whether sufficient notice was supplied to non-residents
of legal action affecting them by the publication of an
announcement in a local newspaper.
HELD.
No, because the statutory notice was not reasonably
calculated to reach those who could have easily be
informed by other means. Notice must be reasonably
calculated, under all the cirucmstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
Notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey
the required information, and it must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearance. The
means employed must be such as one that reasonably
might inform the absent party. Adjudications resulting in
the deprivation of life, liberty or property must be
preceded by notice and an opportunity for a hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case. Personal service of
written notice within the jurisdiction is always adequate
in any type of proceeding.
Discussion. Because the fundamental right of due
process is the opportunity to be heard, this right has little
worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending
and can choose for himself whether to appear or default.
13. LACHANCE VS. ERICKSON
14. CSC VS. LUCAS
FACTS:
On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant
information officer at the Agricultural Information
Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity),
filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-
complaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a
photographer of the same agency, for misconduct. Based
on the description of the petitioner, while she was
standing before a mirror, near the office door of Jose
Lucas, she noticed a chair at her right side which Mr.
Lucas sit at that very instant. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent
to reach for his shoe, and at that moment she felt Mr.
Lucas hand touching her thigh and running down his palm
up to her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced Mr.
Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or she will
kick him. But Mr. Lucas touched her again and so she hit
him. A verbal exchange then ensued; she was thrown out
of the door, and was told never to enter the office again.
On June 8, 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry of DA
issued a summons requiring the respondent to answer the
complaint. According to Lucas, he did not touch the thigh
of the complainant and what happened was that he
accidentally brushed complainants leg while reaching for
his shoe. After a formal investigation, respondent was
found guilty of simple misconduct with a penalty of
suspension for 1 month and 1 day. In due time, respondent
brought his case to the Civil Service Commission.
Thereafter, the CSC issued a resolution finding the
respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposing on
him a penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent
moved for reconsideration, but was denied. Then,
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA set
aside the resolution of the CSC and reinstated the
resolution of BOPI of DA. The CA further assailed that
the respondent was not given due process as he was not
informed of the modification of the charge against him,
the distinctions of simple and grave misconduct. He only
came to know of the changes when he received the notice
of the resolution dismissing him from service.
ISSUES:
1. WON respondent Lucas was denied due process when
the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a
charge of simple misconduct.
2. WON the act complained of constitutes grave
misconduct.
HELD:
1. The SC sustained the ruling of the CA that the basic
requirement of due process is that a person must be duly
informed of the charges against him, and that a person
cannot be convicted of a crime which he was not charged.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic
and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right
to due process in investigations and hearings. 2. Under the
circumstances, the act of the respondent is not constitutive
of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that
respondent was maliciously motivated. It has also been
noted that the respondent has been in the service for 20
years and this is his first offense.
15. CSC VS. LEDESMA
16. ANONYMOUS VS. RADAM
17. PEFIANCO VS. MORAL
FACTS:
Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative
complaint against respondent for dishonesty. She was
dismissed. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to
compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report. It was denied.
HELD:
A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to
be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges
filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges
and the evidence presented during the hearings of the
investigation committee. Respondent had been accorded
these rights.
18. YLAYA VS. GACOTT
19. MACIAS VS. MACIAS
20. OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR VS. INDAR
21. INGARAHAM VS. WRIGHT
RELEVANT FACTS:
James Ingraham was a junior high student in a Florida
public school. After failing to respond quickly to a
teachers instructions, Ingraham was brought to Principal
Willie Wrights office where he refused to admit the
infraction. Ingraham was then subjected to corporal
punishment by Principal Wright, with the help of the
Assistant Principal and his personal assistant. According
to the record, Ingrahams spanking was particularly harsh
as he was subjected to twenty separate strokes from the
wooden paddle. Ingrahams doctors ordered him to
remain out of school to recover from injuries sustained
during his paddling. Ingraham and another student
brought suit alleging that Florida law allowing corporal
punishment violated the Eighth Amendment, violated
their due process rights, and sought damages in addition
to declaratory and injunctive relief. The district Court
granted Wrights motion to dismiss and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE:
Does the Eighth Amendment bar corporal punishment in
public schools? Does due process require notice to parents
before corporal punishment is imposed?
HOLDING:
No, the Eighth Amendment has no application to corporal
punishment in public schools. No, notice is not required
before administering punishing as the Florida statutory
scheme contains adequate safeguards to prevent wrongful
punishment, and affords adequate remedies in the event a
student is deprived of his rights.
REASONING:
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. First,
the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment
historically applied to those convicted of crimes rather
than to the disciplining of school children. Justice Powell
explained that there was no basis for extending the Eighth
Amendment beyond that historical context, particularly as
applied to schools that are already carefully monitored by
local communities. Furthermore, aggrieved students and
parents can seek criminal and civil remedies in the event
punishments exceed what is necessary to enforce rules
and impose discipline within the school environment.
Next, the Court turned to the Due Process issue,
explaining that both physical restraint and infliction of
pain are within the historical meaning of liberty interest
protected by guarantees of due process of law. Children
obviously have a strong and legitimate interest in
avoiding unwarranted punishments or being
unnecessarily deprived of their liberty. However, the
Court here concluded Florida law already contained
adequate protections, with teachers and principals alike
required to exercise prudence in applying punishments,
subject to the watchful eye of the community and the
possibility of subsequent civil or criminal liability for
wrongful behavior. The Court saw no need to add pre-
punishment notifications, as school discipline has always
been handled without the need for prior notification or
hearings. Finally, the Court explained that imposing
additional requirements on schools seeking to impose
punishments would intrude state authority to regulate
schools. Justice Powell pointed out that additional
safeguards may well require schools to abandon certain
modes of punishment, and any small benefit from adding
constitutional remedies to already existing tort and
criminal remedies were small compared to the important
interests of schools protecting their educational
environments.
22. GUZMAN VS. NU
FACTS:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and
Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National
University, have come to this Court to seek relief from
what they describe as their school's "continued and
persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition
"for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated
August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due
process due to the fact that they were active participants
in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the
petitioners failure to enroll for the first semester of the
school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not
because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional
and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his
academic showing was poor due to his activities in
leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman is facing
criminal charges for malicious mischief before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the
destruction of properties of respondent University. The
petitioners have failures in their records, and are not of
good scholastic standing.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners were denied due process.
HELD:
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents'
comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never
conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether
or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated
"in activities within the university premises, conducted
without prior permit from school authorities, that
disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated
acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander,
noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and
defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the
pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case
for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot,
without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion
or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the
omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly
published rule of theirs by which students may be
expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic
standing.
The school had violated the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools that no penalty shall be imposed upon
any student except for cause as defined in the manual
and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have
been conducted.
There are standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE
RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE
PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS.
23. DLSU VS. CA