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POLICE POWER women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
PASEI v. Drilon (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to
FACTS: all members of the same class.

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It workers rests on substantial distinctions.
challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE Ichong vs Hernandez
entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of
Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions
of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to
Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that:
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the
of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates
informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
and protection of the Filipino workers. capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
exercise of police power. laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law

Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
RULING: [Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. The petitioner has protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and
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The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation


enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary
or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the
matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
LUTZ v. ARANETA
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
GR No. L-7859, December 22, 1955
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
98 PHIL 148
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due
FACTS: Plaintiff Walter Lutz, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the
process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly
intestate estate of Antionio Ledesma,
related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the sought to recover from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be taxes, under section 3 of the CA 567 or the Sugar Adjustment Act thereby
no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there assailing its constitutionality, for it provided for an increase of the existing tax
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So on the manufacture of sugar, alleging that such enactment is not being levied
the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is for a public purpose but solely and exclusively for the aid and support of the
due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, sugar industry thus making it void and unconstitutional. The sugar industry
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or situation at the time of the enactment was in an imminent threat of loss and
standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly needed to be stabilized by imposition of emergency measures.
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been ISSUE: Is CA 567 constitutional, despite its being allegedly violative of the
made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. equal protection clause, the purpose of which is not for the benefit of the
general public but for the rehabilitation only of the sugar industry?
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen HELD: Yes. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of
in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed to fully play,
their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems means provided in the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are
not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally
matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of
the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers the state's police power.
from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict
with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on
the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.
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ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, et exercise of the power and eminent domain. This is a revolutionary kind of
al., petitioners, vs.HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially
REFORM, respondent. intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully
available at the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the
nullification of the entire program.

No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were


FACTS: The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes deemed full owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full
the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating on intend to cultivate the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on the
same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR
occupied by tenants who re actually cultivating such lands. of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land
primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm
holding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the LOZANO VS MARTINEZ
land owners shall have been determined, they petitioned the court for a writ
of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could FACTS: This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving
not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention. prosecution of offenses under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check
Law. The defendant in these case moved seasonably to quash
ISSUE the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an
Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power. offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the
respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No.
Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and
CARP is violative of the Constitution. dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the court
for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist
Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle
the following ground:
of eminent domain by divesting the land owner of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation 1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
HELD 2) it impairs freedom of contract;
Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
Constitution itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject.
However, objection is raised to the manner fixing the just compensation, 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives. However, there is no arbitrariness 5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim
in the provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is only Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third
preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts Reading.
will still have the right to review with finality the said determination.
ISSUE:
No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is
money and no other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.
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RULING: accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The proper
exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and
No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within
and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of
debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is within the incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain acts deemed The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the
pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is
which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The State
inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as needs to implement decisive steps to regulate system of education by
malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. directing students to the course where he is best suited through initial tests
and evaluation. The decision of the respondent judge was reversed.

The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a


matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC
deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
DECS v San Diego 180 SCRA 533 (December 21, 1989) ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Facts: The respondent failed to pass the National Medical Admission Test
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat
(NMAT) 3 times and he was denied admission to take the test for another
from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station
time by the petitioner under its rule that a student is allowed only to take the
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case
NMAT 3 times and after 3 consecutive failures a student shall not be allowed
was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order
to take NMAT the 4th time. Respondent invoke his constitutional rights on
and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case,
academic freedom and quality education in his petition for mandamus before
the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
the court. Respondent judge rendered decision citing the admission rule of
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
the petitioner as an arbitrary exercise of police power, depriving respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
of his right to pursue medical education thus this petition for review before
the higher court.

Issue: Whether or not the admission rule implemented by petitioner an Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
arbitrary exercise of police power.

Held: The court held that police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to
require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
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reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries.
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just
Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust
can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it come forward and not the police power of the state.
easier to kill them there The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A
unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA.
forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were vs.
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S.
given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and LIM,Respondent.
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying due process. Facts:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Facts: Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and
regulation of establishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more
the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set than twice a day.
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC),
the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene
beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents,
power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public. in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal
private property liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution
Ruling: encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as
well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade
property. The ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid
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exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals
Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to
that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances. only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not
exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
in their business. must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of unreasonable.
the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to
privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through
of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a such implements as the general welfare clause.
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been
constituents in general. used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC. The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
Issue: the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State. ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
Held: align with the Constitution.
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance
power, and as such, it is unconstitutional. should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were
Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners.
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived
the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments
in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights
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to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the
Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
welfare, needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned
the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest. needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
the personal life of the citizen.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the MIRASOL VS. DPWH, digested
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It
must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
GR # 158793, June 8, 2006 (Constitutional Law Police Power)
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective
data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited
considerations.
and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the motorcycles is unconstitutional.
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard
Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
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unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power
ensure public safety. may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare
clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. LGUs
Facts: like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective
The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. legislative bodies, in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general
that was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in 2001. welfare of the city.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed the City of Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to
under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city.
within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of police
Terminals of the oil companies (the brief history of the Pandacan Oil power
Terminals is here).
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting 25 July and a lawful method.
2002, which period was extended up to 30 April 2003.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Courts 7 March 2007 Decision. concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method. It was enacted for the
The SC ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety
Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was
the governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027. After the SC impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from
promulgated its Decision, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area
oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
the DOE, sought to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of the decision.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027 safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The
depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a
in the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became
in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests
people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). of such interests. Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the best position to
determine the needs of its constituents.
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In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden
government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The restriction imposed to
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely
occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with
be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or paramount rights of the public. In the regulation of the use of the property,
means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a nobody else acquires the use or interest therein, hence there is no
reasonable relation to the end in view. compensable taking.

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other businesses
ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted
industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or although they can be applied to other profitable uses permitted in the
municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and commercial zone.
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory
of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated
be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for Pandacan area is congested with buildings and residences that do not
the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Code.
Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected
cannot be said to be unjust. An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory which amounts for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial
to taking without compensation distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
as it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits them from members of the same class. The law may treat and regulate one class
conducting operations in the City of Manila. However, the oil companies are differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila. The differences to distinguish one class from another.
City of Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks to
industries in the zones it established. prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist attack.
The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist
because they have invested billions of pesos in the depot, and the forced target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas
closure will result in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in would be nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in
constructing new facilities. This argument has no merit. In the exercise of the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment
police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to of the ordinance which provides for the cessation of the operations of these
promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the
Compensation is necessary only when the states power of eminent purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the conditions
domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future conditions as well.
10

Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all businesses and industries in the or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control over them. The
area it delineated. President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere
with the activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479 of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own discretion
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local
unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992) and RA affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting
8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998). within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.

It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,530 SCRA 341 (2007)
Congress. However, a brief survey of decisions where the police power Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass
measure of the LGU clashed with national laws shows that the common Transport System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila
dominator is that the national laws were clearly and expressly in conflict with Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove thebus terminals located
the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Respondents, provincial bus
that there was no room for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited operators who had bus terminals that were threatened to be removed,
merely gave DOE general powers to establish and administer programs alleges that EO should be declaredunconstitutional and illegal for
for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land
conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources and to transportation units over their respective terminals
encourage certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public
interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power
continuous supply of petroleum products. These powers can be
exercised without emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power,
these ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the let alone legislative power. In light of the administrativenature of its powers
LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general welfare of and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as
its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the latter. Considering that envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been validly designated by the
the powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan Terminals are not President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly
categorical, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Manila. order the eliminationof the respondents terminals.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under
the Constitution. An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be
devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. The LGC delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid
was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local delegation, the power may be exercised by the President
governments as mandated by the Constitution. There is no showing how the andadministrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal
laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of corporations or local government under an express delegation by the LGC of
its power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to 1991.
reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction. Measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people
using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper
The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs subject for the exercise of police power.
On Constitutional Law, The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect
Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is that
an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the Presidents power
within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference
over LGUs to one of general supervision. Consequently, the Chief Executive
to rights.
11

Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot
20, 1998) Posted on October 4, 2012 G.R. No. 127820 292 SCRA 676 amend the former.
July 20, 1998 Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-
95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for
expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land. APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., Petitioners,

Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS: APO Fruits

conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5

through a socialized housing project. Petitioner, pursuant to its parcels of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On

Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made 12 October 1995, the two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the

an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private DAR. DAR offered P86.9 million for AFCs land and P164.40 million for

respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized HPIs land (total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI and DAR cannot

petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with agree on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just

the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14

Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed February 1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation

to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and of the land for three years. But nevertheless, the government, through the

not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, Land Bank of the Philippines, deposited P26M into AFCs account and

if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private P45M into HPIs account as down payment in 1996. The DAR also caused

respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines in

trial court dismissed the complaint Issue: Whether a Local Government December 1996. Later, titles were given to farmers under the CARP

Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program). Due to DARABs failure to

its law-making body. Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of just

Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor

can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted of AFC and HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from

by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution assessors, that the purchase price should be higher than what was offered

is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, by DAR; that the purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR

the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR appealed to the CA,

was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in the CA reversed the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not there was just

effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being compensation. FACTS: No. AFCs and HPIs land were taken in 1996
without just compensation. DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was
12

commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners,
three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of
the RTC. The RTCs finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts,
evidence. DAR was given chance to support its ruling on why the purchase unless modified by this Act. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is
price should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to present such particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the
evidence. To allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them determination of just compensation, reads, as follows: Sec. 17.
empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation,
oppressive. The concept of just compensation embraces not only the the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
just inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
necessary to cope with his loss. Just compensation is defined as the full factors to determine its valuation. Note should be taken that in said
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on AFCs and HPIs lands
expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network,
measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein
used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the substantial amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall up. The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stones throw
be real, substantial, full, and ample. The power of expropriation is by no from the residential and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR
means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in should never ignore. The market value of the property (plus the
the constitutional injunction that private property shall not be taken for consequential damages less consequential benefits) is determined by such
public use without just compensation and in the abundant jurisprudence factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size,
that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the shape and location. Therefore, AFC and HPI is entitled to the amount of
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation (Php 1.38 billion) as computed with 12% interest per
just compensation. Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive annum plus attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the just compensation or
Agrarian Reform Law) provides: SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The P138 million.
Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
13

Manila Memorial Park Inc. vs Linsangan (November 22, 2004) Post under acts of Florencia which were outside the authority given her. As such, the
case digests, Civil Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by SC ruled that the principal cannot be held liable for actions of agents
Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Florencia Baluyot is authorized by the Manila outside the scope of their authority when such acts are ratified by the
Memorial Park Inc. (MMPI) to sell burial lots to those interested in principal himself. On the part of MMPI, they did not ratify Florencias
purchasing. Herein respondent Atty. Linsangan was approached by acts, nor did they know of such actions.
Florencia with an offer to sell to the former a lot that she alleges to have
already been previously sold but the owner thereof has cancelled and thus,
Atty. Linsangan shall only continue the payment thereof amounting to
P95,000, Atty. Linsangan agreed and payed an initial P35, 000.
Thereafter, Florencia advised Atty. Linsangan that there were changes in
the contract and that she needed him to sign a new contract stipulating
the total price of P132, 000 but Florencia assured Atty. Linsangan that
he would only pay the agreed P95, 000. In the new contract, Atty.
Linsangan acceded that he has read and understood all the stipulations
therein. The payment was made in installments for two years which Atty.
Linsangan completed, however, after two years, Florencia informed
Linsangan that their contract was cancelled and offered a different lot,
Atty. Linsangan refused the offer and filed a suit for breach of contract
against MMPI and Florencia. MMPI avers that Florencia acted beyond the
scope of her authority as MMPIs agent since the latter did not allow her
to renegotiate existing contracts but only to sell new contracts. Atty.
Lnsangan on the other hand argues that MMPI should be liable for the
acts of its agents. Issue: Whether or not MMPI is liable for the acts of
Florencia Held: NO. The SC ruled that Florencia acted outside the scope of
her authority as agent of MMPI and Atty. Linsangan failed to ascertain
the authority given to Florencia especially that their agreement on the
second contract had a different stipulation than what he and Florencia
agreed upon. Moreover, Atty. Linsangans signature over the new contract
signifies his agreement thereto and serves as a form of ratification for the
14

SANIDAD VS COMELEC 73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976 Ponente: Held. Yes. International obligations in peace time are created through
Martin, J FACTS: On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito elementary consideration. Every state has an obligation not to
Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on of other states.
October 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and
Discussion. In this case, the Court found that the Hague Convention of
1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the president has
1907 could not be applied but the Convention was applicable only in
no power to propose amendments to the new constitution, as such, the
time of war. It was on the basis of the principle of freedom of maritime
referendum plebiscite has no legal basis. ISSUE: 1. Is the case at bar
communication that this case was decided.
justiciable? 2. Does the president have authority to propose
amendments to the Constitution? 3. Is the submission to the people of PEOPLE v. POMAR November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.
the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed sufficient (Labor Standards: Police Power, basis of social legislation) FACTS: Julio
and proper submission? HELD: The issue of whether the President can Pomar is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a
assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable question tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de
since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in the City
president to perform such act is in question. The president has the of Manila. under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted
authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers are vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy. However, Pomar did not
generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days before
deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too and 30 days after her delivery and confinement. Despite demands
short especially since the questions are issues of the day and the people made by her, Pomar still refused to pay Fajardo. The CFI found Pomar
have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law. guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No.
3071. POmar appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania)
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands
Brief Fact Summary. The fact that the Albanian (P) authorities did not in the exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy
make the presence of mines in its waters was the basis of the United purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in
Kingdom (D) claim against them. Synopsis of Rule of Law. International factory, shop or place of labor of any description, and of insuring to
obligations in peace time are created through elementary consideration them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before
and one month after their delivery. ISSUE: Whether or not Act 3071
Facts. The explosion of mines in the Albanian (P) waters resulted in the
has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police
death of a British naval personnel. It was on this basis that the United
power of the state. RULING: The police power of the state is a growing
Kingdom (D) claimed that Albania (P) was internationally responsible
and expanding power. As civilization develops and public conscience
for damages. Issue. Are international obligations in time of peace
becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been
created through elementary consideration?
15

demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment with reference to the complaint. It held that there were substantial differences between the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot logos or trademarks of the parties nor on the continued use of Del
grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or Monte bottles. The decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of
violate the express inhibition of the peoples law the constitution. If Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not SSMI committed infringement against
the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to Del Monte in the use of its logos and bottles. HELD: Yes. In determining
conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first whether two trademarks are confusingly similar, the two marks in
amend that law. It will also be noted from an examination of said their entirety as they appear in the respective labels must be
section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the employment of considered in relation to the goods to which they are attached; the
women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the precognizant
each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or words but also on the other features appearing on both labels. It has
corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who been correctly held that side-by-side comparison is not the final test of
employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under similarity. In determining whether a trademark has been infringed, we
the law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered. must consider the mark as a whole and not as dissected. The Court is
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts agreed that are indeed distinctions, but similarities holds a greater
and the law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the weight in this case. The Sunshine label is a colorable imitation of the Del
Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void. Therefore, the Monte trademark. What is undeniable is the fact that when a
sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby manufacturer prepares to package his product, he has before him a
dismissed. boundless choice of words, phrases, colors and symbols sufficient to
distinguish his product from the others. Sunshine chose, without a
DEL MONTE CORPORATION and PHILIPPINE PACKING
reasonable explanation, to use the same colors and letters as those used
CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SUNSHINE SAUCE
by Del Monte though the field of its selection was so broad, the
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES G.R. No. L-78325 January 25, 1990
inevitable conclusion is that it was done deliberately to deceive. With
FACTS: Petitioner Del Monte Corporation (Del Monte), through its local
regard to the bottle use, Sunshine despite the many choices available to
distributor and manufacturer, PhilPack filed an infringement of
it and notwithstanding that the caution "Del Monte Corporation, Not
copyright complaint against respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing
to be Refilled" was embossed on the bottle, still opted to use the
Industries (SSMI), also a maker of catsup and other kitchen sauces. In
petitioners' bottle to market a product which Philpack also produces.
its complaint, Del Monte alleged that SSMI are using bottles and logos
This clearly shows the private respondent's bad faith and its intention
identical to the petitioner, to which is deceiving and misleading to the
to capitalize on the latter's reputation and goodwill and pass off its
public. In its answer, Sunshine alleged that it had ceased to use the Del
own product as that of Del Monte.
Monte bottle and that its logo was substantially different from the Del
Monte logo and would not confuse the buying public to the detriment ASIA BREWERY, INC. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SAN
of the petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the MIGUEL CORPORATION G.R. 103543 July 5, 1993 Facts: San Miguel
16

Corporation (SMC) filed a complaint against Asia Brewery Inc. (ABI) for increase of P0.184/kwh, subject to the condition that in the event that
infringement of trademark and unfair competition on account of the the Board finds that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates,
latter's BEER PALE PILSEN or BEER NA BEER product which has been all excess amounts collected from the applicants customers as a result
competing with SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN for a share of the of this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly
local beer market. The trial court dismissed SMC's complaint because credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future
ABI "has not committed trademark infringement or unfair competition consumptions. Subsequent to an audit by the Commission on Audit
against" SMC On appeal by SMC, the Court of Appeals reversed the (COA), the ERB rendered its decision adopting COAs recommendations
decision rendered by the trial court, finding the defendant Asia and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the
Brewery Incorporated GUILTY of infringement of trademark and unfair average amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs
competition. ABI then filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Are the billing cycles beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that
words PALE PILSEN as part of ABIs trademark constitute the provisional relief in the amount of P0.184/kwh granted under the
infringement of SMCs trademark? Ruling: No. The Supreme Court said Boards Order dated 28 January 1994 is hereby superseded and
it does not constitute an infringement as the words PALE PILSEN, modified and the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with
which are part of ABIs trademark, are generic words descriptive of the MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing
color (pale), of a type of beer (pilsen), which is a light bohemian cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to MERALCOs customers
beer with a strong hops flavor that originated in the City of Pilsen, or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption. The
Czechislovakia and became famous in the Middle Ages. The Supreme ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense
Court further said that the words "pale pilsen" may not be as this should be borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the
appropriated by SMC for its exclusive use even if they are part of its income or profits realized from the operation of their business hence,
registered trademark. No one may appropriate generic or descriptive should not be passed on to the consumers. Further, in applying the net
words. They belong to the public domain. Petitioner ABI has neither average investment method, the ERB adopted the recommendation of
infringed SMC's trademark nor committed unfair competition with the COA that in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of
latter's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN product. the property should be included, determined in accordance with the
number of months the same was actually used in service during the
Republic vs. Meralco [G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002.] Facts:
test year. On appeal (CA GR SP 46888), the Court of Appeals set aside
On 23 December 1993, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed
the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO
with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision
rates by an average of P0.167/ kwh and the refund of such amount to
of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of
MERALCOs customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing
P0.21/kwh in its distribution charge. The application also included a
cycle beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for Reconsideration
prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section
filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the
16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order 172.
petition before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the
On 28 January 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional
17

petitions and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. MERALCO the evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with
was authorized to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of reference to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not
P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs billing cycles sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng
beginning February 1994. Further, in accordance with the decision of Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the
the ERB dated 16 February 1998, the excess average amount of
deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference
P0.167/kwh starting with the applicants billing cycles beginning
to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and
February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCOs customers or
Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between
correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption. 1.
the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that
Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the States police
under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful
powers The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is
marriage; accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as
founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing
rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions,

thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased
affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and
becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the Rosalia. Issues: Whether or not the chinese marriage is valid and
common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the recognizable in the Philippines. Whether or not the mohammedan
owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is marriage is valid. Held: No. Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order
continued, the same is subject to public regulation. No. 68) provides that All marriages contracted without these Islands,

Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee 43 Phil 43 [GR No. 18081 March 3, 1922] which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were

Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, contracted, are valid in these Islands. To establish a valid foreign

Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove

P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a

Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign

marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The marriage by convincing evidence. In the case at bar there is no competent

estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy

that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is

Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral

Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried. The conflicting claims to the conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage.

estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the

Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing same. Yes. The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is
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that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, children born of these unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either
but, it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the to proclaim immoralit
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such appointee of President John Adams (President Adams) to a justice of
is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they the peace position in the District of Columbia, brought suit against
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant President Thomas Jeffersons (President Jefferson) Secretary of State,
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of James Madison, seeking delivery of his commission.

Civil Procedure is that a man and woman deporting themselves as


Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
(Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to review executive
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has limited
intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United States
substantial reason for denying to the legislative power the right to remove Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the
impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare Congress.
what shall be valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when
Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing
they took place, were against the law. Public policy should aid acts
President Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the
intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to
judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist
invalidate marriages. The courts can properly incline the scales of their
appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President
decisions in favors of that solution which will mot effectively promote the
Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the
public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative
District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were
intention into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in holding that
confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jeffersons
the marriage of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in
inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marburys, were
conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void,
undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president
would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that there
instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of
are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married
the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court,
according to local custom. We then have it within our power either to
requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.
nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the
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Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?


Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. As the President
signed Marburys commission after his confirmation, the appointment
has been made, and Marbury has a right to the commission Given
that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver
Marburys commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to
review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of the
law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of
the government to do a particular thing therein specified,
mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme
Court. To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to
sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside the
constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.