ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA 1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v.
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, which states
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN
R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L.
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON.
ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of
RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards.
Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should
not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections
fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be
achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without
sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable
target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that
it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.
Discussions:
that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation
or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because
of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To
be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent
in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers
as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
Rulings:
1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. 22 With respect to RA 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided
in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the
BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating
revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees
and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the
purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue
targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2
and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient
standards: public interest, justice and equity, public convenience and welfare and
simplicity, economy and welfare.33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it
approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence,
the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
TELEBAP vs COMELEC
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337
G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP)
is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to
be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that
it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA
Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the
Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print
space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be
procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and
television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that
the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to
advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time
for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of
law and without just compensation.
Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable
public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time
as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print
space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast
industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken
by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG [86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978]
Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on
February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any
person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged
in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution.
Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable
aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the
Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval
of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of
50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human
right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted
he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial
of an alien employment permit fee.
ISAE v Quisimbing G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000
J. Kapunan
Facts:
The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily
for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that they got
compared to that of their foreign teaching counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire.
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants foreign-hires
certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing, transportation, and 25% more pay than locals
under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The first was grounded on
leaving his home country, the second was on the lack of tenure when he returns home.
The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties.
The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisimbing denied the unions
mfr.
He said, The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It
is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws
is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A
classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of
the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the
former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have
to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of
the School.
The union appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist.
The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were paid local
salaries.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial
Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment
status.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA,
accused-appellant
G.R. No. 121777
(350 SCRA 163 January 24, 2001KAPUNAN, J.

Issue:
Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause

Held: Yes, Petition granted

Ratio:
Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all people to human dignity
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."
International law prohibits discrimination, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The latter promises Fair
wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless
of sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate
in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
In this jurisdiction, there is the term equal pay for equal work, pertaining to persons being paid
with equal salaries and have similar skills and similar conditions. There was no evidence here that
foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.
These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.[
For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve
as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting
foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not
enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave
travel allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There
is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Obiter:
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. It does not
appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for
purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that
these groups were always treated separately. The housing and other benefits accorded foreign
hires were not given to local hires, thereby such admixture will nbot assure any group the power
to exercise bargaining rights.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS,
accused-appellant.
Facts:
The victim of rape in this case was a minor below twelve (12) years of age, who herself
narrated the shameful details of the dastardly act against her virtue. The victim was peddled for
commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because the
complainantwas a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of lasciviousness
on distinctlyseparate occasions..The accused was then CongressmanRomeo Jalosjoswho, inspite
of his having been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory rape, was stillre-elected
to his congressional office. On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime ofstatutory
rape and twelve (12) for acts of lasciviousness, were filed against accused-appellant
The victim, Maria Rosilyn, grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care of
SimplicioDelantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old
homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting
boarders at his house.He, however, was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of one of their boarders. They went tothe Pasay
City Police where she executed a sworn statement against SimplicioDelantar. Rosilynwas
thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD).The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which eventually
led to thefiling of criminal charges against accused-appellant He was also convicted on six (6)
counts of acts of lasciviousness.
TOPIC: Equal Protection
RULING:
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."[6]
This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is
being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a
prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy
of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or
the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most
compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police
officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into
a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations
are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.[8]
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.[9]
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification
in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to
all those belonging to the same class.[10]
Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to
prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of ones liberty. As a
punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the
accused.[12] The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of
his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will.[13]
Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him of his power of
locomotion[14] and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of
restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."[15]
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individuals status
in society.[16] Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security
in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares
inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the
curtailment and elimination of certain rights.[17]
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellants claim that re-
election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of
the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
GR No 148208
Puno, J.
Facts:
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively
replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a
petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP from
implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment
of a Human resource management system and a compensation structure as part of the authority
of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below shall be in
accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that the
classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said
proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the
other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that
it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and administrative
autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor General,
as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of employees
is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the
government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws,
hence unconstitutional.

Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee
status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients
are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act.
Officers of the BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the
former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.

Decision: Sec 15(c) unconstitutional. Judicial notice that other Govt Financial Institution
undertook amendment of their charters from 1995 to 2004 a blanket provision for all employees
to be covered by SSL. The said subsequent enactments constitute significant changes in
circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso
of Section 15(c). Legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one
distinct class, separate from other governmental entities. There is no substantial distinctions so
as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. The equal
protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions
cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest. It is clear that the enactment of the seven
subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso anathema
to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.