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Social Movements and Organizational
Form: Cooperative Alternatives to
Corporations in the American Insurance,
Dairy, and Grain Industries
Marc Schneiberg Marissa King
Reed CollegeColumbia University
Thomas Smith
Reed College
and towhat extent, do social move 1997; Davis and Thompson 1994; Davis et al.
How, ments promote institutionaldiversity and 2005; Fligstein 2001; Haveman, Rao, and
alternative organizational forms? Scholars have Paruchuri 2007; Lounsbury, Ventresca, and
recently addressed this question by combining Hirsch 2003; Minkoff 1994; Rao 1998;
movement and organizations research (Clemens Soule forthcoming). This
Schneiberg 2002;
Direct correspondence toMarc Reed ASR reviewers and editors for comments and
Schneiberg, helpful
College, 3203 SE Woodstock Boulevard, Portland, We owe special thankstoHuggyRao for
suggestions.
OR 97202 (marc.schneiberg@reed.edu). We thank feedback and suggestions at a very early stage of this
Woody Powell, Michael Lounsbury, Steve Barley, project. The
usual caveats apply. This research was
Susse Frank Dobbin, Ove
Georg, Pederson, Paul supported by a National Science Foundation grant
Gronke, Jeffrey Parker, Noel Netusil, members of the (#0318466) to the firstauthor,and by theLevine
International Center for Business and Politics, and the and Corbett-Goldhammer funds at Reed College.
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636 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
(Armstrong 2002; Clemens 1997; Lounsbury et directly and controls for economic, political,
al. 2003; Moore and Hala 2002; Rao 1998). and community factors thatshape thecollective
Despite a growing body of quantitative organi action costs of creating new forms. It is also the
zational analyses that invokemovement effects firstthataddresses how movements can alter the
(Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Greve, Pozner, micro-economics of organization by helping
and Rao 2006; Ingram and Simons 2000;
cooperators solve coordination problems and
McLaughlin 1996; Ruef 2000), few studies
or mem
manage organizing costs associated with group
measure movements' presence, activity,
diversity,mobility, and community instability.
bership (Lounsbury 2001; Rojas 2006;
Well developed movements, we suggest, helped
Schneiberg 2002; Soule forthcoming).
produce social ties and sustain cooperative
Quantitative analyses of policy directlymeas
ure movement
forms as theUnited States shifted from a soci
strength (e.g., Amenta,
Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Soule and Olzak ety of stable communities, local networks, and
2004), but organizational analyses often rely self-governing towns to a more diverse and
on indirect proxies, measuring movement cor impersonal society of geographically mobile
relates or enabling conditions. strangers.
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 637
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638 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
tion,and credit famines, corporate consolidation immense sum is an annual gift from the hard work
also fueled political conflict, protests, populist people to a set of sharpers who ridicule us for our
you cannot afford to pay these high premiums to forge networks and coalitions forprotests, lob
joint stock companies. Insure yourselves and keep bying efforts,and enacting laws,while provid
some money at home. Commercial companies ing new formswith regulatory support, legal
wasted seven-tenths of the premiums: This infrastructure,and political cover. Such cover is
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 639
Stryjan 1994). Finally,movements can promote conditional effects on policy outcomes, butwe
favorable environments or "cross form" effects propose parallel arguments about movement
(Minkoff 1994) for cooperatives by forming effects on organizations. Anticorporate move
complementary institutions, related types of ments can pursue economic organization as an
organizations, or communities of similar forms alternative to using the state against corpora
in parallel domains (Ruef 2000; Schneiberg tions, yielding conditional positive effects of
2007). Such organizations and communities movements for cooperative forms (Schneiberg
can supply cooperatives with capital, favored 2002,2007). This strategymay flowfrom a dis
trading relations, and managerial expertise, as trustof politics and a principled rejection of
well as networks and organized groups, vivid states in favor of community and local self-suf
instantiations of alternatives, analogies, and ficiency.Activists often turn to cooperatives as
cognitive or sociopolitical legitimacy (Barnett a "third way" between markets and states or
and Carroll 1987; Baum 1996; Ben-Ner 1984; corporations, or as a way to organize outside
Elster 1988; Ingram and Simons 2000; established institutions(Rothschild-Whitt 1979;
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640 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Ware 1989). This strategy can also stem from and lard pitched Midwestern dairy and hog
counter-mobilization by corporations and farmers against beef interests,cotton growers,
blocked political access. Anticorporate move the Southern Alliance, and the Populist Party,
ments may abandon politics for private strate splitting theAlliance and contributing to the
gies and organization when political victories Populists' defeat (Lampard 1963; Nixon 1928).
are subverted by corporate capture of courts or Dairy farmers dissociated themselves from
commissions (Clemens 1997; Hattam 1992). wheat and cotton-beltpopulists, opting to lobby
Both of the above strategic concerns affect on their own as an interest group. Conflicts
ed U.S. anticorporate movements. Agrarians
between cooperative and antimonopoly pro
and independentproducers foughtpolitical bat grams deepened thisrift.Agricultural produc
tles for regulation, antitrust laws, and currency er cooperatives battled "trusts" in theirhome
reform,seeing these as vital elements forregion industries and turned to politics to contest cor
al development. Nonetheless, theywere ambiva porations and to secure enabling legislation.
lent about politics in general, and thirdparty Like unions, however, cooperatives faced
politics in particular (Ostler 1993; Sanders antitrustprosecutions as theyorganized tobar
1999). They "oscillated between fraternalism gain collectively with processors and brokers
and political organization" (Clemens 1997:143), (Guth1982;Young 1991).
periodically declaring their organs to be non Hypothesis 3: As anticorporate movements
political, and opting forprivate self-organiza increase inmembership, organization, or
tionand cooperatives to solve the trustproblem. the prevalence of cooperatives
resources,
Anticorporate movements may thus be most and mutuals will decrease.
productive for cooperative enterprise where
political access isblocked or political means are
rejected, that is, in theabsence of anticorporate Movements as moderating
forces. Finally,
politics. beyond any political engagements or direct
Hypothesis 2: The positive effects of move effects that theymight bring about,movements
ment membership or organization on the are also social infrastructuresfor organization
that can alter how consumers and producers
prevalence of cooperatives and mutuals
will increase in settings characterized by respond to the incentives,collective-action costs,
and trade-offs of
blocked political access or the absence of cooperative enterprise.
Movements could thusmoderate the effectsof
anticorporate political victories. on
micro-economic conditions cooperatives'
Third, prior research suggests thatorganizing forms. Economic sociologists have shown that
dilemmas could prompt movement elites to social structural factors, including profession
oppose cooperatives, yielding a negative effect. al associations, shifts in policy regimes, and
Aldrich and Stern (1983), for example, find new institutional logics, can powerfully mod
thatunion leaders discourage cooperatives for erate economic forces. For example, they trans
fear theywill divide the rank and file between formhow organizations understand and respond
owners and non-owners, undermining solidar tomarket conditions in deciding whether to
ity.Similarly, Schwartz (1976) locates the fail merge, which business strategies to pursue,
ure of Alliance cotton exchanges in conflicts what structures to adopt, orwhether to regulate
between movement elites, who had ties to cor competition (Bartley and Schneiberg 2002;
porations or interests in forgingbroader politi Dobbin and Dowd 1997, 2000; Dobbin and
cal coalitions, and rank-and-file groups, who Sutton 1998; Thornton and Ocasio 1999). We
were interested inbypassing or contesting cor extend this logic to consider movements as
porations throughcooperatives. Both dynamics moderating social factors thatcan buffer coop
would foster negative associations between eratives from collective-action costs associated
movement mobilization and cooperatives. with group diversity or community dissolution.
Conflict among producers or between coop Research argues that, in general, consumers
eratives' and movements' political aims could or producers turn to cooperatives tomanage
also fosternegative associations between coop market failures or costs of contractingwith for
eratives and populist movements. In the 1890s, profit firms (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Ben
struggles overGreenback proposals, margarine, Ner 1984; Hansmann 1995;Williamson 1985).
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 641
When markets fail toprevent corporations from areas, as these investmentsentail fixed costs and
benefiting at the expense of consumers or pro agglomeration economies.
ducers, these groups have incentives to organ Hypothesis 4a: As theprices thatconsumers are
ize cooperatives. This occurs when information
charged increase, theprices thatproducers
about products is costly, collective goods are are paid decrease, and population density
involved, or trading partners are locked into
decreases, the prevalence of cooperatives
exchanges due tomonopoly or transaction and mutuals will increase.
specific investments.In these cases, producers or
consumers become vulnerable to exploitation by Yet the costs of collective enterprise associ
corporations and suffer"costs of contracting," ated with population change and declining
such as monopoly over- or under-pricing, qual community or commonality can undermine
itydilution,or service failure.Moreover, theycan gains from solving market failures, leading to
reduce conflicts of interestand contractingcosts Hypothesis 4b:
by unifying ownership with production or con Hypothesis 4b: As population change, residen
sumption via a cooperative ormutual firm. tial instability, and group or community
Yet in choosing cooperative forms,consumers
heterogeneity increase, the prevalence of
and producers are subject to costs of collective
cooperatives and mutuals will decrease.
ownership, which themselves often depend on
the strengthof a common community or culture These baseline hypotheses letus propose two
(Ben Ner 1984; Hansmann 1995; Rothschild ways inwhich movements can serve as social
andWhitt 1986). Cooperative firms relyon col infrastructures for organization, moderating
lective action and decision making among micro-economic effects on cooperative forms.
numerous, often diverse groups. Cooperatives First, to the extent thatmovements expand
may thus sufferfrom differences in interests, actors' choices bymaking cooperative alterna
protracteddeliberation, enforcement issues, and tives available and legitimate, consumers and
declining commitment.Furthermore,by spread producers will turnmore readily to these forms
ingprofits, losses, and decision making across as costs of contracting with corporations
consumer or
producer groups, cooperatives become severe.Well-developed movements will
diminish incentives forowners tomonitor man magnify the effects of adverse pricing, failures
agement, develop expertise, and invest in to provide services, and population density on
improvements. Such "costs of ownership" are cooperative enterprise.
low for stable, homogenous groups, inwhich
Hypothesis 5a: Increased movement member
long-standing relations prevail and community ship, resources, and organization will
or common culture is strong. But as population
increase the effects of adverse prices and
change or influxesof new groups disrupt social
or as group population density on the prevalence of
relations, heterogeneity increases,
cooperatives and mutuals.
these bases for cooperatives dissolve.
Cooperatives face growing organizing costs, Second, by providing cooperatives with social
internaldivision, and shrinkingsocial resources ties, templates, and already-organized collec
for sustaining commitment, trust, and democ tivities,movements may supplement or partly
racy (Bonin, Jones, and Putterman 1993; substitutefor traditionalcommunity.This could
Hansmann 1995; Haveman and Rao 1997; reduce cooperatives' and mutuals' dependence
Hoffman and Libecap 1991; Putterman 1982; on well-established, stable, and homogenous
Whyte andWhyte 1991). groups. As a dairy official noted about market
We thus expect cooperatives to proliferate ing cooperatives (cited inKnapp 1969:200),
as contracting costs increase. They will prolif less organizing work is required when cooper
erate in settingswhere consumers are charged atives can use already-established movement
high prices, where producers receive lowprices, collectivities as organizing platforms:
and where consumers or producers receive lit
Wherever I founda strongGrange, I had the least
tle or no service from for-profitfirms, as when
difficultyin gettingmilk producers to join our
population density is low.Corporations will not associations.Usually I could depend on theGrange
find itprofitable to build processing plants or officers for help and Grange meetings were splen
distribution networks in sparsely populated did opportunities to preach the doctrine of collec
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642 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
tive bargaining. State granges endorsed and rec ized to insure themselves against fire and other
ommended theNEMPA [New England Milk hazards (Bainbridge 1952:161; Heimer 1985;
Producers to members and Grange
Association]
Schneiberg 2002). These firms included a score
halls were placed at our disposal without charge_
or so ofmultistate "factorymutuals," butmost
It has been the Mother Organization ... that for
were "class mutuals" inwhich property owners
over half a century has been building up the sen
in a town, city, or industrycontracted to cover
timent,developing the leadershipand layingthe
foundation for the work that was to follow. one another against property damage or loss
up to a specified limit.Class mutuals used amix
More generally,movements constitute social of assessment and advanced premium plans,
infrastructurethatcan fosterbroader social ori
and theywere mainly local operations with few
entations, sustain commitment, and facilitate cash assets. Yet were numerous,
they especial
thecommunication and collaboration thatcoop
ly in theMidwest, rural Pennsylvania, and
eratives require (Rothschild andWhitt 1986). To
upstateNew York, with more than3,500 inbusi
the extent that"mother organizations" promote
ness between 1903 and 1929 (see Figure 1). By
solidarity, theycan reduce cooperatives' depen the early twentiethcentury,mutuals wrote 11 to
dence on traditional communities, buffering
12 percent of the nation's fire insurance, cap
themfrom the disruptive effects of residential
turing40 percent of the farm business and key
instability, immigration, and group diversity. commercial lines by 1921, and reaching 35 per
Hypothesis 5b: Increased movement member cent of the insurance in force inWisconsin
ship and organization will decrease the (Bainbridge 1952; Heflebower 1980).
negative effectsof population change, res Property owners formed mutuals to solve
idential instability,and group or community moral hazards they faced with for-profitinsur
heterogeneity on the prevalence of coop ers (Hansmann 1995; Heimer 1985; Schneiberg
eratives and mutuals. 2002). Stock insurers,forexample,made money
from investments rather than insurance and
Indeed, just as movements shape policy
competed without limit for premiums to fund
processes differentlyat differentpoints (King, investments. They thus failed to accumulate
Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005; Soule and King
reserves, eroding their capacity to pay claims
2006), theirorganizational effectsmay also vary and leavingpolicyholders unprotected aftercon
over time, with movements like the Grange
flagrations. Insurers tempered rivalry via cartels,
serving mainly as moderating influences for which subjected the insured to rate hikes and
cooperatives once highly politicized struggles discrimination. In response, property owners
over economic order begin to recede into the
pursued mutuals and anticorporate politics like
past.
anticompact laws and regulation, drawing on
movements against combines in railroads and
CASE SELECTION AND INDUSTRY other sectors formodels, techniques, and per
CONTEXT sonnel (Grant 1979; Kimball 1960). Stock insur
We address movement effectson organizations ers also refused to invest in fire-prevention
by analyzing cooperatives and mutuals in the systems to help consumers. These investments
fire insurance, dairy, and grain industries.All had collective-good and consumer-specific
threewere leading sectors forcooperative organ qualities and did not become common until
via mutuals.
ization in theUnited States. In addition, con consumers aligned incentives
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 643
N. Ins.
Mutuals
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644 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Creamery, these effortsplaced dairy firstamong larly in the upper Midwest and Plains states,
agricultural sectors in terms of both establish growers were successful (see Figure 1). The
ing cooperatives and their output share. By number of elevator cooperatives reached 1,000
1909, therewere more than 2,700 dairy coop by 1907 and peaked atmore than 4,000 in the
eratives in theUnited States, concentrated, as 1920s, settlingdown to 2,614 by 1936 (Elsworth
Figure 1 shows, inmany of the same places 1928). By 1925, grain cooperatives held 38 per
where mutuals had existed in 1903 (Elsworth cent of themarket, making them first indollar
1928). By 1891, 60 percent of cheese in the volume in agriculture (Heflebower 1980).
United States was manufactured cooperatively; Grain farmerspursued cooperatives to over
by 1936, cooperatives accounted for 40 per come market concentration among "line eleva
cent of butter output; and by 1964, 65 percent tor"companies (Filley 1929; Saloutos andHicks
of butter and 70 to 75 percent of fluidmilk 1951). Line companies were syndicates of com
were produced or marketed via cooperatives mission firms,grain dealers, and exporters that
(Heflebower 1980; Knapp 1969). owned up to 800 or 900 elevators, monopo
Dairymen also combined cooperative self lized distribution along a railroad line, and
organization and politics to contest corpora densely interlockedwith railroads and terminal
tions.At first,
markets underproduced butterand elevators. Line companies received favorable
cheese factories, leaving milk producers who termsfrom railroads and warehouses, and they
needed manufacturing facilities to their own sought to eliminate independent elevators. They
cooperative devices. For-profit factories sub paid farmershigh rates forgrain inplaces where
sequently appeared, but theypaid one price for competition existed, and low rateswhere itdid
all milk grades. This practice, farmers felt,dis not. Line companies also "docked" growers for
criminated unfairly between quality producers mixtures of grain, required bushels over legal
and those who watered theirmilk, and appro weight standards, and paid farmers for lower
priated investments thatfarmersmade in feed, grade grain,which they then repacked and sold
animal care, and equipment toproduce high-fat as higher grade. In response, growers organized
milk (Heflebower 1980; Lampard 1963). For theirown grain elevators and mobilized politi
fluidmilk producers, theproblem involved con cally against line companies. They obtained
centrateddistribution,which leftfarmers facing laws to force railroads to provide sites for ele
"the milk trust"?urban milk dealers who col vators, antitrustprosecutions, antidiscrimina
luded to cut prices (Filley 1929; Knapp 1969; tion laws to prevent overbidding by line
Young 1991). Dairy farmerswere vulnerable in elevators, and a 1906 ICC investigation that
this transactionbecause seasonal surpluses and ended railroads' opposition to the farmers' ele
the perishable nature of their goods made it vatormovement (Filley 1929).
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 645
struggles over trustsand combines by moder Bartley 2001). States are arenas, "attractors,"
ating theeconomic and community dynamics of and targets formovement mobilization and
organization? political activity.We focus on the number of
We chose this strategy based on historical cooperatives and mutuals per statebecause we
considerations and data availability. The years are interestedin theirprevalence and persistence
1903 and 1913 are the earliest forwhich sys across states and over time.We use negative
tematic data exist, respectively, on insurance binomial regressions because theyare suitable
mutuals and agricultural cooperatives. The 1903 for count data and, unlike Poisson models, they
to 1929 and 1913 to 1927 periods also cover key do not assume that themeans and variances of
thedependent variables are equal (Long 1997).
periods of cooperative organization.Yet the ear
liestwaves of anticorporate movement mobi Data on insurance mutuals per state come
lization and the fiercest political struggles over from Best's Insurance Report and Spectator's
censuses
corporations predated 1900. Indeed, coopera
Insurance Year Book?annual of insur
tives first emerged in force together with ers?and have been compiled into seven state
level panels for 1903, 1905,1909,1914,1919,
Granger railroad laws and antitrustand Populist
politics in the lastquarter of thenineteenth cen 1924, and 1929. Spectator changed its report
tury.Moreover, anticorporate mobilization ing method in this period, so we include a
occurred in cycles. The firstwave occurred in dummy variable to control for this shift.Data on
thePopulist era,with theGrange and Farmers' cooperatives come from theU.S. Department of
Alliance peaking, respectively, in themid-1870s Agriculture's Agricultural Cooperative
and 1890. Both movements participated direct Associations, Marketing and Purchasing
ly inpolitical struggles over the emerging cor (Elsworth 1928) and Cooperative Purchasing
and Marketing (Elsworth 1930). These reports
porate order.The second wave occurred during
the Progressive decades of the early twentieth list thenumber of dairy cooperatives in opera
tionper state for five panels (1913,1915,1922,
centuryandwas marked by the resurgenceof the
1925, and 1927) and grain elevator cooperatives
Grange and the rise of other groups, like the
Farmers' Union. Such groups seemed more for four panels (1913, 1915, 1925, and 1927).
committed to sectoral agendas than to the
wholesale reconstitution of economic order Independent Variables
throughpolitical means. Unless noted, data for the independent vari
These historical shiftswarrant a two-part
ables come from theU.S. Census reports on
analytical strategy.We first examine how anti
movements Population, Agriculture, andManufacturers for
corporate engaged in the late nine
1900, 1919, 1920, 1930, and 1940. For the
teenth-centurypolitical struggles shaped the cross-sectional we measure econom
analyses,
early distributions of cooperatives andmutuals. ic factors and controls using 1900 data, and
We use the earliest available cross-sectional
social movements and political factors at their
data on those forms, and exploit the Populist
dates of occurrence.2 For time-series
era conjunction analyses,
of movements and anticorporate
Here, we exploit time-seriesdata to see ifmove are 1903 and 1913,which leaves too great a time
ments moderated the organizational effects of span between independentand dependentvariables
economic and community conditions, shaping we shoulduse 1900or 1910
and suggestsinsteadthat
data for independent variables. Further, the historical
cooperatives in an ongoing fashionwhile whole record indicates that the three forms have common
sale struggles over the corporation receded into
social and political roots, hence using the same time
thepast and the economy settled into its"mod
period for economic factors and controls for the three
ern" form.
forms would be appropriate. We chose 1900 as a con
We conduct state-level analyses as states are sidered compromise. Fortunately, independent vari
key sites for regulating agricultural finance and ables correlated very strongly (typically .90 or higher)
trade (Ingram and Rao 2004; Schneiberg and across decades from 1880 to 1910.
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646 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
we use decennial data, time-varyingindependent 1896, or (3) an anticompact law for insurance
variables, and linear interpolation for panel before 1903. A watershed in the struggles over
years, lagging independent variables for one corporate order, theGranger laws subjected the
year. railroads to public controls of rates, bans on
discrimination, and strong,as opposed to advi
Social movements. To analyze movement sory,regulatorycommissions (Berk 1994; Buck
effects in the cross-sectional analyses, we use 1913; Dobbin 1994; Kanazawa and Noll 1994).
These lawswere a decisive political victory for
fourmeasures ofGrange strength: (1) thenum
ber of national Grange family members per agrarians and producers over corporate forces.
state in 1875, (2) national Grange familymem They also left important legacies, generating
bers in 1876, (3) the number of members per arguments andmodels for struggles against cor
state Grange in 1875, and (4) the number of porations inother sectors at the state and nation
al levels. Antitrust laws likewise reflected
Grange organizations in 1875. All fourmeas decisive victories against corporations, both
urements were taken at the height of the first
generally (James 1999; Sanders 1999) and in
Granger mobilization and come from Tonz
insurance,where "anti-compact" laws targeted
(1964) and Buck (1913). We use peak years insurers (Grant 1979; Schneiberg 1999). We
because we are interested in the effects of the
code states forGranger laws using Buck (1913),
Grange on cooperative organization during its for general antitrust laws using James (1999),
heyday, and whether itsorganization-promoting and for anticompact laws using Spectator's Fire
effectswere conditional on political forces.We Insurance: Laws, Taxes, Fees (Schneiberg and
also use peak years because fourmeasures of
Bartley2001).
Grange strengthare available, andmembership
declined precipitously in the 1880s and 1890s,
Economic conditions. We include econom
although we obtained similar resultswith 1880
and 1890 data.We also considered including a ic factors as controls and to analyze whether
variable for the Farmers' Alliance using mem movements moderated economic forces. To tap
bers per state in 1890, reported inAppleton s contracting costs, we use Census data on the
Annual Cylcopedia and Register (see Sanders average price per gallon of milk thatwas paid
to dairy farmers, the average price per bushel
1999), butmembership is reported for only 25
states and no figures appear for key Alliance paid for wheat, and population density.
states.We thereforefocus solely on theGrange. Producers and consumers have greater incen
tives to form cooperatives when con
We retain this focus on theGrange in the corporate
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 647
tion.We use the size distributions to calculate opt for economic self-organization
as an alter
one category (complete where k = the number We pursue parallel strategies for all three
of categories homogeneity), increases as units industries,with minor modifications where suit
become more heterogeneous, and reaches 1 able. In the cross-sectional analyses, we focus
when all units are equally distributed across on the direct and conditional effects ofmove
categories. We use both measures of econom ments on organizational forms.We fitmain
ic heterogeneity for insurance because farm effectsmodels with controls, economic factors,
ers and manufacturers organized mutuals, but and theanticorporate politics variables.We then
we use only the farmmeasure for dairy and add movement measures to assess direct effects
grain cooperatives, which were organized only and interaction terms to consider conditional
by farmers.We expect to find cooperatives in effects. In the time-series analyses, we focus on
stable, homogenous communities. Increasing movements as moderating influences.We begin
population change, immigration, racial diver with main-effects models for economic and
sity, farm heterogeneity, and manufacturing community bases pertaining to cooperatives
should all decrease cooperative and mutual and mutuals, add our movement measure, and
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648 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
3
_Model 1_Model 2_Model
Controls
Population(000,000) .533**
.499*
.480**
(.0593) (.062) (.067)
Value added -17.8** -15.4** -13.7**
(4.92) (4.70) (4.84)
Economics Organization
5.29 ** 4.14**
Populationdensity(000) 4.32**
(1.51) (1.61) (1.57)
Percent population change -.035** -.037** -.036**
(.0075) (.0076) (.0077)
Percent foreign-born white .063** .079** .073**
(.013) (.012) (.013)
Percent non-white -.023* -.015 -.014
(.0092) (.0089) (.0092)
Farmer diversity -4.81** -5.24** -5.37**
(1.18) (1.144) (1.09)
Manufacturerdiversity 6.61*5.06* 4.89*
(2.67) (2.38) (2.36)
Anticorporate Politics
Percent populist vote -.029** -.030** -.028**
(.0075) (.0074) (.0077)
Granger railroad law .850** .623** .982**
(.173) (.164) (.252)
General antitrust law -.511** -.571** -.537**
(.193) (.181) (.1821)
Anticompact law .659** .580* .610**
(.212) (.225) (.221)
Social Movements
National Grange members (000) .019* .025*
(.0088) (.010)
Members by railroad law -.019|
(.011)
Constant 1.796
3 3.07
(2.316) (2.22) (2.19)
Observations_42_39_39_
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
<
t/> .10; *p < .05; **/? < .01 (two-tailed tests).
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 649
Table 2. Effects of Social Movements on Dairy and Grain Elevator Cooperatives per State, 1913
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650 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
65.6%
Dairy 83.8%
1.6%
Grain
124.1% 154.2%-64.9%
Note: Figures tabled are the predicted percent change in the number of mutuals or cooperatives per state for a
standard deviation increase in national Grange members.
ed, negative binomial models to account for the ismuch larger,however, for grain. Increasing
numbers of zeros in thedata generate virtually Grange strengtha standard deviation increases
identical results for all three sectors (available grain cooperatives by 154 percent in stateswith
from the authors on request). outGranger laws,but decreases theirnumber by
Table 3 gives the sizes of these movement 65 percent in stateswith Granger laws.
effects.The unconditional effectscome from the In sum,we find that the late nineteenth-cen
secondmain-effectmodels foreach sector.They tury agrarian-producerist movements fueled
give thepredicted percent change in the num cooperative forms.They did so, however, as an
ber ofmutuals and cooperatives for a one stan alternative topolitical attacks on corporations,
dard deviation increase in national Grange or in response to corporate counter-mobilization
membership.5 All show substantial effects. and blocked political access. Moreover, these
Increasing the number of Grange members by movements may have thwarted cooperative
a standard deviation generates a 21.4 percent enterprise in grain as theymobilized political
increase in the number of insurance mutuals ly against corporations.
per state,and a 65.6 and 124.1 percent increase,
respectively, in dairy and grain cooperatives. Economic, community, and political con
The conditional effects come from themod ditions. Consistent with Hypothesis 4a, agri
els with interaction effects.They give the size cultural cooperatives proliferatedwhere farmers
of movement effects in each sector for states
received low prices forproduce, and in sparse
with and without Granger laws. They come
lypopulated places where corporations lacked
from the interactioneffects inTables 1 and 2 and incentives to invest inprocessing, distribution,
show effects that are largely as expected. or supply networks. The coefficients inTable 2
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the positive for prices and population density are all nega
effects ofmovements areweaker inpoliticized
tive,although population density ingrain isnot
settingswhere theGrange pursued politics. In significant. Moreover, consistent with
one stan
insurance, increasing Grange strength Hypothesis 4b, residential instability,hetero
dard deviation increasesmutuals by 28.9 percent
geneity, and racial divisions made cooperative
in states without Granger laws, but only 5.9
enterprisesmore costly,decreasing theirpreva
percent in stateswith such laws. In dairy,Grange lence. Population change reduced thenumber of
strength increases cooperatives by 83.8 percent insurancemutuals. Heterogeneity among farm
in stateswithout laws, but only 1.6 percent in ers decreased thenumber of insurancemutuals
stateswith Granger laws. The interactioneffect and grain cooperatives. Racial diversity lowered
the number ofmutuals and cooperatives in all
three sectors.
5
figures were calculated
These using the stan
Surprisingly, population density and manu
dard formula for the magnitude of effects for nega facturingdiversityhad positive effectson insur
tivebinomial models: (exp [b * s] - 1) X 100%, ancemutuals. Mutuals may have benefited from
where b is the regression coefficient, and s is the stan critical-mass dynamics: heterogeneity indense
dard deviation of the independentvariable (Long ly settled areas increased the chance that some
1997). subgroupwould shoulder the costs of collective
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 651
action (Marwell and Oliver 1993). The preva white coefficient ispositive, but only significant
lence of foreign-bornwhites also had positive inModel 3.
effects in insurance and dairy, suggesting that Second, Model 2 shows a negative "main"
immigrationpromoted, rather than suppressed, effectofGrange strengthonmutuals. Model 3,
cooperatives. This might reflecteconomic self however, shows that theGrange in this period
organization in immigrantcommunities, which acted mainly as a moderating influence for the
resulted from dense networks, scarce resources, effectsof economic and community conditions
and exclusion from mainstream economies on mutuals. A significant negative effect for
(Bonacich andModell 1980;Gamm and Putnam population change is coupled with a smaller,
1999; Portes and Manning 1986). Or, immi positive, and significantcoefficient for the inter
action between population change and Grange
gration could have been a conduit for organiz
ing templates.Rochdale cooperatives inEngland strength.Increasingmovement strengthdecreas
es the negative effect of population change.
produced models thatdiffused across mid-nine
This confirms Hypothesis 5b.Movements can
teenth-century Europe, which were then import
ed to theMidwest by immigrantsfromGermany buffermutuals from thedisruptive effectof res
and theNordic countries (Ford 1913; Furlough idential instability,reducing theirdependence on
and Strikwerda 1999; Knapp 1969; Schneiberg stable communities.
Granger victories of the 1870s, and mutuals quite consistent with Hypothesis 5b, which
were associated with anticompact laws that tar assumes a negative immigration effect, but it
does indicate thatmovements reducedmutuals'
geted insurance cartels. Yet in both sectors,
cooperatives were negatively associated with dependence on immigrant communities or the
the Populist vote and antitrust laws favored by templates they imported.Here, too,movements
serve as a functional substitute for supportive
Populists and theAlliance. This may reflectdis
communities.
comfortamong thepropertied insuredand dairy
farmerswith the radical Populist politics of the
1890s. In contrast, grain farmers seemed to Dairy. Table 5 analyzes dairy cooperatives
draw sustenance and political cover from from 1913 to 1927. Baseline Models 1 and 2 are
Populists and their trust-bustingprograms, as also largely consistentwith Hypotheses 4a and
general antitrustmeasures had positive effects 4b. Coefficients are positive for foreign-born
on elevator
cooperatives. whites and negative fornon-whites; both are sig
nificant. Coefficients for heterogeneity, popu
Time-Series Analysis lation density, and change are all negative, but
only reach significance inModel 3. The effect
Insurance. Table 4 showsmodels of insurance ofmilk price isnegative and significant.Dairy
mutuals per statefrom 1903 to 1929. Model 1
cooperatives proliferated in communities with
provides a baseline forhow economic and com few racial divisions andmany European immi
munity factors affectmutuals. Model 2 adds grants, and where farmers received low prices
the time-varyingGrange strengthmeasure, and formilk.
Model 3 adds interaction terms to see ifmove Models 2 and 3 showmovement effects,but
ments moderate economic forces. Three find indicate again that the Grange was mainly a
ings emerge. moderating force.Model 3 pairs a significant
First, results fromModels 1 and 2 are con
negative coefficient forpopulation change with
sistentwith Hypothesis 4b: mutuals depend on a smaller, positive coefficient for its interac
stable, homogenous, and supportive communi tion term. It also pairs a positive coefficient for
ties. Population change and farmheterogeneity foreign-born whites with a smaller, negative
have significant, negative effects. The racial coefficient for its interaction term. Increasing
diversity coefficient is also consistently nega movement strengthdecreased theeffectsof both
tive,although not significant.The foreign-born population change and foreign-bornwhites on
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652 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Table 4. Negative Binomial Models of theNumber of InsuranceMutuals per State, 1903 to 1929
3
_Model 1_Model 2_Model
Controls
Population(000,000) .297**
.386** .408**
(.072) (.063) (.089)
Value added .743 1.09 .585
(1.02) (.895) (.916)
Economics of Organization
(.013) (.282)
Members X Population density -.054
(.085)
Members X Percent population change .0032**
-.0012
ble and European immigrant communities. yielding results consistent with Hypotheses 4a
and 4b. Coefficients for population density,
Model 3 also pairs a negative coefficient for the
non-whites, heterogeneity, and prices are all
milk price with a positive interaction.
negative and significant. The coefficient for
Movements moderate economic incentives; but
population change is negative but not signifi
rather thanboosting organization in response to cant. Grain cooperatives proliferated in sparse
monopoly, the Grange reduced cooperatives' lypopulated areas, inhomogenous and perhaps
dependence on adverse pricing. stable communities with few economic and
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 653
Table 5. Negative Binomial Models of the Number of Dairy Cooperatives per State, 1913 to 1927
racial divisions, and where farmers faced low negative, but not significant, coefficient for
prices. foreign-born whites.
Here,too, Models 2 and 3 show that the Table 7 charts themagnitude ofmovements'
Grange moderated economic and community moderating influences by listing the size of the
effects of economic and community factors
Model
forces. 3 pairs a negative coefficient for
across three levels of Grange strength?low
population change with a positive coefficientfor
the interaction term. As above, the Grange (25th percentile), medium (50th percentile),
and high (75th percentile). The table firstgives
reduced the negative
effect of population
thepredicted change in thenumber ofmutuals,
change, buffering grain cooperatives from res dairy, and grain cooperatives per state for a
idential instability.
Model 3 also yields a nega standard deviation increase in population
tive coefficient for the interaction of change for each level of Grange strength. In
foreign-born whites and Grange strength,and a insurance, the negative effect of population
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654 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Table 6. Negative Binomial Models of theNumber ofGrain Elevator Cooperatives per State, 1913
_to 1927_
3
_Model 1_Model 2_Model
Controls
(.021) (.720)
Members X Price of wheat .013
(.093)
Members X Population density .423
(.397)
Members X Percent .0091**
population change
(.0021)
X Percent -.0095*
Members foreign born
(.0047)
Members X Percent non-white -.0075
(.034)
Members X Farmer diversity . 134
(.809)
27.6**
Constant 26.6** 18.9**
change onmutuals consistently falls as Grange low, a standard deviation increase inpopulation
strength increases. Where Grange strength is change decreases the number of dairy cooper
low,a standard deviation increase inpopulation atives by 32.9 percent; where Grange strength
change decreases the number of mutuals by is at themedian,that change decreases dairy
50.0 percent; where Grange strength is at the cooperatives by only 22.6 percent. Similarly,
median, thatchange decreases mutuals by 46.2 where Grange strength is low, the increase in
percent; where Grange strength is high, it population change decreases the number of
decreases mutuals by 22.5 percent.The negative grain cooperatives by 49.8 percent; where
effectof population change on dairy and grain Grange strength is at themedian, itdecreases
cooperatives also falls as Grange strengthgoes grain cooperatives by only 32.5 percent.
from low tomedian. Where Grange strength is Movements buffered cooperatives from the
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 655
Grain_-49.8%_-32.5%_112.6%
Effects of Foreign-Born Whites
Dairy_26.1%_23.0%_8.5%
Note: Figures tabled are the predicted percent change in the number of mutuals or cooperatives per state for a one
standard deviation increase in population change or foreign-born whites, and a one standard deviation decrease in
milk prices.
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656 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
also reduced grain cooperatives' dependence pers, new discourses, or communities of simi
on particular economic (price) conditions. lar forms in nearby domains?that in turnfos
ter new forms in a sector. Yet neither those
both move
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION works nor the current study measure
ments and their intermediate organizational or
How do social movements promote new organi discursive outcomes, leaving it to future
zational forms and alternatives to for-profitcor researchers to sortout direct and indirectmove
porations? Recent scholarship reemphasizes ment effects (but see King and Haveman forth
how contestation and collective action play crit
coming). Fortunately, we have abundant
ical roles in thedevelopment of institutionsand resources for thatwork, including possibilities
organizational forms,generating new syntheses byMinkoff(1994),Ruef (2000),and
identified
of movements and organizations research Greve and colleagues (2006) for integrating
andMinkoff Davis et al. 2005;
(Clemens 2004; analyses of movement effects on forms with
Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Schneiberg and discourse analysis and ecological work on or
Yet few studies combine mul
Lounsbury 2008). ganizational communities.
tivariatemethods and directmeasures ofmove Our analyses also contribute tomovement
ments to catalog and assess movement effects research. Until recently,movement scholars
on organizations. focused on the emergence of movements, leav
We advance research at the movements/ ing outcomes largely unanalyzed (Guigni
organizations interfaceby analyzing movement 1998).We join effortsto close thisgap with new
effects on cooperative enterprise in threeU.S. evidence thatmovements have important?
industries over threedecades. Using multivari organizational?effects. We also extendmove
ate techniques to consider various causal rela ment analyses of political opportunity,
tionships, we found that anticorporate mobilization, and counter-mobilization.
movements were "organization-generating Scholars have documented features of political
organizations" (Stinchcombe 1965) during the systems that render themmore or less open to
late nineteenth century. Increasing Grange movements' demands, generating conditional
strengthhad positive effects inall three sectors movement effectson policy outcomes (Amenta
on the prevalence of cooperative alternatives et al. 1992; Soule and King 2006; Soule and
to corporations. These effects were condition Olzak 2004). Scholars argue furtherthatmobi
al on thepolitical context,with theGrange fuel lization and its outcomes emerge from inter
ing cooperative formsmost vigorously as either actions in which movements and
an alternative topolitics or a response toblocked counter-movements shape the environment and
political access. Further,we found thatmove political opportunities for one another (Meyer
ments continued to foster cooperatives beyond and Staggenborg 1996; Vogus and Davis 2005;
the nineteenth-century populist revolts, serv Zald and Useem 1987). Movements evoke
ing as social infrastructurethatmoderated the counter-mobilization, which can blunt chal
organizational effects of economic forces. The lengers' efficacy, reverse gains, create or close
Grange partly substituted for community sup off opportunities, and prompt challengers to
ports, insulating cooperatives from ownership shift venues or tactics.We develop this rea
costs associated with population change, and soning by documenting conditional movement
reducing theirdependence on immigrant com effects on organizations and rooting this find
munities or carriers. In effect,theGrange helped ing in the dynamics of contention. Counter
sustain cooperative forms as theUnited States mobilization by corporate forces prompted
shiftedfrom a society of stable, local commu producer movements to shiftfrompolitics and
nities to a diverse and impersonal society of anticorporate policies to private strategies of
geographically mobile strangers. economic self-organization.
Furtherwork isneeded to clarify these causal Our study relies on crude proxies for corpo
relations.We propose multiple mechanisms for rate counter-mobilization and blocked politi
movement effects. Moreover, Haveman and col cal access; with our data, we cannot rule out the
leagues (2007) and Schneiberg (2007) argue possibility that agrarians rejected politics on
thatmovements have indirect effectson forms. principled rather thanpragmatic grounds. Our
Movements may produce outcomes?newspa study does suggest, though, that research on
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MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 657
century, realizing early political and organiza kets, generate institutionalsupports for industry
tional victories as they grew in strength development, and populate markets with new
(Schneiberg and Soule 2005). As corporations forms of enterprise.Moreover, as social infra
counter-mobilized, though, they could some structures,movements help institutionalizekey
times deny their opponents political access, forms andmarket supports,bufferingthemfrom
prompting agrarians towork outside the state adverse or short-term economic forces.
and build alternative orders throughcooperative Our findings aboutmovement effectsduring
enterprise.Further,as politicized national strug the "age of corporate consolidation" suggest
gles over the corporate order receded into the that cooperative alternatives to corporations
past, agrarian-producerist
movements served
emerged as integral and enduring, rather than
increasingly as social infrastructurefor coop aberrant or transitory,elements ofU.S. capital
eratives, moderating economic forces and ism during the early twentieth century
buffering these forms from adverse economic (Schneiberg 2007). Economic sociologists and
and community conditions. institutionalistsrightly take the rise to domi
Finally,we contribute to core agendas in eco nance of the corporation as a key tendency in
nomic sociology by analyzing how social struc the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-centu
tures moderate economic forces, facilitate ryU.S. economy. Our work suggests, though,
market development, and shape economic thatcorporate consolidation was a continuous
organization. Economic sociologists have shown ly contested historical process. Reformers and
how social structuralfactors?policy regimes, anticorporatemovements successfully promot
institutional logics, and professional associa ed and sustained across
cooperative enterprises
tions?condition theeffectsof economic forces industrieswith very different economic char
on institutionsand organizations. They trans acteristics, rendering them less dependent on
form,forexample, how organizations and indus peculiar economic forces, common cultures,
tries understand and respond to market and other idiosyncratic local conditions. In so
conditions, such as deciding whether tomerge, doing,movements like theGrange helped insti
which structures and strategies to adopt, and tutionalize cooperatives andmutuals alongside
how to regulate competition (Bartley and
corporations, fostering substantial and lasting
Schneiberg 2002; Dobbin and Dowd 2000; organizational diversity within American cor
Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Lounsbury 2007;
porate capitalism.
Mizurchi, Stearns, andMarquis 2006; Thornton
and Ocasio 1999).We add thatmovements like Marc Schneiberg is theJohnC Pock Professor of
wise qualify as moderating social factors.As Sociology at Reed College. He is currently studying
alternatives to corporations in nineteenth- and twen
producers of social ties, templates, and already
formed collectivities, movements can alter the tieth-century American capitalism, including mutu
als, cooperatives, and local, state-owned enterprise.
micro-economics of organizational choice, mit
He is collaborating with Gerald Berk on a study of
igating costs of cooperative ownership and ren associations and collaborative learning, and with
dering forms less dependent on specific Matt Kraatz on a study of mutual bank conversion to
economic conditions.
for-profit corporations. His research appears injour
Economic sociologists and others also show nals such as Politics and Society, American Journal
how social factors, networks, and collective of Sociology, Research in the Sociology of
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658 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Organizations, and Socio-Economic Review. He currently examining the role of social processes,
recently coauthored
a Sociological Theory article such as diagnostic expansion, substitution, and dif
with Elisabeth Clemens on research strategies for fusion, in the autism epidemic.
institutional analysis. Thomas SmithgraduatedfromReed College with a
Marissa King graduatedfromReed College with a BA in history. He wrote a senior thesis on squatter
BA in sociology. is now a postdoctoral
She research societiesandfederal landpolicy in theOhio Territory
fellow at Columbia University where she completed after theAmerican Revolution. He currently resides
her PhD. Her previous work analyzed the organiza inPhiladelphia, PA andplans tostartworkingon his
tional foundations of early social movements. She is MBA nextfall.
APPENDIX
Variable
Obs Mean Min.
SD Max.
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in OZ > O OiUICO
Milk
Added
Change
Wheat
Pop
Output
Density
het
born
Antitrust
law
white
Vote
Anticomp
Member
RR
Population
Wheat
Milk
Value
Plst
Foreign
Pop
Price
Grange
Non-
Farm
| .945
Number
Granges_.441
-.234
.046
-.417
-.039-.264
-.122
-.172
-.009
-.143
.360_.308
.400
-.280
-.086
.178
Grange
-.341
-.190
.082
-.308
-.047
-.136
-.124
.083
.401
-.194
-.211
.369
.468
.349
O of
members
Anticompact
law
-.372
.044
.170
-.025
-.224
-.285
-.006
-.048
-.133
.296
-.367
.087
.097
.240
Q
General
antitrust
.223
-.290
.272
.133
-.237
-.191
-.193
-.332
-.043
.032
.041
.255
.265?
Granger
railroad
law
.272
.011
.305
-.049
-.000
-.344
-.234
-.187
-.056
.186
-.233
-.207
j>
Percent
populist
vote
-.390
.041
-.533
.375
-.452
-.030
-.390
.209
-.423
-.001
.1063?
-.675
Percent
-.188
-.229
-.032
-.463
-.424
.447
-.072
.451
.316
non-white
Z
Percent
foreign-born
Farm.584
-.006
-.549
-.670
-.514
.305
.344
.209
.494
.412 .276
.355
.389
-.261
-.210
.039
-.256 ?
jgheterogeneity
Price
of
wheat
.132
.312
-.246
-.391
.406
.350
Percent
pop.
change
-.180
-.182
-.117
.242
-.144
.106
-.334 g
Price
.016
-.271
-.299
-.647
.012
milk
of
Table
Correlation
A2.
Matrix
for
Cross-Sectional
Analyses
Wheat
output
-.266
-.214
.319
density
Population
-.232
-.240
.785
.311
output
Milk
-.059
-.087
M
.268
added
value
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660 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Obs
Variable Mean Min.
SD Max.
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s? o O 050)M
PopAdded
Output
Output Density MilkWheat born white het het Vote law Antitrust
Anticomp
Change
N
Grange
members
.664
.432
-.126
-.238
.244
.073
.179
-.081
-.206
.304
.120
.311
-.287
-.220
-.053_.027
R
Value Milk WheatPopulation
Price Pop ForeignNon-FarmManPlst RR
Price
Anticompact
law
.009
-.200
.127
.000
-.286
-.015
.027
-.147
-.354
.269
-.140
-.092
.087
.097
.240
|
General
antitrust
-.199
.191
.126
.295
-.081
-.233
-.055
-.072
-.032
.023
-.239
-.270
.255
.265
O
Granger
railroad
law
.209
.047
.331
-.022
-.061
-.196
-.035
-.130
-.230
.142
-.108
-.033
-.207
g
B-.592
-.123
-.101
-.094
-.003
-.426
.425
.064
.231
.081
Percent
-.437
populist
-.367
vote
Manu
heterogeneity
.328
.543
-.263
-.433
.535
-.058
-.085
-.233
.179
.029
.046?
3 -.121
heterogeneity
-.320
-.450
-.333
.265
.470
.422
.150
.002
Farm
.092
Table
Correlation
A4.
Matrix
Variables
Independent
Time-Series
of
for
Analysis
Percent
non-white
-.077
-.439
-.342
-.251
-.199
.294
.068
-.025
-.662Z
| -.127
-.285
Percent
.259
.235
.461
.157
.414
foreign
born
.104
Percent
pop.
change
-.141
-.182
-.130
.241
-.124
-.128
-.272 J?
Price
wheat
bushel
.150
-.071
.507
-.144
.177
.846
O
Price
milk
gallon
.004
-.334
.330
-.143
.111
-
Wheat
output
-.244
-.195
.326
density
Population
-.224
-.275
.689
.318
Milk
-.092
-.121
Man. added
.421
output
value
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662 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Table A5. Direct and Conditional Effects of Movements on the Number of Mutuals and
Grange law X
strength -.14**
_-.055_-.025*
Grain Elevator Cooperatives 1913
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