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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang

iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa


Assignment (A-H of the syllabus) pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

TOPIC: ON JURISDICTION C. SANDIGANBAYAN: Original The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for
and Exclusive Jurisdiction (a. What offense or crime was certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan,
committed) Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the
information and her motion for reconsideration.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The Antecedents
Manila
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of
THIRD DIVISION the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state
university is known as a government scholar. She was
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008 appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December
21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with
PHILIPPINES, respondents. President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in
UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her
DECISION siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent
REYES, R.T., J.: Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
government funds? Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance
for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the being then the Student Regent of the University of
President. the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the
performance of her official functions, committing
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to the offense in relation to her office and taking
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare advantage of her position, with intent to
Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
councils within the state university, consequently filed a wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property government by falsely and fraudulently
with the Office of the Ombudsman.6 representing to former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, the University of the Philippines will be renovated
found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. Student Hall," and for which purpose accused
27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads: HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount
of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III,
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
President, and the latter relying and believing on
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D.
said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and
SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and
delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.
penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as
FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which
follows:
check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade
Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or
misappropriated for their personal use and benefit,
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
and despite repeated demands made upon the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the
Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH
said accused failed and refused to do so to the
EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer,
damage and prejudice of the government in the an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple
aforesaid amount. student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied) She further contended that she had no power or authority
to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged
that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over in the information that it was among her functions or duties
the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in
UP student regent. connection with her official functions, the same is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or
offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed
has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of
jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against
Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered
not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It
should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the
government, that was duped. Even assuming that she According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her
received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the
Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10 BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and
exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no definition of a public office, petitioners stance that she was
jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous.
not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, Compensation is not an essential part of public office.
in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to
include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249
compensated.14 which provides:

Sandiganbayan Disposition Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall


exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the involving:
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of
merit.15 It ratiocinated: (A) x x x

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
the Sandiganbayan over this case. positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal Compensation and Position Classification Act of
offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the
jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by xxxx
the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides
that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
other offenses committed by public officials and government-owned or controlled corporations, state
employees in relation to their office. From this universities or educational institutions or
provision, there is no single doubt that this Court foundations. (Italics supplied)
has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed
by a public official in relation to his office. It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that
the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive
Accused-movants claim that being merely a jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
member in representation of the student body, she enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their
was never a public officer since she never received salary grades, because the primordial consideration
any compensation nor does she fall under Salary in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of
Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-
provision of law? stock corporations. The board of directors or
trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the corporation.
University of the Philippines reveals that the Board
of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents
exclusively exercises the general powers of of the University of the Philippines is performing
administration and corporate powers in the functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the
the ends specified by law such sums as may be conclusion that being a member of such board,
provided by law for the support of the university; 2) accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the
To prescribe rules for its own government and to category of public officials upon whom this Court is
enact for the government of the university such vested with original exclusive jurisdiction,
general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a
law, as are consistent with the purposes of the position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher
university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation under the Compensation and Position Classification
of the President of the University, professors, Act of 1989.
instructors, lecturers and other employees of the
University; to fix their compensation, hours of Finally, this court finds that accused-movants
service, and such other duties and conditions as it contention that the same of P15 Million was
may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion received from former President Estrada and not
leave of absence under such regulations as it may from the coffers of the government, is a matter a
promulgate, any other provisions of law to the defense that should be properly ventilated during
contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for the trial on the merits of this case.16
cause after an investigation and hearing shall have
been had. On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a
It is well-established in corporation law that the Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
corporation can act only through its board of
Issue for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason
JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS action.22
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION."19 In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the
Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument exceptions, thus:
below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary As a general rule, an order denying a motion to
Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be
charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is
funds in question personally came from President Estrada, rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary
not from the government. procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an
answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse,
Our Ruling reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying
The petition cannot be granted. a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an
answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
judgment of acquittal.
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition
the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of
established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition
then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that
it would be unfair to require the defendant or taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial same.
if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or offense, or is not the court of proper In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial
venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior
motion to quash is made with grave abuse of judgment, this Court granted the petition
discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to
judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of dismiss the case.
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following
are a few examples of the exceptions to the general In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the
rule. denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of
Frauds, this Court granted the petition
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, this Court granted the In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash
City Court of Manila and directed the respondent based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent
court to dismiss the case. judge and ordered him to desist from further action
in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial
of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying
over the offense, this Court granted the petition for the motion to quash based on prescription was set
prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from aside on certiorari and the criminal case was
further proceeding in the case. dismissed by this Court.24

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a
denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper grave abuse of discretion.
venue, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by remain at all times accountable to the people.29
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which
We first address petitioners contention that the was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March
4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
amended, in her motion to quash before the jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995
Sandiganbayan.25She repeats the reference in the instant made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
authorities.27 Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere has jurisdiction over the following:
clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that
petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall
made by the Sandiganbayan.28 exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos one or more of the accused are officials occupying
on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest the following positions in the government, whether
norms of official conduct required of public officers and in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
employees, based on the concept that public officers and time of the commission of the offense:
employees shall serve with the highest degree of
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the " (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: " (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or controlled corporations,
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members state universities or educational institutions or
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial foundations.
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads; " (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade "27'" and up under the
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of Compensation and Position Classification Act of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, 1989;
assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads; " (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher; " (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval the Constitution; and
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and
occupying the position of provincial director and Position Classification Act of 1989.
those holding the rank of senior superintended or
higher; B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
14-A, issued in 1986. Supreme Court.

" In cases where none of the accused are occupying " The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg.
positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or 129, as well as the implementing rules that the
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter
6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. shall represent the People of the Philippines, except
in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether " In case private individuals are charged as co-
in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of principals, accomplices or accessories with the
their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the public officers and employees in the proper courts
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and them.
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, " Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the
arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14- the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but
instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It
to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil shall be unlawful for any person having family or
action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil close personal relation with any public official to
action separately from the criminal action shall be capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
action had heretofore been filed separately but requesting or receiving any present, gift or material
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the or pecuniary advantage from any other person
criminal case is hereafter filed with the having some business, transaction, application,
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil request or contract with the government, in which
action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or such public official has to intervene. Family relation
the appropriate court, as the case may be, for shall include the spouse or relatives by
consolidation and joint determination with the consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree.
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action The word "close personal relation" shall include
shall be deemed abandoned." close personal friendship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute rise to intimacy which assures free access to such
approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses public officer.
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may (b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all induce or cause any public official to commit any of
prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
with the Sandiganbayan.32
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay
the offense of estafa. marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan
sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
the said provision. complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other
ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other
pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
katawa-tawa. requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at committed in relation to their office.
the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention
of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain
the law and every part of the act is to be taken into that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
view.35 In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in for estafa versus a director of the National Parks
direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be Development Committee, a government instrumentality.
interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best The Court held then:
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti
The National Parks Development Committee was Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer
created originally as an Executive Committee on Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the
January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon simple reason that the latter would not have
Memorial, Luneta and other national parks jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
(Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold
the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the
on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, government employees separately charged for the
1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. same crimes, has not altered the nature of the
Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice- offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an punishable by penalties higher than prision
attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine
Development, Department of Natural Resources, on of P6,000.00, committed by government employees
December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, in conspiracy with private persons, including
issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive,
1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981). simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations could be so transferred, a joint trial would
decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency nonetheless not be possible.
under the Office of the President and allotments for
its maintenance and operating expenses were issued Petitioner UP student regent
direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3). is a public officer.

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She
with greater firmness in Bondoc v. does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP
Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time
Bondoc read: that We will be called upon to define a public officer.
In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is
difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39 The
1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. "A public office is the right, authority and duty,
Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
different statutes and jurisprudence. period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that: invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him
A public office is the right, authority, and duty for the benefit of the public. The individual so
created and conferred by law, by which for a given invested is a public officer."42
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary
invested with some portion of the sovereign Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying
functions of the government, to be exercise by him student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the
for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction
under our political system is therefore not a natural over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of
by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and
creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold higher but who are by express provision of law placed
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed
no one can be said to have any vested right in an there by express provision of law.44
office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
In Laurel v. Desierto,41
the Court adopted the definition of Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors
Mechem of a public office: or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by in relation to her office.
P.D. No. 1606.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no
essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to
incidental to the public office.47 contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts
were not ratified by the governing body of the state
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private
office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the capacity and not in relation to public office.
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public makes one a public It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
officer.48 averments in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction
is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss,
with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would
legitimate governmental function by providing advanced become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, defendant or respondent.53
and giving professional and technical training.49 Moreover,
UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no
dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.50 uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent
of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
The offense charged was committed functions, committing the offense in relation to her office
in relation to public office, according and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
to the Information. conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring A lawyer owes candor, fairness
supplied) and honesty to the Court.

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz,
of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606
information based on this ground. as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of
his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and
Source of funds is a defense that should his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge
be raised during trial on the merits. petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or
Estradas private funds and not from the government misrepresent."
coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name
came from the Office of the President and not its then Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The
occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using
information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the a name different from that with which he was authorized.
amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56
the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and
misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and
Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court
amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)." should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation not act with complete candor and honesty before the
that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense courts.58 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of merit. SO ORDERED.
the instant case.54
Republic of the Philippines Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after
SUPREME COURT due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with
Manila public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, for violation
of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
EN BANC 6713,3 violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and
violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil
G.R. No. 165835 June 22, 2005 Service Law. Based on this complaint, a case for Violations
of R.A. No. 1379,4 Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, Petitioner,
Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6713, docketed as
vs.
Case
SANDIGANBAYAN and the OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents. No. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against
petitioner.5 Petitioners wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and
DECISION
their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all
surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for
Tinga, J.:
violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they acted as
Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in
Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces of receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-
the Philippines. Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari gotten wealth.
and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside public
On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the
respondent Sandiganbayans Resolution1 dated 29 October
Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the
2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment2dated 2
Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition
November 2004, and to enjoin public respondents
with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of
Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman from further
a Writ of Preliminary Attachment6 against petitioner, his
proceeding with any action relating to the enforcement of
wife, and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully
the assailed issuances.
acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, as
On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, amended. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 0193,
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II of the Field entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Maj. Gen. Carlos F.
Garcia, et al." It was alleged that the Office of the and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil
Ombudsman, after conducting an inquiry similar to a actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of
preliminary investigation in criminal cases, has determined unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his
that a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and family, and cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of
the other respondents therein who hold such properties Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606,10 as amended, and
for, with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 1411 and 14-A.12
incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge
amounts of money and properties manifestly out of Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or
proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other the law creating it, was intended principally as a criminal
lawful income, if any.7 court, with no jurisdiction over separate civil actions,
petitioner points to President Corazon C. Aquinos
Acting on the Republics prayer for issuance of a writ of issuances after the EDSA Revolution, namely: (1) E.O. No. 1
preliminary attachment, the Sandiganbayan issued the creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed for. The (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by
corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and cronies, (2)
subsequently issued on 2 November 2004 upon the filing of E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379
a bond by the Republic. On 17 November 2004, petitioner by transferring to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil
(as respondent a quo) filed a Motion to Dismiss8 in Civil Case actions filed against President Marcos, his family and
No. 0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil Code and other
Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. existing laws, and (3) E.O. No. 14-A whch further amended
1379. On even date, petitioner filed the present Petition, E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by providing
raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the that the civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed
Sandiganbayan. against President Marcos, his family and cronies, may
proceed independently of the criminal action.
Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is
without jurisdiction over the "civil action" for forfeiture of Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that the
unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379, Sandiganbayan has been granted jurisdiction only over the
maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the separate civil actions filed against President Marcos, his
Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 29 of the law, family and cronies, regardless of whether these civil actions
were for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under guilty thereof. The petition is also supposedly bereft of the
R.A. No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages or required certification which should be made by the
indemnification for consequential damages or other civil investigating City or Provincial Fiscal (now Prosecutor) to
actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws. the Solicitor General. Furthermore, he opines that it should
According to petitioner, nowhere in the amendments to have been the Office of the Solicitor General which filed the
P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that the petition and not the Office of the Ombudsman as in this
Sandiganbayan has been vested jurisdiction over separate case. The petition being fatally defective, the same should
civil actions other than those filed against President have been dismissed, petitioner concludes.
Marcos, his family and cronies.13 Hence, the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over any separate civil action against In their Comment,16 respondents submit the contrary,
him, even if such separate civil action is for recovery of noting that the issues raised by petitioner are not novel as
unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379. these have been settled in Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan17 which categorically ruled that "there is no
Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019
for forfeiture filed against him is fatally defective for failing and 1379 now rests with the
to comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Sec. Sandiganbayan."18 Respondents argue that under the
2, R.A. No. 1379, 14 namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a Constitution19 and prevailing statutes, the Sandiganbayan is
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecution vested with authority and jurisdiction over the petition for
arm of the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 filed against petitioner.
General that there is reasonable ground to believe that Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D. 1606, as
there has been violation of the said law and that amended, as the prevailing law on the jurisdiction of
respondent is guilty thereof; and (c) an action filed by the the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines.15 He argues that only informations for perjury Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
were filed and there has been no information filed against exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
him for violation of R.A. No. 1379. Consequently, he
maintains, it is impossible for the Office of the Ombudsman a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
to certify that there is reasonable ground to believe that a otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
violation of the said law had been committed and that he is Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of
of the accused are officials occupying the following whether these cases are civil or criminal in nature. The
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, petition for forfeiture should not be confused with the
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of cases initiated and prosecuted by the PCGG pursuant to E.O.
the offense: Nos. 14 and 14-A, as these are dealt with under a separate
subparagraph of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in particular
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions Sec. 4.c thereof.20 Further, respondents stress that E.O. Nos.
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as 14 and 14-A exclusively apply to actions for recovery of
Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), family, and cronies. It would also not be accurate to refer to
specifically including: a petition for forfeiture as a "civil case," since it has been
held that petitions for forfeiture are deemed criminal or
. penal and that it is only the proceeding for its prosecution
which is civil in nature.21
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher ranks; The Office of the Ombudsman filed a
separate Comment,22 likewise relying on Republic v.
.
Sandiganbayan to argue that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture filed against
As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public
petitioner. The Ombudsman explains that the grant to the
positions covered by the aforestated law, the petition for
Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No.
forfeiture should be within the jurisdiction of the
1379 did not change even under the amendments of
Sandiganbayan.
R.A. No. 797523 and R.A. No. 829424, although it came to be
Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioners
limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials as
argument that the petition for forfeiture is "civil" in nature
enumerated therein, including Philippine army and air
and the Sandiganbayan, having allegedly no jurisdiction
force colonels, naval captains, and all other officers of
over civil actions, therefore has no jurisdiction over the
higher rank, to which petitioner belongs.25
petition, since the same P.D. No. 1606 encompasses all
In arguing that it has authority to investigate and initiate In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the
forfeiture proceedings against petitioner, the Office of the present Petition should be dismissed for blatant forum-
Ombudsman refers to both the Constitution26 and R.A. No. shopping. Even as petitioner had filed a Motion to
6770.27 The constitutional power of investigation of the Dismiss as regards the petition for forfeiture (docketed as
Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its Civil Case No. 0193) before the Sandiganbayan on the
power to investigate any act of a public official or employee ground of the Sandiganbayans alleged lack of jurisdiction,
which appears to be "illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient" he filed the instant Petition raising exactly the same issue,
covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials even though the Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 is
as defined under R.A. No. 1379. Furthermore, Sec. 15 still pending resolution.1avvphi1 Worse, it appears that
(11)28 of R.A. No. 6770 expressly empowers the the Motion to Dismiss and the instant Petition were filed on
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases of the same day, 17 November 2004.
unlawful acquisition of wealth. This authority of the
Ombudsman has been affirmed also in Republic vs. Petitioner refutes these arguments in his Reply31 and
Sandiganbayan.29 enunciates that the Sandiganbayans criminal jurisdiction is
separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction, and that the
The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioners Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been
allegation that the petition for forfeiture filed against him removed without subsequent amendments expressly
failed to comply with the procedural and formal restoring such civil jurisdiction. His thesis is that R.A. No.
requirements under the law. It asserts that all the 1379 is a special law which is primarily civil and remedial
requirements of R.A. No. 1379 have been strictly complied in nature, the clear intent of which is to separate the prima
with. An inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation was facie determination in forfeiture proceedings from the
conducted by a Prosecution Officer of the Office of the litigation of the civil action. This intent is further
Ombudsman. The participation of the Office of the Solicitor demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which grants the
General, claimed by petitioner to be necessary, is actually authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary
no longer required since the Office of the Ombudsman is investigation being done by the City or Provincial Fiscal,
endowed with the authority to investigate and prosecute and the authority to file a petition for forfeiture to the
the case as discussed above.30 Solicitor General.
Petitioner also points out in his Reply32 to the Comment of civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times
the Office of the Ombudsman, that the use of the phrase be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined
"violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379" in P.D. No. 1606, in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
as amended, implies jurisdiction over cases which are appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being
principally criminal or penal in nature because the concept deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
of "violation" of certain laws necessarily carries with it the action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
concept of imposition of penalties for such violation. Hence, separately from the criminal action shall be
when reference was made to "violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action
and 1379," the only jurisdiction that can supposedly be had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein
implied is criminal jurisdiction, not civil jurisdiction, has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
thereby highlighting respondent Sandiganbayans lack of hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
jurisdiction over the "civil case" for forfeiture of ill-gotten court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
wealth. Of course, petitioner does not rule out cases where Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may
the crime carries with it the corresponding civil liability be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
such that when the criminal action is instituted, the civil criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be
action for enforcement of the civil liability is impliedly deemed abandoned.
instituted with it, and the court having jurisdiction over the
criminal action also acquires jurisdiction over the ancillary Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the
civil action. However, petitioner argues that the action for charge of forum-shopping.
forfeiture subject of this case is not the ancillary civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Rather, the The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the
petition for forfeiture is an independent civil action over Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture
which the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. Petitioner under R.A. No. 1379; (b) whether the Office of the
points to P.D. No. 1606, as amended, which treats of Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, initiate and
independent civil actions only in the last paragraph of Sec. prosecute such petitions for forfeiture; and (c) whether
4 thereof: petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping.

Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary The petition is patently without merit. It should be
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding dismissed.
The seminal decision of Republic v. jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses
Sandiganbayan33 squarely rules on the issues raised by enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such
petitioner concerning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty. Since this
and the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. After change resulted in the proliferation of the filing of cases
reviewing the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is
the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved punishable by a penalty not higher than prision
the question of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not being of a
violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D.
was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate No. 186040 and eventually by P.D. No. 1861.41
forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of First
Instance of the city or province where the public officer or On the foregoing premises alone, the Court in Republic v.
employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. Sandiganbayan, deduced that jurisdiction over violations of
No. 1379.Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the
to P.D. No. 1486,34 original and exclusive jurisdiction over Sandiganbayan.42 It could not have taken into consideration
such violations was vested in the said court.35 P.D. No. R.A. No. 797543 and R.A. No. 824944 since both statutes
160636 was later issued expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486, which also amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as well as modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not yet enacted at the time. The subsequent
by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in enactments only serve to buttress the conclusion that the
connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan indeed has jurisdiction over violations of
said court.37 Such civil actions removed from the R.A. No. 1379.
jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan include those for
restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with
instruments and effects of the crime, civil actions under exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379.38 Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 12939 abolished the following positions whether in a permanent, acting or
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
regular courts and expanded the exclusive original offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present
classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of the
and Position Classification Act of 989 (R.A. No. 6758), Sandiganbayan, petitioners argumentthat the
specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice- Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petition for
governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and forfeiture it being "civil" in nature and the Sandiganbayan
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil actions
department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members collapses completely.
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first
the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and recognized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, thus: "[T]he rule
higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and,
captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the therefore, civil in nature."46 Then, Almeda, Sr.
Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior v. Perez,47 followed, holding that the proceedings under R.A.
superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial No. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty
prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special acquired in favor of the State. It noted that the
prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that
managers of government-owned or controlled
provided for in a civil action.48
corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials
However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture
thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the
of illegally acquired property partakes the nature of a
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3)
penalty. In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,49 the Court cited
Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
voluminous authorities in support of its declaration of the
provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members
criminal or penal nature of forfeiture proceedings, viz:
of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of
and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under property without compensation, in consequence of a
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.45
default or an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several
this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way counts in an information is upheld if one count is good.
of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, According to the authorities such proceedings, where the
but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course owner of the property appears, are so far considered as
of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner from
legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to being a witness against himself and to prevent the
aid in the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a compulsory production of his books and papers. . . ." (23
forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from Am. Jur. 612)
the owner to the sovereign power. (23 Am. Jur. 599)
.
"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the
incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the "Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be
consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute
refusal to comply with some requirement of law.' It may be providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil
said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of causes shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want
duty.'" (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.) of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however,
suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal
. nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all
the purposes of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment
"Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of which declares that no person shall be compelled in any
goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment criminal case to be a witness against himself. The
against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the
rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be
that where the person using the res illegally is the owner of proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought
rightful possessor of it the forfeiture proceeding is in the to be forfeited." (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368)50
nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in
the nature of Cabal v. Kapunan modified the earlier ruling in Almeda, Sr.
v. Perez.51 The Court in Cabal held that the doctrine laid
down in Almeda refers to the purely procedural aspect of
the forfeiture proceedings and has no bearing on the It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A.
substantial rights of respondents, particularly their No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination.52 This was Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in
reaffirmed and reiterated in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired
property amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this
Republic v. Agoncillo53 and Katigbak v. Solicitor General.54 reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider
that the respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a
The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over public officer or employee and the violation of R.A. No.
violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring 1379 was committed during the respondent officer or
Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have employees incumbency and in relation to his office. This is
Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee in line with the purpose behind the creation of the
and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor." What acts Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft courtto address the
would constitute a violation of such a law? A reading of R.A. urgent problem of dishonesty in public service.58
No. 1379 establishes that it does not enumerate any
prohibited acts the commission of which would necessitate Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore
the imposition of a penalty. Instead, it provides the abandon his erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has
procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case a public jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture filed against
officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an President Marcos, his family and cronies.
amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful We come then to the question of authority of the Office of
income and income from legitimately acquired the Ombudsman to investigate, file and
property.55 Section 1256 of the law provides a penalty but it
is only imposed upon the public officer or employee who prosecute petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. This
transfers or conveys the unlawfully acquired property; it was the main issue resolved in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.59
does not penalize the officer or employee for making the
unlawful acquisition. In effect, as observed in Almeda, Sr. v. Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General
Perez, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
unlawfully acquired upon the respondent public officer or before the then Courts of First Instance. P.D. No. Decree No.
employee.57 1486 was later issued on 11 June 1978 vesting the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379 statutes that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a
forfeiture proceedings. Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the
Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file and prosecute condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
forfeiture cases. This may be taken as an implied repeal by existing and prior laws.64
P.D. No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former Courts of
First Instance and the authority of the Solicitor General to The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379 refers
file a petition for forfeiture under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 by to the jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding and the
transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the authority to file the petition for forfeiture. As P.D. No. 1486
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to the
respectively.60 An implied repeal is one which takes place Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, the then
when a new law contains some provisions which are Courts of First Instance and Solicitor General cannot
contrary to, but do not expressly repeal those of a former exercise concurrent jurisdiction or authority over such
law.61 As a rule, repeals by implication are not favored and cases. Hence, P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are
will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the inconsistent with each other and the former should be
legislature so intended. Before such repeal is deemed to deemed to have repealed the latter.lawphil.net
exist, it must be shown that the statutes or statutory
provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the On 11 June 1978, the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was
latter be inconsistent with the former. The language used in enacted, P.D. No. 148765 creating the Office of the
the latter statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable Ombudsman (then known as the Tanodbayan) was passed.
with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency The Tanodbayan initially had no authority to prosecute
that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1486, such jurisdiction being
repeal.62 vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier mentioned.

P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which provides On 10 December 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly
that "[A]ny provision of law, order, rule or regulation repealing P.D. No. 1486. Issued on the same date was P.D.
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree is hereby No. 160766 which amended the powers of the Tanodbayan
repealed or modified accordingly."63 This is not an express to investigate administrative complaints67 and created the
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.68 P.D. No. 1607
provided said Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor with Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefore and to direct
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of and control the prosecution of said cases.74 The power to
all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file informations conduct the necessary investigation and to file and
therefor, and direct and control the prosecution of said prosecute the corresponding criminal and administrative
cases.69 P.D. No. 1607 also removed from the Chief Special cases before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or
Prosecutor the authority to file actions for forfeiture under administrative agency against any public personnel who
R.A. No. 1379.70 has acted in a manner warranting criminal and disciplinary
action or proceedings was also transferred from the Chief
The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.75
law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be
thereby revived unless expressly so provided. From this it Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D. Nos. 1860
may fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force and 186176 which granted the Tanodbayan the same
where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by authority. The present Constitution was subsequently
implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the ratified and then the Tanodbayan became known as the
repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the Office of the Special Prosecutor which continued to exercise
language of the repealing statute provides its powers except those conferred on the Office of the
otherwise.71Hence, the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. Ombudsman created under the Constitution.77 The Office of
1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor the Ombudsman was officially created under R.A. No.
General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, 6770.78
but not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over
the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by
(now Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation R.A. No. 6770, corollary to Sec. 13, Art. XI of the
therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the Constitution, include the authority, among others, to:
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor.72
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
The Tanodbayans authority was further expanded by P.D. any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
No. 163073 issued on 18 July 1990. Among other things, the employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
Tanodbayan was given the exclusive authority to conduct appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary It is obvious then that respondent Office of the Ombudsman
jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any acted well within its authority in conducting the
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of investigation of petitioners illegally acquired assets and in
such cases;79 filing the petition for forfeiture against him. The contention
that the procedural requirements under Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379 were not complied with no longer deserve
consideration in view of the foregoing discussion.
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-
after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties shopping. Forum-shopping is manifest whenever a party
involved therein.80 "repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the substantially founded on the same transactions and the
petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. However, the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
Ombudsmans exercise of the correlative powers to substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
investigate and initiate the proper action for recovery of ill- resolved adversely by, some other court."83 It has also been
gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to defined as "an act of a party against whom an adverse
cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and
wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.81 As regards such possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other
wealth accumulated on or before said date, the than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the
Ombudsman is without authority to commence before the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
Sandiganbayan such forfeiture actionsince the authority on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
to file forfeiture proceedings on or before 25 February 1986 court would make a favorable disposition."84 Considered a
belongs to the Solicitor Generalalthough he has the pernicious evil, it adversely affects the efficient
authority to investigate such cases for forfeiture even administration of justice since it clogs the court dockets,
before 25 February 1986, pursuant to the Ombudsmans unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the
general investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No. judiciary, and trifles with and mocks judicial
6770.82 processes.85 Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a
ground for summary dismissal of the complaint or
initiatory pleading with prejudice and constitutes direct However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had
contempt of court, as well as a cause for administrative filed a Motion to Dismiss88 in relation to the petition for
sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in the forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. The existence of this
same case where the forum-shopping is found.86 motion was only brought to the attention of this Court by
respondent Office of the Ombudsman in its Comment. A
There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner
forum-shopping. The present petition was filed raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the
accompanied by the requisite Verification and Certification same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact,
Against Forum Shopping87 in which petitioner made the the Arguments and Discussion89 in the Petition of
following representation: petitioners thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of
. unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted
from the Motion to Dismiss. The only difference between the
3.] As Petitioner, I have not heretofore commenced any
two is that in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of
other action or proceeding in the Supreme Court, the Court
failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, involving the
procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner
same issues as that in the above-captioned case.
prays for the annulment of the
Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 29 October 2004
4.] To the best of my knowledge, no such action or
and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial.
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency.
Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the same intent of
5.] If I should hereafter learn that such proceeding has been dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner,
commenced or is pending before the Supreme Court, the his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is incontestably forum-
undertake to report that fact to this Honorable Court within shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the petition
five (5) days from knowledge thereof. outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate
action against the counsel and party concerned.90 The
brazenness of this attempt at forum-shopping is even
demonstrated by the fact that both the Petition and Motion
to Dismiss were filed on the same day, 17 November 2004. TOPIC: ON JURISDICTION C. SANDIGANBAYAN: Original
Petitioner should have waited for the resolution of and Exclusive Jurisdiction (b-1. Who committed the offense
his Motion to Dismiss before resorting to the petition at or crime)
hand.
Republic of the Philippines
Petitioners counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus, SUPREME COURT
needs to be reminded that his primary duty is to assist the Manila
courts in the administration of justice. As an officer of the
court, his duties to the court are more significant and SECOND DIVISION
important than his obligations to his clients. Any conduct
which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the G.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004
administration thereof contravenes his oath of
ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner,
office.91 Atty. De Jesus failed to accord due regard, as he
vs
must, the tenets of the legal profession and the mission of
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the
our courts of justice. For this, he should be penalized.
Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez,
Penalties imposed upon lawyers who engaged in forum-
Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon.
shopping range from severe censure to suspension from
David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
the practice of law.92 In the instant case, we deem the
Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N.
imposition of a fine in the amount of 20,000.00 to be
Nueca, respondents.
sufficient to make Atty. De Jesus realize the seriousness of
his naked abuse of the judicial process.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
DISMISSED. Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus is DECLARED in
CONTEMPT of this Court and meted a fine of Twenty This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
Thousand Pesos (20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
days from the finality of this D E C I S I O N. Costs against injunction filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of
petitioner. SO ORDERED. the remand by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
of the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul
Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 21. one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal
armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said
The petition at bench arose from the following milieu: Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting upon him serious,
mortal and fatal wounds which caused his
The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine death, and as a consequence thereof, complainant
Military Academy, a member of the Armed Forces of LUZ N. NUECA, mother of the deceased victim,
the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as suffered actual and compensatory damages in the
well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN
National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100
was conducting surveillance operations on drug (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and
trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of ONE
Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. He HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00)
somehow got involved in a shooting incident, PESOS, Philippine Currency.1
resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N.
Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively
Information was filed with the RTC of Naga City, suspending the petitioner from the service under
Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-3184 Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847.
charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters
Bombita, Jr. alias "Jun Bombita" with murder. The of the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91,
accusatory portion of the amended Information preventively suspending the petitioner from the service
reads: until the case was terminated.2

That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this by the RTC, while accused Bombita remained at large. The
Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.
Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually When arraigned on April 9, 1991,3 the petitioner, assisted
helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order10 denying
Motion to Quash4 the Information alleging that as the motion to dismiss. It, however, ordered the conduct of a
mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408,5 in relation to preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime
Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his
R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had office as a member of the PNP.
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members
and officers. In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that
it was no longer presenting any evidence in connection
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June with the petitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already
25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his rested its case, and that its evidence showed that the
reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his petitioner did not commit the offense charged in
suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served connection with the performance of his duties as a member
the same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23, of the Philippine Constabulary. According to the
1993,6 the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a)
C. Naval requesting information on whether he issued an the petitioner was not wearing his uniform during the
order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not incident; (b) the offense was committed just after midnight;
reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a (c) the petitioner was drunk when the crime was
motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. committed; (d) the petitioner was in the company of
He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse
suspension and pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC called "Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant."11
denied the motion on March 9, 1994.7 Trial thereafter
proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m.
petitioner commenced the presentation of his evidence. On on March 15, 1990, he was at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and
July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss8the case. Citing Restaurant at Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance
Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,9 he argued on alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No.
that since he committed the crime in the performance of his 03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The
duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of
the case. Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated
his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the
aforestated date.12 mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and
unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an
that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not official mission when the crime was committed.
in the performance of his official function. The trial court
added that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13 the issue On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and
had become moot and academic. The amendatory law issued an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31,
transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from 1995 Order. It declared that based on the petitioners
the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting
have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce
4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz
the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the Nacario Nuecas admission in her complaint before the
ruling in Republic v. Asuncion14 and R.A. No. 7975. The PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the
amendment consisted in the inclusion therein of an shooting happened.
allegation that the offense charged was not committed by
the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-
nor in relation to his office.lawphi1.nt Amended Information and to allege that the offense
charged was committed by the petitioner in the
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration15 of performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his
the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter
those of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the
charged was committed by him in relation to his official stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to consider
the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is
7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it is
applied retroactively.16 hereby declared that after preliminary hearing, this
Court has found that the offense charged in the
Information herein was committed by the accused in
his relation to his function and duty as member of jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner
the then Philippine Constabulary. had a salary grade of "23." Furthermore, the prosecution
had already rested its case and the petitioner had
Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following
the Supreme Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et al., the rule on continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should
G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994: continue with the case and render judgment therein after
trial.
(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to
file a Re-Amended Information alleging that Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for
the offense charged was committed by the trial on May 3, 1996, for the petitioner to continue
Accused in the performance of his presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence,
duties/functions or in relation to his office, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the
within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof; Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
remanding the records of the case to the RTC.
(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended
Information, the complete records of this The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the
case, together with the transcripts of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
stenographic notes taken during the entire abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of
proceedings herein, are hereby ordered jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.
transmitted immediately to the Honorable
Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court, The petitioner contends that when the amended
Manila, for appropriate proceedings.17 information was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991,
P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over
Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, the case against him as he was charged with homicide with
Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime
Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of was committed while in the performance of his duties. He
Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
as amended by R.A. No. 7975,18 the RTC retained P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes
committed by members and officers of the PNP with a The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is
salary grade below "27" committed in relation to office are determined by the allegations in the Information or the
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the
amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be commencement of the action, unless such statute provides
applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional
because under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those cases requirements must be alleged in the Information.19 Such
where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the
effectivity of the law should be referred to the proper trial case continues until the case is terminated.20
court.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No.
The private complainant agrees with the contention of the 1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all
petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor cases involving the following:
contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
be applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
jurisdiction over the crime committed by the petitioner Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by
the time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the officers and employees in relation to their office,
law should be given retroactive effect. including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or
The Ruling of the Court complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine
law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the of P6,000.00 .21
remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive
jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by
public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
the facts showing the intimate relation between the office Pambansa Blg. 129.
of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime
in the Information that the crime charged was committed charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
by the offender in relation to his office because that would corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper
be a conclusion of law.22 The amended Information filed Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case
with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In
allegation showing the intimate relation between his office this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with
and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide
jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had
24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably
to include therein an allegation that the petitioner to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not
amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect and under be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears
Section 2 of the law: stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law
which may be applied retroactively.23
In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
"27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
SO ORDERED.
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent,
exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
TOPIC: ON JURISDICTION C. SANDIGANBAYAN: Original Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
and Exclusive Jurisdiction (b-2. Private individuals awarded by the Government, through the Department of
committing the offense or crime with public officers) Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine
Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction,
Republic of the Philippines operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino
SUPREME COURT International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
Manila (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain
Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of
EN BANC the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged
violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a
vs.
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
to the government.
DECISION
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy
PERALTA, J.: Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict,
among others, herein respondent for violation of Section
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of
assailing the Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer
Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the
Information filed against herein respondent for alleged resolution finding probable cause.
violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A.
3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005,
Practices Act. respondent was charged before the SB as follows:

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent
this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from
ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of today within which to show cause why this case should not
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of accused considering that the accused is a private person
the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-
Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, case.5
unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction of the The prosecution complied with the above Order contending
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and
Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the
Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if
under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 he is a private person, because he was alleged to have
(BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility conspired with a public officer.6
Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of
the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the
under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Information filed against him on the ground that the
Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an
more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the the show cause order of the SB, also contended that,
Philippines.4 independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public
officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090. respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated
by any official authority as a government agent, may not be
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit: prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

The prosecution filed its Opposition.8


On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE
pertinent portions of which read thus: JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS
dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged
co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long III
before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL
ordered quashed and dismissed.9 PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT
QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to CASE NO. 2809010
wit:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
I
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER unlawful:
THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
xxxx
II
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will
profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are: Respondent contends that by reason of the death of
Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged
(1) that the accused is a public officer; in the Information and, as such, prosecution against
respondent may not prosper.
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and The Court is not persuaded.

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.11 no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be
charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean,
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them
private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death
the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not
may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as mean that there was no public officer who allegedly
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the
a case involving herein private respondent.13 Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e)
The only question that needs to be settled in the present
and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should
petition is whether herein respondent, a private person,
have been charged.
may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was The requirement before a private person may be indicted
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is
Information. that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not
require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to
where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in
as in the present case where the public officer has already violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy,
died, the private person may be indicted alone. the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability
incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators co-conspirators.
in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons
enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed
pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts
act of each of them and they are jointly responsible of public officers and private persons alike, which
therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated
by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of
the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or a private person who conspired with such public officer in
written by each of them and it makes no difference whether violating the Anti-Graft Law.
the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time
of trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of
does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that: governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine
jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One
person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime
So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does except when the law specifically provides a penalty
not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of
defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19 conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable
offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but
alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in
furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will
the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law
remains undisturbed. responsible for the whole, the same as though performed
by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more
a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The
stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is
Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x
x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close
mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal
specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the act, for the commission of which they all acted by common
existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the
cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x
with the other evidence of record, in establishing the x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party
existence, of the consummated crime and its commission created by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
by the conspirators.
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators
extent and character of their respective active participation attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the
law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who
anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn
persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of
the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its
out the conspiracy. presence.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as
the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different
imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy
this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section
separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another
criminal liability. agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the
Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case
xxxx was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB,
through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no
jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution
conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a
design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed
criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31,
conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible
consummating their common purpose is a patent display of error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final
their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now
criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22 argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919
should be applied in the instant case.
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should
be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded
settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he
in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No.
ventilated before the trial court during trial, where 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that
private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his
Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to
his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused that jurisdiction."
in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief
is tantamount to submission of his person to the Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the
jurisdiction of the court.27 purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of
Thus, it has been held that: objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any
other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance
competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to
the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before
the courts jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other
files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby matters which called for respondent courts exercise of its
gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said
John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534) courts jurisdiction over him. x x x.28

xxxx In the instant case, respondent did not make any special
appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]: person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued
be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the
voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not his person.
to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion
for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that
the instant case involves a contract entered into by public
officers representing the government. More importantly, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of
the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting
original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and
3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to
in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices Criminal Case No. 28090.
or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant
case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section SO ORDERED.
3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile.
Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Republic of the Philippines
Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by SUPREME COURT
the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the Manila
latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons
SECOND DIVISION
already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already
divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case
G.R. Nos. 140576-99 December 13, 2004
involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would
mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner,
longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on vs.
other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division),
offenders. ALBANO & ASSOCIATES and the ASSOCIATION OF
GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS, INC., respondents.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve
matters which are mere incidents in the main case and the DECISION
main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years.
Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court CALLEJO, SR., J.:
would further delay the resolution of the main case and it
would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case. the Revised Rules of Court, of the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, dated June 9, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos.
25122 to 25145, and its Resolution dated October 22, 1999, for Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real estate
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at General
Santos City and questionable payments of transfer taxes
The Antecedents prejudicial to the government had been entertained into
between certain parties. She then requested the
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Ombudsman to investigate the petitioner, Retired Brig. Gen.
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) was established in Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the AFP-
December 1973 and started its actual operations in 1976. RSBS,6 together with twenty-seven (27) other persons7 for
Created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as conspiracy in misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in
amended, the AFP-RSBS was designed to establish a defrauding the government millions of pesos in capital
separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to gains and documentary stamp taxes.8
the AFP military retirement system as provided for in
Republic Act No. 340.1 Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS was On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary
to be funded from three principal sources: (a) investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy C. Rubillar-Arao filed
congressional appropriations and compulsory twenty-four (24) separate Informations with the
contributions from members of the AFP; (2) donations, Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and several other
gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the system; and (3) all accused. The filing of the Informations was duly approved
earnings of the system which shall not be subject to any tax by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve
whatsoever.2 AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or (12) Informations were for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep.
controlled corporation (GOCC) under Rep. Act No. 9182, Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
otherwise known as "The Special Purpose Vehicle Act of Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
2002." It is administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP 25122 to 25133.9 All were similarly worded, except for the
through a Board of Trustees and Management Group.3 Its names of the other accused, the dates of the commission of
funds are in the nature of public funds.4 the offense, and the property involved. Representative of
the said Informations is that filed in Criminal Case No.
On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a 25122, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
member of the House of Representatives representing the
First District of the Province of South Cotabato, filed a That sometime on September 24, 1997, and prior, or
"Complaint-Affidavit"5 with the Office of the Ombudsman subsequent thereto, in General Santos City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this and P157,342.50, respectively, thereby short-
Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a changing and causing undue injury to the
high ranking public official being then the President, government through evident bad faith and manifest
and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low ranking public partiality in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED
officer being the Project Director, both of the AFP- NINETY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVEN
RSBS, while in the performance of their official and 50/100 PESOS (P292,207.50), more or less.
duties, taking advantage of their official positions
and committing the offense in relation to their CONTRARY TO LAW.10
offices, conspiring together and confederating with
NILO FLAVIANO and ALEX GUAYBAR, both private On the other hand, twelve (12) other separate Informations
individuals, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully indicted the accused for Falsification of Public Documents,
and criminally execute and/or cause the execution defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the
of a falsified Deed of Sale covering Lot-X-4, a real Revised Penal Code, docketed therein as Criminal Cases
property located at General Santos City, by making it Nos. 25134 to 25145.11 Save with respect to the names of
appear therein that the purchase price of the said lot the other accused, the dates of the commission of the
is only TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY- felonies, and the property involved in each case, the
SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS Informations were, likewise, similarly worded,
at P3,000.00 per square meter, when in truth and in representative of which is that in Criminal Case No. 25134.
fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, The accusatory portion reads:
agreed, that the same was sold for P10,500.00 per
That on or about September 24, 1997, and sometime
square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR
prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos City,
HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, and use the
Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a
said falsified Deed of Sale as basis for payment of
high-ranking public official being then the President,
capital gains and documentary stamp taxes relative
and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low-ranking public
to the sale of the subject lot in the amount of
officer being the Project Director, both of the AFP-
only P299,700.00 and P89,910.00, respectively,
RSBS, while in the performance of their duties,
when the capital gains, and documentary stamp and
taking advantage of their official positions and
other taxes should have been P524,475.00
committing the offense in relation to their offices, Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Special
conspiring and confederating with each other and Prosecutor opposed the said motions.15
with accused NILO FLAVIANO and JACK GUIWAN,
both private individuals, acting with unfaithfulness Meanwhile, pending resolution of the aforementioned
and with malicious intent, did, there and then, motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates filed a "Notice
willfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify a public of Appearance"16 as private prosecutors in all the
document by executing and/or causing to be aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and
executed a Deed of Sale for a 999-sq. m. property Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI)17 on March 9, 1999. The notice of
particularly identified as Lot-X-5 located at General appearance was apparently made conformably to the
Santos City and stating therein a purchase price of letter-request of Retired Commodore Ismael Aparri and
only P3,000.00 per square meter or a total of TWO Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are members
MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN thereof.
THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS when in truth
and in fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in In a Resolution18 dated April 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan
fact, agreed, the purchase price of said lot denied the earlier motions filed by the petitioner for lack of
is P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN merit. Consequently, a warrant of arrest against him was
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE issued.19 He posted a cash bail bond for his provisional
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) liberty.20
PESOS, thereby perverting the truth.
On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the appearance of
CONTRARY TO LAW.12 the law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors,
contending that the charges brought against him were
On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion purely public crimes which did not involve damage or
to Dismiss the Informations and to Defer the Issuance of injury to any private party; thus, no civil liability had
Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction.13 He, arisen.21 He argued that under Section 16 of the Rules of
likewise, filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Criminal Procedure, "an offended party may be allowed to
Suspend Proceedings14 on February 16, 1999, because of intervene through a special prosecutor only in those cases
the pendency of his motion for reinvestigation with the where there is civil liability arising from the criminal
offense charged."22 He maintained that if the prosecution
were to be allowed to prove damages, the prosecution own, apart from the individual members who compose
would thereby be proving another crime, in violation of his it.24 Hence, it is of no moment if some members of AGFOI
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the are or have been members and beneficiaries of the AFP-
charge against him. RSBS.

In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Meanwhile, on June 6, 1999, the petitioner filed a "Motion
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members for Reinvestigation"25 with the Sandiganbayan, mentioning
of the AGFOI and contributors of AFP-RSBS. It alleged that therein his unresolved motion for reconsideration with the
as such members-contributors, they "have been Office of the Ombudsman. He prayed that the proceeding be
disadvantaged or deprived of their lawful investments and suspended and his arraignment deferred pending the
residual interest at the AFP-RSBS" through the criminal resolution of the reinvestigation.
acts of the petitioner and his cohorts. It posited that its
clients, not having waived the civil aspect of the cases The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in its Order dated
involved, have all the right to intervene pursuant to Section June 11, 1999. The fallo of the said resolution reads:
16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the law firm
averred that its appearance was in collaboration with the WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from
Office of the Ombudsman, and that their intervention in any today within which to elevate its evidence and to do
event, was subject to the direction and control of the Office whatever is appropriate on the Motion for
of the Special Prosecutor.23 Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and
supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of
Replying to the comment, the petitioner refuted the accused Jose Ramiscal, Jr. and to inform this Court
allegation of AGFOI that he had civil interest in the criminal within the said period as to its findings and
cases involved. He posited that AGFOI was neither a recommendations together with the action thereon
member nor a beneficiary of the AFP-RSBS. Moreover, of the Ombudsman.
considering that it was funded partly by the national
government and individual soldiers by way of salary As prayed for in open court by Pros. Monteroso, this
deductions, the AGFOI never contributed a single centavo authority from the Court for the prosecution to
to the funds of the AFP-RSBS. He further averred that evaluate its evidence and take such appropriate
AGFOI, as an organization, has a distinct personality of its
action as regards accused Ramiscals subject motion I
shall also include the case regarding all the accused.
WHETHER OR NOT, BY NATURE, THE SUBJECT
SO ORDERED.26 CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF
SECTION 3(E), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND
In the meantime, in a Resolution27 dated June 9, 1999, the ARTICLE 172, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171, OF
Sandiganbayan made short shrift of the petitioners THE REVISED PENAL CODE GIVE RISE TO CIVIL
opposition and denied his plea for the denial of the LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ANY PRIVATE PARTY.
appearance of the law firm.28 In justifying its resolution, the
Sandiganbayan declared as follows: II

Considering that the offended parties are members of the WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS REPRESENTED BY
AFP-RSBS, as represented by the two (2) flag officers, and ALBANO & ASSOCIATES ARE PRIVATE INJURED
their right may be affected by the action of the Court PARTIES ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS THE
resolving the criminal and civil aspects of the cases, there PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IN THE SUBJECT CASES.33
appears a strong legal presumption that their appearance
should not be disturbed. After all, their appearance is In support of his petition, the petitioner reiterated the same
subject to the direct supervision and control of the public arguments he put forth before the Sandiganbayan.
prosecutor.29
The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that the remedy
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration30 of the resorted to by the petitioner under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Sandiganbayans Resolution of June 9, 1999, which was Civil Procedure was improper since the assailed
opposed31 by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are interlocutory in
Resolution32 denying the same on October 22, 1999. nature and not final; hence, the remedy of the petitioner
was to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
The petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He also argues that the
the Rules of Civil Procedure, for the nullification of the June petition is premature because the reinvestigation of the
9, 1999 and October 22, 1999 Resolutions of the graft court, cases had not yet been completed. On the merits of the
and raised the following issues: petition, he posits that the AGFOI is a member of the AFP-
RSBS, and that its rights may be affected by the outcome of that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance,
the cases. He further alleged that the appearance of the of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the
private prosecutor was subject to the direct supervision task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the
and control of the public prosecutor. controversy or determining the rights and liabilities
of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains
The petitioner, however, asserts, by way of reply, that the to be done by the Court except to await the parties
assailed orders of the Sandiganbayan are final orders; next move (which, among others, may consist of the
hence, his recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or
Procedure was proper. the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to
cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
The Ruling of the Court "final" or, to use the established and more
distinctive term, "final and executory."35
The Assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
are Interlocutory in Nature

The word interlocutory refers to something intervening Conversely, an order that does not finally disposes
between the commencement and the end of a suit which of the case, and does not end the Courts task of
decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of adjudicating the parties contentions and
the whole controversy. The Court distinguished a final determining their rights and liabilities as regards
order or resolution from an interlocutory one each other, but obviously indicates that other things
in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals34 as follows: remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory,"
e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under
A "final" judgment or order is one that finally
Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done
extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing
by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication
amendment thereof, or granting or denying
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
applications for postponement, or production or
presented at the trial, declares categorically what
inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a
the rights and obligations of the parties are and
"final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as
which party is in the right; or a judgment or order
above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not
be questioned on appeal except only as part of an of probable cause against the petitioner after the
appeal that may eventually be taken from the final reinvestigation of the cases, and, thereafter, the
judgment rendered in this case.36 Sandiganbayan would sustain the finding of probable cause
against the petitioner and issue warrants for his arrest, the
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, graft court would then have to proceed to trial, receive the
to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience evidence of the parties and render judgment on the basis
to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are thereof. The petitioner would then have the following
promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be options: (a) to proceed to trial, and, if convicted, file a
contested in a single appeal.37 petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
this Court; or (b) to file a petition for certiorari, under Rule
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only final 65 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the resolutions of the
judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
Sandiganbayan may be assailed therein. The remedy is a amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
mode of appeal on questions of law only.38 said resolutions and decision.

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan merely resolved to Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall
allow the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates treat the petition as one filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
as private prosecutors, on its finding that the AGFOI, Court. Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is
represented by Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to
who were, likewise, investors/members of the AFP-RSBS, is encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of
the offended party whose rights may be affected by the procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical
prosecution of the criminal and civil aspects of the cases sense, as they are used only to help secure, not override
and the outcome thereof. Furthermore, the private substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
prosecutor is subject to the direct supervision and control rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Consequently, in
of the public prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan did not the interest of justice, the instant petition for review may be
dispose of the cases on their merits, more specifically, the treated as a special civil action on certiorari.39 As we held
guilt or innocence of the petitioner or the civil liabilities in Salinas v. NLRC,40 a petition which should have been
attendant to the commission of the crimes charged. brought under Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of the Rules
Assuming that the Ombudsman would maintain the finding of Court, is not an inflexible rule. The strict application of
procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy is grave abuse of discretion where the public
disposition of the case on the merits.41 respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary
or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as
Although there is no allegation in the petition at bar that to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.43
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, nonetheless, the Besides, unless we resolve the present petition on its
petitioner made the following averments: that the graft merits, other parties, like the private respondents herein,
court arbitrarily declared the AGFOI to be the offended may, likewise, enter their appearance as offended parties
party despite the plain language of the Informations and and participate in criminal proceedings before the
the nature of the crimes charged; and that the graft court Sandiganbayan.
blatantly violated basic procedural rules, thereby
eschewing the speedy and orderly trial in the above cases. The Appearance of the Law Firm Albano & Associates
He, likewise, averred that the Sandiganbayan had no
authority to allow the entry of a party, through a private The respondent law firm entered its appearance as private
prosecutor, which has no right to the civil liabilities of the prosecutor for AGFOI, purportedly upon the request of
accused arising from the crimes charged, or where the Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, quoted infra:
accused has no civil liabilities at all based on the nature of
Atty. Antonio Albano
said crimes. The petitioner also faulted the Sandiganbayan
Practicing Lawyer
for rejecting his opposition thereto, in gross violation of the
Albano-Irao Law Offices
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Penal
Code. Indeed, such allegations are sufficient to qualify the
Dear Atty. Albano:
petition as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As we
held in People v. Court of Appeals:42 We represent a number of Retired Generals and
other Star Rank Officers who rightfully claim to have
The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it
been disadvantaged or deprived of our lawful
does not have the legal power to determine the case;
investments and residual interest at the Retirement
there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent,
Separation Benefit System, AFP because of alleged
being clothed with the power to determine the case,
oversteps its authority as determined by law. There
plunder of the Systems Funds, Large Scale Estafa The AGFOI and/or Commodore
and Falsification of Public Documents. Aparri and/or Brig. Gen.
Navarro Are Not the Offended
We are requesting that you appear in our behalf as Parties in the Informations filed
private prosecutor of our case. Before the Sandiganbayan

Thank you very much. The petitioner avers that the crimes charged are public
offenses and, by their very nature, do not give rise to
(Sgd.) COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI (RET) criminal liabilities in favor of any private party. He asserts
that, as gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases
(Sgd.) BGEN. PEDRO I. NAVARRO (RET)44 Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019, the offended party is the government because
As gleaned from the letter-request, the legal services of the based on the deeds of sale executed in favor of the AFP-
respondent law firm were not engaged by the AGFOI itself; RSBS, as vendee, it was deprived of capital gains and the
it was Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who did documentary stamp taxes. He contends that the
so, for and in behalf of the other retired generals and star Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145, for
rank officers claiming to have residual interests in or to be falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article
investors of the AFP-RSBS, the vendee of the lots subject of 171 of the Revised Penal Code, do not contain any
the Informations against the petitioner. Moreover, there is allegation that the AGFOI or any private party sustained
no showing in the records that the Board of Directors of the any damage caused by the said falsifications. The petitioner
AGFOI, authorized them to engage the services of the further argues that absent any civil liability arising from the
respondent law firm to represent it as private prosecutor in crimes charged in favor of AGFOI, the latter cannot be
the above cases. Neither is there any resolution on record considered the offended party entitled to participate in the
issued by the Board of Directors of the AGFOI authorizing proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. According to the
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro to secure the petitioner, this view conforms to Section 16, Rule 110 of the
services of the respondent law firm to represent it as the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
private prosecutor in said cases. If at all, the respondent
law firm is the counsel of Aparri and Navarro only. SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal
action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the
to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by AGFOI, and even Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen.
counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Navarro, are not the offended parties envisaged in Section
16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
The petitioner posits that the AGFOI is not a member, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
beneficiary or contributor of the AFP-RSBS, and that even if
it were so, it would not sustain a direct and material Under Section 5, Rule 11045 of the Rules, all criminal actions
damage by an adverse outcome of the cases. Allowing the covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
AGFOI to intervene would open the floodgates to any under the direct supervision and control of the public
person similarly situated to intervene in the proceedings prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the
and, thus, frustrate the speedy, efficient and inexpensive accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil
disposition of the cases. action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said
criminal acts is impliedly instituted46 and the offended
In his Comment, the Special Prosecutor avers that the party has not waived the civil action, reserved the right to
AGFOI is entitled to intervene in the proceedings in the institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to
Sandiganbayan because it is a member of the AFP-RSBS, the criminal action, the prosecution of the action inclusive
whose rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases. of the civil action remains under the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor.47 The prosecution of
The AGFOI and the respondent law firm contend that the offenses is a public function.48 Under Section 16, Rule 110
latter has a right to intervene, considering that such of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may
intervention would enable the members of AGFOI to assert intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel,
their rights to information and access to the official records, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his
documents, and papers, a right granted by no less than interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive
paragraph 7, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution. administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose
Furthermore, the funds of the AFP-RSBS are impressed would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-
with public character because the government provided for consuming for both parties and further delay the final
its initial funds, augmented from time to time by the salary disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be
contributions of the incumbent AFP soldiers and officers. avoided.49 With the implied institution of the civil action in
the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one
composite proceeding, with the criminal action The offended party may be the State or any of its
predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal instrumentalities, including local governments or
action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and government-owned or controlled corporations, such as the
others from committing the same or similar offense, to AFP-RSBS, which, under substantive laws, are entitled to
isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in restitution of their properties or funds, reparation, or
general, to maintain social order. indemnification. For instance, in malversation of public
funds or property under Article 21752 of the Revised Penal
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for Code, frauds under Article 21353 of the Revised Penal Code,
the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private and violations of the Forestry Code of the Philippines, P.D.
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by No. 705, as amended, to mention a few, the government is
reason of the delictual or felonious act of the the offended party entitled to the civil liabilities of the
accused.50 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused. For violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
following are the civil liabilities of the accused: 3019,54 any party, including the government, may be the
offended party if such party sustains undue injury caused
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil by the delictual acts of the accused. In such cases, the
liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and government is to be represented by the public prosecutor
103 of this Code includes: for the recovery of the civil liability of the accused.

1. Restitution; Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may also be a private
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
or omission of the accused,55 or that corporate entity which
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of.
asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial
to consider his appearance merely as a matter of interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle
tolerance.51 him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if
the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the
demand and the accused will be protected by the
satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be nor is it entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for
a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The said cases. Thus, it is not the offended party in the said
interest of the party must be personal; and not one based cases.
on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and unrelated party.56 We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the
offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for
Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also be members falsification of public documents under paragraph 4, Sec. 1,
or beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS, the respondent AGFOI Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing
does not have a legal right to intervene in the criminal cases that in the felony of falsification of public document, the
merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the existence of any prejudice caused to third person or the
constitutional right of such members to have access to the intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes
records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are such members entitled to immaterial. The controlling consideration is the public
intervene therein simply because the funds of the AFP- character of a document and the violation of the public faith
RSBS are public or government funds. It must be stressed and the destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed.
that any interest of the members of the AFP-RSBS over its The offender does not, in any way, have civil liability to a
funds or property is merely inchoate and incidental. Such third person.57
funds belong to the AFP-RSBS which has a juridical
personality separate and independent of its However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered
members/beneficiaries. thereby is underpriced by a public officer and his co-
conspirators to conceal the correct amount of capital gains
As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. and documentary stamp taxes due on the sale causing
25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. undue injury to the government, the offenders thereby
3019, the offended party is the government, which was commit two crimes (a) falsification of public document
allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other accused defined in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal
of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes, based on Code; and (b) violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,
the actual and correct purchase price of the property stated a special penal law. The offender incurs civil liability to the
therein in favor of the AFP-RSBS. The AGFOI was not government as the offended party for violation of Section
involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, but not for falsification of public
charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said transactions,
document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Republic of the Philippines
Penal Code. SUPREME COURT
Manila
On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS
was made liable for the payment of the capital gains and EN BANC
documentary stamp taxes and, thereafter, gave the correct
amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the G.R. No. 154473 April 24, 2009
government, and the petitioner and his co-accused
pocketed the difference between the correct amount of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA
taxes and the amount entrusted for payment, then the AFP- MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
RSBS may be considered the offended party entitled to vs.
intervene in the above criminal cases, through the ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
Government Corporate Counsel.58
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
In fine, the AGFOI is not the offended party entitled to
G.R. No. 155573 April 24, 2009
intervene in said cases.
PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
vs.
is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review


on certiorari filed under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of
Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 20021 and
the June 23, 20022 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-
109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25, filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-
20023 and the September 18, 20024 Orders of the RTC of Complaint8 for libel.
Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent
The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City
different factual settings, thus: Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).9 Despite the
challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information10 for
G.R. No. 154473 libel against the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-02-109407, with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102.
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then
Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and
delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Consolidation,11 contending that Judge Jaime N. Salazar of
Roots and Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case
Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, because his appointment to the judiciary was made
Quezon City.5 The speech was subsequently published in possible through the recommendation of respondents
the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin.6 father-in-law. Petitioner further moved that the case be
ordered consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded Case No. Q-02-103406, which is the subject of G.R. No.
to by the respondent when he stated in his speech that 155573] pending with Branch 101 of the RTC.

Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent,
signing a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that for his part, moved for the dismissal of the case on the
could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his
solution that isnt even a requirement for voting. But person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could
reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his
are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally
grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should
common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion- investigate him and the case should be filed with the
peso price tag.7 Sandiganbayan.12
On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO
Order13 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407 and JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.16
considering as moot and academic petitioners motion to
inhibit. While the RTC found that respondent was no longer G.R. No. 155573
an impeachable officer because his appointment was not
confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco were
alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to guests of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon
his officehe delivered the speech in his official capacity as and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The
COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan television shows episode that day was entitled "COMELEC
that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all Wars."17 In that episode, the following conversation
other courts. transpired:

On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are
ruling that it was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the being used for a "PR" campaign against you? Is that what
libel case.14 you are saying?

Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure Benipayo: No, I think [its] not COMELEC funds, [its]
questions of law, the instant Petition for Review on Photokina funds. You know, admittedly, according to
Certiorari15 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the [c]harg d[a]ffaires of the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to
Rules of Court raising the following grounds: me in July of 2001, it is whats been [so] happening to the
Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess of 2.4
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] thats about 120
MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?] [T]hey wouldnt tell
TO DISMISS; me, you see. Now you asked me, [who is] funding this? I
think its pretty obvious.18
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME
OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED "IN Petitioner considered respondents statement as
RELATION TO HIS OFFICE;" AND defamatory, and, through its authorized representative,
filed a Complaint-Affidavit19 for libel. Respondent similarly II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE
questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.20 The City INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS
Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal Case COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS
No. Q-02-109406 by filing the corresponding OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT
Information21 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101. HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.

Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE
raising similar arguments that the court had no jurisdiction SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE
even if criminal prosecution were possible, jurisdiction TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT
rested with the Sandiganbayan.22 OUTRIGHT.27

On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the
Order23 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 for lack same issues and the same parties, the Court, upon the
of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, recommendation of the Clerk of Court,28 consolidated the
in the further assailed September 18, 2002 Order,24 denied cases.29
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.25
The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin
Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners cases is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to
seasonably filed before this Court, on pure questions of law, the exclusion of all other courts.
another Petition for Review on Certiorari26 under Rule 122
in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the The Ruling of the Court
following grounds:
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME in their pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged
OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his
RESPONDENT "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE"; AND office. They are of the conviction that the resolution of the
said question will ultimately determine which courtthe
RTC or the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction over the
criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes that both More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v.
parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost Endaya,34 acknowledged the unmistakable import of the
concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed said provision:
to identify, is whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction
over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of
is shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is
said courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is
offense, it would be pointless to still determine whether the categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of
crime is committed in relation to office. those statutory provisions that leave no room for
interpretation. All that is required is application. What the
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction law ordains must then be followed.35
of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action, This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over
unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v.
thereof.30 Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),31 as Estanislao,36where the Court further declared that
amended by Republic Act No. 4363,32 is explicit on which jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous
court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, act is committed "by similar means,"37 and despite the fact
thus: that the phrase "by similar means" is not repeated in the
latter portion of Article 360.38 In these cases, and in those
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its
written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the
filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases.
instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,39 we explained at length
city where the libelous article is printed and first published that:
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense xxx.33 [Underscoring The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal
and italics ours.]1avvphi1.zw+ Code, which categorically provides that jurisdiction over
libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial
matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Courts jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said
Branch 32 and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of law however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the
jurisdiction over libel was raised. In that case, the MTC exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
judge opined that it was the first level courts which had **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520
jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by
elevation of the matter to us, respondent judges orders the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional
were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows: Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases,
hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases."
Courts Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995,
and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public
been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined respondent committed an error in ordering that the
from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to
remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the
of Quezon City for proper disposition." clogged dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding
the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general
Another case involving the same question was cited as character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter
resolving the matter: the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special
nature. "Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a
"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible particular court, are special in character, and should prevail
error committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other
denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a
jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the general law." A later enactment like RA 7691 does not
Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-
cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict
imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and between a general law and a special law, the latter must
two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment.
Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21
therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the October 1996, this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction
MTC. over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality:

Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to "RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR
be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS
libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES;
should have clearly so indicated because implied repeals INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
are not favored. As much as possible, effect must be given AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES.
to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law xxxx
by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a
pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict C
should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an
"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE
repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency
EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In
COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS."
the law which broadened the jurisdiction of the first level
(Underscoring supplied)40
courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional
Trial Courts from taking cognizance of certain cases over
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v.
which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,41Manzano,
jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was
and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare
categorically contained in the first sentence of the amended
herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that
Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in Section
criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written
6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal
defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately
libel.
with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A
subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of
other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated
express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal
RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are
defamations in writing or by similar means.42The grant to REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
the Sandiganbayan43 of jurisdiction over offenses of Quezon City for further proceedings.
committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the
expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the SO ORDERED.
RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written
defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is
committed in relation to office. The broad and general
TOPIC: ON JURISDICTION C. SANDIGANBAYAN: Original
phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
and Exclusive Jurisdiction (c. How was the offense or crime
amended by Republic Act No. 8249,44 cannot be construed
committed)
to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.45
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively
Manila
rests in the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and
futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is
EN BANC
committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion
reached by the trial court that the respondent committed G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former
COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs.
case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error. This
Court, therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and their OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA
proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds unnecessary ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE
any further discussion of the other issues raised in the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
petitions.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
JR., petitioner-intervenors. headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M.
Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by
MARTINEZ, J.: Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal
Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of
joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang
Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy
them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to
investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly
pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows: involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the
said incident was a legitimate police operation.1
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons
believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, However, a review board led by Overall Deputy
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the
involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the
where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26)
by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors.
Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt.
ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Ricardo de Leon.
Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor
Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was amended informations has the rank of only a Chief
among those charged as principal in eleven (11) Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
information for murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's
Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996
Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
informations as accessories after-in-the-fact. Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring,
and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,9 the
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,3 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and
Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.4 Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction
under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations5before
the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should
Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused6 was dropped from remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by
the case. petitioner and some of the accused.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions While these motions for reconsideration were pending
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction
asserting that under the amended informations, the cases cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on
fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 229910 and No.
pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act 109411 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and
No. 7975.7 They contend that the said law limited the Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or Senate Bill No. 84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali
more of the "principal accused" are government officials Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining
with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 done so in his concurring and dissenting
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. opinion.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law xxx xxx xxx
as R.A. No. 824913 by the President of the Philippines on
February 5, 1997. Considering that three of the accused in each
of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents:
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and
promulgated a Resolution14 denying the motion for Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet
reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it begun in all these cases in fact, no order of
"stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996." arrest has been issued this court has
competence to take cognizance of these
On the same day15 the Sandiganbayan issued and cases.
ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent
portion of which reads: To recapitulate, the net result of all the
foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution court admitted the Amended Informations in
and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained
concurring and dissenting opinion, the jurisdiction to try and decide the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and cases16 (Empahasis supplied)
the President of the Philippines approved it
on February 5, 1997. Considering the Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4
pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any
granting, as they are now granting, the court over which trial has not begun as to the approval
Special Prosecutor's motion for hereof." Petitioner argues that:
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already
a) The questioned provisions of the statute in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to
were introduced by the authors thereof in procedural due process.
bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the
situation in which petitioner's cases were in c) The title of the law is misleading in that it
at the Sandiganbayan by restoring contains the aforesaid "innocuous"
jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually
right to procedural due process and the equal expands rather than defines the old
protection clause of the Constitution. Further, Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby
from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot- violating the one-title one-subject
dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of requirement for the passage of statutes
a pending incident involving the transfer of under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the Constitution.17
passage of the law may have been timed to
overtake such resolution to render the issue For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-
therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249
petitioner's vested rights under the old innocuously appears to have merely expanded the
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975) jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of
Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute
from the fact that it was again made to suit intended to apply specifically to the accused in the
the peculiar circumstances in which Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the
petitioner's cases were under, namely, that Sandiganbayan. They further argued that if their case is
18

the trial had not yet commenced, as provided tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural
in Section 7, to make certain that those cases due process would be violated as they could no longer avail
will no longer be remanded to the Quezon of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they
City Regional Trial Court, as the acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme
Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus Court.
making it an ex post factolegislation and a
denial of the right of petitioner as an accused
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor- The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section
General filed separate pleadings in support of the 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in
question and praying that both the petition and the Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a
petition-in-intervention be dismissed. special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal
This Court then issued a Resolution19 requiring the parties and civil cases involving graft and corrupt
to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten practices and such other offenses committed
(10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the by public officers and employees including
question of whether the subject amended informations those in government-owned or controlled
filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege corporations, in relation to their office as may
the commission by the accused therein of the crime be determined by law.
charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No.
8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive The said special court is retained in the new (1987)
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI,
Section 4:
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is
representing the People of the Philippines, filed the Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as
required supplemental memorandum within the the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
nonextendible reglementary period. and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree
nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach No. 148621 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the
of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological
one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,22 Section 20 of Batas
with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, Pambansa Blg. 123,23 P.D. No. 1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A.
was not convincingly discharged in the present case. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249.27 Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the (a) Provincial governors, vice-
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases: governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. provincial treasurers,
1606, as amended] is hereby further assessors, engineers, and other
amended to read as follows: provincial department heads;

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan (b) City mayors, vice-mayors,


shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction members of the sangguniang
in all cases involving: panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as city department heads;
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. (c) Officials of the diplomatic
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, service occupying the position
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one of consul and higher;
or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, (d) Philippine Army and air
whether in a permanent, acting or interim force colonels, naval captains,
capacity, at the time of the commission of the and all officers of higher rank;
offense:
(e) Officers of the Philippines
(1) Officials of the executive branch National Police while
occupying the positions of regional director occupying the position
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade of provincial director and those
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and holding the rank of senior
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic superintendent or higher.
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(f) City of provincial (5) All other national and local officials
prosecutors and their classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
assistants, and officials and Compensation and Position Classification Act
prosecutors in the Office of the of 1989.
Ombudsman and special
prosecutor; b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by
(g) Presidents, directors or the public officials and employees mentioned
trustees or managers of in Subsection a of this section in relation to
government-owned or their office.
controlled corporations, state
universities or educational c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to
institutions or foundations; and connection with Executive Orders Nos.
1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof
classified as-Grade "27" and up under the In cases where none of the accused are
Compensation and Position Classification Act occupying positions corresponding to salary
of 1989; Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP
(3) Members of the judiciary without officers mentioned above, exclusive original
prejudice to the provisions of the jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
Constitution; proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal
(4) Chairman and members of the circuit trial court, as the case may be,
Constitutional Commissions, without pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in
prejudice to the provisions of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Constitution;
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts its special prosecutor, shall represent the
whether in the exercise of their own original People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and
as herein provided. 4-A, issued in 1986.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive In case private individuals are charged as co-
original jurisdiction over petitions of the principals, accomplices or accessories with
issuance of the writs of mandamus, the public officers or employee, including
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, those employed in government-owned or
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and controlled corporations, they shall be tried
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction jointly with said public officers and
and over petitions of similar nature, employees in the proper courts which shall
including quo warranto, arising or that may exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa apply to all cases pending in any court over
Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules which trial has not begun as of the approval
that the Supreme Court has promulgated and hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
may hereafter promulgate, relative to
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975.
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree
all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and
[Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended)
from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan (b) City mayors, vice-mayors,
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction members of the sangguniang
in all cases involving: panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as city department heads;
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. (c) Officials of the diplomatic
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, service occupying the position
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one of consul and higher;
or more of the pricipal accused are afficials
occupying the following positions in the (d) Philippine Army and air
government, whether in a permanent, acting force colonels, naval captains,
or interim capacity, at the time of the and all officers of higher rank;
commission of the offense:
(e) PNP chief superintendent
(1) Officials of the executive branch and PNP officers of higher
occupying the positions of regional director rank;
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and (f) City and provincial
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic prosecutors and their
Act No. 6758), specifically including: assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the
(a) Provincial governors, vice- Ombudsman and special
governors, members of the prosecutor;
sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, (g) Presidents, directors or
assessors, engineer, and other trustees, or managers of
provincial department heads; government-owned or
controlled corporations, state
universities or educational c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to
institutions or foundations; and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof
classified as Grade "27" and up under the In cases where none of the principal accused
Compensation and Position Classification Act are occupying positions corresponding to
of 1989; salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in
the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers
(3) Members of the judiciary without occupying the rank of superintendent or
prejudice to the provisions of the higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
Constitution; jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
(4) Chairman and members of the court, municipal trial court, and municipal
Constitutional Commissions, without circuit trial court, as the case may be,
prejudice to the provisions of the pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
Constitution; provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

(5) All other national and local officials The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
classified as Grade "27" or higher under the appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the
Compensation and Position Classification Act final judgment, resolutions or orders of
of 1989. regular court where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade "27,"
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by
or not otherwise covered by the preceding
the public officials and employees mentioned
enumeration.
in Subsection a of this section in relation to
their office. xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-


principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employees, including except in certain cases,29 contends that the Sandiganbayan
those employed in government-owned or has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals
employees in the proper courts which shall that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
have exclusive jurisdiction over them. Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b)
R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II,
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads: Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the
law on bribery),30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),31 or (e) other
criminal cases in which trial has not begun in offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in
proper courts. items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee32holding any of the positions enumerated in
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word
paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is
"principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the
in relation to the office.
above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975,
was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are
"principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over being charged with murder which is a felony punishable
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on
intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to
the subject criminal cases since none of the principal "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
accused under the amended information has the rank of with other crimes committed by the public officials and
Superintendent28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A.
the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses
tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accused's It is an established precept in constitutional law that the
officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
of those public officers or employees enumerated in concurrence of four elements, namely:
paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in
pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any (1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
reference to the criminal participation of the accused public
officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the law;
Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D.
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions
1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of
only, and
the public officer as a requisite to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the
same class,35
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of
R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
all of which are present in this case.
law33 because its enactment was particularly directed only
to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to
contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables
evidence and convincing argument were presented to of the questioned provisions. The classification between
warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and those pending cases involving the concerned public officials
signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could
executive department as unconstitutional. Every have been affected by the amendments of the
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against
the party who challenges the law must present proof of those cases where trial had already started as of the
arbitrariness.34 approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that
makes real differences.36 In the first instance, evidence
against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter had expressed strong sentiments against those officials
the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the
examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed
within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the
courts subject to the constitutional limitations,37 it can be legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph
to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory
provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now provision of R.A. 8249.39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was
claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by
category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved
paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by
case involving" certain public officials and, under the the President of the Philippines.
transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in
any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices
argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the allegedly had against petitioner during the committe
Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient
only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their
"any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases presence and participation in the legislative hearings was
are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the
where trial had already begun are not affected by the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head
transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The
8249). Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly
empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of
reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on legislation.40
the part of a Senator and two Justices of the
Sandiganbaya38 for their participation in the passage of the Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the
said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law41 for they are commission of the offense on
deprived of their right to procedural due process as they order to convict the
can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had defendant.43
allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
(e) Every law which, in relation
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post to the offense or its
facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,42 an ex post factolaw is consequences, alters the
one situation of a person to his
disadvantage.44
(a) which makes an act done
criminal before the passing of This Court added two more to the list, namely:
the law and which was
innocent when committed, and (f) that which assumes to
punishes such action; or regulate civil rights and
remedies only but in effect
(b) which aggravates a crime imposes a penalty or
or makes it greater than when deprivation of a right which
it was committed; or when done was lawful;

(c) which changes the (g) deprives a person accussed


punishment and inflicts a of crime of some lawful
greater punishment than the protection to which he has
law annexed to the crime when become entitled, such as the
it was committed. protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a
(d) which alters the legal rules proclamation of a amnesty.45
of evidence and recieves less or
different testimony that the Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of
law required at the time of the penal laws.46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive
law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of
laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain their passage.54
acts and establish penalties for their violations;47 or those
that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to
their punishment.48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of
regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of law.55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts,
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Supreme Court still has the power of review to
the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural determine if he presumption of innocence has been
statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by convincing overcome.56
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice.49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much
unconstitutional. emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law
that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The
a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can
has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated
The same contention has already been rejected by the court in the title of the law because such is the necessary
several times50 considering that the right to appeal is not a consequence of the amendments. The requirement that
natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the title57is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in
statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose
against ex post facto laws.51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to which the statute seeks to achieve.58 Such rule is liberally
matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a
statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance
facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249
does not come within the prohibition.52 Moreover, the law expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of
did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.53 It the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as
has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to
that general subject.59 The Congress, in employing the word Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
"define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction
Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers over criminal cases committed by the public officers and
the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the employees, including those in goverment-owned or
jurisdiction of various courts.60 controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may
be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared
subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue
retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether may be provided by law.
under the allegations in the Informations, it is the
Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the
jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to
petitioner and entervenors. the office of the accussed PNP officers.

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or In People vs. Montejo,64 we held that an offense is said to
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the have been committed in relation to the office if it (the
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in of his official functions.65 This intimate relation between
the complaint or informations,61 and not by the evidence the offense charged and the discharge of official duties
presented by the parties at the trial.62 "must be alleged in the informations."66

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against As to how the offense charged be stated in the
petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged Court mandates:
must be committed by the offender in relation to his office
in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or
it.63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with omissions complied of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise whether they are sufficient in law to support
language without repetition not necessarily in a conviction if one should be had. In order
the terms of the statute defining the that the requirement may be satisfied, facts
offense, but in such from as is sufficient to must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every
enable a person of common understanding to crime is made up of certain acts and
know what offense is intended to be charged, intent these must be set forth in the complaint
and enable the court to pronounce proper with reasonable
judgment. (Emphasis supplied) particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff
and defendant) and circumstances. In short,
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that the complaint must contain a specific
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the allegation of every fact and circumstance
facts."67The real nature of the criminal charge is necessary to constitute the crime charged.
determined not from the caption or preamble of the (Emphasis supplied)
informations nor from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the
law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no
information.68 indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense."70
The noble object or written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69 Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present
case, we find the amended informations for murder against
The object of this written accusations was herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific
First; To furnish the accused with such a factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection
descretion of the charge against him as will between the offense charged and the discharge of official
enable him to make his defense and second function of the offenders.
to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal
for protection against a further prosecution In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
for the same cause and third, to inform the informations71 for murder reads:
court of the facts alleged so that it may decide
AMENDED INFORMATIONS within the jurisdiction of his Honorable
Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T.
III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T.
CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4
INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS,
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO,
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. all taking advantage of their public and
AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, official positions as officers and members of
CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. the Philippine National Police and
ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. committing the acts herein alleged in relation
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA to their public office, conspiring with intent
JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. to kill and using firearms with treachery
CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. evident premeditation and taking advantage
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, of their superior strenghts did then and there
SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot
CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO latter mortal wounds which caused his
LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 instantaneous death to the damage and
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
Murder as defined and penalize under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON,
follows CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO
II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation
INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is
TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among
LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to others, falsely representing that there were no arrests
office as officers and members of the made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Philippine National Police are charged herein Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or
as accessories after-the-fact for concealing about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden
the crime herein above alleged by among mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by
others falsely representing that there the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in
where no arrest made during the amended information that the victim was one of those
the read conducted by the accused herein at arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville
Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the
1995. immediately preceding paragraph of the amended
information, the shooting of the victim by the principal
CONTRARY LAW. accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City."
How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two
While the above-quoted information states that the above- places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while
named principal accused committed the crime of murder there is the allegation in the amended information that the
"in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not
the said principal accused was intimately related to the see the intimate connection between the offense charged
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier
the amended information does not indicate that the said discussed, is an essential element in determining the
accused arrested and investigated the victim and then jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
killed the latter while in their custody.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with regular policeman and . . .
such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact special policemen appointed
offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in and provided by him with
relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We pistols and higher power guns
believe that the mere allegation in the amended and then established a camp . . .
information that the offense was committed by the accused at Tipo-tipo which is under his
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That command . . . supervision and
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual control where his co-
avernment that would show the close intimacy between the defendants were stationed
offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official entertained criminal
duties. complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between as well as assumed the
the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at authority to arrest and detain
issue, we ruled: person without due process of
law and without bringing them
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is to the proper court, and that in
determined by the allegations in the line with this set-up
complaint or information and not by the established by said Mayor of
result of evidence after trial. Basilan City as such, and acting
upon his orders his co-
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960),
defendants arrested and
where the amended information alleged
maltreated Awalin Tebag who
denied in consequence thereof.
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of
Basilan City, as such, has
we held that the offense charged was
organized groups of police
committed in relation to the office of the
patrol and civilian
accused because it was perpetreated while
commandoes consisting of
they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official
functions and would not have been duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order
committed had they not held their office, to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to
besides, the accused had no personal motive public office.
in committing the crime thus, there was an
intimate connection between the offense and Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
the office of the accused. informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the
Unlike in Montejo the informations in accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
court below do not indicate that the accused exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
arrested and investigated the victims and Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.
then killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of
that the accused for the purpose of extracting R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March
or extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
kidnapped and detained the two victims, and Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal
failing in their common purpose they shot; Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the
and killed the said victims. For the purpose of Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations original jurisdiction over the said cases.1wphi1.nt
that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial. SO ORDERED.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy


that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does
not appear in the information, which only signifies that the
said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close
Republic of the Philippines contrary has not been proved. Like any other person
SUPREME COURT accused of an offense, he is entitled to the full and vigilant
Manila protection of the Bill of Rights.

EN BANC Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of


the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993 informations for rape with homicide filed against him and
six other persons. We shall treat it as we would any other
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner, suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just and
vs. impartial judgment from this Court.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, The pertinent facts are as follows:
NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN
DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice), On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. requested the filing of appropriate charges against several
DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the
and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six respondents in rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan
their official capacities as members of the State Gomez.
Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the
CRUZ, J.: Department of Justice conducted a preliminary
investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not
There is probably no more notorious person in the country present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano
today than Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, Brion, Jr.
who stands accused of an unspeakable crime. On him, the
verdict has already been rendered by many outraged On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an
persons who would immediately impose on him an angry "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear for
sentence. Yet, for all the prejudgments against him, he is investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It
under our Constitution presumed innocent as long as the
was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of
and he was immediately taken to the said camp. that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused,
including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively
identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently
Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said cases
as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense
Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the
and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial
court with one of the accused. This Court thereupon
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to
inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent
counsel. Judge Harriet Demetriou.

After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were
Sanchez. This warrant was issued on August 13, 1993, by amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an
Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of aggravating circumstance.
Manila, Branch 7, in connection with Criminal Cases Nos.
93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash
relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was the informations substantially on the grounds now raised
forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral
where he remains confined. arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion.
Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary
the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven restraining order/writ of injunction.
informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon,
Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed
Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary against him should be quashed because: 1) he was denied
Eileen Sarmenta. the right to present evidence at the preliminary
investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-
to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is affidavit, thus:
illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction
over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides Atty. Brion, Jr.:
arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the
informations are discriminatory because they do not [W]e manifest that after reviewing them
include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a there is nothing to rebut or countermand all
public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the these statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is
Sandiganbayan. concerned, We are not going to submit any
counter-affidavit.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to
which we required a Reply from the petitioner within a ACSP Zuo to Atty. Brion:
non-extendible period of five days.1 The Reply was filed five
xxx xxx xxx
days late. 2 The Court may consider his non-compliance an
implied admission of the respondents' arguments or a loss
Q. So far, there are no other
of interest in prosecuting his petition, which is a ground for
statements.
its dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard this
procedural lapse and proceed to discuss his petition on the A. If there is none then, we will
basis of the arguments before us. not submit any counter-
affidavit because we believe
The Preliminary Investigation.
there is nothing to rebut or
countermand with all these
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993,
statements.
belie the petitioner's contention that he was not accorded
the right to present counter-affidavits.
Q. So, you are waiving your
submission of counter-
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the
affidavit?
petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, manifested that
A. Yes, your honor, unless there Atty. Panelo:
are other witnesses who will
come up soon. 3 Yes.

Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, ACSP Zuo:


respondent Jovencito Zuo, told Atty. Brion that he could
still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No such So, insofar as the respondent,
counter-affidavit was filed. Mayor Antonio Sanchez is
concerned, this case is
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuo submitted for resolution. 4

furnished the petitioner's counsel, this time Atty. Salvador


Panelo, with copies of the sworn statements of Centeno and On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's
Malabanan, and told him he could submit counter-affidavits subsequent manifestation that his counsel, Atty. Brion, was
on or before August 27, 1993. The following exchange not notified of the inquest held on August 13, 1993, and
ensued: that he was not furnished with the affidavits sworn to on
that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or
ACSP Zuo: with their supplemental affidavits dated August 15, 1993.
Moreover, the above-quoted excerpt shows that the
For the record, we are petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on August 13, 1993,
furnishing to you the sworn was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
statement of witness Aurelio
Centeno y Roxas and the sworn The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never
statement of SPO3 Vivencio disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the entire
Malabanan y Angeles. proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak
and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that
Do I understand from you that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question
you are again waiving the his representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and
submission of counter- inofficious.
affidavit?
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, of Justice are null and void because it had no jurisdiction
provides that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if over the case. His claim is that it is the Office of the
subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on the investigation of all cases involving public officers like him,
evidence presented by the complainant. as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.

Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15,
the preliminary investigation5, so may he waive the right to paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate and prosecute,
present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his any illegal act or omission of any public official. However,
defense. as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v.
Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary rather a shared or concurrent authority in. respect of the
investigation does not impair the validity of the offense charged."
information or otherwise render the same defective and
neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the Petitioners finally assert that the information
case or constitute a ground for quashing the information.6 and amended information filed in this case
needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is not disputed that the information and
flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused, order amended information here did not have the
an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do
proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the case not believe that such approval was necessary
at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason or at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545
need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman
conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment. has authority to investigate charges of illegal
or omissions on the part of any public official,
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It
must, however, be pointed out that the
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
submits that the proceedings conducted by the Department
"any [illegal] act or omission of any public
official" (191 SCRA at 550) Application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
is not an exclusiveauthority but rather a physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not,
shared or concurrent authority in respect of required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of
the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent onthe
sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression
office of the Ombudsman in the present case that submission is necessary. 12
does not have any adverse legal consequence
upon the authority the panel of prosecutors The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang,
to file and prosecute the information or Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued by PNP
amended information. Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said
camp for investigation.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government
such as the Department of Justice, in connection with the In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court
charge of sedition, 10 and the Presidential Commission on declared:
Good Government, in ill-gotten wealth cases,11 may conduct
the investigation, Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that
ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing
The Arrest and answer some questions, which the
person invited may heed or refuse at his
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993? pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally
objectionable. Under certain circumstances,
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of however, such an invitation can easily
Court as the taking of a person into custody in order that he assume a different appearance. Thus, where
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. the invitation comes from a powerful group
Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an composed predominantly of ranking military
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his officers issued at a time when the country has
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making just emerged from martial rule and when the
the arrest. suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted,
and the designated interrogation site is a We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come
military camp, the same can be easily under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing
taken, not as a strictly voluntary as follows:
invitation which it purports to be, but as an
authoritative command which one can only Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis supplied) A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking
military official and the investigation of Sanchez was to be (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, arrested has committed, is actually
it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the committing, or is attempting to commit an
petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, offense;
apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without
protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the (b) When an offense has in fact just been
officers who had come to fetch him. committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the has committed it; and
requisites of a "custodial investigation" are applicable even
to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for (c) When the person to be arrested is a
questioning. prisoner who has escapes from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the final judgment or temporarily confined while
petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was his case is pending, or has escaped while
pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who being transferred from one confinement to
first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo himself another.
acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on
the basis of the sworn statements of the two state It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present
witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested." when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of
Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection
petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for
arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the
Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant
allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six served as the initial justification for his detention.
days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the
offense had "in fact just been committed" when the The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of
petitioner was arrested. charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of
arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be
doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court released because of such defect. * Applicable by analogy to
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court
petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on that:
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge
sure, but it was nonetheless legal. authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, custody of an officer under process issued by
we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is order of a court of record, and that the court
that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
over his person, he may move to quash the information, but render the judgment, or make the order, the
only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises writ shall not be allowed; or if the
other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
waived that objection and to have submitted his person to the person shall not be discharged by reason
the jurisdiction of that court.14 of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines or of a person The Informations
suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. The petitioner submits that the seven informations
charging seven separate homicides are absurd because the
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
ground that she had been arrested by virtue of a John Doe
warrant. In their return, the respondents declared that a This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor
new warrant specifically naming her had been issued, thus General in this wise:
validating her detention. While frowning at the tactics of
the respondents, the Court said: Thus, where there are two or more offenders
who commit rape, the homicide committed
The, case has, indeed, become moot and on the occasion or by reason of each rape,
academic inasmuch as the new warrant of must be deemed as a constituent of the
arrest complies with the requirements of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
Constitution and the Rules of Court regarding Therefore, there will be as many crimes of
the particular description of the person to be rape with homicide as there are rapes
arrested. While the first warrant was committed.
unquestionably void, being a general
warrant, release of the petitioner for that In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies
reason will be a futile act as it will be the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty
followed by her immediate re-arrest to the highest degree. Thus, homicide
pursuant to the new and valid warrant, committed on the occasion or by reason of
returning her to the same prison she will just rape, loses its character as an independent
have left. This Court will not participate in offense, but assumes a new character, and
such a meaningless charade. functions like a qualifying circumstance.
However,by fiction of law, it merged with
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the rape to constitute an constituent element of a
Court, 17 more recently in the Umil case. 18 special complex crime of rape with homicide
with a specific penalty which is in the highest
degree, i.e. death (reduced to reclusion merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying
perpetua with the suspension of the her. The separate informations filed against each of them
application of the death penalty by the allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed
Constitution). by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by
the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that: separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or
information must charge but one offense, It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta
except only in those cases in which existing and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but the
laws prescribe a simple punishment for informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the
various offenses. petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own petard.

Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. The Alleged Discrimination
2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with of the non-inclusion of Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo
only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the Lavadia in the informations must also be dismissed.
other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with
having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge
Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the all those who in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he
allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the
seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in information a person against whom he believes no
abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, sufficient evidence of guilt exists. 19 The appreciation of the
their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the
silence Sarmenta. prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear
showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately discretion. 20
for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against
by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the them should come under the jurisdiction of the
President of the Philippines. 21 But even this Court cannot Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This
order the prosecution of a person against whom the contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at it just the same for the guidance of all those concerned.
least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or
convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by
decision to prosecute him. P.D. No.1861, provides:

The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan
showing of a grave abuse of discretion that will justify shall exercise:
judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in
such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
petition for mandamus, not certiorari or involving:
prohibition.22 Moreover, before resorting to this relief, the
(1) Violations of Republic Act
party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-
No. 3019, as amended,
accused in the same case must first avail itself of other
otherwise known as the Anti-
adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
inclusion.23
Republic Act No. 1379, and
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
charges have been filed against Alqueza and Lavadia, the of the Revised Penal Code:
charges against the petitioner and his co-accused should
(2) Other offenses or felonies
also be dropped.
committed by public officers
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and employees in relation to
their office, including those
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused employed in government-
were incumbent public officials or employees at the time of owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple Public office is not of the essence of murder.
or complexed with other The taking of human life is either murder or
crimes, where the penalty homicide whether done by a private citizen
prescribed by law is higher or public servant, and the penalty is the same
than prision correccional or except when the perpetrator. being a public
imprisonment for six (6) years, functionary took advantage of his office, as
or a fine of P6,000.00. . . . alleged in this case, in which event the
(Emphasis supplied) penalty is increased.

The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner But the use or abuse of office does not adhere
stands charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), to the crime as an element; and even as an
which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it aggravating circumstance, its materiality
covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense arises not from the allegations but on the
committed in relation to the office of the petitioner. proof, not from the fact that the criminals are
public officials but from the manner of the
In Montilla v, Hilario,24 this Court described the "offense commission of the crime
committed in relation to the office" as follows:
There is no direct relation between the commission of the
[T]he relation between the crime and the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as
office contemplated by the Constitution is, in municipal mayor because public office is not an essential
our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall element of the crime charged. The offense can stand
into the intent of the Constitution, the independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged
relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, in the information that the commission of the crime
the offense cannot exist without the office. In charged was intimately connected with the performance of
other words, the office must be a constituent the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the
element of the crime as defined in the statute, exception laid down in People v. Montejo. 25
such as, for instance, the crimes defined and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were
of the Revised Penal Code. charged with murder for the death of a suspect as a result
of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. officer, as Mayor of Basilan City. (Emphasis
The appearance of a senator as their counsel was supplied).
questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was
inhibited by the Constitution from representing them We have read the informations in the case at bar and find
because they were accused of an offense committed in no allegation therein that the crime of rape with homicide
relation to their office. The Court agreed. It held that even if imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge
their position was not an essential ingredient of the offense, of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an
there was nevertheless an intimate connection between the "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It
office and the offense, as alleged in the information, that follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is
brought it within the definition of an offense "committed in triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
relation to the public office."
Conclusion
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the
It is apparent from these allegations that, petitioner are not supported by the facts and the applicable
although public office is not an element of the law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be
crime of murder in abstract, as committed by rejected. In consequence, the respondent judge, who has
the main respondents herein, according to started the trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner
the amended information, the offense therein and his co-accused, may proceed therewith without further
charged is intimately connected with their hindrance.
respective offices and was perpetrated while
they were in the performance, though It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a
improper or irregular, of their official decision on the merits of the criminal cases being tried
functions. Indeed they had no personal below. These will have to be decided by the respondent
motive to commit the crime and they would judge in accordance with the evidence that is still being
not have committed it had they not held their received. At this time, there is yet no basis for judgment,
aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of only uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution against
respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his such irrelevant public speculations as they can be based
instructions because he was their superior only on imperfect knowledge if not officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
judge is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of Criminal OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU
101146 and 101147 and to decide them with deliberate OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
dispatch.
x-----------------------x
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203299
AND HANNAH SERANA V SANDIGANBAYAN CASE
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and
TOPIC: ON JURISDICTION H. MILITARY COURTS: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
Cybercrime
x-----------------------x
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT G.R. No. 203306
Manila
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG
EN BANC MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP, BERTENI
"TOTO" CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID,
G.R. No. 203335 February 18, 2014
TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA, CIRILO P.
SABARRE, JR., DERVIN CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE
vs.
IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President
JR., Petitioners,
Benigno Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE
vs.
PHILIPPINES, and HOUSE OF
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203359 G.R. No. 203391

SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner, HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO,
vs. VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, KATHERINE ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN,
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE NATIONAL UNION
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Petitioners,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR OF THE vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon
x-----------------------x Aquino III, LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as Secretary
of Justice, Respondents.
G.R. No. 203378
x-----------------------x
ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA
ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL G.R. No. 203407
R. BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs. BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF BIENVENIDO L. LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned
JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND Artists of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno, CRISTINA E.
INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan, FERDINAND
AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS R. GAITE, Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B.
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List,
TECHNOLOGY, Respondents. LANA R. LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Women's
Party, ADOLFO ARES P. GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA
x-----------------------x MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Philippine National Police, The DIRECTOR of the
Republic of the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., National Bureau of Investigation (all of the Executive
Executive Secretary, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Department of Government), Respondents.
represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by x-----------------------x
SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE LIMA,
Secretary of the Department of Justice, LOUIS G.R. No. 203453
NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive Director of the
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE
Information and Communications Technology Office,
PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE
NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, Director of the National
(PPI), CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND
Bureau of Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A.
RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN,
BARTOLOME, Chief of the Philippine National Police,
MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH ALWYN ALBURO,
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of
ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-
the Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-to-
x-----------------------x ra10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
G.R. No. 203440 THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND
MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, AND MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
GILBERT V. SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
(all of the Ateneo Human Rights Center),Petitioners, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
vs. CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as CENTER, AND ALL AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES
Executive Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her OF GOVERNMENT AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER
capacity as Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE MANUEL THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERS, DIRECTION IN
ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC
Interior and Local Government, The CHIEF of the ACT NO. 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President; HOUSE OF
G.R. No. 203454 REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as Speaker of the House
PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. of Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
ANDRES, Petitioners, capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE
vs. LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THE HON. LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL Executive Director, Information and Communications
GOVERNMENT,Respondents. Technology Office; HON. NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS,
in his capacity as Director, National Bureau of
x-----------------------x
Investigation; and P/DGEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME,
in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National
G.R. No. 203469
Police, Respondents.
ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO;
x-----------------------x
BENJAMIN NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C.
RIMORIN; JULIUS D. ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V.
G.R. No. 203501
ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN
P. MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD A. RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A. vs.
HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S. REMENTILLA; MARICEL HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official
O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH S. YU; capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC. PRESIDENT RUBEN B. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as
LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS, Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her
INC. COORDINATOR PEDRO E. RAHON; Petitioners, official capacity as Secretary of Justice; LOUIS
vs. NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official capacity as
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity Executive Director, Information and Communications
as President of the Republic of the Philippines; SENATE Technology Office; NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his
official capacity as Director of the National Bureau of INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE HANDS IN THE
Investigation; and DIRECTOR GENERAL NICANOR A. PASSAGE AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC
BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the ACT 10175, Respondents.
Philippine National Police,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203518
G.R. No. 203509
PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed
BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. of DAKILA-PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN
COLMENARES, Petitioner, HEROISM, represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO
vs. LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar S. Melencio,
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, MARLON ANTHONY
JR., Respondent. ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A. CASIO, NOEMI
LARDIZABAL-DADO, IMELDA ORALES, JAMES
x-----------------------x MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M. RAGRAGIO, MARIA
FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR.,
G.R. No. 203515 LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO,
IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
SARAH E. OSORIO, ROMEO FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L.
represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity as
TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C.
President and in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
AQUINO III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT
JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND
NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR
MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT
OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF 3. Advertise and promote goods or services and
THE DOJ OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE OTHER make purchases and payments;
MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND
COORDINATING CENTER, Respondents. 4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities
like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges,
DECISION trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities,
hospitals, and schools; and
ABAD, J.:
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several person through his e-mail address or telephone.
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions
and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual
The Facts and the Case accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a
boon to the need of the current generation for greater
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of information and facility of communication. But all is not
the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can well with the system since it could not filter out a number
connect to the internet, a system that links him to other of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace
computers and enable him, among other things, to: technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for
instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all
reputation of another or bully the latter by posting
kinds of information that he needs for research,
defamatory statements against him that people can read.
study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including
communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the
pictures and videos, for the general public or for
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or
special audiences like associates, classmates, or
surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or
friends and read postings from them;
defrauding him through false representations. The wicked
can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or
for exposing to pornography guileless children who have The Issues Presented
access to the internet. For this reason, the government has
a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following
contain and punish wrongdoings. provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as
crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, as provisions that would enable the government to track
to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and down and penalize violators. These provisions are:
networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as
well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending
electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent
these tomfooleries from happening and punish their
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish Communications;
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in
these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the
original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it Commission of Cybercrimes;
earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
government agencies from implementing the cybercrime j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
law until further orders.
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the The Rulings of the Court
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
Section 4(a)(1)
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic
Data; Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data; Act:

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data; (a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of computer data and systems:
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of
Computer Data; (1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a
computer system without right.
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with
Computer Data; the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be
struck down.
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard,
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and an American constitutional construct,1 useful in
Coordinating Center (CICC); and determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target
a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with
the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related
peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of
unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove
libel.
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the
protect such interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard client, such permission would insulate him from the
was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
applications to equal protection.3
Section 4(a)(3) provides:
In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section
4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act Act:
accessing the computer system of another without right.
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and
It is a universally condemned conduct.4
availability of computer data and systems:
Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize
xxxx
the work of ethical hackers, professionals who employ tools
and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless
damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical
alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer
hackers evaluate the target systems security and report
data, electronic document, or electronic data message,
back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and
without right, including the introduction or transmission of
give instructions for how these can be remedied. Ethical
viruses.
hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors who
come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from
records.5 overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech
Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires
and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
an agreement between them as to the extent of the search,
these guaranteed freedoms.
the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This
is referred to as the "get out of jail free card."6Since the
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.11 Petitioner has
purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may failed to discharge this burden.
not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its
subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a Section 4(a)(6) provides:
form of vandalism,8 the act of willfully destroying without
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
right the things that belong to others, in this case their
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data
Act:
message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and
computer systems and private documents.
availability of computer data and systems:
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an
xxxx
inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect9 or the fear of
possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens (6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over
who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the
proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if
laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the such a domain name is:
state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially
harmful conduct.10 Here, the chilling effect that results in (i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an
paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly existing trademark registered with the appropriate
describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no government agency at the time of the domain name
tendency to intimidate the free exercise of ones registration;
constitutional rights.
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners a person other than the registrant, in case of a
the heavy burden of proving that under no set of personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual Section 4(b)(3) provides:
property interests in it.
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
violates the equal protection clause12 in that, not being Act:
narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to
suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the xxxx
name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary
device. For example, supposing there exists a well known b) Computer-related Offenses:
billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law
xxxx
would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who
registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional
name and another who registers the name because it
acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or
happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that,
deletion of identifying information belonging to another,
considering the substantial distinction between the two,
whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if
the law should recognize the difference.
no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall
be one (1) degree lower.
But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio
Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as a
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the
pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the
constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith
to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was
who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the
registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable
of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is searches and seizures.13 But the Court acknowledged its
baseless. existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc,14 it ruled that
the right to privacy exists independently of its identification
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
protection. intrusion.18

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the The usual identifying information regarding a person
concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address,
explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of
Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon"15 the his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.19 The
relevance of these zones to the right to privacy: law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying
information without right, implicitly to cause damage.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to
Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due
legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these process of law.
zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to
privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the
valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed
that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates
with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion
protection of the law against such interference or attacks." of personal identifying data of another. There is no
fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of
privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches16 and Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the
seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered
(b) the right to privacy of communication and from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in
correspondence.17 In assessing the challenge that the State the news to secure information about him that could be
has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that identity information must be intended for an illegitimate
purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of
information made public by the user himself cannot be expression clause of the Constitution.21 They express fear
regarded as a form of theft. that private communications of sexual character between
husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be
which can be established through the overt acts of the regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In
offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious
useful property pertaining to another, unless special kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn
perpetrator.20 As such, the press, whether in quest of news conspicuously."22 This meaning given to the term "favor"
reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written
special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms
which is required by this Section. of married couples or consenting individuals.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of
Congress on this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
Section 4(c)(1) provides: give a proper perspective on the issue. These deliberations
show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing x x x
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute
between and among two private persons x x x although that
the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
may be a form of obscenity to some."23 The understanding
of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the
xxxx
element of "engaging in a business" is necessary to
(c) Content-related Offenses: constitute the illegal cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to
punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and
(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, pornography for favor and consideration. This includes
control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.25
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity,
with the aid of a computer system, for favor or The subject of Section 4(c)(1)lascivious exhibition of
consideration. sexual organs or sexual activityis not novel. Article 201 of
the RPC punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law
and indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003 penalizes those who "maintain or hire a person to Section 4(c)(2) provides:
engage in prostitution or pornography."26 The law defines
prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme, or design Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute
involving the use of a person by another, for sexual the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money,
xxxx
profit, or any other consideration.27
(c) Content-related Offenses:
The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which
the State can regulate materials that serve no other
xxxx
purpose than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or
pornography.29 The Court weighed the property rights of (2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts
individuals against the public welfare. Private property, if defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the
containing pornographic materials, may be forfeited and Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a
destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in
has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to Republic Act No. 9775.
eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.
It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the
In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth Anti-Child Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to cover
of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity.30The identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing
Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when
where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using
persons engaged in the business of maintaining, a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child
controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the pornography already embraces the use of "electronic,
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means."
with the aid of a computer system as Congress has Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
intended.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute
when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a
legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such xxxx
higher penalty.32 The potential for uncontrolled
proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography (c) Content-related Offenses:
when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
xxxx
Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The
it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture
transmission of commercial electronic communication with
or create any form of child pornography"33 clearly relates
the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell,
to the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core
or offer for sale products and services are prohibited
offenses that ACPA seeks to punish.34 Petitioners are wary
unless:
that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a
sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable for
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the
producing child pornography but one who formulates the
recipient; or
idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces
off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet (ii) The primary intent of the communication is for
could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime. service and/or administrative announcements from
the sender to its existing users, subscribers or
The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply
customers; or
commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below. For
now the Court must hold that the constitutionality of (iii) The following conditions are present:
Section 4(c)(2) is not successfully challenged.
(aa) The commercial electronic
Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law communication contains a simple, valid, and
reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt
Section 4(c)(3) provides:
of further commercial electronic messages
(opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding
communication does not purposely disguise that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of
the source of the electronic message; and computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age
of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited
(cc) The commercial electronic ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance
communication does not purposely include since people might have interest in such ads. What matters
misleading information in any part of the is that the recipient has the option of not opening or
message in order to induce the recipients to reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their
read the message. recipients always have the option to delete or not to read
them.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited
commercial communications, also known as "spam." The To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny
term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a
sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam." The separate category of speech which is not accorded the same
term referred to a Monty Pythons Flying Circus scene in level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
which actors would keep saying "Spam, Spam, Spam, and guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled
Spam" when reading options from a menu.35 to protection.36 The State cannot rob him of this right
without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate
points out that unsolicited commercial communications or forms of expression.
spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network
capacities of internet service providers, reduces the Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code
efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with
the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy
since the person sending out spams enters the recipients Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal
domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the
commercial speech enjoys less protection in law. Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read: exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or may be brought by the offended party.
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other
memory of one who is dead. hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the provisions
of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
shown, except in the following cases: Act:

1. A private communication made by any person to xxxx


another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and (c) Content-related Offenses:

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without xxxx


any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative
or other official proceedings which are not of (4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other amended, committed through a computer system or any
act performed by public officers in the exercise of other similar means which may be devised in the future.
their functions.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A code37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime
libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice"
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with
the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for
conviction.38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence
malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of actual malice in instances where such element is
of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is
available where the offended party is a public official or a
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay
libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National
otherwise good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code
could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel
v. People39 even where the offended parties happened to be against private persons, the Court recognizes that these
public figures. laws imply a stricter standard of "malice" to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended party
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a is a public figure. Societys interest and the maintenance of
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) good government demand a full discussion of public
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person affairs.44
defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40
Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of
offender makes the defamatory statement with the actual malice or malice in fact when it found Cristinelli
knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of Fermin guilty of committing libel against complainants who
whether it was false or not.42 The reckless disregard were public figures. Actually, the Court found the presence
standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of of malice in fact in that case. Thus:
probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had
serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he the motive to make defamatory imputations against
published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a
sufficient to establish actual malice.43 general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her
part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article
being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as
there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the recognizes truth as a defense but under the condition that
electoral campaign. (Emphasis ours) the accused has been prompted in making the statement by
good motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:
Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide
leeway given to utterances against public figures in the Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal
above case, cinema and television personalities, when it prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to
modified the penalty of imprisonment to just a fine of the court and if it appears that the matter charged as
6,000.00. libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the be acquitted.
prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law
explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not
defamatory character of the assailed statement.45 For his constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the
defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable imputation shall have been made against Government
reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of
true.46 their official duties.

Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the
the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the countrys imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
obligations under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v. Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines,
Republic of the Philippines,47 the United Nations Human as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply
Rights Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to
to the effect that penal defamation laws should include the ensure that they do not stifle freedom of
defense of truth. expression.48Indeed, the ICCPR states that although
everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its exercise
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Free
defamatory statement should constitute an all- speech is not absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions,
encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 as may be necessary and as may be provided by law.49
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals Section 5 provides:
from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new
crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also
penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) constitute an offense:
above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of
"similar means" for committing libel.
Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated
cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous in this Act shall be held liable.
statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime.
intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on
Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of
libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet
the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held
media is distinct from that of print.
liable.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that
freewheeling, anything-goes writing style.50 In a sense, they
renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or
are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers
aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the
reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace,
offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from
facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the
overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
networking site as well as by the speed with which such
protected expression.
reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet
users. Whether these reactions to defamatory statement
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current
posted on the internet constitute aiding and abetting libel,
body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting
acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime law punishes, is
sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of
another matter that the Court will deal with next in relation
"netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the
to Section 5 of the law.
services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and
jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding for example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or
or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor real-life connections.57
General argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at
times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and
enforcing the law.51 The legislature is not required to define Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with shared
every single word contained in the laws they craft. interests use Facebook to get in touch.58 Users register at
this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and they are, add other users as friends, and exchange
application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets messages, including automatic notifications when they
another in destroying a forest,52 smuggling merchandise update their profile.59 A user can post a statement, a photo,
into the country,53 or interfering in the peaceful picketing of or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to
laborers,54 his action is essentially physical and so is anyone, depending on the users privacy settings.
susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character.
These forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the If the post is made available to the public, meaning to
tests of common sense and human experience. everyone and not only to his friends, anyone on Facebook
can react to the posting, clicking any of several buttons of
But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are preferences on the programs screen such as "Like,"
muddier and the line of sight is somewhat blurred. The idea "Comment," or "Share." "Like" signifies that the reader likes
of "aiding or abetting" wrongdoings online threatens the the posting while "Comment" enables him to post online his
heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of feelings or views about the same, such as "This is great!"
cyberspace use. When a Facebook user "Shares" a posting, the original
"posting" will appear on his own Facebook profile,
According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer consequently making it visible to his down-line Facebook
Report, 33% of Filipinos have accessed the internet within Friends.
a year, translating to about 31 million users.55 Based on a
recent survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the top 10 most Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking
engaged countries for social networking.56 Social and microblogging service that enables its users to send
networking sites build social relations among people who, and read short text-based messages of up to 140
characters. These are known as "Tweets." Microblogging is
the practice of posting small pieces of digital content immoral." Marias original post is then multiplied by her
which could be in the form of text, pictures, links, short friends and the latters friends, and down the line to friends
videos, or other mediaon the internet. Instead of friends, of friends almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to
a Twitter user has "Followers," those who subscribe to this both Maria and Linda, comes across this blog, finds it
particular users posts, enabling them to read the same, and interesting and so shares the link to this apparently
"Following," those whom this particular user is subscribed defamatory blog on her Twitter account. Nenas
to, enabling him to read their posts. Like Facebook, a "Followers" then "Retweet" the link to that blog site.
Twitter user can make his tweets available only to his
Followers, or to the general public. If a post is available to Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random persons
the public, any Twitter user can "Retweet" a given posting. "Retweet" of Nenas original tweet and posts this on her
Retweeting is just reposting or republishing another Facebook account. Immediately, Pamelas Facebook Friends
persons tweet without the need of copying and pasting it. start Liking and making Comments on the assailed posting.
A lot of them even press the Share button, resulting in the
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger further spread of the original posting into tens, hundreds,
who originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service thousands, and greater postings.
provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like
PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet caf that may The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an
have provided the computer used for posting the blog; e) openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or
the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; "Sharing" it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or
and f) the person who posts a link to the blog site.60 Now, abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on
suppose Maria (a blogger) maintains a blog on the office bulletin board a small poster that says, "Armand
WordPress.com (blog service provider). She needs the is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger,
internet to access her blog so she subscribes to Sun seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not
Broadband (Internet Service Provider). be libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur,
passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!,"
One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement
that a certain married public official has an illicit affair with with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author.
a movie star. Linda, one of Marias friends who sees this Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the
post, comments online, "Yes, this is so true! They are so physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in
social networking site. Would a reader and his Friends or Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,61 a case involving
Followers, availing themselves of any of the "Like," the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of
"Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or 1996. The law prohibited (1) the knowing transmission, by
abetting libel? And, in the complex world of cyberspace means of a telecommunications device, of
expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding
or abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime? "obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient
under 18 years of age; and (2) the knowing use of an
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are persons under 18 years of age or to display in a manner
essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think available to a person under 18 years of age
little or haphazardly of their response to the original communications that, in context, depict or describe, in
posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And, terms "patently offensive" as measured by contemporary
considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
or thousands of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the organs.
criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice
as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated
challenged posting? the First Amendments guarantee of freedom of speech for
being overbroad. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled:
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of
libel would be a square peg in a round hole when applied to The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
cyberspace libel. Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. 223, is a matter of special concern for
law that takes into account its unique circumstances and two reasons. First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of
culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special
millions that use this new medium of communication in U.S. Const. amend. I concerns because of its obvious chilling
violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to effect on free speech. Second, the CDA is a criminal statute.
freedom of expression. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal
conviction, the CDA threatens violators with penalties
including up to two years in prison for each act of violation.
The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means
to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
unlawful words, ideas, and images. As a practical matter, area of protected freedoms.62
this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the risk of
discriminatory enforcement of vague regulations, poses If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of
greater U.S. Const. amend. I concerns than those implicated what sinister predicaments await internet users will
by certain civil regulations. suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues.
Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties.
xxxx Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for
law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.63 The terms
U.S.C.S. 223, presents a great threat of censoring speech "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates
that, in fact, falls outside the statute's scope. Given the chilling effect on those who express themselves through
vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.64 Hence,
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or
would be entitled to constitutional protection. That danger abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
provides further reason for insisting that the statute not be
overly broad. The CDAs burden on protected speech When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of
cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-
drafted statute. (Emphasis ours) vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the
doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T.
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v.
with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can Commission on Elections,65 "we must view these
spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the
Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as
cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to
friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a mount facial challenges to penal statutes not involving free
governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of speech."
this cyberspace communication technology to protect a
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the
violation of his constitutional right can raise any great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly
constitutional ground absence of due process, lack of fair complex web of interaction on social media websites would
notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily
vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of or selectively enforce the law.
a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It
prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the
statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal
prohibition against third-party standing.66 conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed,
how will the court ascertain whether or not one netizens
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another
instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality comment did not?
of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights
under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the
grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory
story against Armand like "He beats his wife and children,"
The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling then that should be considered an original posting
effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes published on the internet. Both the penal code and the
violating free speech. A person who does not know whether cybercrime law clearly punish authors of defamatory
his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys reputations
law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to that society values. Allowed to cascade in the internet, it
avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law will destroy relationships and, under certain circumstances,
thus chills him into silence.67 will generate enmity and tension between social or
economic groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, tension in their relationships.
pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that
any government threat of punishment regarding certain In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when
uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the "Google procures, stores, and indexes child pornography
and facilitates the completion of transactions involving the to address this clearly to relieve users of annoying fear of
dissemination of child pornography," does this make possible criminal prosecution.
Google and its users aiders and abettors in the commission
of child pornography crimes?68 Byars highlights a feature in Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is
the American law on child pornography that the unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the
Cybercrimes law lacksthe exemption of a provider or part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect
notably a plain user of interactive computer service from on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of
civil liability for child pornography as follows: aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace
front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information consummated.71 In the absence of legislation tracing the
provided by another information content provider and interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such
cannot be held civilly liable for any action voluntarily taken as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section
in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
that the provider or user considers to be obscene...whether Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
or not such material is constitutionally protected.69 Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

When a person replies to a Tweet containing child But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of
pornography, he effectively republishes it whether cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply
wittingly or unwittingly. Does this make him a willing to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on
accomplice to the distribution of child pornography? When Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
a user downloads the Facebook mobile application, the user Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on
may give consent to Facebook to access his contact details. Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting,
In this way, certain information is forwarded to third Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section
parties and unsolicited commercial communication could 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
be disseminated on the basis of this information.70 As the Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on
source of this information, is the user aiding the Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of
distribution of this communication? The legislature needs the freedom of expression.
The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these Section 6 provides:
offenses is for the same reason not objectionable. A hacker
may for instance have done all that is necessary to illegally Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised
access another partys computer system but the security Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by,
employed by the systems lawful owner could frustrate his through and with the use of information and
effort. Another hacker may have gained access to communications technologies shall be covered by the
usernames and passwords of others but fail to use these relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty
because the system supervisor is alerted.72 If Section 5 that to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
punishes any person who willfully attempts to commit this provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
specific offense is not upheld, the owner of the username special laws, as the case may be.
and password could not file a complaint against him for
attempted hacking. But this is not right. The hacker should Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes
not be freed from liability simply because of the vigilance of through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the
a lawful owner or his supervisor. Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial
distinction between crimes committed through the use of
Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive information and communications technology and similar
limits and could cover the innocent.73 While this may be crimes committed using other means. In using the
true with respect to cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the technology in question, the offender often evades
area of free expression, any attempt to commit the other identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause
acts specified in Section 4(a)(1), Section 4(a)(2), Section greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for
4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)(6), higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and
Section 4(c)(1) as well as the actors aiding and abetting the Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law
commission of such acts can be identified with some
Section 7 provides:
reasonable certainty through adroit tracking of their works.
Absent concrete proof of the same, the innocent will of
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under
course be spared.
this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for
Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as be a blatant violation of the proscription against double
amended, or special laws. jeopardy.76

The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely The same is true with child pornography committed online.
expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPAs scope so as to
be prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously
laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two discussed, ACPAs definition of child pornography in fact
different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital,
does not bar prosecution of the other although both optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the
offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would
some important act which is not an essential element of the likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
other.74 With the exception of the crimes of online libel and prohibition against double jeopardy.
online child pornography, the Court would rather leave the
determination of the correct application of Section 7 to Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law
actual cases.
Section 8 provides:
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if
the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the
posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of
be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve (Ph200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate
essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the to the damage incurred or both.
same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section
under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already
4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely
mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand
establishes the computer system as another means of
pesos (Ph500,000.00) or both.
publication.75 Charging the offender under both laws would
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One
critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or hundred thousand pesos (Ph100,000.00) but not
a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph500,000.00)
(Ph500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to or both.
the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the
enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of Computer Data
with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5)
Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph200,000.00) but not on Misuse of Devices; when the crime punishable under
exceeding One million pesos (Ph1,000,000.00) or both. 4(a) is committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on
Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts Unsolicited Commercial Communications; and Section 5 on
enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt in the Commission of
with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 Cybercrime.
or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided,
That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes
higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature
committed through a computer system. prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it
regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power
enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or
imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the
thousand pesos (Ph50,000.00) but not exceeding Two act or omission was but an element of another offense or
hundred fifty thousand pesos (Ph250,000.00) or both. might just have been connected with another
crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret and
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their
enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with range as determined by the legislative department.
imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is
lawmaking body.78 being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that
Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person
for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
Section 12 provides: crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law
enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of
authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as
means traffic data in real-time associated with specified tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for
communications transmitted by means of a computer official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital
system. messages come from, what kind they are, and where they
are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin,
recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners
destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of
invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be
underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
protected from government snooping into the messages or
information that they send to one another.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will
require a court warrant.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper
governmental purpose since a law may require the
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law
disclosure of matters normally considered private but then
enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of
only upon showing that such requirement has a rational
the above-stated information.
relation to the purpose of the law,79 that there is a
The court warrant required under this section shall only be compelling State interest behind the law, and that the
issued or granted upon written application and the provision itself is narrowly drawn.80 In assessing
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance
the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional
there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the guarantees.81
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in the physical location of their computers or laptops from
enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order day to day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit
to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public cybercrimes from virtually anywhere: from internet cafs,
good.82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the from kindred places that provide free internet services, and
government should be able to monitor traffic data to from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals
enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes. using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with
unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or can neither be located nor identified. There are many ways
recording of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law the cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those
enforcement authorities with the power they need for who peddle child pornography could use relays of
spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in computers to mislead law enforcement authorities
cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed, as regarding their places of operations. Evidently, it is only
Chief Justice Sereno points out, the Budapest Convention on real-time traffic data collection or recording and a
Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt subsequent recourse to court-issued search and seizure
legislative measures to empower state authorities to collect warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.
or record "traffic data, in real time, associated with
specified communications."83 And this is precisely what Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of
Section 12 does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in Section 12 are too broad and do not provide ample
this country to collect or record such data. safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading
the peoples right to privacy. The concern is
But is not evidence of yesterdays traffic data, like the scene understandable. Indeed, the Court recognizes in Morfe v.
of the crime after it has been committed, adequate for Mutuc88 that certain constitutional guarantees work
fighting cybercrimes and, therefore, real-time data is together to create zones of privacy wherein governmental
superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those powers may not intrude, and that there exists an
who commit the crimes of accessing a computer system independent constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be
without right,84 transmitting viruses,85 lasciviously left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all
exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or freedoms.89
consideration;86 and producing child pornography87 could
easily evade detection and prosecution by simply moving
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the measured from the general publics point of view. Without
United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would
categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. have no basis in fact.
Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in
making certain important decisions, while informational As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user
privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of who courses his communication through a service
personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to provider, must of necessity disclose to the latter, a third
informational privacythat those who oppose government person, the traffic data needed for connecting him to the
collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to recipient ICT user. For example, an ICT user who writes a
protect. text message intended for another ICT user must furnish
his service provider with his cellphone number and the
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have cellphone number of his recipient, accompanying the
private information disclosed, and the right to live freely message sent. It is this information that creates the traffic
without surveillance and intrusion.91 In determining data. Transmitting communications is akin to putting a
whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed,
this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a and sending it through the postal service. Those who post
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an letters have no expectations that no one will read the
actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain information appearing outside the envelope.
matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her
expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to Computer datamessages of all kindstravel across the
accept as objectively reasonable.92 internet in packets and in a way that may be likened to
parcels of letters or things that are sent through the posts.
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, When data is sent from any one source, the content is
not in relation to its application to a particular person or broken up into packets and around each of these packets is
group, petitioners challenge to Section 12 applies to all a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data:
information and communications technology (ICT) users, information that tells computers where the packet
meaning the large segment of the population who use all originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice
sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one call, video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing
another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how the packet
fits together with other packets.93 The difference is that that phone numbers one dials should remain private, such
traffic data sent through the internet at times across the expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize
ocean do not disclose the actual names and addresses as reasonable.
(residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only
their coded internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets In much the same way, ICT users must know that they
travel from one computer system to another where their cannot communicate or exchange data with one another
contents are pieced back together. over cyberspace except through some service providers to
whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to for a successful cyberspace communication. The
look into the contents of the messages and uncover the conveyance of this data takes them out of the private
identities of the sender and the recipient. sphere, making the expectation to privacy in regard to them
an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as
For example, when one calls to speak to another through reasonable.
his cellphone, the service providers communications
system will put his voice message into packets and send The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion
them to the other persons cellphone where they are that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are
refitted together and heard. The latters spoken reply is gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal
sent to the caller in the same way. To be connected by the patterns of activities which can then be used to create
service provider, the sender reveals his cellphone number profiles of the persons under surveillance. With enough
to the service provider when he puts his call through. He traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a persons
also reveals the cellphone number to the person he calls. close associations, religious views, political affiliations,
The other ways of communicating electronically follow the even sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond
same basic pattern. what the public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls
within matters protected by the right to privacy. But has
In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the the procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been
United States Supreme Court reasoned that telephone users drawn narrowly enough to protect individual rights?
in the 70s must realize that they necessarily convey phone
numbers to the telephone company in order to complete a Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with
call. That Court ruled that even if there is an expectation due cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic
means traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point out that The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement
the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says
jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause or not is that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or
left to the discretion of the police. Replying to this, the content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly,
Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding
define the meaning of every word it uses in drafting the these data in their hands from looking into the identity of
law. their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This
will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad
through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law, elements in these agencies.
dealing with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it
intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to
suggests that "due cause" should mean "just reason or those "associated with specified communications." But this
motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it
Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the
even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable target communications. The power is virtually limitless,
commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing
cause," thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin expedition," choosing whatever specified communication
to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals
prohibits. to privacy.

Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to
data collection will be used. Will the law enforcement authorize collection of traffic data "in real time" because it
agencies use the traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a is not possible to get a court warrant that would authorize
cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against an the search of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But
identified suspect? Can the data be used to prevent warrantless search is associated with a police officers
cybercrimes from happening? determination of probable cause that a crime has been
committed, that there is no opportunity for getting a
warrant, and that unless the search is immediately carried
out, the thing to be searched stands to be removed. These a totalitarian society."96 The Court must ensure that laws
preconditions are not provided in Section 12. seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written
with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
12 provides minimal protection to internet users and that
the procedure envisioned by the law could be better served Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law
by providing for more robust safeguards. His bare
assurance that law enforcement authorities will not abuse Section 13 provides:
the provisions of Section 12 is of course not enough. The
grant of the power to track cyberspace communications in Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of
real time and determine their sources and destinations traffic data and subscriber information relating to
must be narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.95 communication services provided by a service provider
shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be
for being violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of
the overbreadth doctrine. These doctrines however, have receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities
been consistently held by this Court to apply only to free requiring its preservation.
speech cases. But Section 12 on its own neither regulates
nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time
unnecessary. extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once
computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere
government and kindred institutions to monitor furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal
individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a
have previously been impractical or even impossible. "All notification to preserve the computer data until the
the forces of a technological age x x x operate to narrow the termination of the case.
area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern
terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of The service provider ordered to preserve computer data
private life marks the difference between a democratic and shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of
constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property. preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal
They liken the data preservation order that law transmission or use of the same.
enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of
garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law
proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from
accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially Section 14 provides:
belong to them.
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an
through the internet belong to their authors or recipients order requiring any person or service provider to disclose
and are to be considered private communications. But it is or submit subscribers information, traffic data or relevant
not clear that a service provider has an obligation to data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two
indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid
for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation
the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the
and subscriber information relating to communication purpose of investigation.
services for at least six months from the date of the
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the
transaction and those relating to content data for at least
issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners objection is that the
six months from receipt of the order for their preservation.
issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-
Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively
when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. The a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to
service provider has never assumed responsibility for their issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory
loss or deletion while in its keep. powers.98

At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the
data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function
enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them
to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed (e) To render inaccessible or remove those
procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful computer data in the accessed computer or
search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of computer and communications network.
communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be
made only after judicial intervention. Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may
order any person who has knowledge about the functioning
Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law of the computer system and the measures to protect and
preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is
Section 15 provides: reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the
undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data.
Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension
the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the of time to complete the examination of the computer data
following powers and duties. storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no
case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct approval by the court.
interception, as defined in this Act, and:
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data will supplant established search and seizure procedures.
storage medium; On its face, however, Section 15 merely enumerates the
duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer
the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer
data secured;
system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court
warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored
on the rights of the person from whom they were taken.
computer data;
Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of and seizure rules but merely supplements them.
the computer data storage medium; and
Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 17 provides: Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict
or block access to computer data:
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration
of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.
providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may When a computer data is prima facie found to be in
be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an
data subject of a preservation and examination. order to restrict or block access to such computer data.

Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of
of preservation or examination, destroyed or deleted upon expression and violates the right against unreasonable
the lapse of the prescribed period. The Solicitor General searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that
justifies this as necessary to clear up the service providers this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws
storage systems and prevent overload. It would also ensure enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must
that investigations are quickly concluded. satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom
and right mentioned.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data
subject of previous preservation or examination violates Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of
the users right against deprivation of property without due code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts,
process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go
user has a demandable right to require the service provider into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital
to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in space, it is indisputable that computer data, produced or
its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should created by their writers or authors may constitute personal
have saved them in his computer when he generated the property. Consequently, they are protected from
data or received it. He could also request the service unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored
provider for a copy before it is deleted. in their personal computers or in the service providers
systems.
Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the right to be secure in ones papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to
and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take
that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.
cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the
Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19
under its control and disposition without a warrant. The for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches
search warrant. and seizures.

The content of the computer data can also constitute Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law
speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction
on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly Section 20 provides:
not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may,
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the
within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of
provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from
expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize
law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a
content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with
warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that
imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum
such content violates some law, for to do so would make
period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos
him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.100
(Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement
but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established authorities.
to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of
Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of
attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply
or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency
constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to
doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and
situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or
present danger rule.101 Section 19, however, merely
valid.
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in
violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829,102 Section 20
necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to Center. There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days
constitute an offense in and of itself, it would not have had from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be
to make reference to any other statue or provision. known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the
P.D. 1829 states: Office of the President, for policy coordination among
concerned agencies and for the formulation and
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the
knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or following powers and functions:
delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation
and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the (a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend
following acts: immediate assistance of real time commission of
cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency
x x x. response team (CERT); x x x.

Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly
must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime
be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to
Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any
non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.
insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which
are not struck down by the Court. In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it been considered as sufficient standard.106 Hence, Sections
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid.
enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.103 1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that
directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial
cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the communications;
petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or
follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
recording of traffic data in real-time; and
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes
management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
the Department of Justice to restrict or block
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect
access to suspected Computer Data.
cyber environment and organization and users
assets.104 This definition serves as the parameters within
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity
plan. a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a
computer system without right;
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is
consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data
combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, interference, including transmission of
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and viruses;
international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast
and reliable international cooperation."105 This policy is c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-
clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has squatting or acquiring domain name over the
internet in bad faith to the prejudice of j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of
others; computer data under a court-issued warrant;

d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft k. Section 15 that authorizes the search,
or the use or misuse of identifying seizure, and examination of computer data
information belonging to another; under a court-issued warrant;

e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction
the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or of previously preserved computer data after
sexual activity for favor or consideration; the expiration of the prescribed holding
periods;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the
production of child pornography; m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of
justice in relation to cybercrime
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one investigations;
degree higher when crimes defined under the
Revised Penal Code are committed with the n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime
use of information and communications Investigation and Coordinating Center
technologies; (CICC);

h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICCs
cybercrimes; Powers and Functions; and

i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the
authorities to require service providers to Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.
preserve traffic data and subscriber
information as well as specified content data Further, the Court DECLARES:
for six months;
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as
VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the
original author of the post; but VOID and constitutes a violation of the proscription against
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who double jeopardy; as well as
simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Child pornography committed online as to which,
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the
D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes
4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Section 4(a)(4) on System
SO ORDERED.
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section
4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-
related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related
Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft,
and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.1wphi1

Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE


DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7
that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases,
WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender


under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175
and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code

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