GSIS and GARCIA vs.

KMG DIGEST
DECEMBER 19, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 170132 December 6, 2006

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as
GSIS President & General Manager, petitioners,
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.

FACTS: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS
personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
(KMG or the Union), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees.

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing
131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for
their participation in said rally. In reaction, KMGs counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of
said directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004
in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively
denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted the petition and
enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges
arising from the same facts and events.

CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available to
workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS
employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees organization, petitioner Garcia
could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations
notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action.

ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid

HELD: NO

The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government personnel to self-
organization to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.. It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid
provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held,
citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize
is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of
Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and
of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the
association, [and] the overriding considerations of national security.

As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision in accordance
with law. This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even
deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right
of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which enjoins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.

Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may be held
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondents members
launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same
thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase prohibited concerted activity refers to any collective
activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees organization,
with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force
concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out
and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main
office building. The record of attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of the protest,
851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756)
took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,leaving the other employees to fend for
themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the second day,
707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third
day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day
activity.

In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004, the stubborn fact
remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had
taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they
assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and
even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery
disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.

To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility,
under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise
discipline GSIS personnel for cause. At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of
administrative charges against the absenting participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely
performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in
when he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within
his jurisdiction.

BRENT SCHOOL, INC.DIMACHE vs. RONALDO ZAMORA and DOROTEO R.

ALEGRE
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990 en banc

FACTS:

Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by petitioner

Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a
specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of
execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements
dated March 15, 1973, August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the
same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained in the
original contract of July 18, 1971.

On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the
Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16,
1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of
the definite period of employment." Although protesting the announced termination
stating that his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his
employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had acquired the
status of regular employee - Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a
receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May
16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."

The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for

clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the
recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead
required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former
position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized
"fixed period employment" or employment for a term.

RULING:

Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully

terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof,
he is declared not entitled to reinstatement.

The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July
18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet
been promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly
recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior,
thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed employment
without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment
with a fixed period. The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June
18, 1949 and became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a
period. No prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of
its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.

It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School
and Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the
duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this
Court.

The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment

contracts under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1,
1974. The Code contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or
employment with a fixed or definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle
of licitness of term employment began to take place at about this time.

Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary

employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such
regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just
causes for which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite
period." And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in
the following manner: where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period"
and "regular" employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective
December 16, 1975.

Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by
eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was
renumbered (becoming Article 271).

As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal
interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which
the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict,
without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his
employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal
interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable
interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of
term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to
remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from
obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more
relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.

Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed
period of employment as still good rulea rule reaffirmed in the recent case of
Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the
fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of termination
following the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term employment
contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her
employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period.
At the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed
terminated and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a
condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the employ
of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment
was due to expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter
of termination.

Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the

expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity
of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to
said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a
letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the
approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective.
In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.

MERLINDA JACINTO, ET.AL. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION;
and THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
By:Wea Matriz

FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. They incurred
unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then staged. DECS Sec. Cario immediately
issued a return-to-work order, but it was ignored by petitioners. Sec. Cario issued formal charges and
preventive suspension orders against them. They were administratively charged with gross misconduct;
gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions; ignoring report-to-work directives; etc.
During the investigation, petitioners did not file their answers or controvert the charges against them. As
a consequence, Sec. Cario, in his decisions found them guilty as charged and imposed the penalty of
dismissal except Jacinto which is and Agustin who were meted only six (6) months suspension.
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB): dismissed the appeals for lack of merit
CSC: set aside the Orders of the MSPB; found the petitioners (except Merlinda Jacinto) guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; imposed upon them the penalty of six (6) months
suspension without pay; and automatically reinstated them to the service without payment of back
salaries; the CSC found her guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations; imposed upon
her the penalty of reprimand; and automatically reinstated her in the service without payment of back
salaries
CA: Affirmed decision of CSC
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether civil servants are guilty of grave misconduct in participating in mass actions.
HELD: Yes. The terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are
governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes. Workers in
the public sector do not enjoy the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the
proviso in accordance with law. This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use
of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. The Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed.
The teachers have given cause for their suspension, for being absent in their classes and joining in the
mass actions. They were not fully innocent of the charges against them although they were eventually
found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and not grave misconduct or
other offense warranting their dismissal from the service; being found liable for a lesser offense is not
equivalent to exoneration. In the case of Merlinda Jacinto, there was a finding that there was no proof
that she joined the unlawful mass actions.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
modification.

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July

28, 1989)
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions
demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court
action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for
staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the
resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject
matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand
that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus
have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the
court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice
provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful
concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180
provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and
strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states
that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as
government employees and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it
is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority
to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS
before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is
appropriate.

Victorias Milling Co. Inc. v. Social Security

Commission [G.R. No. L-16704. March
17, 1962]
28
AUG
.date
FACTS
The Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor:
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take
into consideration and include in the Employees remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as
well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employees
remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a
maximum of P500 for any one month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote
the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a
previous Circular No. 7, expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the
employers and employees respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, In order to
assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term compensation for the purposes
of such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the
general interpretation of the words compensation, remuneration and wages. Counsel further
questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security
Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the
Official Gazette.

ISSUE
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic
Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the
approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Act.

RULING
No. The Commissions Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the
President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should
be construed. The Circular purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what,
in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based.
The Circular neither needs approval from the President nor publication in the Official Gazette.

Samahang Mangagawa etc. vs NLRC 295 SCRA 171 (1998)

FACTS:
Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing United Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM) was the certified collective bargaining
representative of all regular rank and file employees of private respondent Top Form Manufacturing Philippines, Inc. On February 27, 1990, the
parties agreed to discuss unresolved economic issues. On the minutes of the meeting, the Union proposed that any future wage increase given by
the government should be implemented by the company across-the-board or non-conditional. Management requested the union to retain this
provision since their sincerity was already proven when the P25.00 wage increase was granted across-the-board. The union decided to defer this
provision, relying on the undertakings made by the officials of the company who negotiated with them and since the company has granted to us
government mandated wage increases on across-the-board basis

On October 15, 1990, the RTWPB-NCR issued Wage Order increasing the salary of the workers. The union requested the implementation of said
wage orders. However, they demanded that the increase be on an across-the-board basis. Private respondent refused to accede to that demand.
Instead, it implemented a scheme of increases purportedly to avoid wage distortion.

The union demanded that it should fulfill its pledge of sincerity to the union by granting an across-the-board wage increases (sic) to all employees
under the wage orders. The union reiterated that it had agreed to retain the old provision of CBA on the strength of private respondents promise
and assurance of an across-the-board salary increase should the government mandate salary increases.

The union filed a complaint with the NCR NLRC alleging that private respondents act of reneging on its undertaking/promise clearly constitutes an
act of unfair labor practice through bargaining in bad faith. It charged private respondent with acts of unfair labor practices or violation of Article
247 of the Labor Code, as amended, specifically bargaining in bad faith, and prayed that it be awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages. The
union added that it was charging private respondent with violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code.

Private respondent contends that there was no agreement to the effect that future wage increases mandated by the government should be
implemented on an across-the-board basis. Otherwise, that agreement would have been incorporated and expressly stipulated in the CBA.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent committed an unfair labor practice in its refusal to grant across-the-board wage increase.

HELD:
No. The private respondent did not commit an unfair labor practice in its refusal to grant across-the-board wage increase.

The alleged violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code, as amended, as well as Article XVII, Section 7 of the existing CBA as herein earlier quoted is likewise
found by this Branch to have no basis in fact and in law. No benefits or privileges previously enjoyed by the employees were withdrawn as a result of the
implementation of the subject orders. Likewise, the alleged company practice of implementing wage increases declared by the government on an across-
the-board basis has not been duly established by the complainants evidence. The complainants asserted that the company implemented Republic Act No.
6727 which granted a wage increase of P25.00 effective July 1, 1989 on an across-the-board basis. Granting that the same is true, such isolated single act
that respondents adopted would definitely not ripen into a company practice.

Petitioner union does not deny that discussion on its proposal that all government-mandated salary increases should be on an across-the-board basis was
deferred, purportedly because it relied upon the undertaking of the negotiating panel of private respondent. Neither does petitioner union deny the fact
that there is no provision of the 1990 CBA containing a stipulation that the company will grant across-the-board to its employees the mandated wage
increase. They simply assert that private respondent committed acts of unfair labor practices by virtue of its contractual commitment made during the
collective bargaining process. The mere fact, however, that the proposal in question was not included in the CBA indicates that no contractual commitment
thereon was ever made by private respondent as no agreement had been arrived at by the parties.

Obviously the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on the parties; but the failure to reach an
agreement after negotiations continued for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a collective
bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement

Arco Metal Products Co. vs Samahan 554 SCRA 111 (2008)

FACTS:

December 2003, petitioner paid the 13th month pay, bonus, and leave encashment of three union members in amounts proportional to the
service they actually rendered in a year, which is less than a full twelve (12) months.
Respondent protested the prorated scheme, claiming that on several occasions petitioner did not prorate the payment of the same benefits to
seven (7) employees who had not served for the full 12 months. The payments were made in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003, and 2004.
According to respondent, the prorated payment violates the rule against diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code. Thus, they
filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
Petitioner claims that its full payment of benefits regardless of the length of service to the company does not constitute voluntary employer
practice. It points out that the payments had been erroneously made and they occurred in isolated cases in the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999,
2002 and 2003. According to petitioner, it was only in 2003 that the accounting department discovered the error when there were already
three (3) employees involved with prolonged absences and the error was corrected by implementing the pro-rata payment of benefits pursuant
to law and their existing CBA. It adds that the seven earlier cases of full payment of benefits went unnoticed considering the proportion of one
employee concerned (per year) vis vis the 170 employees of the company. Petitioner describes the situation as a clear oversight which
should not be taken against it.
The appellate court found that petitioner, however, had an existing voluntary practice of paying the aforesaid benefits in full to its employees,
thereby rejecting the claim that petitioner erred in paying full benefits to its seven employees. The appellate court noted that aside from the
affidavit of petitioners officer, it has not presented any evidence in support of its position that it has no voluntary practice of granting the
contested benefits in full and without regard to the service actually rendered within the year. It also questioned why it took petitioner eleven
(11) years before it was able to discover the alleged error.

ISSUE: Whether or not the full payment of benefits regardless of the length of service to the company does constitute voluntary employer practice.

HELD: It was held that the full payment of benefits regardless of the length of service to the company constituted voluntary employer practice.
 Any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle
of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the Constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, and to afford
labor full protection. Said mandate in turn is the basis of Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be rendered in favor of labor.

In the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2002 and 2003, petitioner had adopted a policy of freely, voluntarily and consistently granting full benefits to its
employees regardless of the length of service rendered. True, there were only a total of seven employees who benefited from such a practice, but it
was an established practice nonetheless. Jurisprudence has not laid down any rule specifying a minimum number of years within which a company
practice must be exercised in order to constitute voluntary company practice. Thus, it can be six (6) years, three (3) years, or even as short as two (2)
years. Petitioner cannot shirk away from its responsibility by merely claiming that it was a mistake or an error, supported only by an affidavit of its
manufacturing group.

If petitioner wants to prove that it merely erred in giving full benefits, it could have easily presented other proofs, such as the names of other
employees who did not fully serve for one year and thus were given prorated benefits. This could have easily bolstered petitioners theory of
mistake/error, but sadly, no evidence to that effect was presented.

Suico vs NLRC 513 SCRA 375 (2007)

FACTS:
Culver B. Suico, Teresa D. Ceniza, Ronald R. Dacut (complainants were regular employees of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
Cebu Jones Exchange and members of Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon ng Pilipinas (MKP).
September 1997, MKP launched a strike against PLDT. Complainants participated in the strike by picketing the PLDT.
PLDT sent 2 notice to explanation to Suico et.al, for the acts of violation that happen during the strike. But the complainant failed to provide the
required written explanation the acts charged to them. They replied informing, that they opt to exercise their rights to due process and request
to furnish a copy of the formal written complaint complaint filed them, statement of witness/es and preliminary investigations and/or report/s
conducted on the aforesaid incident, if any.
PLDT findings based on the available evidence found the complainants guilty and were subsequently terminated
Suico et.al filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages.
It is the view of PLDT that in the dismissal of employees for strike-related violence, it is sufficient to merely declare the latter to have lost their
employment without having to comply with any procedure for their termination. PLDT, refused to implement said policy, contending that it
applies to administrative cases only and not to strike-related cases such as the ones involving Suico, et al.

ISSUE: Whether PLDT violated the requirements of due process under the Labor Code when it dismissed said employees without heeding their request for
the conduct of a formal hearing as provided for under PLDT Systems Practice No. 94-016 and prior to submission of their respective answers to the charges
against them.

HELD: The procedure adopted by PLDT in dismissing Suico, et al. fell short of the requirements of due process.

The requirements of due process by which to test the validity of the procedure adopted by PLDT in dismissing Suico, et al. are those embodied in Art. 277
(b) of the Labor Code, Rule XXII of the Implementing Rules of Book V and Systems Practice No. 94-016.

PLDT complied with the two-notice requirement of due process. The first notices sent to Suico, et al. set out in detail the nature and circumstances of the
violations imputed to them, required them to explain their side and expressly warned them of the possibility of their dismissal should their explanation be
found wanting. The last notices informed Suico, et al. of the decision to terminate their employment and cited the evidence upon which the decision was
based.68 These two notices would have sufficed had it not been for the existence of Systems Practice No. 94-016. Under Systems Practice No. 94-016, PLDT
granted its employee the alternative of either filing a written answer to the charges or requesting for opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
assistance of his counsel or union representative, if he so desires.

Suico, et al. exercised their option under Systems Practice No. 94-016 by requesting that a formal hearing be conducted and that they be given copies of
sworn statements and other pertinent documents to enable them to prepare for the hearing. 69 This option is part of their right to due process. PLDT is
bound to comply with the Systems Practice.

Company policies or practices are binding on the parties.60 Some can ripen into an obligation on the part of the employer,61 such as those which confer
benefits on employees 62 or regulate the procedures and requirements for their termination

Art. 277 (b) in relation to Art. 264 (a)55 and (e)56 recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without distinction as to the cause of their termination. 57
Where no distinction is given, none is construed.58 Hence, the foregoing standards of due process apply to the termination of employment of Suico, et al.
even if the cause therefor was their supposed involvement in strike-related violence prohibited under Art. 264 (a) and (e).

Moreover, the procedure for termination prescribed under Art. 277(b) and Rule XXII of the Implementing Rules of Book V is supplemented by existing
company policy. Art. 277(b) provides that the procedure for termination prescribed therein is without prejudice to the adoption by the employer of
company policy on the matter, provided this conforms with the guidelines set by the DOLE such as Rule XXII of the Implementing Rules of Book V. This is
consistent with the established principle that employers are allowed, under the broad concept of management prerogative, to adopt company policies that
regulate all aspects of personnel administration including the dismissal and recall of workers.

MANEJA VS NLRC 290 SCRA 603 (1998)

FACTS: Petitioner Rosario Maneja worked with private respondent Manila Midtown Hotel beginning January 1985, as a telephone operator. She was a
member of the National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) with an existing CBA with the private respondent.

In February 13, 1990, a fellow telephone operator, Rowena Loleng, received a request for long distance call (RLDC) form and a deposit for P500.00 from a
Japanese guest but the call was unanswered. The deposit was then forwarded to the cashier. The same evening, the Japanese guest again made an RLDC
and deposited another P500.00 but the call was also unanswered. Loleng passed the RLDC to Maneja for follow up.
ON February 15, the cashier inquired about the P1000 deposit made. After a search, the first one was found in the guest folio while the other in the folder
for cancelled calls. Petitioner Maneja saw that the 2nd RLDC form was not time stamped so she placed it in the machine to stamp it with the date February
15. But after realizing that the call was made 2 days before, she changed the date to February 13.

On March 7, the chief telephone operator asked the petitioner and Loleng to explain the Feb 15 incident. Both submitted their written explanation. On
March 20, a written report was submitted, stating that their actions were covered violations of the Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Action (OSDA) as
1. Forging, falsifying official documents and;
2. Culpable carelessnessnegligence or failure to follow specific instruction/s or established procedure/s
On March 23, petitioner was then served notice of dismissal effective on April 1. She refused to sign and wrote under protest.

On October 2, 1990, Maneja filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the labor arbiter (LA). LA found that the petitioner was
illegally dismissed, stating that even though the case revolves on the matter of implementation and interpretation of company policies and is thus within
the jurisdiction of the grievance procedure under the CBA, Art. 217 Labor Code confers original and exclusive jurisdiction of all termination cases to LA.
NLRC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction of LA because the case was subject to voluntary arbitration.

Petitioner insists that her termination is not an unresolved grievance as there had been no grievance meeting between the union and the management.
Petitioner alleged that it has been a company policy that termination cases are not referred to the grievance machinery but directly to LA.

ISSUE: W/N THE LABOR ARBITER HAD JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE CASE

HELD: NLRCs interpretation of Art 216c Labor Code is erroneous. Even though such provision provides that LA have no jurisdiction over cases arising from
interpretation and implementation of CBAs (must be submitted to the grievance machine or voluntary arbitration), it must be read in conjunction with Art
261 which grants voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies which is not the case here.

According to the Sanyo case, there is dismissal which does not involve an interpretation or implementation of a CBA or interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies but involves termination. Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, it may be
referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA or by voluntary arbitration. Where the was already actual termination, i.e. violation of rights, it is
already cognizable by LA.

Moreover, Art 260 also stipulates that only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary
arbitrators. In the case at bar, the union does not event come into the picture as the practice in said Hotel in cases of termination is that they are not
referred anymore to the grievance comitte and that the terminated employee who wishes to question the legality of his termination usually goes to LA for
arbitration, whether the termination arose from the interpretation or enforcement of the company personnel policies or otherwise.

Petitioner was illegally dismissed as there are two requisites in a valid dismissal: 1. That the dismissal must be for any causes expressed in Art 282 Labor
Code and; 2. The employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
1. There is no cause for dismissal as the petitioners actions were not contrary to company practice and there is also no basis for personal
appropriation based on the facts
2. An examination of the record reveals that no hearing whatsoever was ever conducted by the Hotel before Maneja was dismissed. While it may
be true that the petitioner submitted a written explanation, no hearing was actually conducted before she was terminated. She was not
accorded the opportunity to fully defend herself which is clearly a violation of her right to due process.