LEGAL PROFESSION
ISKO NOTES | Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila
RULE 138 ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR
WHO MAY PRACTICE LAW?
Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as
a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law.
BAR MATTER NO. 702
In the Matter of Petition to authorize Sharia'h District Court
Judges to Appoint Shari'a Lawyers as Notaries Public
May 12, 1994
Facts
Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a Bachelor of Laws (LlB)
graduate of Notre Dame University who was admitted to the
Philippine Shari'a Bar filed an instant petition praying that this
Court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order authorizing
all Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers who
possess the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as
notaries public within their respective jurisdictions.
Decision
Considering that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar
Examination is only a special member of the Philippine Bar and
not a full-fledged member thereof even if he holds a Bachelor of
Laws Degree, he is not qualified to practice law before the
regular courts. As a general rule, a Shari'a Lawyer is not
possessed of the basic requisite of practice of law in order to
be appointed as a notary public under Section 233 of the
Notarial Law in relation to Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
B.M. No. 850 - MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RULE 11
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. Compliance card. Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee
a Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the
card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or
that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card
must be returned to the address indicated therein not later than the day after the end
of the member's compliance period.
Section 2. Member record keeping requirement. Each member shall maintain
sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee.
The record required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to
Section 3(c) of Rule 9 should be sufficient record of attendance at a participatory
activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member,
as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.
RULE 12
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall constitute non-
compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of
exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such
compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of a non-compliance notice;
(e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to
circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
Section 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance.
A member failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific
deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to explain the
deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall
contain, among other things, the following language in capital letters:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT
BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE), SHALL BE A CAUSE
FOR LISTING AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER.
The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit hours for
compliance. Credit hours earned during this period may only be counted toward
compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless hours in excess of
the requirement are earned, in which case, the excess hours may be counted toward
meeting the current compliance period requirement.lawphil.net
RULE 13
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Section 1. Non-compliance fee. A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-
compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
Section 2. Listing as delinquent member. Any member who fails to satisfactorily
comply with Section 2 of Rule 12 shall be listed as a delinquent member by the IBP
Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which
case, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
RULE 14
REINSTATEMENT
Section 1. Process. The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be
terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE
requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the
necessary credit hours to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance
during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit hours may not be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. Credit hours
attained during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to
satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the
current compliance period requirement.
Section 2. Termination of delinquent listing administrative process. The termination
of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature but it shall be made with
notice and hearing by the MCLE Committee.
REQUIREMENTS FOR APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION TO
THE BAR
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character,
and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United
States of America. Citizens of the United States of America who, before
July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active
practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing
as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme
Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath
of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in
the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize
the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions.
Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled
attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in
any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court
of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by
satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any
of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they
have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the
Court, be admitted without examination.
Application of this rule may be found in In Re: Petition of
Ramon Quisumbing for Admission to the Bar, Bar Matter
No. 419 (November 1989)
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. All applicants for
admission other than those referred to in the two preceding section shall,
before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they
have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and
recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate,
accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be
filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by
the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has
satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university
duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial
law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor
and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to the bar examination
shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the
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Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a
four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as
major or field of concentration: political science, logic, English, Spanish,
history and economics.
BAR MATTER NO. 914
Re: Application of Vicente Ching For Admission to the
Philippine Bar
October, 1 1999
Issue
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a
Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine
citizenship 14 years after he has reached the age of majority?
This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case
involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of
Vicente D. Ching.
Decision
Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of
14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of
majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect
Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation
of the requirement of electing upon reaching the age of
majority. The Court denied Vicente Chings application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and
that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
BAR MATTER NO. 712
Re: Petition of Al Argosino to take the Lawyers Oath
March 19, 1997
Facts
Petitioner Al Argosino passed the bar examinations held in
1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide. The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's
conviction arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner can be allowed to take the lawyers
oath despite his previous conviction in a criminal case
Decision
The Court allowed Argosino to take the lawyers oath. In
allowing him, the Court recognizes that Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court was persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all
efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. The Court
gave him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
A.M. NO. 545-SBC
Barba v. Pedro
December 26, 1974
Facts
Hector S. Pedro is a successful bar candidate in the 1956
examinations, having obtained an average of 81.16%, but was
not yet allowed to take the lawyer's oath because of a complaint
for immorality filed against him by Purisima Barba.
Barba alleged that sometime in July, 1953, Pedro came to her
house and with lewd designs succeeded in gratifying his carnal
desires, an act repeated thereafter on three different occasions
accompanied by pledges to marry, as a result of which a child
was born. Pedro, however, did not fulfill his promise but married
another woman instead.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner can be allowed to take the lawyers
oath despite a complaint of immorality filed against him
Decision
The Court allowed petitioner to take his oath. Eighteen years
had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations. He was a
successful bar candidate but because of this lapse from moral
propriety, he has not been allowed to take the lawyer's oath. It
likewise appears, from the testimonials submitted, that he has
behaved rather well. At least, no other misdeed has been
attributed to him. There is no affront to reason then in ruling that
the punishment, while deserved, has lasted long enough. He
has sufficiently rehabilitated himself. Retribution has been
exacted, He has expiated for his offense. It is understandable
that the bitterness in the heart of complainant cannot easily be
erased, but that should not prove decisive. Even the most
heinous of crimes prescribe after a certain period. The Court felt
that all the years he has been denied the privilege of being a
lawyer would satisfy the requirement that failure to live up to the
requisite moral standard is not to be taken lightly.
APPLICATION, EXAMINATIONS AND PASSING AVERAGE
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. All applicants for
admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence
required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the
beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of
this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and
certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4
they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to
practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and
certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at
the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and
citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. Notice of applications for admission
shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers
published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days
before the beginning of the examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. Applicants, not otherwise provided for
in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the
following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile
Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations,
and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation;
Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing.
Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into
the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all
examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to
each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without
help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his
penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers without
much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a
typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be
allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are
necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of other
frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers.
No oral examination shall be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. Examinations for admission to the bar of
the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall
be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on
bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day:
Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation
(afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon);
Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth
day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises
(afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. Examinations shall be conducted
by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court.
This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court,
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who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to
serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who
shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of
this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. No candidate shall endeavor to
influence any member of the committee, and during examination the
candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or
receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any
other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the
same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action,
including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the
court.
Section 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed
to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per
cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the
examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per
cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per
cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per
cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. Not
later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as
may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such
examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be
filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest,
after the court has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. Candidates who
have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from
taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court
that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes
as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the
candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the candidates
have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same
conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the
particular subject.
ADMISSION TO THE BAR; JUDGMENT; SC EXCLUSIVE
POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW IS A PRIVILEGE , NOT A RIGHT
A.M. NO. 1162
In Re: Lanuevo
August 29, 1975
Facts
The Supreme Court received a confidential letter on the alleged
raising of grade of at least one examinee in the 1971 Bar
Examinations. The Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
and found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and
Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal
Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar candidate with
office code No. 954 (Ramon E. Galang a.k.a. Roman Galang)
underwent some changes. Galang passed in the 1971 bar
examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered by
the Court as 75%, the passing mark for the 1971 bar
examinations. It appeared in the investigation that Bar
Confidant Victorio Lanuevo asked the examiners to recheck the
papers of Galang and reconsider if his grade can be raised
because he allegedly got high grades in other subjects.
Decision
Both Lanuevo and Galang were disbarred and their names
were stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
The Court stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted
the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, it cannot be
withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority
from the Court. The Court also expressed its strong disapproval
of the actuations of the bar examiners.
In Re: Cunanan
March 18, 1954
Facts
Republic Act No. 972, which fixed the passing marks for bar
examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955, was passed
by Congress. It was known as the Bar- Flunkers Act of 1953.
It ordered that any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of 70% in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to
the August 1951 bar examinations; 71% in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72% in the in the 1953 bar examinations; 73% in
the 1954 bar examinations; 74% in the 1955 bar examinations
without obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office
as member of the Philippine Bar:
Issue
Whether or not R.A. 972 is valid
Decision
The Court ruled that the portion of Republic Act No. 972
referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 is unconstitutional
and, therefore, void and without force and effect. For lack of
unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of Article 1 which refers
to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that
is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be
in force.
All petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952 are denied, and all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per
cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not.
ADMISSION AND OATH, CERTIFICATE, ATTYS ROLL
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. An applicant
who has passed the required examination, or has been otherwise found to
be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. The Supreme Court shall thereupon admit the
applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and
shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that
a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which
certificate shall be his authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a
roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the
person admitted when he receives his certificate.
AUTHORITY TO APPEAR, COMPENSATION, LIEN
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to
be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and
no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court
for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who
assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority
under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any
issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon
make such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court
for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in
his official transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent
client on appeal. An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a
lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on
appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the
appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority
to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made
in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their
client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the
full amount in cash.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than
a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance
of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be
bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion
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on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When an
attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been
demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under
this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. An attorney may retire at any time from
any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed
in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to
the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly
employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the
former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance
party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his
place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to
writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he
shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated
in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court,
intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his
compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment,
rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.
AUTHORITY TO BIND CLIENTS
A.C. NO. 2473
Guiang v. Antonio
February 3, 1993
Facts
Aurora Guiang filed a petition for suspension and disbarment
from the practice of law on the ground of negligence and mal-
practice of Atty. Leonardo B. Antonio (petitioners former
counsel).
In one civil case, the Court of Appeals had rendered a decision
adverse to plaintiffs, one of whom was the petitioner. The CA
granted Atty. Antonios motion for Reconsideration on April 22,
1981 and giving petitioner up to May 27, 1981 to file the motion.
On May 26, 1981, Atty. Antonio filed another motion for
extension which was granted. On June 26, 1981, respondent
filed the Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied on July 27, 1981. Respondent failed to file the appeal
within the 15-day period from receipt of the denial by the Court
of Appeals. He said petitioner failed to furnish and deliver to him
all the necessary documents; petitioner was nowhere to be
found when she was needed and she could not be contacted;
and that respondent had to send petitioner to Davao City to get
some documents, and by the time she returned, the period for
appeal had expired.
Decision
The Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for
six months. The Bar Confidant found the respondent guilty of
negligence and malpractice for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Added to this offense are the highly improper statements in
respondent's pleadings describing his client's case as "hopeless
or beyond legal remedy" after neglecting to file the appeal on
time..
Respondent blames petitioner for not returning on time from
Davao City yet in his Answer to the letter-complaint of petitioner,
Guiang was in her house a week or so before the lapse or the
period for appeal. He could have informed petitioner that the
period for filing the appeal was soon to lapse or he could have
adopted steps to prevent default. In his entry of appearance
before the Court of Appeals, he complained that important
documents were still with the CLAO lawyer in Manila, which
was not true because the CLAO lawyer turned over the
complete records to him.
G.R. No. 94457
Legarda v. CA
March 18, 1991
Facts
Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a case where New
Cathay House wanted her to sign the lease agreement and to
construct a restaurant on her lot in West Ave., QC. She was
issued a writ on preliminary injunction. This was the point where
Antonio Coronel entered his appearance as counsel for
Legarda. He filed a motion for extension of time to file an
answer to the complaint. That was the last Dean Coronel was
heard of. Legarda failed to file her answer with the court thus
evidence was presented ex parte. Judgment was rendered
against her. The property was executed and sold and the one-
year redemption period expired. She appealed to the CA but
this time through another lawyer. Coronel still handled the case
and filed a reply to the consolidated comment and memoranda.
CA decided against Legarda, Coronel filed no motion for
reconsideration. She was ordered to vacate the premises but
was not relayed to her by Coronel. She appealed to the SC,
which annulled the decisions of the trial court and CA because
of her counsel's negligence. The Court also directed Coronel to
answer for his negligence.
Coronel motioned for extension of time because he hasn't had
the time to attend to Legarda's case because of the more than
80 Marcos cases handled by him. He filed another motion
because he became ill. The Court junked this.
Issue
Whether or not Coronel served his client with competence and
diligence.
Decision
The Court held that Coronels failure to exercise due diligence
in protecting and attending to the interest of his client caused
the latter material prejudice. Considering that he is a law school
dean and a top quality lawyer, he should be giving top-quality
service. However, he did not.
While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client
will suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack
of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and
equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance
with the facts and circumstances of each case. Adherence to
the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright
deprivation of their property through a technicality.
G.R. No. 110399
SMC v. Laguesma
August 15, 1997
Facts
The SMC Supervisors and Exempt Union filed this petition to
reverse and set aside the Order of public respondent,
Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,
Bienvenido E. Laguesma that excluded the employees under
supervisory levels 3 and 4 and the so-called exempt employees
from the proposed bargaining unit and ruled out their
participation in the certification election. It also sought to allow
the grouping together of three separate plants, Otis, Cabuyao,
and San Fernando into one bargaining unit.
Issue
1. Whether or not supervisory employees 3 and 4 and
the exempt employees are considered confidential
employees
2. If they are not, do the employees of the three plants
constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit
Decision
The Court reversed the assailed order. On the first issue, the
Court ruled that said employees do not fall within the term
confidential employees who may be prohibited from joining a
union.
On the second issue, it held that the fact that the three plants
are located in three different places, namely, in Cabuyao,
Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando,
Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be
completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of
the employees are not sacrificed.
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G.R. No. 116208
People v. Salido
July 5, 1996
Facts
Accused-appellant, Allan Kawasa, is involved in the crime of
kidnapping. It was stated that on January 6, 1993 at around 7
o'clock in the morning, Loreta Chua, her two sons Stanley and
Jermyn, and her housemaid Elizabeth Luega, were on board
Mrs. Chua's car, driven by Bartolome Mabuti, when they were
blocked by another car, along Taft Avenue. Three unidentified
men, later found to be Allan Kawasa, Molibas Sindad, and
"Alvin" Zacaria alighted from the blocking car, introduced
themselves as Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) agents and
boarded Mrs. Chua's vehicle. Sindad took the wheel from
Mabuti, Zacaria sat beside Mabuti and Stanley in the front seat,
while Kawasa sat beside Luega, Jermyn, and Mrs. Chua at the
back seat. They then proceeded towards South Super Highway,
with the car that blocked them and another back-up car
following them.
Upon reaching Susana Heights at around 9 o'clock, the three
vehicles stopped. Mrs. Chua alighted from her car, with Kawasa
following. They talked for a while. Then Kawasa returned and
boarded Mrs. Chua's car. They drove away with the occupants
of the two cars, leaving Mrs. Chua behind. Luega, Mabuti and
the two children were then blindfolded and their hands tied.
They were brought to a nipa hut in the middle of a sugar field
where they were kept. Here, Luega was raped by one of the
men whom she was not able to identify.
On January 7, 1993, the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted an operation in
Bongo, Laguna for the rescue of the kidnapped individuals. At
about 7 o'clock of the same evening, police operatives rescued
Mabuti, Luega, and the Chua children, from the hands of their
abductors after a brief gunfight.
On January 8, 1993, a team led by Chief Inspector Allen Fortes
of the PNP from Camp Crame apprehended accused Bulod,
Silangan, Balabagin, and Codalez in Bacoor, Cavite and
brought them to Camp Crame for questioning.
On their way to Camp Crame, Fortes and his team met a
speeding Ford Cortina car with Plate No. NKV 997, which was
suspected as one of the cars used by the kidnappers. Upon
intercepting said vehicle, the peace officers found Kawasa,
Sindad, Zacaria, Salido, and Medal, who were thereupon
arrested and subsequently charged with kidnapping and serious
illegal detention.
The accused-appellant and other accused persons in this case
were arrested, prosecuted and found guilty of kidnapping before
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region.
They were sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify, jointly and severally with the other two above-named
accused, the offended party in the sum of P20,000.00.
Accused-appellant denies involvement in the crime and claims
he was deprived the opportunity to submit his evidence
and to disprove the evidence for the prosecution due to the
inefficiency and negligence of his counsel, for which reason,
accused-appellant urges us to reopen the case with respect to
him. He appealed before the Supreme Court and sought for a
retrial.
Issue
Whether or not the accused-appellant is bound by his counsels
alleged negligence
Decision
YES. In the case at bar, accused-appellant has not shown such
carelessness or negligence in his lawyer's discharge of his
duties, or that his counsel was singularly inept or motivated by
bad faith or excusably misled by the facts, so as to justify us in
not applying the rule that clients are bound by the acts of their
counsel, including his mistakes.
The record shows that accused-appellant's counsel attended
the hearings, cross-examined the prosecution witnesses,
presented accused-appellant to testify and introduced his own
evidence which to him was sufficient and relevant, and after an
adverse decision, appealed the case.
If there is anybody to blame, it is accused-appellant himself.
Accused-appellant, in his testimony and in his brief, admitted
having accosted of blocked the car driven by Mrs. Chua's driver,
Bartolome Mabuti, allegedly because he was requested to help
arrest Mabuti (Appellant's brief, p. 14). Such testimony and
related evidence were considered by the trial court (Decision
RTC, par. 3, p. 4). This belies accused-appellant's claim that his
counsel did not present evidence. This is perhaps the reason
why accused-appellant does not challenge the decision of the
trial court, but opted to train his guns on his former counsel.
If indeed accused-appellant felt and believed that his counsel
was inept, then he should have taken action, such as
discharging him earlier, instead of waiting until an adverse
decision was handed, and thereupon heap all blame and
condemnation on his counsel, who cannot now be heard to
defend himself.
The SC dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTCs decision
with slight modification that the civil indemnity of P20,000.00
which accused-appellant was ordered to pay offended party in
increased to P50,000.00 in consonance with current
jurisprudence.
G.R. No. 89571
Tupas v. CA
February 6, 1991
Facts
Record shows that the petitioners received a copy of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on April 3,
1989, and that the motion for reconsideration thereof was filed
on April 17, 1989, or fourteen days later. The order of May 3,
1989, denying the motion was received by the petitioners'
counsel on May 9, 1989. Instead of filing the petition for review
with the Court of Appeals within the remainder of the 15-day
reglementary period, that is, on May 10, 1989, the petitioner did
so only on May 23, 1989, or 14 days later. The petition was
therefore clearly tardy. Petitioners appealed to the SC.
Decision
The Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in
dismissing the petitioners' appeal on the ground of tardiness.
On the contrary, the challenged resolution is conformable to the
applicable law and jurisprudence that, despite the confusion of
the petitioners former counsel, carried no esoteric meaning not
available to the ordinary practitioner.
The petitioners' counsel did not file the petition for review within
the remaining period, which he should have known was only
one day. Neither did he move for an extension that would have
been granted as a matter of course. The petition for review
being indisputably late, he could not thereafter ask that it be
treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which can be filed within a reasonable time. This remedy
cannot be employed as a substitute for a lost appeal. 3 It
follows that for having themselves forfeited the right to appeal,
the petitioners cannot now plaintively claim that they have been
denied due process.
G.R. No. 74697
Alabanzas v. IAC
November 29, 1991
Facts
Alicia Palma filed a complaint for recovery of possession with
damages against Lino Alabanzas and Nelly Alabanzas before
the CFI. Property at issue was a lot sold by plaintiff to
defendants with unpaid balance of P8,000. The complaint was
dismissed and plaintiff was ordered to pay defendants the
court-determined sums. In the same dismissal decision,
defendants were, however, ordered to pay plaintiff the balance
to the lot and the plaintiff to execute thereafter the
corresponding deed to transfer. Palma appealed the decision.
But with her failure to file her brief within the reglementary
period and after a 90-day extension, CA dismissed her appeal.
But same court later revoked said dismissal. It reasoned that:
appellant Palma did not know about the dismissal until informed
that the Alabanzas held a victory party to celebrate their
winning of the case; and the failure to file brief was due to
gross misconduct of her counsel.
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It ordered the Alabanzas to vacate the lot, demolish their house
thereon, and pay Palma the balance on the subject lot. Palma
turned to Supreme Court to seek relief.
Decision
Petition is meritorious. Reasons:
1. Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is
removed from the power or jurisdiction of the Court
which rendered it to further amend, much less
revoke, it.
2. The client is bound by his counsels conduct,
negligence and mistake in handling the case, and the
client cannot be heard to complain that the result
might have been different had his lawyer proceeded
differently. It is only in case of gross or palpable
negligence of counsel when the courts must step in
and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.
G.R. No. L-48335
Aguila v. CFI Batangas
April 15, 1988
Facts
Petitioner Juan Aguila is the son of Escolastico Alabastro and
Juliana Matienzo. Escolastico was Julianas second husband
whom she married after her first husband died. Juan was
claiming the property as the sole child of the second marriage.
His claim was, however, disputed by the children of one Maria
Alabastro, who was the only child during Julianas first
marriage. They sued for partition and damages against Juan
before the CFI Batangas. They alleged that Juliana and her
second husband had not acquired anything during the second
marriage. Judgment was rendered in favor of the children of the
first marriage and petitioner was precluded to present own
evidence owing to what he later called gross ineptitude of his
counsel, who failed to appear at two scheduled meetings.
A motion for reconsideration and a second motion for
reconsideration to present evidence were both denied by the
trial court. He was, however, given an extension of 20 days to
file record on appeal and another extension of 15 days. The trial
court later denied the record on appeal because the decision
had become final and executory.
Petitioner questioned the acts of the trial court before the CA.
The court denied the appeal and so was the motion for
reconsideration. He then appealed to the SC but the appeal and
the motion for reconsideration were likewise denied. Two more
motions for reconsideration were filed but were also denied. SC
warned petitioner that no further motion for reconsideration will
be entertained.
Peititioner filed another case, this time, for the reconveyance of
the properties before the CFI Batangas. Respondents argued
that petitioner was barred by res judicata. The trial court
considered the objection and dismissed the case. Petitioner
again appealed to SC.
Issue
1. Can petitioner invoke his right to substantial justice
and due process as against the res judicata rule?
2. May petitioners petition for reconveyance of the
property disputed be entertained in this case?
3. Can petitioner reopen a case on the ground of
neglect and mistake on the part of his counsel?
Decision
The SC denied the petition. On the first issue, the SC did not
agree with petitioners contention that he was deprived the
opportunity to submit evidence. In fact, the trial court judge
meticulously examined the evidences even if he could have
simply denied the motion for reconsideration outright. On the
second issue, the SC said that reconveyance may only be
sought in cases, where there is a mistake or fraud, property is
registered in the name of a person not its owner. It cannot be
employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of a court of
justice determining the conflicting claims of ownership. On the
third issue, the SC reiterated the rule that a client is bound by
the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be
heard to complain that the result might have been different had
he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his
lawyer. Petitioner wanted to nullify the previous court decisions
on the ground that his counsel was grossly inept. This was not
accepted by the SC saying that doing otherwise, all a defeated
party would have to do to salvage his case is claim neglect or
mistake on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing the
adverse judgment. There would be no end to litigation if these
were allowed. The SC also noted that in this case, the
petitioner should have noticed the succession of errors
committed by his counsel and taken appropriate steps for his
replacement. Petitioner, however, sought the aid of another
counsel when it was already too late.
G.R. No. L-79244
Aylion v. Sevilla
December 10, 1987
Facts
A petition for probate of a holographic last will and testament of
Mateo Ayllon Sr. was filed on 7 November 1977 by Erlinda
Ayllon, the petitioner, with the Court of First Instance of Guiuan
Eastern Samar. In said will, the testator made disposition of
specific properties to the petitioner, as his surviving spouse with
whom he had no children, and to the respondents, as his sons
and daughters by a first marriage. The respondents opposed
the probate, and so hearings were held until the case was
submitted for decision at about the end of 1981.
While the case was awaiting the court's decision the Petitioner,
without the aid of a lawyer, entered into a verbal amicable
settlement with the respondents. Relying on the verbal
settlement and believing that she will be given one-half (1/2) of
the house and lot situated at Concepcion Street, Guiuan Easter
Samar, in return for her abandoning the rest of the properties
willed to her, petitioner wrote her lawyer a letter requesting the
latter to file a motion to dismiss the case. Petitioner's lawyer
complied with her request. On 14 March 1984, the case was
dismissed. However, the respondents apparently did not comply
with their verbal agreement with the petitioner. Hence, the
petitioner filed an affidavit with the court on 22 March 1984,
asking for the withdrawal of her motion to dismiss and for
revival of the case.
On 7 September 1984, the trial court reconsidered the order of
dismissal, and revived the case. But, on 10 September 1985,
the court issued an order recalling the order of 7 September
1984, thereby reviving the order of dismissal of 14 March 1984,
on the grounds that (1) the case was amicably settled, and (2)
the petitioner failed to present three (3) witnesses who could
Identify the handwriting of the testator in the disputed
holographic will, as provided under Article 811 of the Civil Code.
.
On 23 September 1985, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the
case, but the motion was denied. .
Upon petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter court
required the petitioner to file a Record on Appeal within Sixty
(60) days from notice. The counsel of the petitioner received the
notice on 11 February 1987, so that the last day to file the
record on appeal was on 12 April 1987. But, instead of
preparing and eventually filing the Record on Appeal, the
petitioner's counsel filed an Appeal Brief dated 28 February
1987, but actually filed through the mails on 17 March 1987.
Hence, in a Resolution * dated 29 May 1987, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal on account of failure of
counsel of the petitioner to filed a record on appeal, which
is required in appeals in special proceedings.
Issue
Whether or not the accused-appellant is bound by his counsels
alleged negligence.
Decision
YES.
Petitioner's counsel failed to file a record on appeal despite due
notice and the period of sixty (60) days given to him to file said
record on appeal. Instead of filing the record on appeal, as
required, what the petitioner's counsel did was to file an
Appeal Brief. And even after petitioner's counsel received a
copy of the respondents' Motion for the Dismissal of the Appeal
for failure of the petitioner to file a record on appeal, nothing
was done by petitioner's counsel to correct or amend the
erroneous procedure he had taken. Thus, it is clear that the
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failure of the petitioner, through counsel, to file the record on
appeal was not inadvertent. In other words, petitioner's counsel
ignored compliance with the requirement of filing a record on
appeal, as provided for by the Rules. Hence, there is no
reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals, in
dismissing petitioner's appeal.
Petitioner has, in effect, lost the right to establish the validity of
the alleged holographic will of the late Mateo Ayllon yet, as his
surviving spouse, petitioner has not lost her hereditary rights
which are acquired by law. And, in the interest of justice, and to
avoid multiplicity of suits, the trial court in Special Proceeding
No. 459 was required by the SC to determine and adjudicate
the respective hereditary shares of petitioner and respondents
in the estate of the late Mateo Ayllon in accordance with the
rules on intestate succession.
The petition was DENIED, but the case was remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings, specifically, to determine and
adjudicate to the petitioner and respondents their respective
hereditary shares in the estate left by Mateo Ayllon in
accordance with the rules on intestate succession.
G.R. No. L-36666
Tesoro v. CA
December 19, 1973
Facts
In a mayoralty election in Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, candidate
Benjamin Sanidad obtained 1,692 votes and was declared
winner as against his closest rival Orlino Tesoro who garnered
1,585 votes. Alleging poll anomalies, the latter filed a protest. In
the trial court, both parties agreed, after due hearing, to just
submit the case for decision on the basis of the ballots and
other documentary exhibits without adduction of further
evidence. This was exactly what was done by the trial court,
which, after examining the ballots involved in the protest and
counter-protest, found that petitioner Tersoro was the election
winner with 1,626 votes as against Sanidad with 1,514 votes.
Thereafter, respondent Sanidad perfected his appeal to CA.
However, after CA granted the motion of the original lawyers of
Sanidad to withdraw as counsel, Atty. Consatante Pimentel, the
new counsel, filed a motion to remand for a new trial to allow
him to further present additional evidence. The motion was
denied by CA, and so he turned to the Supreme Court..
Decision
Petition denied. Sanidad is now estopped from seeking a
second chance to submit additional evidence, after he and his
previous counsel submitted the case for decision on the basis
of evidence already before the trial court. He should not now be
rewarded for his miscalculations or strategic error. Moreover,
the alleged newly discovered evidence was actually forgotten
evidence, which respondent Sanidad and his counsel already
knew or should have known during the trial. Appellate courts do
not sit to remedy the tactical mistake committed by the parties
or their counsel at the trial.
It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is
bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and
cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been
different had he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the
mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted as
reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a
suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could
allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently
diligent or experienced or learned. Mistakes of attorneys as to
the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy or certain evidence, the proper defense, or the
burden of proof, failure to introduce certain evidence, to
summon witnesses, and to argue the case are not proper
grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is
so great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from
properly presenting his case.
G.R. No. 111478
Salonga v. CA
March 13, 1997
Facts
Petitioner George Salonga proposed to buy-out all the
leaseholding rights of Milagros Izon, president of private
respondent Paul Geneve Entertainment Corporation on a
property located at No. 32 Jupiter St., Bel-air Village, Makati
City in the amount of P5.5 million. Salonga did not have the
sum of money, he proposed instead to Mrs. Izon a joint venture
enterprise between his company, Solid Intertain Corporation
and private respondents company, Paul Geneve Corporation.
The idea was that Solid Intertain Corporation and Paul Geneve
Corporation will form a new corporation in the name Solidisque
Inc. The documents all in seven sets were drafted by both
parties respective counsels. Mrs. Izon has signed the joint
venture agreement. The document with extra copies was then
delivered to Salonga for his signature and for notarization. The
document together with the extra copies remained unsigned
and unexecuted. With the memorandum of agreement still
unsigned, not notarized and in the possession of Salonga, the
latter transferred all his equipments and properties from his
former business site, Metro Disco, to the subject premises in
question after informing Mrs. Izon that he did not have a place
where he can transfer his things and asked that he be allowed
to put it at No. 32 Jupiter St. Club Ibiza was thus opened and
made operational on the leased premises under the name Solid
Intertain Corporation. No corporation under the name Solidsque
Inc. was ever registered as agreed upon in the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Paul Geneve Entertainment Corporation filed a complaint for
specific performance with temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction with prayer for damages against George
Salonga and Solid Intertain Corporation to enforce a
memorandum of agreement that was supposedly perfected
between the parties. During the scheduled hearing for
injunction, only private respondents appeared despite notice to
petitioners. For disobeying the restraining order issued by the
court, private respondent sought to cite petitioner for indirect
criminal contempt during the hearing on the civil case whereby
Atty. Garlito, Jr. presented George F. Salonga in support of the
opposition to the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners and their counsel again failed to appear on the date
set for hearing the motion for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. Despite two motions for extension of time to file an
answer, no answer was filed. Petitioners counsel later moved
to dissolve the injunction and set the hearing on another date,
but on said latter date, only private respondents counsel
showed up.
Due to petitioners failure to file an answer, Paul Geneve
submitted a third ex parte motion to declare Salonga and Solid
Intertain as defendant in default, which was favorably acted
upon. The trial court judgment ordered defendants to sign,
perform and execute the formalities of the Memorandum of
Agreement; and to undertake the creation and formation,
organization and registration of a new corporation pursuant to
and in accordance with Philippine Laws before the Securities
and Exchange Commission, under the business name and style
Solidisque Inc., among others. Salonga was also adjudged
guilty of civil contempt and ordered him and Solid Intertain to
jointly and severally pay a fine of P2,000 a day until he
complies with the orders of the court.
Salonga appealed to the CA, saying that the judgment by the
trial court must be annulled on the ground of fraud on the part of
their previous counsel and that the judge never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Salonga in hearing the
criminal contempt proceedings, thereby depriving petitioner
Salonga of his basic constitutional right to due process.
However, CA disagreed with these arguments and denied the
petition. It reduced the fine from P2,000 to P1,000. Salonga
appealed to SC.
Issue
1. Whether or not the alleged blatant, serious and
culpable negligence and professional misconduct of
petitioners previous counsel amounted to deprivation
of due process of law that will justify annulment of the
default judgment rendered by the trial court against
petitioners.
2. Whether or not the CA committed grave and serious
reversible error in merely reducing the fine for the
indirect contempt instead of nullifying the entire
contempt proceedings as having no basis in law and
procedure.
Decision
Petition was denied by the SC. On the first issue, it held that a
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judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: that the
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process
of law; or that it has been obtained by fraud. Absent any of
these grounds, a final and executory judgment cannot be
voided. In this case, both grounds were not sufficiently proven.
It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
This is based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer
within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded
as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence
of petitioners counsel may result in the rendition of an
unfavorable judgment against them. Exceptions to the foregoing
have been recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or
gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process
of law, or when its application results in the outright deprivation
of ones property through a technicality. None of these
exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.
The SC also said that the counsel did not commit gross
negligence but only simple negligence when he arrived late in
hearings or he failed to attend at all.
On the second issue, the SC cited Gavieres vs. Falcis: A
courts power to punish for contempt is primarily self-
preservative, in the exercise of which the interest of private
parties be they litigants or not in the case in which it is
invoked is at best only a coincidental, not a necessary or an
indispensable, factor. A citation for indirect contempt issued by
the Court itself, even if based on information only privately or
informally communicated to the court, operates as the written
charge prescribed by the Rule and if duly and regularly heard,
makes a resulting contempt order no less valid than if it had
been rendered upon formal charges preferred by a party-
litigant. Indeed, it has been held that such charges may be
made, not only by the court or the prosecuting officer, but
even by a private person.
UNLAWFUL RETENTION OF FUNDS AND CHARGING
LIENS
G.R. No. l-40007
Taada v. CA
October 23, 1985
Facts
Lorenzo Tanada (Petitioner) and late Francisco Delgado and
among others were former partners in a law firm Deldago and
Tanada. Narcisa Mendoza hired them in a suit pending in CFI
Nueva Ecija and agreed to pay a contingent equivalent to of
whatever amount she might recover.
The parties in the case ended up in a compromise agreement.
In a decision rendered on April 8, 1941, Mendoza was declared
the owner of 9 parcels of land. Due to difficulty in segregating
the share pertaining to the law firm, the petitioners offered to
sell their share to Mendoza. Mendoza, however, does not have
the money by that time. The parties ended up with an
agreement that Mendoza will manage and administer the
property.
From 1941-1958 Mendoza delivered the petitioners share with
the fruits of the property. Stating 1959, however, she stopped
delivering the law firms share. This made the petitioners to file
a suit for the partition of the properties before the CFI.
In her answer, Mendoza contended that since the case was
terminated through a compromise agreement, of the
properties she obtained from winning the suit is not
proportionate to the services rendered by the petitioners.
CFI (1967) ruled in favor of petitioners (Tanada), half of
the lands acquired by Mendoza was granted to the
petitioners
CA modified the CFI decision. Petitioners share was
reduced to of the parcel of land.
SC (1985) RULED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS. CFI
DECISION REINSTATED
CFI had given its stamp of approval to petitioners lien any
judgment or decree in favor of their client to the payment of the
said lien consisting of the of whatever amount or property
she may obtain from defendants or any of them by reason of
the complaint filed in the above title case
It further appears that immediately after the promulgation of the
Rodas order of April 8, 1941, Narcisa Mendoza surrendered to
the Register of Deeds the certificates of title covering the lands
involved for annotation of the petitioners' lien; and that, pending
the physical division of the lands in question, she delivered to
the petitioners their one-half share of the yearly produce from
1941 to 1958. Indeed, such actuation on her part was
tantamount to virtual acquiesence in the order of Judge Rodas
and she cannot now be allowed to repudiate her
representations or assume an inconsistent posture. It is a rule
constantly adhered to "that a party who voluntarily executes,
either partially or in toto, a judgment rendered for or against
him, or who voluntarily acquiesces in or ratifies, either partially
or in toto, the execution of that judgment is not permitted to
appeal from it."
G.R. No. 41607
Nasser v. Cuevas
August 21, 1990
The Nassers and Matutes (petitioners) availed the services of
Atty. Paterno Canlas (respondent) in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the late Amadeo Matute Molave. The
petitioners and respondent had an agreement that the payment
of attorneys fees will be P600,000.00 (share in the property)
and P412,000.00 (cash). A condition, stating that the
corresponding liability of a party is extinguished only upon the
full payment of the lien, is also attached to the said agreement.
When the proceeding for the settlement of the estate has
ended, Canlas moved for the execution of the agreement.
Judge Cuevas (CFI Mla.) approved Canlas motion and ordered
for its execution.
The order for the execution of the agreement was assailed by
the petitioners. They contended that the execution was
improper because there is no written agreement stating the
precise terms of payment of Canlas attorneys fees.
Only the Nassers complied in the undertaking to pay Canlass
fees. Meanwhile, the recalcitrant heirs maintain that the
agreement pertains to the payment of fees on installment and
this has been orally agreed upon in the Chambers of Judge
Cuevas.
SC- RULED IN FAVOR OF CANLAS. NASSERS PETITION
DENIED.
The clause cannot be construed as granting to any obligors, by
implication, the option to pay in installments
Legal principle: the creditor cannot be compelled partially to
receive the prestations in w/c the obligation consists unless
there is an express stipulation to that effect
It was 8mons. or so before the agreement was approved and
none of the petitioner drew attention to this matter (fees).
Petitioners havent paid their due to Canlas nt even a single
centavos for 16 years.
It is noteworthy that the agreement of compromise and of
partition in question was signed by the obligors with the
assistance of their respective counsel, and was not approved
by the Probate Court until after eight months or so. At no time
did they then draw attention to the absence in the agreement,
or in the Court order approving it, of any option on their part to
pay their share in the attorney's fees by parts or In installments.
Equally noteworthy, as reflective of the heirs' intention, or lack
of it, to comply with their obligation to pay Canlas' fees, is that
from the time of the execution of the compromise agreement,
up to date hereof, sixteen years altogether, they have not paid a
single centavo to Mr. Canlas.
Neither does the Court find in the record any proof worthy of the
name to substantiate the supposed agreement verbally made
before Justice Barredo. The self-serving affidavits of the heirs
do not, all circumstances considered, qualify as such proof.
AUTHORITY TO APPEAR FOR GOVERNMENT
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G.R. No. 92561
Orbos v. CSC
September 12, 1990
Facts
In the course of the reorganization of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), Guido C. Agon
and Alfonso Magnayon were appointed to the positions of Head
Telecommunications Engineer, range 74.
DUTIES OF ATTYS, SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL
Nerio Madarang who was also appointed to the position of
Supervising Telecommunications Engineer, range 12,
questioned the appointments of Agon and Magnayon by filing
an appeal with the Reorganization Appeals Board of the DOTC
composed of Moises S. Tolentino, Jr. of the Office of the
Secretary, as Chairman and Assistant Secretary Rosauro V.
Sibal and Graciano L. Sitchon of the Office of the Secretary, as
members. In a resolution dated January 9, 1989 the said
Reorganization Appeals Board dismissed Madarang's appeal
for lack of merit. Hence, he appealed to the public respondent
Civil Service Commission (CSC)
In its resolution dated August 29, 1989, respondent CSC
revoked the appointments of Agon and Magnayon for the
contested positions and directed the appointment of Madarang
to the said position of Heads Telecommunications Engineer.
DOTC Assistant Secretary Sibal sought a reconsideration of the
said resolution of the CSC but this was denied in a resolution
dated November 2, 1989.
On November 21, 1989, Assistant Secretary Sibal filed a
manifestation with the CSC stating that they will convene their
Selection and Promotion Board to deliberate on the position of
Head Telecommunications Engineer (reclassified to Engineer IV
pursuant to National Compensation Circular No. 58 effective
July 1, 1989) with qualified candidates including appellant Nerio
Madarang.
Respondent Madarang requested the CSC to take appropriate
action by implementing its resolutions dated August 29, 1989
and November 2, 1989. The CSC directed the immediate
implementation of its aforementioned resolution insofar as it
concerned the appointment of Madarang. This made Agon and
Magnayon file their separate motions for reconsideration of the
aforestated resolutions of the CSC but these were denied by
the said commission.
In behalf of the petitioner, the Solicitor General filed a petition
before the SC with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order.
Issue
Whether or not the Solicitor General may act in behalf of the
petitioners.
Decision
The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, its
agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents
including petitioner and public respondent. This is so provided
under Presidential Decree No. 478:
SECTION 1. Functions and Organization. (1) The Office of the
Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. .... (Emphasis supplied.)
In the discharge of this task the Solicitor General must see to it
that the best interest of the government is upheld within the
limits set by law. When confronted with a situation where one
government office takes an adverse position against another
government agency, as in this case, the Solicitor General
should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the
government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court
what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the
government although it may run counter to a client's position. In
such an instance the government office adversely affected by
the position taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in
the merit of its case, may appear in its own behalf through its
legal personnel or representative.
In the present case, it appears that after the Solicitor General
studied the issues he found merit in the cause of the petitioner
based on the applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, it is his
duty to represent the petitioner as he did by filing this petition.
He cannot be disqualified from appearing for the petitioner even
if in so doing his representation runs against the interests of the
CSC.
Petition is GRANTED and the questioned resolutions of the
respondent CSC were annulled insofar as they direct the
appointment of Nerio Madarang to the contested position..
See previous cases: Guiang v. Antonio; Legrda v. CA
G.R. No. 105938
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
September 20, 1996
Facts
Raul Roco and his colleagues Teodoro Regala, Edgardo
Angara, Avelino Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio Vinluan, Victor
Lazatin, Eduardo Escueta and Paraja Hayudini from the
Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello (ACCRA) Law
Office were charged together with Eduardo Conjuangco for
acquiring ill-gotten wealth. The Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) based its charge from the refusal of
the law firm to divulge information as to who had been involved
in PCGG Case No. 0033 despite the knowledge of the law firm
on the assets, personal transactions, and business dealings of
their clients. Later, the PCGG amended the complaint,
excluding Roco from the list of defendants. Such exclusion was
based from the manifestation of Roco that he would identify the
persons and stockholders involved in the said PCGG case. The
law firm petitioned for the PCGG to grant them the same
treatment as what had been accorded to Roco. It was at this
point that the PCGG answered with a set of requirements and
conditions for exclusion which were the disclosure of the
identity of the clients; submission of documents purporting to
the substantiation of the lawyer-client relationship; and
presentation of the deeds of assignments which the lawyers
executed in favor of its clients, covering the shareholdings of
the latter. To bolster this set-up, the PCGG presented supposed
proof to the effect that Roco had complied with such conditions.
The First Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the petition of
the ACCRA lawyers.
Issues
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan strictly applied the
concept of agency
2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving
the law firm equal treatment as that of Roco despite
the fact that the confession of Roco did not really
reveal the information being asked by the PCGG
3. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan did not uphold the
sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship
Decision
On the first issue, the SC held that the Sandiganbayan did not
strictly apply the concept of agency, which states that an
attorney is more than a mere agent or servant because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on
him by his client.
On the second issue, it was ruled that the Sandiganbayan erred
and violated the equal protection clause. The inclusion of the
ACCRA lawyers was merely being used as a leverage to
compel them to name their clients classifying persons as to
those who can give valuable information apart from those who
cannot is not a valid classification espoused by the equal
protection clause.
On the third issue, the Court held that the Sandiganbayan did
not uphold the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship. As a
general rule, the identity of the client should not be shrouded
with mystery, as a requirement of due process, except when:
a. revealing the name of a client would implicate the
latter in the very activity for which he sought the
advice of the lawyer;
b. the disclosure would expose the client to civil liability;
and
c. the content of the client communication is relevant to
the subject matter of the legal problem on which the
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client seeks legal assistance.
NOTE: The case of the prosecution must be built upon
evidence gathered by them from their own sources, not from
compelled testimony requiring them to reveal information
prejudicial to their client. The confidentiality privilege extends
even after the termination of the lawyer-client relationship.
Separate Opinions
Vitug, J., concurring:
It is unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners
to breach the trust reposed on the lawyers by their clients. The
Republic is attempting to establish a case not on what it
perceives to be the strength of its own evidence but on what it
could elicit from a counsel against his client.
Davide Jr., J., dissenting:
The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in
a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this
case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners prayer for their exclusion
as party-defendants because they did not want to abide with
any of the conditions set by the PCGG.
Even if the court would accommodate the issue of
confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship, the same privilege
cannot be accorded to petitioners because they were sued as
principal defendants in Civil Case No. 0033. Conspiracy is
imputed to the parties therein. Their inclusion as defendants is
justified. The lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the
commission of a crime or against the prosecution of the lawyer
therefor.
Puno, J., dissenting:
I join the majority in holding that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion when it misdelineated the metes and
bounds of the attorney-client privilege by failing to recognize its
exceptions However, I part ways with the majority when it ruled
that petitioners need not prove they fall within the exceptions to
the general rule. I respectfully submit that the attorney-client
privilege is not a magic mantra whose invocation will ipso facto
and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly
put, it is not enough to assert the privilege. The person claiming
the privilege or its exceptions has the obligation to present the
underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege.
It ought to be obvious that petitioners right to claim the
attorney-client privilege is resolutory of the Complaint against
them, and hence should be decided ahead and independently
of their claim to equal protection of the law. Pursuant to the rule
in legal hermeneutics that courts should not decide
constitutional issues unless unavoidable, I also respectfully
submit that there is no immediate necessity to resolve
petitioners' claim to equal protection of the law at this stage of
the proceedings.
G.R. No. L-43155
Ortega v. CA
August 14, 1987
Facts
On May 22, 1948, Joaquin Ortega died intestate. He was
survived by his wife, Emilia Ybanez who initiated intestate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate. On the other hand,
the common law wife, Calixta Yap filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order appointing Emilia as administratix.
Corollary, Emilia presented a verified inventory and appraisal of
the estate of the deceased and it was approved by a probate
court. Upon knowing this, the children of Calixta Yap filed in the
probate court a motion for intervention in the intestate
proceedings, alleging that they were the acknowledged natural
children.
In view of this, Judge Amador Gomez issued an order on
November 24, 1962 declaring Emilia Ybanez and her daughters
by Joaquin Ortega as the legal heirs. In this regard, since there
is no money claims filed against the estate, probate court
declared that proceedings closed and terminated.
On February 12, 1973, Calixta Yap Civil Case No.1184-0 was
amended showing:
1. Calixta Yap was married to Joaquin Ortega in 1927
before Justice of Peace Silverio Zamora
2. Calixtas children were legitimate or legitimated
3. that Emilias children were illegitimate
4. that approval by probate court of the inventories
submitted in the intestate proceedings had no basis
5. that declaration by the probate court of Emilia Ybanez
and her children as legal heirs was an error.
Nevertheless, despite the vehement objections of the
petitioners, Judge Estenzo allowed the amendments. Part of
the decision of Judge estenzo shows that all parcels of lands
which are found by his court be the conjugal partnership
properties of Calixta Yap and Joaquin Ortega.
For this reason, Emilia filed her petition for certiorari in the
Court of appeals on the ground that respondent Judge Estenzo
converted private respondentss action for quieting of
title,declaration of nullity of sale, and annulment of tax
declaration. However, CA DISMISSED the petition on February
14, 1976.
Issue
Whether or not the declaration of heirs made by Judge Estenzo
is valid.
Decision
The Supreme Court held that the declaration of the heirs made
by Judge Estenzo is void because such matter was already
resolved with finality by the probate court. In addition to this, the
court finds it with finality because there was no appeal from
respondent. Conversely, the probate court has no right to
determine with finality the ownership thereof. It was held also
that the issue of ownership of specific property be raised in a
separate ordinary action.
Further, the SC REMANDED to the trial court full hearing of the
case only on question of ownership of the 174,496 square
meters of land in Sta. Cruz, Leyte.
A.C. No. 7136
Guevarra v. Eala
August 1, 2007
Facts
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) first met Atty. Jose Emanuel
Eala, the respondent ,in January 2000 when his (complainant's)
then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as
her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled
"Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant
noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love
you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." He also noticed
that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home
from work. Complainant even saw Irene and respondent
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he
confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal
house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's
birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment,
anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following
that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of
the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded
social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which
card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated
October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene.
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene
constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as
he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw
Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent
during a concert, she was pregnant.
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And so on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment before

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a.
Noli Eala was filed for "grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner

Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION dated October 26, 2004, found the
charge against respondent sufficiently proven. The IBP Board of
Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution
dated January 28, 2006.

Decision
The SC upheld the recommendation of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner.

Eala was DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of

his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
(Underscoring supplied),

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that

adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

From respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an

adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined
under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by
any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a
man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the
marriage be subsequently declared void." (Italics supplied)
What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship,
he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families."

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent

and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly
preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party
which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other which is
the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case
against a lawyer.

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