GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS CA

GR NO. 97336

FEB. 19, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner, an Iranian resident and an exchange medical student in Lyceum Northwestern

Colleges, Dagupan City, courted and promised to marry Mrilou Gonzales, a 22-year old Filipino
lass with a good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community.
She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married and they agreed that they
would do so at the end of the semester, which was in October of 1987.
They even visited the girls parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval of marriage
On August 20, 1987, petitioner forced her to live with him in his apartment; she was still a virgin
before she lived in with him
Petitioners attitude towards her started to change as he began to maltreat her, sustaining
injuries
Private respondent filed a petition for damages for the alleged violation of their agreement to
get married.
Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore,
and that he is already married to someone from Bacolod
Petitioner likewsieprayed for an award for miscellaneous expenses and moral damages as he
had suffered mental anxiety and besmirched reputation
The RTC of Pangasinan ruled in favour of private respondent on the basis on Art. 21
The CA affirmed in toto the trial courts ruling
Petitioner contends that he had not committed any moral wrong or violated any good custom or
public policy and that a mere breach of promise is not actionable

ISSUE:

W/N damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art. 21

RULING: YES.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise is not an actionable wrong per se.
But Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi0delict in this jurisdiction by
granting actual legal remedy for the countless number of moral wrongs that is impossible for the
human foresight to expressly enumerate in a statute.
When a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman, and also the proximate cause of the surrendering the woomans virginity, which in
reality had no intention of marrying her--- could justify an award for damages not because of
breach to marry but because of fraud and deceit behind such promise.
 Private respondent surrendered her virginity not because of lust but because of moral seduction
which a ground to recover damages pursuant to Art. 21