Cases on Succession
INSTITUTION OF HEIRS:
A. Definition and Requisites
[No. 20374. October 11, 1923]
In re will of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO
PECSON, applicant and appellee, vs. AGUSTIN
CORONEL ET AL., opponents and appellants.
FACTS:
On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga probated as the last will and
testament of Dolores Coronel (testatrix) who
named as her sole heir Lorenzo Pecson, the
husband of her niece. The relatives of testatrix by
consanguinity questioned the genuineness of the
will on the following grounds: First, that it was
improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel
should dispose of her estate by excluding her
blood relatives; and second, that if such will was
not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous
illegal influence.
ISSUE:
Whether the decedent can exclude her blood
relatives in the disposition of her estate.
HELD:
YES. It is true that the ties of relationship in the
Philippines are very strong but we understand that
cases of preterition of relatives from the
inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of
ones estate by will when there are no forced
(compulsory) heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil
Code in force in the Philippines since 1989.
The SC held that nothing is strange in the
preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood
relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson
as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore, although the
institution of the beneficiary here would not seem
the most usual and customary, still this would not
be null per se.
In the absence of any statutory restriction every
person possesses absolute dominion over his
property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he
pleases without regard to natural or legal claim
upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the
requisite capacity to make a will, and the
disposition of his property is not affected by fraud
Fac Fortia Et Patere
or undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid
by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or
unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from
making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as
unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate.
X X X (40 Cyc., 1079.)
PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA V. RIGOR
August 30, 1979
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan,
left a will executed and was probated by the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December
5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the
testators nearest relatives, his three sisters. In
addition, the will provided that it be adjudicated in
favor of the legacy purported to be given to the
nearest male relative who shall take the
priesthood.
The will of the testator is the first and principal law
in the matter of testaments. When his intention is
clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation
must be in accord with the plain and literal
meaning of his words, except when it may
certainly appear that his contention was different
from that literally expressed.
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the
construction of wills. It is the greatest rule in
giving effect to a will.
From the testamentary provisions, it may be
deduced that the testator intended to devise the
rice lands to his nearest male relative who would
become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the rice
lands, who would lose the devise if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or
having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated, and who would be obligated to
say masses for the repose of the souls of the
testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest
of Victoria would administer the rice lands only in
two situations: (a) during the interval of time that
no nearest male relative of the testator was
studying for priesthood; and (b) in case the
testator's nephew became a priest and he was
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excommunicated.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any
nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the
administration of the rice lands by the parish priest
of Victoria as envisaged in the will was likewise
inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public
charitable trust was constituted by the testator in
his favor assumes that he was a trustee or a
substitute devisee. The contention is untenable. A
reading of the testamentary provisions does not
support the view that the parish priest was a
trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that
the testator was not survived by a nephew who
became a priest.
The CA correctly rules that this case is covered by
Article 956 of the Civil Code which provides that if
"the bequest for any reason should be inoperative,
it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases
of substitution and those in this the right of
accretion exists."
This case is also covered by Article 960(2) which
provides "legal succession takes place when the
will does not dispose of all the belongings to the
testator." There being no substitution nor
accretion as to the said ricelands, the same should
be distributed among the legal heirs. The effect is
as if the testator had made no disposition as to the
said rice lands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die
partly testate and partly intestate, or that there
may be mixed succession. If a conditional legacy
does not take effect, there will be intestate
succession as to the property recovered by the
said legacy.
B. Equal Sharing; Collective and
Simultaneous Institution
Nable vs. Uson
March 10, 1914
FACTS:
Fac Fortia Et Patere
This is an appeal which involves a question which
arises from the interpretation of the first and
second clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena
Uson.The court below found that the children of
the deceased sisters should take only that portion
which their respective mothers would have taken if
they been alive at the time the will was made; that
the property should be divided into six equal parts
corresponding to the number of sisters; that each
living sister should take one-sixth, and the children
of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth,
each one- sixth to be divided among said children
equally. The appellants asserted that under a
proper construction of the paragraphs of the
codicil, the property should be divided equally
between the living sisters and the children of the
deceased sisters, share and share alike, a niece
taking the same share that a sister receives.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the living sisters and the
children of the deceased sisters shall take
per capita and in equal parts the property
passing under the codicil in this case.
RULING:
Yes. The appellants' contention is well founded.
The court finds expressions which seem to indicate
with fair clearness that it was the intention of the
testatrix to divide her property equally between
her sisters and nieces.
Upon looking at the codicil, it can be observed
that: first that the testatrix, in the first paragraph
thereof, declares that after her husband's death
she desires that "my sisters and nieces, as
hereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs in
the second place, that the testatrix, in the second
paragraph of the codicil, names and identifies each
one of her heirs then living, in each one of the
persons whom she desires shall succeed her
husband in the property. Among those mentioned
specially are the nieces as well as the sisters. The
nieces are referred to in no way different from the
sisters. Each one stands out in the second
paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the other and
under exactly the same conditions; and in the third
place, the last clause of the second paragraph of
the codicil, taken together with the last clause of
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the first paragraph, is decisive of the intention of
the testatrix. In the last clause she says that she
names all of the persons whom she desires to take
under her will be name "so that they must take
and enjoy the property in equal parts as good
sisters and relatives.
We have then in the first paragraph a declaration
as to who the testatrix desires shall become the
owners of her property on the death of her
husband her nieces as well as her sisters. We
have also the final declaration of the testatrix that
she desires that the sisters and the nieces shall
take and enjoy the property in equal parts. Thus,
of the property passing under the codicil, the living
sisters and the children of the deceased sisters
shall take per capita and in equal parts.
C. Statement of a False Cause in the
Institution of Heirs
Austria v. Reyes
Feb 27, 1970
Facts:
1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk
of her estate was given to the respondents, alll
have been declared by the former as her legally
adopted children.
2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for
the probate of her will. It was opposed by the
petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The
opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed.
3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for
intervention for partition alleging that they were
the nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent
had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, hence the latter were
strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.
4. The lower court held that the validity or
invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs.
It held that the testator was possessed of
testamentary capacity and her last will was
executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or
undue influence.
Issue:
Fac Fortia Et Patere
Whether or not the institution of the heir is
valid
RULING:
Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the
stated cause for the testamentary institution does
not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution.
An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set
aide the institution if certain factors are present.
Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled
under Art. 850 the following requisites must
concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the will, 2)
the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must
appear from the face of the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and
doubts are resolved on its side especially when the
will shows a clear intention on the part of the
testator to dispose of practically his whole estate
as in this case.
D. Preterition
Nuguid v. Nuguid
GR L-23445, June 23, 1966
FACTS:
Rosario died single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving were her
legitimate parents, Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers
and sisters. One of the siblings filed a holographic
will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years before
her death and prayed that she be admitted to the
probate and be appointed administrator. The
parents opposed saying that they are the
compulsory heirs of the decedent in the direct
ascending line and that the will should be void on
the ground of absolute preterition.
ISSUE:
Is the will void on the ground of preterition?
RULING:
YES. The decedent left no descendants, legitimate
or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending line her parents. And, the
will completely omits both of them; thus receiving
nothing by the testament, depriving them of their
legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited.
This is a clear case of preterition. Note that A. 854
of the NCC merely nullifies the institution of heir.
Considering that the will presented solely provides
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for the institution of the petitioner as universal heir
and nothing more, the result is the same. The will
is null and void.
ACAIN VS IAC
OCTOBER 27, 1987
FACTS:
Constantitno filed for probate of the will of his
decased brother Nemesio. The spouse and
adopted child of the decedent opposed the
probate of will because of preterition. RTC
dismissed the petition of the wife. CA reversed and
the probate thus was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was preterition of
compulsory heirs in the direct line thus their
omission shall not annul the institution of heirs.
RULING:
Preterition consists in the omission of the forced
heirs because they are not mentioned there in, or
trough mentioned they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited. As for the
widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in
the direct line. However, the same cannot be said
for the adopted child whose legal adoption has not
been questioned by the petitioner. Adoption gives
to the adopted person the same rights and duties
as if he where a legitimate child of the adopter
and makes the adopted person a legal heir hence,
this is a clear case of preterition.
The universal institution of petitioner together with
his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of
the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs without any other testamentary
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that
nothing was written. No legacies and devisees
having been provided in the will, the whole
property of the deceased has been left by
universal title to petitioner and his brothers and
sisters.
NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185
FACTS:
Fac Fortia Et Patere
This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in
his will left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, the herein
respondents, with omission of the children by his
first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission
of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the
testator with the belief that he had already given
each of the children portion of the inheritance,
particularly a land he had abandoned was
occupied by the respondents over which
registration was denied for it turned out to be a
public land, and an aggregate amount of money
which the respondents were indebted to their
father.
ISSUE:
Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of
the omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in
this case?
HELD:
Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and
declared a total intestacy on the ground that
testator left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, without expressly
disinheriting the children by his first marriage but
upon the erroneous belief that he had given them
already more shares in his property than those
given to the children by his second
marriage. Disinheritance made without a
statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul
the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial
to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.
Petitioners, in their petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of
the Court of Appeals, basically affirming that
rendered on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 23,
adjudicating the property subject matter of the
litigation to respondents. The case and the factual
setting found by the Court of Appeals do not
appear to deviate significantly from that made by
the trial court.
Viado Non V. CA
February 15, 2000
Full text:
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado
and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces of
property, among them a house and lot located at
147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered
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by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682. Virginia
P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado
died three years later on 15 November 1985.
Surviving them were their children -- Nilo Viado,
Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca
Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo
Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April
1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs
herein respondents --- his wife Alicia Viado and
their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a
common residence at the Isarog property. Soon,
however, tension would appear to have escalated
between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent
Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the
property be equally divided between the two
families to make room for the growing children.
Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute
ownership over the entire property and demanded
that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the
latter. On 01 February 1988, petitioners, asserting
co-ownership over the property in question, filed a
case for partition before the Quezon City RTC
(Branch 93). Jj sc
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute
ownership over the subject property on two
documents --- a deed of donation executed by the
late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal
share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado
and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which
Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power
of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner
Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their
rights and interests over their share of the
property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both
instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and
registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682 was
cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title No.
373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked
the validity of the foregoing instruments,
contending that the late Nilo Viado employed
forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado
to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner
Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that
her brother Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure
her signature to the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. She added that the exclusion of her
retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial
settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that
should warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners
asseverated at the assailed instruments, although
executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only
five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the
Fac Fortia Et Patere
three parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo
Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died. Sc
jj
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court
found for respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado
and her children as being the true owners of the
disputed property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification by
ordering the remand of the records of the case to
the court a quo for further proceedings to
determine the value of the property and the
amount respondents should pay to petitioner Delia
Viado for having been preterited in the deed of
extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to
seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The appellate court ruled correctly.
When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her
part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property
in question included, was transmitted to her heirs -
-- her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado,
Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The
inheritance, which vested from the moment of
death of the decedent,[1] remained under a co-
ownership regime[2] among the heirs until
partition.[3] Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
would be a partition although it would purport to
be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation
or an extrajudicial settlement.[4]
In debunking the continued existence of a co-
ownership among the parties hereto, respondents
rely on the deed of donation and deed of
extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the
title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due
execution of the documents on the grounds
heretofore expressed. Sj cj
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have
raised boil down to the appreciation of the
evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both
the trial court and the appellate court. The Court
of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has
found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be
utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-
serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo
Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue
influence in procuring the signatures of the parties
to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial
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settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on

how and in what manner those supposed vices
occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof
why Julian Viado should be held incapable of
exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights
and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The
asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she
has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on
the mistaken belief that the instrument merely
pertained to the administration of the property is
too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to
believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by
profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of
the assailed document.

The fact alone that the two deeds were registered

five years after the date of their execution did not
adversely affect their validity nor would such
circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The
registration of the documents was a ministerial
act[5] and merely created a constructive notice of
its contents against all third persons.[6] Among the
parties, the instruments remained completely valid
and binding. Supreme

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to

be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
settlement verily has had the effect of preterition.
This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of
proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a
collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No.
373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104
of the Civil Code to the effect that where the
preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud,
the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share
pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has
thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the
case for further proceedings to make the proper
valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment
of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and

the decision, dated May 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. No.
37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No
special pronouncement on costs.

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