Conflict Resolution Narratives

Module guide
Introduction to conflict resolution

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Content and learning objectives
The module explores the different explanations offered by researchers regarding the emergence of
conflicts as an almost unavoidable facet of human life. It outlines the main categories of conflict theories,
their core elements as well as the conflict resolution mechanisms that some of them entail. In a
subsequent stage, tools that can be used to understand conflicts and to design adapted conflict resolution
initiatives are described. These tools have been used successfully for decades to assist peace builders to
resolve some of the most heated and protracted conflicts. The module ends by considering various
theories including those of conflict management/settlement, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.
At the end of this module, participants should be able to:
Categorize conflicts according to different theories;

Distinguish options for conflict resolution, according to the different conflict categories;
Relate different options for conflict resolution to a specific conflict.
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Organization
Below you have an outline of the modules structure with an indication of the dates when each section is
available.
Module one: Introduction to Conflict Resolution

Week one
Open Close
Introduction Welcome! Introduce yourself Day 1 Day 7
What do conflict and conflict resolution mean to you? Day 1 Day 7
Lesson Lesson 1: Conflict Theories Day 1 Day 7
Lesson 2: Conflict Resolution Tools and Theories Day 1 Day 7
Activity Self-Assessment Quiz Day 1 Day 7
Activity 1: Applying Conflict Resolution Tools and Theories Day 1 Day 7
Forum Forum 1: Strengths and Weaknesses of Conflict Resolution Tools and Day 1 Day 7
Theories
Support Forum Day 1 Day 7
Reflection Activity
What does conflict mean to you?

Estimated time 20 minutes
Share your thoughts and experience:
Watch the video `What is Conflict?` http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5pU5DNjoXY

After reflecting on the video, share your definition or understanding of conflict and conflict
resolution. Explain what stood out for you from this video and why.
Post to forum: What does conflict mean to you?
Lessons
Lesson 1: Conflict Theories

Estimated time 1 hour
The purpose of this lesson is to outline the main conflict theories as well as the conflict resolution
mechanisms that they logically entail to effectively prevent the onset of conflict or to facilitate their
non-violent resolution. Conflict theories fall into 3 categories, internal, contextual and relational. In
the first category, the conflict is said to be rooted within the very essence or nature of conflict
parties. In the second category, the conflict is said to be contextual and to spring from the
condition in which conflict parties live and interact. In the third category, the conflict is said to be
relational since it is not found within actors but between them, in the relation between conflict
parties.
Lesson 2: Conflict Resolution Tools and Theories

The purpose of this lesson is to outline three analytical tools that yield important insights
regarding the onset and development of conflicts but also concerning potential avenues to resolve
conflicts effectively. In particular, Johan Galtungs ABC Triangle, the conflict timeline and John
Paul Lederachs Pyramid of actors are introduced. In the second part of the lesson, various
theories on the most effective way to resolve conflicts are outlined including conflict management,
conflict resolution and conflict transformation.
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Activity
Activity 1: Applying Conflict Resolution Tools and Theories

Estimated time 3 hours
The scenario-based activity is immersive and you act as the main character. Therefore, you are to
perform the tasks assigned to you as if they were actual challenges you face in your work place.
The aim of this activity is to apply a conflict theory and a conflict resolution tool to your case and
to map past and present conflict resolution attempts. This will provide you with the theoretical
foundation necessary to develop relevant solutions to resolve your conflict. In particular, the
activity requires you to:
Apply at least one conflict theory to a conflict of your choice (refer to the Forum Choose a
conflict).
Apply the ABC Triangle to a conflict of your choice by exploring the attitudes, behaviour and
contradiction of the main actors.
Map the main conflict resolution attempts undertaken in a conflict of your choice.
Social activities
Discussion Forum 1: Strengths and Weaknesses of Conflict Resolution Tools and

Theories
The social activity is conducted in the form of a discussion forum. This forum enables you to
reflect on your activity and to exchange your own thoughts and experiences for discussion with
others. It facilitates the exchange of lessons learned as well as collaborative learning. The
discussion forums are an integral part of the learning process. In particular, this discussion forum
requires you to:
Create a post with at least five bullet points where you briefly discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of a conflict theory and the ABC Triangle.
Draw between two and five Lessons Learned from your mapping of previous conflict
resolution efforts undertaken in your case study. Compare your input with those of other
participants and develop joint Lessons Learned.
You may also describe the challenges you encountered when you completed the activity and
ask questions to other participants and/or the facilitator.
Support Forum
The discussion forum is an integral part of the learning process which provides you with a space
where to make queries, clarify doubts, reflect on specific issues or share ideas/experiences with
other participants.
Optional activities
Optional activity on testing, exploring and reflecting your personal behaviour in conflict
situation
The optional activity provides you with an instrument (Thomas Kilman Conflict Mode Instrument)
to map and interpret your personal patterns of behaviour in situations of interpersonal conflict.
Furthermore it gives you an idea of how different styles of conflict-handling may affect
interpersonal and group dynamics in the process of negotiation or mediation. Last but not least, it
gives you some guidelines of the appropriateness of certain strategies in conflict situations.
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Resources
Explore the materials and links in the cybrary to improve your understanding of social media
tools;
Browse the glossary of terms for unfamiliar terms or words and their definitions;
Utilize these additional resources to improve your understanding and enhance your inputs to
discussion forums, journal entries and peer reviews;
Use the Support Forum to make queries, clarify doubts or share ideas with other participants.
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Activity Checklist
Use the activity checklist below as an organizer. Plan for all the activities you have to do in this module,
and follow up on activities you have started but are still to complete.
Module one: Introduction to Conflict Resolution

Week one
Date Status
Introduction Welcome! Introduce yourself
What do conflict and conflict resolution mean to you?
Lesson Lesson 1: Conflict Theories
Lesson 2: Conflict Resolution Tools and Theories
Activity Self-Assessment Quiz
Activity 1: Applying Conflict Resolution Tools and Theories
Forum Forum 1: Strengths and Weaknesses of Conflict Resolution Tools and
Theories
Support Forum
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Introduction to Conflict Resolution
MODULE 1 |
OVERVIEW AND LEARNING OBJECTIVES
The module explores the main categories of conflict theories, their core elements as well as the
conflict resolution mechanisms that some of them entail. It also reviews essential tools that can be
used to design adapted conflict resolution initiatives.
BOX 1 | LEARNING OBJECTIVES
At the end of the module participants will be able to:
Categorize conflicts according to different theories;

Distinguish options for conflict resolution, according to the different conflict categories;
Relate different options for conflict resolution to a specific conflict.
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LESSON 1 |
Conflict Theories
LESSON OUTLINE:
1. Introduction
2. Internal Theories of Conflict
3. Contextual Theories of Conflict
4. Relational Theories of Conflict
5. Protracted Social Conflicts
6. Summary of Key Messages
At the end of the lesson participants will be able to:
Distinguish the main types of conflict resolution theories;

Appraise the chain of events leading to conflict according to the main conflict theories;
Describe the main elements of a protracted social conflict.
1. Introduction
For centuries, scholars have studied the origins of conflicts in order to prevent them and to resolve
them. They have developed theories to explain the origins and causes of conflicts as well as to
guide their search for solutions. The different theories provide explanations for the inherent nature
of conflict in human societies and ad a result they can act as guides to develop effective and long-
lasting solutions to end hostilities. Because they are prerequisites for the development of effective
conflict resolution methods and techniques, conflict theories must be studied carefully. Many
theories have been developed by psychologists, politicians, economists, biologists and sociologists
and an exhaustive list cannot be compiled. The purpose of this lesson is to outline the main conflict
theories as well as the conflict resolution mechanisms that they logically entail to effectively prevent
the onset of conflict or to facilitate their non-violent resolution.
Conflict theories fall into 3 categories, internal,

contextual and relational (Ramsbotham et al. 2005). In
the first category, the conflict may be rooted within the
BOX 3 | CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT THEORIES
very essence or nature of conflict parties. The roots of
Category 1: Internal Conflicts spring from
conflict are internal whether in the nature of humans,
within humans;
their psychology or their physiology. In the second
category, the conflict may be contextual. According to Category 2: Contextual Conflicts result from
these theories, conflict springs from the condition in the environment, society or system in which
which conflict parties live and interact. In the third humans live;
category, the conflict may be relational since it is not
found within actors but between them, in the relation Category 3: Relational Conflicts spring from
between conflict parties. relations between humans.
Internal conflict theories are mostly relevant for

psychologists and biologists and as such, they will only be briefly introduced. Contextual conflict
theories are mostly used by scholars of international relations and do not provide direct and explicit
solutions to individual conflicts. Relational conflict theories provide great insights into the type of
conflicts in which peace operations are deployed. They will be explored in greater depths and the
conflict resolution efforts that they call for will be outlined.
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FIGURE 1 | CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT THEORIES
Category 1: Internal conflict theories PERSON A PERSON B
Category 2: Contextual conflict theories PERSON A PERSON B
Category 3: Relational conflict theories PERSON A PERSON B
TABLE 1 | CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT THEORIES

Internal Theories Contextual Theories Relational Theories
Theory 6: Community Relations
Theory 1: Human Nature
Theory 7: Human Needs
Theory 2: Human Theory 4: Anarchy
Theory 8: Power Politics
Psychology Theory 5: Globalisation
Theory 9: Conflict
Theory 3: Human Biology
Transformation
2. Internal Theories of Conflict
Theory 1: Human Nature as a Source of Conflict
In various cultural and religious traditions, it is believed that

human nature is weak and aggressive and that humans have
destructive drives and a dark side (Fromm 1973). In fact, the very
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BOX 4 HUMAN NATURE IN
ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY
foundation of the Judeo-Christian civilization, which was imposed
on other cultures, is that humans are part animal and part divine
For out of the heart proceed evil
(Niebuhr 1953). In Christianity, but also in many other religious
thoughts, murders, adulteries,
traditions, men are described as weak and sinners by nature, and fornications, thefts, false witness,
their very essence is a duality of good and evil. Men are torn blasphemies.
between their wish to return to God and their lowest instincts that
drive them to compete and seek honour and glory. In this context, The Bible (King James Version),
Matthew 15:19
the biblical story of the Fall is an important archetype, an
important symbol of the limits inherent to human nature. Human
nature is, in fact, the source of all conflicts and suffering. This idea
"But man has ever been, most of
was popularized by St Augustine. It was then developed in a anything, [prone to] dispute."
different form by the famous political philosopher Thomas Hobbes
who argued that the three main sources of conflict are competition The Holy Quran, The Cave 18:54
for gain, fear of insecurity and defence of honour. Before Hobbes, Machiavelli had already argued
that strife was the result of the human drive for power and self-preservation.
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Theory 2: Human Psychology as a Source of Conflict

th
At the turn of the 20 century, the father of psychology, Sigmund Freud, adapted this theory in line
with his clinical work. Freud argued that men are driven by an instinct that builds up and that must
find an expression. There is a spontaneous and uncontrolled build-up of testosterone and
aggression that is part of our survival instinct and which inevitably leads to conflict. According to
Freud, conflict is the result of two opposing drives which he calls eros and thanatos (Fromm 1973).
When the former prevails, aggression is directed outwards in the direction of others. When tanathos
prevails then aggression is directed towards oneself. This energy must be expressed whether
internally or externally.
Innate aggressiveness conflict
Besides Freud, other scientists outlined the existence of such aggressive mechanisms. Paul Scott
(1958), for example, argued that humans have an internal mechanism which produces conflict or
fighting whenever stimulated. This simplistic model has slowly evolved from a basic theory of
aggression whereby conflict is the result of innate aggressiveness, to a more complex frustration-
aggression theory (Lorenz 1967). According to this more complex model, it is the excessive
frustration of our goals and wishes that is said to trigger aggressive behaviour. Social life is
characterized by some agents that frustrate others, thereby facilitating the build-up of aggression
and its inevitable release much like the steam in a pressure cooker (Dougherty& Pfaltzgraff 1990).
The simple law of frustration-aggression shapes human relations and explains the intractable nature
of conflict in all societies.
Frustration aggressiveness conflict
In line with this theory, people develop ways to release their aggressiveness to avoid its destructive
release in social settings. Sports arenas, festivals, movies, arts and other activities allow for the
expression of aggressiveness in a social context that will not destroy the very fabric of society.
Likewise, communication channels are created to vent frustration. Together with these channels,
people must be educated and socialised to control their instinct. This is the process of civilisation
described by Norbert Elias whereby humans move away from public torture towards surgical war
(2000). This has nothing to do with the civilizing mission and colonisation, but only with the
transformation of moral sensitivity.
BOX 5 | ANGRY YOUNG MEN

In a study on the outbreak of civil wars, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner argue that in a society, the doubling in the
proportion of males in the age range 15-29 increases the risk of violent conflict from 4.6 % to 19.7 %. They claim that
rebellions rely almost exclusively upon this particular segment of the population and that a likely explanation for
this extreme selectivity is that some young men have both an absolute advantage and a taste for violence. (Collier,
Hoeffler & Rohner 2009: 16). According to these scholars, a major reason for the outbreak of civil wars is the innate
aggression of young men, a core tenet of many internal conflict theories. However, this simplistic explanation
overlooks other structural factors such as general poverty, high youth unemployment and gendered expectations
that males should be tough and provide an income for their family.
In fact, societies have created inhibitions to tackle aggression by emphasising the threat of
punishment. When a person is frustrated and becomes aggressive, the anticipation of punishment
may inhibit him or her. But in some cases, this interference from society may in turn fuel the conflict
with a frustration-aggression-social interference to stop aggression-more frustration cycle of
conflict (Megargee & Hokanson 1970).
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FIGURE 2 FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION-SOCIAL INTERFERENCE TO STOP AGGRESSION CYCLE
OF CONFLICT
Conflict
More
Social Frustration
Interference
Aggressiveness
Frustration
Theory 3: Human Biology as a Source of Conflict
Physiological theories of conflict also exist. For example, MacLean argues that humans have a
triune brain with reptilian, limbic and neocortical subsystems (1978). Whenever a situation arises, it
is experienced or interpreted in different ways by the three different brains. The conflict arises
between the feelings of the limbic brain and the thinking of the neocortical brain. If the limbic system
predominates, then people will feel strongly about an issue. In cases of important stress, the
reptilian and limbic brains may no longer be under the control of common sense. This leads in turn
to irrationality and potentially to conflict. In this category, you also have theories that draw on
biology. Sociobiology explains that by nature men are driven to spread their genes wherever they
can because they are naturally driven to seek to father offspring. As a result, they may engage in
fights to secure mating partners or to defend their territory.
BOX 6 | IS IT ALL ABOUT GENDER?

In War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, Joshua S. Goldstein (2003) draws on a
biological conflict theory to explain the onset of wars. According to him, masculinity plays a prominent role in the
emergence of wars since: (1) mens genes program them for violence; (2) testosterone makes men more aggressive
than women, (3) men are bigger and stronger than women, (4) mens brains are adapted for long-distance mobility
and for aggression and last but not least women are biologically adapted for caregiving roles that preclude
participation in war. Goldstein argues that fighting results from a perceived loss of status of male citizens who take
up of arms in order to reproduce the masculine hero. Although Goldstein finds some empirical evidence to support
his hypotheses, biological conflict theories tend to completely ignore the importance of the social and cultural
construction of gender roles in the onset of war.
The problem with this theory is that it starts from physiological processes and then draws
conclusions regarding social behaviour. And this move is not accepted by all scientists. Besides, it
fails to explain why conflicts take place at certain times and in certain places. In order to explain
why conflict does not affect every society in the same way, some researchers have begun to mix
psychological theories of aggressiveness with cultural learning. According to these analysts, a
conflict is the result of aggressiveness plus a stimulus from the environment. Far from being
universal for all humans, frustration is culturally learnt. It is something that is taught through rewards
and punishments. In some societies, frustration may arise in certain cases while in other societies it
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may not. A central reason is cultural understandings of frustration. Here the idea of dissonance is
introduced: conflict emerges as a reaction to the gap between a preferred, and the actual, state of
affairs. The gap between reality and expectations is the central problem. This dissonance creates
anxiety and insecurity and calls for a solution, and sometimes results in a conflict. This is connected
to the idea of relative deprivation as a perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value
capabilities (Gurr 1970). It is relative because it is not universally shared. Some people may be
frustrated by not having a swimming pool in their garden while others may be frustrated by not
being able to feed their children; hence the relative nature of the discrepancy between wishes and
reality.
Critiques of Internal Conflict Theories
These theories that focus on the individual are very important in general. Psychologists and
anthropologists rely on them for their research with great effectiveness. However, they remain
contested and some authors, such as Margaret Mead, have explained that far from being a
biological necessity, warfare is an invention, a cultural construction. But more importantly, many
internal theories fail to explain why conflicts affect some societies more than others. As a result,
they provide limited insights for conflict resolution at the international level.
In 1989, a group of high-level anthropologists, psychologists,

biochemists, geneticists and other experts met in Spain to |
BOX 7 SEVILLE DECLARATION, 1989
summarise the scientific knowledge and evidence regarding
the foundation of violence in human societies. This important [I]t is scientifically incorrect to say
conference resulted in the Seville Statement, which was that war or any other violent
endorsed by UNESCO and many other professional and behaviour is genetically programmed
scientific associations. Based on all the research into our human nature[or] that in
accumulated, scientists came to the conclusion that it is the course of human evolution there
scientifically incorrect to say that war or any other violent has been a selection for aggressive
behaviour is genetically programmed into our human behaviour more than for other kinds
nature[or] that in the course of human evolution there has of behaviour.
been a selection for aggressive behaviour more than for other
kinds of behaviour. As such, it seems that most of the theories outlined above may not be accepted
by the entire scientific community and that human nature may not be the source of conflict after all.
So far, in this lesson, we have looked at internal theories of conflict that locate the origins of
disputes and war within humans. We reviewed various approaches and it has ultimately been
concluded that the natural sciences are not providing us with sufficient explanations as to the cause
of conflicts. Internal theories remain useful for interpersonal conflicts but we need a different type of
tools to understand the type of conflict that we are dealing with in this course. Therefore, we are
moving on to the second category of conflict theories: contextual theories.
3. Contextual Theories of Conflict
The second category of theories explains the occurrence of disputes and war as a consequence of
the context and environment in which humans live. These theories argue that conflict is an
inevitable part of life because there exists a universal condition that influences all people, all
societies and all states. Everyone is in a certain condition which leads to strife and war. War is
universal because some universal factors lead people and nations to fight. It is not about human
nature, it is about the external conditions in which people and nations live.
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Theory 4: Anarchy as a Source of Conflict
One of the most well-known theories is that of structural realism (Waltz 1979). According to this
theory, states live in a world where there is not one single and unified supreme authority that has
the power to coerce others or to enforce international law. States live in a world where anarchy
prevails and it is this anarchical condition that leads to conflict. Indeed, how does one survive in a
world where no one is going to uphold the law, in a world where might is right and all that matters is
military strength? The logical answer is that one is going to make sure that one has the means to
defend oneself in case of an attack. A rational course of action in a world where no one is going to
respect or uphold your rights is to defend yourself by all possible means. But how do your
neighbours react when you start to stockpile weapons and develop a sophisticated defence
system? Naturally, they are going to arm themselves as well and become distrustful. The end result
is an arms race, and while it all started with a wish to be safe, the end result is that everyone is
even more insecure since everyone is armed. This is what is called a security dilemma or paradox
(Booth & Wheeler 2007). Then, when you combine this process with a strong leader, the end
product is often conflict. So this theory is one of the best examples of how global anarchy, which is
a condition affecting all parties, leads to a climate propitious to war.
Anarchy mistrust need for security militarisation arms race conflict
FIGURE 3 | THE CAUSAL LINK FROM ANARCHY TO THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND WAR
Adapted from Tang (2009)
Anarchy
The causal link to the security dilemma

Need for self-help toward survival or security
Uncertainty and fear
Self-help through power competition
The Security Dilemma

security dilemma
consequences of the
Potential
Vicious Circle
Unintended consequences: Unintended consequences:

War or threat of war (as a Partially self-defeating results
tragedy) (more power but less security)
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Theory 5: Globalisation as a Source of Conflict
A second contextual theory is that of globalisation. Globalisation is a process that is shaping the
st
21 century in profound ways. It has completely transformed the way people relate to one another,
to their society, to their country and to their fellow human beings. It also has an impact on all
spheres of life, from economics to politics passing through religion and ethnicity. Globalisation is a
process by which countries and societies have become integrated in a global network through
advances in communication (internet, satellite phones), technology, and transportation (plane,
boat, train). It has radically transformed the way the political and economic systems work and by the
same token it has facilitated the emergence of conflicts across the planet. It seems that due to
globalisation distance becomes irrelevant or relative. We can communicate with any one on the
planet at any time. We can travel half way around the world in a couple of hours; we can trade
goods and products in milliseconds to distant strangers, etc. Thanks to technological change, social
life has become abstracted from its context and lifted out of space-time dimensions (Scholte 2000).
As a result of increased movement and mixing, cultures are brought closer to one another and there
is greater diversity. But at the same time, states are no longer water-proof, societies and their
authority structure are open to the world, and identities are no longer fixed and secure.
Globalisation is characterized by a very high pace of change in which cultures are brought closer to
one another. People from very diverse religious, ethnic, cultural and geographic backgrounds are
now meeting regularly through work, tourism, the media and extensive travelling. Faced with
diversity, people are led to always reconsider their own beliefs and ideas in the light of incoming
information. This leads to changes and hybridity but also to fragmentation and the erosion of
traditional identities and power structures. When the local meets the global, identity is challenged.
This lack of stability creates a sense of insecurity and existential anxiety, and individuals feel the
need to find protection in strong communities (Karner & Aldridge 2004). In a fragmented and ever-
shifting world, women and men look for communities to relieve their uncertainties (Kinnvall 2004,
Eisenstadt 2000).
BOX 8 | CASE STUDY: CONFLICT DIAMONDS AND GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is said to speed up conflict dynamics due to the intensifying interconnectedness of people and
markets all around the world. One particularly troublesome example of how globalization and conflict interact can
be found in the issue of conflict diamonds or blood diamonds, where rough diamonds are exploited and
consequently used as a resource to fund warring parties in conflict. Tidwell and Lerche estimate that the trade of
conflict diamonds amounts to some $250 million per year. The General Assembly in December 2000 adopted a
resolution (A/RES/55/56) on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict with the aim of breaking the link between the
illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict. It was especially the brutal civil wars of Angola and Sierra
Leone which brought the topic on the international agenda. In both cases conflict diamonds continued to fund the
rebel groups - the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) in Sierra Leone. The global dimension of this issue comes to light, when looking at the actors involved in the
trading, manufacturing and certification process. It is not only diamond trading companies, situated all around the
world, but also national governments and international bodies like the World Diamond Congress. Whilst the UN
applied targeted sanctions against the rebel groups in Angola and Sierra Leone, the World Diamond Congress in
2000 initiated the so called Kimberly Process. By issuing a certification for all rough diamonds, coming from a non-
conflict source, the international diamond industry is provided the possibility to block conflict diamonds from
reaching markets. It is hoped that by effectively controlling the trade of conflict diamonds, funding for rebel
organizations could be cut off and thus help shorten wars and prevent their recurrence.
Tidwell & Lerche (2004); UN (2001)
As a consequence, many types of resistance movements and fundamentalisms emerge.

Confronted with uncertainty, people return to the truth of religion and tradition and defend their
community against the globalising forces of capitalism, western influence, liberalism, etc. Ultimately,
amidst this general rush towards community and certainty, identities clash and conflicts emerge.
While a full-blown clash of civilisations is not a reality, there seems to be increasing tensions
regarding religion, nationalism, ethnicity and cultural ties (Huntington 1993). The prominence of
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terrorism may be explained, in part, by this global movement and as a result of speedy globalization
and standardization.
Globalisation is playing a role similar to anarchy in that it is almost a universal condition that shapes
human relations and facilitates conflict. The logical chain of event of this conflict theory begins with
globalising forces which increase interaction, movement and exchanges across frontiers. State
borders become more porous and individuals from different cultural, religious and ethnic
communities interact more frequently and are pushed to question their identity and to justify their
beliefs and way of life. The high pace of change together with the lack of stable identity leads to
insecurity and anxiety. As a result, people begin to resist globalising forces and to find protection
through primordial identity ties. This may lead to a polarisation of identities and to conflicts.
Globalisation porous borders insecure identity resistance conflict
Critique of Contextual Conflict Theories
Anarchy and globalisation are two examples of contextual conflict theories that may be used to
explain many contemporary wars. However, like internal theories, contextual theories fail to explain
why all societies are not affected by conflict to the same extent. Besides, they yield very limited
insights to resolve ongoing civil wars and inter-state wars. This is why we now turn our attention
towards the third category of conflict theories: relational theories.
4. Relational Theories of Conflict
Finally, the third category of theories is that of relational conflict theories that explain the onset of
conflict based on the difficulties of humans to relate
to one another peacefully. Relational theories are
numerous and they may focus on leadership, |
BOX 9 MAIN RELATIONAL CONFLICT THEORIES
ethnicity, class struggle, arms race, power struggles,
etc. In this section we will only consider some of the Theory 6: Community relations;
most influential theories, namely, community
relations, human needs, political power and conflict Theory 7: Human needs;
transformation (see typology developed by Fisher et Theory 8: Political Power;
al. 2000). What is interesting is that, in many cases,
Theory 9: Conflict transformation.
the different internal and contextual theories have
been adapted to fit the level of relations between
actors and as such there are great resemblances. This third category of theories is by far the one
that is preferred in the field of conflict resolution because you do not need to fall into some sort of
international or biological determinism to explain conflict. Nothing predisposes or forces people to
fight and hence it is possible to develop effective and long-lasting solutions.
Theory 6: Community Relations as a Source of Conflict
The first theory is that of community relations. The assumption behind this theory is that social
and community relations can easily fall into patterns of miscommunication and
misperception which may lead, if unaddressed, to polarization, hostile attitude and a lack of trust
between the different groups. Conflicts are inherent to human relations and tend to result from
social interaction between individuals and groups with different cultures, religions, values and life
styles. For example, when one person meets another person who seems different, a discomfort
results and a wish to protect ones identity and ones community automatically emerge. Indeed,
when a person meets a stranger, there is always a process of testing and learning where the
individual tries to define herself or himself in relation to the other. Who am I compared to her or
him? Am I better or worse? Am I right or wrong? Is this true or false? With time, the answers to
these questions may crystallize and take shape as realities. Actions of others will take a special
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meaning that can be positive or negative. Events will be interpreted through a certain lens inherited
from the past and built in line with previous encounters with strangers. Stereotypes will be created
and applied to all people who share similar traits. Slowly, there is a process of categorisation,
polarization and homogenization with the creation of an us versus them. While this does not
necessarily lead to violence, it greatly facilitates the emergence of disagreements and
contradictions, the first two stages of conflict escalation. Indeed, Robert North explains that in such
situations, individuals and groups have a tendency to over perceive the threat or importance of
events and to over react as a result (Zinnes et al. 1961; Holsti et al. 1968). Such dynamics may be
combined with a certain need for enemies used by skilful leaders to mobilise people and to gain
support (Volkan 1987). Furthermore, conflicts in community relations tend to become even more
entrenched due to shared memory (past abuses and conflicts, etc.) and historical traumas
(genocides, pogroms, discrimination, etc.) as well as xenophobia and racism. Here, a process of
dehumanization may be set in motion, ultimately legitimizing atrocious acts of violence (Waller
2007).
Community relations misperception & miscommunication polarisation conflict
The theory of community relations provides a useful explanation for the occurrence of conflicts but
more importantly it facilitates the design of solutions to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.
Indeed, based on the theory, points of entry for conflict resolution arise along the entire chain of
events that lead to conflict. For example, any of the following steps could be taken to avert conflict:
Enhance communication;
Foster a better understanding of the other;
Favour tolerance of diversity;
Challenge stereotypes and generalisations;
Re-humanise the other;
Create forum for constructive and peaceful interaction.
In practice, this could be done through cultural exchanges, inter-faith dialogue, peace education,
communal peace committees, etc.
BOX 10 | INGROUP OUTGROUP DYNAMICS

Inter-communal conflicts are often characterized by so called ingroup outgroup dynamics. The concept stems
from sociology and social psychology and describes the process of identity formation of an ingroup (we) by
differentiation against an outgroup (them). For example in the course of conflict it may be meaningful for groups to
define themselves according to their race, class, gender or religion. Along with this group formation different social
phenomena relevant to the analysis of conflicts can be observed:
(1) Preference of ingroup members: The affinity of people is often biased in favour of the members of ones
own group. In practice this may be reflected in the evaluation of others or in the allocation of resources to
fellow group members. Ethnocentrism is an extreme manifestation of the preference of ingroup members
over the outgroup. Van der Dennen finds that then the glorification of the sociocentric-sacred (ideology,
god-given order, ...) is correlated with a state of hostility or permanent quasi-war towards out-
groups(1985). This includes racial discourses as in Nazi Germany as much as wars which are connoted
religiously.
(2) Influence on social behaviour: People are likely to shift their beliefs in line with changing social norms in
their group as the identity of the individual is defined by the belonging to the group. This hold especially
true in cases where group categorization is psychologically salient as for example in ethnically divided
societies.
(3) Radicalization of group behaviour: Group behaviour often tends to be more radical than the initial
inclination of individual group members. This may be mainly the case when the group identity is
threatened. The violence may range from sanctions against a dissenter or potential renegade within the
group, to punitive expeditions, and even genocide, between groups.
Total identification with the group makes the individual perform altruistic acts to the point of self-sacrifice,
and at the same time behave with ruthless cruelty towards the enemy or victim of the group.
Van der Dennen (1987)
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Issues of ethnicity, religion and ideology are prominent in community relations. In societies divided
along religious or ethnic lines, economic and political competition often takes place on the basis of
religion and ethnicity, especially in communities where there is a professional specialisation of
certain groups. Conflicts arise when there are no systems in place to bring different groups together
around shared issues and events. Recent studies on the role of ethnicity in conflicts point in
different directions (Ramsbotham et al. 2005). Most studies find that high levels of ethnic
fractionalisation do not increase the risk of the onset of civil war - although high levels of
fractionalisation may make civil wars longer and their recurrence more likely. Other factors seem to
play a role such as the match between ethnic belonging and social classes, the presence of skilful
leaders, the existence of transnational ethnic networks, state discrimination, social inequalities,
weak states, etc. The issue of mobilisation is also part of the problem since ethnic fragmentation
makes mobilisation more difficult and should decrease the chance of conflict.
BOX 11 | CASE STUDY: INTER-COMMUNAL CONFLICTS IN INDIA

A famous study in the field of conflict resolution is that of Ashutosh Varshney (2002) on urban violence in Indian
communities. Varshney compared various communities where different ethnic and religious groups cohabited and
looked at the breakout of conflict. He found that the communities most at risk of violence were those where local
associations, such as trade unions, political parties and professional associations, were divided along ethnic or
religious lines. In fact, violence and the risk of conflict were found to be significantly lower in communities where all
such organisations and associations were multi-ethnic. Indeed, they provided a space where antagonisms,
stereotypes and rumours could be defeated and addressed. Communication in these groups prevented the onset of
polarization and hence of violent conflict (Varshney 2002).
Theory 7: Human Needs as a Source of Conflict
The second theory is that of human needs. It was developed by John Burton (1990) and is a mix
between internal and relational theories. In his work, Burton emphasised the link between frustration
and the existence of a set of human needs, which are basic and fundamental: security, autonomy,
recognition, dignity, bonding, etc. As he explained,
There are certain ontological and genetic needs that will be pursued, and
that socialization processes, if not compatible with such human needs, far
from socializing, will lead to frustrations, and to disturbed and anti-social
personal and group behaviours. Individuals cannot be socialized into
behaviours that destroy their identity, and others need goals and, therefore,
must react against environments that do this behaviours that are a
response to frustration of such human needs will often seem aggressive and
counterproductive, but they are understandable in this context (Burton
1990a: 33-34).
The assumption is that we all have basic physical, social, psychological needs such as
identity, security, care, which lead to conflict if they are not fulfilled.
FIGURE 4 | UNIVERSAL HUMAN NEEDS

UNIVERSAL HUMAN NEEDS
FOOD SHELTER RECOGNITION SECURITY
FREEDOM IDENTITY CREATIVITY PRIVACY
PARTICIPATION AFFECTION
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According to human needs theory, it is the deprivation of these needs, or of the access to these
needs that leads to conflict. The tension is between ones potential and the felt deprivation or
boundaries that limit one from reaching ones potential. These needs are physical, emotional,
psychological, social and spiritual. John Burton argues that some needs, such as recognition,
identity, security, autonomy and relations, are non-negotiable. These needs are not rooted in any
particular culture but are universal; every man and woman across the planet share the same needs.
What depends on culture is the articulation and expression of these needs. Needs are so
fundamental that they cannot be repressed and must be satisfied.
To this theory of human needs, we can connect the notion of scarcity. Conflicts arise when
resources are scarce. For example, if a village claims ownership of a water well, then neighbour
villages will lose access to a potential source of water. There is a zero-sum game whereby access
to limited resources will be limited for certain groups. The more people there are, the more strain
there is on already scarce resources. So there is a material reality to this fear but there is also a part
that is constructed. The idea that basic needs are zero-sum equations is itself flawed since affection
and freedom are needs that are not necessarily zero-sum even though one may perceive them to
be so.
Human needs scarcity deprivation unfulfilled needs frustration conflict
The theory of human needs provides a useful account of the emergence of conflicts but more
importantly it yields important insights for conflict prevention and resolution. Indeed, based on the
theory, points of entry for conflict resolution arise along the entire chain of events that lead to
conflict. For example, any of the following steps could be taken to avert conflict:
Resource sharing;
Fair distribution of resources;
Scarcity perception management;
Fair management of natural resources;
Increase efficiency of resource use;
Social safety net to fulfil basic needs;
Reconciliation;
Socialisation to channel frustration and avert aggressive behaviour.
In practice, this could be done through negotiations, the adoption of new technologies, a welfare
system, peace education and any other method that could ensure that everyones basic needs are
met (Burton 1990b).
BOX 12 | CASE STUDY: HUMAN NEEDS IN MALI

Water is a scarce resource in Mali: Two-thirds of the country is covered by desert. Four-fifth of the population relies
on subsistence farming. Therefore the access to drinking water and water for irrigation purposes is a source of
ongoing conflict between different clans and communities. In the northern parts of Mali the Tuareg and Songhai
have been fighting to death over access to water resources. Extreme weather phenomena such as droughts and
floods pose a constant threat to the fragile peace in the region. Insufficient rain drives the farmers to expand the
area they cultivate; floods on the other hand can lead to plagues of insects or to the spread of devastating diseases
like Cholera. Currently the population of Mali suffers from a triple disaster (UNICEF). People are simultaneously
affected by a food and nutrition crisis, resulting from a prolonged drought as well as from displacements and the
effects of armed conflict in parts of the country.
Since 1994 the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) has been conducting a successful mediation
project in the arid zones of the North. Their goal is to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict over water resources
by ensuring that the basic needs of local populations are met. GIZ works with Yehia Ag Mohammed Ali, a member of
a respected Tuareg clan. Because of his status, Yehia is in the position to actively mediate between tribes as he is
widely considered to be a local leader among the nomadic people. On a regular basis he holds court sessions and
decides on demands over water pumps or conflicts over arable land. The court fosters the fair distribution of water
resources all the while providing a forum for the discussion of conflicts raging between different clans. Last but not
least, it offers the youth who grew up during the war a unique example of a peaceful conflict resolution mechanism.
Berghof Foundation (2012); ICRC (2012)
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Theory 8: Political Power as a Source of Conflict
The third relational theory is that of political power and it is based on the assumption that access to
power is at the core of conflict. The political apparatus is the stage for a competition between
individuals and groups who vie for power. Because power is limited there is only one president -
the conflict is often depicted in zero-sum terms where the power gained by an opponent is
synonymous with a relative loss of power for oneself. According to this conflict theory, war is the
continuation of politics by other means. What cannot be resolved peacefully at the political level will
degenerate into violence. In many countries, political power is tantamount to control over the
security forces, access to natural resources and use of economic power for self-enrichment. The
lack of political power is thus a major obstacle to the fulfilment of ones needs and expectations. In
many cases, weak states, failing states, governance deficits and political illegitimacy are symptoms
and sources of conflicts over political power (Zartman 1995; Milliken 2003). Conflicts over political
power are not only played out within states but also at the international and regional levels (the
West versus the rest, the core versus the periphery, coloniser versus colonised) and the sub-
national and local levels (urban centres versus rural areas, higher caste versus lower caste,
workers versus capitalists, etc.).
Political power competition conflict
The theory of political power provides an enlightening explanation regarding the onset of conflicts
but more importantly it facilitates the design of solutions to prevent and resolve conflicts. Indeed,
based on the above conflict logic, points of entry for conflict resolution arise. For example, any of
the following steps could be taken to avert conflict:
Democratisation;
Separation of political powers;
Subordination of the army to the political leaders;
Power-sharing mechanisms such as free and fair elections;
Good governance;
Rule of law and independent judiciary;
Civic culture whereby election results are accepted by all parties.
In practice, violent conflicts can be avoided by developing adequate structures and channels to
address grievances and share power in a fair manner. The legitimacy of the political system is very
important and democratization may or may not be the best solution. Power must be fairly distributed
in absolute terms as well as in relative terms.
BOX 13 | CASE STUDY: TRANSITIONAL POWER-SHARING IN NEPAL

In 2006 Nepals ten-year civil war came formally to an end with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed
between the Maoists and seven major political parties. The agreement provided for power sharing between the
groups to establish unity in the country until elections would be held. This power-sharing was characterized by the
formation of a grand coalition government and consensus decision-making. On request, the United Nations Mission
in Nepal (UNMIN) was established to monitor the disarmament process of Maoist combatants and to provide
technical support for the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a Constituent Assembly in a free and
fair atmosphere, in consultation with the parties (S/RES/1740). An important success factor of the power-sharing
agreement was its positive sum character:
(1) Both the Maoists and the political parties obtained a role in the government that either provided them
with more influence compared to before the ceasefire was signed or at least did not imply a loss of
influence.
(1) Even though the peace and electoral process benefited from assistance and support from international
actors, there was a strong local ownership of the political framework. Nepali actors were the main authors
of the CPA and of the electoral process. This assured the legitimacy of the peace process and the
commitment of all parties.
(2) Finally, the CPA was a flexible document with a vague language, which did not specify the percentual share
of parties representation. This shifted the parties focus more on thematic issues and allowed to satisfy
the needs of spoilers (especially concerning the share of power), who otherwise might have compromised
the peace process.
CSCW (2008); Ogura (2008); PRIO 2008
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Theory 9: Conflict Transformation
The fourth conflict theory is that of conflict transformation, which assumes that strife springs from
structural inequality and injustice in the social, political and economic spheres (Fisher et al. 2000).
Conflicts escalate and are exacerbated when the demands for change within a society are met with
resistance and oppression by the actors and structures in place. Indeed, structures take a long time
to evolve and are more static than individual governments and political changes. This clash
between static structures and fast change in social expectations, migration, the environment,
political systems or economic order, leads to conflict. Indeed, few states have put in place efficient
mechanisms to adapt to the changes wrought by globalisation. Patriarchal and traditional authority
structures may be strongly established but they are unable to cope with the acceleration of pace
and the increased interconnectedness that result from globalisation (Scholte 2000).
Change resistance from established structures conflict
This theory draws its name not from the issue at stake but from the solutions that is offered. Indeed,
according to this theory, the adequate solutions are based on deep work on the root causes of
conflict and injustice. It is about changing attitudes, empowering individuals and working on fairness
in economic distribution and political access. It is not about simply resolving the conflict but about
completely transforming the structure so that similar conflicts do not even arise in the future. For
example, any of the following steps could be taken to avert conflict:
Democratisation;
Empowerment;
Fair trading;
Gender equality;
Constitutional reform.
In practice, this could be done through any method that could ensure the transformation of
illegitimate structures in any spheres of life.
BOX 14 | CASE STUDY: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN EL SALVADOR

Political and economic exclusion were said to be the root causes of the Salvadorian civil war. Land ownership and
income were concentrated in the hands of the economic elite and the authoritarian and the exclusionary nature of
the political regime in place ignored the needs of the grieving majority. The demands for change coming from
below were met with repression and elections were rigged to prevent the oppositions victory in the 1970s. The lack
of institutional channels to address political, economic and social grievances led to the emergence and growth of
armed guerrilla groups. In 1980 five Salvadoran revolutionary organisations founded the Farabundo Mart National
Liberation Front (FMLN) with the aim of defeating the government and implementing a socialist agenda.
Subsequently, a revolutionary war started in 1981 and turned into a longstanding civil war. Under the aegis of the
United Nations, the Chapultepec agreements were signed in 1992 after two years of negotiation. The agreements
addressed the root causes of the conflict by supporting:
- The reorganisation of civil-military relations;

- The reform and reduction of the armed forces;
- The creation of a new police force;
- The transformation of the FMLN into a political party;
- Constitutional and judicial reforms;
- Arrangements for enhancing human rights;
- The regularisation of land ownership in conflict areas.
These agreements allowed for the democratization of the regime and for political demilitarisation. Between 1991
and 1995, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established through Security Council
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Resolution 693 to ensure their implementation. It is important to note that all levels of society engaged in the peace
process. The Catholic Church supported regional peace initiatives while other organisations such as the National
Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) and the womens human rights organisation CO-MADRES mobilised the
population at the grassroots level. Even though poverty, violence and criminality are not negligible issues in El
Salvador nowadays, there has been no relapse into civil war since the ceasefire.
lvarez (2010); Reiber (2002); UN (1995
All these theories have strengths and weaknesses but they all yield useful insights to grasp a
situation and to find adequate solutions. Now that we have covered all the main theories of conflict,
we are going to consider Edward Azars concept of protracted social conflict.
5. Protracted Social Conflicts
Edward Azar is a central figure in the field of conflict resolution. Based on decades of research, he
came to identify a new type of conflict distinct from traditional disputes over territory, economic
resources, or East-West rivalry [and that] revolves around questions of communal identity (Azar
1991: 93). He coined the term of protracted social conflicts to describe the new type of conflict and
outlined four elements required for their violent escalation, namely, a communal content, human
needs, governance and international linkages.
Communal Content
First of all, a protracted social conflict has a communal content whereby the core of the problem is
the destructive relationship between the state and identity groups (ethnic, religious, cultural,
ideological). Azar explains that when state structures are absent (in remote areas, rural villages,
weak or failed states) or are not giving enough space for the expression of certain identities
(censorship, authoritarianism, discrimination), people turn to their identity group for security and
stability. This results in some sort of disarticulation between the state and society which leads to
violence. In particular, he argues that in many cases the disarticulation resulted from artificial and
indiscriminate colonial structures that were imposed on indigenous societies. While such structures
could be upheld through force during colonial times, this is no longer an option, and the misfit
between government structures and identity groups is becoming more and more apparent. In order
to resolve protracted social conflicts, one must take into account this communal element and
address divisions and identity clashes.
Human Needs
The second element of protracted social conflicts is the deprivation of human needs. On this
subject, Azar draws to a large extent on the human needs theory developed by Burton and
contends that such deprivation is the underlying source of protracted social conflicts. Attempts to
fulfil these universal and non-negotiable needs often take a communal dimension because identity
groups are either the sole providers of these needs or offer a language to frame their demands. In
order to address protracted social conflicts, it will be essential to reduce all forms of
underdevelopment and this requires a profound transformation since the [g]roups which seek to
satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure
of their society (Azar 1990: 155).
Governance
The third element of protracted social conflicts is that of governance and the role of the state. This
aspect of conflict is central to the fulfilment of human needs since states are bequeathed with the
authority to govern the territory and to ensure the satisfaction of the human needs of the population.
Any deprivation of basic needs is thus connected to a governance deficit since, as Azar (1990: 10)
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explains, [m]ost states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by
incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human
needs. The governance element of protracted social conflicts also has a communal dimension
since the political apparatus is often dominated by and biased in favour of a specific identity group.
It is thus intrinsically connected to the disarticulation between state and society. In the long run,
people may not find the system fair and legitimate and may withdraw their support or consent.
International Linkages
The fourth and final element of protracted social conflicts is that of the international linkages that
conflict actors may have with foreign governments or powerful lobbies (businesses, Diasporas,
international organisations, transnational criminal groups, etc.). Conflict may be facilitated and
fuelled by arms trade, cross-border interests, and drug trade, amongst others. This element is
especially prominent in the case of weak and failed states that have very porous borders. But it is
applicable to all states to the extent that they enjoy strong connections to regional and international
organisations and the international economic system.
Azar finally points to a variety of factors that participates in the eruption and escalation of conflict.
He mentions the existence of certain process dynamics or conflict mechanisms that lead to the
actual conflict whether through the security dilemma, miscommunication or aggressiveness. Conflict
mechanisms include snowballing based on over-perception and over-reaction, increasing
simplification whereby the issue is boiled down to one single event, increasing personification
whereby one single party becomes the source of the conflict, the security dilemma, etc. All these
processes facilitate the escalation of conflicts.
BOX 15 | CASE STUDY: PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA

The civil war in Sri Lanka is an instructive example of protracted social conflict. Although the conflict is often boiled
down to the ethnic dualism between the Buddhist Sinhalese majority (74%) and the mostly Hindu Tamil minority
(18%), other factors contributed to the severity of the conflict such as the deprivation of human needs, poor
governance and international linkages in line with Azars theory (1990).
Communal Content: In the case of Sri Lanka, ethnic heterogeneity and separation were reinforced by the
British system of colonial rule which privileged the Tamil minority over the Sinhalese majority. This
resulted in the disarticulation between the state and identity groups which saw Tamil demands for self-
rule being opposed by the growth of Sinhalese nationalism. These conflicting interests resulted in the
violent civil war between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil liberation movement (LTTE).
Deprivation of Human Needs: The Sri Lankan conflict was characterized by the violent struggle of
communal groups for basic needs like security, recognition and the right to economic participation. Sirimal
Abeyratne (2002) argues that the conflict also arose due to the missing socio-economic opportunities of
the youth on both sides. They were the most vulnerable to the effects of a stagnant economy in the late
70s and turned to violence to claim their rights.
Poor Governance: The high level of political repression led to the systematic exclusion of the Tamil
minority from the pursuance of different goods. Benedikt Korf speaks of ethnicized entitlements in the
case of Sri Lanka, meaning that in the already prior to the outbreak of civil war in Sri Lanka ethnicity
became the key mechanism to the access of resources. This held true for different sectors of the society a
governmental law of the 1970s for example requested that Tamils who wanted to enter the university
should demonstrate higher marks than their fellow Sinhalese students.
International Linkages: The civil war was influenced by South Indian Tamil nationalism, but also by the
overall strategic interests of India in the region. According to the Council of Foreign Relations in the 1970s
it was Indias external intelligence agency which helped to arm and train the LTTE. The support however
diminished after the terrorist turn of the LTTE in the 1980s. The Tamil diaspora played a central role in
providing the LTTE with arms and funds. According to data of the International Crisis Group at the height
of the conflict which claimed over 100.000 lives, the diaspora contributed an estimated $200 million a year
to the Tigers.
Abeyratne (2002); CFR (2009); ICG (2010); Korf (2005)
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There exists three categories of conflict theories:
o Internal;
o Contextual;
o Relational.
Internal conflict theories assume that the sources of conflict are to be found within humans, in
their nature, psyche or biology;
Contextual conflict theories assume that the source of conflict is a universal condition that
shapes the context or environment in which humans and states live;
Relational conflict theories assume that the source of conflict is found in the relation between
people.
o Community relations theory assumes that conflicts spring from misperception and
miscommunication;
o Human needs theory assumes that conflicts result from the deprivation of universal
and non-negotiable human needs;
o Political power theory assumes that conflicts result from competition over the
political apparatus of a community or state;
o Conflict transformation theory suggests that conflicts emerge when illegitimate
structures are confronted with demands for change.
Relational conflict theories yield important insights to resolve conflicts:
o Community relations theory emphasises the need to facilitate communication and
to dispel stereotypes and negative attitudes;
o Human needs theory emphasises the need to foster development and to share
resources;
o Political power theory emphasises the need to set up power-sharing mechanisms ;
o Conflict transformation theory emphasises the need to address the root causes of
conflicts in a society.
Protracted Social Conflicts have four elements that are required for their escalation into
violence:
o A communal element;
o Human needs deprivation;
o Poor governance;
o International linkages.
FIGURE 5 | CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT THEORIES
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LESSON 2 |
Conflict Resolution Tools and Theories
LESSON OUTLINE:
1. Introduction
2. Conceptual Tools in Conflict Resolution
3. Conflict Resolution Theories
4. Theories of Change in Conflict Resolution
Relate different options for conflict resolution to a specific conflict;

Differentiate the attitudes, behavior and contradiction in a conflict;
Appraise the main theories in conflict resolution.
1. Introduction
st
At the beginning of the 21 century, the world seems to be affected by an incalculable number of
conflicts sometimes with devastating effects for its victims. Conflicts seem to be everywhere: in
family relations, at work, within communities, between states or nations aspiring to sovereignty and
at the international level. The great diversity between people and human communities has led to
inevitable clashes over diverging interests, scarce resources, access to power, incompatible values,
etc. The lack of mechanisms to communicate, express grievances, manage differences and resolve
incompatibilities has resulted in countless clashes, riots, upheavals, wars and crimes against
humanity. Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister during the Second World War and Nobel Prize
in Literature, famously described this state of affair: The story of the human race is war. Except for
brief and precarious interludes there has never been peace in the world; and long before history
began murderous strife was universal and unending. In this context, the study and perfecting of
war has had a very long and exceptionally fruitful history and in 2012 alone, over US$1.5 trillion
(US$1,500,000,000,000) was spent worldwide on military expenditures.
BOX 17 | DEFINITION: CONFLICT
Conflict is a relationship between two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have, or think they have,
incompatible goals. Since persons differ in their goals and motives, conflicts might be considered inevitable and only
become problematic from a normative point of view when they are violent or destructive. This depends on the
means (peaceful or violent) the conflict parties employ to resolve their incompatibility and how the conflict evolves
subsequently. Therefore, a conflict system can be described considering the conflict situation (circumstances that
generate the incompatibility), the conflict attitude (the parties perceptions of each other and of the conflict) and the
conflict behaviour of the respective parties to the conflict. Depending on these variables conflicts can be further
classified into subcategories, such as violent conflict, armed conflict, asymmetrical conflict or war.
Fisher et al. (2007); Galtung (1969); Kriesberg (2007); Mac Ginty (2006)
While conflicts have been an inescapable part of life, attempts to mitigate their effects or to resolve
them have also existed for centuries. Despite the fact that there have been relatively few years
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without war during the history of mankind, there have also been few years without peace treaties,
peace agreements, negotiations and more general attempts to restore peace and security. And over
the last century, the institutionalisation of conflict resolution mechanisms at the personal, inter-
personal, familial, tribal, sub-national, national, regional or international levels has made important
headway; the creation of the United Nations in 1945 being but one of its most symbolic expressions.
Despite the necessity for strong international conflict resolution mechanisms and even though the
idea of peace and the practice of mediation or negotiation are very old, the existence of an
academic and scientific discipline regarding the resolution of conflicts is very recent. It is only
following the Second World War that peace research was founded as an academic discipline
(Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 34).
Over the last 70 years, theories and tools to resolve conflicts have been developed and through trial
and error effective methods to end hostilities have been perfected. Conflict resolution is very much
based on resources drawn from conflict analysis and there can be no resolution of a dispute without
a prior analysis of the actors, causes and dynamics of the conflict. And ultimately, avenues and
opportunities for conflict resolution emerge from conflict analysis. In this lesson, conceptual tools
used in conflict analysis are introduced and combined together to provide a comprehensive picture
of the possible ways to resolve conflicts. In particular, the ABC Triangle, the conflict timeline and the
pyramid of actors are described with a view to yield unique insights into conflict resolution. Building
on these conceptual tools, the second part of the lesson describes the main theories of conflict
resolution.
2. Conceptual Tools in Conflict Resolution
TOOL 1: The ABC Triangle
The first conceptual tool in conflict resolution is the ABC triangle developed by the Norwegian
sociologist Johan Galtung (2000). Conflict can be
generally defined as [m]utually incompatible goals BOX 18 | ATTITUDE & BEHAVIOUR
among parties amidst a lack of coordinating or mediating
Attitude: ideology, stereotypes, hatred,
mechanisms give birth to conflict (Azar 1990: 5). For castes, gendered beliefs, racism and
example, a rebel group may proclaim its independence emotions such as hatred, revenge,
and sovereignty over part of an existing state or two suspicion, disgust, distrust
villages may claim ownership of a water well located
Behaviour: verbal abuse, riots, physical
between them. This incompatibility may lead to a aggression, occupations, protests, battles,
disagreement or what Galtung calls a Contradiction. The boycotts, strikes, war, non-cooperation,
two parties are willing to achieve their respective goal but rape, killings, torture, sexual harassment,
the opposition of the other party and their inability to do censorship
so create frustration and aggression. These feelings of
frustration and aggression will be turned outward into open violent behaviour as well as inward
through the creation of a specific set of attitudes and perceptions of oneself and the enemy. If no
solution is found to defuse the tensions, a vicious circle is set into motion whereby violent behaviour
strengthens attitudes and vice versa. The conflict becomes self-sustaining and the original
contradiction may recede into the background while attitude and behaviour become the main drivers
in the escalation process. As such, any conflict is composed of a given contradiction (C), a set of
attitude (A) and a specific behaviour (B).
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FIGURE 6 | GALTUNGS ABC TRIANGLE
The ABC triangle can be applied to all conflict ranging from inter-personal disputes to international
conflicts. In the case of Ivory Coasts civil war the three corners of the triangle would look as follow:
Attitudes: distrust, rivalry and xenophobic stereotypes about the other resulting in a North-
South divide. The concept of Ivoirit was developed in the mid-1990s by President Henri
Konan Bdi to categorise immigrants and their descendants as well as people born in the
Maninka and Senoufo regions as Non-Ivorians. Alassane Ouattara was banned from
running in the 2000 presidential elections because of his status as a Non-Ivoirian (his
mother was originally from Burkina Faso).
Behaviour: coup attempts, targeted killings of politicians, seizure of territory, military
intervention, violence between rebel and government-affiliated armed groups but also
against civilians, especially sexual violence against women, accompanied by negotiations
and broken ceasefires.
Contradiction: citizenship and access to power, land and resources, electoral eligibility,
and human and civil rights.
Johan Galtung (2000) explains that the ABC Triangle can provide a checklist throughout conflict
resolution efforts. Indeed, conflict resolution should be holistic and should never focus solely on a
single corner of the triangle at the expenses of the other. In particular, Galtung warns us about the
dangers of three possible fallacies.
The first fallacy is the liberal fallacy which assumes that a conflict will be resolved by fostering the
right mind. The problem with this reductive focus on attitudes is that it is based on the assumption
that the Problems derive from hateful or distorted minds badly in need of religious/ideological
conversion, psychotherapy and/or peace and conflict education; blind to the circumstance that even
the most normal mind can kill or tolerate killing when the contradictions frustrating people just go on
and on (Galtung 2000: 80). This exclusive focus on the (A) corner may overlook the root causes of
the conflict by disregarding the role that the deprivation of basic needs has on the escalation
process.
The second fallacy is the conservative fallacy which assumes that taming violence may end a
conflict. This simplistic focus on behavior disregards the contradiction itself as well as the role
played by attitudes in the continuation of hostilities. It single-mindedly tries to address the conflict
symptoms without treating the root causes.
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BOX 19 | CASE STUDY: CONSERVATIVE FALLACY IN AFGHANISTAN
Although the US-led intervention in Afghanistan was partly justified on liberal grounds, it did not include a
comprehensive strategy for the building of effective state structures. Under the aegis of the war against terror,
counterinsurgency operations relied on a military only strategy. It is only later and in light of the limits of such a
strategy that measures were implemented to win hearts and minds and to rebuild state structures. Critics argue that
the internationally mandated troops still struggle to build a sustainable peace in Afghanistan because of the
conservative fallacy.
Paris (2010); Williamson (2011)
Finally, the Marxist fallacy is based on the assumption that a conflict can be resolved by targeting
the contradiction without addressing the attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of the conflict. This
would amount to fulfilling the basic needs of an entire population without addressing the hatred and
distrust that they have of each other.
For each corner of the ABC Triangle, there exists a

particular form of peace activities that are especially BOX 20 |
relevant. Peacekeeping is perfectly designed to While United Nations peacekeeping
address violent behavior (B) corner since it is operations are, in principle, deployed to
designed to separate the armed forces of conflicting support the implementation of a cease-fire or
parties, monitor ceasefires and support the peace agreement, they are often required to
implementation of peace agreements. Peacemaking is play an active role in peacemaking efforts and
may also be involved in early peacebuilding
largely suitable to address the attitudes of conflict activities.
actors (A) corner since it is based on negotiation
and mediation with a view to reaching a shared and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
legitimate political agreement. And finally, Principles and Guidelines (2008: 19)
peacebuilding is most useful to address the
contradiction (C) corner - since it seeks to positively alter structural contradictions, improve
relations between the conflict parties It may also refer to activities connected with economic
development, social justice, reconciliation, empowerment of disadvantaged/strategic groups and
humanitarian support (Berghof Handbook 2012). United Nations peace operations offer a holistic
approach to conflict resolution since they potentially cover all three corners of the triangle. Indeed,
as explained in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008: 19),
[w]hile United Nations peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the
implementation of a cease-fire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in
peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities. The expanded
mandate of recent peace operations is characteristic of the shift from traditional peacekeeping to
multidimensional peace operations.
The ABC Triangle is our first tool. And when we are going to look into resolving a conflict, it gives us
three possibilities to intervene. Mediators and third parties may act by changing the attitudes of
conflict actors from hostile to less hostile. Or they may act on the behaviour by increasing security
and protecting people so as to decrease the level of direct violence. And finally, they can act to
transcend the clash of interests and contradiction that has led to the conflict in the first place
(Galtung 2000).
The ABC Triangle is often associated with Johan Galtungs CDS Triangle on violence. Galtung
explains that we have a propensity to believe that violence is a visible behavior aiming to cause
harm. However, there exist other types of violence which are less obvious but which may cause
even greater pain or harm to its victims. For example, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon declared
in 2009 that 6 million children die of hunger every year, that is, 17,000 every day. This type of
violence goes largely unnoticed, especially when compared to the media attention received in the
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event of a plane crash, ISAF casualties in Afghanistan or rockets being fired into Israeli territory
from the Gaza strip. The CDS Triangle is designed to go beyond the usual focus on behavioural
violence and it differentiates three types of violence:
Cultural violence corresponds to violence legitimated by cultural beliefs, norms, rules and
assumptions (the caste system, gender discrimination, class, etc.). This type of violence is
largely diffuse and invisible but clearly intends to harm, though indirectly, through symbolic
material (preaches, propaganda, images, speeches, etc.).
Direct violence is made of visible and obvious acts of violence intended to harm directly
(murder, bombing, suicide attack, drone attacks, pollution, destruction of cultural heritage,
displacement, etc.).
Structural violence results from structures which facilitate or lead to violence (poverty,
economic exploitation, patents on life-saving drugs, unintended consequences of economic
policies, etc.). It is invisible with no will to harm but it is no less destructive. Perpetrators
remain largely unknown, anonymous and diffuse since there is no obvious and direct
connection between the act and the harm. Examples include child hunger but also
disparities in life expectancy between countries, tariffs that disadvantage subsistence
farming, drivers of climate change, etc. Structural violence is responsible for the majority of
conflict deaths and thereby highlights the importance of addressing the structural causes of
conflicts.
FIGURE 7 | GALTUNGS CDS TRIANGLE
TOOL 2: Conflict Dynamics
The second conceptual tool is very simple and yet provides powerful analytical insights into conflict
and conflict resolution. Conflicts are ever-changing and are characterised by specific dynamics.
Conflict dynamics follow an escalation and de-escalation curve whereby tensions increase, violence
breaks out, and once the conflict has peaked or a stalemate has been reached, violence decreases
and solutions are found to finally return to a state of stable peace. Many different typologies exist to
categorise the different conflict phases but in general, most conflicts follow this trend with some of
them taking a long time to escalate or a long time to de-escalate. For the sake of simplicity, conflicts
have a first phase before violence erupts, a second phase during which violence is regular and a
third phase post-violence. In each of these phases, different conflict resolution techniques will be
used.
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FIGURE 8 | CONFLICT DYNAMICS
Generally speaking, peacemaking, conflict prevention and early warning will be useful in the first
phase before violence erupts. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict management and conflict
containment will be adapted to the second phase during violence. And finally, peacebuilding,
reconciliation and development will be needed in the last phase once violence has ended. These
are general guidelines since peacemaking remains relevant during the conflict as well as after.
Likewise, peacebuilding - through peace education and cultural exchanges may be useful before
violence erupts.
If we combine insights from the ABC Triangle together with the different phases of the conflict, nine
opportunities for conflict resolution emerge which can be computed using the following table:
TABLE 4 | OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

(C) Contradictio
(A) Attitudes (B) Behaviour
n
Before Violence
During Violence
After Violence
(C) Contradictio
n
Peace education, No-fly zone, sanctions, Arbitration, Official or
cultural exchanges, UNSC resolution, early secret negotiations, UN
Before Violence intelligence sharing, warning, visa or IAEA observers,
preventive diplomacy restrictions UNOVIC
Peacekeeping,
Winning hearts and Negotiations,
strategic bombing,
During Violence minds, conflict mediation, government
counter-insurgency,
resolution workshops reform,
roadblocks
Peace education, Rule of law, Security Development, state-
power-sharing, Sector Reform, building,
After Violence reconciliation, inter- Disarmament, de- democratisation,
religious meetings mining economic reforms
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BOX 21 | ATTITUDES BEFORE VIOLENCE: GUINEA
The United Nations Office for West Africa facilitated in cooperation with ECOWAS, the African Union and the
international community Guineas transition from military to constitutional rule throughout 2009 and 2010. The main
objective was to prevent political tensions from escalating into full-blown conflict, not least in view of the stadium
massacre in 2009 and the upheavals in neighbouring Cte dIvoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Steady
support from the United Nations and ECOWAS-led mediation assured that the transition would take place without a
descent into civil war. To support national dialogue and reconciliation, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund provided
financial support to ECOWAS`s mission to facilitate dialogue between the Conseil National pour la Dmocratie et le
Dveloppement (CNDD), which had seized power in a military coup in 2008, and the opposition, Forces Vives. A political
agreement was reached which allowed for the appointment of a new Prime Minister proposed by the opposition, the
establishment of a National Transition Council and the organisation of free and fair presidential elections. The
mediation allowed the conflict parties to enter into dialogue, to ease tensions, re-build trust and promote cooperative
attitudes on both sides important preconditions to avoid a descent into chaos after the elections and to assure the
acceptance of election results.
UN (2011); Yabi (2010)
BOX 22 | BEHAVIOUR DURING VIOLENCE: CYPRUS
Traditional peacekeeping operations offer an opportunity for conflict resolution by targeting a change of behaviour of
the parties in conflict. They aim at creating the conditions for a lasting peace in a country torn by conflict.
Peacekeeping operations are usually deployed to support the countries making the difficult early transitions from
conflict to peace. A current example is the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which was originally
established in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. Since then the two
communities have not succeeded in reaching an agreement. This is why the mandate of UNFICYP has been
continuously extended by the Security Council to enable the Force to supervise ceasefire lines, maintain a buffer zone,
undertake humanitarian activities and support the good offices mission of the Secretary-General. However, as the
conflict is merely frozen but not solved, a many state officials and non-governmental organizations are working in
parallel to break the impasse, change attitudes and resolve the core of the conflict.
Tirman (2004); UN (2012)
BOX 23 | CONTRADICTION AFTER VIOLENCE: TIMOR LESTE
Timor Leste is currently recovering from a deadly secessionist conflict, which has lasted for 25 years. The fight for
independence from Portuguese and later Indonesian occupation has caused a loss of more than 100.000 people. It was
only in 1999 that a UN sponsored agreement between Portugal and Indonesia allowed for a popular referendum on the
independence of Timor Leste. After a clear vote, the UN took over the administration of Timor Leste to manage the
transition to independence.
Since then, many measures have been taken to establish a sustainable peace. However, the main issue of contradiction
remained in force within the society, namely the divide between the people who preferred the integration to Indonesia
and those who were in favour of the independence of the country. This very divide presented one of the main
challenges to nation-building in Timor Leste.
As reconciliation is considered a key element to bring together divided societies, a commission for Reception, Truth and
Reconciliation was established to investigate the human rights violations committed between 1974 and 1999.
Integrating the political parties representing the different societal groups within a democratic system is another
approach to confront the contradictions.
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In 2002, UNDP already considered the rebuilding of state institutions, schools, infrastructure and markets to be a
relative success. However, democratic transition has proved to be a source of renewed conflict and violence erupted
in the forerun of the first democratic elections held in 2007, reflecting a symptom of embittered political rivalries
(Crisis Group 2012). According to international monitors, the trend in 2012 could be turned as general elections were
much less violent. The country still faces numerous challenges, but the instruments in place to face the remaining
contradictions makes international observers paint a more optimistic picture for further development in Timor Leste.
Cabasset-Semedo & Durand (2009); ICG (2012); UNDP (2002)
TOOL 3: Pyramid of Actors ?
The third conceptual tool is the pyramid of conflict actors developed by John Paul Lederach and
Johan Galtung. In any given conflict, there is great number of actors involved more or less directly
either as perpetrators, victims or bystanders. The main categories of actors are states and
government, non-state security actors, international and regional organisations, public stakeholders
and others such as refugees, diasporas, etc.
The variety of actors can also be classified according to the power that they enjoy. At the top, you
have a powerful and highly visible elite of state officials, international civil servants and so on. They
are relatively few in number but the power that they wield makes them extremely important in the
continuation and termination of conflict. In the middle, there are a larger number of middle-range
and sub-national leaders active in trade unions, political parties, community groups, religious
organisations, professional associations, and so on. They act as some sort of intermediaries
between the elite and the people since their position of leadership gives them access to both the
elite and large constituencies. Finally, there are the great majority of people which wield much less
power individually but which are much larger in number. These three categories can be represented
as follows:
FIGURE 9 | PYRAMID OF ACTORS
Each category of actors has different interests, goals and resources as well as different powers to
influence the situation. Far from being homogenous, each of the three levels is fragmented,
especially during war time where strains are put on resources and relationships. When peace
workers are going to design intervention strategies, they may choose to work with one or more of
these levels. The middle leadership is especially important since it possesses access to the top
leaders as well as to the people. They are influential and yet have access to unique communication
channels to mobilise people.
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When it comes to conflict resolution, different solutions can be implemented at different levels of the
pyramid. Official negotiations between state officials and diplomats (Track I diplomacy) will focus
entirely on the tip of the pyramid. Unofficial conflict resolution workshops targeted at emerging
leaders and key civil society actors (Track II diplomacy) will focus exclusively on the middle of the
pyramid with hopes that changes will then trickle down and also affect the top leadership.
Reconciliation and development initiatives especially focus on the bottom of the pyramid since they
are supposed to affect the largest number of recipients as possible. All these solutions are
complementary and necessary to secure a stable peace and require the participation of all actors.
Opportunities for Conflict Resolution
The ABC Triangle, the Conflict Dynamics and the Pyramid of Actors can be combined together to
develop even more specific avenues for conflict resolution. The following table represents twenty-
seven options for conflict resolution targeting different actors at different times and in different
manners:
TABLE 5 | OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

(C) Contradictio
n
Before Violence
During Violence
After Violence
Conflict resolution efforts are diverse and may have different time frames. For example, emergency
food delivery is supposed to be immediate and short-term while reconciliation is necessarily
protracted and long-term. When considering the various options, it is necessary to clarify whether
the objective requires a short, medium or long-term horizon.
3. Conflict Resolution Theories
Conflict resolution tools provide useful but generic insights into the different approaches to resolving
conflicts. The table of opportunities for conflict resolution puts all corners of the ABC Triangle, all
levels of the Pyramid of Actors and all phases of the conflict on the same level, as if they were all
useful, relevant and necessary to achieve peace. However, there is little agreement regarding the
utility and effectiveness of each conflict resolution opportunity among all peace and conflict experts.
Some argue that work on behaviour is the only solution to achieve some kind of peace while others
believe that only by transforming the root causes of a conflict can one hope to achieve peace.
Overall, three different theoretical approaches exist concerning the most effective and realistic way
to resolve conflicts.
Conflict Resolution Theory 1: Conflict Settlement and Conflict Management
The first theory is that of Conflict Settlement and Conflict Management and according to this
approach, violence must be managed with superior power and through the help of legitimate actors.
A core assumption of this theory is that conflicts are inherently asymmetric with some actors being
very powerful and other actors being less powerful. Asymmetry may be played out at the military
level, in terms of legitimacy, in the amount of economic resources or access to political, social,
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communication and economic networks (diaspora, criminal drug-trade), etc. Therefore, when a
conflict breaks out, only a greater power can bring an end to direct violence. Force is believed to be
the solution, not as a moral ideal but as a matter of fact. If we look at history, it seems that force
results in more durable settlements between conflict actors. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP), out of all armed conflicts that took place between 1946 and 2004, only 20% of
these conflicts were renewed within ten years compared to 25% for conflicts that ended with a
1
peace agreement and 30% for those that ended with a cease-fire.
This theory favours the use of Track I diplomacy by leaders and diplomats as well as military force
as the most effective forms of conflict resolution. It deals almost exclusively with the overt behaviour
of conflict actors the (B) corner and the aim is not to work on the root causes or on the
worldviews upheld by conflict parties but on the direct acts of violence. This clear orientation
towards militaristic and security-oriented solutions does not result from any warmongering but from
logical conclusions drawn based on the historical record. Some of the most well-known proponents
of this approach are William Zartman and Jacob Bercovitch. Zartman is especially known for
developing the concepts of ripe moment for negotiation and mutually hurting stalemate. According
to him, intervention must take place when conflict parties are trapped in a situation where there is
no realistic prospect of victory on either side, where resources are running low and where there is
no clear strategy to win.
BOX 24 | CASE STUDY: CONFLICT SETTLEMENT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN LIBYA
A recent attempt to end a conflict by addressing violent behaviour - (B) corner - is the airborne intervention of the
international community in Libya 2011. Based on Security Council Resolution 1973, a coalition of 19 states relied on
strategic or smart bombing to protect civilians or civilian populated areas under threat of attack by the Gaddafi
troops (S/RES/1973). In order to achieve that goal, the intervening forces mainly attacked targets which were deemed
vital for the war-making capacity of Gaddafis army. Although the international community succeeded in ending the
fighting, the conflict in Libya is far from being resolved as the underlying root causes, meaning the (A) and (C) corners
have not yet been successfully addressed.
BOX 25 | GIVE WAR A CHANCE
In an article entitled Give War a Chance and published in Foreign Affairs in 1999, Edward Luttwak explains that
although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. If allowed
to run its course, war is said to be uniquely able to establish the preconditions necessary for a sustainable settlement of
hostilities. Conversely, intervention by outside parties such as NGOs and multilateral organisations are criticized for
preventing the transformation of war into peace by freezing the conflict and prolonging the state of hostility
indefinitely. While this approach to conflict resolution is very different from that of Zartman and Bercovitch and is
rarely upheld within the field of conflict resolution, it is nevertheless representative of a widespread yet mistaken belief
in the transformative potential of war.
Conflict Resolution Theory 2: Conflict Resolution
The second theory is the Conflict Resolution approach which covers a wide range of perspectives.
A core assumption of this theory is that conflicts are often based on miscommunication and
misunderstanding and that if an outside actor acts as a mediator by facilitating exchanges of views,
tensions will de-escalate. The role of third parties is to facilitate dialogue and to give the full
ownership of the peace process to the conflict actors like a midwife who assists with the delivery
of a baby. Ultimately, it is the conflict actors who do the work and who take responsibility for their
future. While this may be of limited effect in many cases, it has the strength of going at the speed
1
It should be noted that in the longer term, conflicts that ended with a victory of one of the
belligerents are more likely to recur (42% of cases) than conflicts that ended with a peace
agreement (36%) or a cease-fire (34%).
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that conflict actors can bear. There is no rushing or pushing or pressuring. It is supposed to be a
genuine process that builds a stable and long-term commitment to a peaceful future.
While Conflict Management deals primarily with violent behaviour (B) corner - Conflict Resolution
deals with both A and B, the behaviour of conflict actors as well as their ideology, worldviews, etc.
As such, it is not only security-oriented but it is also process-oriented since it builds trust and
communication channels. Track II diplomacy and work with the middle leadership are the preferred
techniques used to achieve the needed changes in behaviour and attitudes. A major strength of this
approach is that it is very creative regarding communication and trainings and that a very wide
variety of tools and techniques have been developed. A key aspect of this theory is that conflicts
can end with a win-win situation whereby both parties are better off.
BOX 26 | CASE STUDY: CONFLICT RESOLUTION THE OSLO PROCESS
One famous example of track two diplomacy efforts tackling mainly the behavioural and attitudinal dimensions of
violent conflict, are the Norwegian sponsored talks between Israelis and Palestinians better known as Oslo Process.
The non-governmental research organization, the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Sciences, facilitated
discussions between non-official, yet important members of both societies. The success of this effort led to its
evolution into a forum for secret negotiations. It was only then that representatives with official negotiation
mandates joined the group. The resulting 1993 Oslo Peace Accord intentionally left out most of the critical issues at
stake, such of the right to return for the Palestinian refugees or the status of Jerusalem. Overall, this process was
designed to improve possibilities for negotiation on the underlying conflict issues by developing confidence and
demonstrating potential concrete benefits of bi-communal cooperation. The accord aimed at changing conflict
attitudes (A), such as hatred and distrust, by including mutual recognition in the series of agreements. This
recognition was expressed by Israel agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian self-government in parts of the
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The PLO on the other side recognized Israel's right to exist and renounced its intent to
attack and destroy that state.
In terms of changing the behaviour of the conflicting parties (B), it was hoped that the accord could lead to a period
of relative stability and decreasing violence as it included the renunciation of the use of force. The accord for instance
had foreseen a Joint Liaison Committee for the settlement of disputes arising from the implementation of the
agreement.
The logic behind tackling the A and B corners first, was the idea that by changing attitudes and behaviour the
prospects for arriving at a political deal including the harder conflict issues (C corner) could be improved. History
however took another path and large-scale violence broke out again. This is mainly due to the inability to reach an
accord on the key subjects of conflict.
Hglund & Kovacs (2012); MEDEA (2012)

Conflict Resolution Theory 3: Conflict Transformation
The third is that of Conflict Transformation. This approach is very similar to that of Conflict
Resolution but it puts greater emphasis on the transformative dimension of conflict. According to
proponents of this theory such as Johan Galtung, conflict is not a problem but a potential source of
positive change and creativity. As such, the aim is not to end the conflict but to facilitate the
expression of its transformative potential while diminishing its violent and destructive facets. What is
needed is to transform the destructiveness into construction by changing the conflict relations
between the different actors. If a society experiences a massacre, you must identify the factors that
enabled this type of violence in order to transform them. The forces that fuelled violence must be
redirected in a peaceful and creative direction. Conflict transformation is about moving a conflict
from the battlefield to the courtroom whereby relations between conflict actors are framed in a non-
destructive framework.
While the Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution were respectively focusing on the
diplomatic tracks 1 and 2, this approach is multi-track and focuses on all three levels. All forces of a
society must be harnessed to transform conflict relations. Likewise, the objective will be to transform
all three angles of the triangles, A, B, and C. As such, it is security-oriented (B), process-oriented
(A), as well as issue-oriented (C), by dealing with the core issues and roots of the dispute. Being
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more comprehensive, more holistic and more ambitious than the precedent theories, Conflict
Transformation is often criticized for being too idealistic. Indeed, how could conflict transformation
stop a genocide from unfolding?
BOX 27 | JOHAN GALTUNG ON CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
Conflicts are generally not solved, resolved or dissolved, parties, goals and incompatibilities (issues) are usually still
there. To think we have the conflict completely behind us may be a major error.
However, through conflict transformation, the conflict as it was recedes into the background. Conflict
transformation is like leaving the hospital; not the same as a clean bill of health. The prognosis is that real health will
come about as the result of Self acting as his/her own health worker
The goal of conflict transformation is peace; the capacity to handle conflict creatively and nonviolently
The goal is not any final solution, but to transform the conflict and build the capacity for the parties themselves to
hand conflicts nonviolently and creatively.
Galtung (2000)
BOX 28 | CASE STUDY: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN KOSOVO
Since war in Kosovo ended with the signing of the Military Technical Agreement in 1999, a transformation of the
conflict is taking place, involving conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts to address security issues, attitudes and
conflict causes (A), (B) and (C) corners.
Track I: In July 2006 the first round of direct talks on Kosovos status took place, observed by the Contact Group, EU
and NATO, under the auspices of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. In 2007, the Contact Groups Troika - the EU, U.S.
and Russia started a new round of negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, which ended without a compromise
status settlement. In 2011 a dialogue started between Serbia and Kosovo facilitated by the EU with the aim to
promote cooperation on issues unrelated to the status of Kosovo, such as freedom of movement, recognition of
diplomas or trade.
Track II: Princeton Universitys Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) organised a conference in 2000 in Skopyje on
Albanians as Majorities and Minorities: A Regional Dialogue, which was the first direct meeting between the
Kosovo-Albanian leadership and members of the new Serbian government. During the same year, the Kosova Action
for Civic Initiatives (KACI) organised an in-depth discussion on the rights of Serbs. The United States Institute for
Peace (USIP) invited all relevant Kosovo-Albanian and Serb political and community leaders in Virginia, where they
adopted a Pact Against Violence concerning topics such as elections, media, security or refugee return. Since 2008
a Joint Programme "EU/Council of Europe Support to the Promotion of Cultural Diversity in Kosovo is being
implemented, aimed at increasing cultural heritage rehabilitation activities with all relevant institutions, using
cultural heritage as a tool for reconciliation and dialogue between communities.
Track III: A consortium of NGOs including the forum Civil Peace Service is running an interethnic youth centre in
Dragash, which was founded in 2000 by the Balkan Peace Team (Germany/Netherlands). Pax Christi
(Flanders/Netherlands) and the forum Civil Peace Service oversee a peacebuilding program for communities in
Kosovo, where they compare and contrast experiences from Kosovo and Northern Ireland. Partners for Democratic
Change focuses on building democracy at the local level through community mediation for family and social disputes.
Bol Ma! (Albanian, Enough) was the first Kosovo-wide Albanian public-awareness campaign for nonviolence.
Efforts for conflict resolution in Kosovo on three tracks are part of a larger process of conflict transformation, which
also addresses all corners of the conflict triangle.
Process-oriented (A): Attitudes are being influenced through continuous track-1-dialogue facilitated by the EU, but
also (interethnic) dialogue and reconciliation related activities on the Track II and III levels. Dialogue opens the
deadlock in the relationship between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, direct interaction helps them to transform the
negative perception of each other, to re-build mutual respect and trust and to develop cooperative attitudes.
Security-oriented (B): In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1244, the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) is in
charge of establishing and maintaining a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order. KFOR also
monitors, verifies and when necessary, enforces compliance with the conditions of the Military Technical Agreement
and the disarmament as well as transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The European Union Rule of
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Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo investigates, prosecutes and adjudicates cases of war crimes, terrorism and organised
crime. It also monitors and advises to develop and strengthen a multi-ethnic police.
Issue-oriented (C): The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is supporting democratisation
and institution building while the EU is assisting in economic development activities. During the EU-facilitated
dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade both parties achieved agreement on a variety of issues but the main
contentious issue Kosovos political status remains unresolved.
Council of Europe (2012); de Vrieze (2002); UNGA (2010); UNOSEK (2006)
4. Theories of Change in Conflict Resolution
All attempts to intervene in a conflict and to resolve hostilities between parties are based on a set of
assumptions about the causes of the conflict, the actors, the dynamics, and the factors that impede
the establishment of peaceful relations. That is, all conflict resolution projects are based on theories
of change that are going to shape and frame intervention (Weiss 1998). These theories of change
are closely linked to conflict theories and are based on four components:
1) Beliefs about the underlying root causes of the conflict, that is, its source;
2) A set of assumptions about the interconnections between conflict causes, that is, a causal
path;
3) A set of beliefs regarding the conditions necessary to the transformation of these conflict
causes either in the direction of escalation or de-escalation;
4) Beliefs about what type of strategic and programmatic decisions will lead to the creation of
the adequate condition for the transformation of the conflict (Ibid.).
These four components are often implicit and taken-for-granted by peace workers. Overall theories
of change are of the type: We believe that by doing action X, we will produce result Y, which will
bring us closer to conditions favourable to peace. The causal pathways of theories of change may
put much emphasis on the need to address the structural roots of violence while others prefer to
emphasise the need to deal with misperception, stereotypes and poor communication.
Despite their central role in the success of conflict resolution efforts, theories of change are rarely
articulated during the planning phase of the project. Project participants remain mostly unconscious
of their importance, and lack the reflexivity necessary to develop appropriate intervention adapted to
a complex and ever-changing environment. Certain theories of change are widely used to resolve
conflicts and to build peace in post-conflict societies. In a recent report on Guidance on Evaluating
Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, the OECD (2008: 82-84) provides a useful table on
theories of change:
TABLE 6 | THEORIES OF CHANGE

Theory of change Examples of methods
Individual change: If we transform the Individual change through training, personal
consciousness, attitudes, behaviours and skills of transformation or consciousnessraising workshops or
many individuals, we will create a critical mass of processes; dialogues and encounter groups; trauma
people who will advocate peace effectively. healing.
Healthy relationships and connections: Strong Processes of intergroup dialogue; networking;

relationships are a necessary ingredient for relationshipbuilding processes; joint efforts and
peacebuilding. If we can break down isolation, practical programmes on substantive problems.
polarisation, division, prejudice and stereotypes
between/among groups, we will enable progress on
key issues.
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Withdrawal of the resources for war: Wars require Campaigns aimed at cutting off funds/national
vast amounts of material (weapons, supplies, budgets for war; conscientious objection and/or
transport, etc.) and human capital. If we can resistance to military service; international arms
interrupt the supply of people and goods to the war control; arms (and other) embargoes and boycotts.
making system, it will collapse and peace will
become possible.
Reduction of violence: If we reduce the levels of Ceasefires; creation of zones of peace;

violence perpetrated by combatants and/or their withdrawal/retreat from direct engagement;
representatives, we will increase the chances of introduction of peacekeeping forces/interposition;
bringing security and peace. observation missions; accompaniment efforts;
promotion of nonviolent methods for achieving
political/social/economic ends; reform of security
sector institutions (military, police, justice
system/courts, prisons).
Social justice: If we address the underlying issues of Longterm campaigns for social and structural
injustice, oppression/exploitation, threats to identity change; truth and reconciliation processes; changes
and security, and peoples sense of in social institutions, laws, regulations, and economic
injury/victimisation, it will reduce the drivers of systems.
conflict and open up space for peace.
Good governance: Peace is secured by establishing New constitutional and governance

stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee arrangements/entities; powersharing structures;
democracy, equity, justice, and fair allocation of development of human rights, rule of law, anti
resources. corruption; establishment of democratic/equitable
economic structures; economic development;
democratisation; elections and election monitoring;
increased participation and access to decision
making.
Political elites: If we change the political calculus Raise the costs and reduce the benefits for political
and perception of interests of key political (and elites of continuing war and increase the incentives
other) leaders, they will take the necessary steps to for peace; engage active and influential
bring peace. constituencies in favour of peace; withdraw
international support/funding for warring parties.
Grassroots mobilisation: When the people lead, the Mobilise grassroots groups to either oppose war or to
leaders will follow. If we mobilise enough opposition advocate positive action; use of the media; nonviolent
to war, political leaders will be forced to bring peace. direct action campaigns; education/mobilisation effort;
organising advocacy groups; dramatic/public events
to raise consciousness.
Peace agreements/accords: Some form of political Official negotiations among representatives of key
settlement is a prerequisite to peace we must parties; Track 1 and Track II dialogues among
support a negotiation process among key parties to influential persons; civil society dialogues in support
the conflict and violence. of negotiations.
Economic action: People make personal decisions, Use of government or financial institutions to change
and decision makers make policy decisions based supply and demand dynamics; control incentive and
on a system of rewards/incentives and reward systems; boycotts and embargoes.
punishment/sanctions that are essentially economic
in nature. If we can change the economies
associated with warmaking, we can bring peace.
Public attitudes: War and violence are partly TV and radio programmes that promote tolerance;
motivated by prejudice, misperceptions, and modelling tolerant behaviour; symbolic acts of
intolerance of difference. We can promote peace by solidarity/unity; dialogue among groups in conflict,
using the media (television and radio) to change with subsequent publicity.
public attitudes and build greater tolerance in
society.
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Transitional justice: Societies that have experienced Truth and reconciliation commissions; criminal
deep trauma and social dislocation need a process prosecutions and war crimes tribunals; reparations;
for handling grievances, identifying what happened, community reconciliation processes; traditional rites
and holding perpetrators accountable. Addressing and ceremonies; institutional reforms.
these issues will enable people to move on to
reconstruct a peaceful and prosperous society.
Community reintegration: If we enable displaced Negotiation and problem solving to enable returns;
people (IDPs/refugees) to return to their homes and intergroup dialogue; excombatantcommunity
live in relative harmony with their neighbours, we will engagement; processes for handling land claims;
contribute to security and economic recovery. trauma healing.
Culture of peace: If we transform cultural and Peace education; poverty eradication; reduction of
societal norms, values and behaviours to reject social inequalities; promotion of human rights;
violence, support dialogue and negotiation, and ensuring gender equality; fostering democratic
address the fundamental causes of the conflict, we participation; advancing tolerance; enhancing the free
can develop the longterm conditions for peace. flow of information/knowledge; reducing the
production of and traffic in arms.
Assumptions and beliefs which underlie all conflict resolution efforts may not be entirely right. The
potential implications of misguided or incomplete theories of change are important since a bad
project design may lead to the escalation of the conflict. Conflict resolution may become counter-
productive and impede relationship-building instead of fostering trust and cooperation. Therefore, it
is important that peace workers reflect explicitly on the theories of change on which their projects
rely, as well as on the causal pathways through which they expect to reach their objectives.
BOX 29 | THEORY OF CHANGE THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS
Over the last few decades, problem-solving workshops that focused on inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue have
developed quickly as a way to facilitate communication across the conflict lines. The theory of change that underpins
most Track II workshops of this type is that contact increases the likelihood of building peaceful and sustainable
relations. As Daniel Barenboim explains, [a]ny kind of contact between two sides can only be positive, because
anyone who wants to have contact is inevitably preoccupied with the future (Schulz 2008). Barenboim and Edward
Said organised workshops to bring young Israelis and Palestinians together. This type of people-to-people diplomacy,
from the bottom up, relies on the assumption that stereotypes and the us/ them dichotomy can be broken down
through education. In place of hatred and suspicion, trust and cooperation can be built.
The contact theory of change, also known as contact hypothesis, holds that when conflict parties enter some sort of
communication exchange in non-competitive and largely symmetrical power relations, they can learn about each
other and develop relations that are not based on the usual conflict pattern. The organisation of joint activities of an
interactive nature and with a team of mediators/facilitators can allow for relationship building, cooperation and the
questioning of stereotypes and beliefs about the enemy. There is a process of re-humanisation of the other that may
result in the realisation that their destinies are profoundly interconnected. But is this contact hypothesis based on
hard evidence? Is simple contact the solution or should the encounters take place in specific conditions?
Researchers have found that the contact hypothesis must be qualified. In the case of the Middle East, Atieh et al.
listed possible reasons behind the failure of some such educational programmes (2005).
Some of them failed to bring together large sections of society;

Some ignored the socio-economic inequalities between participants;
Some were focused on the present at the expense of reflection on past traumas
Some did not challenge the assumptions that participants held about the group to which others belonged.
In a recent article, Michael Schulz explains that the causal pathway assumed by the contact hypothesis is far from
straight-forward but is instead composed of many steps which involve risks that can impede relationship building
(Schulz 2008: 46). While his study partially confirms the hypothesis, it also highlights potential short-comings.
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BOX 30 |CASE STUDY - THEORY OF CHANGE IN GRASSROOTS CONFLICT PREVENTION IN LIBERIA:
In the wake of the 14year civil war in Liberia, a large international NGO received donor funding to develop
Community Peace Councils (CPCs), a communitybased mechanism for resolving a range of disputes, with an
explicitly interethnic approach. The CPCs were designed to promote greater democratic participation through
leadership development. The evaluation team first identified underlying theories of change and programme
assumptions (derived mainly from discussions with local and international staff members):
Theories of change for the Community Peace Councils:
Theory #1: By establishing a new communitylevel mechanism for handling a range of dispute types, we will
contribute to keeping the peace and avoiding incidents that have the potential for escalating into serious
violence.
Theory #2: By creating inclusive structures for community problem solving, we can improve communication,
respect, and productive interactions among subgroups in the community, and improve the access of
disenfranchised groups to decision making.
Theory #3: By creating a new leadership group infused with democratic concepts and provided with critical skills,
we can foster more effective and responsive leadership.
The evaluation team then discussed whether and how these theories of change were appropriate for the situation in
Liberia, and how they were playing out in the programme. To begin, the team conducted an updated conflict
analysis, based on interviews and focus groups with a wide range of people in the communities themselves. The
team then examined whether the programme was having the effects envisioned in the theory of change. For
example, the team examined what kinds of conflicts the CPCs handled, and whether those conflicts had the
potential for escalating and inciting widespread violence. If they did, then the CPCs would directly contribute to
stopping a key factor in violent conflict. If, however, those conflicts were unconnected to the driving factors of the
conflict or the local level conflict handling mechanisms were not able to address the types of conflict most likely to
escalate, then the CPCs would make little or no contribution to Peace Writ Large.
The evaluation team found that the CPCs were, for the most part, not handling the most serious and volatile
disputes, which concerned land issues. The team then explored whether this was due to a failure in programme
implementation, or, alternatively, a theory of change that was incomplete or inaccurate. The main conclusion was
that, while the CPCs were set up and trained well, as communities were repopulated and traditional leadership
patterns were reestablished, the CPCs were mostly excluded from handling land issues. At the same time, the hope
(and theory) regarding alternative leadership models proved unfounded, as traditional leaders gained control over
the CPCs or used them to address issues they preferred that someone else deal with. The evaluation recommended
that the agency work to expand the mandate and capability of the CPCs for handling land disputes, by connecting
them to land commissions and other emerging government structures. It should also be said that the CPCs did
represent a useful developmental advance, even if they were unable to fulfil, as completely as hoped, a contribution
to Peace Writ Large.
OECD 2008: 79
Conceptual tools in conflict resolution:

o Tool 1: the ABC Triangle yields important insights regarding the key elements that
must be taken into account to understand and then resolve a conflict. It points to
the role played by attitudes, behaviour and the contradiction;
o Tool 2: the graph of conflict dynamics separates the conflict into three phases:
before violence, during violence and after violence. It highlights the importance of
using conflict resolution methods that are adapted to the current phase of the
conflict and to the current level of violence;
o Tool 3: the pyramid of actors divides conflict actors into three categories according
to their visibility and power: the top leadership, the middle leadership and the
people. It emphasises the importance of dealing with conflict issues holistically from
the official level to the grassroots level.
Conflict resolution theories:
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o Conflict Settlement and Conflict Management: Focus on Track I diplomacy by

acting on overt behaviour and direct violence. It is security-oriented and
acknowledges the role played by military intervention for conflict resolution;
o Conflict Resolution: Focus on diplomatic Track I and II by acting on overt behaviour
and direct violence as well as on attitudes. It is security-oriented and process-
oriented and emphasises the importance of facilitating communication to resolve
conflicts;
o Conflict Transformation: Multi-track approach addressing behaviour, attitudes as
well as the contradiction itself. It is security-oriented, process-oriented and issue-
oriented. It emphasises the constructive and transformative aspect of conflict.
Theories of change are based on four components:
o Beliefs about the underlying root causes of the conflict;
o A set of assumptions about the interconnections between conflict causes;
o A set of beliefs regarding the conditions necessary to the transformation of these
conflict
causes either in the direction of escalation or de-escalation;
o Beliefs about what type of strategic and programmatic decisions will lead to the
creation of
the adequate condition for the transformation of the conflict.
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Module guide
Methods in conflict resolution
UNITAR
During peace operations and more generally in conflict resolution, United Nations staff may be required to
engage with government officials, armed groups or any other actors to fulfill their mandate. In particular,
they may have to secure the cooperation of a conflict party through negotiations or mediation in order to
reach an agreement that will restore international peace and security. This module describes the main
methods used by the United Nations and other actors to resolve conflict. In particular, it introduces three
conflict resolution methods: negotiation, mediation and humanitarian negotiation. It provides illustrative
examples and tips to conduct successful negotiations and mediation. The module requires participants to
prepare a conflict resolution effort adapted to address their case study.
Describe the main steps and elements of negotiation, mediation or humanitarian negotiation;
Outline a strategy enabling the implementation of mediation, negotiation or humanitarian
negotiation;
Develop possible solutions for mediation or negotiation processes in a specific conflict;
Formulate lessons learned and best practices of mediation, negotiation or humanitarian
negotiation.
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Organization
available.
Module three: Methods in Conflict Resolution

Weeks three and four
Open Close
Lesson Lesson 6: Negotiation Day 1 Day 14
Lesson 7: Mediation Day 1 Day 14
Lesson 8: Humanitarian Negotiation Day 1 Day 14
Activity 3a: Preparing for Negotiation and Mediation Day 1 Day 14
Activity 3b: Generating Solutions to Resolve a Conflict Day 1 Day 14
Forum Forum 3a: Challenges in the Preparation of Negotiation and Mediation Day 1 Day 14
Forum 3b: Challenges in the Generation of Solutions to Conflicts Day 1 Day 14
Lessons
Lesson 6: Negotiation
The purpose of this lesson is to define negotiation and to introduce the main approaches used in
negotiations, namely, positional negotiation and interest-based negotiation. The characteristics of
each approach are outlined and their respective strengths and weaknesses are analysed. The
lesson also explores ways to reach a win-win solution whereby all parties are satisfied with the
outcome of the negotiation process. Also, the main stages of the negotiation process are listed
and described from pre-negotiations to the ratification and implementation of an agreement.
Lesson 7: Mediation
The objective of this lesson is to explore the characteristics of a mediation process including the
different approaches that can be used, the different steps of a mediation process and the role that
mediators may wish to play to resolve a conflict. The technique of re-framing is also explored as a
tool to enable conflict parties to move forward towards the resolution of the conflict. The problem
of inclusivity in mediation is discussed and the overall strengths and weaknesses of mediation as
a method to resolve conflicts are analysed.
Lesson 8: Humanitarian Negotiation

The purpose of this lesson is to define humanitarian negotiations as well as their main
characteristics. Usually, humanitarian negotiations are conducted by humanitarian actors to
achieve humanitarian objectives with conflict actors in countries affected by conflict. As such, they
differ from other types of negotiations and specific strategies must be used. In this context, the
lesson introduces the humanitarian levers that negotiators can use to reach a settlement. Also,
the potential negative implications of humanitarian negotiations are considered.
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Activity
Activity 3a: Preparing for Negotiation and Mediation

Select a detailed and specific approach to resolve a conflict of your choice;

Generate realistic suggestions regarding the venue, timing and secrecy of the process;
Outline the objectives to be reached to resolve the conflict.
Activity 3b: Generating Solutions to Resolve a Conflict

The aim of this activity is to design possible solutions to resolve a conflict of your choice. This will
enable you to draw on all the knowledge and insights gathered so far to come up with alternatives
to violence. In particular, the activity requires you to:
Outline the positions, interests and needs of the lead actors in a conflict of your choice;
Re-frame the conflict to enable the mediation or negotiation to move forward;
Generate realistic solutions to resolve the conflict.
Social activities
Discussion Forum 3a: Challenges in the Preparation of Negotiation and Mediation

requires you to:
Create a post with at least five bullet points where you briefly discuss the main challenges
you faced when preparing negotiation or mediation (Please refer to the User Guide for
detailed information on how to use forums).
Draw between two and five Lessons Learned to take the peace process forward in your case
study. Compare your input with those of other participants and develop joint Lessons
Learned.
Discussion Forum 3b: Challenges in the Preparation of Negotiation and Mediation

requires you to:
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you faced when generating solutions;
Learned;
Support Forum
where to make queries, clarify doubts and reflect on specific issues or share ideas/experiences
with other participants.
Optional activities
Optional activity 3a: Techniques of communication: I statements

The optional activity on I statements does provide you with the possibility to reflect and practice
your communication habits. The activity aims at studying a way of expressing feelings, beliefs
and values during a negotiation process without putting the listener on the defensive.
Optional activity 3b: Mirroring

The optional activity on Mirroring is based on a training of active listening. It aims at building an
understanding for the importance of well-developed listening skills during a process of mediation
or negotiation.
Optional activity 3c: Questioning

The aim of this optional activity is to train your skills of effective questioning. The optional activity
provides you with guidelines of when to use which type of questions in order to get the
information needed. Based on field scenarios you have the opportunity to use the acquired skills.
Resources
tools;
Use the Support Forum to make queries, clarify doubts or share ideas/experiences with
other participants.
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Activity Checklist
Use the activity checklist below as an organizer. Plan for all the activities you have to do in this module, and
follow up on activities you have started but are still to complete.

Date Status
Lesson Lesson 6: Negotiation
Lesson 7: Mediation
Forum Forum 3a: Challenges in the Preparation of Negotiation and Mediation
Forum 3b: Challenges in the Generation of Solutions to Conflicts
Support Forum
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Diplomatic Tracks in Conflict Resolution
Narrative Module 2 |

Conflict Resolution
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MODULE 2 |
The module outlines the various diplomatic tracks that can be used to resolve conflicts. It explores the
strengths and weaknesses of each track and provides illustrative examples. The concept of multi-track
diplomacy is also introduced.
Describe the main elements of the three diplomatic tracks;

Select suitable diplomatic tracks to address a specific conflict;
Compare the strengths and weaknesses of official, unofficial and grass-roots diplomatic initiatives.
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LESSON 4 |
Track I Diplomacy
LESSON OUTLINE:
1. Track I Diplomacy
2. Various Types of Track I Diplomacy
3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Track I Diplomacy
Define Track I diplomacy;

Outline various types of Track I diplomatic activities used to resolve conflicts;
Identify the strengths and weaknesses of Track I diplomacy.
1. Track I Diplomacy
All over the world, diplomacy, and more specifically conflict management and conflict resolution, may be
conducted through three different diplomatic tracks: Track I, Track II and Track III diplomacy.
Track I diplomacy focuses on official conflict resolution between the top leaders and representatives of the
states in conflict. Recalling the pyramid of actors introduced previously, this corresponds to conflict resolution
at the very tip of the pyramid and it does not include the lower echelons of the middle leadership and civil
society.
Said et al. have defined Track I diplomacy as "a process whereby

BOX 3 | DEFINITION OF TRACK I DIPLOMACY
communications from one government go directly to the
decision-making apparatus of another (1995). This definition is "a process whereby communications from
very broad and does include official representation through one government go directly to the decision-
embassies and consulates, and personal relations between making apparatus of another
state rulers. In fact, the normal diplomatic channels are a core Said et al. (1995)
element of Track I conflict resolution. This type of diplomacy is
conducted by civil servants and selected officials who will act as representatives of state interests with the aim
of interacting with other representatives belonging to other states. These officials may be monarchs,
presidents, prime ministers, ministers, diplomats and ambassadors, amongst others.
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FIGURE 1 | TRACK I DIPLOMACY
Historically, this approach to international relations has dominated the scene. Ever since territorial political
entities (i.e., kingdoms, states, etc.) were established as the universal form of organization around the world,
Track I diplomacy has been used to manage relations between rulers. Throughout history, there has been
countless examples, especially in Europe, of such diplomatic practices since monarchs and princes have
communicated with their rivals through official diplomatic channels. Congresses were established at the end of
major wars to draw settlements and to agree on the terms of the peace. The peace of Westphalia is one of the
most well-known in international circles since it put an end to the supreme authority of the Church and paved
the way for the rise of nation-states as the highest
authority (Clark 2005). Nowadays, Track I diplomacy is BOX 4 | TRACK I DIPLOMACY IN THE UN CHARTER
the most thoroughly institutionalised form of parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
international conflict resolution and its many tools are likely to endanger the maintenance of international
enshrined within the very foundation of the international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution
community. Article 33 of the UN Charter states that the by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, of their choice.
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial Article 33 (1995)
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
or other peaceful means of their choice.
FIGURE 2 | TRACK I DIPLOMACY AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
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In this example, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are meeting formally in an
official multilateral setting. It is still Track I diplomacy but it is taking place within an international organization,
within a multilateral framework to simple bilateral relations. Similar official multilateral settings are found at
the African Union, the European Union, the World Bank, etc. Within the United Nations, it is important to
mention that there is a lot more than Track I diplomacy being carried out since NGOs and civil society
representatives are also included within the work of the organization through ECOSOC.
Track I diplomacy may have numerous styles and purposes. It can be used coercively or non-coercively.
Examples of coercive diplomacy include sanctions, intimidation, and threats of sanctions. In the case of the
Iranian nuclear programme, Track I diplomacy has been used to open communication channels as well as to
keep relationships strong between Iran and different actors of the international community (the UN, the IAEA,
powerful states). The system of representation (embassies, membership in international organisations, etc.)
has enabled the exchange of information between representatives of states. But Track I diplomacy has also
been used as a threat and as a source of intimidation to influence the behaviour of the Iranian government.
The potential threat of the nuclear programme was met with a counter-threats and then by sanctions. The
Islamic Republic was at first given ultimatums to communicate information, then to organize visits and controls
of its nuclear facilities and, finally, to stop its programme or put it under international scrutiny. Because of non-
compliance and the impossibility of finding a solution or compromise, sanctions have been put in place.
Because threats and forceful demands were not sufficient, various actors took a series of multilateral and
unilateral actions. Powerful states have restrained their cooperation as well as Irans freedom to use the
international system to its advantage (scientific collaboration, trade, financial flows, boycott of Iranian oil, etc.).
But sanctions have also been taken multilaterally through the UN Security Council. The effectiveness of
sanctions is questionable since historically states have managed to redirect scarce resources to protect their
interest, leading in turn their population to bear the cost of sanctions, embargos, boycotts and restrictions.
BOX 5 | EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAG
The sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in 1990 caused a devastating humanitarian crisis among Iraqs civilian
population. According to Foreign Affairs the sanctions were the longest running, the most comprehensive and the
most controversial in the history of the world body (2004). The financial and trade embargo was originally designed to
force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, to accelerate the Iraqi disarmament and to track and eliminate all weapons of mass
destruction. Combined with the damages from the Gulf War, the sanctions led to severe human suffering, including
hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths among children during the 1990s (Ibid.). It was only with the initiation
of the oil-for-food program, established by the UN in 1995 that Iraq was allowed to sell oil on the world market in
exchange for medicine, food and other items necessary to meet the basic human needs of the population. Besides the
humanitarian cost of the sanctions, the scientific community and practitioners questioned the effectiveness and the
legal basis of the sanctions. While some explain that the sanctions sped up the disarmament process, the record is quite
negative when it comes to the policy goals that were targeted. The initial idea of putting sanctions was to make the
population pressuring their rulers to change policy. If policy does not change, the people are expected to reject the
rulers and rise against them. This has proved to be a simplistic and false model. Politics in Iraq have not worked this
way. To the contrary, the sanctions appear to have strengthened the government, by increasing its economic role and
its symbolic appeal.
Following the failures and unintended consequences of classical sanctions, the concept of smart or targeted
sanctions was developed. The idea was to reduce human suffering by putting restrictions only on targeted leaders,
resources or corporate entities.
The purpose of Track I approaches is to influence and adjust the behaviour of other states in line with
international law or with the interests of stronger states. It may also be a tool to reach a shared agreement.
Here, negotiations on climate change are a good example where it is in the interest of everyone to find a
solution. Persuasion and coercion are used to some extent but it cannot be compared to the approach taken by
the USA and Western states towards Irans nuclear programme. Track I diplomacy does not necessarily have to
take place directly between the interested parties. For example, the USA and Iran ended all diplomatic
relations since 1979. Therefore, they use third parties as mediators by inviting a trusted partner to facilitate
exchanges of views. Likewise, Norway has acted as an intermediary between the USA and the Nepalese
Maoists and Qatar has facilitated communication between the USA and the Taliban. Track I diplomacy differs
from Track II and Track III diplomacy to the extent that it focuses on official communication and interaction and
neglects the role that private citizens, NGOs, business actors, and other non-state groups could play. Of course,
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the boundaries between the three approaches are not water-tight and there are well-known examples of
overlap.
2. Various Types of Track I Diplomacy
Track I diplomacy is very much inherent to international relations and

BOX 6 | EXAMPLES OF TRACK I
shapes relations between states. It constitutes the fabric, or at least the DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES
main threads, of the international community. During times of war or when
relations between states tense up, official diplomacy may be used in a (1) Consultation;
variety of ways to help resolve the dispute. The term Track I diplomacy is (2) Special Envoys;
used in reference to many tools and techniques used by official (3) Good Offices;
governments and amongst these, eight stand out as being of greater
(4) Diplomatic Sanctions;
importance: (1) Consultation, (2) Special Envoys, (3) Good Offices, (4)
Diplomatic Sanctions, (5) Fact-Finding Missions, (6) Arbitration, (7) (5) Fact-Finding Missions;
Negotiation, (8) Mediation. As peace workers, you may wonder why other (6) Arbitration and Adjudication;
activities such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement and war are not (7) Negotiation;
included in the list. Although these initiatives are the product of official (8) Mediation.
diplomacy, they are rarely included in definitions of Track I conflict
resolution.
Consultation
Consultation is defined as procedures facilitating the sharing of FIGURE 3 CONSULTATION|

information and the seeking of advice (Yarn 1999). It is a
technique used by a state to anticipate the reaction of other Party A Party B
states regarding a chosen course of action that may adversely (sharing of information)
affect them. The aim is thus to begin talking about the issue so
as to reach a shared solution. It is thus a tool that can be used to
prevent escalation. Here, the parties meet directly and do not rely on a third party. In this matter, it differs
from mediation or
arbitration.
Special Envoys
Special envoys are often high state representatives with a strong FIGURE 4 | SPECIAL ENVOYS
authority and trust from their state. They are sent to create an
additional communication channel and to show commitment to Party A Party B
resolving a dispute. For example, Pierre Chevalier, a former CONFLICT
Belgian cabinet member was sent as a special envoy of the OSCE
to mediate a dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas
prices. A special envoy - who had the rank of Ambassador - for
Northern Ireland was also sent by the USA to help with the special envoy
peace process. Special envoys have also been sent personally by
the UN Secretary-General to deal with specific issues. There
have been UN special envoys for Kosovo, Darfur and climate
change and new ones are appointed regularly.
BOX 7 | CASE STUDY: KOFI ANNAN IN SYRIA
In March 2012, Kofi Annan was appointed as a UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy to Syria in order to seek a
peaceful solution to the crisis, an end to the killings of civilians, the human rights abuses, and a path towards a political
transition (UN News 2012). In accordance with his mandate Annan put forward a six point peace plan which included
agreements on an immediate ceasefire, free passage of aid, a ban on heavy weaponry, freedom of demonstration and
media and a transition of political power. Due to a lack of coherence among the members of the Security Council and
the absence of serious, purposeful and united international pressure, including from the powers of the region, (Ibid.)
Annan resigned from the mandate, admitting that the plan did not lead to a decrease of violence between the conflict
parties. The UN Secretary General together with the Secretary General of the League of Arab States, Nabil El-Araby,
appointed Lakhdar Brahimi as a successor.
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Good Offices
The concept of good offices is best illustrated within the framework of the United Nations. Indeed, the UN
Secretary-General can use his good offices, that is, his symbolic power and weight, to meet with state leaders
and other actors with a view to facilitating communication and de-escalating tensions. He may also appoint
individuals as special representatives to conduct such actions. More generally, good offices are a procedure to
solve conflict whereby a respected third party acts on his or her own, or by request of other actors, to meet
conflict participants and to get them to move closer to peace. In its more narrow sense, the term may be used
to refer to any third party that offers a space where peace negotiations can be conducted (Yarn 1999).
BOX 8 | CASE STUDY: GOOD OFFICES
Making use of good offices is often part of a strategy of preventive diplomacy. In 1998, Kofi Annan made use of his
good offices when negotiating a settlement of a dispute between the US and Iraq over arms inspections. The weight
and prestige of his office, combined with the threat of the UN Security Council taking action, led Saddam Hussein to
allow the resumption of UN-led arms inspection. But it is not only high level political representatives that are in a
position to offer their service of good offices to the conflicting parties. Offering their good services is a major
component of the Swiss foreign policy. Switzerland often acts as so called protecting power, this means that in the
absence of direct diplomatic relations between two states, a Swiss representative may be stepping in to represent the
countrys interest. This is for example the case in Iran, where Switzerland represents US interests since 1981. Direct
diplomatic relations were cut in consequence of the taking of hostage of 52 US diplomatic staff members. Other
meaningful mandates of Switzerland acting as protecting power include the representation of interests of US in Cuba,
of Great Britain in Argentina and Iran in Egypt.
Fischer (2002); Whitfield (2009)
Diplomatic Sanctions
They are punishments imposed for disobeying and going against FIGURE 5 | DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS
the will of the punisher. In such cases, it is a negative sanction.
Sanctions may also take the form of rewards for adjusting ones Party A / International Community
behaviour to the wishes of the other party. Such sanctions are
positive. The objective is to deter actors from non-compliance (imposition)
and to encourage a certain behaviour. Sanctions may be
unilateral or multilateral as seen in the case of the Iranian nuclear
programme.
Party B
Fact-finding Missions
special envoy
Fact-finding Missions are usually set up to determine the facts regarding a specific controversy or event. It is
essential for most conflict resolution since it is supposed to provide a clearer picture of what happened, with
whom, and how. It provides a timeline and map of the conflict that will hopefully settle doubts and clashing
perceptions. The aim of fact-finding missions is not do develop solutions; it is only to provide a strong factual
foundation so that the peace process may continue. The fact-finders are either chosen by disputants or are
experts mandated by an international organization. Ultimately, it may be a very political instrument that may
interpret the facts using diplomatic language in order to facilitate the peace process. Indeed, the entire
resolution of the conflict may be jeopardized by damning evidences that would put blame on one party and
challenge its participation in the dialogue. Moreover, fact-finding missions may be set up by states themselves
solely as a mean to gain legitimacy. Its conclusions are not neutral or impartial and are used to claim the
innocence of perpetrators. In such cases, fact-finding missions are public relations tools used to show that
crimes are being investigated, thereby providing a positive faade to the world. In some cases, the report
coming out of the mission may be rejected by one or more of the concerned parties. Such was the case of the
Goldstone report regarding the Gaza conflict published in 2009.
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BOX 9 | CASE STUDY: UN FACT-FINDING IN TIMOR LESTE
The importance of fact-finding in conflict resolution has increased since the early 1990s. The Declaration on Fact-
finding adopted in 1991 gives the Secretary-General an enhanced and explicit mandate to carry out continuous
monitoring in order to provide early warning. In addition, in his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali stressed the need for increased fact-finding: "preventive steps must be based on timely and
accurate knowledge of the facts".
In general, fact-finding can be used before, during and after a conflict the latter being the case in Timor Leste. The UN
established an Investigative Commission, which focused on violence carried out in 1999 by the Indonesian National
Armed Forces (Indonesian: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) and pro-Indonesian militias, following East Timors
independence referendum. In its report the commission listed the following patterns of human rights violations and
breaches of humanitarian law: (1) intimidation and terror; (2) killings and massacre; (3) gender Violence; (4)
international staff and journalists targeted by the militia and TNI; (5) destruction of property; (6) displacement of
people; (7) destruction of evidence; (8) Indonesian army and militia involvement; (9) human rights and international
humanitarian law violations.
As a response to these violations, the commission made a number of recommendations, which resulted in the
establishment of special panels for serious crimes and truth commissions.
Dorn (1995); ICG (2011); UNGA (1991); UNGA (2000); UNSC (1992)
Arbitration
Arbitration is a process of conflict resolution whereby parties to a FIGURE 6 | ARBITRATION

conflict ask for an impartial third party to settle the dispute.
Conflict parties provide the arbitrator with evidences and facts and Arbitrator
agree to abide by the decision taken. The arbitrator will then
(adjudication)
adjudicate. While in most cases the parties enter some sort of
agreement to respect the verdict, also called award at the
international level, arbitration can also be non-binding, in which Party A Party B
case it is called advisory arbitration. This method is broadly used in
trade and commerce. But in international relations it has also been
conducted to settle various disputes. Based in The Hague, the Permanent Court of Arbitration is an
special envoy
intergovernmental organization established in 1899 to oversee the arbitration of international conflicts and it
has thus made numerous rulings regarding territorial disputes amongst others. Eritrea and Yemen brought two
cases to the Court regarding territorial sovereignty (1998) and maritime delimitations (1999).
BOX 10 | CASE STUDY: ERITREA VS. ETHIOPIA
The Commission was directed to decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one
Government against the other, and by nationals (including both natural and juridical persons) of one party against the
Government of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party that are (a) related to the conflict
that was the subject of the Framework Agreement, the Modalities for its Implementation and the Cessation of
Hostilities Agreement, and (b) result from violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, or other violations of international law.
BOX 11 | CASE STUDY: THE FRONTIER DISPUTE BETWEEN MALI AND BURKINA FASO (1983-1986)
Similar to arbitration, adjudication is a process of conflict resolution that involves a neutral third party with the
authority to determine a binding settlement. However, adjudication occurs most commonly in the court system and is
usually significantly more formal than arbitration. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague is the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations (UN) and an important body for international dispute settlement. The Courts role is
to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by states and to give advisory opinions on
legal questions referred to it by authorised UN organs and specialised agencies. The most contentious cases the ICJ has
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to deal with are often related to territory and borders, such as in the case of Mali and Burkina Faso.
The dispute between the two states concerned a 100-mile stretch of land in the north-east of Burkina Faso crossed by
the Beli River and rich in natural resources. While Mali based its claim on ethnic grounds, Burkina Faso relied on the
borders inherited from colonial times. In 1974 the border dispute escalated into a war, resulting in the establishment
by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) of a mediation commission which mandated a neutral technical commission
to demarcate the border. Unsatisfied with the work of the commission, both governments sought binding adjudication
before the ICJ in 1983. Even before the court could determine the issue, war broke out again in 1985. As a
consequence, Burkina Faso sought the court to indicate provisional measures to protect the rights of both parties and
to stop the armed conflict which posed a threat to the judicial settlement. The Chamber unanimously ordered:
1. That the governments of Burkina Faso and Mali should refrain from any actions which might aggravate or
extend the dispute;
2. That both governments should abide by the ceasefire instituted in December 1985;
3. That both governments withdraw their armed forces;
4. That the situation which prevailed before the armed conflict should not be modified in regard to the
administration of the disputed area.
Finally, in 1986 the court held that boundary in the disputed area had to correspond to the delimitation of the former
French colonies as of the end of the colonial period. Both Mali and Burkina Faso welcomed the decision and indicated
their willingness to accept it as final and binding.
Burgess (1997); ICJ (1987); Leigh (1987); Naldi (1986); Yarn (1999)
Besides these six concepts, negotiation and mediation are broadly used as part of Track I diplomacy. Because of
their importance for conflict resolution, entire lessons will be devoted to them in the next module.
3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Track I Diplomacy
Being one of the oldest forms of conflict resolution at the international level, official diplomacy has enjoyed
many historical successes and averted a large number of escalating conflicts. However, the record is not
entirely positive since there are also multiple historical examples of its failure to prevent escalation or to
achieve long lasting peace (i.e., the Treaty of Versailles which paved the way for World War II). In the field of
conflict resolution, there is a certain bias against Track I diplomacy since it is often based on state interests and
on the power struggle that characterizes international relations. Furthermore, official diplomacy rejects the
ideals of many peace researchers regarding the possibility of living in a peaceful world where the weak and the
strong can cohabit without violence and oppression. This bias is not totally unfounded.
Track I diplomacy is often criticised for being a competitive arena where states contend for power. In an
anarchical world where states live by the rule of the strongest, official diplomacy represents one tool to
stabilize that system and to further establish the influence of some over others. Track I diplomats are
representatives of their states and are thus bound to representing their state's interests. Such interests may
not be fair or just and may reject any calls for peace and the swift resolution of hostilities. States may benefit
too much from the war (legitimacy, internal stability, unification of the nation, control of land and resources,
etc.) to be interested in settling the dispute - despite the unbearable cost it has on its population. Diplomats
are therefore constrained in their freedom and flexibility and may not be able to go beyond certain red lines.
What would be the point of negotiators considering creative and alternative options when these are not
supported by the head of state? The strong structures of states are both enabling negotiations but also
constraining them. And these structures may also be a source of conflict when used for questionable ends
(human rights abuse, corruption, etc.).
Track I diplomacy is based on the assumption that states are the most important actors in international politics
and should therefore play the main role in negotiations. Not only do states have more power than any
individual but politically speaking, there are no other actors that enjoy such capabilities. States often have vast
resources at their disposal but they are also in most cases representative of their people. As such, the
decisions that they take may be more readily accepted by their people than decisions taken by international
organisations or other states. States are powerful and are already part of a broad communication network
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whereby diplomatic tracks exist for the expression of discontent and the resolution of disputes. This means
that overall, official diplomatic efforts are usually better funded than their unofficial counterparts, but more
importantly, they tend to be supported by more abundant informational and logistical resources and they
possess greater legitimacy - legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, neighbouring states and
their own people.
Official diplomacy may be used by other states to influence the situation in a given country. Historically, this
has been done by offering military or financial support to one of the parties or by withdrawing such support to
tilt the balance of power. As a result, the power relations at the negotiating tables are affected by external
powers whether by creating more symmetry between the negotiating parties or, on the contrary, by increasing
the power asymmetry. Of course, this is not necessarily the case. Third parties or other actors may actually
facilitate the negotiation process for the best of all. An illustrative example is the role played by Nelson
Mandela as a third-party in the resolution of the conflict in Burundi. Likewise, the International Criminal
Tribunal may also be a powerful yet impartial facilitator of official diplomacy since it possesses a clear mandate
and represents more or less the consensual views of the international community.
BOX 12 | POWER POLITICS: RUSSIA AND CHINA AS VETO POWERS IN THE CASE OF SYRIA
A recent example of external powers bringing their diplomatic weight to the table in order to influence the balance of
power between negotiating parties is the continued Chinese and Russian support of the Assad regime in Syria.
Throughout 2012 both countries have taken a strong stand in support of the regime and against international action.
This also included the use of veto power in the UN Security Council to block sanctions against the regime.
Furthermore, Russia continued to supply arms that Syria had contracted to buy. According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), arms trade between the two countries amounted to US$4 billion in
2011. Russia and China consider the maintenance of sovereignty of existing states to be a key principle and thus
used their veto to send a clear statement against regime change.
Track I diplomacy focuses on the top leadership. While this increases the legitimacy of the decisions that are
taken, it may not be adapted to address protracted social conflicts. Indeed, in an increasing number of conflicts
around the world, the pyramid of actors is no longer clear cut. Power and authority are far more diffuse and
fragmented, shared between different groups that enjoy no official status or representation. In Somalia for
example, hierarchical power does not extend from the head of state to the people. Therefore, questions arise
as to who should negotiate and how official tracks can be used for conflict resolution? The situation is made all
the more difficult by the fact that the number of inter-state conflicts is decreasing while the number of civil
wars and intra-state conflicts is increasing. Who has the legitimacy to negotiate in such cases and which
channels of communication can be used? In many conflicts, the state may not want to recognise the official
existence of rebel groups on its territory for fear of fragmentation and a loss of national sovereignty. Faced
with this difficulty whereby one party enjoys international recognition while the other party does not,
diplomatic negotiations have nevertheless taken place. In such cases, it is not uncommon for a third party to
step in to facilitate the process. Otherwise, there is always the possibility of conducting secret negotiations.
Alternatively, the idea of Track 1.5 diplomacy has been developed. With Track I consisting in the official
interaction of state representatives, and Track II consisting of unofficial diplomacy between unofficial
individuals, there is a space left empty for the unofficial interaction of officials. In the case of Northern Ireland,
a Track 1.5 diplomatic initiative was set up with young Irish political leaders because of their greater flexibility
and contact with the people. In the case of Mozambique, the Italian NGO St Egidio served as a facilitator
between two warring parties as part of a successful Track 1.5 diplomatic process. With the approval of all
involved, the NGO helped to reach a shared agreement. Track 1.5 diplomacy is an interesting combination of
various techniques that draw on the strengths of official diplomacy, such as representation and resources, and
the strengths of unofficial diplomacy with greater freedom and flexibility in the interaction.
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BOX 13 | EXAMPLES OF TRACK 1.5 DIPLOMACY
Track 1.5 Mediation

The role of Jimmy Carter in the de-escalation of tensions with North Korea in 1994 illustrates the contribution of
unofficial third parties to conflict resolution between state actors. In this period tensions in the international arena
were increasing, due to suspicions and fears about North Koreas intention to develop a nuclear arsenal. The situation
escalated further when North Korea withdrew its membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
threatened to expel the IAEA's inspectors, as a result of which the United States began pushing for U.N. sanctions.
At this time, President Kim Il Sung invited Jimmy Carter as a representative of The Carter Center to visit North Korea.
Two days of talks led to the halt of North Koreas nuclear programme and to the first dialogue between the United
States and North Korea in 40 years. In subsequent talks the countries reached further agreements in which North Korea
committed itself to neither restart its nuclear reactor nor to reprocess the plant's spent fuel. Moreover, North Korea
stopped the construction of other plants, and all plants were to be exchanged for light-water reactors unsuitable for
the production of weapons-grade materials.
Track 1.5 Workshops

The Geneva based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has become quite well known for successfully bringing together
belligerent parties in severe conflicts all around the world, which also includes engaging with extremist organizations
and other non-state armed groups. Their approach ranges between official Track I diplomacy, as decision makers are
often included in the process and the workshops are outcome oriented. Still, the private nature of the Centre and the
actors attached moves them closer to Track II approaches.
An example of mediation series and consultations combined with workshops designed to bring the parties closer to an
agreement can be found in the case of HD Centres activities in Sudan.
Sudan went through two devastating civil wars in the 20th century - the first lasting from 1955-1972 resulting in major
economic, ethnical and religious tensions between the Muslim Arabs of Northern Sudan and the Christian and animist
population of Southern Sudan. The outbreak of the second civil war (1983-1989) was then a direct consequence of
continuing struggles between the two opponent groups. It was only in 2005 that a comprehensive peace agreement
was signed, which set the timetable for a referendum on the independence of Southern Sudan. Furthermore the
agreement contained components on the development of countrywide democratic governance and the share of oil
revenues. It is the multiplicity of conflict areas and issues that makes the conflict in Sudan probably one of the most
difficult to end. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has been involved in the region of Darfur since 2003 to help
address the humanitarian situation. It is in the same region that the Centre got involved in the facilitation of a series of
workshops that brought together key representatives from two of the main Darfur Opposition Movements - the Sudan
Liberation Movement /Unity (SLM/Unity) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). They were joined by
representatives of several UN agencies. Humanitarian workshops were held in Geneva, Darfur and Kenya between
2008 and 2010, to help improve the humanitarian situation. The workshops focused on key humanitarian issues,
including safe humanitarian access, high-jacking of humanitarian agency vehicles, the protection of civilians and the
rights of of internally displace people (IDPs). One remarkable outcome of this process was the signing of an agreement
between the belligerents, brokered by the HD Centre, on the protection of Children in Darfur.
Carter Center (2012); CHD (2011); Eskandarpour (2011);Taulbee (2003)
Finally, Track I diplomacy has been criticised for failing to systematically deal with the root causes of the
conflict. Many analysts explain that when officials negotiate a settlement, they are not addressing issues of
attitudes, that is, the ideology, worldview, stereotypes or prejudices of the entire populations that are in
conflict. As a result, while direct violence may be over as a result of successful negotiations, the source of the
violence may remain complete. How can two people be at peace when they are still suspicious of one another,
when they still engage in dehumanization, when they still refuse interaction in daily life? Peace agreements
between states may resolve state issues but the reality for peasants and tradesmen may remain the same. How
can peace be in the hearts of all citizens through an official peace agreement? While certain outcomes and
decisions may be taken, the emotional, spiritual and psychological reality of war may still shape the life of a
great majority. This is one of the reasons why Track I diplomacy tends to remain conservative and to
strengthen the oppressive structures at play internationally.
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BOX 14 | STRENGTHS OF TRACK I DIPLOMACY BOX 15 | WEAKNESSES OF TRACK I DIPLOMACY
Long historical record with successes; State-centric power politics;

Binding decisions with large constituency; Might is right;
High international and national legitimacy; Diplomatic protocol may be rigid;
Established and institutionalized; Official line is often polarized;
High capacities and resources; Does not address attitudes (A) corner;
States are powerful and important; Popular stereotypes & enemy images remain;
Follows the national interest; Does not always deal with root causes;
Outcome-oriented. Little space to question the cost of war;
Low trust and mutual understanding.
Track I diplomacy is the most institutionalised and oldest form of international conflict resolution;
Process whereby communication from one government goes directly to another government;
Track I diplomacy can take place within bilateral or multilateral settings;
The main types of Track I diplomatic activities include:
o (1) Consultation;
o (2) Special Envoys;
o (3) Good Offices;
o (4) Diplomatic Sanctions;
o (5) Fact-Finding Missions;
o (6) Arbitration;
o (7) Negotiation;
o (8) Mediation.
The main strengths of Track I diplomacy include:
o A long historical record of successes;
o High decision-making power;
o Decisions are taken for a very large constituency.
o International and often national legitimacy;
o High degree of institutionalization with international web of diplomat, embassies and official
arenas for dialogue;
o Important resources and capabilities;
o Centred on powerful international actors: states;
o Tends to protect national interest.
The main limits of Track I diplomacy include:
o It is the continuation of power politics;
o Based on competitive assumptions with the domination of great powers;
o Negotiators and diplomats follow the interests of their state and the protocol;
o Does not address attitudes, enemy images and root causes of the conflict;
o Lack of recognition of important actors (rebel groups, terrorists, etc.);
o Does not necessarily challenge oppressive structures and structural violence;
o Low trust and little mutual understanding.
Track 1.5 diplomacy is a hybrid form of diplomatic activity that combines elements of Track I and Track II
diplomacy. In particular it may enable the unofficial interaction of state representatives.
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LESSON 4 |
Track II Diplomacy
LESSON OUTLINE:
1. Introduction
2. Track II Diplomacy
3. Various Types of Track II Diplomacy
4. Objectives of Track II Diplomacy
5. Problem-Solving Workshops
6. Strengths and Weaknesses of Track II Diplomacy
Define Track II diplomacy;

Outline various types of Track II diplomatic activities used to resolve conflicts;
Explain the purpose and phases of problem-solving workshops;
Identify the strengths and weaknesses of Track II diplomacy.
1. Introduction
For decades, scholars have tried to develop the best approaches to the resolution of conflicts around the
world. Track I diplomacy became the dominant approach to ensure international peace and security but with
time another type of diplomacy emerged to fill in major gaps unaddressed by official diplomacy. The profound
changes in the international system that enabled greater democratisation of knowledge and information
sharing facilitated the emergence of strong networks of nonofficial peace researchers. In turn, this paved the
way to the emergence of Track II diplomacy to complement official initiatives. The transformation of
international relations away from a purely state-centric system to a more diverse order based on businesses,
NGOs, international organisations and other non-state actors opened a space for private citizens and non-
governmental peace makers to contribute to conflict resolution (Chataway 1998).
Track II diplomacy has since spread and become an integral part of conflict resolution. It has been adopted and
accepted by state actors themselves as a strong complement to official diplomacy. In this context, the objective
of this lesson is to introduce Track II diplomacy in general terms, to study its objectives and to assess its
strengths and weaknesses in more details. In particular, we will look at a variety of Track II projects that have
been carried out throughout the world.
2. Track II Diplomacy
History of Track II Diplomacy
In 1798, when an American private citizen decided to engage in unofficial diplomacy by talking privately with
officials of another country, France in that case, his government introduced a bill condemning his undue
interference in public affairs. The objective of the US government was to stop individuals from engaging in non-
official diplomatic relations with foreign nations because of the harm that this could cause. A heated debate
ensued over the role of private and non-official actors in diplomacy and a large majority of commentators
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condemned the man for his temerity. While Track II diplomacy did not seem to be welcomed at the time, the
transformation of diplomatic relations and of the international order means that the situation is rather
different today even though some countries outlaw Track II activities that run against the official foreign
policy.
The concept of Track II diplomacy was developed by US

BOX 17 | PSYCHOLOGY AND CONFLICT
officials, academics and intellectuals during the Cold
War and the term itself seems to have been coined by [P]sychological factors also contribute to escalation
former US Foreign Service officer Joseph V. Montville in and perpetuation of conflict by creating barriers to
1979, during a conference organized at the Esalen the occurrence and perception of change... when
Institute to encourage unofficial exchanges between psychological barriers can themselves be removed or
American and Soviet citizens (Homans 2011). Two years at least reduced in importance, the contending
later, Montville co-authored an article entitled Foreign parties create new possibilities for negotiations. Rigid
Policy According to Freud in which he defined the main assumptions and postures rooted in past history no
longer bar the way.
elements of Track II diplomacy. The authors (Davidson &
Montville 1981-1982: 153) explained that besides Davidson & Montville (1981-1982: 153)
incompatible interests, psychological factors also
contribute to escalation and perpetuation of conflict by creating barriers to the occurrence and perception of
change. As a result, when psychological barriers can themselves be removed or at least reduced in
importance, the contending parties create new possibilities for negotiations. Rigid assumptions and postures
rooted in past history no longer bar the way (Ibid.). But traditional diplomacy does not enable the removal of
psychological barriers and instead has a tendency to further entrench aggressive attitudes and escalate conflict.
It is for these reasons that the authors suggest that Track II diplomacy could be used as a complement to
address the shortcomings of official diplomacy (Ibid.: 155). In this context, Davidson and Montville (Ibid.) define
Track II diplomacy as unofficial, non-structured interaction. It is always open-minded, often altruistic,
andstrategically optimistic, based on best case analysis. Its underlying assumption is that actual or potential
conflict can be resolved or eased by appealing to common human capabilities to respond to good will and
reasonableness.
Since the 1980s, Track II diplomacy has been further developed, mainstreamed and put into practice to
facilitate the resolution of many conflicts. It played an important role in negotiating the 1993 Oslo Accords as
well as in de-escalating the conflict over North Koreas nuclear program in 1994. More recently, it has been
used in Afghanistan as well as with Iranian citizens over the countrys nuclear ambitions. The approach is now
used by many actors including NGOs, think tanks, humanitarian organisations, former government officials,
academic institutions and it is even sponsored by states (Ramsbotham 2005; Kriesberg 2007).
Definitions of Track II Diplomacy
Nowadays, Track II diplomacy refers to a type of informal BOX 18 | DEFINITION OF TRACK II DIPLOMACY
and unofficial process whereby influential yet unofficial
citizens (retired political and military leaders, scholars, Unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities
journalists, religious or ethnic leaders, social activists) aimed at building relationships and encouraging
engage in a dialogue with a view to building trust, new thinking that can inform the formal process.
confidence and understanding, and ultimately, to resolving Track II activities typically involve influential
the conflict. It focuses on the psychological barriers which academic, religious, and NGO leaders and other
civil society actors who can interact more freely
entrench miscommunication and misperception at the
than high-ranking officials.
conscious and unconscious levels and which facilitate the
onset of a conflict spiral of dehumanisation, fear, mistrust, USIP (2011)
anger and aggressiveness. It can be visually represented by
the following diagram:
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FIGURE 7 | TRACK II DIPLOMACY
Track II diplomacy takes place in an informal, neutral and confidential setting where influential actors may
discuss very sensitive issues with a view to overcoming psychological barriers and hopefully to influencing
policy and decision-makers. In this process, they are accompanied by practitioners and experts who guide the
participants towards a better understanding of the situation and of each others views and beliefs (Kaye
2001).The role of the intermediaries and unofficial mediators is very important. They are not conflict actors but
only experts who can guide conflict actors to transform their relations. They may be officials, judges,
arbitrators, or professional mediators. But more often than not, they are informal and work outside of Track I
diplomatic channels. It should be noted that this divide between the two tracks is becoming increasingly elusive
(Chataway 1998; Fisher 2006).
BOX 19 | TRACK II DIPLOMACY TWO CASE STUDIES
Case Study 1 - Peoples Republic of China

Actors: Peoples Republic of China, Asian neighbors and the United States of America;
Intermediaries: Center for Strategic and International Studies' Pacific Forum, International Institute for
Strategic Studies;
Description: The intermediaries gathered selected Chinese and American defense officials in a non-official
setting following the escalation of the conflicts over the bombing of Chinas Embassy in Serbia (1999) as well
as over the U.S. spy plane crisis on the Chinese island of Hainan. The meetings facilitated communication and
exchanges of views and participated in the de-escalation of the tensions between the two superpowers.
Case Study 2 Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

Actors: Peoples Republic of China, Japan, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, the
Republic of Korea and the United States of America;
Intermediary: National Committee on American Foreign Policy;
Description: Following the stalling of the six-party talks over the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
nuclear ambitions in 2005, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy organized a high-level panel of
former officials and diplomats to keep the communication open though in an unofficial setting.
Adapted from Homans (2011)
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3. Various Types of Track II Diplomacy
Track II diplomacy encompasses a number of different techniques such as interactive conflict resolution,
problem-solving workshops, citizen diplomacy, pre-negotiations, back-channel diplomacy and walks in the
wood (Azar 2002: 23). All these approaches differ in their scope, structure, target audience and characteristics
but they nevertheless share the objective of providing a non-judgmental, non-coercive, safe and confidential
space where participants may share their beliefs, needs, perceptions and fears fruitfully. Free from the official
constraints, they may come up with alternative options for the resolution of the conflict. Ultimately, the
development of mutual understanding and a shift in perceptions and attitudes is central to Track II diplomacy.
Interactive conflict resolution
Interactive conflict resolution is a socio-psychological approach to conflict resolution based on direct

communication between conflict parties. It revolves around a series of problem-solving discussions between
unofficial representatives and facilitated by a skilled intermediary. The objective is to enhance communication,
share information, address barriers to negotiations, create constructive relationships across conflict lines, etc.
Outcomes of interactive conflict resolution can be used as part of pre-negotiations, in parallel to official
negotiations or independently from official negotiations.
Problem-solving workshops
Problem-solving workshops are forums for unofficial conflict representatives to meet, explore the sources of
the conflict and develop possible solutions. They provide unofficial communication channels free from official
diplomatic constraints and away from media attention. Problem-solving workshops are often facilitated by
academics and do not require to engage in negotiations. Instead, they may take the form of joint brainstorming
sessions over key aspects of the conflict.
Citizen Diplomacy
Citizen diplomacy takes place when average citizens, acting as representatives of their country, create
communication channels with their opponent in a view to exchange views, challenge misperception and
transcend conflict lines. It may take the form of direct negotiations or of sporting events, cultural and scientific
exchanges, artistic performances, etc.
BOX 20 | CITIZEN DIPLOMACY
The examples for citizen diplomacy are manifold as even activities which are not labelled as such may fall under this
category. The scope of activities ranges from government-sponsored citizen diplomacy programs to projects conducted
by NGOs, faith-based institutions, businesses or education and youth services.
According to the Institute of International Education citizen diplomacy may consist of the following activities:
- High School/ Youth Exchange Programs

- International Volunteering
- Professional and Leadership Exchanges
- Postsecondary Exchanges (e.g., study abroad, fellowships, post-graduate programs)
Besides these examples of citizen diplomacy in the realm of larger organizational structures, there are also historical
and recent examples of individuals acting as citizen diplomats. During the First World War it was pacifist British and
German women, who made an attempt to overcome the hostilities between the two countries by exchanging letters, by
appealing to the common humanity of womenhood (Patterson 2008: nn) and their dedication to an active search for
an early and just peace settlement. The story somehow repeats when looking at the Israel based Peace Factory, which
in 2012 started the campaign Israel loves Iran to give a clear sign of the population against a possible war against Iran.
The mission of the initiative is promoting peace in the middle east by making connection between people, opening
new communication lines, making people get to know each other and re-humanize people from the other side (Peace
Factory 2012). It is an attempt to spread positive communication in order to break the dominance of hate propaganda.
The variance of citizen diplomacy initiatives is quite broad the idea is that also ordinary people can make a difference.
Bhandari & Belyavina (2011); Patterson (2008); Peace Factory (2012)
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Pre-negotiations
Pre-negotiations are discussions that take place prior to the official negotiations in order to resolve procedural
and technical issues as well as to set up the agenda. They enable negotiators and mediators to prepare ahead
of time and to consider potential avenues to reach an agreement. They also enable conflict parties to initiate a
process of confidence building and to demonstrate their commitment to resolve their differences.
Back-channel diplomacy
Back-channel diplomacy takes place secretly and may be organised in parallel to official or front channel
diplomacy. Back channel diplomacy bypasses and complements Track I diplomacy in order to explore
alternative solutions that differ from the declared positions and interests of the respective parties. Its secret
and private character enables negotiators to communicate in a more informal and open framework.
Walks in the wood
Walks in the wood take place between individual negotiators and their purpose is to provide a confidential
space to explore alternative options away from the other actors taking part in the negotiations. While
agreements reached in this way may not be acceptable to all the other stakeholders, they may nevertheless
lead to confidence-building and even breakthroughs.
BOX 21 | WALKS IN THE WOOD
The idea of walks in the wood stems from an historical example whereby a diplomatic agreement was reached in a
rather unofficial manner. In 1982, Switzerland hosted the negotiations on the demobilization of Intermediate Nuclear
Forces (INF) between the U.S. and the USSR. An informal agreement was reached between the parties as result of the
two main negotiators the American Paul H. Nitze and the Russian Yuli A. Kvitsinsky - leaving the official meeting for a
walk in the countryside of Geneva. The agreement became known as the walks in the wood proposal and is an
example of how interpersonal relations and informal settings can influence the outcomes of negotiation processes.
Academy of Achievement (2008); FAS (2012)
Some of these activities (i.e., pre-negotiations, back-channel diplomacy and walks in the wood) are closely
connected to Track I diplomacy since they are undertaken by officials but in unofficial settings. The other
activities are unofficial and independent from Track I diplomacy and are the focus of this lesson.
4. Objectives of Track II Diplomacy
Track II diplomacy, and more particularly interactive conflict resolution BOX 22 | CONCEPTUAL STAGES OF
and problem-solving workshops, are set up to foster dialogue with a view TRACK II DIPLOMACY
to building trust, confidence and understanding, and ultimately, to
resolving the conflict. But contrary to Track I diplomacy, this unofficial Stage 1: Socialization;
approach is not outcome-oriented (i.e. the settlement of a territorial Stage 2: Filtering;
dispute) but is process-oriented. In other words, de-escalation is achieved Stage 3: Policy Adjustments.
by working on the (A) corner of Galtungs ABC Triangle, such as
Kaye (2007)
relationships, attitudes, worldviews, stereotypes and so on. Changes in
attitudes of the participants will then spread to a broader constituency
and influence the public debate as well as the formal policy-making process. Dalia Dassa Kaye (2007) explains
that in this regard the progress of Track II activities is defined by three conceptual stages that are not always
consecutive: socialization, filtering and policy adjustment.
During the socialization stage, intermediaries encourage influential elites to reflect upon the terms of the
conflict and to reconsider their assumptions and perceptions about the other conflict actors. This stage takes
place during the workshop and within the designated forum. Following this first stage, participants are invited
to translate and disseminate insights gathered in the forums in order to broaden the constituency of individuals
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holding less conflict-prone attitudes. Filtering may influence the public debate and policy-making through the
media, NGOs, academic institutions and think tanks. During this stage, an infrastructure for peace may be
developed whereby like-minded people may form social networks, organisations and pressure groups to
discuss peace, increase popular support for negotiations and legitimize de-escalatory measures (International
Peace Academy 2002). Finally, the last stage is that of policy adjustments whereby changes in attitudes lead to
concrete shifts in the policies of conflict parties. The first stage is critical since if participants do not change
their attitudes, policies of conflict actors will not change. It is therefore important to understand this first stage
in greater details.
Transforming attitudes
The purpose of Track II diplomacy is to change the (A) corner of Galtungs ABC Triangle and to transform the
attitudes of each of the conflict parties towards their opponents. During informal talks, it is common for
participants to question generalisations and stereotypes that they held true about their enemy and hence to
abandon aggressive attitudes that were used for political mobilisation and for the moral-psychological
legitimisation of acts of tremendous violence (International Alert 2007; Waller 2007). Indeed, informal
intermediation, contrary to official diplomacy, tackles the emotional, spiritual and psychological dimensions of
the conflict. It is not only about outcome, it is about taking into account the holistic needs of the human beings
involved in the fighting. When this dimension of the conflict is also addressed, participants can adjust their
perception of the conflict in line with their new understanding of their opponent and new attitudes. In
particular, they may generate greater confidence in the need for official negotiations as well as in the
possibility of resolving differences. Daniel Lieberfeld (2002) explains that the case of South Africa, key
negotiators between the National Party and the ANC had previously participated in Track II diplomacy. This
process of trust-building went hand-in-hand with the transformation of perceptions of conflict actors.
Open constructive communication channels
Track II diplomacy works through the opening and strengthening of creative and non-violent communication
channels. While governments have developed a sophisticated system of representation and dialogue through
embassies, consulates, regional organisations and international organisations, such networks remain mostly
unavailable to citizens, private individuals and unofficial representatives in general. In such a context, Track II
activities greatly contribute to the opening of communication channels to conflict parties that had until then
been unable to meet and communicate with their opponents in a safe environment (Kriesberg 2007). No space
existed for the creation of a shared understanding and the possible resolution of disputes. Moreover, states
that do not officially recognise a conflict party or who do not have official relations may find it useful to use this
type of channels. Examples include meetings between the USA and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO),
Iran or the Taliban. But besides opening new channels, this type of approach also enables actors to go beyond
the restrictions and constraints of diplomatic language to communicate differently. For example, official
negotiations may not be the best place to share life stories, fear and needs and to build empathy. And this is
where informal dialogue can be useful since feelings, concerns and values can be shared freely.
Relationship and confidence building
Track II diplomacy is designed to strengthen relations between conflict parties by fostering mutual
understanding and building trust across conflict divides. Participants meet face-to-face and develop a deeper
understanding of their respective intention, needs and rationale. Shared interests and common goals may
emerge and myths can be separated from reality. At a deeper level, this type of encounters may enable
enemies to recognize their shared humanity and to develop empathy and shared responses to grievances.
Unfortunately, few participants of Track II workshops are able to share this understanding and trust in the
outside world.
Developing new options
During the socialization phase of Track II diplomacy, participants are invited to use the new communication
channels and to build on the new trust in order to discuss alternative options for the resolution of the conflict
(Kriesberg 2007). Cooperative solutions in direct opposition to the aggressiveness of official policies may be
considered and moderate alternatives may be explored. In times of war, the media and politicians are trying to
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mobilize the entire country and the polarization process that follows leads to the marginalization and exclusion
of dissenters as traitors or idealists. In this regard, Track II diplomacy may rehabilitate moderate options and
give them a renewed legitimacy. Lieberfeld gives the example of the Dakar Conference of 1987 which brought
ANC leaders together with intellectuals close to the governing party. The success of this informal encounter
meant that more moderate actors such as Thabo Mbeki (ANC) came out strengthened. It also influenced public
opinion and favoured discussion regarding the participation of the ANC in negotiations (Lieberfeld 2002).
5. Problem-Solving Workshops
Problem-solving workshops are influential BOX 23 | INSIGHTS FROM PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOPS

Track II activities designed to settle disputes,
not necessarily by ensuring that all problems
are solved, but by dealing with perceptions Communication is possible.
and attitudes. The name is thus deceptive Some enemies want peace;
since it goes beyond mere problem-solving Understand positions, fears and needs of enemies;
to include a certain transformative content
Awareness of possible incentives and solutions;
(Ramsbotham et al. 2005). These workshops
are spaces whereby twelve to fifteen Mutual trust and understanding;
carefully chosen unofficial representatives Reconsideration of enemy images and stereotypes;
enter some form of dialogue with a third
party in order to analyse the conflict, its Creation of a potential shared future;
sources and potential solutions. Taking place Peace does not mean chaos, death or the destruction of ones
over a couple of days and up to a week, they identity.
provide a safe and confidential environment
Adapted from Maiese (2003)
where opponents can communicate with
one another without legitimising the other
or affecting the public face of the conflict. Conflict parties are never asked to give up their beliefs, ideologies
and positions and they are not required to find a solution or to make policy adjustments. They are simply
invited to explore the situation from a different and creative point of view.
Problem-solving workshops rarely have a set agenda since this could be interpreted as a form of bias and could
potentially constrain the entire process. Instead, communication is free to enable participants to address issues
that matter or that the feel comfortable to discuss. But in general, such workshops have four phases:
Phase 1: Outline of Respective Positions and Attitudes
Participants take turns to explain their respective positions and views on the conflict to the mediator. Because
conflicts are often heated, this first phase takes place between one party and the mediator rather than as a
direct exchange between conflict parties. This ensures that everyone has a chance to express their views in a
relatively calm and uninterrupted manner. This process may be emotionally and psychologically violent as
traumas and blames are attributed and hurtful comments are made. Many experts argue that this first phase is
essential because telling ones story facilitates further discussions and provides a foundation to consider
alternative options. The present and the future can rarely be discussed without having first a clear idea of the
past. However, a discussion of the past is not sufficient and may create a sense of frustration for participants
who want to move ahead. A deterioration of the relations between conflict parties is not uncommon at this
point.
Phase 2: Discussion of Positions and Attitudes with the Intermediary
The second phase involves discussions of the different accounts of the conflict between conflict actors and the
intermediary. The objective is to clarify important points and to go into more details. At this stage,
intermediaries may present conflict resolution tools and theories to help conflict parties to better understand
the situation as well as the impact of their actions. For example, they may introduce the escalation and de-
escalation curve and show them how propaganda, stereotypes and threats lead to escalation and violence.
Likewise, they may explain how defensive actions and military buildup will lead to an arms race and greater
insecurity. An objective is to move the conflict relation from a win-lose to a win-win approach and to break the
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vicious circle of conflict to enable new forms of non-violent communication to emerge and transcend polarized
worldviews. Intermediaries may also use this opportunity to draw up a list of topics to be discussed in
subsequent sessions.
Phase 3: Direct Communication across Conflict Lines
Participants begin to communicate directly and to collaborate in the exploration of potential solutions. The aim
is not to reach a settlement but to help participants explore the variety of obstacles to peace as well as existing
possibilities for de-escalation. Shared needs and interests are emphasized and stereotypes are debunked. It is
only then that conflict parties can begin to brainstorm over shared solutions. In a majority of cases, attitudes
remain mostly unchanged if not made worse during the first phases of the workshop. But as it progresses,
participants begin tol develop a better understanding despite the continued conflict and opposition. It is rarely
to address all conflict causes in a single workshop and as a result, a series of workshops may be organized to
create continuity in relationships, to strengthen communication, to sustain feelings of trust and to develop
holistic solutions (Kaye 2001).
BOX 24 | CASE STUDY: PROBLEM-SOLVING IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
Herbert C. Kelman and his colleagues from Harvard University organised a continuing workshop with highly influential
Israelis and Palestinians who met regularly between 1990 and 1993. The workshops last session took place just prior
to the conclusion of the Oslo agreement and the overall process is said to have laid the groundwork for the agreement.
The workshop took place in an academic setting facilitated by a panel of social scientists with expertise in international
conflict, group processes and the Middle East. The participants included six Israelis and six Palestinians from various
backgrounds (e.g., parliamentarians, political leaders and activists, journalists, editors, directors of think tanks, and
academics). In addition, they were supposed to be representative of the mainstream of their societies and close to the
center of the political spectrum. The workshop discussions were absolutely private and confidential. The third party,
composed of three or more persons, had a strictly facilitative role and therefore did not propose solutions or
participate in the substantive discussions. Thus, the facilitators were only in charge of creating a propitious
atmosphere, by establishing norms and making occasional interventions that were conducive to open discussions.
The workshop aimed at facilitating analytic and problem-solving interaction between the parties. To achieve this kind
of interaction, the following agenda was agreed:
(1) Discussion of each partys central concerns in the conflict, their fundamental needs and existential fears.
(2) Joint thinking about possible solutions to the conflict or to particular issues that take into consideration the
needs of both sides.
(3) Discussion of the political and psychological constraints within the two societies that could constitute
barriers to negotiation and to the implementation of the discussed solutions.
(4) Joint thinking about ways of overcoming the constraints that have been identified.
In 1991, the official negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians started and also influenced the course of the
workshop since certain participants were appointed to ambassadorial or cabinet positions and to the official
negotiating team of their state.
According to Kelman, the workshop contributed in three ways to the Oslo agreement: (1) through the development of
cadres experienced in communication with the other side and prepared to carry out productive negotiations; (2) the
sharing of information and the formulation of new ideas that provided important substantive inputs into the
negotiations; (3) and the fostering of a political atmosphere that made the parties open to a new relationship.
Kelman (2005)
6. Strengths and Weaknesses of Track II Diplomacy
Track II diplomacy emerged as a complement to Track I diplomacy with the objective of addressing important
gaps in conflict resolution practice. It was designed to bring greater flexibility and confidentiality and to address
deeper conflict issues. Its emphasis on unofficial representatives who do not have the follow the diplomatic
protocol or stick to the official foreign policy of their state has indeed enabled unique exchanges addressing the
attitudes of conflict parties, stereotypes, and enemy images. The original framework within which this type of
diplomacy is conducted may enable the consolidation of trust and mutual understanding as well as the
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consideration of solutions to de-escalate tensions. It has proven useful in building confidence across conflict
lines and in the necessity of an official peace process. However, experiences in Track II diplomacy have also
shown the limits of the unofficial approach.
Track II Diplomatic activities are designed in such a way that it is difficult to assess objectively their success and
impact. Their focus on long-term attitudinal transformation rather than short-term outcomes means that they
rarely produce direct and tangible results; and measuring changes in attitudes is rather difficult, especially in
conflict situations. While is it possible to assess the shifts in attitudes between the beginning and the end of the
workshop, it is much more difficult to assess their impact on policy-makers and on the public debate. This state
of affairs provides ammunition to detractors of the approach (Zartman 2007).
Based on extensive research on Track II diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia, Kaye (2007: xiii)
concludes that Track two has not led to such extensive shifts in security policy, although there are examples of
track two work influencing official thinking and a variety of security initiatives and activities, particularly in
South Asia. Kaye explains that Track II diplomacy never reached its full potential because of obstacles at the
individual, domestic and regional levels.
At the individual level, Track II efforts have been BOX 25 | IMPACT OF TRACK II DIPLOMACY
hampered by the difficulty of finding participants who are
willing to take an active part in the process and who are, [T]rack two regional security dialogues rarely lead
at the same time, in a strong position of influence the to dramatic policy shifts or the resolution of long-
public and policy debates in their society. In many cases, standing conflicts [even though] they have played
participants are staunchly opposed to cooperation and a significant role in shaping the views, attitudes, and
knowledge of elites, both civilian and military, and in
they enter unofficial forums with a counter-productive,
some instances have begun to affect security
aggressive and hostile attitude. Some may use the
policy.
opportunity to build alliances, to learn about each other, Kaye (2007: xi)
to learn about their allies and the weaknesses of their
enemies. If the intermediaries do not manage to transcend the polarization of the conflict actors, Track II
diplomacy can have a negative effect on the conflict. Indeed, interactions in track two dialogues have, in
some cases, led participants to develop views of their adversary that are more rather than less negative. Others
may simply fail to buy in to cooperative security concepts (Kaye 2007: xiii). In other cases, participants have
proved open-minded but their lack of connections to policy-making circles and their limited grassroots
constituency led to little tangible results.
At the domestic level, a major issue is the difficulty of filtering new attitudes into a conflict-ridden society.
People who have lost family members in the conflict and suffered of the violence, displacement and economic
decline are often opposed to cooperative attitudes which are assimilated with a lack of recognition for their
loss as well as a feeling of injustice. Governments may also feel threatened by cooperative attitudes which may
be perceived as signs of weakness and dishonour by their constituency or of submission to the opponent or
powerful states. This is why unofficial dialogues are not widely advertised and publicized. In the past,
participants have been targeted by radical individuals and threats and intimidations made their way into the
workshops themselves. Threats and intimidations may also come from peers or governments. In such a
context, how can new attitudes filter to reach a broader constituency than a dozen workshop participants?
BOX 26 | CHALLENGES OF FILTERING NEW ATTITUDES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Domestic environments make participants cautious about exposing track two ideas to wider audiences. Cooperation
with Israel is still a dangerous position in the region, and Israelis are suspicious of cooperative postures that may signal
weakness. The regional context of a deadlocked Middle East peace process and the bloody and uncertain aftermath of
the Iraq war not to mention enduring rivalries and power imbalances make regional discussions of confidence-
building and cooperative security difficult even in the Gulf context. Ideas supporting regional security cooperation are
still unknown or unpopular among vast segments of the population throughout the Middle East.
Kaye (2007: xv)
Finally, obstacles to Track II diplomacy can result from a regional environment unfavourable to the idea of
cooperation or negotiation. When the official peace process moves forward then changes in attitudes fostered
through Track II diplomacy are more likely to filter and influence the policy debate. However, when the
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regional environment gives little hope for conflict resolution, Track II efforts yield more limited results.
Paradoxically, Track II diplomacy is less effective when it is most needed.
BOX 27 | STRENGTHS OF TRACK II DIPLOMACY BOX 28 | WEAKNESSES OF TRACK II DIPLOMACY
Unofficial and unconstrained by official foreign Participants may not be able to reach out to a large
policy or diplomatic protocol; constituency or affect policy circles;
Process-oriented; Participants may be opposed to cooperation;
Addresses attitudes (A) corner; Can have a negative effect on the conflict;
Challenges stereotypes & enemy images; The filtering of new attitudes rarely leads to policy
Deals with conflict root causes; adjustments;
Greater trust and mutual understanding; Limited resources and lack of legitimacy;
Takes place in the absence of official efforts. Decisions are not binding;
Results may depend on domestic and regional
contexts.
Track II diplomacy emerged in the 1970s as a complement to Track I diplomacy;

Track II diplomacy refers to informal and unofficial efforts whereby influential citizens engage in a
dialogue with a view to building trust, confidence and understanding, and ultimately, to resolving the
conflict;
Track II diplomacy works on the long-term transformation of attitudes of conflict actors;
The main types of Track II diplomatic activities include:
o (1) Interactive conflict resolution;
o (2) Problem-solving workshops;
o (3) Citizen diplomacy;
o (4) Pre-negotiations;
o (5) Back-channel diplomacy;
o (6) Walks in the wood.
The main conceptual stages of Track II diplomacy are:
o Stage 1: Socialization among participants;
o Stage 2: Filtering of new attitudes to a broader constituency;
o Stage 3: Policy Adjustments.
Problem-solving workshops are forums for unofficial conflict representatives to meet, explore the sources
of the conflict and develop possible solutions. They usually have three phases:
o Phase 1: Outline of Respective Positions and Attitudes;
o Phase 2: Discussion of Positions and Attitudes with the Intermediary;
o Phase 3: Direct Communication across Conflict Lines.
The main strengths of Track II diplomacy include:
o Unofficial and unconstrained by official foreign policy or diplomatic protocol;
o Process-oriented;
o Addresses attitudes (A) corner;
o Challenges stereotypes & enemy images;
o Deals with conflict root causes;
o Greater trust and mutual understanding;
o Takes place in the absence of official efforts.
The main limits of Track II diplomacy include:
o Participants may not be able to reach out to a large constituency or affect policy circles;
o Participants may be opposed to cooperation;
o Can have a negative effect on the conflict;
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o The filtering of new attitudes rarely leads to policy adjustments;

o Limited resources and lack of legitimacy;
o Decisions are not binding;
o Results may depend on domestic and regional contexts.
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LESSON 5 |
Track III Diplomacy
LESSON OUTLINE:
1. Introduction
2. Track III Diplomacy
3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Track III Diplomacy
4. Multi-track Diplomacy
Define Track III diplomacy;

Identify the strengths and weaknesses of Track III diplomacy;
Identify the various diplomatic tracks used in multi-track diplomacy.
1. Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, the number of BOX 30 | DEFINITION OF TRACK III DIPLOMACY
organisations and groups working on peace and development
has increased exponentially. There has been an important People-to-people diplomacy undertaken by
flourishing of projects and programmes regarding all phases individuals and private groups to encourage
of conflicts and in all spheres of life. International interaction and understanding between hostile
organisations, regional organisations, non-governmental communities and involving awareness raising
organisations, multinational corporations, economic and empowerment within these communities.
Normally focused at the grassroots level, this
associations, trade unions are all examples of this trend.
type of diplomacy often involves organizing
Meanwhile, the authority of the state and its role in the meetings and conferences, generating media
conduct of world politics has been eroded. States no longer exposure, and political and legal advocacy for
have complete control over their borders, over financial flows marginalized people and communities.
and over trade (Scholte 2000). The internet and global
communication networks have made state borders less USIP (2011)
relevant. This means that the political space has evolved and
that non-state organisations have begun to play an increasingly important role in world politics (OCHA 2006).
By-passing official channels and diplomatic relations, NGOs have begun to implement projects at the grassroots
level. In this context, the concept of Track III diplomacy was coined to refer to those grassroots conflict
resolution activities targeting the people and local communities. This alternative form of diplomacy is
supplemental to the other two Tracks and the complementarity between all of them has opened up the
possibility of conducting multi-track diplomacy. The purpose of this lesson is to introduce Track III diplomacy as
well as the added value of adopting a multi-track approach to conflict resolution.
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2. Track III Diplomacy
Definition of Track III Diplomacy
Track III diplomacy corresponds to diplomacy undertaken by individuals and private groups to resolve conflicts
or address conflict-related issues at the local and communal level. In general, the purpose is to facilitate
communication, to empower communities, to raise awareness about pressing issues and hence to participate
in long-term peace building. Such objectives may be connected to the fair management of resources (local
peace conferences, cooperatives), the healing of traumas (psychological support, hospitals, orphanages),
reconciliation (truth commissions, workshops, peace education), the environment (removing mines, de-
pollution, reforestation), culture (football diplomacy, scientific exchanges, travelling artists, inter-faith
conferences), etc. People at the grassroots level are the main beneficiaries of these programmes but efforts are
also made to influence the public debate as well as policy makers. Track III diplomacy can be represented
visually as follows:
FIGURE 8 | TRACK III DIPLOMACY
Track III diplomacy is very similar to Track II diplomacy and, according to some experts, they are identical.
Initiatives are informal, unofficial and independent from state actors. But contrary to Track II diplomacy, the
grassroots approach goes beyond the middle-level leadership to address the needs of the people. Such
initiatives work directly on the fabric of societies and adopt a bottom-up approach whereby social changes will
result from local changes. During conflicts, the great majority of victims are civilians, representing up to 90% of
casualties. In turn, the emotional, physical and psychological traumas due to the destructiveness of war are
deeply rooted in peoples lives and memories. This means that if the conflict is to de-escalate sustainably, and if
people are to engage in profound reconciliation, conflict resolution efforts must also be targeted at the
grassroots level.
Characteristics of Track III Diplomacy
In order to facilitate communication among hostile BOX 31 | TRACK III PEACE CONSTITUENCIES
communities, empower vulnerable groups and raise
awareness, Track III diplomacy emphasizes the importance A peace constituency is a lively network of
of building a peace constituency or grassroots peace actors who are bound neither to the state nor to
infrastructure. This constituency will provide legitimacy and any political party, who are pledged to non-
resources to influence the international agenda in a given violence and committed to community-oriented
direction and to build peace from the bottom-up. The focus purposes, and who thus build a counterweight to
the ethnopolitically or religiously segmented
on the local level means that Track III activities can work
society.
directly to foster trust and mutual understanding and
correct misperceptions and fears at the heart of the conflict. Norbert Ropers (2012)
Rather than striking an official deal that may not change the daily life of the great majority, this type of action
works directly by reversing de-humanisation processes and addressing the basic needs of the people. By the
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same token, it includes marginalized groups and vulnerable individuals in the peace process. If we come back to
Galtungs ABC Triangle, Track III diplomacy regroups various activities designed to address all three corners in
depth.
BOX 32 | PEACE EDUCATION
Grassroots activities in the field of peacebuilding can take many different forms. The NGO Search for Common
Ground (SCG) for instance builds on pop-culture to promote a cooperative, non-adversarial approach towards the
other. Adapted in national versions, SCG has launched a series of soap operas in 12 different African countries.
Through the lens of sports and drama The Team focuses on the issues of tribal and ethnic tensions. The listeners of
the soap are given ideas of constructive approaches to conflict resolution in an emotionally loaded setting, which is
close to the lifeworld of normal citizens.
The NGO Seeds of Peace brings together young people from conflict areas on neutral grounds in order to confront
their prejudices and deep-seated fears. The aim of the confrontation strategy is to sow seeds of peace by educating the
young generation to develop empathy, respect and confidence. Overall, teaching integrative negotiation and peer
mediation at the individual level is often seen as a means of constructively resolving conflicts. Grassroots initiatives
therefore make an important contribution to the larger process of peacebuilding.
Track III Diplomacy and Advocacy Networks
Track III activities grow out of non-state transnational advocacy networks established to promote causes,
principled ideas, and norms[which] often involve individuals advocating policy changes at odd with state
interests (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 8-9). Such networks are composed of national and international NGOs,
academic institutions, local social movements, foundations, the media, think tanks, religious organisations,
indigenous groups and professional associations amongst others. They represent certain interests that are
usually marginalized from the public debate and state policies because of their promotion of social change at
the systemic level. Through their peace constituency, they try to influence the national and international
agenda and to promote alternative policies. Through networking activities and the skilful use of the media,
communications and computer technology, they can raise awareness and mobilize people on a global scale. In
turn, this increases their influence and legitimacy despite their limited resources.
Track III diplomacy plays a very important role in the spread of new norms. The abolition of slavery was largely
the result of a shift in public opinion engineered by religious groups and civil society actors who raised
awareness about the immorality of the practice and who ultimately managed to influence state policies. Other
examples include womens rights, the ban on landmines and cluster bombs, freedom of press and freedom of
expression, respect for human rights, etc. Human rights and gender mainstreaming would not have been
possible without the work and pressure from NGOs in monitoring violations, advocating for respect of
international law and mobilizing peace constituencies to make invisible issues the concern of the entire world.
It should be noted that many NGOs depend almost entirely on government funding and are thus criticized for
being grassroots branches of governments merely implementing state policies. Moreover, some NGOs and
members of advocacy networks may push for regressive agendas and fuel conflicts.
BOX 33 | NGOs AND CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA
In Sri Lanka, the number of NGOs increased exponentially throughout the conflict with the support of the diaspora and
because of the faltering peace process. Many NGOs accepted ethno-nationalist rhetoric or operated along ethnic,
religious or linguistic lines. This further polarised conflict actors and created a disconnection with international NGOs.
As a result, the Sinhalese dominated government criticised non-Sinhalese NGOs for being pro-Tamil and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) accused Sinhalese NGOs of favouring the government. The lack of trust and the increased
suspicion worsened conflict dynamics. International NGOs which refused to work along ethnic or religious lines were
also criticized for representing the interests of Western states and for illegitimately interfering in domestic affairs.
The legitimacy of Track III diplomacy has been questioned by state actors as well as by companies and civil
society actors. While it is obvious that many advocacy networks enjoy broad popular support and that their
agenda are respectable (respect of human rights, protection of vulnerable groups, etc.), this is not always the
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case. And detractors have used a perceived lack of legitimacy as a weapon to discredit NGOs, for both good and
bad.
Track III Diplomacy and the United Nations
The importance of this approach to conflict resolution is recognised by the United Nations since many Track III
actors have a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Boutros Boutros-Ghali
(1992), former Secretary-General even stated in the Agenda for Peace that NGOs are an indispensable part of
the legitimacy without which no international activity can be meaningful.
BOX 34 | UN RECOGNITION OF TRACK III DIPLOMACY

Peace in the largest sense cannot be accomplished by the United Nations or Governments alone. Non-governmental
Organizations, academic institutions, parliamentarians, business and professional communities, the media and the
public at large must all be involved.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
An Agenda for Peace (1992)
3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Track III Diplomacy
Track III diplomacy shares many of the strengths and weaknesses of its Track II counterpart. Activities are
unofficial and unconstrained by official policies, they address violent behaviour as well as attitudes and
contradictions, they are process-oriented and they often deal with conflict causes. Track III actors are especially
suited to develop local infrastructures and local peace constituencies based on people with local knowledge. In
this, they may enjoy a greater degree of flexibility, local ownership and creativity than official approaches. They
can be relatively neutral, credible and independent from state interests. Indeed, their non-state status means
that they may be accepted by conflict actors as potential mediators in a much more secret environment.
However, Track III diplomatic activities may also worsen conflict dynamics. They may not be perceived as
legitimate and their impact can be very limited. These strengths and weaknesses are not particular to Track III
diplomacy but they tend to be more prevalent at the grassroots level. Two further issues affect particularly
Track III diplomacy.
Coordination and Long-term Feasibility
Because Track III actors tend to be issue-oriented (exclusive focus on human rights or gender or religion, etc.),
they are often unable to agree on a set of priorities and to coordinate their action. While experts in their
specific issue area, they struggle to contribute to peace and conflict resolution in general. Competition for
resources and infighting has hampered Track III diplomacy and has led to cynicism on the part of recipient
communities. The lack of coordination has also resulted in overlaps and duplication of efforts. In Somalia, WHO
staff commented on the absurd consequences of a lack of coordination: Everybody we talk to [wants] to build
hospitals, because hospitals are a physical, visible thing. And distributing medicine is something everybody
likes. But many NGOs and charities do not ensure that doctors and nurses will be available to work at the
hospital, that electricity will be accessible or that medicines will be distributed fairly.
BOX 35 | THE LEGITIMACY OF NGOs
The increasing clout of NGOs, respectable and not so respectable, raises an important question: who elected Oxfam, or,
for that matter, the League for a Revolutionary Communist International? Bodies such as these are, to varying degrees,
extorting admissions of fault from law-abiding companies and changes in policy from democratically elected
governments. They may claim to be acting in the interests of the peoplebut then so do the objects of their criticism,
governments and the despised international institutions. In the West, governments and their agencies are, in the end,
accountable to voters. Who holds the activists accountable?
The Economist (21 September 2000)
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This leads to another major issue that affects Track III diplomacy, namely, the lack of long-term thinking. NGOs
depend on their supporters and governments for funding and may not enjoy financial security. This means that
long-term commitment may not be possible, a situation made all the more difficult by a high staff turnover and
donor fatigue. In the cases of Uganda and Kenya, the Pokotusa Peace Initiative successfully facilitated conflict
resolution between the Pokot, Karamaja, Turkana and Sabine tribes. Members of the tribes were most grateful
for the assistance they received. However, after a year of peace, violence and cattle raiding resumed and
members of the tribes felt unable to uphold the peace agreement. In light of the weaknesses and limits of
Track III diplomacy as well as of the other two tracks, scholars have suggested that a multi-track approach be
adopted to increase coordination and synergies.
BOX 36 | STRENGTHS OF TRACK III DIPLOMACY BOX 37 | WEAKNESSES OF TRACK III DIPLOMACY
Unofficial and unconstrained by official foreign Lack of coordination;

policy or diplomatic protocol; Short-term with high staff turnover;
Addresses the(A), (B) and (C) corners; Overlap and duplication of efforts;
Deals with conflict root causes; Limited resources and capabilities;
Bottom-up processes; Dependence on donors;
Large peace constituency; Can fuel the conflict;
Local ownership and buy-in; Lack of legitimacy and accountability.
Empowerment and awareness-raising.
4. Multi-Track Diplomacy
From Track I to Multi-Track Diplomacy
With the transformation of international relations in the

BOX 38 | DEFINITION OF MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY
20th and 21st centuries, and with the emergence of a
certain number of non-state actors in the field of conflict A term for operating on several tracks
resolution, new solutions and approaches were needed. simultaneously, including official and unofficial
This was made all the more urgent by the increasing conflict resolution efforts, citizen and scientific
exchanges, international business negotiations,
complexity of conflicts. The multiplicity of conflict actors
international cultural and athletic activities, and other
and the multidimensionality of conflicts meant that a cooperative efforts. These efforts could be led by
multi-track approach to diplomacy had to be developed. governments, professional organizations, businesses,
The international community came to recognise that churches, media, private citizens, training and
complex conflicts could only be solved through the use educational institutes, activists, and funders.
of a wide range of mechanisms that should optimally be
coordinated. USIP (2011)
Experts began to think about ways for official and unofficial diplomacy to collaborate and complement one
another for the greater good of the recipients. And in 1993, just after the end of the Cold War, Louise Diamond
and John MacDonald published a book on multi-track diplomacy. They outlined the existence of 9 different yet
complementary tracks for conflict resolution. From state actors down to businesses and religious groups; the
most important conflict actors and interveners were included to provide a holistic approach to conflict
resolution. Combined, they form a web of interconnected tracks that can be described as follows:
BOX 39 | NINE TRACKS

Track 1 Government: This track focuses on conflict resolution through official diplomacy and other related
governmental activities.
Track 2 Professional Conflict Resolution: This track includes professional non-governmental actors involved in
conflict prevention and resolution.
Track 3 Business: This track refers to business actors and their contribution to peacebuilding through the provision of
economic opportunities, international ties, informal channels of communication and understanding, and general
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support for other conflict resolution related activities.
Track 4 Private Citizens: This is the realm of personal involvement of individual citizens and their contributions to
peace and development. This track includes activities such as citizen diplomacy, exchange programs,
nongovernmental organisations, and interest groups.
Track 5 Research, Training, and Education: This track focuses on conflict resolution through learning and includes
three interrelated fields: research, which is linked to universities, think tanks and research centers; training in order
to provide actors with skills such as negotiation or mediation; and education on different levels covering topics
related to cross-cultural studies or conflict analysis and resolution.
Track 6 Activism: This track refers to advocacy related activities, covering issues such as peace and environment,
disarmament, human rights or social and economic justice.
Track 7 Religion: This track examines the influence of spiritual and religious communities as well as their peace-
oriented beliefs and actions, such as pacifism and nonviolence.
Track 8 Funding: This track includes all actors who provide resources to support the activities undertaken by the other
tracks.
Track 9 Public Opinion and Communication: This is the realm where people have a voice and share their
information. The focus is on how the public opinion is expressed and shaped by the media.
Diamond & McDonald (1996)
FIGURE 9 | MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY

Adapted from Diamond & McDonald (1993)
This compass diagram is designed to emphasise the interconnectedness of all diplomatic tracks in a non-
hierarchical setting. The compass increases the number of tracks from three to nine to include actors such as
businesses, research institutions, activists, religious groups, donors and public opinion. While these actors were
previously active in one of the other three tracks, their separation into more specific tracks is supposed to bring
added analytical depth and a more holistic or systemic approach to peace. While each track is distinct and has
its own resources, values and methods, it can function with other tracks to create a fruitful synergy.
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BOX 40 | MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY IN THE PUNJABS

Since the partition of British India and the creation of an Indian and a Pakistani state, there have always been tensions
and recurrent conflict between the two countries. The Punjab region was also divided between India and Pakistan in
1947 and during the wars of 1965 and 1971 the two Punjabs bore the brunt of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Even though
there has never been a direct conflict between the Punjabs, a considerable proportion of both armies originate from
these provinces and due to the international conflict Punjabis on both sides have never established ties. But since 2004,
there has been a considerable amount of activities such as sports and cultural exchanges, meetings of business
delegations and other initiatives promoted by the two governments and NGOs to build cooperation and confidence
along four diplomatic tracks.
Government: At the federal level, Presidents Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf verbally encouraged an exchange
between the Punjabs. In addition, the Chief Ministers of East and West Punjab established a good relation which
resulted in the initiation of bus services between the Punjabs.
Private Citizens: The Punjabs share a common culture, heritage, spoken language and poetry among others and many
cultural organisations such as the World Punjabi Centre actively promote cultural exchanges. Tourist sights attract
people from both sides: Sikhs from East Punjab are eager to visit their holy shrines in the Pakistani Punjab and Muslims
from West Punjab want to visit their shrines on the Indian side. This led the Pakistani government to preserve shrines
and to facilitate visa procedures for pilgrims. Exchanges also took place in the field of sports with the All Punjab Games
in 2004.
Research, Training and Education: The Center for Research in Rural and Industrial Development in East Punjab has
created a Two Punjab Center which is conducting research on opportunities for economic, cultural and educational
cooperation.
Business: Traders in the Punjabs lost out in the Indo-Pakistani conflict since substantial trade became impossible.
Therefore, traders and governments of both Punjabs had always pressured their central governments to formally open
up the border for trade. The Wagah border between the Punjabs was the first where trade commenced. Since then
substantial progress has been reached on the central government level, as both governments started removing trade
restrictions. Pakistans government announced in 2011 that it was ready to grant Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to
India. Overall, business seems to be one of the most important diplomatic tracks between the Punjabs.
Maini (2007)
Some scholars are critical of having so many different tracks and instead, they prefer to refer to multi-level
peace processes rather than diplomatic tracks (Saunders in Crocker 2001). In any case, whatever approach or
terms one uses, the fact remains that a more holistic view of diplomacy whereby all actors cooperate more or
less closely is slowly developing. Both NGOs and states are becoming aware of this necessity.
BOX 41 | THE TWELVE PRINCIPLES OF MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY

The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) developed twelve operating principles of multi-track diplomacy, which
can serve as guidance for practitioners eager to engage in multi-track diplomacy.
(1) Invitation The third party may engage in a conflict where there is a request for participation or an open
door
(2) Long-Term Commitment recognizing that conflict resolution is time intensive, the third party should
consider making a long-term commitment to people and processes, that may take years to show success
(3) Relationships as the success as peacebuilders is highly dependent on the quality of relationships they are
able to develop, one central step stone in the peacebuilding process is the making of good and trustful
connections to individuals, groups and institutions
(4) Trust Building relationships of mutual trust and sharing throughout all layers of the society
(5) Engagement Once involved in a specific system, the third party becomes a unique part of it itself ideally as
an engaged, caring and accountable partner.
(6) Partnership Working with people on equal terms and understanding conflict transformation as collaborative
process. This includes partnering with local parties and institutions in all steps of the conflict.
(7) Synthesis of Wisdom acknowledging the cultural connotation of conflict resolution principles and practices,
third parties can offer their cultural view as one part of the picture, encouraging local partners to complete the
picture through their experiences and approaches
(8) Multiple Technologies as each conflict situation is different (depending on the stage of conflict, the parties
involved etc.), third parties may choose to utilize a broad variety of techniques and even create new
methodologies if the situation requires a unique approach.
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(9) Action Research - constant evaluation and impact assessment is needed in order to further develop the project
and to share lessons learned with other actors in the field
(10) Responsibility Third parties act as facilitators, assisting parties in conflict to address their own concerns and
fulfil their own visions. This is done by supporting local partners in taking responsibility, creating local
institutions and capacity.
(11) Empowerment Support of local agents of change, which are eager to address the complex and often
dangerous challenges facing their systems. This can take many forms, such as specialized trainings, dialogue
events or conferences
(12) Transformation Facilitation of change at all levels of beliefs, values, perceptions, feelings, behaviours and
structures.
Notter & Diamond (1996)
Cooperation between Diplomatic Tracks
Cooperation between diplomatic tracks is increasingly being discussed. In a previous lesson we saw that
experts were led to develop various forms of Track 1.5 diplomacy to facilitate conflict resolution and avoid the
constraints of official diplomacy. However, finding the best solution is not easy since parties want to safeguard
their interests, their legitimacy, their resources and their independence. Broadly speaking, all conflict
resolution actors have come to the conclusion that cooperation is best because of the failures and successes of
individual peace practices (United States Institute of Peace 2003). Official diplomats had to admit that unofficial
mediation and negotiation could in fact achieve results that they were unable to achieve themselves. Not only
could professional yet informal conflict resolution experts reach negotiated settlements, but these were also
based on the support of middle-level leaders and, in some cases, on the support of a strong popular peace
constituency. This meant that agreements could be taken further than those reached by governments (United
States Institute of Peace 2003). On their side, unofficial diplomats also found their actions limited in certain
ways. While they could deal directly with people, they were not able to reach and influence key leaders. If
Track II diplomats engaged in humanitarian negotiation with armed groups, they needed a safe environment
and hence the non-intervention of state forces. Overall, both tracks agreed upon the need to work more
closely with one another (Lederach 1997). A recent study suggests that cooperation between tracks can be
more effective than single track efforts (Bhmelt 2010).
Two pathways for cooperation are open: the first option is to increase cooperation and the second option is to
begin a process of integration. What we need to understand is that cooperation is not an end in itself but a
means to increasing the overall efficacy of conflict resolution. The aim is thus to engage in berry-picking
whereby constraining structures associated with official diplomacy are avoided and specific cooperation chosen
to suit the purpose of all stakeholders. After all, diplomatic tracks have different values, interests and
objectives which limit cooperation and make integration unlikely. Rather than moving towards full-fledged
integration, what may be more adapted is to increase the communication channels depending on the needs. In
turn, diplomatic tracks may share more information, resources and infrastructures and may even plan
together. The extent of this communication requires that roles be clarified, relationships be based on trust, and
that long-term strategic projects be implemented (United States Institute of Peace 2003). What is essential is
that communication and cooperation do not turn into co-optation.
Ronald Fisher (2006: 87) explains that: On reflection, it

BOX 42 | MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY
makes sense that coordination between Track I and
Track II at the elite level would be limited, in that these On reflection, it makes sense that coordination
tracks have separate overall functions and must between Track I and Track I at the elite level would be
limited, in that these tracks have separate overall
maintain their unique role and independence in order
functions and must maintain their unique role and
to carry these out. This does not mean that
independence in order to carry these out.
information should not be shared and communication
or trust avoided. It only restates the fact that the two
Ronald Fisher (2006: 87)
tracks have different raisons dtre.
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Track III diplomacy corresponds to diplomacy undertaken by individuals and private groups to resolve
conflicts or address conflict-related issues at the local and communal level. In general, the purpose is to
facilitate, communication, to empower communities, to raise awareness about pressing issues and hence
to participate in long-term peace building;
The main characteristics of Track III diplomacy are:
o To facilitate communication among hostile communities;
o To empower vulnerable groups;
o To raise awareness on conflict-related issues;
o To build a peace constituency or grassroots peace infrastructure;
o To build peace from the bottom-up;
o To address the basic needs of the people;
o To address all three corners of Galtungs ABC Triangle.
The main strengths of Track II diplomacy include:
o Unofficial and unconstrained by official foreign policy or diplomatic protocol;
o Addresses the(A), (B) and (C) corners;
o Deals with conflict root causes;
o Bottom-up processes;
o Large peace constituency;
o Local ownership and buy-in;
o Empowerment and awareness-raising.
The main limits of Track II diplomacy include:
o Lack of coordination;
o Short-term with high staff turnover;
o Overlap and duplication of efforts;
o Limited resources and capabilities;
o Dependence on donors;
o Can fuel the conflict;
o Lack of legitimacy and accountability.
Multi-track diplomacy differentiates up to nine complementary tracks to resolve conflicts in a holistic
manner.
The scope of cooperation between diplomatic tracks is limited by the values, norms, resources, interests
and approaches used by the individual tracks.
Communication and information-sharing seems to be the most suitable solution to make use of the
comparative advantages of the different diplomatic tracks.
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Methods in Conflict Resolution
Conflict Resolution
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MODULE 3 |
This module describes the main methods used by the United Nations and other actors to resolve conflict. In
particular, it introduces three conflict resolution methods: negotiation, mediation and humanitarian
negotiation. It provides illustrative examples and tips to conduct successful negotiations and mediation. The
module requires participants to prepare a conflict resolution effort adapted to address their case study.
negotiation;
negotiation.
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LESSON 6 |
Negotiation
LESSON OUTLINE:
1. Introduction
2. Negotiation Styles
3. Win-Win outcome and Satisfaction
4. Stages of Negotiation
5. Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Conflicts
Describe the main steps and elements of negotiation;

Appraise the different negotiating styles;
Define key concepts such as win-win solution, hurting stalemate and ripeness;
Appraise the advantages and limits of negotiation.
1. Introduction
Negotiating is part of day-to-day life and is a very common technique used

BOX 3 | DEFINITION OF
by people to deal with conflict or to simply get what they want. It may be
NEGOTIATION
low profile between a customer and a merchant at the market or it may be
high profile when a UN Special Representative engages in dialogue with the Bilateral or multilateral process
president of a member state to find a way out of a violent civil war. in which conflict parties and
Generally speaking, negotiations correspond to a bilateral or multilateral influential actors try to find a
process in which conflict parties and influential actors try to find a shared shared solution or compromise
solution or compromise through communication and the sharing of through communication and
information. In other words, negotiations are face-to-face discussions to find the sharing of information.
a solution when actors pursue incompatible goals. The aim is to secure an
agreement acceptable to all parties involved through interactive dialogue. It may be private and confidential or
public and informal. Each of two or more sides attempts to
BOX 4 | MAIN CHARACTERISTICS
realize its objective through offers and counteroffers. But
Involves at least two parties; negotiation is also about the formation of a specific
Parties pursue (seemingly) incompatible goals; relationship in a certain direction (conciliation,
Condition of relative power symmetry; cooperation, coexistence etc.), the sharing of information
It is a verbal and dynamic process ; and data, persuasion or accommodation. Parties are also
Parties want to find a solution; responsible for the consequences of reaching, or failing to
Use of dialogue and exchange of information. reach, a shared agreement (Yarn 1999, 316).
2. Negotiation Styles
Two main styles of negotiation can be used depending on the context and the objective. The first type is that of
positional negotiation - also called positional bargaining - and is used in most cases and especially for minor
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conflicts. The second type is that of interest-based negotiation also known as integrative or joint problem-
solving.
Positional negotiation
Positional negotiation is the most common type of negotiation used to reach agreements on most conflicts. It is
a strategy whereby negotiators begin from their original position and then bargain with one another to find a
middle way and reach compromise. Both parties select a series of solutions that meet their interests and then
present them sequentially, according to a preferred outcome. The first solution is supposed to be the one
where you give least and ask most. But if neither party is satisfied with the outcome, they must slowly shift
their position by making concessions and compromises as well as by giving incentives to the other. The right
balance must be found between giving in too much and failing to find a compromise. The end result is a forced
mutual compromise.
Characteristics of positional negotiation
Positional negotiation is based on the assumption that the settlement is going to be a zero-sum game and
cannot be win-win. The cake is not big enough and must be split. As such, the goal is to gain the most. This
leads contenders to be locked into their positions and to refrain from making concessions. The process is
therefore slow and parties may give up before a compromise can be reached.
In positional negotiations, the relationship between parties is not a priority and is, in fact, framed as an
offensive struggle between enemies/competitors in which one cannot show ones weaknesses and fears. Trust
is low, the sharing of information is limited, lying or withholding information is part of the game; threats and
deception are used and coercion is not uncommon. The process is confrontational, competitive and results in
further polarization. In multilateral settings, this approach becomes cumbersome, slow and complex and thus
increases the risk of derailing the negotiations.
Despite all these characteristics and disadvantages, positional negotiation has benefits. Indeed, it limits the
disclosure of information, it prevents giving more than necessary to secure a settlement and it can be used as
a tool to keep the existing balance of power. Besides, it might be the most adapted approach to settle a
conflict over limited resources. It is adapted when the relationship between parties is not important or when
the relationship does not enable the use of an alternative approach (low trust between historical enemies for
example).
BOX 5 | STRENGTHS OF POSITIONAL NEGOTIATION BOX 6 | WEAKNESSES OF POSITIONAL NEGOTIATION
Does not require trust; May damage relationships;

Limits disclosure of information; Locked positions may lead to polarization;
Limits unnecessary concessions; Results in a forced mutual compromise;
Useful for conflicts over limited resources; Slow with a higher risk of stalling;
Useful for negotiations between strangers Coercion, threats, lying, competition;
Useful for simple conflicts; Limited information sharing may result in a partial
May be the only option short of force. settlement.
Interest-based negotiation
Interest-based negotiations are based on the assumption that it is possible to find a win-win solution by
fulfilling the greatest number of interests and needs for all conflict parties. It is a strategy whereby everyones
concerns are addressed proactively as opposed to positional negotiations which requires on parties slowly
making concessions. According to Fisher and Ury, Interest-based negotiations are built on four general
principles: (1) people must be separated from the problem since the relationship between the parties is
different from the substantive problem that they face; (2) work on interests i.e., what people really want
rather than on positions i.e., what people claim they want; (3) creatively generate multiple options for mutual
gain before narrowing down; (4) Evaluate negotiation outcome based on S.M.A.R.T. criteria (Specific,
Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, Time-bound) of fairness and acceptability.
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Characteristics of interest-based negotiations
Interest-based negotiations are about cooperating to

BOX 7 | PRINCIPLES OF INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATION
resolve the problem rather than competing to gain in
absolute and relative terms. They shift the focus (1) Separate people from problem;
away from public positions to the consideration of (2) Work on interests , not positions;
everyones interests and needs. Negotiators are also (3) Generate as many options as possible;
(4) Base outcome on S.M.A.R.T. criteria.
led to separate value-judgements from facts. As a
result, such negotiations are less likely to damage
the relationship, especially when they are successful. In fact, the relationship is not only preserved but it can
even be improved by the end of the process.
Interest-based negotiations are based on the important assumption that there is a possibility of stepping out of
a zero-sum struggle towards a win-win solution. When adopting this approach negotiators must consider
whether all parties are going to play the game or whether some of them may have ulterior motives that will
thwart the process. In multilateral settings, interest-based negotiations may create great momentum and deep
reforms but they may also facilitate free-riding by actors unwilling to play by the rules. The benefits of interest-
based negotiations are obvious, but negotiators should bear in mind that the conditions might not be
appropriate for this type of conflict resolution. Trust, honesty, open communication and a win-win solution
may not be available. Finally, dealing with positions may be overly lengthy, making the approach very
challenging when time is limited.
BOX 8 | STRENGTHS OF INTEREST-BASED BOX 9 | WEAKNESSES OF INTEREST-BASED

NEGOTIATION NEGOTIATION
Win-win solution; Lengthy and time-consuming;
Addresses interests and needs; Facilitates free-riding;
Cooperative; Requires trust, honesty and open communication;
May strengthen the relationship; Requires disclosure of information including
Holistic; interests and needs;
Creative; Win-win solutions may not be available;
A wide range of solutions are considered. Everyone should play by the rules.
Parties may not be able to deal with traumas and
emotions in order to cooperate.
Role and Skills of Negotiators
Negotiators tend to adapt their role to the type of negotiation they are conducting. In positional negotiations
and in interest-based negotiations, negotiators tend to adopt the following attitude:
TABLE 1 | NEGOTIATOR ATTITUDES: POSITIONAL NEGOTIATION VS. INTEREST-BASED NAGOTIATION

Positional Negotiation Interest-Based Negotiation
Competitive, aggressive and confrontational; Collaborative, empathetic and understanding;
Maximises gains and minimises losses; Maximises overall gains;
Manipulation and deceit; Trust and integrity;
Puts preconditions; Accept fair concessions;
Make high demands; Make reasonable demands on himself and others;
Resist concessions; Full disclosure;
Limited disclosure; No ulterior motives.
Hide ulterior motives.
At the negotiation table, negotiators should try to cultivate certain skills known to facilitate conflict resolution.
In particular, the negotiator may:
Be assertive yet flexible because the aim is to be respected, not to be liked;

Have a strong personality and control over his emotions;
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Take time to explain his or her perspective, interests, worldview, positions and needs;
Listen actively to others;
Put oneself in the shoes of the other;
Separate people from problems, value-judgments from facts, positions from needs;
Shift the conflict from opposing positions to shared needs;
Be creative and open-minded;
Transcend polarised views which depict the conflict as Us VS Them;
Emphasise common grounds rather than differences;
Ask open-ended rather than closed questions to invite the other to expand;
Always have a fallback position whether it is adjourning the session, consulting advisors, or a specific
settlement option.
3. Win-Win Outcome and Satisfaction
Reaching a Win-Win Outcome
The objective of interest-based negotiation is not to beat the other party but to reach an agreeable settlement
where all stakeholders feel that they have won. This is the Win-Win approach. Such negotiations have certain
defining characteristics:
The negotiating parties enjoy a feeling of accomplishment;
All parties feel that they have been heard and that their interests and needs have been taken into
consideration by the others;
All parties agree that the process was conducted fairly and that the outcome is both acceptable and
positive;
All actors feel that their relationships have been tested but that they have come out preserved and
even strengthened;
All parties think that the commitments made during the negotiations will be respected.
BOX 10 | WIN-WIN & ZERO SUM

In negotiations, a zero sum strategy refers to a situation where a gain for one side results in a loss for the other, which
makes it difficult to reach an outcome favourable for all parties. On the contrary, a win-win strategy refers to a
situation where all parties are better off. This can be best illustrated through the famous example of a dispute over an
orange (Fisher & Ury 1991).
Two people are arguing over the division of a single orange between them. In the bargaining process they exchange
offers and counteroffers of a 80-20 split and of a 30-70 split in favour of one or the other person. After having made
several concessions, the two parties agree to a 50-50 split which from the perspective of a zero sum logic appears fair
and wise. However, one then throws away the peel in order to eat the fruit. Meanwhile, the other person throws away
the fruit and uses the peel to bake a cake. In this case, both could have obtained everything they wanted (the peel of
the whole orange and the inside of the whole orange), if they had only discussed not how much of the orange they
wanted, but the reasons why they wanted the orange (e.g., their real interests and needs). This would have resulted in
a win-win situation.
Fisher & Ury (1991); Rubin (1994)
Certain pitfalls exist that may derail negotiations and prevent reaching a Win-Win outcome. They include:
Pitfall 1: Premature Judgment;
Pitfall 2: Narrowing down to a single issue;
Pitfall 3: Focusing on ones problems and needs;
Pitfall 4: Lack of Information.
The first pitfall is that of premature judgment whereby one or more parties remains locked into their position
and are unable to even consider new ideas or the legitimacy of the interests of their counterparts. The conflict
context leads actors to remain critical, judgmental and on the defensive and to jump to conclusions regarding
the intentions of the other. In such cases, communication is not open enough and the vicious circle of conflict
prevents parties from separating people from the problem.
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The second pitfall is that of narrowing negotiations down to a single issue. When negotiating parties focus
their attention on a single issue (price, territory, access to resources, etc.), it is very likely that there will be a
winner and a loser. Aware of the difficulties of sharing limited resources, negotiators have a tendency to fall
back into positional negotiations and to engage in a relatively sterile search for answers on a single element of
discord. In this context, broadening negotiations from positions to interests and needs enables the search for a
more holistic solution where all actors are winners.
The third pitfall is that of focusing on ones problems and needs without considering those of the other
parties. In heated conflicts, negotiators may find it difficult to put themselves in the shoes of the other or to
take a step back to have an overview of the conflict. They usually remain centred on what they wish to
achieve and offer solutions that only meet their interests. This lack of empathy, cooperation and creativity may
slow down negotiations and increase the risk of reverting to positional negotiations. It also stops negotiators
from focusing on facts rather than interpretations and value-judgments.
The fourth pitfall emerges when there is a lack of information and data. Negotiations require preparations,
clarity of purpose as well as a thorough understanding of the situation. If a win-win outcome is to be reached, it
is essential that negotiators take time before and during the entire process to gather and share relevant
information necessary to address all relevant needs and interests. In numerous cases, deadlocks are
transcended when one party shares new information that had remained up until then hidden or unknown. This
is why a conflict analysis must be conducted prior to the beginning of negotiations.
BOX 11 | TRICKY NEGOTIATION TACTICS
The tactics chosen and the reactions of the other negotiating parties can be decisive for the power relations during the
negotiation process. According to Fisher and Ury tricky tactics can be divided into three categories: deliberate
deception, psychological warfare and positional pressure tactics.
Deliberate deception refers to the misrepresentation about facts, authority or intentions and is probably one of the
most common forms of dirty tricks. Examples include false statements, better known as phony facts. Furthermore it
might occur that the other side does not carry the full authority over the bargaining process. They might want to take
the accord to someone else for approval, enabling them to open a second round of negotiation. This technique is
known as Ambiguous authority.
Psychological warfare is often used to put the opposite negotiation party in a feeling of unease, making them more
eager to compromise and to come to a quick agreement. This goal may be reached through different tactics. The first
one is to design stressful situations by influencing the physical environment in which the negotiations take place (e.g.,
making it too warm, too noisy or choosing the offices of one negotiating party). Another tactic is to make direct or
indirect personal attacks, such as not looking in the eyes, or by neglecting to listen to your statements. Other
strategies are the good guy/ bad guy routine or the posing of threats and warnings. The success of these
strategies always depends on the credibility of the communication and power resources.
Positional pressure tactics are used to force one party to effectively make concessions. One side may for example
refuse to negotiate at all. Extreme demands or constantly increasing demands may have similar devastating effects on
the negotiation process. This kind of deadlocked situations may be solved by turning to a third party for mediation.
Other strategies include references to hardhearted partners. In this case the negotiator may state that he personally
would have no objection, but a hardhearted partner will not let him. Delay may be another strategy to come to a
favourable negotiation outcome. Striking parties may for example choose to return to the negotiation table only few
hours before the deadline ends. Last but not least, negotiators may pursue a take it or leave it strategy. The pressure
which is connected to this strategy highly depends on the stage of the negotiation process at which this tactic is applied.
Overall it is important to be prepared to cope with the different strategies and tactics to avoid becoming a victim at
the end of the negotiation process.
Fisher & Ury (1983)

The Satisfaction Triangle
When negotiators try to reach a Win-Win solution, they must ensure that all parties involved are satisfied at
the substantive, procedural and psychological levels. These three levels or dimensions of satisfaction set the
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framework to assess whether negotiations and conflict resolution in general are designed and conducted in
a way that fulfils the needs and demands of stakeholders.
The substantive level of satisfaction includes the core interests and needs of conflict actors such as money,
territory, shelter, political representation, etc. If negotiating parties are not satisfied at the substantive level
and believe that their needs have not been addressed, it is impossible to reach a Win-Win solution.
The procedural level refers to satisfaction about the way the process is conducted (peacefully, with trust, on
time, legally, etc.). For example, if negotiations are conducted unfairly (inability of one or more parties to
express their views, unsafe environment, etc.), it will be very difficult to reach a Win-Win settlement that will
be mutually agreeable.
Finally, the psychological level refers to the satisfaction of psychological needs such as trust, non-violence,
cooperation, non-coercion, etc. In this case, parties are unlikely to reach a Win-Win solution if one or more
negotiators are using unfair or counter-productive negotiating techniques (e.g., deceit, verbal abuse, insults,
lack of cooperation, etc.).
Each stage of the negotiation process (outlined below) must be carried in line with these three levels or
dimensions of satisfaction to maximise the likelihood of reaching a Win-win solution. The Satisfaction Triangle
provides a visual representation of these dimensions of satisfaction.
FIGURE 1 | SATISFACTION TRIANGLE
4. Stages of Negotiation
Because there exist different styles of negotiations with different purposes and different actors, no two
negotiations follow the same pattern. However, there is a general series of stages through which most
negotiation processes go:
Stage 1: Pre-negotiation and planning;
Stage 2: Initial meetings with sharing of information;
Stage 3: Generation of potential solutions;
Stage 4: Drafting of agreement;
Stage 5: Ratification and implementation.
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This list of negotiating stages is applicable for interest-based negotiations only and may not be adapted to
positional bargaining and other types of negotiations where trust and collaboration are lacking.
Stage 1: Pre-negotiation and planning
At first, the negotiation must be prepared with a full analysis of

BOX 12 | OBJECTIVES OF PRE-NEGOTIATION
the conflict and th e careful selection of the negotiators, the
objectives, the location (turf is power), the format, the duration Conflict analysis;
and the style of the negotiations. All parties must assess Selection of negotiators;
Choice of objectives (including means,
whether negotiating is likely to be an adequate and effective
strategy and tactics);
solution to achieve their stated objectives. It is at this stage that Decisions on location, duration, format
negotiators can already avoid the pitfall of a lack of information. and style;
Once the above tasks are complete, negotiators may initiate Initiate contact;
contact with their counterpart either directly or indirectly Agree on design and structure of
through a third party. In this phase of the process, stakeholders negotiations;
decide on the design and structuring of the entire negotiation Commit to negotiations and to finding a
process and express their commitment to enter direct solution.
negotiation with the wish to reach a settlement. This first step is
crucial because it provides a foundation to the entire process. It will shape the institutionalization of
negotiation procedures and if it is not properly managed, chances of collapse will be higher. The United Nations
Department of political Affairs has developed a useful Operational Guidance Note with a pre-negotiation
checklist.
BOX 13 | BATNA BEST ALTERNATIVE TO A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT

BATNA is a term coined by Fisher and Ury to refer to the alternative open to a negotiator in case he or she fails to reach
a settlement. It is the bottom line which helps negotiators to decide how far they can make concessions before they
are better off without reaching an agreement. The BATNA is the answer to the question: what is your alternative if you
fail to find a solution? During the pre-negotiations, it is important to reflect on ones own BATNA as well as that of the
other parties as this will reveal an important element of the balance of power.
REFLECTION BOX |
In order to define the bargaining range available to the negotiating parties, reflecting upon the Best Alternative to a
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) may be crucial. The following questions can lead the way to define the possible scope
of action:
Which needs of mine and of my opponent are truly threatened by this conflict?
What are the needs and interests that are most important to be negotiated at this time?
If we are unable or unwilling to negotiate a meaningful agreement, what are my alternatives?
o Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) - what is the best I can expect if we don't
come to a negotiated agreement?
o Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (WATNA) - what is the worst I can expect if we don't
come to a negotiated agreement?
o Most Likely Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement - (MLATNA) - what is the most likely alternative
if we don't come to a negotiated agreement?
How might these relate to the situation facing the other person(s) involved in this dispute?
When it really comes down to it, what do I want to happen as a result of this process?
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Stage 2: Initial meetings with sharing of information
When the face-to-face negotiations begin, negotiators engage in a series of initial meetings to build confidence
and show commitment to the process. All parties begin is to share perspectives and to identify clearly the
problem. The aim is to reconstruct the conflict step-by-step by exchanging information, point of views and
interpretations of events. At this point, negotiators must decide how much information they want to disclose
to the other parties as it might be used against them in order to raise demands. When something has a high
value for a party, others can ask for greater concessions in order to reach a deal. On the contrary, if something
seems to be of little value, it may be obtained easily without any major concessions.
Negotiators may adopt different approaches during the initial phase of the negotiation process. On one end of
the spectrum, one party may demand that a set of preconditions be met before the negotiations can truly
begin. This is used to put pressure on the other but also to test the good will and commitment of the other
parties. In some cases, very high demands may be made in order to force concessions from the very beginning.
This may be combined with a clear refusal to change ones position or attitude. Such an approach can pay off
but it may also jeopardise the entire process. On the other hand of the spectrum, negotiators may begin with
constructive, productive and non-threatening statements regarding the process itself rather than the
substantive issues. One party may actually make voluntary concessions as a sign of commitment. Negotiations
may be lengthened by this need for dialogue at the expense of dealing with substantive issues straight away.
This approach has its strengths but also its weaknesses as parties may lose their enthusiasm and good will
because of the lack of tangible results.
Stage 3: Generation of potential solutions
Once the negotiations are under way and that the participants have reconstructed the conflict, solutions may
be creatively generated to address the needs, interests and views of stakeholders. Alternative solutions are
designed to meet the largest number of objectives and these are assessed against the S.M.A.R.T. criteria of
acceptability and fairness. Depending on the approach adopted by the negotiators, the generation of potential
solutions may be based on trust and cooperation or on the contrary, on suspicion and deception with one party
dragging its feet and making few concessions. Thinking out of the box and creativity are skills very much
appreciated during this stage of negotiations as they enable productive brainstorming. It is only towards the
end of this phase that inadequate and unacceptable solutions are discarded and that a win-win settlement is
reached.
Stage 4: Drafting of agreement
During this stage of the negotiation process, parties move from a general solution to a more detailed and
practical agreement. Throughout the narrowing down of the solution to make it implementable, negotiators
must ensure that the agreed details are sufficient and necessary to resolve all of the problems raised. This
phase may be quite lengthy since parties have to develop a comprehensive plan that will work in the long term.
During this stage, parties may agree to leave certain grievances aside and to address them in another round of
negotiations.
Stage 5: Ratification and Implementation
Finally, both parties conclude the process with an agreement on a realistic implementation process. The
agreement must be ratified by the conflict parties who must ensure that their respective constituencies will
accept its terms and content. Negotiators must also agree on implementation procedures, timetable and
programme, together with observers to ensure that the agreement is respected. Review meetings may be
planned throughout the implementation phase. Also, in this last phase of negotiations, negotiating parties may
look for regional or international support. Part of this last step includes the anticipation and pre-emption of
critiques of the agreement. It may be constructive to include all parties into the implementation process as this
is likely to increase buy-in and commitment.
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BOX 14 | CASE STUDY: INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATION IN KENYAS ELECTORAL CONFLICT
In 2007-2008, presidential elections in Kenya resulted in chaos and violent conflict after the opposition rejected the poll
results. The UN Department of Political Affairs assisted the AUs Panel of Eminent African Personalities, including
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to engage the two main presidential candidates in an interest-based
negotiation process.
During a first pre-negotiation and planning phase the parties agreed on the terms of reference for negotiation and
defined the issues to be negotiated. The outcome was a four-points agenda: the immediate end of violence; addressing
the humanitarian crisis; a political solution to the crisis; and long-term issues such as constitutional, electoral and legal
reform.
Subsequently, the sharing of information led the parties to recognise that the election results were only a trigger for
the outbreak of violence and that the core problem was a more general crisis of the Kenyan political system and
institutions, which were lacking legitimacy and were unable to address grievances. A joint analysis of the crisis resulted
in the acknowledgement that under the current conditions it was impossible to find out who was the true winner of
the elections and that a comprehensive political solution was necessary.
Originally, both parties were defending the position that they had won the presidential elections and both wanted their
leader to become president of Kenya. But a closer look at their interests and fears revealed their real motivations. On
the one hand, both parties wanted to hold power, govern the country and set up policies that favoured their
supporters. On other hand, they feared exclusion from the political and economic spheres. Hence, the major issues to
address were power and inclusion. The solution was power-sharing and the creation of a new position of power, which
was the post of Prime Minister.
The negotiations resulted in the signing of an Agreement on the principles of partnership of the Coalition Government.
The agreement states: There will be a Prime Minister of the Government of Kenya, with authority to coordinate and
supervise the execution of the functions and affairs of the Government of Kenya. The two main parties also shared
executive power and the positions in the Cabinet.
After the agreement was signed, the implementation phase started when the National Assembly of Kenya passed the
Nation and Reconciliation Accord Act that effected a temporary change to the constitution in order to include the
position of Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers. In 2010 a constitutional referendum was held in Kenya and
subsequently a new constitution was adopted.
DPA (2008); IECAH (2008); Office of Public Communications, Republic of Kenya (2008);
Office of Public Communications, Republic of Kenya (2010)
5. Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Conflicts
It is important to note that not all conflicts can be resolved through negotiations. However, there exist certain
conditions that may facilitate such an approach. William Zartman explains that conflicts in which neither party
has a realistic hope of a victory through unilateral action have a greater chance of being resolved through
negotiations. Indeed, when states are engaged in a war of attrition where the cost is too high for both parties
to continue fighting, they have a greater incentive to move to the negotiation table. Zartman explains that in
cases where states are locked into a mutually hurting stalemate, the conflict is ripe for negotiations.
BOX 15 | MUTUALLY HURTING STALEMATE (MHS)

[W]hen the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is
painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative
policy or way out.
Zartman (2001)
Ripeness is essentially a matter of perception and it can be made more real through:
(1) Incentives (e.g., economic assistance from a third party, etc.);
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(2) Persuasion based on power (e.g., threats from neighbouring states);

(3) Persuasion based on communication (e.g., a mediator leads conflict parties to realise the potential
benefits of peace).
Other factors that can increase the perception of ripeness include changes in the international order or in the
political situation of conflict parties. The election of a new leader may be an opportunity for negotiating a
settlement. Likewise, pressure from a powerful state may push a party to the negotiation table. This type of
arm twisting may kick-start negotiations but does not ensure that an acceptable agreement will be reached and
implemented. Third parties may also provide what Zartman calls a Mutually Enticing Opportunity, a strong
incentive for both parties to join the negotiation table.
BOX 16 | MUTUALLY ENTICING OPPORTUNITY (MEO)

Negotiators must provide or be provided prospects for a more attractive future to pull them out of their conflict, once a
Mutually Hurting Stalemate has pushed them into negotiations. The seeds of the pull factor begin with the way out that
the parties vaguely perceive as part of the initial ripeness, but that general sense of possibility needs to be developed
and fleshed out into the vehicle for an agreement, a formula for settlement and a prospect of reconciliation that the
negotiating parties design during negotiations. When a MEO is not developed in the negotiations, they remain truncated
and unstable, even if they reach a conflict management agreement to suspend violence.
Zartman (2001)
When a conflict is not ripe, Track II diplomacy can be useful to create or stimulate ripeness. For example, a
third party can guide conflict actors to consider the costs and impact of conflict or to expand their horizon on
their needs and interests. Direct communication through informal diplomacy can help to build trust and
confidence across conflict lines and to open a broader realm of possibilities for conflict resolution. The
stimulation of ripeness through Track II diplomacy can be especially useful when official negotiations are
impossible for any of the following reasons:
One or more parties is seen as illegitimate by the others;
The middle leadership is concerned about the cost of the conflict;
The middle leadership is unsupportive of an official peace process;
The population at large is critical of any peacemaking.
BOX 17 | CASE STUDY: MUTUALLY HURTING STALEMATE IN ACEH

Separatist conflict in Aceh had started in 1976, when the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) had launched its insurgency for
independence. The Government of Indonesia and the Indonesian military (TNI) as well as GAM had taken advantage of
ceasefires to reinforce their capacities and to strengthen their position in the conflict. In 2003, the promising Cessation
of Hostilities Agreement broke down because the conflict actors were simply unwilling to believe that their military
options were exhausted. Therefore, both sides viewed the peace process primarily in tactical terms and as a means to
undermine their opponents or gain some other short-term advantage (Aspinall & Crouch 2003). The conflict was not
yet ripe for negotiations.
From 2003 onwards, the conflict ripened and GAM and the TNI became locked in a hurting stalemate. After the TNI had
intensified its military operations, there were signs of a decline in GAMs strength and its battlefield losses seemed to
cause a drop in morale within its ranks. Hence, GAM was facing hardship without any prospect for independence. On
the other hand, the military offensive was unable to eradicate GAM and the human rights abuses that resulted from
the military operations antagonized the population and fostered popular support for GAM. In addition, the government
had to bear the increasing human and financial costs of operations that were estimated at US$130 million per year
(Huber 2008).
Besides the intensifying hurting stalemate, political changes increased the prospects of a peace agreement. Even
though, there had always been key actors in the government that had favoured negotiations over a military solution,
hard-liners had dominated for a long time. In 2004, a change in government allowed for a change of policy and gave
one of the most important proponents of a negotiated peace, Jusuf Kalla, the position of Vice President. In addition,
former president of Finland Martti Ahtisaari agreed to mediate the conflict and brought a high degree of authority and
leverage to the process.
Moreover, the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 struck Aceh and rendered suffering in symmetry unprecedented in the
province (Large & Aguswandi 2008). Both conflict parties quickly promised to cease hostilities to allow access for
humanitarian aid. The tsunami also attracted renewed international interest in the conflict and its peaceful resolution.
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Finally, the tsunami offered both sides a pretext to resume negotiations with greater concessions and without losing
face, hence strengthening the parties perception of a way out.
All in all, GAMs declining strength, changes in the composition of government and the post-tsunami environment
reinforced simultaneously the parties perception of a hurting stalemate and of the potential of a negotiated
settlement. After five rounds and six months of negotiation the two sides eventually agreed on the Helsinki
Memorandum of Understanding bringing the long civil war to an end in 2005.
Aspinall (2003); Aspinall (2005); Huber (2008); Large & Aguswandi (2008)
Negotiation is a bilateral or multilateral process in which conflict parties and influential actors try to find a
shared solution or compromise through communication and the sharing of information.
Negotiation involves at least two parties who pursue (seemingly) incompatible goals in a condition of
relative power symmetry. It is a verbal and dynamic process whereby parties want to find a solution and
use dialogue and exchange of information to this end.
Positional negotiation is a strategy whereby negotiators begin from their original position and then
bargain with one another to find a middle way and reach compromise.
Strengths of positional negotiation:
o Does not require trust;
o Limits disclosure of information;
o Limits unnecessary concessions;
o Useful for conflicts over limited resources;
o Useful for negotiations between strangers
o Useful for simple conflicts;
o May be the only option short of force.
Weaknesses of positional negotiation:
o May damage relationships;
o Locked positions may lead to polarization;
o Results in a forced mutual compromise;
o Slow with a higher risk of stalling;
o Coercion, threats, lying, competition;
o Limited information sharing may result in a partial settlement.
Interest-based negotiation is a strategy whereby everyones concerns are addressed proactively in order
to find a win-win solution that will fulfil the greatest number of interests and needs.
Strengths of interest-based negotiation:
o Win-win solution;
o Addresses interests and needs;
o Cooperative;
o May strengthen the relationship;
o Holistic;
o Creative;
o A wide range of solutions are considered.
Weaknesses of interest-based negotiation:
o Lengthy and time-consuming;
o Facilitates free-riding;
o Requires trust, honesty and open communication;
o Requires disclosure of information including interests and needs;
o Win-win solutions may not be available;
o Everyone should play by the rules.
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o Parties may not be able to deal with traumas and emotions in order to cooperate.
The Win-Win approach assumes that the objective is not to beat the other party but to reach an
agreeable settlement where all stakeholders feel that they have won.
Pitfalls to reach a Win-Win solution include:
o Pitfall 1: Premature Judgment;
o Pitfall 2: Narrowing down to a single issue;
o Pitfall 3: Focusing on ones problems and needs;
o Pitfall 4: Lack of Information.
The Satisfaction triangle provides a visual representation of three dimensions that must be taken into
account to assess satisfaction, namely, the psychological, the procedural and the substantive dimensions
The stages of negotiation include:
o Stage 1: Pre-negotiation and planning;
o Stage 2: Initial meetings with sharing of information;
o Stage 3: Generation of potential solutions;
o Stage 4: Drafting of agreement;
o Stage 5: Ratification and implementation.
A conflict is ripe when neither party has a realistic hope of a victory through unilateral action.
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LESSON 7 |
Mediation
LESSON OUTLINE:
1. Introduction
2. Types of Mediation
3. Steps of Mediation
4. Role of the Mediator
5. Re-framing a Conflict
6. Inclusivity
7. Limits of Mediation
Describe the main steps and elements of mediation;

Appraise the different types of mediation;
Explain the purpose of re-framing;
Outline the importance and dangers of inclusivity in mediation;
Identify the advantages and limits of mediation.
1. Introduction
Mediation is an extension of negotiation whereby a

BOX 19 | DEFINITION: MEDIATION
third and neutral party acts as a facilitator (Yarn 1999).
Like negotiation, mediation is a very old technique that Mediation is a process where those in conflict
is broadly used in todays world in family relations, seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help
commercial and trade businesses or international from an outsider (whether an individual, an
relations. For the period 1945-2000, more than 300 organization, a group, or a state) to change their
international conflicts were recorded by Bercovitch perceptions or behavior, and to do so without
and Fretter (2004) and more than 3,750 mediation resorting to physical force or invoking the authority
attempts were made to resolve them. Mediation is a of the law.
technique to resolve conflicts that is largely used by Bercovitch (1992)
many actors and recognized by the United Nations in
its
Charter.
Mediation is defined in the United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012: 4) as a process whereby a
third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping
them to develop mutually acceptable agreements. The premise of mediation is that in the right environment,
conflict parties can improve their relationships and move towards cooperation. The key difference between
negotiation and mediation is the presence, in mediation, of a third party which helps conflict actors to reach an
acceptable settlement. Mediation is about the voluntary participation of actors into a face-to-face dialogue
with the assistance of a mediator. The objective is to enable dialogue and the sharing of information to jointly
reach an agreement.
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The main characteristics of a mediation process are as follow:
Voluntary participation of all actors present;

Face-to-face dialogue;
Non-coercive and non-violent intervention;
Assistance of an impartial mediator to facilitate communication;
Conflict parties have full ownership and responsibility for the process;
Sharing of relevant information to affect behaviour and attitudes;
Mutually acceptable agreement reached jointly.
Mediation processes vary in approach, scope and outcome and the above characteristics may not be applicable
to more directive types of mediation which can rely on threats and coercion. In this regard, the role played by
the mediator will influence the nature of the mediation. According to some, mediators should not enjoy
independent authority to make decisions and should only act as a catalyst to enable conflict parties to reach an
agreement themselves. The neutrality, impartiality and absence of coercion on the part of the mediator are
often stressed as being defining features of any mediation. However, this is not always the case and in practice,
the mediator is unlikely to solely facilitate the process. James Wall (1981) outlined more than 100 functions
played, and behaviours adopted, by mediators.
The objective of this lesson is to explore the characteristics of a mediation process including the different
approaches that can be used, the different steps of a mediation process and the role that mediators may wish
to play. The technique of re-framing is also explored as a tool to enable conflict parties to move forward
towards the resolution of the conflict.
2. Types of Mediation
Every mediation process is different but in general terms, three approaches are widely used to enable conflict
parties to reach a settlement: (1) facilitative mediation; (2) evaluative mediation; and (3) transformative
mediation (Bercovitch 2007). Each approach has its specific characteristics and may not be suitable to all types
of conflict.
Type 1: Facilitative Mediation
Facilitative mediation corresponds to a process whereby the mediator is responsible for the good development
of the mediation process rather than its substance. The mediation provides a structure and a space for
communication between conflict parties but does not impose an agenda or the content of the discussions. The
entire process is driven by the parties on a consensual and voluntary basis. It is based on the assumption that
the best way to reach an agreement that will be accepted and implemented is to solely provide the right
conditions and environment for the conflict parties to communicate. The full ownership and responsibility for
the process rest on the shoulders of the parties, not the mediator.
Type 2: Evaluative Mediation
Evaluative mediation gives a greater role to the mediating third-party. The mediator is expected to actively help
conflict parties to reach a mutually acceptable agreement by evaluating the merit of the demands they make as
well as of the solutions they offer. The mediator guides and advises parties to develop their position and to find
convincing reasons to support their claims. He or she will then put forward a middle way solution and will
attempt to persuade the different parties to accept it. The judgment of the mediator is ultimately based on a
good understanding of the underlying root causes of the conflict and the options offered should address them.
In some cases, a mediation process may begin in a facilitative form to then slowly evolve towards an evaluative
form. It should be noted that this approach to mediation is often used prior to court cases and has a certain
legal dimension.
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BOX 20 | CASE STUDY: EVALUATIVE MEDIATION : MARTTI AHTISAARI IN THE ACEH CONFLICT
Evaluative mediation was employed by the former President of Finalnd Martti Ahtisaari in the mediation of the
Memorandum of Understanding between the Free Aceh Movement (Indonesian: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and
the Government of Indonesia in 2005. When Martti Ahtisaari assumed his role as mediator, he knew that the
government would never accept Acehs independence as an outcome: It was clear that the government was not
offering independence and I had to work out with GAM how they could obtain the things they wanted, which they
thought independence would have fulfilled. Our task was to examine whether we could reach an agreement on this
basis. The outcome would be the next best alternative to independence and it needed to be guaranteed by proper legal
arrangements. (Ahtisaari 2008: 24). Thus, Ahtisaari helped GAM to evaluate its position and demands and to find
potential alternatives which could equally satisfy their interests and needs. To conduct affective evaluative mediation, a
mediator must be able to persuade conflict parties to re-frame their view of the conflict and to accept a solution that
fulfills their interests and needs. In this regard, Ahtisaari managed to do so when he convinced GAM to accept special
autonomy: The only agenda and vehicle we have is special autonomy, nothing else. (Martti Ahtisaari cited by
Awaluddin 2008: 27).
Awaluddin (2008), Ahtisaari (2008), Aspinall (2005)
Type 3: Transformative Mediation
Transformative mediation is characterized by

BOX 21 | EMPOWERING THROUGH MEDIATION
its emphasis on the actual transformation of
the conflict and its underlying structures. In transformative mediation, the term empowerment refers
Rather than focusing on reaching an acceptable the increasing skills of conflict parties to make beneficial
settlement, this type of mediation works decisions for themselves. In The Promise of Mediation (1994:
towards the empowerment and emancipation 2), Baruch Bush and Joe Folger explain that empowerment is
of conflict parties. In particular, it enables [t]he restoration to individuals of a sense of their own value
participants to transcend their perceptions and and strength and their own capacity to handle lifes problems.
Conflict parties become clearly aware of their needs, interests
world-views with a view to increasing
and options and they use this knowledge to make constructive
autonomy and power in general. It is based on decisions.
the assumption that conflicts are relational and
emerge from problems of communication rather than conflicts of interests. As such, the goal is to restore
mutual recognition, communication and non-violent interaction, putting an end to the spiral of escalation and
de-humanisation characteristic of conflicts. Success in transformative mediation is not measured based on a
settlement but on the degree to which conflict parties have re-built strong, dynamic and constructive
interaction patterns.
Transformative mediation is often opposed to more classical approaches which focus on solving problems
rather than transforming it. While approaches tend to overlap, it is possible to broadly differentiate them. Heidi
Burgess provided a useful comparison based on idealized descriptions of both transformative and problem-
solving approaches to mediation.
TABLE 2 |COMPARISON: TRANSFORMATIVE AND PROBLEM-SOLVING MEDIATION

Transformative Mediation Problem-Solving Mediation (Evaluative &
Facilitative)
Assumptions Conflict is an opportunity for moral growth Conflict is a problem in need of a solution;
About and transformation; Conflict is a short term situation.
Conflict Conflict tends to be a long term process.
Facilitate parties' empowerment and Take collaborative steps to solve identified

Ideal
recognition of others. problem;
Response
Maximize joint gains.
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Goal of Parties' empowerment and recognition of Settlement of the dispute.

Mediation others.
Secondary: parties are seen as experts, with Mediator is expert, who directs problem
Mediator motivation and capacity to solve own solving process.
Role problems with minimum help;
Mediator is responsive to parties.
Mediator explains concept of mediation, but Mediator explains goal is settlement, designs
lets parties set goals, direct process, design process to achieve settlement, sets ground
ground rules. Makes it clear settlement is only rules. May consult parties about these issues,
one of a variety of possible outcomes; but mediator takes lead;
Mediator "microfocuses" on parties' Mediator "categorizes" case, frames it for
statements, lets them frame issues disputants;
themselves; Mediators direct the discussions, dropping
Mediators allow parties to take discussions issues which are not amenable to
where they want them to go; encouraging negotiation (for example, relational or
discussion of all issues that are of importance identity issues) and focusing on areas "ripe"
to the parties, regardless of whether or not for resolution (usually negotiable interests);
they are easily negotiable; Mediators discourage discussion of the past,
Mediator
Mediators encourage mutual recognition of as it tends to lead to blaming behaviours,
Actions
relational and identity issues as well as needs focus instead is on the present and future--
and interests; how to solve the current problem;
Mediators encourage an examination of the Emotions are seen as extraneous to "real
past as a way of encouraging recognition of issues." Mediators try to avoid parties'
the other; emotional statements, or emotions are
Emotions are seen as an integral part of the tightly controlled;
conflict process; mediators encourage their Mediators use their knowledge to develop
expression; options for settlement; can be quite directive
Mediators encourage parties' deliberation of about settlement terms.
situation and analysis of options; parties'
design settlement (if any) themselves and are
free to pursue other options at any time.
Mediators focus on parties' interactions, Mediators focus on parties' situation and

Mediator
looking for opportunities for empowerment interests, looking for opportunities for joint
Focus
and/or recognition of the other. gains and mutually satisfactory agreements.
Time is open-ended; parties spend as much Mediator sets time limits, encourages parties
Use of Time time on each activity as they want to. No pre- to move on or meet deadlines. Mediator
set "stages" as in problem solving mediation. moves parties from "stage" to "stage."
Definition of Any increase in parties' empowerment and/or Mutually agreeable settlement.

success recognition of the other--"small steps count".
Type 4: Directive Mediation
Directive mediation is the most robust form of mediation since the mediator influences directly the content
and substance of the mediation. The mediator may do so by offering incentives (carrots) or by using threats
(stick) to achieve compliance. Directive mediation aims at changing the parties framing of issues and their
associated behaviour to reach a settlement. The most powerful form of directive mediation is also referred to
as power mediation because the mediator employs economic, military, and political resources to pull or push
the parties in the desired direction and to secure compliance.
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BOX 22 | US POWER MEDIATION: ENDING WAR IN BOSNIA
After several failed attempts by the Contact Group and the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) to produce a settlement to the Bosnian war, the United States took over the negotiations. The
new mediator was hence a state actor, represented by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, with superior military and
economic power and the leverage to persuade other states as well as international organisations to support its policies.
In November 1995, the US organised the Dayton conference and invited the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and
Yugoslavia. The result was the Dayton agreement, which was signed in December 1995 and brought the Bosnian war to
an end. During the negotiations the US applied the following strategies:
(1) Sticks: In August 1995, NATO started a massive bombing campaign against Serb targets, which was
followed by Croat and Muslim offensives on the ground. As a consequence, the latter were able to advance
significantly and to take possession of large areas previously occupied by the Serb forces. The military
campaign contributed to the peace process in two respects: It enhanced the credibility of Western diplomacy
by demonstrating to the Serbs that their non-cooperation would be severely punished. And the territorial
changes made subsequent territorial bargaining easier, because fewer adjustments were necessary.
The US also threatened to withdraw its support for Bosnian Muslims and to isolate them in order to obtain
greater flexibility from them. The US furthermore threatened the delegations that it would announce the
failure of the talks and the end of the conference the next day. As a result, the parties quickly came to an
agreement and brought the conference to a successful end.
(2) Carrots: The US promised the Bosnian Muslims that they would receive training and equipment for their
army as well as financial assistance from other Muslim states if they agreed to the Dayton settlement. The US
also promised to persuade Europe and Russia to support the lifting of the UN arms embargo.
All in all, the US had resources to its disposal that previous mediators lacked and which it was able to use to coerce,
entice and persuade the disputants. However, the means used by the US raise the question as to whether the process
can be called mediation. On the one hand the US bridged the gaps between the parties and also left some room for
negotiation and bargaining. But on the other, it had recourse to force to reach a settlement.
Halbrooke (1998); Touval (1996)
Pros and Cons of Mediation Types
Proponents of facilitative and transformative mediations emphasise the ability of these approaches to
empower conflict parties by giving them complete ownership and responsibility for the process. Conflict parties
are responsible for the conflict in the first place but they are also responsible for finding a solution, or not.
Critiques of facilitative and transformative mediations argue that such approaches are time-consuming and
often fail to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. The lack of pressure and direction from the mediator
means that irrelevant issues may be discussed at length at the expenses of finding a solution.
Proponents of evaluative mediation, on the other side, argue that conflict parties expect to resolve their
disputes and that to do so they need the assistance of a skilful mediator that can guide them and direct them.
The evaluation of claims is essential to ensure that a fair agreement is reached. Critiques of this approach will
instead criticize this counter-productive focus on reaching a settlement. The objective should not be to find a
solution at all costs but to empower parties to restore communication. Finding a solution should be the
decision of the conflict parties themselves, not an assumption imposed by a third party.
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FIGURE 2 |PARTIES CONTROL IN MEDIATION PROCESSES
3. Steps of Mediation
According to the United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012: 4), mediation starts from the
moment the mediator engages with the conflict parties and other stakeholders to prepare for a process and
can include informal talks-about talks and may extend beyond the signing of agreements. From informal
mediation in domestic disputes to high-profile mediation to resolve international conflicts, the structure of
mediation processes can vary greatly. The dynamic nature of
conflicts means that mediation should not be linear and fully BOX 23| OWNERSHIP
controlled but that it should remain flexible. Despite great
diversity, most mediation process follows a series of seven It is challenging for an external mediator to
steps that overlap to some extent: identify whose ownership is necessary and to
facilitate ownership of the process beyond
people in positions of power. Cultivating and
Step 1: Preparation;
exercising ownership may require
Step 2: Opening; strengthening the negotiating capabilities of
Step 3: Outline of the Conflict; one or more of the conflict parties, as well as
Step 4: Exchange of Views; civil society and other stakeholders, to enable
Step 5: Moving Forward; their effective participation in the process
Step 6: Terms of Agreement; and ability to engage on often complex
issues. The extent to which the process is
Step 7: Closure
inclusive has a direct impact on the depth of
ownership.
The description of each step of a mediation process provided UN (2012: 14)
below are especially applicable for facilitative mediation and
are less adapted for more directive or evaluative types of
mediation.
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Step 1: Preparing Mediation
Like negotiations, any mediation process must be carefully BOX 24| PREPAREDNESS
designed and prepared. During this first step, mediators and
conflict parties must agree on the basics. Preparedness includes Preparedness allows the mediator to guide
and monitor the mediation process, help
the knowledge and skills of the mediators as well as the political,
strengthen (where necessary) the negotiating
financial and administrative support necessary to support the capacity of the conflict parties and other
entire mediation process. More specifically, mediators must not stakeholders, assist them in reaching
only gather information through a full conflict analysis, but they agreements, and galvanize support for
implementation. A well-prepared and
must also consult with conflict parties to decide upon an agreed supported mediator is able to manage
procedure, a timeline, a series of deadlines, rules, the role that expectations, maintain a sense of urgency
the mediator is expected to play, etc. while avoiding quick-fix solutions, and
effectively respond to opportunities and
challenges in the overall process.
Conflict parties must also express their wish to engage in the
UN (2012)
mediation process with the assistance of the mediator as this will
ensure that the nature of the process is fully voluntary. Consent
of conflict parties is required for mediation to be effective but it does not automatically translate into
commitment. Consent may be given incrementally depending on the degree of trust and confidence in the
process. It may be informal at first and then become official as the process makes progress. Consent may
fluctuate and may even be withdrawn depending on the evolution of the conflict (fragmentation of leadership,
high casualties, no respect of ceasefire, etc.) or the mediation itself. A range of factors can influence the degree
of consent:
Integrity of the mediation process;
Security and confidentiality;
Acceptability of the mediator;
Evolution of the conflict on the political and military fronts;
Change in the regional and international context;
Influence of a third party such as a neighbouring state;
Lack of consent of some conflict parties;
Change of leadership affecting one or more conflict parties
BOX 25| CONSENT IN MEDIATION TIPS FOR MEDIATORS
Understand whose consent is necessary for a viable mediation process to start. If only some of the conflict
parties have agreed to the mediation, the mediator may need to engage with the consenting parties and
gradually expand the consent base. Such a judgement of sufficient consent should be based on an analysis of
the different constituencies and an assessment of the possible impact of an initially limited mediation process,
as well as the potential for excluded parties to derail the process.
Cultivate consent, in order to create the space for, and a good understanding of, mediation. Informal contacts
allow parties to test the waters without committing to a fully-fledged mediation process; this can help address
possible fears or insecurities.
Engage with local and community-based actors or organizations, including womens groups, as well as external
actors with access to and relationships with conflict parties to encourage the use of mediation.
Use confidence-building measures at different stages to build trust between the conflict parties and between
the mediator and the parties, as well as confidence in the mediation process.
Be consistent, transparent and even-handed in managing the mediation process, and respect confidentiality.
Periodically assess whether the process has sufficient consent and be prepared for fluxes in consent
throughout the mediation, working to bring the conflict parties back into the process and drawing on the
influence of their backers or other third parties as appropriate.
UN (2012)
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Step 2: Opening the Mediation Process
During this second step, the mediator introduces the parties, the conflict, the purpose of the mediation, the
role of the mediator, the logistics (time, place, confidentiality, procedure, possibility of private meetings), the
role of the parties. The aim is to set the parties at ease, to earn their trust, and to make them feel safe. During
this opening phase, parties should commit to the mediation process and accept the authority of the facilitator.
The mediator should stress the confidentiality and impartiality of the process. Impartiality is not synonymous
with neutrality and mediators should explicitly state the values and principles that they have been mandated to
uphold.
BOX 26| IMPARTIALITY TIPS FOR MEDIATORS
Ensure and seek to demonstrate that the process and the treatment of the parties is fair and balanced, including
through an effective communications strategy.
Be transparent with the conflict parties regarding the laws and norms that guide their involvement.
Not accept conditions for support from external actors that would affect the impartiality of the process.
Avoid association with punitive measures against conflict parties by other actors and minimize public criticism of
the parties as much as possible, while maintaining frank exchanges in private.
Handover to another mediator, or mediating entity, if they feel unable to maintain a balanced and impartial
approach.
UN (2012)
Step 3: Outline of the Conflict
During this third step of the mediation process, each of the conflict parties takes some time to outline his or
hers views and understanding of the conflict without being interrupted. Other parties should listen actively,
refrain from speaking and remain polite. The mediator himself usually remains silent and does not make any
comments at this stage. In some cases, she or he may ask open-ended questions to get clarifications and more
information. At this stage, the mediator can begin to make a draft of the needs and positions of each of the
parties, of their complaints, questions or positive praises. This will enable the planning of the next step of
mediation.
Step 4: Exchange of Views
Actors now begin to debate and to discuss the different issues raised in the previous step. They may disclose
new information, clarify facts, challenge the understanding of the other, etc. This transition from uninterrupted
outlines by each party to an exchange of views between them can easily lead to heated disputes and
escalation. As such, the mediator must keep the process under control by including everyone, ensuring that
information is understood, that everyone is heard and listened to, and he or she may summarise points to
clarify everyones opinion. Aggressive and unfair behaviour may be challenged and rules of mediation restated.
During this phase of mediation, actors may ask to have private meetings with the mediator. These are
confidential and enable the sharing of grievances without pressure from other conflict parties. Private meetings
can also be used by the mediator as a way to control the process, to consult with assistants and to give time to
conflict parties to calm down. During this phase of exchange of views, the ultimate objective is foster mutual
recognition, re-humanisation of the other and to facilitate the reconstruction of communication across conflict
lines.
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Step 5: Moving Forward
Once the conflict has been reconstructed and the facts have been clarified, conflict parties may move from
discussions about the past to discussions about a shared future. The mediator should summarise what has
been said and accomplished so far and make a list of issues that must be settled. All parties are required to
agree with the presentation of the mediator or correct any inaccurate statements. Practical activities may
include brainstorming sessions to create solutions, creating a list of criteria that must be included in the
agreement, etc.
Step 6: Terms of Agreement
During this penultimate step, conflict parties begin to brainstorm over the details of potential solutions and
alternatives to conflict. They must consider implications and consequences of a settlement for themselves and
the others. The mediator may act as a reality check when unrealistic claims are made. At the end of this phase,
a S.M.A.R.T. (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Time-bound) and fair agreement should be drafted.
Safeguards and checks regarding the implementation of the agreement should also be listed together with a
timeline.
Step 7: Closure
Finally, the mediator double-checks that all issues have been resolved and that conflict parties are satisfied
with the settlement that they have reached. The mediation process can then be closed by acknowledging the
effort made by all parties and highlighting the progress that has been made. Everyone should sign the
agreement and get a copy of it. Formal closure concludes the mediation. These seven steps are one way among
many to run a mediation process. In reality, the borders between phases are often blurry or non-existent.
4. The Role of the Mediator
A mediator can be an expert mediator, a state or international civil servant, a scholar, a religious figure or any
individual that is willing to mediate and whom the conflict parties respect. In any case, the mediator should be
skilled and have a good knowledge of the participants and of the conflict. The mediator is not simply a silent
figure who facilitates the process and in some extreme cases, the mediator may adopt directive strategies
using carrots and sticks to break down the conflict dynamics. Joseph Stullberg (1987) has made a list of 7
different roles that a mediator can play:
1) Open communication channels and keep them open;

2) Guide and help parties to think creatively about the possible options, to think out of the box;
3) Keep conflict parties in touch with reality to avoid them making unrealistic demands;
4) Give the entire responsibility for the process to the participants;
5) Help participants to think differently about the conflict by re-framing it;
6) Educate participants to develop important skills such as empathy, active listening, emotion
management, etc.;
7) Act as a scapegoat and take the blame if some ideas do not work.
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On top of these roles, a mediator may actively separate BOX 27| A GOOD MEDIATOR
parties to reduce tensions, strike a power balance by
empowering the weaker side, suggest trade-offs, suggest A good mediator promotes exchange through
listening and dialogue, engenders a spirit of
to broaden the mediation process to include relevant collaboration through problem solving, ensures that
stakeholders, use carrots and the sticks to manage negotiating parties have sufficient knowledge,
conflict parties, put ultimatums or threaten to quit, etc. information and skills to negotiate with confidence and
broadens the process to include relevant stakeholders
(Zartman 2007). All these attitudes ultimately depend on
from different segments of a society. Mediators are
the context, the nature of the conflict and the character most successful in assisting negotiating parties to forge
of participants. In the 21st century, people with very agreements when they are well informed, patient,
different cultures meet much more often than they used balanced in their approach and discreet.
to. This means that mediation may take place between UN (2012: 4-5)
people of different cultures. Therefore, the mediator
must be ready to adapt accordingly.
BOX 28| SHOULD MEDIATORS BE NEUTRAL?
It is often assumed that mediators should be neutral. However, the lack of neutrality may be a strength and a key to
taking the mediation process forward. For example, in talks over the nuclear programme of North Korea, the Chinese
mediators have managed to play an influential role because of the trust they enjoy in the eyes of the North Korean
leaders. Their pro-North Korean bias is actually facilitating communication and increasing confidence in the process.
Likewise, when the Russians negotiated with the Serbs over the situation in the Balkans, they managed to get
compliance because they were trusted by their interlocutor. Had NATO contacted the Serbians directly, it might have
been seen as an act of intimidation and trust would have been lacking. In fact, a completely impartial and neutral
mediator may not achieve results because of the lack of trust and credibility that s/he would enjoy in the eyes of the
conflict parties.
5. Re-framing a Conflict
Re-framing is a conflict resolution technique which allows mediators to move mediation and negotiation
forward by shifting the terms of the debate from a polarised setting to a more fluid frame where shared
interests are possible. Indeed, in any conflict actors have public positions which are radically opposed to those
of their opponents. These positions are seen as incompatible and inevitably clash. The goal of re-framing is to
resolve a conflict by moving away from these opposed positions to consider needs, interests and fears.
FIGURE 3 |POSITIONS INTERESTS AND NEEDS
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Re-framing involves the creation of an alternative interpretation of events and beliefs of a conflict. When
conflict actors are engaged in a fight, they are no longer listening to one another and are solely opposing strong
and polarised statements based on their position. They are blaming one another, making the other wrong,
justifying their actions, etc. By re-framing the conflict, the mediator opens the door to an alternative way of
seeing the world, of communicating with the other and of perceiving/interpreting the situation. Re-framing is
carried out by moving from the opposition of positions to the consideration of the interest and needs that
underlie the conflict. For example, a conflict may erupt between members of two different religious groups.
Their positions are crystallised around a believer/unbeliever dichotomy whereby acts of violence can be
justified. There is no way to get the two parties to collaborate at the level of positions. However, it might be
that the clash erupted because of underlying needs for political representation or justice, needs that might be
shared and over which collaboration is possible. This shift from positions to needs is what is called re-framing.
FIGURE 4 |FROM INCOMPATIBLE POSITIONS TO RE-FRAMING
Jay Rothman developed a specific type of re-framing technique known as the ARIA Framework whereby
conflict actors slowly move from Antagonism to Resonance to Invention and to Action. In the first part of the
mediation process, parties are expected to focus on their incompatible positions and to act negatively towards
one another. They are led to express their frustration, anger and other negative emotions in a controlled way.
In the second part of the mediation, the mediator leads conflict parties to reframe their conflict from positions
to interests and needs. This is based on the assumption that everyone needs security and identity, two
universal needs that are actually interconnected: the more people feel secure, the less aggressive they are and
vice versa. Once conflict parties realize this state of affair, they enter into resonance and can move on to
inventing new solutions and implementing them.
6. Inclusivity
Any mediator must take important decisions regarding the conflict actors that will be invited or allowed to take
part in the mediation process. Inclusivity refers the degree to which the views and range of conflict parties are
represented and integrated into the mediation effort. Greater inclusivity ensures that:
Conflict causes are addressed;
The needs of the population are addressed;
The Mediation process enjoys legitimacy;
National ownership is strengthened;
There is greater buy-in;
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Potential peace spoilers are included.
It should be noted that inclusivity does not automatically mean that all parties take direct part in the
mediation. It only means that a broad range of perspectives is included in the deliberations. However,
inclusivity also has drawbacks:
Many conflict actors are not legitimate and do not represent a large constituency;
Including armed groups in the process sends the signal that violence pays;
Some actors may oppose mediation;
Not all parties are coherent enough to engage in mediation;
Some key actors may refuse to include other parties;
Inclusivity is time-consuming and may lead some actors to give up because of a lack of progress;
It may not be suitable to reach a quick cease-fire;
Confidentiality is harder to ensure.
TABLE 3 |ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES OF INCLUSIVITY

Advantages Challenges
Addresses conflict causes Finding legitimate and representative actors
Addresses needs Opposition from certain actors
Legitimacy Lacking party coherence
Strengthens national ownership Certain actors refusing to include others
Greater buy-in Time-consuming
Inclusion of potential spoilers Ensuring confidentiality
BOX 29| CASE STUDY: INCLUSIVITY - JOINT AND INTEGRATED AU-UN MEDIATION IN DARFUR
In 2006, the United Nations and the African Union initiated a joint mediation effort to settle the conflict in Darfur.
Ambassador Jan Eliasson (UN) and Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim (AU) were appointed to unify all peace initiatives
under the umbrella of the joint mediation support team, to unify the splintered rebel movements and to start
substantive talks.
The inclusion of relevant rebel groups and unarmed actors in a peace process is necessary to establish a durable peace
agreement and to avoid the emergence of peace spoilers. Being aware of the failures of previous negotiation efforts in
Darfur, the AU-UN mediating team heavily built on inclusivity, aiming at integrating all stakeholders into the peace
process including rebel groups, civil society and Western donors.
Although the aspirations were high, the joint AU-UN mediation failed to live up to the expectations and the mediators
were not able to resolve the conflict. One of the main reasons behind the failure of the peace negotiations lied in the
unsuccessful attempt to unify the rebel movements. Splinter rebel groups that were not invited to participate in the
peace process began to act as spoilers through the attack civilians, humanitarian workers and the AU peacekeepers.
In an attempt to decrease the number of spoilers, the AU and UN mediators invited the splinter rebel leaders to attend
negotiations in Sirte, Libya. However, major rebel leaders then decided to boycott the negotiations, blaming the
mediators for encouraging fragmentation and factionalism among the rebel groups and for legitimising their use of
violence (see Netabay 2009:9). Nilsson observed that during previous attempts to come to an agreement in Darfur the
exclusion of victimized people in the IDP camps led to major popular demonstrations against the ongoing peace talks.
This led the joint AU and UN mediation team to reach out to major refugee camps. However, Steinberg argues that
there may be occasions where it is wise to include only the principal armed parties in the initial stages of peace
negotiation, as long as it is clear that the voices of other key actors including IDP representatives will be heard and
heeded shortly thereafter (Crisis Group: 2007).
Overall, the mediators were faced with a major dilemma. Greater inclusivity may not be acceptable to all parties and
may not lead to an agreement, but a lack of inclusivity may facilitate the emergence of peace spoilers.
Banseka (2012),Netabay (2009), Nilsson (2006), Steinberg (2007)
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BOX 30| INCLUSIVITY TIPS FOR MEDIATORS
Identify the level of inclusivity needed for the mediation to start and required for a durable peace that
addresses the needs of all affected by the conflict.
Communicate with any party or actor necessary to address the conflict, with the knowledge of the other
negotiating parties.
Limit contacts with actors that have been indicted by the International Criminal Court to what is necessary for
the mediation process.
Promote understanding among conflict parties of the value of broader participation and minimize
preconditions for participation in the process.
Ensure systematic and structured consultation with womens groups early in the process to allow for
meaningful participation, with specific efforts to include them in the mediation process.
Encourage conflict parties to include women in their delegations.
Identify partners to help build the capacity of civil society and other relevant stakeholders to engage
effectively.
Develop mechanisms to broaden participation in the process, and to engage and include the different
perspectives within civil society and other stakeholders, throughout the various phases of the peace process.
Use different forms of media, including social media and opinion polls, to expand participation, inform and
engage the public and identify potential points of contention.
UN (2012: 13)
7. Limits of Mediation
Mediation can have positive and negative impacts on a conflict and mediators should always remember that
withdrawing or putting the process on hold may be the best course of action. This may be especially important
if:
Conflict parties are pursuing talks in bad faith;
The mediation is at odds with international legal obligations;
Some actors are manipulating the process;
Some actors are purposefully limiting the mediators room for manoeuvre.
Withdrawal is a very sensitive decision to make and mediators should decide whether the risks of withdrawing
outweigh the value of keeping conflict parties engaged in a faltering process. Ultimately, mediation may not be
suitable in certain conflicts, especially in cases where:
The main conflict parties are not open to trying to negotiate a settlement;
The mediator is not accepted or his credibility is questioned;
There is no regional or international consensus to support the process
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Mediation is a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent,
manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements. The premise of
mediation is that in the right environment, conflict parties can improve their relationships and move
towards cooperation.
The main characteristics of a mediation process are as follow:
o Voluntary participation of all actors present;
o Face-to-face dialogue;
o Non-coercive and non-violent intervention;
o Assistance of an impartial mediator to facilitate communication;
o Conflict parties have full ownership and responsibility for the process;
o Sharing of relevant information to affect behaviour and attitudes;
o Mutually acceptable agreement reached jointly.
The three main approaches to mediation are:
o (1) Facilitative mediation;
o (2) Evaluative mediation;
o (3) Transformative mediation.
In general, mediation has seven steps that can overlap to some extent:
o Step 1: Preparation;
o Step 2: Opening;
o Step 3: Outline of the Conflict;
o Step 4: Exchange of Views;
o Step 5: Moving Forward;
o Step 6: Terms of Agreement;
o Step 7: Closure.
Mediators may be called to play different roles throughout a mediation process:
o Open communication channels;
o Guide parties to think out of the box;
o Reality checker;
o Give the entire responsibility for the process to the participants;
o Re-framing;
o Educate participants to develop important skills;
o Scapegoat.
Re-framing is a conflict resolution technique which allows mediators to shift the terms of the conflict from
a polarised setting to a more fluid frame where shared interests are possible.
The goal of re-framing is to resolve a conflict by moving away from opposed positions to consider needs,
interests and fears.
Mediators may decide upon the degree of inclusivity of the mediation process. Increasing or decreasing
inclusivity will have implications on the conflict and on the mediation itself.
Not all conflicts can be resolved through mediation. Some cases are more amenable to mediation than
others.
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LESSON 8 |
Humanitarian Negotiation
LESSON OUTLINE:
1. Introduction
2. Preparing for Negotiation with Armed Groups
3. Humanitarian Levers
4. Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Negotiations
Describe the main steps and elements of humanitarian negotiation;

Outline key elements in the preparation of humanitarian negotiations with armed groups;
Identify the various humanitarian levers;
Appraise potentially negative consequences of humanitarian negotiations.
1. Introduction
During peace operations and more specifically

BOX 32 | DEFINITION OF HUMANITARIAN NEGOTIATIONS
during humanitarian activities, UN staff may be
required to engage with government officials or Humanitarian negotiations are those negotiations
armed groups to fulfil their mandate. In particular, undertaken by civilians engaged in managing, coordinating
they may have to secure the cooperation of a and providing humanitarian assistance and protection for
conflict party through negotiations in order to reach the purposes of: (i) ensuring the provision of protection
an agreement that will facilitate humanitarian action and humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations; (ii)
and the work of the United Nations. Such endeavour preserving humanitarian space; and (iii) promoting better
respect for international law.
are called humanitarian negotiations and may
concern access to refugees, the delivery of aid or UN OCHA (2006: 1)
assistance, the protection of certain groups, the
preservation of humanitarian space, the promotion of international law, the release of hostages, etc.
Humanitarian negotiations can be a humanitarian necessity and can also be used to build trust and confidence
and can serve as precursors to a peace process. Usually, humanitarian negotiations are conducted by
humanitarian actors to achieve humanitarian objectives with conflict actors in countries affected by conflict.
Humanitarian negotiations differ from other types of negotiations because:

The stakes are usually very high and success can save lives;
It involves the negotiation of non-negotiable humanitarian needs;
Negotiating parties are in a de facto power asymmetry since one is a humanitarian actor and the
other is characterized by its ability to use violence;
Humanitarian actors may be seen as a nuisance;
The background and cultures of both parties are radically different;
Commitment and implementation are difficult to secure and enforce;
The conflict environment makes communication difficult;
An agreement must be reached quickly.
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Because of these issues, humanitarian negotiations should only be entered into if they are necessary.
Moreover, positional negotiations are not an option because of the great power asymmetry. Likewise interest-
based negotiations are very difficult since the views of the negotiating parties are radically opposed. This
situation is made all the more difficult by the fact that finding a compromise may not even be an option for
humanitarian workers since it may imply illegal or immoral concessions.
2. Preparing for Negotiation with Armed Groups
Analysing Armed Groups
All humanitarian negotiations should be preceded by a full

BOX 33 | ARMED GROUPS
analysis of the conflict. Particular care should be taken in the
study of the armed groups and humanitarian actors involved Non-State Armed Groups are groups that
since this will yield very important insights regarding the have the potential to employ arms in the
potential negotiations. Armed groups are characterized by their use of force to achieve political, ideological
or economic objectives; are not within the
use of force to accomplish given objectives outside the formal
formal military structures of States, State-
military chain of commands of states and international alliances or intergovernmental
organisations. The command structure of the group may not be organizations; and are not under the control
fully functioning and as a result, lower-ranking members may of the State(s) in which they operate.
not respect the agreement reached by their leaders.
UN OCHA 2006. 1
In the manual Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups,
OCHA suggests to study:
Past and current motivations;
Hierarchical structure and leadership as well as autonomy of sub-commanders;
Principles of action;
Interests and shared interests;
Constituency and degree of legitimacy;
Needs;
Ethno-cultural or religious dimensions;
Control of population and territory;
Coalitions with other conflict actors;
Previous history of negotiation.
The multiplication of humanitarian actors in

BOX 34 | LEGITIMACY OF ARMED GROUPS TIPS FOR
conflict zones means that coordination is NEGOTIATORS
necessary. In many cases, armed groups
have engaged with individual organisations Armed groups may profess to act on behalf of a particular group
to better pursue their interests. They have (e.g. ethnic group, tribe), when in many cases the group has no basis
for claiming a mandate from the purported constituents.
played humanitarian actors against one
another with negative implications for the Humanitarian negotiators should be aware of the potential for the
targeted beneficiaries of the humanitarian armed group to use the process of negotiations as a means of
activities. Multi-agency negotiations with exerting further control over their stated constituency. Humanitarian
armed groups may be more adapted but negotiators should therefore establish and maintain separate lines of
communication with bona fide community and civil society leaders
require greater coordination and
from within the population that may be under the control of the
agreement over the underlying objectives armed group (e.g. tribal leaders; womens committees; religious
of the process. All efforts must be made to leaders).
keep the humanitarian demands strictly
separated from political influences. UN OCHA 2006: 1
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BOX 35 | POLITICS IN HUMANITARIAN NEGOTIATIONS THE CASE OF ANGOLA

There was no clear strategy for negotiating humanitarian access in Angola in the months immediately following the
resumption of fighting between UNITA and government forces in September 1992. This renewed fighting followed
rejection by UNITA of the September 1992 election outcome.
In response to worsening humanitarian conditions, the UN Security Council passed resolution 811 (12 March 1993) which
called on parties to the conflict to allow unimpeded access to those in need, and mandated the SRSG to coordinate
humanitarian assistance with the resources at her disposal. This resolution provided the mandate for the SRSG to
conduct humanitarian negotiations, at a time when she was also facilitating political negotiations. Concerns about this
linkage between political and humanitarian negotiations lead the Department of Humanitarian Affairs to set up a
Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) in April 1993.
UCAHs mandate included negotiation of humanitarian access and protection of humanitarian space. The UN
Humanitarian Coordinator directing UCAH drew up an Emergency Relief Plan (ERP) for humanitarian assistance, to which
both parties to the conflict subsequently agreed, if only in principle.
By establishing itself as a distinct humanitarian entity, thereby severing the linkages between political and humanitarian
negotiations, UCAH played a central role in negotiations with the Government of Angola and UNITA on humanitarian
issues, and worked to maintain a neutral and impartial posture by referring issues of a political nature to the SRSG.
UN OCHA 2006: 22
Framing the Negotiation Process
Humanitarian negotiations differ from other types of negotiation in that they must be conducted within the
framework of humanitarian principles and policies as well as international law. As a matter of fact, these
negotiations are supposed to enable and facilitate humanitarian actions and must necessarily abide by the
relevant principles. The three fundamental principles of humanitarian action are humanity, neutrality and
impartiality. The principle of humanity calls for all forms of human suffering to be addressed, especially when it
affects vulnerable groups. The principle of neutrality requires humanitarian actors to avoid taking sides in the
conflict or related controversies. The principle of impartiality requires that assistance be provided without
discrimination and based on the needs of victims. Neutrality and impartiality are not necessarily objective and
measurable criteria and depend on subjective perceptions.
Besides humanitarian principles, international law may also be used to frame the negotiations. Relevant bodies
of law include International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International
Criminal Law and customary international law. Due consideration of international law is necessary to ensure
that negotiators do not make illegal concessions or promises. Likewise, UN negotiators are subject to specific
rules and expectations since they work within the framework of the UN Charter, relevant Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions and the Organisations rules and regulations. For example, UN Peace Agreements
cannot give amnesty to parties who committed or supported international crimes such as war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide.
BOX 36 | APPLYING HUMANITARIAN PRONCIPLES TIPS FOR NEGOTIATORS

Applying the Principle of Humanity:
Humanitarian negotiators should clearly communicate to the armed group the paramount interest of their
organization(s) as being to alleviate human suffering;
Armed groups that have limited or no knowledge of the motivations and objectives driving humanitarian action may
be suspicious of the motives of humanitarian actors. They may believe that assistance is being provided to opposing
groups, or that all the assistance should go to their group, rather than to civilians that are most in need.
Applying the Principle of Neutrality:
Humanitarian negotiations should never endorse, or be perceived to endorse, a particular political aspiration or
objective of the armed group;
Negotiation does not mean acceptance, and humanitarian negotiators must make clear that by entering into
negotiations they are not endorsing or according any recognition to the armed group.
Applying the Principle of Impartiality:
Humanitarian negotiators must not enter into an agreement with the armed group that would constrain
humanitarian action such that it is no longer delivered on the basis of need alone;
Humanitarian negotiators cannot accept conditions that the armed group may wish to impose restricting
beneficiaries of assistance and protection to those within certain ethnic, political or religious groups.
UN OCHA 2006: 25-26
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According to OCHA, humanitarian principles and international law can provide a strong framework that will
enable negotiators to:
Define boundaries within which to seek agreement;
Identify the issues that should be addressed during the negotiations;
Assist in generating options for consideration during negotiations;
Provide reference benchmarks for evaluation of options and monitoring implementation;
Frame the legal obligations of armed groups (accountability and duties of armed groups under
international law);
Provide incentives for armed groups to negotiate.
Throughout the negotiation process, humanitarian negotiators should make sure that their interlocutors
understand their responsibilities, duties and legal obligations under international law. Armed groups can be
receptive to the humanitarian principles and may take their legal obligations very seriously. Indeed, some of
them may wish to become mainstream and to join the political process and have strong incentives to abide by
international legal norms. Indeed, they may realize that compliance could enhance their credibility and
legitimacy but that the publicizing of their non-compliance could reduce their economic and political support,
especially from the diasporas.
Stages for Humanitarian Negotiations
Like all types of conflict resolution initiatives, humanitarian negotiations must be flexible enough to adapt to
changing circumstances and to the evolution of the conflict. However, humanitarian negotiations tend to go
through specific steps which are very much similar to those of other negotiation processes. Instead of going
through these steps, we will solely focus on particular points of critical importance in humanitarian
negotiations.
The preparation of humanitarian negotiations demands particular care. Besides the full conflict analysis and the
careful study of the framing of the process according to humanitarian principles and international law, this
phase requires a detailed coordination of all humanitarian partners. Humanitarian negotiations take place in a
specific context where other intervening NGOs and agencies may want to align on a similar position to push a
humanitarian agenda collectively. This enables relatively powerless actors to speak with one powerful voice
and to avoid manipulation by the interlocutors. Coordination must be revised throughout the entire process.
Sequencing and Linkages
When deciding on a strategy to negotiate, humanitarian actors may want to reflect on the linkages and
sequencing of their demands. Armed groups may not be receptive to your demands and priorities and
strategies must account for these realities. According to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2004: 48),
Sequencing means that you set aside the hardest topics until last. This enables the negotiations to move
forward and trust to emerge. However, this may also lead to the collapse of the process at the last minute
when the most difficult issues are brought up.
Contrary to sequencing, linkages are about connecting topics that are related. For example, if your interlocutor
wants you to facilitate the repatriation of refugees, you may link this issue to the current needs that these
people face (protection, food, immunisation, etc.). Both linkages and sequencing are double-edged swords and
should be used carefully. Finally, some objectives might better be kept secret and addressed through
overlapping projects whose nature will not be criticised by your interlocutor. For example, it might be better to
focus on the welfare of vulnerable groups rather than to mention specifically victims of rape.
Selecting Negotiators
An important step in the preparation of humanitarian negotiations is the selection of a negotiator as well as the
selection of interlocutors. Intermediaries are often used to create communication channels prior to the
negotiations since it may be excessively difficult to make direct contact with rebel leaders or government
officials that are at the top of the hierarchy. Alternatively, it may be strategic to negotiate with lower-ranking
leaders as long as they have the power to mobilise people and implement the agreement. This step is difficult
because during conflicts the situation changes rapidly and power relations change accordingly. Furthermore,
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some armed groups may try to delay and stall the negotiation process by sending phoney or powerless
negotiators. While it is important to select the right interlocutor, it is equally important to pick the right
negotiator or team of negotiators to represent humanitarian actors. A choice has to be made between
international and national workers, men and women, etc. Personality types must also be considered.
It is advisable to use a team approach during humanitarian negotiations.

Negotiating as a team has many advantages and makes manipulation by armed BOX 37 | ADVANTAGES OF
TEAM NEGOTIATIONS
group more difficult. At the most basic level, negotiating as a team provides a
greater degree of protection and security from direct violence and abuses. It Avoid manipulation;
also provides more safeguards to prevent negotiations from entering a vicious Protection & security;
circle of threats and counter-threats. New strategies may be possible when Prevent breakdown;
negotiating as a team (good cop/bad cop, taking personal responsibility to Offer new strategies;
Witnesses;
protect your colleagues, etc.).
Broader expertise and
experience;
Having your colleagues present will also provide you with additional witnesses Division of labour;
who will be able to confirm or deny what was said and done behind closed Shadow negotiator.
doors. It will also make it more difficult for the interlocutors to come back on
promises that were made. A negotiating team also has the marked advantage of drawing on the expertise and
experience of more individuals and of enabling the division of labour to increase efficiency. By the same token,
armed groups may understand better the mandate and objectives of your organisation.
Finally, negotiating as a team opens up the possibility of having a shadow negotiator, an individual who is not
directly present during the negotiations but who has full knowledge of the process. The shadow negotiator has
the added advantage of not being caught in the heat of the negotiations (stress, anger, frustration,
hopelessness, etc.) and can thus act as an objective adviser and reference point to keep the process moving in
the right direction.
BOX 38 | FINDING THE RIGHT INTERLOCUTEUR MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES IN AFGHANISTAN

[I]n the spring of 2009, MSF set about establishing different contacts with the opposition and, by the summer, had
been able to initiate communication with known IEA [Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan also known as Quetta Shura]
members. Right from their first discussions, these new interlocutors made clear to MSF that its earlier contacts were not
legitimate representatives of their group. Their connections lay instead with the Haqqani Network, whose influence
extended over Kabul and Afghanistans southeast, as well as the Waziristan region in Pakistan. The IEA was rooted in the
south but was also influential in the rising insurgencies in the west and north. The two groups were partner organisations,
but they had distinct constituencies and interests. From then on, the two channels should be engaged separately for
negotiation, depending on the area at stake. While MSF had been successful in expanding its network, time had
nonetheless been lost in identifying the right contacts to secure guarantees in Helmand.
MSF 2011: 61
3. Humanitarian Levers
The power asymmetry characteristic of humanitarian negotiations should not lead negotiators to assume that
they have no power and that they will have to concede on every point. The lack of military power should not be
equated with a complete lack of power. As a matter of fact, humanitarian actors enjoy a different type of
power that gives them some leverage during negotiations. Drawing on the work of Paul Bonard, the Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue outlines alternative sources of power open to humanitarian negotiators and that can be
used to gain leverage during the negotiations: the power of persuasion, denunciation, substitution and
mobilisation.
The Power of Persuasion
Persuasion is about leading the interlocutor to realise that respect for humanitarian law and human rights
would be in their advantage since it could avoid them international condemnation, isolation, or criminal
conviction and it could increase their formal recognition by the international community. This type of power is
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used by most humanitarian actors and usually takes the form of low-key advocacy away from media attention.
However, its effectiveness is rather limited, especially in cases where armed groups do not acknowledge
international law and have no political will to find a solution.
The Power of Denunciation
If persuasion does not work, denunciation may be used in certain cases and by certain actors. Once quiet
advocacy has shown its limits, it may be possible to inform or even threaten your interlocutor that their non-
respect of international law may attract media attention and decrease their credibility, legitimacy and
international support. Denunciation can be counter-productive and the actual publication of information may
lead to the breakdown of negotiations. News media have their own agenda and there is no guarantee that they
will truthfully report the violations in accordance with the message you wanted to publicise.
BOX 39 | THE POWER OF DENUNCIATION THE EXPERIENCE OF MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES IN YEMEN
Every year MSF compiled and published its Top Ten Humanitarian Crises, a public relations effort aimed at increasing
its visibility in the media. December 2009 was no exception and Yemen was on the list.
In particular, MSF said that, Violence escalated sharply in August as Yemeni army forces began carrying out air strikes
and artillery assaults against Al Houthi rebels, and reported that tens of thousands [of civilians fled] into neighbouring
Hajja, Amran, and Al Jawf governorates, where they had little to no access to healthcare services.
The information was picked up by Al Jazeera and many other Arab media outlets. The Qatari satellite channel even ran a
special edition on MSFs statements on Yemen in December 2009, its analysts wondering publicly about the negative
impact this speaking out would have on the credibility of President Saleh.
The governments response was instantaneous. Right in the middle of the war, it immediately suspended authorisation
for all of the organisations activities in Yementhe movement of people and vehicles, imports, new projects, and the
renewal of MSFs framework agreement. In a meeting, government representatives laid out their main grievances to the
head of mission: MSF had failed to remain neutral in the conflict by only condemning military violence and not that
committed by the Houthists, and it had offered an unfounded evaluation of the healthcare services in government areas
where it worked little, if at all. One of MSFs government contacts concluded, It was this kind of purely political report
that got you expelled from Darfur.
Yet listing Yemen as one of the Top Ten Humanitarian Crises served no clear political or operational objectiveother than
to attract media attention to a neglected crisis. 7 That lack of intention and objective resulted in a vague description of
the conflict and its consequences in which the government may have seen a kind of empathy with the insurgents cause.
And the brief account did present the government as the main culprit in escalating hostilities and impeding aid, cracking
down on an uprising claiming social, economic, political, and religious marginalisation.
The authorities were explicit regarding the terms of the negotiation: if MSF agreed to deny that the Yemeni government
was creating problems of access and that there was a lack of healthcare services in government zones, and to stress that
the medias sole use of the Yemen case out of the Top Ten report reflected that same medias viewpoint only, the
government would lift the sanctions. MSF accepted the deal. In December 2009, MSF operational managers sent the
Yemeni government a letter acknowledging that the report may have appeared biased, and that the issues with civilian
access to healthcare services were not sufficiently documented. The national press agency issued two press releases with
headlines that spoke for themselves: MSF apologizes for inaccurate report on Saada, and MSF: apology to Yemen for
wrong report on the health conditions of IDPs. These were texted to a number of Yemeni mobile phone subscribers and
picked up by about twenty national media organisations and a few international news agencies. The government
immediately lifted all sanctions against MSF.
MSF 2011: 44-45
The power of denunciation is closely connected to the

BOX 40 | INTENSIFICATION VS. ESCALATION
intensification of a conflict. In many cases, if a conflict is to be
resolved, it must first be brought to light and to the attention Intensifying a conflict: making a hidden conflict
of everyone. Structural inequalities can remain invisible for more visible and open, for purposeful,
long periods of time and in order to address them, it is first nonviolent ends.
necessary that all stakeholders become aware of their Escalating a conflict: making a conflict more
existence and impact. Humanitarian actors often find polarized and more violent.
themselves working not to resolve a conflict, but to intensify it
and make it more visible, to the point where the issue is more widely recognised and effective action begins to
be taken. Intensifying a conflict applies to all conflict resolution initiatives and not solely to humanitarian
negotiations.
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The Power of Substitution
Substitution refers to the fact that humanitarian aid

BOX 41 | MEETING THE DEMANDS OF ARMED GROUPS
may indirectly lead to an increase in the credibility,
popularity and legitimacy of an armed group. If Our organization cannot agree to distribute food only to
peoples basic needs are met, access to clean water is camps under your control, because, as you know, we
provided and vulnerable groups are immunised, all provide assistance wherever there is a need... What we
can do, however, is to include the civilians in those camps
stakeholders will benefit. Diseases do not have
in our needs assessment and that will ensure that those
ideological borders and safe drinking water is equally most in need in the camps also can be helped.
valuable for civilians and armed groups. Substitution
may include food and tents or more intangible goods UN OCHA 2006: 29
such as the expertise that the humanitarian
community may bring regarding agriculture, economics, development, medicine, etc. It should be noted that
humanitarian assistance should be delivered according to the principles of humanity, neutrality and
impartiality. This means that negotiators cannot agree to deliver assistance in areas selected by the armed
group. Instead, they may offer to take into account the needs of selected population in their needs assessment.
Substitution can have serious ethical implications and may worsen the conflict. Particular care should be taken
with this source of power.
The Power of Mobilisation
Humanitarian actors may decide to mobilise their constituency, allies and partners to influence armed groups.
They may include regional and international organisations, NGOs, public figures, states, interest groups. These
actors may decide to use other forms of power to support humanitarian initiatives. Allies are to be chosen
carefully so as not to threaten the impartiality and neutrality of your mission. Likewise, too much pressure may
put an end to negotiations altogether. Power is to be used carefully and consistently by humanitarian actors.
Humanitarian actors may also use the threat of withdrawal to influence their interlocutors. However, if an
agency tells an armed group that it will withdraw, it must do so since failure to carry out the sanction would
lead to a loss of credibility for the entire humanitarian community. Threats may also be met by counter-threats,
which could take the vulnerable population as an innocent hostage of a negotiation deadlock.
Different humanitarian actors have access to different forms of power. For example, international NGOs such
as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch may be able to bring a particular situation to the attention of
the media and to make use of both loud and quiet advocacy to reach their ends. On the other hand, the United
Nations is more likely to mobilise Member States, regional organisations and influential public figures.
BOX 42 | THE POWER OF MOBILISATION THE EXPERIENCE OF MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES IN ETHIOPIA
Reflecting on its activities in Ethiopia, MSF provided an enlightening overview of the complexity of mobilizing allies and
partners for humanitarian ends:
On the diplomatic front, the team responsible for coordinating the different MSF sections relations with countries, civil
society and international institutions saw that appealing to the African Union would be futile, given Ethiopias
prominent role in the organization. The team therefore concentrated its efforts on United Nations agencies and western
donors who, as providers of aid to Ethiopia, were liable to take seriously the difficulties experienced by the people of
Ogaden in gaining access to their aid. But Ethiopia is the United States main African ally and its partner in the war on
terror, particularly in Somalia where the Ethiopian government plays a leading role in the combat against Islamist
insurgents. Most of the diplomats and representatives of those UN agencies present in Ethiopia privately expressed their
alarm at the governments refusal to allow access to the area and its misappropriation of aid. While many of them
encouraged MSF to voice what they were thinking, none of them seemed to have either the means or the ambition to
change the balance of power with the Ethiopian government, a past master in the art of controlling aid.
MSF 2011:39
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TABLE 4 | ACTIVATING HUMANITARIAN LEVERS TIPS FOR NEGOTIATORS

Adapted from HD Centre (2004: 84)
Source of Power Activation

Identify applicable international law and treaties;
Persuasion
Explore possibilities for legal investigation, prosecution and sanctions.
Identify national and international media outlets that exert the most influence
over your interlocutor, their constituency and their allies;
Denunciation
Start making contact with these bodies, ensuring that all staff members are aware
of the message you want to convey.
Draw up realistic scenarios to show the conditions that will exist depending on
Substitution whether aid/services are provided or not, so that you can offer credible incentives
or make credible threats.
Identify actors that have an interest in your region or sector and that enjoy
influence over your counterpart;
Consider all possible allies, including actors at the international, regional, national
Mobilisation
and local levels, other humanitarian organisations and private enterprises;
Start engaging with these entities, while always keeping in mind that they will
have their own political interests and agenda; distance yourself if necessary.
4. Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Negotiations
Humanitarian negotiations can have unintended consequences which can worsen a humanitarian crisis.
Negotiators should be aware of certain pitfalls and consider withdrawal if necessary. Unintended consequences
may affect the victims, the armed groups or the humanitarian actors.
Unintended consequences for victims and armed groups
When humanitarian actors express their wish to have access to vulnerable groups and to address a
humanitarian crisis, armed groups may use their control over territory and their military power as bargaining
tools. Armed groups may carry out attacks or restrict movement within the territory they control in order to
put pressure on humanitarian actors and to raise the stakes. This has direct consequences for the intended
beneficiaries of assistance and humanitarian actors must be prepared for this eventuality. Moreover, if
negotiations breakdown with frustration and anger on both sides, this may jeopardise future attempts to
provide humanitarian assistance and negatively affect victims.
BOX 43 | NEGOTIATING WITH TERRORISTS

[I]f negotiating with an armed group is deemed a humanitarian necessity, then the designation of that group as a
terrorist group by some States or institutions should not automatically preclude negotiations with the group. As with
negotiations with all armed groups, negotiations with those that employ terror tactics must focus solely on
humanitarian issues and not on the political demands or aspirations of the armed groupThis point was highlighted in
the 2004 Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (S/2004/431): The
designation of certain non-State armed groups as terrorist organizations has had an adverse impact on opportunities for
humanitarian negotiations. The prohibition on dialogue with armed groups in Colombia, for example, has resulted in
severe restrictions on access to populations in need.
UN OCHA 2006: 73
Besides victims, humanitarian negotiations may have adverse effects for armed groups. Negotiations can put
the life of interlocutors at risk (attacks by government forces) or may lead to greater insecurity for their
constituencies (attacks on the villages of negotiating leaders). External actors may put pressure on
humanitarian actors to limit contacts with armed groups and may even use sanctions against civilians, armed
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groups and humanitarian actors to achieve their goal. Humanitarian actors must actively work to ensure the
security of all participants during negotiations since failure to do so could be fatal to the negotiations. Potential
solutions include:
Parallel advocacy and negotiations with relevant actors (host government, regional organisations,
International Criminal Court, neighbouring states) to ensure a broad support for the process. UN high
officials are particularly suited to play this role.
Communication with relevant actors (armed groups, host government, local leaders, civil society)
regarding the purpose of the negotiations and their exclusively humanitarian framework;
Collaborate with other humanitarian actors to ensure a broad consensus and support for negotiations
among the humanitarian community.
Unintended consequences for humanitarian actors
Humanitarian negotiations may also have adverse consequences for humanitarian actors themselves. Issues of
particular importance include a loss of legitimacy and perceived neutrality and a decrease in security. It is very
common in humanitarian crises for actors to question the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian actors.
Stakeholders may perceive bias and discrimination in the delivery of assistance. Humanitarian negotiations can
further reinforce these perceptions by giving the impression that humanitarian organisations collaborate and
legitimize armed groups.
OCHA (2006: 72) invites humanitarian actors to mitigate negative perceptions by communicating with all
stakeholders about the negotiation process and remaining transparent (this does not include the sharing of
confidential information). Negotiations should be open with all conflict parties if necessary. In any case,
humanitarian actors must explain that negotiations:
Focus exclusively on humanitarian issues;
Do not replace political negotiations;
Do not confer legitimacy or recognition on the armed group (OCHA 2006: 72).
Besides issues of neutrality and impartiality, entering into humanitarian negotiations may lead to a decrease in
the security of negotiators, their colleagues, their organization and the humanitarian community at large. Due
care should be taken during the preparation phase to put in place contingency plans. Some security risks can be
lowered by:
BOX 44 | PARALLEL HUMANITARIAN NEGOTIATIONS MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES IN AFGHANISTAN

In 2008 to 2009, negotiations were undertaken on several fronts, including with US authorities. To ensure the safety of
patients (whether affiliated with the opposition or not) in Lashkar Gah hospital where MSF was working, the facility had
to be designated as neutral and the presence of armed men thus prohibited under the Geneva Conventions. The goal of
negotiations with the armed opponents of the Karzai government was to reach an agreement allowing drugs to be
transported safely on the roads. Confrontation with the US authorities was avoided when the Obama administration
issued directives to the US military command that satisfied the demands MSF had made locally. However, confrontation
with the armed opponents proved difficult to contain through negotiation. The representatives of the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan (IEA) took advantage of MSFs requests to make demands that were difficult for the latter to meetfor
example, a signed commitment from the US military forces guaranteeing their compliance with the Geneva
Conventions, which MSF was not in a position to obtain. Using its ability to permit or block the transport of drugs, the
IEA initiated a confrontation that MSF was forced to take up and through which the governments opponents sought
political gain; that is, recognition and legitimisation of their power in the areas they controlled.
MSF (2011: 241)
Informing all stakeholders that the negotiations are taking place;

Requesting security guarantees from all stakeholders;
Conducting the negotiations in a safe and neutral location.
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Humanitarian negotiations are negotiations undertaken by civilians engaged in managing, coordinating

and providing humanitarian assistance and protection for the purposes of:
o (i) ensuring the provision of protection and humanitarian assistance to vulnerable
populations;
o (ii) preserving humanitarian space; and
o (iii) promoting better respect for international law (OCHA 2006).
Humanitarian negotiations differ from other types of negotiations because:
o The stakes are usually very high and success can save lives;
o It involves the negotiation of non-negotiable humanitarian needs;
o Negotiating parties are in a de facto power asymmetry since one is a humanitarian actor and
the other is characterized by its ability to use violence;
o Humanitarian actors may be seen as a nuisance;
o The background and cultures of both parties are radically different;
o Commitment and implementation are difficult to secure and enforce;
o The conflict environment makes communication difficult;
o An agreement must be reached quickly.
Non-State Armed Groups have the potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political,
ideological or economic objectives; are not within the formal military structures of States, State-alliances
or intergovernmental organizations; and are not under the control of the State(s) in which they operate.
When analysing armed groups, negotiators should consider:
o Past and current motivations;
o Hierarchical structure and leadership as well as autonomy of sub-commanders;
o Principles of action;
o Interests and shared interests;
o Constituency and degree of legitimacy;
o Needs;
o Ethno-cultural or religious dimensions;
o Control of population and territory;
o Coalitions with other conflict actors;
o Previous history of negotiation
Humanitarian negotiations should be framed by the three humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality
and impartiality as well as by international law including:
o International Humanitarian Law (IHL);
o International Human Rights Law (IHRL);
o International Criminal Law;
o Customary international law.
Humanitarian negotiations usually follow the same steps as other types of negotiation.
When preparing humanitarian negotiations, negotiators should consider their priorities and reflect upon
the linkages or sequencing of their demands.
o Linkages connect related subjects together;
o Sequencing separates demands to facilitate negotiations.
Negotiating as a team may have advantages including:
o Avoid manipulation;
o Protection & security;
o Prevent breakdown;
o Offer new strategies;
o Witnesses;
o Broader expertise and experience;
o Division of labour;
o Shadow negotiator.
During humanitarian negotiations, humanitarian actors may draw on alternative sources of power known
as humanitarian levers. These include the powers of persuasion, denunciation, substitution and
mobilisation.
Humanitarian negotiations may have unintended consequences for intended beneficiaries, armed groups
and humanitarian actors.
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TABLE 5 | CHECKLIST - PREPARING FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARMED GROUPS (ADAPTED FROM UN OCHA 2006)
Name of Armed Group: Armed Group Negotiator: Date:
Original motivations:
Economic
Political
Religious
Motivations
Ideological
Other
Current motivations
What do leaders say about motivations?
Single leader
Executive committee
Structure Hierarchical or flat
Who are central/local leaders to be aware of?
Sources of support
What are the principles of action of the group?
Guerilla warfare
Economic principles
Principles of Action Ideological principles
Political principles
Religious principles
What are the groups dominant interests?
Achieving political outcomes
Self-preservation
Interests Economic interests
Personal interests of leaders
Other
Do stated interests concur with actions of the group?
Stated constituency
Constituency Other community leaders
Do community leaders endorse the armed group?
Organisational
Resource-related
Needs Identity-related
Needs of individual negotiator
Religious beliefs
Ethno-cultural Dimensions Cultural practices (e.g. role of tribal elders, community mediators)
How does the armed group view members of other groups?
Extent of control over:
1) Population
Control of Population & 2) Territory
Territory How is control exerted?
What is the basis for this control (coercion/ legitimate support basis,
etc.)?
0
Module guide
Methods in conflict resolution
UNITAR
During peace operations and more generally in conflict resolution, United Nations staff may be required to
engage with government officials, armed groups or any other actors to fulfill their mandate. In particular,
they may have to secure the cooperation of a conflict party through negotiations or mediation in order to
reach an agreement that will restore international peace and security. This module describes the main
methods used by the United Nations and other actors to resolve conflict. In particular, it introduces three
conflict resolution methods: negotiation, mediation and humanitarian negotiation. It provides illustrative
examples and tips to conduct successful negotiations and mediation. The module requires participants to
prepare a conflict resolution effort adapted to address their case study.
negotiation;
negotiation.
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Organization
available.

Open Close
Lesson Lesson 6: Negotiation Day 1 Day 14
Lesson 7: Mediation Day 1 Day 14
Lesson 8: Humanitarian Negotiation Day 1 Day 14
Activity 3a: Preparing for Negotiation and Mediation Day 1 Day 14
Activity 3b: Generating Solutions to Resolve a Conflict Day 1 Day 14
Forum Forum 3a: Challenges in the Preparation of Negotiation and Mediation Day 1 Day 14
Forum 3b: Challenges in the Generation of Solutions to Conflicts Day 1 Day 14
Lessons
Lesson 6: Negotiation
The purpose of this lesson is to define negotiation and to introduce the main approaches used in
negotiations, namely, positional negotiation and interest-based negotiation. The characteristics of
each approach are outlined and their respective strengths and weaknesses are analysed. The
lesson also explores ways to reach a win-win solution whereby all parties are satisfied with the
outcome of the negotiation process. Also, the main stages of the negotiation process are listed
and described from pre-negotiations to the ratification and implementation of an agreement.
Lesson 7: Mediation
The objective of this lesson is to explore the characteristics of a mediation process including the
different approaches that can be used, the different steps of a mediation process and the role that
mediators may wish to play to resolve a conflict. The technique of re-framing is also explored as a
tool to enable conflict parties to move forward towards the resolution of the conflict. The problem
of inclusivity in mediation is discussed and the overall strengths and weaknesses of mediation as
a method to resolve conflicts are analysed.

The purpose of this lesson is to define humanitarian negotiations as well as their main
characteristics. Usually, humanitarian negotiations are conducted by humanitarian actors to
achieve humanitarian objectives with conflict actors in countries affected by conflict. As such, they
differ from other types of negotiations and specific strategies must be used. In this context, the
lesson introduces the humanitarian levers that negotiators can use to reach a settlement. Also,
the potential negative implications of humanitarian negotiations are considered.
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Activity

Select a detailed and specific approach to resolve a conflict of your choice;

Generate realistic suggestions regarding the venue, timing and secrecy of the process;
Outline the objectives to be reached to resolve the conflict.

The aim of this activity is to design possible solutions to resolve a conflict of your choice. This will
enable you to draw on all the knowledge and insights gathered so far to come up with alternatives
to violence. In particular, the activity requires you to:
Outline the positions, interests and needs of the lead actors in a conflict of your choice;
Re-frame the conflict to enable the mediation or negotiation to move forward;
Generate realistic solutions to resolve the conflict.
Social activities
Discussion Forum 3a: Challenges in the Preparation of Negotiation and Mediation

requires you to:
you faced when preparing negotiation or mediation (Please refer to the User Guide for
detailed information on how to use forums).
Learned.
Discussion Forum 3b: Challenges in the Preparation of Negotiation and Mediation

requires you to:
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you faced when generating solutions;
Learned;
Support Forum
where to make queries, clarify doubts and reflect on specific issues or share ideas/experiences
with other participants.
Optional activities
Optional activity 3a: Techniques of communication: I statements

The optional activity on I statements does provide you with the possibility to reflect and practice
your communication habits. The activity aims at studying a way of expressing feelings, beliefs
and values during a negotiation process without putting the listener on the defensive.
Optional activity 3b: Mirroring

The optional activity on Mirroring is based on a training of active listening. It aims at building an
understanding for the importance of well-developed listening skills during a process of mediation
or negotiation.
Optional activity 3c: Questioning

The aim of this optional activity is to train your skills of effective questioning. The optional activity
provides you with guidelines of when to use which type of questions in order to get the
information needed. Based on field scenarios you have the opportunity to use the acquired skills.
Resources
tools;
Use the Support Forum to make queries, clarify doubts or share ideas/experiences with
other participants.
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Activity Checklist
Use the activity checklist below as an organizer. Plan for all the activities you have to do in this module, and
follow up on activities you have started but are still to complete.

Date Status
Lesson Lesson 6: Negotiation
Lesson 7: Mediation
Forum Forum 3a: Challenges in the Preparation of Negotiation and Mediation
Forum 3b: Challenges in the Generation of Solutions to Conflicts
Support Forum
5
Module guide
The United Nations and regional actors in
conflict resolution
UNITAR
Conflict resolution, and various activities related to peace and security, including peace operations, is a
field of practice in which formal organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union
(EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the African Union (AU) and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are highly present. The growth in the number and importance of
international organizations has been one of the most prominent features of world politics since 1945, and
since the 1980s regional intergovernmental organizations have increased their role in conflict
management and resolution. Module 4 explores the role of the United Nations and regional organisations
with a formal mandate relevant to conflict resolution. In particular, it focuses on the regionalisation of
conflict resolution and on the strengths and weaknesses of regionalising conflict resolution efforts.
Explain the role played by the different United Nations organs in the resolution of conflicts;
Recognize the role played by regional organisations in conflict resolution;
Compare the conflict resolution potential of international and regional actors in a specific conflict;
Recommend on the involvement of international and regional organizations in conflict resolution
initiatives.
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Organization
available.
Module four: The United Nations and the Regionalisation of Conflict Resolution
Week five
Open Close
Lesson Lesson 9: The United Nations in International Conflict Resolution Day 1 Day 7
Lesson 10: The Regionalisation of International Conflict Resolution Day 1 Day 7
Activity 4: Regionalising Conflict Resolution Day 1 Day 7
Forum Forum 4: Advantages and Limits of Regionalising Conflict Resolution. Day 1 Day 7
Lessons
Lesson 9: The United Nations in International Conflict Resolution

The purpose of this lesson is to define the role played by the various organs of the United Nations
in international conflict resolution. It explores the role plays by the Secretariat, the General
Assembly and the Security Council and provides illustrative examples of past and current
interventions. The lesson focuses especially on the role played by the United Nations in conflict
prevention and peacemaking. In this regard, the activities undertaken by the UN Secretary-
General are emphasised. The strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations in conflict
resolution are discussed.
Lesson 10: The Regionalisation of International Conflict Resolution

The objective of this lesson is to explore the interplay between the United Nations and regional
organisations active in conflict resolution. Global-regional partnerships for conflict resolution
range from consultation and parallel mediation, to joint operations and peace enforcement. This
lesson explores the role that global and regional organisations play respectively as well as the
nature of their relationships. The advantages and limits of the regionalization of conflict resolution
are discussed.
Activity
Activity 4: Regionalising Conflict Resolution

The aim of this activity is to reflect upon the role of the United Nations and regional organisations
to resolve a conflict of your choice. This will enable you to draw lessons learned regarding the
comparative advantages of international and regional organisations. In particular, the activity
requires you to:
Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations in resolving a conflict of your
choice;
Reflect upon the comparative advantage of regional organisations to solve the conflict;
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Generate broad recommendations to regionalise or not your strategy for peace.
Social activities
Discussion Forum 4: Advantages and Limits of Regionalising Conflict Resolution

requires you to:
1) Create a post with at least eight bullet points on the advantages and limits of
regionalising conflict resolution.
2) Based on the above points, decide whether you would recommend regionalising the
peace initiative or centralise it under UN leadership. Compare your input with those of
other participants and develop joint Lessons Learned.
3) You may also describe the challenges you encountered when you completed the
activity and ask questions to other participants and/or the facilitator.
Support Forum
where to make queries, clarify doubts, reflect on specific issues or share ideas/experiences with
other participants.
Resources
tools;
Use the Support Forum to make queries, clarify doubts or share ideas with other participants.
3
UNITAR
Activity Checklist
Use the activity checklist below as an organizer. Plan for all the activities you have to do in this module,
and follow up on activities you have started but are still to complete.
Module four: The United Nations and the Regionalisation of Conflict Resolution
Week five
Date Status
Lesson Lesson 9: The United Nations in International Conflict Resolution
Lesson 10: The Regionalisation of International Conflict Resolution
Activity 4: Regionalising Conflict Resolution
Forum Forum 4: Advantages and Limits of Regionalising Conflict Resolution.
Support Forum
4
The United Nations and Regional

Actors in Conflict Resolution
Conflict Resolution
MODULE 4| UNITAR
The United Nations and Regional Actors in Conflict Resolution
MODULE 4 |
The United Nations and Regional Actors in

Conflict Resolution
The module focuses on conflict resolution within the context of the United Nations and key regional
organisations. In particular, it focuses on the regionalisation of conflict resolution and on the strengths and
weaknesses of regionalising conflict resolution efforts.
Define the role played by the different United Nations organs in the resolution of conflicts;
Define the role of the United Nations in peacemaking;
Discuss the role played by regional organisations in conflict resolution;
Appraise the strengths and weaknesses of regionalising conflict resolution initiatives.
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LESSON 9 |
The United Nations in International Conflict Resolution
LESSON OUTLINE:
1. Introduction
2. The United Nations Organs and Conflict Resolution
3. Spectrum of United Nations Conflict Resolution Activities
4. United Nations Activities for Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking
Define the role played by the different United Nations organs in the resolution of conflicts;
Outline the spectrum of United Nations activities for conflict resolution;
Discuss the record of the United Nations in peacemaking
1. Introduction
The United Nations is a unique international organization founded BOX 2 | UN PREAMBLE

after the Second World War in order to facilitate international
cooperation on subjects such as international peace and security, We the peoples of the United
economic development, social progress and human rights. The United Nations determined to save
Nations was founded with the ambition to save succeeding succeeding generations from the
generations from the scourge of war. In particular, the purpose of the scourge of war and for these ends
to unite our strength to maintain
United Nations, as stated in Article 1 of its Charter is to:
international peace and security, and
to ensure that armed force shall not
Maintain international peace and security; be used, save in the common
Develop friendly relations among nations; interest.
Promote social progress and better living standards;
Preamble, UN Charter
Promote human rights.
Of these, the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary purpose of the organization. The
United Nations has two main responsibilities in this regard, namely, to bring about the cessation of armed
conflicts and to support conflict actors to resolve their dispute peacefully and non-violently. The UN has at its
disposal a wide range of mechanisms that facilitate the resolution of internal, regional, transnational and
international conflicts. Nowadays, the United Nations is the most universal and legitimate actor to maintain
international peace and security. According to Susan Allen Nan (2003), [m]uch of the work of the United
Nations could be classified as global track-one diplomacy.
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2. The United Nations Organs and Conflict Resolution
Three organs of the United Nations play a prominent role in conflict resolution and the settlement of disputes:
the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat.
The General Assembly
The General Assembly is made up of representatives of all the Member States of the United Nations and each
Member State has one vote. They discuss and take decisions on all international issues covered by the UN
Charter. This ranges from development, humanitarian, social and human rights issues to financial issues, which
includes approving the budget for UN peace operations.
Under Articles 10 to 14 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly is endowed with the power to discuss any
issues within the scope of the Charter and to make recommendations. In particular, they may discuss any
conflict situations with the exceptions of those which take place essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state (Article 2.7). This exception has not prevented the General Assembly from discussing domestic issues
related to human rights and civil wars.
The General Assembly also has the power to make recommendations on measures for the peaceful
adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly
relations among nations (article 14). However, the General Assembly may only make recommendations where
it has been requested by the Security Council to do so. In this regards, Article 12 explains that [w]hile the
Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present
Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation
unless the Security Council so requests.
BOX 3 |THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Based on Articles 37.2 and 38, the General Assembly may make recommendations to settle a conflict. For example, in
1948, the General Assembly developed a comprehensive road map regarding the future of Palestine. However, the non-
binding character of the recommendations meant that conflict actors were not forced to implement the plan and that
the General Assembly could not enforce them. In this particular instance, General Assembly recommendations failed to
resolve the conflict.
In 1954, the General Assembly requested Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld to mediate a dispute between the
United States and China. Eleven American military personnel were held prisoners following the destruction of their
aircraft during the Korean War. The Secretary-General was requested to use the means most appropriate in his
judgment to resolve the conflict. This use of personal mediation enabled the release of the prisoners.
The Security Council
The Security Council is made up of five permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and United States) and ten non-permanent members, elected by the General Assembly for a two-year
term. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The
Security Council may investigate and recommend appropriate peaceful measures to resolve disputes and
prevent them from escalating. However, in situations where the Security Council has determined that there is a
threat to international peace and security, it may take more coercive measures. These measures may or may
not involve the use of force.
The legal basis for the Security Councils power to investigate and take appropriate measures is outlined in
Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council may also decide to work with regional organizations
or arrangements to resolve disputes and maintain international peace and security (according to Chapter VIII of
the UN Charter), as long as those regional arrangements are consistent with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.
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The competence of the Security Council extends to all conflicts the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 38) as well as disputes where conflict parties
have requested the involvement of the Security Council. The Security Council may also consider a matter at the
request of the Secretary-General, Member States or the General Assembly whether the concerned states
consent or not.
The general responsibility for the peaceful resolution of disputes falls on Member States and it is only in more
serious cases with regional and international consequences that the Council may act. Article 33.1 provides that
Member States must first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice. The
UNs task is to encourage parties to resort to these peaceful solutions but if they are unable to, the UN may
then employ other mechanisms to assist the parties in resolving their differences. Overall, there is a growing
awareness for the fact that in the twenty-first century maintaining global peace and security requires states to
act proactively rather than just reacting to crises. The emphasis lies therefore on prevention, calling on the
international community for early action in order to be effective. The international community is therefore
putting efforts in developing tools and measures that can be taken well short of any use of force. The duty to
prevent however can only be exercised collectively, through a regional or global organization.
BOX 4 | THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Negotiation
UN Charter Articles 33.1, 33.2 and 36.1 enable the Security Council to call conflict parties to resolve their dispute and to
recommend specific solutions. For example, in resolution 395 (1976) the Security Council called Greece and Turkey to
resume direct negotiations over their differences [and] to do everything within their power to ensure that this results
in mutually acceptable solutions.
Mediation
In the conflict between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, the Security Council appointed a series of mediators and
representatives to resolve the conflict. It began with the Canadian General McNaughton in 1949, followed by the
Australian Owen Dixon in 1950, the American Frank Graham in 1951 and the Swede Gunnar Jarring in 1957.
Fact-Finding Mission
Based on the Charter, the Security Council may establish fact-finding missions and in 2005, the Council appointed an
International Independent Investigation Commission to work together with the Lebanese authorities to investigate the
bombing that killed Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
Good Offices
Recourse to good offices has been regular to facilitate the maintenance of international peace and security. A
Committee of Good Offices consisting of Belgian, American and Australian representatives was in fact established in
1947 to supervise the peace process between the Netherlands and Indonesia. A similar committee was set up with
representatives of Mexico and Sweden as well as the President of the General Assembly to explore solutions to the
Korean War.
Sanctions
Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to impose military sanctions and to take such action by air, sea or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Economic sanctions may also be imposed
and may take the form of arms embargoes, financial and banking restrictions, freezing of assets, commodity restrictions,
etc. For example, sanctions were imposed on Apartheid South Africa from 1977 until 1994 and on Libya in 1992 over its
involvement in the Lockerbie bombing.
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Secretariat
The Secretariat is the administrative arm of the United Nations and is led by the Secretary-General. The
Secretary-General is the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations and is appointed by the General
Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council, for a five-year, renewable term. The Secretary-
General has the power to bring any situation that may threaten international peace and security to the
attention of the Security Council. The Security Council still maintains the power to decide whether the situation
is in fact a threat to international peace and security.
The Secretariat is made up of a wide variety of departments and offices, which deal with all aspects of the
United Nations mandate. The secretariats which assist in conflict resolution include DPA, DFS, OCHA, DPKO and
PBSO amongst others.
The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) provides substantive direction to special political missions
(SPMs) and contributes also to peace operations or the organization of elections in post-conflict
societies. In some cases, DPA regional divisions provide political analysis or take the lead in mediation
and good offices efforts.
The Department of Field Support (DFS) is responsible for delivering dedicated support to UN field
operations, including peacekeeping operations and special political missions. Specifically, this includes:
personnel, finance, procurement, logistic, communications, information technology and other
administrative and general management issues.
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) plays a major role in UN efforts to
manage and resolve conflicts when humanitarian needs are a predominant factor. OCHA is responsible
for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has the responsibility for the executive direction
and administration of all UN peace operations. Activities range from traditional peacekeeping tasks
such as observer mission and ceasefire monitoring to more complex activities including peacebuilding
and post-conflict reconstruction.
The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) supports the UN in the long-term recovery and
reconstruction of post-conflict societies. In particular, the PBSO advises the Secretary-General on
areas demanding coordination and coherence within the United Nations system in undertaking
peacebuilding efforts.
BOX 5| THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The Secretary-General personally conducted 103 international mediation efforts for the period 1945 to 1995, amounting
to 17% of all UN mediation efforts. Over the same period, Special Envoys mediated on 206 occasions, amounting to 34%
of all UN mediation efforts (Fretter 2002).
Following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General
use his good offices to resolve the conflict. Diego Cordovez was then appointed as a UNSG personal representative to
negotiate a settlement between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Cordovez conducted shuttle diplomacy to
secure the removal of Soviet troops. However the absence of the Afghan resistance at the negotiations as well as the
general context of the Cold War meant that progress was slow.
During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran asked the Secretary-General to investigate the use of chemical weapons by Iraqi troops.
The Secretary-General appointed a group of expert to assess the situation. This resulted in the publication of a report
that confirmed the use of chemical weapons and paved the way for the Security Councils condemnation of Iraq for the
use of such weapons.
In certain conflicts, the Secretary-General refused to take action because of the essentially domestic character of the
conflict (e.g., during the Nigerian civil war). In other cases, Member States objected to his intercession (e.g., the United
Kingdom regarding the conflict in Northern Ireland).
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3. Spectrum of United Nations Conflict Resolution Activities
The United Nations is the worlds conflict resolution organization by excellence and its various organs permit to
address international crises and disputes through a wide spectrum of conflict resolution initiatives. The United
Nations has been involved in different conflicts to various extents. Some conflicts ended through a decision
made by the Security Council (the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988) and peace agreements were signed in UN premises
with the Secretary-General as a witness. In other cases, the United Nations paved the way for intervention but
left implementation to Member States or regional organisations (First Gulf War). And finally, in many disputes
the United Nations played only a peripheral role or no role at all (Northern Ireland, Ecuador and Peru).
The UN blue helmets are the most iconic and popular symbol of the UNs contribution to world peace but UN
peace operations are just one of the many instruments that the organisation can put in place in case of a threat
to international peace and security. Peacekeeping overlaps with other activities such as conflict prevention,
peacemaking, peace enforcement or peacebuilding. Conflict prevention and peacemaking are the activities
most relevant to traditional conflict resolution. The spectrum of UN activities can be represented as follow:
FIGURE 1 |FROM CONFLICT PREVENTION TO POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING
Over the past years, the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building
and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred. Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of
activity. While UN operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or peace
agreement, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in
early peace building activities. UN operations may also use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of
the Security Council, to defend themselves and their mandate, particularly in situations where the State is
unable to provide security and maintain public order. This is especially the case in peacekeeping operations and
peace enforcement missions.
In addition to these more robust approaches to peace, the United Nations may also deploy a Special Political
Mission (SPM) which may take the form of:
Political field missions;
Special envoys;
Expert panels to monitor Security Council sanctions.
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There is a huge variety in the mandate, size and duration of SPM field missions. In general, they tend to be
involved in conflict prevention, peacemaking or peace building. The major difference between a peacekeeping
operation and a SPM field mission is uniformed personnel. In SPM field missions there are very few or no
uniformed personnel. Because SPM can be deployed as conflict prevention, peacemaking or peace building
initiatives, they may be deployed at the same time as peacekeeping operations or before or after the
deployment of a peacekeeping operation.
Conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement rarely occur in a linear or sequential
way. Indeed, experience has shown that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing. Used piecemeal or in
isolation, they fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict that,
thereby, reduces the risk of conflict recurring. However, the international communitys ability to combine these
activities effectively remains limited and this has resulted in critical gaps in the international response to crises
that have threatened international peace and security.
The creation of a new UN peacebuilding architecture reflects a growing recognition within the international
community of the linkages between the UN peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building roles. When a
country comes before it, the Peacebuilding Commission helps marshal the resources at the disposal of the
international community and advice on, and propose, integrated strategies for peace building and recovery. In
doing so, it aims to bring together relevant actors, including international financial institutions and other
donors, UN agencies, civil society organizations, and others in support of these strategies; as well as to provide
strategic advice to the principal UN organs and help facilitate political dialogue, enhance coordination, and
monitor the progress of both national and international actors.
In the spectrum of UN activities, conflict prevention and peacemaking are the two main areas of non-violent
and unarmed conflict resolution. They embody various types of activities including negotiation, mediation and
humanitarian negotiation.
4. United Nations Activities for Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking
UN Mediation and Negotiation
Conflict prevention and peacemaking involve Track 1 measures designed to avoid conflict escalation, to reach
an acceptable settlement and to end conflict. They usually involve diplomatic actions aimed at bringing hostile
parties to a negotiated agreement. This may include the facilitation of dialogue, negotiation, mediation, and
enquiries into sources of disagreement or confidence building measures.
One common approach is the use of the UN Secretary Generals good offices to engage in dialogue with the
different parties. One of the first examples of a UN peacemaking initiative, was the appointment of the Swedish
diplomat Count Folke Bernadotte as the UN Mediator in Palestine in 1948 to use his good offices to promote a
peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine (General Assembly Resolution 186 of 14 May 1948).
More recent examples include the mediation efforts by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2008 in Kenya
following the disputed presidential elections, the appointment of the Joint UN-AU Chief Mediator for Darfur by
the Secretary-General of the UN and the Chairperson of the African Union in 2008, the appointment of a
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) affected areas in Uganda in 2006
and efforts by Lakhdar Brahimi to mediate in the Syrian conflict opposing President Bashar al-Assad to the Free
Syrian Army and other opposition groups.
The United Nations is a central figure in international peacemaking since its universal membership, credibility,
legitimacy and impartiality can give the organization great leverage. Between 1945 and 1995, out of the 295
international conflicts that erupted, the UN was involved in the resolution of 29% of them. No other regional or
international organization has deployed resources to resolve that many conflicts. In that same period of time,
the UN conducted 23% of all international mediation attempts (615 out of 1,485 attempts) compared to 47%
by states, 11% by regional organisations, 6% by NGOs and 4% by individual mediators (Fretter 2002: 101).
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TABLE 1 |FREQUENCY OF CONFLICTS AND UN MEDIATION ATTEMPTS 1945-1995 (Fretter 2002)

Frequency of
Total no. of No. of conflicts UN mediation attempts after
System Era
conflicts involving the UN attempts fatalities of
10,000+
1945-55 41 14 72 27
1956-65 69 25 75 43
1966-75 50 16 132 88
1976-85 73 17 135 125
1986-95 62 14 201 168
Total 295 conflicts 86 conflicts 615 attempts 451 attempts
UN Mediators and Mediation Strategy
The United Nations has relied on different types of mediators to lead its peacemaking activities. While the
Secretary-General himself and Special Envoys have conducted over half of the mediation efforts between 1945
and 1995, other mediators have been used including:
The Security Council (usually in the form of a referral);

Good Offices Committees;
Special Missions;
Top military officers (Field Commanders);
High-ranking mediators (former diplomats and officials such as Jimmy Carter, Kofi Annan, etc.);
Low-ranking mediators.
The performance and rate of success of these different mediators vary and the following table summarises key
data on the subject.
TABLE 2 |CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIATOR RANK AND PERFORMANCE (ADAPTED FROM FRETTER 2002)
No. of successful
UN Mediator rank Frequency of attempts Raw success rate
attempts
Secretary-General 103 29 28%
Security Council 74 23 31%
UN Good Offices
4 3 75%
Committee
UN Commission or
50 13 26%
Special Mission
Special Envoy or
206 58 28%
Representative
Top military officer 40 23 58%
High-ranking mediator 55 20 36%
Low-ranking mediator 14 3 21%
Total 615 attempts 208 attempts (33.8%)
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When the United Nations engage in peacemaking and conflict prevention, the UN mediator acts as an impartial
and often neutral third-party. In the majority of cases, UN mediators employ a facilitative approach to promote
dialogue, communication and information sharing. More directive approaches whereby the UN mediator would
have greater leverage and power over the disputants through the use of incentives and threats are rarely used.
Instead, the emphasis is on building rapport and trust and this is time-consuming. For example, Alioune
Blondin, mediated 23 times in Angola while Doego Cordovez mediated on 19 occasions in Afghanistan and
Cyrus Vance and Thorvald Stoltenberg mediated on 46 occasions in Yugoslavia. This choice of approach follows
from the principles contained in the UN Charter but is also dictated by the structure, mandate and resources of
the United Nations.
Constraints on UN Mediation
The UNs approach to mediation, and to peacemaking in general, has been the subject of much criticism. In
1994, Saadia Touval published a provocative article entitled Why the UN Fails in the re-known journal Foreign
Affairs. Based on his analysis of the UN interventions in Afghanistan, Angola, Haiti, Somalia and the Former
Yugoslavia, Touval (1994: 45) argued that the UNs record was not only poor but that UN mediation had
extended or aggravated many of those disputes. Touval explained that the main factors behind these failures
were:
The lack of real leverage of the United Nations;

The lack of flexibility and coherence of the United Nations responses;
The last resort character of UN mediation in conflicts that pose a threat to international peace and
security;
The insufficient aura of legitimacy of the United Nations.
Due to its structures, composition, procedures, mandate and general characteristics, the United Nations is both
empowered and constrained to maintain international peace and security. Various interconnected factors
constraint UN action in the realm of mediation and explain Touvals assessment. They include:
The procedures of the United Nations: The decision-making procedures of the United Nations which
include both consensual approaches as well as veto powers have slowed down reaction time and
excluded certain conflicts from the agenda;
The operating principles of the United Nations: the principles contained in the UN Charter restrict the
UNs use of force as well as the type of conflicts that the organization can address. As a result,
preventive activities in domestic conflicts can only take place with the consent of relevant Member
States and mediation effort tend to be implemented in highly polarized protracted conflicts that pose
a threat to international peace and security. Between 1945 and 1995, 65% of United Nations
mediation efforts were undertaken after 36 months of hostilities had already elapsed (Fretter
2002);UN membership and the commitment of Member States: The universal membership of the
organization is a major source of legitimacy but it can also be constraining since the support of the
most powerful members is required to implement credible and strong solutions. Acting in the name of
the organization, UN mediators derive their leverage from their normative position rather than from
their military and political power. As such, they require the full financial, political and logistical support
of Member States to carry out their mission. This has proved a major impediment to rapid and
effective intervention in many conflicts. For example, the UNs failure to act effectively and rapidly in
Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda resulted more from the lack of political will in the Security Council than
from any systemic constraint.
BOX 6|UN MEDIATION AND GREAT POWERS

The potential scope of mediation by the Secretary-General depends very much on what he is permitted to do by the
major powersThe main weakness of the Secretary-General is that he cannot apply sanctions, but the members of the
Security Council can strengthen his position by endorsing his endeavours and by exerting bilateral pressure on the
parties to a conflict.
Skjelsbaek & Fermann (1996:99)
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Besides constraints inherent to the United Nations, the success of UN mediation efforts will also depend on the
international context as well as factors specific to the conflicts. The international context has deeply influenced
the United Nations pattern of intervention; the Cold War being the most obvious example. The geopolitical
tensions and the interests of powerful states meant that disputes were either kept off the UN agenda (conflict
over Berlin between 1958 and 1961) or that the UN was paralyzed (Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956,
Cuban missile crisis in 1962). But the success of UN mediation also depends on the nature of the conflicts it
addresses. Conflict causes, actors and dynamics substantially affect the outcome of mediation initiatives and
the UNs focus on protracted conflicts unripe for settlement has negatively affected its record. The following
diagram provides a representation of the key factors that have shaped the UN record in peacemaking and
conflict prevention.
The United Nations is ultimately a reflection of the social and political relations between its Member States and
it is largely through the efforts of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General that the organization is able to
resolve conflicts more effectively than individual states. Ultimately, effective conflict prevention and
peacemaking depend on the political will and strong support of states to empower the United Nations to fulfil
its mission. Secretary-General U Thant (1961-1971) described this state of affairs in unequivocal terms in his
memoirs View from the UN:
Great problems usually come to the United Nations because governments have been
unable to think of anything else to do about them. The United Nations is a last-ditch,
last-resort affair, and it is not surprising that the Organization should often be blamed
for failing to solve problems that have already been found to be insoluble by
governments. More often than not, the United Nations is criticized for failing to resolve
a crisis or to enforce an action. It is not generally realized that the failure of the United
Nations is the failure of the international community, and the failure to enforce an
action is due to the refusal of the party or parties concerned to comply with the
Organizations decisions.
FIGURE 2 |SUCCESSFUL UN MEDIATION
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The purpose of the United Nations, as stated in Article 1 of its Charter is to:
o Maintain international peace and security;
o Develop friendly relations among nations;
o Promote social progress and better living standards;
o Promote human rights.
Three organs of the United Nations play a prominent role in conflict resolution:
o The General Assembly is endowed with the power to discuss any issues within the scope of
the Charter and to make recommendations;
o The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and
security and may investigate and recommend appropriate peaceful or coercive measures to
resolve disputes;
o The Secretariat is the administrative arm of the United Nations and is led by the Secretary-
General who has the power to bring any situation that may threaten international peace and
security to the attention of the Security Council.
The United Nations is the worlds conflict resolution organization and its spectrum of activities include:
o Conflict prevention;
o Peacemaking;
o Peace enforcement;
o Peacekeeping;
o Peacebuilding.
The creation of a new UN peacebuilding architecture reflects a growing recognition within the
international community of the linkages between the UNs peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding
roles.
The United Nations is a central figure in international peacemaking since its universal membership,
credibility, legitimacy and impartiality can give the organization great leverage.
Between 1945 and 1995, out of the 295 international conflicts that erupted, the UN was involved in the
resolution of 29% of them.
The UN may use different types of actors to mediate disputes including:
o The Secretary-General himself;
o Special Envoys and Representatives;
o The security Council (usually in the form of a referral);
o Good Offices Committees;
o Special Missions;
o Top military officers;
o High-ranking mediators;
o Low-ranking mediators.
The performance and rate of success of these different mediators vary and the following table
summarises key data on the subject.
In the majority of cases, UN mediators employ a facilitative approach to promote dialogue,
communication and information sharing. More directive approaches are rarely used.
Due to its structures, composition, procedures, mandate and general characteristics, the United Nations is
both empowered and constrained to maintain international peace and security.
The UNs approach to mediation has been the subject of much criticism and important factors behind the
organisations mixed record include:
o The procedures of the United Nations;
o The operating principles of the United Nations;
o UN membership and the commitment of Member States.
Besides constraints inherent to the United Nations, the success of UN mediation efforts also depends on
the international context as well as factors specific to the conflicts.
The United Nations is a reflection of the social and political relations between its Member States and
ultimately effective conflict prevention and peacemaking depend on the political will and strong support
of states.
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LESSON 10 |
The Regionalisation of International Conflict Resolution
LESSON OUTLINE:
1. Introduction
2. The United Nations and Regional Organisations
3. Main Regional Organisations Involved in Conflict Resolution
4. The United Nations and Regionalisation The Case of Darfur
5. Benefits and Challenges of Regionalisation
Outline the main provisions contained in the UN Charter for the collaboration between the United Nations and
regional organisations;
Describe the role played by key regional organisations in the resolution of conflicts;
Identify the advantages and limits of the regionalization of conflict resolution.
1. Introduction
Today, the United Nations is the worlds conflict resolution BOX 8 | CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN
organization by excellence. Its resources, mandate and UNION ARTICLE 4
legitimacy make it a unique actor which makes a distinctive
The Union shall function in accordance with the
contribution to world peace. However, the emergence of
following principles:
the United Nations took place in a particular international
environment characterized by a spectacular increase in the e. Peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member
States of the Union through such appropriate
number of governmental, intergovernmental and non-
means as may be decided upon by the
governmental organisations involved in peace and security Assembly;
issues. Conflict resolution is today a field of practices in
h. The right of the Union to intervene in a Member
which formal organisations, such as the United Nations
State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in
(UN), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty respect of grave circumstances, namely war
Organisation (NATO), African Union (AU) and Association of crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are very active. Typically,
i. Peaceful co-existence of Member States and
the UN is considered a global actor while the others are
their right to live in peace and security;
described as regional actors. They are all formal
organisations with headquarters, bureaucracies, formal j. The right of Member States to request
procedures and a membership comprising three or more intervention from the Union in order to restore
states. peace and security.
The growth in the number and importance of international

organisations (IOs) and regional organisations has been one of the most prominent features of world politics
since 1945. The advance of regionalism in conflict resolution has been particularly noteworthy since the 1980s,
involving both the increasing amount of regional actors involved in conflict management, and the importance
that has been attached to their work. Regional conflict management began in 1948 when the UN entered into
formal cooperation with the Organization of American States (OAS), the first body to be recognised as a
regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. However, it has been in the post-Cold War period
that we have seen the UN enter into an unprecedented variety of partnerships with regional organisations.
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Traditionally, regional actors were relied upon by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to manage conflicts that
might not benefit from international involvement, or conflicts that were small and localised.
In recent times, regional actors and other arrangements have been asked to respond to conflicts considered
threats to international peace and security, sometimes involving mass atrocity, crimes against the civilian
population committed by non-state parties, but frequently, also by sovereign governments. Global-regional
partnerships for conflict resolution range from consultation and parallel mediation, to joint operations and
peace enforcement. This lesson explores the role that global and regional organisations play respectively as
well as the nature of their relationships.
2. The United Nations and Regional Organisations
During the drafting of the UN charter, it was deemed necessary to safeguard a centralised and global control to
ensure great power cooperation in and through the UN System. It is only after the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security had been conferred on the UN Security Council that
concessions were made to the advocates of regionalism. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter addressed
the role of regional organisations and their relation to the UN. Articles 52, 53 and 54 clarified different aspects
of the relation between global and regional organisations:
Article 52 encouraged regional conflict management provided that their activities are consistent with
the principles of the United Nations;
Article 53 enabled the United Nations to rely on regional organisations to enforce action;
Article 54 required regional organisations to keep the United Nations fully informed of their activities
in the maintenance of international peace and security.
Chapter VIII thus offers the UN an expanded set of options for conflict response.
BOX 9 | UNITED NATIONS CHARTER CHAPTER VIII: REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action
provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles
of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make
every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional
agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference
from the Security Council.
Article 53
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy
state.
Article 54
The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under
regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Chapter VIII contains an inherent hierarchy - with regional arrangements serving global interests as defined by
the UN Security Council. The rationale was to subordinate regional arrangements to reduce the risks of
regional groups constituting a threat to the global system. UN Charter Article 54 further established the
primacy of the UN by securing a right to be kept fully informed of the activities of regional organisations.
The UN Charter does not define what regional arrangements or agencies are and as a result various types of
organisations have been treated as if they were entities covered by the intention of the UN Charter. Regional
entities have included collectives of states that may be based on affinities in geography, identity, or interest.
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This means that a collective defence alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
considered as a regional entity since the UN had justified its endorsement of NATO peace and security
decisions in reference to Chapter VII. The AU is officially classified as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter. Moreover, there are significant differences between the UN and how it relates to those
peace and security agents with which it has collaborated.
Finally, it should be noted that the focus on regional-global relations overlooks a host of issues that this lesson
does not address. Keep in mind that regionalisation only captures some developments relating to conflict
resolution: coalitions, individual states and private military/security actors are also involved in conflict
resolution, and regionalisation is therefore a part of a wider decentralisation development in international
peace and security management. Additionally, regionalisation is an uneven phenomenon. Some parts of the
world may experience instability and conflict may not have regional actors willing or able to engage in
mediation or peace operations.
3. Main Regional Organisations Involved in Conflict Resolution
Regional organisations vary in structure, resources, membership and location and as a result different
organisations may play very different roles. The most relevant organisations for the maintenance of
international peace and security include the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organization of
American States (OAS).
The European Union (EU)
At the turn of the twentieth century, the European Union emerged as a key actor in conflict resolution
worldwide. The EU is a peace project that came out of one of the most important and most successful conflict
resolution attempts in the wake of World War Two. It enshrined the success of peacemaking through regional
integration. In 2012, the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of its successful
struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights. The stabilising part played by the EU
has helped to transform most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace." The EUs foreign
policy is heavily grounded on the principles upon which the Union is founded and as a result the design of
external actions in the field of conflict resolution is very much shaped by these principles. Some therefore
argue that the EU approaches to conflict resolution differ in many ways from conflict resolution efforts of other
major international organizations.
The 1993 Maastricht Treaty marked the EUs first attempt to outline its foreign policy objectives and conflict
resolution was prominent together with the broader promotion of international security, regional cooperation,
democracy, the rule of law and human rights (Article J.1). In a similar vein, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty declares that
the EUs external action focuses on preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international
security (Art III-193(2c)). It is the combination of the aforementioned principles with strategies of regional
cooperation that define the EUs strategy in foreign policy. It was therefore first in the context of enlargement
that the EU carried out meaningful conflict resolution activities in Eastern Europe.
The EUs contribution to international peace and security however is not limited to the European continent. In
general, it is based on long-term action for regional integration, democratization and good governance as well
as on short and medium-term action based on crisis prevention, conflict management and reconstruction. It is
due to the policy of integration and enlargement that the EU can offer innovative options for conflict resolution
among its member states and for those aiming at entering the community. Compared to the UN and other
international organizations engaged in conflict resolution activities, the EU therefore has the possibility to
make use of a broader spectrum of incentives and conditionalities to maintain peace and security. These
include the provision or cutting of financial and economic benefits as well as assistance and cooperation on
projects in all societal sectors. In other words the EU has the opportunity to take direct influence on local
authorities and decision making processes by offering market access and membership conditional on the
implementation of institutional structures and norms. Prospects for conflict resolution are thus raised by
increasing the costs for spoiling.
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In the wider field of conflict resolution, the EU has been

BOX 10 | RECENT EUROPEAN UNION CIVILIAN AND
accredited with making successfully use of their good
MILITARY OPERATIONS
offices, EU Special Representatives and special envoys. On
a more ad hoc basis, they have been involved in political Balkans (EUFOR-Althea, EUPM, EULEX Kosovo);
dialogue, mediation and facilitation. When it comes to South Caucasus (EUMM Georgia, EUJUST Lex);
conflict prevention, they have a special unit for Conflict
Middle East (EUPOL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah);
Prevention & Crisis Management. Diplomatic activities and
military support have been undertaken in Central Asia, Central Asia (EUPOL Afghanistan);
Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Africa (EU NAVFOR Somalia, EU SSR Guinea-
Specific instruments such as the European Development Bissau EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, EUPOL RD CONGO,
Fund (EDF) or the African Peace Facility (APF) have also EUSEC RD Congo).
been used to foster peace and security and today, the
European Union is the biggest aid donor in the world. It is through Civilian Crisis Management Missions that
the EU tries to fill the mandate of conflict resolution through democratization and state building. Instruments
include the reform of police and security management, the building of a civilian administration, the rule of law
and monitoring.
BOX 11 | EU CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN KOSOVO - EULEX
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the common
European Security and Defence Policy. The mission was created to support the authorities of Kosovo to restore the rule
of law after the declaration of independence in 2008.
The EULEX mission is part of a greater effort of the EU to promote stability and peace in the region of the Western
Balkans. Three goals make up the EUs conflict resolution strategy in Kosovo:
1) Nation-building through democratization and decentralization;

2) Europeanization;
3) Supervision of stabilization through the establishment of a transitional protectorate.
The EU has gradually taken over from the United Nations the main responsibilities of state-building in Kosovo. This task
is politically sensitive since the independence of Kosovo is still contested. The EU Commission in 2005 promised Kosovo
a clear future in Europe thereby expressing its wish for further integration and final membership. But EU member
states such as Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania and Greece are yet to recognise the status of Kosovo.
The EULEX mission aims to develop an independent and multi-ethnic justice system as well as to reform the police
apparatus and the custom services of Kosovo. The mandate also includes the verification of adherence to internationally
recognized standards and best practices. This means that the fight against corruption and organized crimes is as much
part of the EUs mission as the introduction of greater judicial reforms.
The legitimacy and success of the EULEX mission is highly dependent on the performance of the programs and reforms
in place. Recently, the European Court of Auditors credited the mission with having only modest success as levels of
corruption and organized crimes remain high. The northern parts of Kosovo are even said to be unaffected by the
reforms. Besides its limited performance in terms of the management of the mission, the audition report concludes that
[i]n contrast to the rest of the Western Balkans, in the case of Kosovo the incentive of potential EU accession is
jeopardised by the absence of a common EU position on its independence (European Court of Auditors).
ECA (2012); Tocci (2011); Yabanci (2011)
The European Union also has its limits when it comes to conflict resolution and its most noticeable weaknesses
include its limited ability to react quickly and cohesively as well as its limited military and police capabilities.
The European Unions legitimacy and credibility has also been challenged and the effectiveness of its action
questioned.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
One of the most well-known and active regional organisation in the field of peace and security is NATO. Born
during the Cold War, the organisation has a special mandate which emphasises the idea of collective security as
well as the indivisibility of security of all members: an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
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North America shall be considered an attack against all of them. NATO ensures security and freedom for its
members through political and military means. Through North America-Europe collaboration on security and
defence issues, it has acted as regional and strategic stabiliser. NATO and EU overlap in terms of members (21
member states in common) and mandate (peacekeeping and peace enforcement possible).
The NATO Response Force (NRF) has the ability to engage in coercive military interventions. It comprises
25,000 troops, including air, land and sea components and special forces that could be deployed upon five
days notice, for up to one month. It has been fully functional since 2006, yet still requires more capabilities to
carry out the full range of missions. There is a disparity between American and European contributions,
financially and militarily. The US focuses on military capability while Europeans concentrate on civilian
capability. The military budget for 2007 was US$ 2 billion and the costs of missions are covered under the costs
lie where they fall principle.
When it comes to conflict resolution, NATO is an important actor. Its role in the resolution of conflict is
criticised by many since the use of force is its main approach. But NATO is also committed to diplomatic conflict
settlements. In 1956, the North Atlantic Council, NATOs supreme organ, stated that the organisations
Secretary-General could use his good offices to resolve conflicts and engage in mediation, conciliation and
arbitration. Most recently, NATO played an important and much contested role in Libya. The organisation does
not enjoy as much legitimacy as the UN since it does not abide by the principles of neutrality, impartiality or
any other humanitarian principles.
BOX 12 | THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE
With the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) has gone through a process of strategic
redefinition of its original role which centred on the defence against the nations of the Warsaw Pact. As a result of the
redefinition of its strategy, NATO has complemented its role in collective defence with two other major core tasks:
crisis management and cooperative security.
The Alliance since then adopted a holistic approach to crisis management, envisaging NATOs participation in all stages
of a crisis: NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize
post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.
This broad approach to crisis management is reflected in the six missions the NATO Response Force completed so far
which ranged from security support to the Olympics in Greece in 2004 to the protection of the population during the
Iraqi elections in 2006 as well as the 2011 air strikes against the Gaddafi regime in Libya. NATO has also provided
humanitarian relief to Afghanistan as well as in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and in the aftermath of the earthquake
disaster in Pakistan.
With the mission in Libya, the NATO substantially expanded its mandate. The future relevance of NATO will however
be decided based on the alliances performance in response to the so called new security threats these include cyber
security, weapon proliferation and conflicts arising out of ecological disasters.
This rather wide crisis management approach is complemented by the second new key task: cooperative security.
Acknowledging the complex nature of an evolving security environment, NATO is striving for partnerships with
associated countries as well as with other international organizations. NATO furthermore seeks to strengthen
consultation mechanisms with major global players, including civilian and political organizations and bodies in order
to be able to cope with the complexity of todays peace-support and stabilization operations and the multi-faceted
nature of 21st century security challenges.
The African Union (AU)
The Organization for African Unity (OAU) was founded in 1963 to encourage coordination among African states
including for the settlement of conflicts and defence against external aggression. In 1993, a Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was established to strengthen the organization in the area
of peace and security. In 2001, the African Union (AU) was created to replace the OAU with a mandate to boost
development, eradicate poverty and bring Africa into the global economy.
With 53 member states, the organisation had a running budget of US$ 164.3 million for the year 2009. The AU
has a Peace Fund, and is otherwise fully reliant on sources of funding from donors for the sustainability of its
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peace and security efforts. The AU headquarters are located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with approximately 70
staff - including 40 staff working on peace and security issues. The organisation is a top-driven organisation
where five strong African states have a lot of influence: Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. As in
the case of the UN, some states enjoy more power and influence than others.
The AU Commission is working to develop a stronger policy-making role, and more influence over inter-state
dynamics. The architecture for peace and security include the AU Peace and Security Council; the Common
African Defence and Security Policy; a Panel of the Wise; a continental Early Warning System; a Military Staff
Committee; and, the African Standby Force (ASF), which is developing into a continent-wide body of
multidisciplinary military and civilian contingents for rapid deployment.. The ASF rests on brigade size forces in
each sub-region of Africa, reflecting that the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms
(RM) remain central building blocks in the AU structure.
The AU Peace and Security Council may play an important role for conflict resolution. In particular, it regularly
makes use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry to prevent conflict but also of peace-making
and peace-building functions to resolve conflicts where they have occurred. Most recently, it played a leading
role in negotiating a settlement between the Libyan leader and the rebels. One of the AUs most high-profile
interventions is the deployment of the UN-mandated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to conduct
Peace Support Operations in Somalia to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for
the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the United Nations (UN).
BOX 13 | THE AFS: BUILDING AN AFRICAN SOLUTION TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS
The idea of building an African Standby Force was heavily influenced by the failure of the international community to
find a response and to react to the political and humanitarian crises in Somalia and Rwanda. The initial idea was to
create a rapid reaction capacity that would enable African states to respond promptly to humanitarian and political
crises thereby bypassing the heavy institutional and political barriers that characterize major international institutions
like the United Nations. Stabilization tasks and peace consolidation required in the wake of a rapid response could be
realized in partnership with other international actors.
There are five regional standby forces that comprise the ASF: the East African Standby Force (EASF); the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force (ESF); the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS) Standby Force; the North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force; and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Standby Force (SSF).
From the beginning the ASF envisioned a multidimensional approach including military components as well as police
forces and civilian personnel. However, the military dimension is still dominating the structures established so far. The
numbers of civilians in African peace operations have to date rather been limited (De Coning & Kasumba 2010: 22). It
was only in 2008 that a policy framework for the civilian dimension of the AFS was presented to the AU Commission.
The full capacity of a rapid reaction force, where Africans themselves assume complex peace consolidation tasks
including civilian assignments, is yet to be developed.
The civilian capacities will be organized in a standing roster and are planned to cover a wide range of different
expertise, from the promotion of human rights to humanitarian assistance and administrative mission support. This
increased need for specialized personnel in multidimensional peace operations has also implications for the regional
peacekeeping training centres as they are requested to develop and expand both generic and mission-specific trainings
for civilian experts.
Addy & Atuobi (2009); Bachmann (2011); De Coning & Kasumba (2010)
The ASF is supposed to become fully operational in 2015. Whether this goal is met, however, will depend on the
financial resources and the technical assistance efforts provided.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The ASEAN has a mandate to increase economic growth, promote social and cultural development as well as
promoting peace and stability within the region. In particular, its treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
Asia outlines principles for co-operation, the establishment of dialogue over political and security issues with a
view to promote regional peace and stability. The ASEAN is nothing like NATO when it comes to peace and
security. Indeed, its long adherence to the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference means that it has
only used diplomatic approaches. In particular, it has made use of official declarations and political statements
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as well as good offices. Few member states have used the

BOX 14 | SECURITY COMMUNITY PLAN OF
regional conflict management mechanisms offered by the ACTION (2004) - PRINCIPLES
ASEAN. The High Council has not yet been activated and no
member state has brought disputes to its attention in more 1. Non-alignment;
than 40 years. 2. Fostering of peace-oriented attitudes of
ASEAN Member Countries;
3. Conflict Resolution through non-violent
Very few regional organisations in the world have access to means;
military troops in sufficient number to carry out large or 4. Renunciation of nuclear weapons and
medium peace operations. However, direct military force other weapons of mass destruction and
through the deployment of soldiers or peacekeepers on the avoidance of arms race in Southeast Asia;
ground may neither be the primary means of action nor the and
best means to influence the behaviour of actors around the 5. Renunciation of the threat or the use of
world. This is the reason why regional organisations have force (ASEAN Security).
mostly made use of traditional approaches to conflict resolution
including good offices, conciliation, mediation, negotiation and arbitration.
BOX 15 | ASEAN AND THE CAMBODIAN-THAI BORDER CONFLICT
The long-lasting Cambodian-Thai dispute over the Preah Vihear temple area escalated in February 2011 to an
unprecedented level of violence. Several people died and tens of thousands were displaced as a result of clashes
between the Thai and the Cambodian military. After Cambodia had called on the UN Security Council to address the
issue, the Security Council set a precedent by passing the issue on to the ASEAN and its then Chair, Indonesia. Following
shuttle diplomacy conducted by Indonesias foreign minister Marty Natalegawa, the UN Security Council invited the
three states for a private meeting, where they agreed that ASEAN facilitation would create the necessary conditions
for the bilateral demarcation of the border between Thailand and Cambodia. On 22 February 2011, a historic meeting of
ASEANs foreign ministers took place and the conflict between the two Member States was discussed for the first time.
The meeting ended with four decisions:
1) Cambodia and Thailand would cease hostilities;
2) Indonesia would send an observer mission to the border area;
3) Cambodia and Thailand would resume bilateral talks;
4) Indonesia would continue to facilitate the dialogue.
In a series of negotiations facilitated by ASEANs chair, the two states continued to discuss the terms of reference for the
Indonesian observer mission. Even though Thailands civilian leadership did not oppose the deployment of an observer
mission, its military leadership finally blocked the agreement. Finally, the ASEAN-facilitated talks did not lead to an
agreement and the issue was referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, ASEANs engagement set an
important precedent and developed an approach for dealing with future disputes.
ICG (2011); UN (2011)
The Organization of American States (OAS)
The OAS, resulting out of a series of nine International Conferences of American States was founded as the
primary forum for inter-American cooperation. According to the Charter one of the primary purposes of the
organization is to strengthen the peace and security of the continent, including through conflict resolution.
Similar to NATO, the OAS defines itself as a system of collective security. However, compared to its North
Atlantic counterpart, it remains much less institutionalized.
In case of problems of an urgent nature, the OAS can call for the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
The most recent meeting of this kind took place when Colombian military forces and police personnel entered
the territory of Ecuador in March 2008. It is the Secretary General together with the Permanent Council who
have the mandate to assist and to monitor the peaceful settlement of disputes. This includes the entitlement
for each member to resort to the Permanent Council for its good offices.
Regarding conflict resolution instruments, the OAS builds on a strong link between the promotion of
democracy and the settlement of disputes and conflicts. The General Assembly has the possibility to to
condemn an unconstitutionalised interruption of the legitimate exercise of power by democratically
constituted governments by imposing sanctions and by suspending member states whose legitimate
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governments have been overthrown by the use of force. The OAS made use of this four times in the 1990s
following the coup dtats in Haiti, Peru, Guatemala and Paraguay.
During the last decade, the OAS has introduced new instruments for conflict resolution. In 2000 the General
Assembly created the Fund for Peace, providing financial means to member states aiming at peacefully
resolving territorial disputes. Further measures include the Special Program for the Promotion of Dialogue and
Conflict Resolution as part of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. The program was designed to
contribute to the analysis of and dialogue on conflict prevention and resolution. Last but not least, the
Secretary General of the OAS in 2008 created the Inter-American Peace Forum which operates within the direct
framework of the Fund for Peace. Its purpose is to create a culture of regional peace among the different
segments of inter-American societies. In order to meet this goal, NGOs involved in promoting peace have the
right to participate in this forum.
During the Cold War the OAS was regarded as an instrument of the US Foreign Policy and critics still argue
that the predominance of the hegemonic power is defining the policy of the OAS. In the 1990s the focus shifted
from collective defence to broader cooperation in the fields of peace and security to include effective
mechanisms for conflict prevention and for the support of peace processes.
BOX 16 | OAS CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BELIZE AND GUATEMALA
The territorial dispute between Belize and Guatemala dates back to the 1940s and since then, the Belizean territory has
repeatedly been claimed in part or in whole by Guatemala. It was in 1999 that Guatemala renewed this claim, which
caused massive protests among the population of Belize. The deployment of military and police personnel, by both
Guatemalan and Belizean forces, illustrated the increased tensions between the two countries. The confrontation
culminated when in 2000 a Belizean Defence Force patrol shot and killed a Guatemalan national. What followed was
the direct confrontation of Belizean military and police forces with the Guatemalan military.
It was then that, under the auspices of the Organization of American States, representatives of both governments came
together to start a series of talks. The negotiations were guided by a panel of facilitators jointly appointed by Belize and
Guatemala. A first outcome of the talks was the establishment of an adjacency zone on the internationally recognized
border line. The negotiation lead to even more substantial changes and in 2005 both conflict parties signed the
Agreement on a Framework for Negotiations and Confidence-Building Measures. The office of the OAS in the
adjacency zone subsequently helped to carry out a series of measures including the prevention of escalation through
verification missions and the reporting of incidences as well as the fostering of community development and
community resettlement projects. The Group of Friends was established as an advisory board to the Secretary
General of the OAS, providing operational and political support to the negotiation process. This group is composed by
high level representatives of OAS Member States and other parties interested in supporting a peaceful resolution of the
territorial conflict.
Finally both countries agreed to refer to the International Court of Justice for the settlement of the conflict in October
2013. The court will be asked to make a concluding assessment of Guatemalas Territorial, Insular and Maritime claim.
Jacome, Milet & Serbin (2005); OAS (2009)
4. The United Nations and Regionalisation The Case of Darfur
From the early 1990s, the UN collaborated with various regional organisations: NATO in Bosnia; the
Organisation of American States (OAS) in Haiti and El Salvador; the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) in Liberia; the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia; the ASEAN in Cambodia; and the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) in Burundi and Rwanda. In recent years, the United Nations has collaborated with the
African Union to address the conflict in Darfur and important insights can be drawn from the successes and
failures of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the UN-AU hybrid mission for Darfur (UNAMID).
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The War in Darfur
Darfur, a region roughly the size of France in western Sudan, has been subject to an unprecedented AU-led
political and military response, with substantial involvement from the UN Security Council and the UN
Secretariat. It forms a prime example of the many implications of increasing regionalism of peace and security
in general, and of AU-UN collaboration in particular. Since war broke out in 2003, the region has seen a varied
and intense international reaction. In July 2004, the UN Security Council determined in Resolution 1556 that
the situation was a threat to international peace and security and to stability in the region. Substantial
evidence established that the Government of Sudan and other warring parties were complicit in mass atrocity
and crimes against the civilian population. The UN Security Council expressed grave concern at the ongoing
humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights violations that were placing the lives of hundreds of
thousands at risk and leading to a refugee and internal displacement crisis. However, rather than assuming
leadership, state representatives and senior officials of the UN agreed, with their counterparts in the AU, that
the AU should be the lead political and military actor with respect to Darfur.
The UN Security Council decision to regionalise the response to Darfur to have an African solution to an
African problem was important for one overriding reason. The Government of Sudan did not consent to a UN
peace operation in Darfur. Only the AU could deploy armed troops with the regimes blessing. Since the AU
response stayed within the confines of Chapter VI consensual peacekeeping, the African response was legal
and legitimate. It did not pose a big challenge to the UN Security Council to approve of it. So although the
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter was not referred to explicitly in the UN Security Council resolutions or debates
on Darfur, the delegation of the matter to the regional level were broadly in line with the principles of that
Chapter. The important point, for the UN Security Council membership was that the AU-UN relationship
remained informal - a temporary instrument activated in a particular crisis and not a formalised, precedent
setting practice. By rarely referring explicitly to the rules of Chapter VIII, regional-global relationships remain
ad hoc and un-institutionalised.
African Union Capabilities
The AU was, in material terms, not prepared to deploy a fully-fledged peace operation to a situation like
Darfur. The organisation suffered from a lack of political and material support and capacity. Comprehensive
support did not come forth either from many of those states that wanted the AU to play a leading role. There
was reluctance on the part of the UN membership to follow through on some of the proposals made by the UN
Secretary-General to strengthen and make credible the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), to take over the
mission or to take on a larger role in facilitating comprehensive peace talks.
AMISs maximum strength was at approximately 7,000 personnel. A widespread criticism of the mission was
that it could not dominate the mission area: it was not active enough in patrolling the most insecure areas of
(rural) Darfur and it was passive amidst grave human rights violations taking place in front of them. It was
however credited with having stabilised the security situation to some degree. The strongest criticism of the
mission leadership was that the AU was biased with the host government: the National Congress Party (NCP)
regime in Khartoum. And AMISs operations reflected this stance. The Government of Sudan imposed a curfew
on the mission, breaching the Status of Forces Agreement between the AU and Sudan. The regime did not
disarm the Janjaweed, and it continued its military operations in Darfur. The two dominant rebel forces at the
onset of the war: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA)
accused AMIS of having taken sides. These two groups often denied AMIS access to their strongholds of the
region.
In such a context, it is likely that an important transfer of military capacity would have strengthened AMIS and
enabled peacekeepers to:
Conduct more patrols;
Access more regions
Enjoy greater security;
Show a robust presence in the field.
Apart from the material weaknesses (lack of forces, equipment, and capabilities such as attack helicopters), the
AU also displayed other problems including political obstacles (bias with host state) and normative tensions
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(conflict within the AU itself between non-intervention and non-indifference norms). The organisation did not
offer a permissive normative and constitutional setting for responding to intrastate conflicts.
Regionalising the response to Darfur allowed the UN Security Council to argue that it had lived up to its
responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Darfur had seen a response but was this response
sufficient?
Strengthening the AU-UN Relationship
In 2007, AMIS became the larger joint UN-AU hybrid mission for Darfur (UNAMID). It had an actual authorized
deployment of 26,000 personnel. The estimated budget for the first year was US$ 2.2 billion. Despite its larger
structure, UNAMID also struggled to have a credible presence in the field. In February 2010, UNAMIDs Joint
Special Representative acknowledged that although the entire 8 million population of Darfur could be
described as persons of concern to UNAMID... only about half this number are fully accessible.
Over time, as the weaknesses of the AU, AMIS and UNAMID became more widely publicised, there was a felt
need from both the AU and the UN to strengthen their relations and to make the intervention more credible.
Recent initiatives included the Joint Task Force on Peace and Security and the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU)
(integrating UN peace and security presences in Addis Ababa), both launched in 2010. Donor funding helps to
ensure that continental training exercises can take place in Africa under the Amani Africa umbrella with the
aim to operationalise and strengthen the ASF.
However, it is unclear whether technical assistance will make the regional option sufficient for conflict
response in Africa. The UN Security Council spends an estimated 60% of its time discussing conflicts and
concerns related to Africa and there is a growing recognition within UN-circles that it needs to support and lend
credibility to the AU and other African organisations; regional organisations are not simply implementers of UN
decisions and should be treated as genuine partners for global peace and security. Too often, regionalisation is
seen by some UN Security Council members as a legitimate response to the security problems of Africa, due to
their own reluctance to take risks or commit resources there. But without a constructive collaboration,
regionalization will affect the effectiveness and legitimacy of both the United Nations and its regional partners.
5. Benefits and Challenges of Regionalisation
In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali explained that regional arrangements or agencies can render
great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the UNSC, is governed by Chapter
VIII. He also stated that decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not
only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and
democratization in international affairs.
However, cooperation between the UN and regional organisations has been recognised as a double-edged
sword by Kofi Annan. The former Secretary-General explained that, while it could be a solution to deal with the
lack of capacity, resources and expertise of the UN, it could run the risk of being perceived as biased. Annan
concluded that when it comes to regionalisation, the UN should be careful and engage in positive cooperation
on a case by case basis.
Advantages of Regionalisation
The cooperation with regional organisations may bring many advantages to the UN and conflict actors.
Advantages include:
Greater legitimacy and knowledge of the local situation: In many conflicts, neighbouring states
appear to be less biased than powerful states such as the US or France. The colonial legacy being
present in the memories of entire populations, conflict parties often see local actors as more
legitimate and less threatening. In Sudan, for example, the president refused intervention from the UN
but accepted the deployment of AU troops. There is often a desire to find a local or regional solution;
African solutions to African problems.
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Faster deployment: Intervention by regional actors may be much faster since the distance that troops
must travel is often lower. Whenever intervention is permitted and the regional organisation has the
adequate resources, efforts to end the violence or prevent the escalation of hostilities can begin
sooner; a crucial factor in conflict resolution. Regional organisations have traditionally viewed
themselves as having a comparative advantage over the UN at the early stage of conflict response
since they tend to be faster moving and possess the contacts necessary to start peace talks straight
away.
Greater political commitment: Neighbouring states and regional organisations have a greater interest
in resolving conflicts that are likely to affect them. Spill-over effect and contagion through trans-
border flow of people, weapons and other goods mean that neighbouring states have a greater
interest in mitigating the consequences of a protracted conflict near their borders.
Mandate: Regional organisations may intervene when the UN is unable or unwilling to do so. The
voting procedures and the principles of the United Nations may not permit the deployment of blue
helmets or of a political mission. Likewise, the UN may not wish to send peacekeepers because of the
absence of a peace to keep and inadequate resources. Such was the case in Burundi in 2003.
Disadvantages of Regionalisation
Regionalisation is not a panacea for conflict resolution and it has many disadvantages. Such disadvantages
include:
Challenge to multilateralism: Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali originally called for greater
regionalization in the field of peace and security. However, he later emphasised the danger of a
regionalization process that could ultimately challenge the UNs internationalist basis.
Loss of neutrality and impartiality: A common assumption is that the UNs effectiveness in conflict
resolution depends on the multilateral credentials of the organization as well as its respect for
international law and humanitarian principles. The empowerment and legitimisation of regional actors
may lead to a lesser concern for principles such as neutrality and impartiality. This would particularly
be the case with NATO who enjoys military power but a limited legitimacy.
Lack of resources: Regional organisations often face the same constraints as the UN and few of them
possess the experience, the bureaucracy and the resources of the UN. As a result, any peace operation
will face greater challenges. The lack of an efficient administration as well as adequate logistical and
command structures may have negative implications on the ground by worsening the conflict, but also
in the realm of legitimacy whereby regional organisations would lose popular support.
Bias and political interests: As a matter of fact, when a conflict is taking place closer to home, the
stakes are usually higher and reaching an agreement can often prove difficult. Like the UN, regional
organisations are dominated by hegemonic states with greater influence than others. As a result,
decisions and policies may reflect partisan interests and the organisation may be used to gain
legitimacy and curtail the influence of potential rivals.
Backyard approach: The devolution of power to regional organisations may foster a backyard
approach, to use Jean-Marie Guhennos expression. Indeed, the burden of intervention may be put
on regional actors because great powers are not willing to bear that burden, whether directly or
through the UN. Conflicts with a low strategic interest may not licit enough attention. The problem is
that not all regions of the world possess the regional actors capable of intervening. Certain conflicts,
such as in Kashmir, would remain unaddressed. The UNs universal mandate would then be
questioned.
Mandate: Many regional organisations do not have the mandate to actively restore peace and security
within the territorial boundaries of their member states. Their treaties and principles are often too
restrictive and may not allow the use of force within states.
Regional actors might ensure rapid and more context-sensitive intervention types. Populations at risk in places
where the UN Security Council seems unwilling to deploy troops might prefer a response by a sub-optimal
force rather than none at all. Regional actors might also sometimes ensure effective interventions, such as the
use of air power by a coalition of NATO Allies to coerce the government of Muammar Gaddafi of Libya to halt
his attack on Benghazi. Such coercive intervention is usually highly contested in the UNSC.
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When the UN Security Council does not authorise the deployment of peacekeepers, regional organisations are
not always able or willing to act in its place. So regionalism across the board would not be a reliable conflict
management approach. Some regions simply do not have effective regional organisations. The Arab League
and the OIC have shown little interest in taking on conflict resolution roles in regard to Somalia, a member of
both organisations.
Finally, it could well be that too much regional autonomy might lead to fragmentation of the collective
decision-making structure. This might pose a risk to the primacy of the UN, and to counter the development
the UNSC would have to ensure that regional organisations remain delegates, and not UN alternatives;
subsidiaries, not equal partners. The UNSC would have to avoid authorising, or permitting, others to take the
lead in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations without ensuring that those are informed by pro-UN
Charter motivations.
The growth in the number and importance of international and regional organisations has been one of the
most prominent features of world politics since 1945.
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter addressed the role of regional organisations and their relation
to the UN.
o Article 52 encouraged regional conflict management provided that their activities are
consistent with the principles of the United Nations;
o Article 53 enabled the United Nations to rely on regional organisations to enforce action;
o Article 54 required regional organisations to keep the United Nations fully informed of their
activities in the maintenance of international peace and security.
The most relevant organisations for the maintenance of international peace and security include:
o The European Union (EU);
o The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);
o The African Union (AU);
o The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
In the case of Darfur, the collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union had certain
advantages and limits.
There is a growing recognition that the United Nations needs to support and lend credibility to African
regional organisations since they are not simply implementers of UN decisions but should be treated as
genuine partners for global peace and security.
The cooperation with regional organisations may bring many advantages to the UN and conflict actors.
Advantages include:
o Greater legitimacy and knowledge of the local situation;
o Faster deployment;
o Greater political commitment;
o Mandate.
Regionalisation is not a panacea for conflict resolution and it has many disadvantages. Such disadvantages
include:
o Challenge to multilateralism;
o Loss of neutrality and impartiality;
o Lack of resources;
o Bias and political interests;
o Backyard approach;
o Mandate.
23

Conflict Resolution Narratives

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Conflict Resolution Narratives

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Module guide

Introduction to conflict resolution

Content and learning objectives

At the end of this module, participants should be able to:

Categorize conflicts according to different theories;

Module one: Introduction to Conflict Resolution

What does conflict mean to you?

Watch the video `What is Conflict?` http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5pU5DNjoXY

Lesson 1: Conflict Theories

Lesson 2: Conflict Resolution Tools and Theories

Activity 1: Applying Conflict Resolution Tools and Theories

Discussion Forum 1: Strengths and Weaknesses of Conflict Resolution Tools and

Module one: Introduction to Conflict Resolution

Introduction to Conflict Resolution

OVERVIEW AND LEARNING OBJECTIVES

BOX 1 | LEARNING OBJECTIVES

At the end of the module participants will be able to:

Categorize conflicts according to different theories;

BOX 2 | LEARNING OBJECTIVES

At the end of the lesson participants will be able to:

Distinguish the main types of conflict resolution theories;

Conflict theories fall into 3 categories, internal,

Internal conflict theories are mostly relevant for

FIGURE 1 | CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT THEORIES

Category 1: Internal conflict theories PERSON A PERSON B

Category 2: Contextual conflict theories PERSON A PERSON B

Category 3: Relational conflict theories PERSON A PERSON B

TABLE 1 | CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT THEORIES

2. Internal Theories of Conflict

Theory 1: Human Nature as a Source of Conflict

In various cultural and religious traditions, it is believed that

Theory 2: Human Psychology as a Source of Conflict

Innate aggressiveness conflict

Frustration aggressiveness conflict

BOX 5 | ANGRY YOUNG MEN

Theory 3: Human Biology as a Source of Conflict

BOX 6 | IS IT ALL ABOUT GENDER?

Critiques of Internal Conflict Theories

In 1989, a group of high-level anthropologists, psychologists,

3. Contextual Theories of Conflict

Theory 4: Anarchy as a Source of Conflict

Anarchy mistrust need for security militarisation arms race conflict

The causal link to the security dilemma

Uncertainty and fear

Self-help through power competition

The Security Dilemma

Unintended consequences: Unintended consequences:

Theory 5: Globalisation as a Source of Conflict

BOX 8 | CASE STUDY: CONFLICT DIAMONDS AND GLOBALIZATION

As a consequence, many types of resistance movements and fundamentalisms emerge.

Globalisation porous borders insecure identity resistance conflict

Critique of Contextual Conflict Theories

4. Relational Theories of Conflict

Theory 6: Community Relations as a Source of Conflict

Community relations misperception & miscommunication polarisation conflict

BOX 10 | INGROUP OUTGROUP DYNAMICS

Van der Dennen (1987)

BOX 11 | CASE STUDY: INTER-COMMUNAL CONFLICTS IN INDIA

Theory 7: Human Needs as a Source of Conflict

FIGURE 4 | UNIVERSAL HUMAN NEEDS

FOOD SHELTER RECOGNITION SECURITY

FREEDOM IDENTITY CREATIVITY PRIVACY

Human needs scarcity deprivation unfulfilled needs frustration conflict

BOX 12 | CASE STUDY: HUMAN NEEDS IN MALI