ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
CABRAS
1. EXAMPLES OF RULE-MAKING
G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. HON. EMMANUEL
M. MUOZ, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch I,
FACTS:
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corp
(Piadeco) claims to be the owner of Some 72,000
hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities of
Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte,
province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and
Montalban, province of Rizal, and a deed of absolute
sale in its favor. Piadeco applied for registration
as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this
land to the Bureau of Forestry, on December 4,
1963.
The controversy in these cases began when Acting
Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera issued an
order cancelling PWR No. 2065-New. He required
Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him.
Ground for this cancellation was that Piadeco had
violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting
trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed
Reservations, expressly excluded from the said
certificate.
On December 28, 1964, Piadeco applied for the
renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland
Registration PWR 2065-New, which would expire on
the last day of that month. Assistant Director of
Forestry J. L. Utleg denied the renewal requested.
He informed Piadeco that its Titulo de
Propiedad 4136 was not registerable under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 12-2 which took effect on
January 1, 1963. The expiration of its registration
certificate and the non-renewal thereof
notwithstanding, Piadeco continued logging
operations. It was about this time that illegal logging
was denounced by some members of Congress
thereby attracting national attention.
On July 8, 1965, the judge came out with an order
declaring that notwithstanding "the expiration of
petitioner's [Piadeco's] license on December 31,
1964, their said property remains registered with
the Bureau of Forestry subject only to renewal, in
which case it can still pursue its logging operations,
conditioned upon the payment by it of forest
charges." The judge thereupon directed the forestry
officials "and all members of the Armed Forces
stationed along the way" to allow Piadeco "to haul
its logs which have already been properly
documented."
This precipitated the filing on July 28, 1965 by the
Director of Forestry, the Forest Station Warden, the
Armed Forces Chief of Staff 7 of an original petition
with this Court (L-24796, now at bar)
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to annul the order of execution.
ATTY.
ISSUE:
Whether PIADECOs tite is registrable with the
Bureau of Forestry and whether the Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2 is valid
HELD:
PIADECOs title is not registrable under AO 12-
2.
Forestry Admin. Order no. 12-2 is valid.
PIADECOs position is that such amendment
contravenes a.) SEC. 1829 of RAC which does not
specify the titles that are registrable and b.) opinions
of officials that titles issued during the Spanish
regime are registrable.
1. True it is that the law, Section 1829, does not
describe with particularity titles that may be
registered with the Bureau of Forestry. Concededly,
too, administrative authorities in the past
considered as registrable, titles issued during the
Spanish regime. In fact, as late as 1962, Forestry
Administrative Order 12-1 was still in force,
authorizing registration of such Spanish titles. But
when Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 came into
effect on January 1, 1963, that order should be
deemed to have repealed all such previous
administrative determinations.
2. There should be no question now that Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and
effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to
law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code,
empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval
of the department head, to issue regulations
"deemed expedient or necessary to secure the
protection and conservation of the public forests in
such manner as to insure a continued supply of
valuable timber and other forest products for the
future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the
forests and forest reserves, to the same end."
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was
recommended by the Director of Forestry, and
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is
an administrative regulation germane to the
objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped
out by jurisprudence is that when Congress
authorized the promulgation of administrative rules
and regulations to implement a given legislation,
"[a]ll that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes."
2. Quasi-legislative or Rule-making Functions
GOMEZ vs PALOMAR
FACTS:
This appeal puts in issue the
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constitutionality of Republic Act 1635 (Anti-TB
Stamp Law) which provides for the issuance of semi-
postal stamps with regular postage charge plus the
additional amount of 5centavos for the Philippine
Tuberculosis Society. The respondent Postmaster
General, in implementation of the law, thereafter
issued four (4) administrative orders. All these
administrative orders were issued with the approval
of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Petitioner Benjamin P. Gomez mailed a letter
at the post office in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Because this letter, addressed to a certain Agustin
Aquino did not bear the special anti-TB stamp
required by the statute, it was returned to the
petitioner.
Petitioner brought suit for declaratory relief in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, to test the
constitutionality of the statute, as well as the
implementing administrative orders issued,
contending that it violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as well as the rule of
uniformity and equality of taxation.
The lower court declared the statute and the
orders unconstitutional. One of the grounds relied
upon by the court is that the statute is so broadly
drawn that to execute it the respondents had to
issue administrative orders far beyond their powers;
that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
Hence this appeal by the respondent postal
authorities.
ISSUE: Whether RA 1635 and the assailed
Administrative Orders are valid
RULING: Yes. The Court held that judgment
appealed from must be reversed.
Administrative Order 3, as amended by
Administrative Orders 7 and 10, provides that for
certain classes of mail matters (such as mail
permits, metered mails, business reply cards, etc.),
the five-centavo charge may be paid in cash instead
of the purchase of the anti-TB stamp. It further
states that mails deposited during the period
August 19 to September 30 of each year in mail
boxes without the stamp should be returned to the
sender, if known, otherwise they should be treated
as nonmailable.
It is true that the law does not expressly authorize
the collection of five centavos except through the
sale of anti-TB stamps, but such authority may be
implied in so far as it may be necessary to
prevent a failure of the undertaking. The
authority given to the Postmaster General to raise
funds through the mails must be liberally
construed, consistent with the principle that where
the end is required the appropriate means are given.
It is likewise true that the statute does not
provide for the disposition of mails which do not
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bear the anti-TB stamp, but a declaration therein
that "no mail matter shall be accepted in the
mails unless it bears such semi-postal stamp" is
a declaration that such mail matter is
nonmailable within the meaning of section 1952 of
the Administrative Code. Administrative Order 7
of the Postmaster General is but a restatement
of the law for the guidance of postal officials and
employees. As for Administrative Order 9, we have
already said that in listing the offices and entities of
the Government exempt from the payment of the
stamp, the respondent Postmaster General
merely observed an established principle,
namely, that the Government is exempt from
taxation.
3. Central Bank vs Cloribel
Facts:
Respondent Banco Filipino is savings and mortgage
bank which began operations in July 1964. Central
Bank seeks annulment of Judge Gaudencio
Cloribels order restraining Central Bank from
enforcing CB Circular Nos. 185 and 222 and
Monetary Board Resolution Nos. 805 and 1566 in so
far as they restrict the payment by Banco Filipino of
monthly interest on savings deposits and
advance interests on time deposits.
Banco Filipino sets up the defense that the
contested resolutions and circulars are null and
void for a) they were issued without previous notice
and hearing b) they impair vested rights and c) the
statutory power of the Monetary Board to fix the
maximum rates of interest which banks may pay on
deposits and any other obligation does not include
the regulation of the manner computing and paying
interest, since this function is not expressly granted
to petitioner Central Bank.
Issue:
Whether or not the resolutions and circulars issued
by Central Bank are null and void?
Ruling:
No. Central Bank is supposed to gather relevant
data and make the necessary study, but has no legal
obligation to notify and hear anybody, before
exercising its power to fix the maximum rates of
interest. Previous notice and hearing, as elements of
due process, are constitutionally required for the
protection of life or vested property rights, when its
limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding., generally
dependent upon a past act or event which has to be
established or ascertained. It is is not essential for
the validity of General rules and regulations
promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of
persons or enterprises, unless the law provides
otherwise and there is no statutory requirement to
this effect, in so far as the fixing of interest is
concerned.
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That they impair vested rights is obviously
unfounded, for the said resolutions and circulars
operate prospectively and affect only deposits made
and/or interests occurring subsequent to the
promulgation thereof. Furthermore, all contracts
are subject to the police power of the state.
The justification for the inclusion, in the power to fix
the maximum rate of interest, of the Authority to
prescribe the time or manner of payments thereof
springs a) not only from the implied grant of all
powers necessary to carry out those expressly
conferred and b) from the explicit authority of the
Monetary Board to avoid evasion by likewise fixing
maximum rates in any other form (oy payments
of any sort) but also c) from the reasons underlying
the grant of authority to fix said maximum rates.
One objective is to establish a uniform ceiling
applicable to all banks, in order to avoid competition
in the form or higher rates offered to depositors
resulting in reduction of their profits impelling them
to resort to risky ventures and more remunerative
loans and investments.
From the facts, Banco Filipino as it compounds
monthly and pays advance in time deposits
undertakes to pay its depositors more than the
amount fixed by these resolutions and circulars
when compounded quarterly (by 0.029% higher for
savings deposits and by 0.452% higher for time
deposits), the Central Bank is legally authorized to
demand strict compliance.
4.Conference of Maritime manning Agencies vs
POEA 243 SCRA 666
Facts:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencie
s, Inc., an incorporated
association of licensed Filipino manning agencies,
and its copetitioners, all licensedmanning agencies
which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in
behalf of theirrespective foreign ship-owner-
principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01,
series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the POEA
and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the
power and authority to fix and
promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's co
mpensation of Filipino seamenworking in ocean-
going vessels; only Congress can. Governing Board
Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board
resolves to amend and increase the compensation
and other benefits as specified under Part
II, Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L,
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers
Issue:
WON the POEA can promulgate rules
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by virtue of delegation of legislative power.
Yes.The constitutional challenge of the rule-
making power of the POEA-based onimpermissible
delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly
contented by the public respondents, brushed aside
by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.
POEA.
The governing Board of the Administration (POEA)
shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).
To many of the problems attendant upon present-
day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious not to say, specific solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them.
While the making of laws is a nondelegable power t
hat pertains exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitution
ally delegate the authority topromulgate rules and
regulations to implement
a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the
reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if
not impossible, to anticipate situations that may
be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the
law. (Principle of Subordinate Legislation)
That the challenged resolution and memorandum c
ircular, which merely furtheramended the previous
Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to
the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and
equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O.
No.797 can no longer be disputed
5. 69 Phil. 635 Political Law Constitutional
Law Due Process in Administrative Bodies
ANG TIBAY VS. CIR
FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang
Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather,
Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc.
(NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it
averred that the said employees laid off were
members of NLU while no members of the rival
labor union (National Workers Brotherhood) were
laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company
dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations
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(CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The
Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the National Labor
Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
2. Whether or not CIR as administrative body
should comply with the requirements of due procss
HELD: 1. Yes. The records show that the newly
discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC,
were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of
the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence
they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Further, the attached documents and
exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean
the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered (said newly obtained records include
books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay
which were not previously accessible but already
existing).
2. YES. The SC also outlined that administrative
bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by
the Rules of Court must also make sure that they
comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied
with by observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges,
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therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
6. C. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
No. L-16537. June 29, 1962.
FRANCISCO C. CALO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
DELFIN C. FUERTES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, respondents-appellees.
FACTS:
In Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City entitled
Francis C. Calo, claimant-contestant, vs. Delfin C.
Fuertes,applicant-respondent, the Director of
Lands rendered an opinion denying and dismissing
former's claim andcontest against the homestead
application of Delfin C. Fuertes and ordered him to
vacate the premises within60 days from receipt of a
copy of the opinion and stating that, upon finality
thereof, the homestead patentwould be issued to
Fuertes. His request for reconsideration having
been denied by the Director of Lands,Francisco C.
Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources the case, who modified
theopinion of the Director of Lands, ordering
Fuertes to reimburse Calo of the difference between
the value of theimprovements that the latter
introduced on the land in controversy and the value
of the consequentialbenefits derived by him
therefrom.Still dissatisfied with the opinion, Calo
appealed to the President of the Philippines, but
withdrew it before thePresident could act thereon.
He later filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan
a petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction praying that the
enforcement of the opinions of theDirector of Lands
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources be enjoined among others. For failureto
state a cause of action, for lack of jurisdiction
and for not exhausting all the administrative
remediesavailable to the petitioner in the ordinary
course of law, the Court resolves to dismiss as it
hereby dismissesthe herein petition with costs
against petitioner. The petitioner then appeals to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the appeal to the President is a condition
precedent to the appeal to the Courts of Justice.
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HELD:
Yes. The appellants contention that, as the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
the alter ego of the President and his acts or
decisions are also those of the latter, he need not
appeal from the decision of the opinion of the former
to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he
had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of
the Director of Lands, he had exhausted all the
administrative remedies, is untenable. The
withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of
the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at
all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal because the
appeal to the President is the last step he should
take in an administrative case. Furthermore, a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when
"there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In
the case at bar, appeal from an opinion ororder by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
to the President of the Philippines is the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to the
petitioner. Therefore, the judgment appealed from
had already become final and cannot be reviewed.
The appeal is dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner-appellant.
7. Pascual vs Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
(G.R. No. L-11959)
Facts
Petitioner-appellant Arturo B. Pascual was the
mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija in 1951 and was
reelected in 1955. During Pascuals second term,
the Acting Provincial Governor filed three
administrative case with the Provincial Board on
Nueva Ecija against him. Charge No. III was
Maladministrative. Abuse of Authority, and
Usurpation of Judicial Functions.
After presenting evidence regarding the first two
charges, Pascual filed with the Provincial Board a
motion to dismiss on the main ground that the
wrongful acts alleged had been committed during
his previous term of office and could not constitute
a ground for disciplining him during his second
term. However, the motion was denied.
Pascual then filed a petition with the SC to enjoin
the Provincial Board from taking cognizance of the
third charge, but the petition was denied by minute
resolution of December 21, 1956 "without prejudice
to action, if any, in the Court of First Instance."
Accordingly, the petitioner-appellant filed with the
CFI of Nueva Ecija a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking to inhibit the said
Provincial Board from proceeding with the hearing
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of Charge No. III, for lack of jurisdiction.
The Provincial Board moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that it states no cause of action because
the Pascual had not exhausted his administrative
remedies before filing an appeal to the courts, and
because the Provincial Board had jurisdiction over
Charge No. III. CFI dismissed the petition and
Pascual brought the case to the SC on appeal.
Issue
Whether a municipal mayor may be subjected to an
administrative investigation of a charge based on
misconduct allegedly committed by him during his
prior term.
Held
No. each term is separate from other terms, and that
the reelection to office operates as a condonation of
the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
Court should never remove a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. When the people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they
did this with knowledge of his life and character,
and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for
the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to
practically overrule the will of the people.
8. ALZATE VS ALDANA, 107 PHIL 298
FACTS: Anacleto Alzate, Principal of the South
Provincial High School in Agoo, La Union Province,
wrote to the Director of Public Schools that
pursuant to RA No. 842, he was entitled to an
automatic salary increase of 4 rates (1 rate for every
5 years of service) after his salary has been adjusted
to the minimum, and to an additional automatic
salary to the minimum, and to an additional
automatic salary increase of 1 rate, pursuant to
paragraph (b) of the same section and Act, for
having passed the examination for Superintendent
of Private Schools given by the Civil Service
Commission.
The Division Superintendent of Schools for
La Union, denied petitioner's request contending
that in the adjustment of salary of secondary
principals, only the actual number of years of
service as such secondary principal would be
considered, and he would be entitled only to one
rate of salary increase; and since the examination
taken and passed by petitioner was only for the
Bureau of Private Schools, he was not entitled to the
benefit of paragraph (b) of the Public School Salary
Act.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but
he did not receive a ruling on his request. Fearing
that the amount appropriated for payment of the
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salary would be disbursed or expired of the fiscal
year and would be reverted to the general funds of
the government, he filed a mandamus proceeding in
CFI La Union. The latter rendered a decision
directing the Director of Public Schools the sum
claimed by the petitioner. Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the same, which was granted.
ISSUE: W/N the petition states no cause of action
in view of the non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
HELD: NO. The fact that the parties had to agree
and the court had to approve the agreement that the
Director of Public Schools shall recommend to the
proper official not later than June 30, 1958 and
before the closing of office hours on that date the
commitment of the sum of P840.00 claimed by
petitioner, to accounts payable in order to prevent
its reversion, is a recognition by the parties as well
as the court of the validity and urgency of the action
taken by the petitioner-appellant.
Petitioner contends that if he waited for the final
decision, which in fact did not come, whatever
action may thereafter be taken by respondent, even
if favorable to petitioner, would be of no avail after
the reversion of the funds appropriated for the
purpose of salary adjustment. Hence, he claims,
that to require him to exhaust the administrative
remedies would, in the circumstances of the case,
in effect amount to a nullification of his claim. It
would seem, therefore, that in the particular
circumstances of the present case, petitioner had
sufficient cause of action at the time of the filing of
his petition on June 11, 1958, and a resort to the
court without awaiting for the final decision of the
administrative officers is not, in view of the special
situation, premature. The order appealed from was
set aside and the case remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
9.De Lara Jr. vs Cloribel
No. L-21653 (May 31, 1965)
14 SCRA 269
FACTS:
In this case, the petitioner, De Lara Jr., was
granted a timber license to log over an area for
which he is authorized to cut annually.
Consequently, the during non-renewal of his
license, an application for the similar forest
concession was filed by the respondents (P & B
Enterprises Co., Inc.) was approved. After the grant,
P & B procured heavy equipments and introduced
improvements. Meanwhile, the petitioners renewal
for license was approved. The construction of
logging roads within the forest area covered by the
license was commenced which extended not only
along the plaintiffs concession but partially within
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the area covered by the latters timber concession
which cost the company approximately
P139,000.00. This prompted P & B to protest
against the approval in so far as the area of conflict
is concerned. The protest was overruled hence the
company appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources but remains pending study
and consideration. However, the petitioner
continued his logging operation and in doing so
trespassed and used the road constructed by P & B.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued an order prohibiting De Lara from operating
and entering within the contested area. Still, De
Lara continued the operation. A writ of preliminary
injuction enjoining De Lara and his aids from
operating was issued in favor of P & B. De Lara filed
a motion to dissolve the injuction alleging among
others that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies appearing that the appeal
regarding the conflict was still pending
determination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is correct that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable.
HELD:
No. the rule of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not applicable if it should appear that
an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by
a party if he should await, before taking court
action, the final action of the administrative official
concerned on the matter. Petition was dismissed.
10. G.R. No. 113357. February 1, 1996.*
BENJAMIN PAREDES, LUZ BUENSUCESO,
AUGUSTO SEVERINO, RODRIGO TABANERA,
STEPHEN SOLIVEN and ROBERTO SANCHEZ,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RIZALINO
S. NAVARRO, as Secretary of Trade and Industry,
and IGNACIO S. SAPAL, Director of the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
respondents.
TOPIC: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
FACTS: Public respondents promulgated
Administrative Order, revising the rules of practice
before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer (BPTTT) in patent and
trademark cases.
Among the provisions of said administrative orders
increased the fees payable to the BPTTT for
registration of patents and trademarks and
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prohibited the filing of multi-class applications, that
is, one application covering several classes of goods.
Petitioners, who are registered patent agents, filed
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition
to stop public respondents from enforcing the
aforementioned administrative orders.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
prohibition and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners may proceed
with the petition for prohibition when there are
other remedies available.
HELD: No, Prohibition is granted only in
cases where no other remedy is available which is
sufficient to afford redress.
That the petitioners have another and complete
remedy at law either by appeal or otherwise, is
generally a sufficient reason for dismissing the writ.
The court dismissed the petition.
11. QUASHA VS. SEC 83 SCRA 557
Facts: Petitioner had filed on October 10, 1977 and
October 17, 1977 his complaints and continuing
opposition with respondent Commission against the
filing of respondent Manila Polo Club, Incs
Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended
By-Laws which would convert said club into a
proprietary club, assailing the amendments as
illegal, inequitable and immoral, alleging inter alia
that the amendments have the effect of enabling
the members to appropriate the clubs property and
to use it as their contribution to the new club; the
real estate assets of Manila Polo Club consists of 25
hectares, more or less, of prime real estate in the
middle of Forbes Park, Makita, Metro Manila, which
are conservatively valued at present market
valuation of P200 Million and its building,
improvements, facilities and other equipment at
about 20 Million.
The more or less 2,000 actual members who
will become proprietary owners of the Clubs assets
under the proposed conversion will inequitably
enrich themselves if this Honorable Commission will
allow the comparatively paltry sum P12,500.00 to
be paid on or before December 28, 1977 for each
proprietary membership;
the value which the club now commands results
from the accrued contribution of past (and present)
members money, time, effort and foresight; and the
ATTY. CABRAS
conversion plan does not in any way compensate the
predecessors of the present membership (and also
those of the present) members money, time, effort
and foresight; and the conversion plan does not in
any way compensate the predecessors of the present
membership (and also those of the present
membership who do not opt for conversion) who
substantially contributed to making the Club what
it is today and further claiming that the
amendments had not been duly adopted by the
required two-thirds vote. Petitioner prayed for the
disapproval and cancellation of respondent clubs
articles and by-laws and denial of its application to
register its proprietary shares, and prayed for a
restraining order meanwhile enjoining it from selling
and/or accepting any payments for the questioned
proprietary shares.
On December 22, 1977, the respondent
commission through its hearing office Jose C.
Castro issued its Order of the same date denying
injunctive relief for lack of sufficient allegations in
support of the prayer for the issuance of the
preliminary injunction and for obvious lack of merit.
Hence, the petition filed forthwith on
December 23, 1977 by petitioner directly with the
Supreme Court claiming inter alia violation of
petitioners right to due process in that the
questioned order allegedly adjudged the main issues
which should have been resolved (only) after a full-
blown hearing on the merits and praying for the
issuance of a restraining order.
Issue: Whether there was exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Held: No, In view of the extremely limited time, with
the Commissions hearing officer having issued his
questioned order denying injunctive relief only on
December 22, 1977 at the height of the Christmas
holidays with just a few days before the scheduled
deadline of December 28, 1977 petitioner properly
filed the present petition directly with the Supreme
Court without going through the prescribed
procedure of filing an appeal with respondent
Commission en banc within the 30-day
reglementary period since such recourse was
obviously not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
The questions raised by petitioner in his
pending complaints with respondent commission
warrant a full-blown trial on the merits after which
the main issues may be duly adjudicated as
contended by him, and since respondents likewise
concur in this stand, the case will be remanded to
respondent commission for such trial and
determination on the merits.
12. Under Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Valmonte vs. Belmonte
Facts: Petitioner Velmonte represents himself and
co petitioners in the instant case of mandamus
requiring the GSIS to a) furnish petitioners the list
of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were
able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal
note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of
the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information.
The case arose when a request letter was sent by
Velmonte to respondent Belmonte, the then GSIS
General Manager.
A reply letter was sent by Atty. Meynardo Trio,
Deputy General Counsel. However, said letter was
never received by petitioner which resulted to
another letter stating "(W)e are now considering
ourselves free to do whatever action necessary
within the premises to pursue our desired objective
in pursuance of public interest. Thereafter
resulting to this instant petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the Doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is applicable.
Ruling: No, the doctrine does not apply.
Defense of Respondent: Respondent claims that
actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable
by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners,
however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of
Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since
administrative remedies were not exhausted, then
petitioners have no cause of action.
Petitioners Contention: Petitioners claim that they
have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not
they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue
of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it
is argued that this case falls under one of the
exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Court Ruling: Among the settled principles in
administrative law is that before a party can be
allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to
have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law. The courts for reasons of
law, comity and convenience will not entertain a
case unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to settled
exceptions, among which is when only a question of
law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106
Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No.
L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan
ATTY. CABRAS
v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129
SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which
requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can
be passed upon by the regular courts more
competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees,
involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus,
the exception of this case from the application of the
general rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is warranted.
(WARNING) The issue above is not the main issue :D
it is only the issue based on the syllabus.
Main Issue: whether or not petitioners are entitled
to access to the documents evidencing loans
granted by the GSIS
Ruling: Yes.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right
to information is not absolute. As stated
in Legaspi, the people's right to information is
limited to "matters of public concern," and is further
"subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is
limited to "transactions involving public interest,"
and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be
clear that the information sought is of "public
interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee.
The information sought by petitioners in this case is
the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition
were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election
through the intercession of th eformer First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda Marcos. The public nature of the
loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held
by the alleged borrowers make the information
sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern. And the same in not exempted by privacy
under the constitution and is not barred by the
confidentiality of the loan because the same is not
based on any law, nor is it a private document (loan
by GSIS to Public Officials).
Petition Granted.
13. G.R. Nos. March 29, 1996
11270809
PETITIONER REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented
by PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT
RESPONDENTS SANDIGANBAYAN, SIPALAY
TRADING CORPORATION
and ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Facts:
Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against
private respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation
and Allied
Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect their sequestration.
Two (2) separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY and
ALLIED before this Court assailing the
sequestration orders. After the consolidation of
these petitions, this Court referred the cases to
public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper
disposition.
When Sandiganbayan directed the parties to the
case to submit formal evidence in writing. However,
PCGG filed a "Motion To Dismiss" the petitions of
SIPALAY and ALLIED on the ground of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. PCGG argued that
SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first appealed the
sequestration orders to the Office of the President
before challenging them in court, invoking Sections
5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations.
PCGG lost in the two petitions. In the SIPALAY
petition, the Sandiganbayan predicating on PCGGs
failure to implead the petitioner within the period
mandated under Section 26, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution and for having issued the writ of
sequestration without sufficient evidentiary
foundation because PCGG failed to adduce and
proffer that quantum of evidence necessary for its
validity.
In the ALLIED petition, Sandiganbayan held that
the search and seizure order was issued without
due process and in contravention of the organic law
then in force, the Freedom Constitution, under
which mantle, the Bill of Rights found in the 1973
Constitution was amply protected and enforced.
Issue/s:
Whether SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's
motion to dismiss proper
Ruling:
Yes, SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's
motion to dismiss was proper.
Ratio Decidendi:
As a general rule, a direct action in court without
prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when
required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on
a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of
ATTY. CABRAS
action.
However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the
rightful application of the principles aforestated.
The SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions were both filed
on the third quarter of 1986 (September 16 and
August 26, respectively), while the PCGG decided to
file its motion to dismiss only in the middle of 1993
(July 7). Nearly seven (7) years came to pass in
between that so much has already transpired in the
proceedings during the interregnum.
SIPALAY and ALLIED had rested their cases, and
the PCGG had finished presenting all its witnesses,
not to mention other various motions and incidents
already disposed of by the SANDIGANBAYAN, with
special attention to the numerous postponements
granted the PCGG for presentation of its evidence
which prevented an earlier termination of the
proceedings. The motion to dismiss came only at the
penultimate stage of the proceedings where the
remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its
written formal offer of evidence as required by the
SANDIGANBAYAN.
With its undenied belated action, seven (7) years in
the making at that, it is only proper to presume with
conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or
declined to assert what it bewailed as the SIPALAY
and ALLIED petitions' lack of cause of action.
Doctrines Learned:
A direct action in court without prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies,
when required, is premature, warranting its
dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded
on lack of cause of action.
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not affect
the jurisdiction of the Court. The only effect
of noncompliance with this rule is that it will
deprive the complainant of a cause of action,
which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If
not invoked at the proper time, this ground
is deemed waived and the court can take
cognizance of the case and try it.
14.FORTICH V. CORONA
289 SCRA 624
Topic: Factors Affecting Finality of
Administrative Decisions
Facts:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President
(OP) issued a win-win Resolution which reopened
case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision.
The OP had long declared the said Decision final &
executory after the DARs Motion for
Reconsideration was denied for having been filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it
being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion
that the win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997
is not void since it seeks to correct an erroneous
ruling, hence, the March 29, 1996 decisioncould
not as yet become final and executory as to be
beyond modification. They further explained that
the DARs failure to file their Motion for
Reconsideration on time was excusable."
Issues:
WON the DARs late filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration is excusable.
WON the respondents have shown a justifiable
reason for the relaxation of rules.
WON the issue is a question of technicality.
Held:
No, the DARs late filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration is NOT excusable.
Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated
February 12, 1987, mandates that
decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shallbecome final after the lapse of 15
days from receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within
such period. The respondents explanation that the
DARs office procedure made it impossibleto file
its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the
said decision had to be referred to its different
departments cannot be considered a valid
justification. While there is nothing wrong with such
referral, the DAR must not disregard the
reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation.
The rules relating to reglementary period should not
be made subservient to the internal office procedure
of an administrative body.
No, the respondents have NOT shown a justifiable
reason for the relaxation of rules.
The final & executory character of the OP Decision
can no longer be disturbed or substantially
modified. Res judicata has set in and the
adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest.
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard since they are designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival
claims and in the administration of justice. The
Constitution guarantees that all persons shall have
a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies.
ATTY. CABRAS
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities,
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly &
speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in
the relaxation of rules was never intended to forge
a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity.
A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of
procedure can only be resorted to in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
No, the issue is NOT a question of technicality. It is
a question of substance & merit.
A decision/resolution/order of an administrative
body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the
ground that the same was rendered Without or in
Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of
Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or
procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and
mandatory requirement before a case or controversy
can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if
done in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of law
were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules
& settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not
of technical nature.
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared
final and executory, vested rights were acquired by
the petitioners, and all others who should be
benefited by the said Decision.
In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA,
et al., just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of his/her case.
Referential Syllabus:
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Errors
of Judgment and Errors of Jurisdiction,
Compared; Words and Phrases; An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal, while an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction, and which error is
correctable only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.Anent the first issue, in order to
determine whether the recourse of petitioners is
proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between
an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An
error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which
error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other
hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which
is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
This error is correctable only by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The remedy prescribed
in Rule 43 is inapplicable where the petition
contains an allegation that the challenged
resolution is patently illegal and was issued with
grave abuse of discretion and beyond the public
respondents jurisdiction when said resolution
substantially modified the earlier decision which
had long become final and executory.It is true that
under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial
agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,
including the Office of the President, may be taken
to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition
for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. However, we hold that, in
this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule
43 is inapplicable considering that the present
petition contains an allegation that the challenged
resolution is patently illegal and was issued with
grave abuse of discretion and beyond his
(respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas)
jurisdiction when said resolution substantially
modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996
which had long become final and executory. In other
words, the crucial issue raised here involves an
error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which
is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the
appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the
assailed resolution is an original special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners
have correctly done. x x x The office of a writ of
certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases
cases in which the act of the lower court or
quasijudicial body is wholly void.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has the full
discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition
for certiorari filed directly to it if compelling reasons,
or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant.The Supreme Court has the full
discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or
the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be
observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et al.,
Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and
Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we have further
stated in Cuaresma: x x x. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and
ATTY. CABRAS
specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time
and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Courts
docket. Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve
to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition
in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future
litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because
of the magnitude of the problem created by the
issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will
be dis cussed later, we find the assailed resolution
wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their
petition first with the Court of Appeals would only
result in a waste of time and money.
Same; Same; Same; Suspension of the Rules; That
the Supreme Court has the power to set aside its
own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence.That the Court
has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher
interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon
vs. Court of Appeals: Be it remembered that rules
of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time
and again, this Court has suspended its own rules
and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require.
In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy
disquisition of the proper procedure that should
have been taken by the parties involved and proceed
directly to the merits of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; A
motion for reconsideration is not necessary when
the questioned resolution is a patent nullity.As to
the second issue of whether the petitioners
committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed
to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it
to state that the said motion is not necessary when
the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, as will
be taken up later.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping, Explained; Words
and Phrases. ------There is forum-shopping
whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than
by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle
applies not only with respect to suits filed in the
courts but also in connection with litigation
commenced in the courts while an administrative
proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to
defeat administrative processes and in anticipation
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this
case, where the court in which the second suit was
brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).
The test for determining whether a party violated
the rule against forum shopping has been laid down
in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34),
x x x and that is, forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other, as follows: There thus exists
between the action before this Court and RTC Case
No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both
actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts, and the identity on the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action
under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of
auter action pendant.
Same; Same; Same; The test for determining
whether a party has violated the rule against forum
shopping is where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration.It is clear from the above-quoted
rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum
shopping. The test for determining whether a party
has violated the rule against forum shopping is
where a final judgment in one case will amount to
res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A
cursory examination of the cases filed by the
petitioners does not show that the said cases are
similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the
DAR Secretarys order to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
subject property. On the other hand, the civil case
in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment
and cancellation of title issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was
based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in
applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs
title, used documents which were earlier declared
null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of
NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just
compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC
for the surrender of its title. The present petition is
entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks
the nullification of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution of the Office of the President dated
November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued
long after the previous two cases were instituted.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Real Party
In Interest and Real Interest, Explained; One
whose interest over land is a mere expectancy is not
a real party in interest.The fourth and final
ATTY. CABRAS
preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for
intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries,
which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their
motion, movants contend that they are the
farmerbeneficiaries of the land in question, hence,
are real parties in interest. To prove this, they
attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List
of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged
master list was made pursuant to the directive in
the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution which directs the DAR to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants
are qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, a
perusal of the said document reveals that movants
are those purportedly Found Qualified and
Recommended for Approval. In other words,
movants are merely recommendee farmer-
beneficiaries. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a
real party in interest is a party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means
a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.
Undoubtedly, movants interest over the land in
question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not
real parties in interest.
Administrative Law; Judgments; The act of the
Office of the President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its earlier decision which
had already become final and executory, was in
gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept
that accord finality to administrative
determinations.When the Office of the President
issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as
no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of
the President has no more authority to entertain the
second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion
became the basis of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18
and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed
in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in
the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the
said motion should not have been entertained
considering that the first motion for reconsideration
was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the
Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality.
Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become
final and executory, was in gross disregard of the
rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
Same; Same; The orderly administration of justice
requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court
or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality
set by the law, rules and regulations; A resolution
which substantially modifies a decision after it has
attained finality, is utterly void.The orderly
administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial
body must reach a point of finality set by the law,
rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write
finis to disputes once and for all. This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system,
without which there would be no end to litigations.
Utmost respect and adherence to this principle
must always be maintained by those who wield the
power of adjudication. Any act which violates such
principle must immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which
substantially modified the Decision of March 29,
1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void.
Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice
Thomas A. Street in a 1918 case, is a lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight,
or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head.
15. Sotto vs. Ruiz (41 Phil 468 [No. 17419], 18
March 1921)
Facts: Antonio Ruiz, the Acting Director of the
Bureau of Posts, refused to forward a copy of The
Independent as registered mail on the ground that it
contained a libelous matter. Vicente Sotto, a public
official, at that time, was the proprietor of the said
periodical.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Director of Posts was
wrong in refusing to forward the said copy of The
Independent. (Yes)
Held: To say that the publication of an official
telegram from one public official to another is
printed or written matter of a libelous character,
when such telegram contains no attack upon any
person is manifestly arbitrary and unjust and is not
based upon any reasonable interpretation of the
law. The propriety of periodical distributing copies
of a confidential telegram sent by one official to
another may well be questioned. But to do so is not
libelous per se. Even the squib following the copy of
the telegram is no more than attempted humor and
would not be taken seriously by the reading public.
The action of the Director of Posts in disbarring from
the mails copies of The Independent on the ground
that they contained matter of a libelous character
was clearly wrong.
ATTY. CABRAS
16. Antique Sawmills vs Zayco - SANTILLANA
Facts:
On September 30, 1954, a public bidding was
conducted for the award of a 12680-hectare forest
area. Four parties submitted bid applications with
the Bureau of Forestry, namely: the petitioner-
appellant, Antique Sawmills, Inc., the
respondent-appellee, Aquiles Zayco, Crisencio
Milendez and Pedro T. Lo. On November 29, 1954,
the Director of Forestry awarded the bid to the
respondent-appellee, Aquiles R. Zayco. Thereafter,
the losing bidders appealed the above award to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
who, on March 23, 1955, however, affirmed the
same. All the losing bidders filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Secretary of Agricultural
and Natural Resources and issued an order on July
14, 1955 modifying that the forest area in question
was awarded in equal portions to Aquiles R. Zayco
and the petitioner-appellant, Antique Sawmills, Inc.
Zayco received a copy of the above-mentioned order
on July 28, 1955, and on August 20, 1955, he filed
against it a motion for reconsideration. On
September 10, 1955, the same was denied. On
December 19, 1955, Zayco filed with the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources a second
motion for reconsideration which, on February 15,
1956, was resolved by the latter stating that the
second motion for reconsideration was filed too late,
that is, outside the reglementary period of thirty (30)
days prescribed in Section 10 of Forestry
Administrative Order No. 6-2. From the time the
movant received notice of the order sought to be
reconsidered on July 28, 1955, to the time he filed
his first motion for reconsideration on August 20,
1955, twenty-three (23) days had elapsed; and from
his receipt of the order of this Office dated
September 10, 1955, denying the first motion for
reconsideration on November 22, 1955, to the filing
of the instant motion on December 19, 1955,
twenty-seven (27) days had elapsed. All in all, fifty
(50) days had elapsed from his receipt of the order
sought to be reconsidered to the filing of the herein
motion. Consequently, the said order of this office
dated July 14, 1955 had already become final and
executory pursuant to the aforecited regulation.
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On February 27, 1956, the respondent-appellee
appealed to the Office of the President.
On August 27, 1956, however, the Executive
Secretary rendered a decision sustaining the appeal
. This order of the Executive Secretary awarded the
entire forest concession in question to the
respondent-appellee, Aquiles B. Zayco.
Petitioner contends that the period provided by the
rules for the perfection of an appeal is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional. Thus, since, the
respondent-appellee failed to perfect his appeal on
time and finality had already set in the order of July
14, 1955, the Office of the President could not have
required jurisdiction over the same.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
the said period is a mere procedural technicality
which, at least in administrative proceedings, may
liberally be relaxed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the period for perfecting an
appeal is only procedural and can be
relaxed.
2. Whether or not administrative regulations
have the force and effect of law
RULING:
1. In a long line of cases,1 the Supreme Court
has ruled that compliance with the period
provided by law for the perfection of an
appeal is not merely mandatory but also a
jurisdictional requirement. Thus, in the
case of Miranda vs. Guanzon, et al., 92 Phil.
168, this Court held:
Section 13 of Rule 41 provides that when the appeal
is not perfected within the reglementary period the
appeal shall be dismissed. The requirement
regarding the perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional. Such failure has the effect of
rendering final the judgment of the court, and the
certification of the record on appeal thereafter
cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost.
ATTY. CABRAS
2. That administrative rules and regulations
have the force of law can no longer be
questioned. ( Valerio vs. Secretary of
Agriculture, et al., G.R. No. L-18587, April
23, 1963)
The appellees' view that the period fixed in
Administrative Order No. 6-2 of the Director of
Forestry cannot bind the Office of the President
since the latter has supervision and control over the
former cannot commend itself to sound public
policy. Even administrative decisions must and
sometime, as fully as public policy demands that
finality be written on judicial controversies (Manila
Electric Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 61 Phil.
456).
In other words, public interest requires that
proceedings already terminated should not be
altered at every step. The rule of non
quieta movere prescribes that what was already
terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu vs.
San Miguel Brewery, 63 Phil. 615).
17. Uy vs Palomar
27 SCRA 287
Facts:
Manuel Uy filed the complaint with the CFI of
Manila against the Postmaster General, praying for
an injunction to restrain the latter from enforcing
Fraud Order No. 3, dated Nov. 22, 1963, declaring
Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency as conducting a
lottery or gift enterprise and directing all
postmasters and their employees of the Bureau of
Post concerned to return to the sender any mail
matter addressed to Manuel Uy Sweepstakes
Agency or to any of its agents or representatives with
the notation: Fraudulent stamped upon the cover
of such mail matter and, prohibiting the issuance of
payment of any money order or telegraphic transfers
to the said representatives.
Issue: Whether appellees Grand Christmas Bonus
Award plan constitute a lottery, gift, enterprise, or
similar scheme prescribed by the Postal Law as
would authorize the appellant to issue the fraud
order in question.
Held:
The Postal Law contains no provision for
judicial review of decision of the Postmaster
General. This Court, however, had stated that the
action of the Director of Post is subject to revision
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
by the courts in case he exceeded his authority of
his act is palpably wrong.
For lottery to exist, three elements must concur,
namely: consideration, prize and chance.
In the Grand Christmas Bonus Award plan
of the appellee. We do not see the presence of the
element of consideration, that is payment of
something of value, or agreement to pay, for the
chance to win the bonus or award offered. True, that
to be a participant in said plan, one must have to
buy a whole sweepstakes ticket (8 shares) sold by
the Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency or by its sub
agents. But the payment for the price of the
sweepstakes ticket in the consideration for the
chance to win any of the prizes offered by the PCSO
in the sweepstakes draw of December 15, 1953.
Wholly or partly, said payment cannot be deemed as
a consideration also for the chance to win the prizes
offered by the appellee. For nothing is asked of, or
received from, the buyer of the ticket more than the
authorized price thereof, and which price appears
on the face of the ticket.
18. MANUEL vs. VILLENA
FACTS: Magno Manuel had been in continuous
possession of a 20-hectare parcel of public land
since 1939; being an ignorant farmer he did not file
his Tree Farm application (No. 13312) until June
1954. The Director of Forestry rejected the same
because a prior application (No. 3852) had been filed
by Mariano Villena in November 1955. Manuel filed
two motions for reconsideration of the rejection
order but were turned down. Manuel thereafter
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, but the appeal was dismissed the latter.
On motion for reconsideration the Secretary found
that the previous investigation conducted by the
District Forester was not in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Bureau, and so ordered
another investigation to be made; but that before
said investigation was terminated the Secretary
rendered a decision dismissing the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Secretary
of DENR should be set aside.
RULING: No. Under Section 1838 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the function of approval or
rejection of an application for a Tree Farm Permit
falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of
Forestry with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The power thus conferred on the Director of Forestry
with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources is basically executive or
administrative in nature.1 And courts, as a rule,
refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by
administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of
administrative functions. This is so because such
bodies are generally better equipped technically to
ATTY. CABRAS
decide administrative questions and that non-legal
factors, such as government policy on the matter,
are usually involved in the decisions.
There are, of course, limits to the exercise of
administrative discretion. Administrative
proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon a
showing that the board or official has gone beyond
his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional
powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without
regard to his duty or with grave abuse of
discretion2 or that the decision is vitiated by fraud,
imposition or mistake.
19. SAN LUIS VS. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant,Berroya, (private respondent
herein) had been the quarry superintendent in the
Province of Laguna. In April and May of 1973,
petitioner-appellant denounced graft and corrupt
practices by employees of the provincial government
of Laguna. Herein respondent-appellee provincial
governor (one of the petitioners herein) issued an
Office Order transferring Berroya to the office of the
Provincial Engineer. Berroya challenged said
transfer, and the Civil Service Commission ruled the
same violative and ordered that Berroya be reverted
to his regular position of quarry superintendent.
Instead of complying, herein respondent-appellee
provincial governor suspended Berroya for alleged
gross discourtesy, inefficiency and insubordination.
On petitioner-appellants motion for
reconsideration, the Office of the President rendered
a Decision, declaring the one-year suspension
improper, and ordering payment of back salaries to
Berroya. In the interim, respondent-appellant
provincial governor issued an Order dismissing
Berroya for alleged neglect of duty, frequent
unauthorized absences, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of duty and abandonment of office,
which order of dismissal was appealed by Berroya
to the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service
Commission resolved said appeal by declaring the
dismissal unjustified, exonerating Berroya of
charges, and directing his reinstatement as quarry
superintendent. Berroya instituted suit in 1980 to
compel petitioner to reinstate him to his former
position and to pay his back salaries. After trial, the
court a quo rendered its decision finding the
transfer of petitioner-appellant sufficiently
warranted. Furthermore, his one-year suspension
was found to be proper and unassailable. Berroya
appealed from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and it was resolved by the respondent Court
of Appeals in his favor. Petitioners moved to
reconsider the decision of the appellate court but
their motion was denied. Hence, the instant
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petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decisions of both the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the President
can be reviewed by the courts.
HELD:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service
Commission and the Office of the President had long
become final and executory, the same can no longer
be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in
our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their
quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality,
the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.
The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening
of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial acts of public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction
as to the judgments of courts having general judicial
powers. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of
prior adjudications is not confined in its operation
to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as
courts, but it extends to all bodies upon whom
judicial powers had been conferred. Hence,
whenever any board, tribunal or person is by law
vested with authority to judicially determine a
question, like the Merit Systems Board of the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the President,
for instance, such determination, when it has
become final, is as conclusive between the same
parties litigating for the same cause as though the
adjudication had been made by a court of general
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the trial courts act of
reviewing and setting aside the findings of the two
administrative bodies was in gross disregard of the
basic legal precept that accords finality to
administrative findings of facts. The general rule,
under the principles of administrative law in force
in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of
administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the
courts, except when the former have acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and
agencies who have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
generally accorded not only respect but at times
even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
20. VETERANS V VELEZ
Facts
Respondent, Philippine Veterans Assistance
Commission (PVAC), filed in the RTC complaint for
foreclosure of mortgage against the petitioners
ATTY. CABRAS
the Philippine Veterans Investment Development
Corporation (PHIVDEC) and PHIVIDEC Industrial
Authority (PIA).
PHIVIDEC and PIA in their answer alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the case and averred that it is
under the arbitration powers of the Government
Corporate Counsel under Presidential Decree No.
242 which prescribed the procedure for the
administrative settlement and adjudication of
disputes, claims, and controversies between or
among government offices, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss of Petitioner on
the ground that PD 242 is unconstitutional as it
impair the power of judiciary to review.
HENCE this petition for certiori
Sections 1, 3-b and 6 of P.D. 242 provide:
Sec. 1. Provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, all disputes, claims and
controversies solely between or among the
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities of the National Government,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations but excluding constitutional offices or
agencies, arising from the interpretation and
application of statutes, contracts or agreements,
shall henceforth be administratively settled or
adjudicated as provided hereinafter: Provided, That
this shall not apply to cases already pending in
court at the time of the effectivity of this decree.
Sec. 3. . . .
(b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with
respect to disputes or claims or controversies
between or among the government-owned or
controlled corporations or entities being served by
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel;
Sec. 6. The final decisions rendered in the
settlement or adjudication of all such disputes,
claims or controversies shall have the same force
and effect as final decisions of the court of justice.
(Rollo, pp. 29-30.)
ISSUE: W/N PD 242 is unconstitutional?
HELD: No. Since the foreclosure proceeding filed
by PVAC against PHIVIDEC and PIA arose from
the interpretation and application of the
mortgage contract between them, P.D. No. 242
applies to the case.
It does not diminish the jurisdiction of courts
but only prescribes an administrative procedure
for the settlement of certain types of disputes
between or among departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies, and instrumentalities of the National
Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, so that they need not
always repair to the courts for the settlement of
controversies arising from the interpretation and
application of statutes, contracts or agreements.
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The procedure is not much different, and no less
desirable, than the arbitration procedures provided
in Republic Act No. 876 (Arbitration Law) and in
Section 26, R.A. 6715 (The Labor Code).
It is an alternative to, or a substitute for,
traditional litigation in court with the added
advantage of avoiding the delays, vexations and
expense of court proceedings
P.D. No. 242 is a valid law prescribing an
administrative arbitration procedure for certain
disputes among offices, agencies and
instrumentalities under the executive control and
supervision of the President of the Philippines.
Since PVAC filed Civil Case No. 11157 against
PHIVIDEC and PIA without first passing through
the administrative channel, the judicial action
was premature for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, hence, dismissible on
that account
21. St. Martin Funeral Homes vs NLRC (1998)
G.R. 130866
Facts: Private respondent alleges that he started
working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995.
However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his
name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On
January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating
P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other hand claims
that private respondent was not its employee but
only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home and in
January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away,
so the latter took over the management of the
business. Amelita made some changes in the
business operation and private respondent and his
wife were no longer allowed to participate in
the management thereof. As a consequence,
the latter filed a complaint charging that
petitioner had illegally terminated his
employment. The labor arbiter rendered a decision
in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-
employee relationship existed between the parties
and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the
case.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC decisions are appealable to
the CA?
Held:
Yes, In view of The increasing number of labor
disputes that find their way to this Court and the
legislative changes introduced over the years into
the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442
ATTY. CABRAS
(The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas
Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for
and warrant a reassessment of that procedural
aspect. The Court noted that there may have
been an oversight in the course of the
deliberations on R.A. 7902, amending B.P. 129, or
an imprecision in the terminology used therein as
from the records, Congress had intended to provide
for judicial review of the adjudication of the NLRC in
labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an
inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode
of review.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion
that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action of
certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for
judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of
the word appeal in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus
plumae because appeals by certiorari and the
original action for certiorari are both modes of
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.
The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned
here is that the special civil action of certiorari is
within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge
in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but
would subvert, the intention of Congress as
expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill
No. 1495.
22 CERTIORARI
G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION vs. HON.
DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74
FACTS:
Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the
government agency which supervises and regulates
the country's medical colleges, and Secretary
Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of
the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and
set aside the order issued by respondent Judge
Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo,
Rizal, restraining the enforcement of petitioner
Quisumbing's order of closure of the respondent
Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine
Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the College).
The, College, a private educational institution, was
founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of
producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim
citizens from age-old attitudes on health."
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical Education
(BME) authorized the Commission on Medical
Education to conduct a study of all medical schools
in the Philippines. The report of the Commission
showed that the College fell very much short of the
minimum standards set for medical schools.
In her letter, Secretary Quisumbing informed the
Chairman of the College's Board of Trustees, Mr.
Victor Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of
Medical Education to close the College. The College
appealed the decision to the Office of the President,
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the
Secretary. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
Jr., finding "no reason to disturb" the contested
decision, affirmed it.
On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It filed
Civil Case No. 1385 in the court of respondent
Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary
Quisumbing questioning the decision as illegal,
oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain its implementation.
Hence the present petition, assailing the order of
injunction made by respondent judge as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and
praying for a restraining order against its
enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the
action instituted in the court a quo.
ISSUE:
Whether the Courts can hear or determine appeals
from decisions or orders of the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports
HELD: No.
Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the
determination by the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to
continue its operations is in this case clearly
unavailing. There is, to begin with, no law
authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders
of the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not
the function of this Court or any other Court to
review the decisions and orders of the Secretary
on the issue of whether or not an educational
institution meets the norms and standards
required for permission to operate and to
continue operating as such. On this question, no
Court has the power or prerogative to substitute
its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is
obviously not expected that any Court would have
the competence to do so.
The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the
matter is the determination of whether or not
the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
has acted within the scope of powers granted
him by law and the Constitution. As long as it
appears that he has done so, any decision rendered
ATTY. CABRAS
by him should not and will not be subject to review
and reversal by any court.
Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the
Court that those powers were in a case exercised so
whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically
or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correction
or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted
with grave abuse of discretion, or had unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty, or excluded another
from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled it becomes the
Court's duty to rectify such action through the
extraordinary remedies of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may
properly apply. Yet even in these extreme
instances, where a Court finds that there has
been abuse of powers by the Secretary and
consequently nullifies and/or forbids such an
abuse of power, or compliance whatever is
needful to keep its exercise within bounds, the
Court, absent any compelling reason to do
otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary the
ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfy
action or fulfillment by an educational institution of
the standards set down for its legitimate operation,
as to which it should not ordinarily substitute its
over judgment for that of said office.
Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that
the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the
requirements laid down for medical schools and to
mete out sanctions where he finds that violations
thereof have been committed, it was a grave abuse
of discretion for the respondent judge to issue
the questioned injunction and thereby thwart
official action, in the premises correctly taken,
allowing the College to operate without the
requisite government permit. A single ocular
inspection, done after the College had been pre-
warned thereof, did not, in the circumstances,
warrant only the findings of more qualified
inspectors about the true state of the College, its
faculty, facilities, operations, etc. The, members of
the evaluating team came from the different sectors
in the fields of education and medicine, and their
judgment in this particular area is certainly better
than that of the respondent Judge whose sole and
only visit to the school could hardly have given him
much more to go on than a brief look at the physical
plant and facilities and into the conduct of the
classes and other school activities.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is
well-settled doctrine that courts of justice
should not generally interfere with purely
administrative and discretionary functions;
that courts have no supervisory power over the
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proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government; involving the
exercise of judgment and findings of facts,
because by reason of their special knowledge
and expertise over matters falling under their
jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position
to pass judgment on such matters andn their
findings of facts in that regard are generally
accorded respect, if not finality, by the
courts. 15 There are, to be sure, exceptions to this
general rule but none of them obtains in this case.
23. Certiorari
TESORERO VS MATHAY
FACTS:
Respondent DALIGHT filed with public
respondent BOE an application for the approval of
the sound value appraisal of its properties and
equipment. Respondent BOE, after hearings in an
order dated March 13, 1981, constituted an
inspection team to conduct ocular
inspection/verification of the physical existence and
ownership of all the properties and equipment of
DALIGHT. Thereafter, respondent BOE, in an order
dated June 19, 1981, based on the submission of
the inspection team, disapproved TAMSPHIL
appraisal because: (1) TAMSPHIL was disqualified
from making the appraisal, its President-Chairman
being then a technical and engineering consultant
of applicant DALIGHT and (2) there were
deficiencies and discrepancies in the appraisal
report of such serious proportion as to affect the
over-all integrity and reliability of the said report.
On June 24, 1982, DALIGHT again filed an
application for the approval of the appraisal. BOE
constituted a team to conduct ocular
examination/verification of DALIGHT's properties
and equipment, including its books of accounts and
other papers relative to the Appraisal Report of
Asian Appraisal Co., Inc. Respondent BOE, in a
decision dated December 6, 1983, approved the
amount of P282,024,877.40 as the fair and
reasonable value of DALIGHT's properties, assets
and equipments.
Petitioners, in their own behalf and on behalf of the
more or less 70,000 consumers of Davao City and
its environ opposed the inclusion by herein public
respondent Board of Energy (BOE) of some
properties of DALIGHT for reappraisals because
they will have a direct bearing on the rates that
respondent DALIGHT charges its customers to the
effect that the higher the appraisal of the properties,
the higher will be the base of the 12% allowable
return; or otherwise stated, the higher the rates the
consumers will have to pay.
Seventeen (17) days after receipt of the said
decision, petitioners filed a Motion for
ATTY. CABRAS
Reconsideration, but the same was denied in an
order.
ISSUE: Whether petition for certiorari is the proper
remedy
RULING: No.
There is no question that certiorari is not
the proper remedy in this case as PD No. 1206
creating BOE provides for an appeal to the Office
of the President within seven (7) days from
receipt of notice of its decision or orders.
Thereafter, under the Interim Rules Implementing
Sec. 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
final decisions, orders, awards or resolutions of
all quasi-judicial bodies other than those
specifically excepted are reviewable by the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
It will be noted that after receipt of the questioned
decision of December 6, 1983 on December 19,
1983, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
thereof only on January 5, 1984, or seventeen (17)
days from receipt of the said decision, which
therefore had already become final and
executory.
But while it is evident that there was error in the
remedy resorted to, this Court in the broader
interests of justice has in a number of cases given
due course to a petition for certiorari, although the
proper remedy is appeal especially where the
equities warrant such recourse and considering
that dismissals on technicalities are viewed with
disapproval.
Furthermore, it is well settled that litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on technicalities; that every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his case, free from
unacceptable plea of technicalities; that this
Court in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, decided
to disregard technicalities in order to resolve the
case on its merits based on evidence.
A careful review of the records show that this case
will not only affect herein petitioners who on some
points have a good cause of action but also the more
or less 70,000 consumers in Davao City and its
environ. Hence, it appears more appropriate to
consider the petition on its merits rather than to
dismiss it on technicalities.
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24. Police Commission vs Bello
Facts:
A complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
neglect of duty was filed by certain persons with the
Board of Investigators in Binmaley, Pangasinan
against the respondents Genaro C. Ferrer and
Emerano Bonifacio, Chief of Police and Corporal,
respectively. After the two private respondents filed
their answers, the Board found that the charges
imputed against the two were not committed
deliberately but, rather, were done through honest
mistake and recommending the Police Commission
(PC) that the case be dropped. But in its decision,
the PC still found the respondents guilty of serious
neglect of duty and ordered their dismissal in the
service.
Because of this, Ferrer and Bonifacio filed two
separate petitions and contended that the PC had
no jurisdiction to render a decision on the
administrative case because at that time it had not
yet even published its Police Manual as required by
Sec. 26 of R.A. 4864 (Police Act of 1966); and that
the Commission gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing them. Thereafter, the respondent Judge
issued an order requiring the Commission to file an
answer within ten days and issued the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunctions ex parte filed.
The Judge also dismissed the Civil case against
Ferrer and directed that the latter be reinstated
within 24 hours from receipt of the order. The next
day a similar order was issued in connection with
Bonifacios petition.
The Motion for reconsideration filed by PC was
returned unacted upon because it did not have a
proof of service and therefore not in accordance with
the Rules of Court. And on motion by Ferrer and
Bonifacio, respondent Judge issued another order,
this time requiring the members of the PC to show
cause why they should not be held guilty of
contempt for their failure to reinstate the two private
respondents as ordered on the writs. Hence, this
present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge had the power
to issue said writs against the Police Commission?
No.
Ruling:
The Court has already held that it is improper to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to a final
hearing except in cases of extreme urgency, where
the right is very clear; where considerations of
relative convenience bear strongly in complainants
favor; where there is a wilful and unlawful invasion
of plaintiffs right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one,
and etc. As the issuance of a mandatory injunction
ATTY. CABRAS
is the exception rather than the rule, the party
applying for it must show a clear legal right the
violation of which is so recent as to make its
vindication an urgent one.
The principal ground of the petitions by the
respondents is the lack of jurisdiction of the Police
Commission because it had not yet published a
Police Manual when it rendered its decision.
Section 26of the Police Act of 1966 is a mere saving
clause, and refers solely to administrative cases
involving police service and personnel which were
pending at the time of the effectivity of the Act. The
PC was required to absorb the said pending cases
after one hundred days after it shall have published
a police manual. The said Sec 26 may not be
interpreted to mean that the Board of investigators
and the police Commission could not legally
function to carry into effect the purposes of the Act
until after the lapse of the said one hundred days,
because Sec 28 provides that this Act shall take
effect upon its approval. Since the Act was
approved on September 8, 1966, it became effective
immediately on that date. Moreover, Sec. 5, Rule 8
of the Revised Rules of Court prohibits the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte unless
it appears from the facts, shown by affidavits, or by
the verified complaint that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the
matter can be heard on notice. Such facts do not
appear in the case of the private respondents.
Orders of the respondent Judge are hereby declared
null and void.
25. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte-
Foitaf vs Noriel
Facts:
Petitioner labor union would impugn the holding of
a certification election ordered by respondent
Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, Carmelo C.
Noriel, it being alleged that there was a failure to
comply with the thirty percent requirement in the
petition for certification and that it was filed after
the sixty-day period provided for by the law.
Federation of Free Workers, La Suerte
Chapter, filed a petition foe certification election
alleging that out of bargaining unit of more or less
3,500, there were 1,068 signatories. The previous
certification collective bargaining agreement
between the employer La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette
Factory and petitioner labor union on December 5,
1975. There was eleven days later, a motion to
intervene filed by petitioner followed by a motion to
dismiss on the ground that respondent Union had
not complied with the thirty percent consent
requirement and that the petition for certification
was filed beyond the sixty-day period to the
expiration of the collective bargaining contract.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
When a few days later, the employer submitted a list
of the rank and file employees numbering 4,055.
Private respondent thereafter, opposed the motion
to dismiss, stating that there was compliance with
the thirty percent consent requirement and that the
filing was within the period allowed by law.
An appeal was taken to respondent Noriel as
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. An order
came from him, the dispositive portion of which is
to the effect that the appeal was denied. A motion
for certiorari was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not there is no showing of
arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority to
justify granting the writ of certiorari
Held:
No. The objection of petitioner as to the
alleged lack of the thirty percent requirement in the
number of signatories according to the present
Labor Code is without merit. Private respondent
filed the petition for certification supported by 1,068
signatories of the employees of the employer. After
the petition was filed, the employer however
submitted a list of its regular rank and file
employees with a total number of 4, 055. Private
respondent in order to comply with 30% consent
requirement submitted additional list of rank and
file employees. Petitioner did miss the point that
such a requirement of thirty percent of all the
employees in the bargaining unit is relevant only
when it becomes mandatory for respondent Noriel to
conduct a certification election. In such a case,
there is no thirty percent requirement.
Nor was there any improvident or arbitrary
exercise of authority when respondent Noriel
ordered the certification election after the lapse of
sixty-dat period provided for by the law. The law
cannot be any clearer. It argues against the
pretension of the petitioner. According to the Labor
Code: No certification election issue shall be
entertained by the Bureau in any collective
bargaining unit if a collective bargaining agreement
exist between the employer and a legitimate labor
organization, except within sixty (60) days prior to
the expiration of the life of such certified collective
bargaining agreement.
No other meaning can be attached to such
provision, as applied to the present situation, except
that the former collective bargaining agreement
expired on December 5, 1975, sixty days prior to
that date, a petition for certification election could
have been filed. It does not mean that after
December 5, 1975, no such petition could be
entertained be respondent Noriel, provided there
was no certified collective contract in existence at
the time of the petition for holding the certification
ATTY. CABRAS
election was filed by respondent union February 6,
1976. There was no legal bar then to such move.
26.MERALCO VS. CBAA
FACTS: Petitioner questions the decision of the
respondent which held that petitioners pipeline is
subject to realty tax. Pursuant to a concession,
petitioner installed a pipeline system from Manila to
Batangas. Meanwhile, the provincial assessor of
Laguna treated the pipeline as real property. So,
petitioner appealed the assessments to the Board of
Assessment Appeals of Laguna. The board upheld
the assessments and the decision became final and
executory after the lapse of fifteen days from the
date of receipt of a copy of the decision by the
appellant. Meralco Securities contends that the
Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review
the decision of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals and no judicial review of the Board's
decision is provided for in the Real Property Tax
Code. Hence, the petitioners recourse to file a
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper
recourse of the petitioner.
HELD: YES. It was held that certiorari was properly
availed of in this case. It is a writ issued by a
superior court to an inferior court, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
whereby the record of a particular case is ordered to
be elevated for review and correction in matters of
law.
The rule is that as to administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial power there is an
underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts
of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given
by the statute. The purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties
affected by its decisions. The review is a part of the
system of checks and balances which is a limitation
on the separation of powers and which forestalls
arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Judicial review
of the decision of an official or administrative agency
exercising quasi-judicial functions is proper in
cases of lack of jurisdiction, error of law, grave
abuse of discretion, fraud or collusion or in case the
administrative decision is corrupt, arbitrary or
capricious.
27. CERTIORARI
7. No. L-74687. November 12, 1987.*
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
ANTONIO DE LEON, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF
GREGORIO REYES, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS, thru MANUEL LAZARO, (now OFFICE
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), respondents.
FACTS
The land in question is the subject of two
separate applications, one for sale filed by Gregorio
Reyes and one for free patent filed by petitioner
Antonio De Leon. Both are based on the claim of
actual possession.
The Bureau of Lands ruled against Reyes,
who appealed to the Ministry of Natural Resources.
The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs set aside
the decision of the Bureau, but was reversed by the
Minister on motion for reconsideration. Private
respondents elevated the case to the Office of the
President where they were sustained.
ISSUE
Whether or not the challenged decision was
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD
The Court held in the affirmative. While
there is no disputing the authority of administrative
superiors to reverse the findings of their
subordinates, this power must be exercised
sparingly and only upon a clear showing of error.
Lacking such flaw, the decision of the lower
administrative officials should be sustained, if only
because they have closer access to the problem
sought to be resolved and have the direct
opportunity to question the parties and their
witnesses and to assess the evidence first-hand.
28. PLDT vs NTC (241 SCRA 486; G.R. No. 94374,
21 Feb 1995)
Facts
The court rendered a Decision on 27 August 1992
granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by PLDT and
set aside the Decision and Order on 14 November
1989 and 16 July 1990 of the National
Telecommunications Commission ("NTC"). That
Decision of the NTC had granted the application of
private-respondent Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. ("Eastern") for a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity ("CPCN") and to
construct, maintain and operate an International
Gateway Facility ("IGF").
On 16 July 1987 Private respondent Eastern, filed
with the NTC an application for a CPCN
(Certification for Public Convenience and Necessity),
to construct, maintain and operate an IGF
ATTY. CABRAS
(International Gateway Facility).
Eastern is a 60% Filipino owned
corporation organized under Philippine law and
holder of a legislative franchise under R.A. No. 808,
as amended by R.A. No. 5002, in relation to P.D. No.
489 granting it the right and privilege to: . . . land,
construct, maintain and
operate telecommunication systems by cable or any
other means now known to science or which in the
future may be developed for the reception and
transmission of messages between any point in the
Philippines to points exterior thereto, including
airplanes, airships or vessels even though such
airplanes, airships or vessels may be located within
territorial limits of the Philippines.
PLDT contended that an IGF is inherently part of "a
telephone system" since it is "useful only for a
telephone system." Thus, PLDT contends that in
effect Eastern is asking for a CPCN to establish
a telephone system. But Eastern has no franchise to
establish a telephone system. Hence, PLDT
continues, Eastern cannot be granted the CPCN it
seeks.
On 14 November 1989 and 16 July 1990, the
National Telecommunications Commission ("NTC")
rendered a Decision and Order respectively. The
court originally set aside the order and decision on
a petition for certiorari filed by PLDT.
Issue
Whether the petition for certiorari should be
dismissed.
Held
Yes. Eastern in its application was not asking for
authority to install and operate
a domestic telephone or other telecommunications
system, understood as a system for carrying
messages from one point in the Philippines to
another point also in the Philippines. Eastern was
merely asking for authority to install and operate
an international gateway facility, which would
mediate between the domestic telephone system of
PLDT and the transmitting and carrying facilities of
Eastern. The gateway facility will permit messages
originating from a person using PLDT's domestic
telephone system to enter the transmitting and
carrying facilities of Eastern, and as well allow
messages incoming from abroad through Eastern's
carrying facilities to enter PLDT's domestic system.
29. ALZORES VS SEC, 252 SCRA 387
FACTS: Petitioner was a member of Philippine
Columbian Association (PCA), and later immigrated
to US to work as Attorney-Adviser in the U.S.
Department of Commerce and simply stopped
paying membership dues without informing the PCA
of his change of residence and citizenship. When
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
petitioner came back to the Philippines, he inquired
from the PCA President, how he could reactivate his
membership. He was told that he had to pay all
dues, which active members had to pay, during the
time he was out of the country.
Petitioner objected alleging that it was not fair that
he should be required to pay the amount due active
members since he was out of the country and did
not use PCA facilities during his absence. He was
offered to recommend to the PCA Board of Directors
the reactivation of petitioners membership on
condition (1) that only one of his shares would be
validated and (2) that petitioner pay one month due
for every year of absence from the Philippines.
Petitioner replied that he was willing to accept the
second condition but considered the first unfair.
But PCA stood pat on its original proposal.
Petitioner filed with the SEC a complaint, praying
for the replacement of his membership certificates
and his reinstatement as an active member.
Petitioners complaint was referred to a Hearing
Officer. After the parties had submitted their
pleadings and evidence, the decision sustained PCA.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion
was denied in an order. His appeal was dismissed
for having been filed out of time. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the denial of his
appeal but the same was denied.
ISSUE: W/N SEC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the petitioners appeal.
HELD: NO. The alleged errors assigned by petitioner
are mere errors of judgment, but since he failed to
perfect his appeal to the SEC en banc, he cannot
now raise them. Even then further appeal should be
taken to the CA in accordance with B.P. Blg. 129, 9
and Circular No. 1-91. In this case for certiorari are
limited to an inquiry into any jurisdictional errors
which are not present in this case.The failure of a
party to perfect his appeal in the manner and within
the period fixed by law renders the decision sought
to be appealed final, with the result that no court
can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the
decision.
There was absolutely no reason why petitioner did
not perfect his appeal on time. Nor is there any
showing that the SEC committed the errors
attributed to it in the petition. In the first place, the
alleged errors were not committed by the SEC en
banc but, if at all, by the Hearing Officer. What
petitioner claims to be errors of the SEC en banc is
only the consequence of the dismissal of his appeal.
For the fact is that the SEC en banc did not decide
his appeal. What is more, as already stated, the
dismissal of petitioners appeal was in accordance
with law and not at all a grave abuse of the Hearing
Officers discretion. In the second place, this is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. As such, even
assuming that errors were allegedly committed by
ATTY. CABRAS
the SEC en banc, the errors are not errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. There was,
therefore, reasonable basis for the decision of the
Hearing Officer in dismissing petitioners complaint.
30. Chua Hiong vs Deportation Board
No. L-6038 (March 19, 1955)
96 Phil. 665
FACTS:
In this case petitioner, Chua Hiong, was
alleged to have secured the cancellation of his alien
certificate of registration with the Bureau of
Immigration through fraud and misrepresentation
claiming to be an illegitimate son of a filipino
mother). He filed a bond and petitioned for the
dismissal of the proceedings against him on the
following grounds: 1. The jurisdiction to deport
aliens exists only with regard to aliens, those who
are admittedly so; 2. Respondent is a citizen of the
Philippines and his claim is supported by evidence
that, if believed, is sufficient to entitle him to a
declaration of his citizenship; and 3. His filipino
citizenship has already been declared by the
Secretary of Labor, in representation of the
President of the Philippines, and the same is binding
on the other executive branches of the government,
the Deportation Board including. The motion to
quash was denied on the ground that mere plea of
citizenship does not divest the proceedings. That the
Deportation Board has judicial power to pass upon
the sufficiency of the evidence that the respondent
may submit to support his claim of citizenship. The
Deportation Board found the support to his
citizenship inconclusive. The petitioner sought
herein a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
his arrest was made without jurisdiction, that his
claim of citizenship is supported by evidence, that a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
Deportation Board for the case until his petition is
heard by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the preliminary injuction should
continue.
HELD:
Yes. In the case at bar, the court found that
the evidence of which petitioner and the State may
avail of such substantial nature as to afford belief
that only impartial judicial investigation can
evaluate with fairness to the petitioner with justice
to all concerned. Besides, the Executive department
has seen it proper that the issue of citizenship be
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
determined in a judicial proceeding. Wherefore, the
preliminary injuction issued in this case should
continue.
31. No. L-22748. July 29, 1977.*
GREGORIO CO and HERCULANO CO,
petitioners-appellees, vs. THE DEPORTATION
BOARD, respondent-appellant.
TOPIC: Modes of Judicial Review | Prohibition
FACTS: Special Prosecutor of the Deportation
Board filed charges against petitioners with such
Board alleging that as Chinese subjects residing in
the Philippines, who failed, neglected and refused to
register as Chinese nationals with the Bureau of
Immigration, they violated the law, compounded by
the fact that they represented themselves as
Filipinos.
Then they filed with the Deportation Board a motion
to dismiss based on the plea that it lacked
jurisdiction for the reason that they are citizens of
the Philippines.
Such motion was denied as was a subsequent
motion seeking reconsideration. They did exhaust
their administrative remedy, an appeal to the
President being fruitless.
Thereafter, they filed the special civil action of
prohibition and habeas corpus, with the decision as
noted being in their favor on the ground of their
being Filipinos.
ISSUE: WON the judiciary may entertain an
action for prohibition against Deportation Board
during the pendency of an inquiry against appellees.
HELD: Judicial determination is allowable
in cases when the courts themselves believe that
there is substantial evidence supporting the claim
of citizenship, so substantial that there are
reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is
correct. In other words, the remedy should be
allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent
court in a proper proceeding.
32. SIMON VS. CHR 229 SCRA 117
Facts: A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction was
filed by the petitioners (Simon). The petitioners asks
the Court to prohibit public respondent CHR from
further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-
1580, entitled Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al.
In the case, A Demolition Notice, dated 9 July
ATTY. CABRAS
1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo) in his capacity as
an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated
Hawkers Management Council under the Office of
the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the
private respondents (being the officers and members
of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were
given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July,
1990) within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the
demolition notice, the private respondents were
informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls
should be removed to give way to the Peoples
Park. On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
(Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along NORTH EDSA. The complaint
was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July
1990, the CHR issued an order, directing the
petitioners to desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of
the vendors/squatters complaint before the
Commission and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.
Issue: Whether or not the CHR is prohibited to act
upon the case and petition should be granted?
Held: Yes, In the particular case at hand, there is no
cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as
temporary shanties, erected by private respondents
on a land which is planned to be developed into a
Peoples Park. More than that, the land adjoins the
North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can
take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway.
The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus
to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed
paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have
been violated is one that cannot, in the first place,
even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that
as it may, looking at the standards discoursed vis-
a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance,
the Court are not prepared to conclude that the
order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia of the private respondents can fall
within the compartment of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights intended by the
Constitution. Petition is granted.
33. Under Prohibition:
Paredes vs. CA
Facts: On 9 November 1992, public respondents
(Secretary of Trade and Industry) promulgated
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Administrative Order Nos. 1 and 2, Series of 1992,
revising the rules of practice before the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
(BPTTT) in patent and trademark cases, to take
effect on 15 March 1993. Among the provisions of
said administrative orders are Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1
and Rule 15 of A.O. No. 2, which increased the fees
payable to the BPTTT for registration of patents and
trademarks and Rule 59 of A.O. No. 2 which
prohibited the filing of multi-class applications, that
is, one application covering several classes of goods.
On 11 March 1993, petitioners, who are registered
patent agents, filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to stop public
respondents from enforcing the aforementioned
administrative orders and to declare Rule 16 of A.O.
No. 1 and Rules 15 and 59 of A.O. No. 2, series of
1992 of the BPTTT null and void.
On 27 October 1993, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for prohibition and on 10
January 1994, denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners on 18 November
1993.
Issue: Whether or not prohibition is a proper
remedy. (Again not the main issue)
Ruling: Prohibition is not the proper remedy. The
enabling law itself, which is B.P. Blg. 325, has
specifically tasked the Cabinet to review and
approve any proposed revisions of rates of fees and
charges. Petitioners should have availed of this easy
and accessible remedy instead of immediately
resorting to the judicial process.
Our legislature in delegating to administrative
officers the authority to revise fees and charges
expressly required cabinet approval for the proper
exercise of said power. Petitioners should not have
wasted the opportunity to utilize this built-in
remedy.
The grant (or denial) of a writ of prohibition is
ordinarily within the sound discretion of the court
to be exercised with caution and forbearance,
according to the circumstances of the particular
case, and only where the right to seek relief is
clear.[7]
Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other
remedy is available which is sufficient to afford
redress. That the petitioners have another and
complete remedy at law either by appeal or
otherwise, is generally a sufficient reason for
dismissing the writ.[8]
Hence, in Chua Huat v. CA,[9] we ruled that:
Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review, and provides a system of
administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the
courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience,
ATTY. CABRAS
will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and
the appropriate authorities have been given
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed
in the administrative forum.
And in Philnabank Employees v. Estanislao,[10] we
declared:
Secondly, although not inflexible, we have
repeatedly declined on grounds of prematurity, as
well as in the interest of good order, a hasty recourse
to the courts when administrative avenues are still
open. In the instant case, we concur with the ruling
of the Court of Appeals that:
. . . herein petitioners have still another available
recourse under the law being relied upon. Section 2
of B.P. 325 reads in part:
Sec. 2. Determination of Ratio.- xxx. The revision of
rates shall be determined by the respective ministry
heads or equivalent functionaries conformably with
the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance
issued pursuant to Section 4 hereof, upon
recommendation of the imposing and collecting
authorities concerned, subject to the approval of the
Cabinet. xx x (Italics supplied)
The above provision envisions a three-step process
involving a hierarchy of authority before the rate
increases and charges can be imposed and
collected. First, the BPTTT, which is the imposing
and collecting agency, makes a recommendation of
the fee increases and charges. Those recommended
rates and charges are submitted to the Secretary of
the DTI for his evaluation and approval. Second, if
the Secretary of the DTI finds that the rate increases
and charges conform with the rules and regulations
of the Ministry of Finance, then the same are
approved and in turn become the rates of the
department. The determination of the supposed
rates and charges does not end here. As mentioned
in Section 2 above; the rates as determined by the
department head are subject to the approval of the
Cabinet.
The phrase subject to is one qualification. It means
under the control, power or dominion of or
subordinated to, a higher authority (cf.
PNB vs. Deputy, G.R. No. 35515-R, December 12,
1970). Meaning, that the proposed rates and
charges still have to obtain the imprimatur of the
Cabinet, and prior to which, they have to undergo
Cabinet scrutiny. Thus, there is the contingency
that the same may not obtain the approval of the
Cabinet.
Petitioners are not unaware of this remedy provided
by law. They have, in fact, raised the lack of Cabinet
approval as one of the reasons for seeking the
nullification of the aforementioned administrative
orders. (Note: nasagut na yung main issue as to
exhaustion of administrative remedy, that is merun
pang remedy).
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34. G.R. No. April 23, 1993
100127
PETITIONER JOSE D. LINA, JR.
RESPONDENTS ISIDRO D. CARINO, in his
capacity as Secretary of
Education, Culture and
Sports
Facts:
This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
filed by petitioner Senator Jose D. Lina, Jr.
principally as taxpayer, against respondent Isidro
D. Carino, in the latters capacity as the then
Secretary of Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS).
Petitioner disputes the legal authority of respondent
Carino to issue DECS Order No. 30, series of 1991,
dated 11 March 1991, entitled Guidelines on
Tuition and/or other School Fees in Private Schools,
Colleges and Universities for School Year 1991-
1992. It allows private schools to increase tuition
and other school fees, subject to the guidelines there
set out.
Petitioner basically denies the legal authority of
respondent Secretary to issue DECS Order No. 30.
It is the contention of the petitioner that respondent
Secretary at the time of issuing DECS Order No. 30
no longer possessed legal authority to do so,
considering that authority to promulgate rules and
regulations relating to the imposition of school fees
had been transferred to the State Assistance
Council (SAC) by Republic Act No. 6728 (An Act
Providing Government Assistance to Students and
Teachers in Private Education, and Appropriating
Funds therefor).
Issue/s:
Whether DECS Secretary Carino has legal authority
to issue DECS Order No. 30
Ruling:
Yes, Secretary Carino has legal authority to issue
DECS Order No. 30.
Ratio Decidendi:
After careful examination of the provisions of both
P.D. No. 451 (Authorizing The Secretary of
Education and Culture to Regulate the Imposition
of Tuition and Other School Fees) and B.P. Blg. 232
(An Act Providing for the Establishment and
ATTY. CABRAS
Maintenance of an Integrated System of Education),
and the opinions of the Court in Phil. Consumer
case and the Cebu Institute case, the Court
considers that the legal authority of respondent
DECS Secretary to set maximum permissible rates
or levels of tuition and other school fees, and to
issue guidelines for the imposition and collection
thereof, like DECS Order No. 30, must be sustained.
The Court is unable to agree with Linas contention.
We do not see how R.A. No. 6728 could be regarded
as vesting upon the SAC the legal authority to
establish maximum permissible tuition and other
school fees for private schools.
As earlier noted, R.A. No. 6728 deals with
government assistance to students and teachers in
private schools; it does not, in other words, purport
to deal at all with the question of authority to fix
maximum collectible tuition and other school fees.
R.A. No. 6728 did authorize the SAC to issue rules
and regulations; but the rules and regulations
which may be promulgated by the SAC must relate
to the authority granted by R.A. No. 6728 to the
SAC. It is axiomatic that a rule or regulation must
bear upon, and be consistent with the provisions of
the enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to
be valid.
The SAC was authorized to define the classes of
students who may be entitled to claim government
financial assistance. Under the statute, students of
schools charging tuition and other school fees in
excess of certain identified rate or levels thereof
shall not be entitled to claim government assistance
or subsidies. The specification of such levels of
tuition and other school fees for purposes of
qualifying (or disqualifying) the students in such
schools for government financial assistance is one
thing; this is the task SAC was authorized to carry
out through the promulgation of rules and
regulations. The determination of the levels of tution
and other school fees which may lawfully be charged
by any private school, is clearly another matter; this
task is vested in respondent Secretary.
Doctrine Learned:
A rule or regulation must bear upon, and be
consistent with the provisions of its enabling
statute.
35. BLANCO V. BOARD
46 PHIL 190
Topic: Modes of judicial review; Mandamus
Facts:
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The petitioners, along with other qualified persons,
took the examination prescribed by law for a
physician's certificate on May 13 to 16, 1924, and
apparently passed the same. The Board of Medical
Examiners thereupon submitted the final results of
the examinations to the Department Head for
confirmation. But the Secretary of the Interior held
the matter in abeyance, pending the outcome of an
investigation conducted by the Under-Secretary of
the Interior. The finding of the special investigator
was that the questions on the subjects of the
medical examinations held on May 13 to May 16,
1924, had leaked out before said dates. Following
the recommendation of the Under-Secretary, the
Secretary of the Interior annulled the results of the
examinations.
The last paragraph of section 776 of the Medical
Law, as found in the Administrative Code, and as
last amended by section 10 of Act No. 3111,
provides that "The results of all examinations
(medical), including the average and grades
obtained by each applicant, shall be submitted for
confirmation to the Department Head (the Secretary
of the Interior) and made known to the respective
candidates within one month after the date of the
examination."
Issue: WON the mandamus filed by the petitioner
will prosper.
Held:
No, the mandamus filed by the petitioner will not
prosper. The writ of mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of the discretion of a
public officer. Where the law imposes upon a public
officer the right and duty to exercise judgment, in
reference to any matter to which he is called upon
to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised and
not that of the court.
Under the plain terms of the Medical law, it is the
discretionary duty of the Secretary of the Interior to
confirm or not to confirm to confirm or, as in this
instance, to annul the report of the medical
examiners. To hold that the Secretary of the Interior
must in all cases confirm, shutting his eyes to any
irregularity, no matter how glaring, would convert
him into an automatic rubber stamp for imprinting
the requisite approval. That the Department
Secretary who appoints the members of the Board
of Medical Examiners, who has the Board under his
administrative supervision, and who has the power
of confirmation of the report of the Board, cannot do
more than perform the clerical duty of approving the
results of the examinations, under any and all
circumstances, is too specious an argument to merit
serious consideration.
It is likewise elementary law that mandamus may
issue to correct abuse of discretion, if the case is
otherwise proper. But here, the record discloses that
the Secretary of the Interior did not exercise the
ATTY. CABRAS
power granted to him with manifest injustice, or
with gross abuse. Quite otherwise.
Referential Syllabus:
PUBLIC OFFICERS; MANDAMUS, WHEN ISSUES;
DISCRETIONARY DUTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS.
The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or
review the exercise of the discretion of a public
officer. Where the law imposes upon a public officer
the right and duty to exercise judgment, in reference
to any matter to which he is called upon to act, it is
his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the court.
ID.; ID.; ID.Mandamus may issue to correct abuse
of discretion, if the case is otherwise proper.
ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 776, AS AMENDED, OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, CONSTRUED; DUTY OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO CONFIRM
RESULTS OF MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS.The
official duty imposed on the Secretary of the Interior
by the Medical Law (sec. 776, as amended, of the
Administrative Code), is discretionary in nature. It
is the discretionary duty of the Secretary of the
Interior to confirm or not to confirm the report of the
medical examiners.
36. Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board
(99 Phil 797 [No. L-10062], 28 August 1956)
Facts: Paula Aquino Policarpio was the widow of a
member of the Armed Forces killed in action in
1942; upon her application duly approved, she was
granted a monthly pension by Philippine Veterans
Board (herein referred to as the Board.) The
pension was stopped in July 1948 because the
widow received a similar pension from U. S.
Veterans Administration. However, the latter
certified to the Board that the widow had ceased
receiving her pension from the U. S. Veterans
Administration since 1951, whereupon, in February
11, 1953, Policarpio applied to the Board for the
resumption of her former pension. On February 28,
1953, the Secretary of the Philippine Veterans
Board issued a memorandum that her pension was
resumed effective January 30, 1951; and in view
thereof the auditor caused treasury warrants to be
prepared in favor of the widow. Delivery of the
warrants was, however, subsequently stopped, for
the reason that the Board had not yet granted the
restoration of her pension.
On the basis of such facts and in view of the refusal
of the board officers to release the warrants,
Policarpio applied to the Court of First Instance for
a writ of mandamus to compel their release. In its
answer the Board specifically pleaded that the
preparation of the warrants was ordered by mistake,
because Policarpio's petition had not been as yet
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acted upon by the Board.
By agreement of the parties the lower court decreed
the issuance of the writ complained of on the basis
that the fact that the Secretary has signed the
memorandum for the chairman of the board
restoring Policarpios pension, and the further fact
that said check has been drawn by virtue of such
memorandum are sufficient reasons to justify the
release of the same in payment of petitioner's
accumulated pension.
Issue/s: Whether or not the lower court lacked the
authority in rendering its decision. (Yes)
Held: The decision is untenable. It being an
established fact that the resumption of the pension
had not yet been approved by the Veterans Board,
the memorandum of the Secretary and the
preparation of the warrants were obviously
unauthorized, and the taking of such action proves
nothing but that the error or lack of authority was
not discovered until later, as shown by the
subsequent withholding of the warrants.
It was improper to compel delivery of the warrants,
because the Board might, in the exercise of its
discretion, refuse to restore Policarpio's pension;
and even if its refusal should be wrongful or
erroneous, the court could not properly intervene
until she should have exhausted her administrative
remedies. Therefore, the court below should have
limited itself to ordering the Board to take action
upon Policarpio's petition that her pension
payments be resumed.
37. Meralco vs. Savellano
FACTS: the late Juan G. Maniago (substituted in
these proceedings by his wife and children)
submitted to petitioner Commissionerof Internal
Revenue confidential denunciation against the
Meralco Securities Corporation for tax evasion for
having paid income tax only on 25 % of the
dividends it received from the Manila Electric Co. for
the years 1962-1966, thereby allegedly
shortchanging the government of income tax due
from 75% of the said dividends.
Petitioner caused the investigation but did not
found any deficiency of corporate income tax since
under the law, then prevailing (section 24[a] of the
National Internal Revenue Code) "in the case of
dividends received by a domestic or foreign resident
corporation liable to (corporate income) tax under
ATTY. CABRAS
this Chapter . . . .only twenty-five per centum
thereof shall be returnable for the purposes of the
tax imposed under this section." The Commissioner
accordingly rejected Maniago's contention that the
Meralco from whom the dividends were received is
"not a domestic corporation liable to tax under this
Chapter."
Because of this ruling, the claim of informers
reward to Maniago was also denied.
Maniago filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC
against the CIR and Meralco to compel him to
impose the alleged tax deficiency and award him the
informers reward by virtue of RA 2338.
The commissioner moved to dismiss that he is
clothed under the National Internal Revenue Code
and existing rules and regulations with
discretionary power in evaluating the facts of a case
and since mandamus win not lie to compel the
performance of a discretionary power, he cannot
be compelled to impose the alleged tax deficiency
assessment against the Meralco Securities
Corporation. He further argued that mandamus
may not lie against him for that would be
tantamount to a usurpation of executive powers,
since the Office of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is undeniably under the control of the
executive department. The respondent judge
granted the writ hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of mandamus may
lie against the CIR
RULING:
No. A well-recognized rule that mandamus only lies
to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or
duty and not to control the performance of a
discretionary power. Purely administrative and
discretionary functions may not be interfered with
by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means
the power or right conferred upon the office by law
of acting officially under certain circumstances
according to the dictates of his own judgment and
conscience and not controlled by the judgment or
conscience of others. Mandamus may not be
resorted to so as to interfere with the manner in
which the discretion shall be exercised or
to influence or coerce a particular determination.
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Moreover, since the office of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is charged with the administration
of revenue laws, which is the primary responsibility
of the executive branch of the government,
mandamus may not issue against the
Commissioner to compel him to impose a tax
assessment not found by him to be due or proper
for that would be tantamount to a usurpation of
executive functions.
Such discretionary power vested in the proper
executive official, in the absence of arbitrariness or
grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory
authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or
control of others. Such decision or ruling is a valid
exercise of discretion in the performance of official
duty and cannot be controlled much less reversed
by mandamus.
38. Antonio vs Tanco Jr.
65 SCRA 448, July 25, 1975
Facts:
On Sept 5, 1973, the Sec. of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, pursuant to PD No. 6, which
amended certain rules on discipline on government
employees and upon the recommendation of Acting
Director of Fisheries, charged Hilario C. Antonio, the
Regional Director of Region No. IV of the Bureau of
Fisheries, was incompetence and conduct highly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The
complaint was embodied in a formal charge with
order of suspension which was served upon
Antonio on Sept. 14, 1973. The suspension took
effect immediately.
It was alleged that Antonio on May 31,
October 31 and Nov. 30 1972 issued to eleven
persons closely related to, or associated with, each
other twelve seaweed areas of Manila Bay despite
his knowledge that the official policy was that no
exclusive seaweed licenses.
Some weeks after his suspension, or on
October 24, 1973, Antonio sent a telegraphic
request for reinstatement to President Marcos.
On Nov. 16, 1973 or 63 days after his
suspension Antonio informed the Director of
Fisheries that by virtue of section 35 of the Civil
Service Law he was going to return to duty as
Regional Fishery Director.
On Jan 29, 1974 Antonio without awaiting
the decision of the Pres to his request for
reinstatement, ventilated his grievance in the
Judicial forum by filling the instant petition for
ATTY. CABRAS
mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition.
Issue; Whether Antonio is entitled to the writ of
mandamus to compel the Sec. of Natural Resources
to reinstate him.
Held:
We are of the opinion that the mandamus
action was prematurely filed, or, as the respondents
put it, the case is not ripe for adjudication for the
court of justice in view of the pendency of the Office
of the President of Antonios request for
reinstatement. As long as that request is pending,
the matter of his reinstatement is not justiciable.
A mandamus action against administrative
officers should not be entertained if their superiors
can grant relief. Parties asking judicial review of
administrative official action must first exhaust
their remedies in the executive branch.
39. QUINTOS-DELES vs. COMMISSION
FACTS: Teresita Quintos-Deles, Al Ignatius Lopez,
Bartolome Arteche, and Rey Magno Teves were
appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President
pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and
Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution.
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.
transmitted by letter the appointment of the said
sectoral representatives to Speaker Ramon Mitra,
Jr. These sectoral representatives were scheduled to
take their oaths before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr.
at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of
Business. However, petitioner and the three other
sectoral representatives-appointees were not able to
take their oaths and discharge their duties as
members of Congress due to the opposition of some
congressmen-members of the Commission on
Appointments, who insisted that sectoral
representatives must first be confirmed by the
respondent Commission before they could take their
oaths and/or assume office as members of the
House of Representatives. This opposition
compelled Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend
the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution requires the
appointment of sectoral representatives to the
House of Representatives should be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments.
RULING: Yes. SEC.16.The President shall nominate
and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the execu-tive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers
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of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards
In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549
[1987]), we construed Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution to mean that only appointments to
offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said
Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Under the provisions
of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups
of officers whom the President shall appoint. These
four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from
time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank
whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.
40. Marcos vs Manglapus
FACTS:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed
from the presidency via the non-violent people
power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos,
in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Corazon
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the
nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family. Marcos filed for a
petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the
respondents to issue them their travel documents
and prevent the implementation of President
Aquinos decision to bar Marcos from returning in
the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power
to bar his return in the country. He also questioned
the claim of the President that the decision was
made in the interest of national security, public
safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the
ATTY. CABRAS
President acted outside her jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the exercise of the power of
judicial review, the function of the court is merely to
check, not to supplant the Executive.
HELD:
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
cited by petitioners show that the framers intended
to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not
intend courts of justice to settle all actual
controversies before them. When political questions
are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official
whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is
not established, the Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the official concerned and
decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for
the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would
appear clear that the second paragraph of Article
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining judicial
power, which specifically empowers the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, that: Article VII
of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the
principle of separation of powers underlying our
system of government, the Executive is supreme
within his own sphere. However, the separation of
powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute.
What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system
of checks and balances, under which the Executive
is supreme, as regards the suspension of the
privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the
authority to determine whether or not he has so
acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which,
in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the
Court is merely to check not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him
or to determine the wisdom of his act.
41.DE BORJA V VILLADOLID
FACTS: Villadolid, as Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries required the plaintiff, to procure a
commercial fishing boat license as owner and
operator of said motor boats.
Plaintiff refused to secure such license and
contended that he is not so required by section 18
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of Act No. 4003, as amended by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 471, for the reason that he
"is not operating his motor boats for the purpose of
catching fish."
A motion to dismiss the complaint was granted by
the lower court and a motion for reconsideration
having been denied, this case has brought here on
appeal.
Section 17 of Act No. 4003 and section 18 of the
same Act, as amended by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 471, read as follows:
SEC. 17. License tax on operation of boat. Unless
provided with a license issued in accordance with
the provisions of this Act, no person, association or
corporation shall operate any vessel of more than
three tons gross for the purpose of catching fish in
the territorial waters of the Philippine Islands.
SEC. 18. Annual fee on operation of boat. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is hereby
empowered to issue to the proper parties licenses
for fishing operation of powered vessels of more than
three tons gross and sailing or rowed vessels of more
than three tons gross towed or operated in
connection with power -propelled vessels in the
territorial waters of the Philippines upon the
payment of an annual fee of not less than two pesos
nor more than two hundred pesos for every vessel
subject to taxation under this Act: Provided That
failure of a licensee to secure a renewal or extension
of his license and pay the annual fee on or before
the last day of February of each year shall subject
him to a surcharge of one hundred per centum
based on the amount of the original fee, without
prejudice to criminal proceedings against the
delinquent licensee under the penal provisions of
this Act: Provided, further, That all vessels less than
three tons gross shall be licensed under the
provisions of section seventy of this Act: And
provided, also, That the catching of fish under the
license issued shall be subject to the limitations,
restrictions, and penalties imposed by this Act. (As
amended by sec. 1 of Com. Act No. 471.)
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of declaratory relief shall
be given due course? No.
W/N plaintiff is obliged to procure a commercial
fishing boat license? Yes.
HELD:
1. It appears that the Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries demanded that plaintiff pay the license
provided in that Act and in view of the insistent
refusal of plaintiff to comply with such demand,
he finally turned over the case to the Office of
the Fiscal of the City of Manila for appropriate
action. However, plaintiff, file a complaint for
declaratory relief. This attitude of the plaintiff
will only result in multiplicity of actions which
ATTY. CABRAS
should always be invoked and the Rules of Court
obviously seeks to prevent when, in section 2 of Rule
66, it provides that the action for declaratory
relief must be brought "before there has been a
breach" of a contract or statute the construction
of which is sought.
The facts in this case are so clear and unambiguous,
that in the light of said section 2 or Rule 66, there
is nothing left for the courts to adjudicate or
construe regarding the legal rights, suites and
status of appellant in the premises. The general
purpose of declaratory judgment act is to provide for
adjudication of the legal rights, duties, or status of
the respective parties."
2. Pursuant to Act No. 4003, required to pay the
commercial fishing boat license
42. Azajar vs. Bureau of Lands
Facts: The plaintiff, Maria De Azajar filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Albay
seeking a declaratory judgment or relief pleading
that she applied for the purchase of a parcel of land
belonging to the public domain located in the
Province of Albay and that an opposition to such
application was filed by Francisco Ardales, one of
the respondents herein. The respondent contended
that the applicant cannot be entitled to acquire said
lands being a Chinese Citizen. Such opposition,
according to the plaintiff, raises uncertainty and
insecurity to her citizenship which is prejudicial to
her. She contended that unless such question of
citizenship be judicially determined, the Bureau of
Lands should not deny her application. Moreover,
she contended that her father is a Filipino Citizen.
The petitioner prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be rendered declaring her to be a Filipino
Citizen and as such, entitled her to acquire lands of
the public domain and that she possessed all the
rights and privileges accorded to the Filipino
Citizens. After hearing, the court rendered a
decision stating that the plaintiff is a Chinese
Citizen and being such, she is not entitled to acquire
lands of the public domain. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. The appeal was
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. While it was
pending, the First Assistant Solicitor General filed a
motion praying that the appeal be dismissed on the
grounds that an action for declaratory relief is not
the proper proceedings for the purpose of securing
a judicial declaration of Filipino Citizenship and
that the action brought by the plaintiff was not the
proper remedy because the trial court had no
authority or jurisdiction to decide on the merits but
to dismiss it. The appellant objected to this motion
and moved that the appeal be forwarded to the
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Supreme Court because it involves pre questions of
law. However, the First Assistant Solicitor General
objected and appealed for the case to be dismissed
on the ground that the case involved not only
questions of law but also questions of fact being
such the court lacked jurisdiction to hear and
render judgment therein.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs citizenship can
be determined in a complaint for declaratory
judgment or relief.
Held: From a decision of the Director of Lands, an
appeal lies to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Until all the administrative
remedies had been exhausted, no court may compel
the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture
to decide any sales application as such is exclusively
vested upon them. The Supreme Court held that the
appellants citizenship cannot be determined in the
complaint for declaratory judgment/relief as such is
not proper remedy for determination of citizenship.
The appellant may resort to the courts if the exercise
of her rights as citizens be prevented or denied.
However, such was not the action brought in the
case at bar and the lower court should have
dismissed it.
43. DECLARATORY RELIEF
G.R. No. L-4183 October 26, 1951
NATIONAL DENTAL SUPPLY CO. vs. BIBIANO
MEER, in his capacity as Collector of Internal
Revenue, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
This is an action for declaratory relief to obtain a
ruling on whether sales of dental gold or gold alloys
and other metals used for dental purposes come
within the purview of Article 184 of the National
Internal Revenue Code as claimed by the Collector
of Internal Revenue.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
(1) that plaintiff has no cause of action for
declaratory judgment and (2) that even assuming
the existence of a cause of action, relief by
declaratory judgment is not proper because it will
not terminate the controversy.
The court sustained the motion under the first
ground holding that actions for declaratory relief do
not apply to cases where a taxpayer questions his
liability for the payment of any tax collectible under
any law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. From this ruling the plaintiff has
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff can bring the present action for
declaratory relief.
ATTY. CABRAS
HELD:
Plaintiff contends that it can do so under section 1,
Rule 66, of the Rules of Court, which contains no
prohibition to a taxpayer to file an action for
declaratory relief to test the legality of any tax,
whereas defendant contends that the failure to
incorporate in Rule 66 the proviso added by
Commonwealth Act No. 55 to section 1, of Act No.
3736, does not imply its repeal and, therefore, it still
stands and applies to the plaintiff.
The original law on declaratory relief is Act No.
3736, which went into effect on November 22, 1930.
On October 17, 1936, Congress approved
Commonwealth Act No. 55 adding to section 1 of
said Act No. 3736, the following proviso:
. . . Provided, however, That the provisions of this
Act, shall not apply to cases where a taxpayer
questions his liability for the payment of any
tax, duty, or charge collectible under any law
administered by the Bureau of Customs or the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
(a) Propriety of remedy.The proviso added by
Commonwealth Act No. 55 to section 1 of Act No.
3736, which prohibits an action for declaratory
relief in cases where a taxpayer questions his
liability for the payment of any tax, duty, or charge
collectible under any law administered by the
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Internal
Revenue', is not incorporated in the above
provision in order to make it discretionary upon
the courts to apply or not to apply the remedy
in such cases. Of course, where the tax is already
due and collectible, the tax payer cannot prevent
collection by the declaratory action, but he should
pay the tax and sue for its recovery within the period
limited by law. But, where the tax is not yet due,
there can be no valid reason why the tax-payer
cannot by declaratory relief test its validity.
From the opinion of the former Chief Justice Moran
may be deduced that the failure to incorporate the
above proviso in section 1, rule 66, is not due to an
intention to repeal it but rather to the desire to
leave its application to the sound discretion of
the court, which is the sole arbiter to determine
whether a case is meritorious or not.
The foregoing view finds support in section 306 of
the National Internal Revenue Code, which
specifically lays down the procedure to be followed
in those cases wherein a taxpayer entertains some
doubt about the correctness of a tax sought to be
collected. Said section provides that the tax should
first be paid and the taxpayer should sue for its
recovery afterwards. The purpose of the law
obviously is to prevent delay in the collection of
taxes upon which the Government depends for its
very existence. To allow a taxpayer to first secure a
ruling as regards the validity of the tax before paying
it would be to defeat this purpose, and to prevent
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this result the rule regarding declaratory relief was
declared inapplicable to cases involving collection of
taxes.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.
44. Declaratory Relief
ALLIED BROADCASTING VS REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 3001 was passed granting
petitioner the permit or franchise to construct,
maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in
the Philippines. Petitioner was able to construct,
maintain and operate ten (10) radio broadcasting
stations all over the country.
Under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3001,
petitioner's franchise or permit "shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress of
the Philippines when the public interest so
requires . ..."
On November 11, 1974, Presidential Decree No.
576-A entitled "Decree Regulating The Ownership
And Operation Of Radio And Television Stations And
For Other Purposes" was issued.
Pursuant to Section 6 of the said Decree, all
franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates, or
other forms of authority to operate radio or
television broadcasting systems/stations, including
the franchise or permit of petitioner under Republic
Act No. 3001, have been deemed terminated or
revoked effective December 31, 1981. Thus,
petitioner is left with only 3 radio stations located in
Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City.
Petitioner alleged that said Decree has caused it
great and irreparable damage, because (a) it
divested petitioner of its franchise without due
process of law and forced it to divest itself of some
of its radio stations; (b) it deprived petitioner of its
right to further construct, maintain and operate
radio broadcasting stations in other cities or
municipalities of the country. Hence, this petition to
declare Presidential Decree No. 576-A as
unconstitutional and null and void ab initio.
ISSUE: Whether this petition be treated as a
prohibition as being alleged by petitioner
RULING: No.
The petition seeks a declaration of the
unconstitutionality and/or nullity of
Presidential Decree No. 576-A. As such, it must
be treated as one seeking declaratory relief
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action
should be brought before the Regional Trial
Court and not before the Supreme Court. A
petition for declaratory relief is not among the
petitions within the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court even if only questions of law are
involved.
ATTY. CABRAS
Thus, the present petition should be dismissed
on this score.
Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy
involving the law sought to be annulled.
Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an
application for a license to operate a radio or
television station in excess of the authorized
number and that the same is being denied or
refused on the basis of the restrictions under
Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner does not
also allege that it had been penalized or is being
penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is,
likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's
stations had been confiscated or shut down
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 576-A.
Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not
being raised in the context of a specific case or
controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted
his rights.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.
Judicial power is "the right to determine actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants."
The allegation of petitioner that its petition should
be treated as a petition for prohibition does not
place petitioner in any better position. The petition
cannot be considered as one for prohibition as it
does not seek to prohibit further proceedings
being conducted by any tribunal, corporation,
board or person exercising judicial or ministerial
functions.
In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to
prohibit any proceeding being conducted by
public respondent which adversely affects its
interest. Apparently, what petitioner seeks to
prohibit is the possible denial of an application it
may make to operate radio or television stations on
the basis of the restrictions imposed by Presidential
Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the petition is
premature.
45. Mejoff vs Director of Prisons
Facts:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris
Mejoff, the first having been denied. The petitioner
Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent to this
country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the
Japanese forces during the latters regime in these
Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a
Japanese spy. The Board of Commissioners of
Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered the
Philippines illegally, without inspection and
admission by the immigration officials at a
designation point of entry and, therefore, it ordered
that he be deported on the first available
transportation to Russia. In July and August, 1948,
two boats of Russian nationality called at the Cebu
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Port. But their master refused to take the petitioner
and his companions alleging lack of authority to do
so. In October of the same year, after repeated
failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities
transferred him to Bilibid prison where he has been
confined up to the present time.
The Court held that petitioners detention be
temporary and said that temporary detention is a
necessary step in the process of expulsion and
exclusion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements of his deportation, the Government
has the right to hold the undesirable alien under
confinement for a reasonable length of time. But
the Court warned that under established
precedents, too long a detention may justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether the writ of habeas corpus should be
granted?
Ruling:
Over two years having elapsed since the decision
aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not
found ways and means of removing the petitioner
out of the country, and none are in sight, although,
it should be said in justice to deportation
authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no
ship or country would take the petitioner.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no
right of asylum therein even if they are stateless ,
which the petitioner claims to be. It is no less true,
however, as impliedly stated in this Courts
decision, supra, that foreign nationals, not enemy,
against whom no charge has been made other than
that their permission to stay has expired, may no
indefinitely be kept in detention.
The protection against deprivation of liberty without
due process of law and except for crimes committed
against the laws of the land is not limited to
Philippine citizens but extends to all residents,
except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of law of the
Nation. And in a resolution entitled Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and approved by the
general assembly of the United Nations of which the
Philippines is a member, the right to life and liberty
and all other fundamental rights as applied to all
human beings were proclaimed.
Premises considered, the writ will issue
commanding the respondents to release the
petitioner from custody upon these terms; The
petitioner shall be places under the surveillance of
the immigration authorities or their agents in such
form and manner as may be deemed adequate to
insure that he keep peace and be available when the
Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance
and the question of reasonableness shall be
ATTY. CABRAS
submitted to this Court for decision in case of
abuse. Petition granted.
46. Co vs Deportation Board
Facts:
Petitioners Gregorio Co and Herculano Co
being born in Aparri, Cagayan, on April 24, 1920
and September 25, 1922. Their father, a certain Co
Pengco, was a Chinese merchant residing in Aparri,
Cagayan and their mother was Maria Tan Comin,
whose nationality was disputed. Then on July 12,
1957, a Special Prosecutor of the Deportation Board
filed charges against petitioners with such Board
alleging that as Chinese subjects residing in the
Philippines, who failed, neglected and refused to
register as Chinese nationals with the Bureau of
Immigration, they violated the law, compounded by
the fact that they represented themselves as
Filipinos. They were thus enabled to enjoy certain
rights and privileges which are accorded only to
Filipino citizens, such as suffrage, ownership of real
property, Herculano's ownership of a coastwise
vessel, Gregorio Co's loan from the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation.
Then they filed with the Deportation Board a
motion to dismiss based on the plea that it lacked
jurisdiction for the reason that they are citizens of
the Philippines. 9 Such motion was denied as was a
subsequent motion seeking reconsideration. They
did exhaust their administrative remedy, an appeal
to the President being fruitless. Thereafter, they filed
the special civil action of prohibition and habeas
corpus, with the decision as noted being in their
favor on the ground of their being Filipinos. They
pointed out that both the appellee Deportation
Board and the lower court maintained the contrary
view, her citizenship being admitted
Issue:
Whether or not the judiciary may entertain
an action for prohibition and habeas corpus filed
against the Deportation Board
Held:
No. The petitioners are Filipino citizens and
that the Deportation Board was without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the deportation proceedings
filed against them.
Judge Jesus de Veyra of the Manila Court of
First Instance, in a well-written decision, sustained
his jurisdiction, granted the relief sought on the
ground that they were Filipinos, and restrained
appellant Board from taking further cognizance of
the proceeding. Hence this appeal by the
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Deportation Board. On the basis of the finding of
facts of the lower court, tested by the standards
prescribed in Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board,
there was justification for the decision it rendered.
While Vivo v. Montesa 2 and Calacday v. Vivo3 stand
for the proposition that under the well-settled
administrative law doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
an administrative agency, such as appellant, must
be given the opportunity to decide the matter before
it before the courts could intervene, the latter case
pointed out that there are appropriate where the
right to immediate judicial review should be
recognized. As the lower court found, this is one of
them. We cannot see any valid ground for reversal.
47. Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag | Fernan,
C.J. (1989)
FACTS
- Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French
national.
- He was a temporary visitor, but his status was
later changed to that of an immigrant.
- respondent CID Commissioner Ramon Liwag
received a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio
G. Cabrera, Jr., allegedly petitioner's landlord,
accusing petitioner of being an undesirable alien for
"committing acts inimical to public safety and
progress."
- Liwag issued a mission order to a team of CID
agents for them "to locate and bring subject to
Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and
"submit report."
- CID agents went to petitioner's residence in Sta.
Ana to invite the latter to the CID headquarters for
verification of his status but petitioner and his then
lady companion reportedly locked themselves inside
their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents.
- The immigration agents then sought the
assistance of members of the WPD. Once again
petitioner adamantly refused to be taken in and in
the ensuing struggle, both petitioner and the
lawmen were injured. Finally, petitioner was
subdued and immediately taken to the CID
Intelligence Office.
- A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
Commissioner on the same day but there is nothing
in the records to convince this Court that said
warrant was served on petitioner prior to his
apprehension.
- Petitioner's counsel filed the instant petition for
habeas corpus.
ISSUE/S & HELD:
The core issue is the legality of the arrest and
detention of petitioner by the Immigration
Commissioner preparatory to deportation
proceedings.
ATTY. CABRAS
RATIONALE
- SC cited Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago: The
requirement of probable cause to be determined by
a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings.' (Morano vs. Vivo). There need be no
'truncated' recourse to both judicial and
administrative warrants in a single deportation
proceeding.
- What is essential is that there should be a specific
charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section
37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and
that the charge be substantiated by competent
evidence. ... .
- The particular circumstances obtaining in the case
at bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality
and propriety of petitioner's apprehension by
respondent Commissioner. For unlike in the Harvey
case where the warrantless capture of two
suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable
cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a
three-month period during which their activities
were monitored, herein petitioner was "invited" by a
combined team of CID agents and police officers at
his apartment unit on the strength of a mission
order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration
based on a sworn complaint of a single individual.
The essential requisite of probable cause was
conspicuously absent.
- But even assuming that the arrest of petitioner was
not legal at the beginning, certain events have
supervened to render his petition moot and
academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there
was at the inception of his arrest.
- Firstly, petitioner is no longer under confinement.
Petitioner was released upon the posting and
approval of a personal bailbond.
- The general rule in a number of cases is that the
release, whether permanent or temporary, of a
detained person renders the petition for habeas
corpus moot and academic, unless there are
restraints attached to his release which precludes
freedom of action (Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule)
- Examples in Moncupa vs. Enrile: prohibition to
travel, to change his abode and to grant interviews
- Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is not similarly
restrained. Secondly, records show that formal
deportation proceedings have been initiated against
petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the
CID.
- The restraint (if any) against petitioner's person
has therefore become legal. The writ of habeas
corpus has served its purpose.
48. HABEAS CORPUS
CASIMIRO BAYANI, petitioner and appellant, vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
respondent and appellee.
FACTS:
Appellant, Casimiro Bayani arrived at Manila in
August 1917on the syeamship Loongsang and
requested permission to enter declaring that he was
a citizen of the Philippines. The request was
inquired into by a board of special inquiry but was
subsequently denied. Appeal was taken to the
Collector of Customs, which confirmed the earlier
decision.
A writ of habeas corpus was petitioned for in the
CFI, which was also denied.
In the appeal with the Supreme Court , Bayani
alleges that he was not give an full , free and fair
hearing before the special board of inquiry, and he
prayed for a new trial on the merits.
In reply, the Attorney-General admitted the errors
assigned by the appellant. In his brief, he found on
record that some members of the board exhibited ill-
advised actions, there were misstatement of
material facts to witnesses, and one witness was
barred even before she concluded her testimony.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an appeal can be made to courts
after the decision of an administrative body has
become final.
HELD:
Yes, The courts will not hesitate to review the
decision of administrative officers whenever it is
alleged and proved that they have abused the power
and discretion conferred upon them.
It was found out that the witnesses came from a
humble background and were perhaps ignorant and
not accustomed with the scenes of judicial
proceedings and that the entire examination by the
board from beginning to end, of all witnesses, was
made in the spirit of hostility.
The court said, that what should have been done
by the board was to allay their fears and indicated
to them that they were under protection. And where
the record itself had disclosed the fact that the
evidence is weighed in such hostility, the court said
that there could never be that impartial, free , full
and fair hearing contemplated in law.
Further, the court stressed that the essential thing
in investigations like the present as well as all other
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is that there
shall have been an honest effort to arrive at the
truth by methods sufficiently fair and reasonable to
amount to due process of law.
In the end, the court adopted the recommendation
of the Attorney-General and ordered and decreed
that the record be returned to the court whence it
came with directions that the judgment appealed
from be reversed and that an order be issued
directing and commanding the board of special
inquiry to give to the appellant a rehearing as
ATTY. CABRAS
speedily as the facts and circumstances will permit,
and without any findings as to costs.
49. Yu vs Defensor-Santiago
Facts
Petitioner Yu was originally a Portuguese national
who was naturalized as a Philippine citizen.
However, he petitioner applied for and was issued a
renewed Portuguese Passport by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. The
CID (Commission on Immigration and Deportation)
detained the petitioner pending his deportation
case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a petition for
habeas corpus.
Issue
Whether a writ of habeas corpus should be issued
Held
No. The foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. In Board of Immigration
Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that
is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport 23 and represented himself as such in
official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship. Philippine citizenship, it must be
stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed
when required and suppressed when convenient.
50. COLLECTOR VS REYES, 100 PHIL 822
FACTS: CIR demanded from Aurelio P. Reyes
payment of his alleged deficiency income taxes,
surcharges, interests and penalties for the tax years
1946 to 1950. Together with said letter of
assessment, the latter received a warrant of
distraint and levy on his properties in the event that
he should fail to pay the alleged deficiency income
taxes.
Reyes filed with the CTA a petition for review of the
Collector's assessment of his alleged deficiency
income tax liabilities. This was followed by an
urgent petition to restrain the CIR from executing
the warrant of distrain and levy on his properties,
alleging that the right of respondent to collect by
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
summary proceedings the tax demanded had
already prescribed in accordance with section 51 (d)
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as his
income tax returns for the tax years 1946 to 1950
had been filed more than three years ago, the last
one being on April 27, 1951; that a distrain and levy
on his properties would work injustice or irreparable
injury to him and would tend to render any
judgment of the Court in the main case meaningless
and ineffectual; that the requisite if Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 1125 for the filing of a bond or
deposit before a writ of distrain and levy may be
suspended is not applicable in this case; and that a
greater portion of his assets consists of real
properties located in Manila and shares a stock in
the Philippine Racing Club which are all
encumbered in various financial institutions and
therefore there is no possibility that he would
abscond with his property or remove or conceal the
same.
CIR opposed said petition on the ground that CTA
has no authority from executing the warrant of
distraint and levy on his properties of Reyes in
connection with the collection of the latter's
deficiency income taxes. CTA upheld the stand of
Reyes and ordered the CIR to desist from collecting
by administrative method the taxes allegedly due
from Reyes pending the outcome of his appeal.
ISSUE: W/N CTA had any power to grant an
injunction without requiring the filing of a bond or
making a deposit as prescribed by section 11 of
Republic Act No. 1125.
HELD: Yes. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125
prescribes the following:
SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. Any
person, association or corporation adversely
affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of
internal Revenue, may file an appeal in the Court of
Tax Appeals within thirty days after receipt of such
decision or ruling.
The requirement of the bond as a condition
precedent to the issuance of the writ of injunction
applies only in cases where the processes by which
the collection sought to be made by means thereof
are carried out in consonance with the law for such
cases provided and not when said processes are
obviously in violation of the law to the extreme that
they have to be SUSPENDED for jeopardizing the
interests of the taxpayer. Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 1125 is therefore premised on the assumption
that the collection by summary proceedings is by
itself in accordance with existing law; and then what
is suspended is the act of collecting, whereas, in the
case at bar what the respondent Court suspended
was the use of the method employed to verify the
collection which was evidently illegal after the lapse
of the three-year limitation period. The respondent
Court issued the injunction in question on the basis
ATTY. CABRAS
of its finding that the means intended to be used by
petitioner in the collection of the alleged deficiency
taxes were in violation of law. It certainly would be
an absurdity on the part of the Court of Tax Appeals
to declare that the collection by the summary
methods of distraint and levy was violative of law,
and then, on the same breath require the petitioner
to deposit or file a bond as a prerequisite for the
issuance of a writ of injunction.
51. Pineda vs Lantin
No. L-15350 (November 30, 1962)
6 SCRA 757
FACTS:
In this case, Teresa Cuyaong and Apeles
Lopez thru their counsel, complained of certain
actions of the respondent corporation and its
president. They claimed that the above-mentioned
respondents committed various acts in violation of
the Articles of Incorporation of the respondent
corporation. Petitioner ordered the investigation of
the charges and designated the other petitioners,
Yabyabin and Pizarro as investigators. Pursuant to
the order, the petitioners addressed a subpoena to
the respondent. However, the respondent thru a
counsel filed a petition to reconsider order and to
set aside subpoena duces tecum contending that
the approval of the Republic Act. No. 1143 the
power given by law to the Securities and Exchange
Commission to conduct investigations must be
conducted in accordance with the rules adopted by
the Commission. And since the Securities and
Exchange Commission had not till adopted the
rules, it could not proceed with the investigation.
The respondents filed a motion to quash and
discontinue the entire proceedings but it is denied.
Hence, the respondents filed a special civil action for
prohibition against herein petitioners. Herein
petitioners moved to dismiss the same. On
December 6, 1958, Judge Lantin deferred the
resolution of the motion to dismiss. Disagreeing,
herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
and reaffirmed their position that only the Supreme
Court may review orders of the Securities and
Exchange Commission; that when the Manila Court
of First Instance did so review, it went beyond its
authority and jurisdiction. It was then denied by the
respondent judge. The case was elevated to the
Supreme Court for a review on petition for certiorari
with prohibition and preliminary injuction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case for prohibition filed by
the respondents within the jurisdiction of the court
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
of first instance?
HELD:
No. A Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to
grant an injuctive relief against the Securities and
Exchange Commission. That power is lodged
exclusively with the Supreme Court.
52. LEMI vs. VALENCIA
7 SCRA 469, February 28, 1963
FACTS: On January 11, 1963, upon
application of respondent Alfredo M. Cargo,
supported by a sworn statement subscribe by his
co-respondent, Heraclio San Juan, the CFI of
Manila issued a search warrant authorizing them to
search radio station DZQR located at 603 Ronquillo
St., Sta. Cruz Manila, and to seize and take
possession of the radio transmitter used threat,
allegedly in violation of the law in that petitioner
used a transmitter different from the one he was
authorized to use. On that same date and in the
middle of a broadcasting program, they,
accompanied by the agents of the Presidential Anti-
Graft Committee (PAGCOM) served the search
warrant, made the corresponding search, and seized
the transmitter then being used at the aforesaid
station.
Subsequently, ELiseo B. Lemi filed with Us a
special civil action of mandamus, with a petition for
the issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunctionagainst the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether preliminary mandatory
injunction is proper.
HELD: It cannot be denied, therefore, that,
in practical effect, the seizure amounted to a closure
of the station and/or disapproval of petitioners last
application for the renewal of his license.
Section 3 of the Radio Control Act provides
that no application for the renewal of stations or
operator or operator license shall be disapproved
without giving the license a hearing.
Respondents claim that the seizure of
petitioners transmitter was effected lawfully
because it was done pursuant to a search warrant
issued by the CFI of Manila. We perceive no force
and validity in this argument. That the seizure was
made under the authority of a search warrant
cannot obliterate the fact that such seizure was
made in violation of the law requiring previous
hearing. The application for the issuance of the
warrant amounted, in effect, to an effort to evade the
law requiring said hearing.
Supreme Court granted the writ of
ATTY. CABRAS
preliminary mandatory injunction.
53. HONDA VS. SAN DIEGO 16 SCRA 406
Facts:
In the case, the petitioner questioned the
decision of CFI when it issued the writ of injunction
to the Patent Office.
Issue: Whether or not the CFI erred in the issuance
of writ to the Patent Office
Held: The law in this jurisdiction vests upon the
Supreme Court the authority to review final orders
and decisions of the Public Service Commissions.
And in Iloilo Commercial, etc. vs. Public Service
Commission (56 Phil. 28), it was held that in the
absence of a specific delegation of jurisdiction to the
Courts of First Instance co grant injunctive relief
against orders of the Public Service Commission, no
court, other than the Supreme Court, possesses
such jurisdiction. On the other hand, under Rule 44
of the Revised Rules of Court and Section 33 of
Republic Act No. 166, as amended, appeals from
orders and decisions of the Director of the Patent
Office must likewise be taken to the Supreme Court.
It is, therefore, undeniable that the Philippine
Patent Office and the Public Service Commission are
similarly situated and that both are of the same
rank or category as Courts of First Instance.
Consequently, the latter have no jurisdiction to
issue a writ of injunction against them, for the rule
is well settled that a writ of injunction or of
prohibition or of certiorari may be issued against a
court only by another court superior in rank.
54. Under Injuction:
Nocnoc vs. Judge Vera CFI Camarines Norte and
Ernesto Manarang
Facts: In this petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed on October 30, 1973, petitioner, a claimant for
death compensation benefit, assails the order of
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance
dated September 18, 1973 which enjoined the
execution of the order of the Workmen's
Compensation Unit (WCU) Regional District No. 6,
dated March 14, 1973, directing inter alia private
respondent to pay petitioner-claimant the sum of
P3,910.00 for the death of his son, 2 as well as the
order of the same Court dated October 10, 1973
which denied the motion for reconsideration of
above order of September 18, 1973.
On September 19, 1972, petitioner-claimant
filed a claim for compensation under Act 3842, i.e.,
the Workmen's Compensation Act as amended, with
the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU), Regional
District No. 6, at Naga City, for the death of his son,
Norberto Nocnoc, single, who died in an accident on
June 9, 1970, while employed as a bus conductor in
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS
the transportation business of private respondent, to this Court.
Ernest Manarang. The WCU awarded to petitioner-
claimant the sum of P6,240.00, but deducted
thereform the aforesaid amount of P2,330.00 which 55. G.R. No. October 1, 1992
was deemed as advance and/or partial payment on 101344
the claim. PETITIONER ASSET PRIVATIZATION
On May 25, 1973, a petition for certiorari with this TRUST, as Trustee of the
Court, 17 the resolution of which " is a prejudicial Government of the
question," The "Petition for Review on Certiorari" Republic of the Philippines
adverted to was, per resolution of this court dated RESPONDENTS COURT OF APPEALS, JOB
June 8, 1973, considered "NOT FILED" for failure of C. MADAYAG Presiding
peitioner Manarang to pay docket and legal fees. Judge of the Regional Trial
On August 4, 1973, respodent filed a complaint, Court of Makati, Br. 145,
entitled "Ernesto Manarang v. Estanislao Sarto, et and JOHANNESBURG
al." Civil Case No. 2438, for injunction with the PACKAGING CORP.
Court of First Instance, branch II at camarines
Norte, presided by respondent Judge to enjoin the Facts:
enforcement of the writ of execution so issued.
Issue: whether the Court of First Instance, as a On 1 August 1986, the Paragon Paper Plant was
court of general jurisdiction, can entertain a case sold in public auction by the Development Bank of
impugning the validity of award of the Workmen's the Philippines (DBP) Inc., over the latters parcels
Compensation Unit and, in the process restrain the of land in Orani, Bataan, including the
enforcement of a writ of execution is issued by its improvements, machinery and equipment thereon.
Chief Referee. Private respondent Johannesberg Packaging
Ruling: No! Corporation (JPC) with its cash bid of
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction The Workmen's Compensation P120,579,000.00 won in the bidding.
Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide claims for compensation under the On 22 May 1987, by reason of JPCs failure to pay
Workmen's Compensation Act subject to appeal to the the full amount of its cash bid within the stipulated
Supreme Court, in the same manner and in the same period, including the extensions it obtained, DBP
period provided by law and by Rules of Court for rescinded the sale. To avoid the rescission, JPC filed
appeal from the Court of Industrial Relations to the an action before the RTC docketed as Civil Case No.
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.) 16960, captioned Johannesberg Packaging
For, in reviewing the alleged nullity of the award and Corporation and Romeo Cabalinan vs. Development
enjoining its execution, respondent Judge assumed Bank of the Philippines.
jurisdiction over a matter which could have been
elevated from the Workmen's Compensation Unit to On 10 June 1987, the trial court issued a
the Workmen's Compensation Commission, and restraining order directing DBP therein and all
thereafter, on appeal, to this Court. This, he cannot persons acting under them to desist from
do, for "... the decisions, orders and awards entered implementing the order of 22 May 1987 rescinding
by the Workmen's Compensation Commission are the Award of Sale in favor of JPC and the
appealable to the Supreme Court. ... (T)he Court of repossession/take-over from JPC of the Paragon
First Instance is not empowered or clothed with Paper Mill/Plant and facilities at Orani, Bataan,
jurisdiction to review or modify, much less, annul scheduled on 15 June 1987.
an award or order of execution issued by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. Issue/s:
In point of fact, respondent Manarang filed a
Petition for Review on certiorari earlier with this Whether the trial court has the authority to issue a
court on May 25, 1973. This, however, was restraining order or a writ of injunction against APT
considered "NOT FILED" per this Court's resolution in Civil Case No. 16960
of June 8, 1973 for his failure to pay docket and
legal fees. Since he did not pursue the said remedy Ruling:
by seeking the reconsideration of this Court's
resolution and/or paying the required fees, and, No, the trial court has the authority to issue a
instead, went to respondent Judge's court and filed restraining order or a writ of injunction against APT
the complaint for injunction, he may be deemed to in Civil Case No. 16960.
have abandoned the appropriate recourse of appeal
to the Workmen's Compensation Commission and Ratio Decidendi:
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
No restraining order lies against APT in view of Sec.
31 of Proclamation No. 50-A dated 15 December
1986 which provides:
No court or administrative agency
shall issue any restraining order or
injunction against the Trust in
connection with the acquisition, sale
or disposition of assets transferred to
it x x x Nor shall such order or
injunction be issued against any
purchaser of assets sold by the Trust
to prevent such purchaser from
taking possession of any assets
purchased by him.
Indeed, this is not the first time that the propriety of
the issuance of the writ by the lower court against
APT was raised. In Manstruste Systems, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, this Court through Mme. Justice
Carolina Grino-Aquino, ruled that:
Courts may not substitute their
judgment for that of APT, nor block
by injunction the discharge of its
functions and the implementation of
its decision in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition of
assets transferred to it.
We have expressly ruled therein, in addition, that
Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any
provision of the Constitution. Thus:
The President, in the exercise of her
legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution; issued Proclamation
No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from
issuing restraining orders and writs
of injunction against APT and the
purchasers of any assets sold by it,
to prevent courts from interfering the
discharge, by this instrumentality of
the executive branch of the
Government, of its tasks of carrying
out the expeditious disposition and
privatization of certain government
corporations and/or the assets
thereof (Proc. No. 50), absent any
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its
part. This proclamation, not being
inconsistent with the Constitution
and not having been repealed or
revoked by Congress, has remained
operative (Sec. 3, Art XVIII, 1987
Constitution.)
ATTY. CABRAS
Quite significantly, the records do not disclose any
grave abuse of discretion committed by petitioner
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in its
effort to take possession of the assets transferred to
it by DBP. Petitioner simply availed of judicial
processes to recover the transferred assets formerly
owned by private respondent.
In fine, the Court held that respondent Judge has
no authority to issue any restraining order or
injunction against petitioner APT absent any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Doctrine Learned:
Courts are prevented from interfering with the
discharge of tasks of an instrumentality of the
executive branch absent any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction on its part.
56. BINAMIRA V. GARRUCHO
188 SCRA 154
Topic: Modes of judicial review; Quo Warranto
Facts:
In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P.
Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority from which he claims to have been
removed without just cause in violation of his
security of tenure.
Petitioner was designated as General Manager of
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) by the Minister
of Tourism. In addition to this, he was also become
a member of the Board of Directors of the PTA which
was approved by the President. The respondent,
being the new Secretary of Tourism demanded the
petitioners resignation. This was supported by the
memorandum by the President which states that:
It appearing from the records you have submitted
to this Office that the present General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority was designated
not by the President, as required by P.D. No. 564,
as amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism,
such designation is invalid. Accordingly, you are
hereby designated concurrently as General
Manager, effective immediately, until I can appoint
a person to serve in the said office in a permanent
capacity.
Thus, this case.
Issue: WON the petitioner must be reinstated of
being the General Manager of Philippines Tourism
Authority.
Held:
No, the petitioner must NOT be reinstated of being
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
the General Manager of Philippines Tourism
Authority. The line must be drawn between
appointment and designation.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
When completed, usually with its confirmation, the
appointment results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office. Designation, on
the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by
law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as
where, in the case before us, the Secretary of
Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or
where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the
Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice
to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. It is said that
appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an
appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public
office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary
capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation
is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of
tenure on the person named.
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who
apparently believed in good faith that he was being
extended a permanent appointment by the Minister
of Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the
ostensible authority to do so at the time the
designation was made. This belief seemed
strengthened when President Aquino later approved
the composition of the PTA Board of Directors where
the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman
because of his position as General Manager of the
PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the
categorical appointment required to be made by the
President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism,
under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564. We must rule
therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid
title to the disputed position and so has no right to
be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority.
Referential Syllabus:
Political Law; Administrative Law; Appointment and
Designation defined.Appointment may be defined
as the selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. When completed, usually
with its confirmation, the appointment results in
ATTY. CABRAS
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he
is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of
his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on
an incumbent official, as where, in the case before
us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court
are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative
in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary
capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority.Designation may also be
loosely defined as an appointment because it
likewise involves the naming of a particular person
to a specified public office, That is the common
understanding of the term However, where the
person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by
the appointing authority. In this sense, the
designation is considered only an acting or
temporary appointment, which does not confer
security of tenure on the person named.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if so understood as
an appointment the designation of the petitioner
cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally
removed; Case at bar; Reason. Even if so
understood, that is, as an appointment, the
designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his
claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason
is that the decree clearly provides that the
appointment of the General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the
President of the Philippines, not by any other officer.
Appointment involves the exercise of discretion,
which because of its nature cannot be delegated.
Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister
Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion
as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or
designation) of the petitioner was not a merely
mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly
performed by a subordinate even if he happened as
in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court cannot accept the
fact that the act of the Secretary as an extension or
projection of the personality of the President made
irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in
question.Indeed, even on the assumption that the
power conferred on the President could be validly
exercised by the Secretary, we still cannot accept
that the act of the latter, as an extension or
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
"projection" of the personality of the President, made
irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in
question. The petitioner's conclusion that Minister
Gonzales's act was in effect the act of President
Aquino is based only on half the doctrine he
vigorously invokes,
Same; Same; Same; Same; Acts of Department
Heads performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business to be considered valid as acts of
the President of the Philippines must not be
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.
The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department
Head to be the acts of the President of the
Philippines when "performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business." which was true of
the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor
of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts
shall be considered valid only if not "disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive," as also
happened in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner's claim
of security of tenure must perforce fall to the
ground.With these rulings, the petitioner's claim
of security of tenure must perforce fall to the
ground. His designation being an unlawful
encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did
not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in
question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and
was authorized, the designation signified merely a
temporary or acting appointment that could be
legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was
(albeit for a different reason). In either case, the
petitioner's claim of security of tenure must be
rejected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the
petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed
position and so has no right to be reinstated as
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority.The Court sympathizes with the
petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith
that he was being extended a permanent
appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all,
Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do
so at the time the designation was made. This belief
seemed strengthened when President Aquino later
approved the composition of the PTA Board of
Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-
Chairman because of his position as General
Manager of the PTA However, such circumstances
fall short of the categorical appointment required to
be made by the President herself, and not the
Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.
We must rule therefore that the petitioner never
acquired valid title to the disputed position and so
has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority.
ATTY. CABRAS
57. Tarrosa vs. Singson (232 SCRA 553 [G.R. No.
111243], 25 May 1994)
Facts: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor
of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos
in 1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer",
filed a petition for prohibition questioning the
appointment of Singson for not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA)
as required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No.
7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the
Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. The
Secretary of Budget and Management was
impleaded for disbursing public funds in payment
of the salaries and emoluments of respondent
Singson. In their comment, respondents claim that
Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring
the confirmation by the CA of the appointment of
the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend
that an appointment to the said position is not
among the appointments which have to be
confirmed by the CA, citing Section 16 of Article VI
of the Constitution.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Governor of the Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) is subject to CAs
confirmation. (No)
Held: Congress exceeded its legislative powers in
requiring the confirmation by the CA of the
appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An
appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA
under Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation
powers of the Commission on Appointments and
require confirmation of appointment of other
government officials not expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the
Constitution.
58. Phil. Racing Club vs. Bonifacio
FACTS: In a race held at the Sta. Ana Hippodrome
belonging to the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. on July
23, 1950, the competing horses went off to a faulty
start. When the barrier was lifted, one of the horses
turned around and blocked the three horses at its
left thus enabling the three horses on the right side
to run ahead and gain a good lead. The official
starter signaled the stewards of the races who were
then on the judges' stand indicating that the race
should be cancelled. However, one of the stewards
told him to "shut up" and allowed the race to go on
until its termination.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
When the winning horses as well as the
corresponding dividends were announced, the
betting public showed its disapproval of the result.
A commotion resulted which reached the knowledge
of the members of the Commission on Races among
whom were respondents Arsenio Bonifacio et al.
When they noticed the uproar they sent for the
stewards and made an on the spot investigation.
Convinced that the start of the race was faulty, they
decided to cancel it and had their decision
announced to the public. In the meantime, while the
investigation was going on, the holders of the
winning the tickets were able to cash the same. The
result was that while the club paid the dividends on
the winning tickets it had to refund to the holders of
the losing ones the sum of P5,032.00.
Because of this incident, plaintiffs commenced the
present action before the Court of First Instance of
Manila seeking to recover from defendants said sum
of P5,032.00; plus P10,000.00 as moral damages,
alleging that defendants acted without or in excess
of their authority when they ordered the
cancellation of the race and the return of the bets of
the holders of the losing tickets, said acts having
caused plaintiffs moral damages for having placed
their character and reputation under public
suspicion.
Defendants disclaimed responsibility alleging that if
on the date alleged in the complaint they annulled
the race they did so merely pursuant to their official
duties as members of the Commission on Races and
after conducting an on the spot investigation at
which plaintiffs and its employees were heard, and
hence they cannot be held liable for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of the Board of Stewards
in not cancelling the race notwithstanding the bad
start which raised a howl of protest from the public
was final and irrevocable and could no longer be
revised by the Commission on Races in the exercise
of the power of supervision it has over all horse
races in the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
ATTY. CABRAS
The law governing the operation of horse races in
the Philippines is Republic Act No. 309. This Act
creates a Commission on Races which is charged
with the supervision and regulation as well as the
duty to enforce the laws relating to horse races in
the Philippines.
It would, therefore, appear that in every horse race
the rule requires that there be a board of judges who
should determine the result of the race and whose
decisions are final and unappealable. In addition,
the rule requires that there be a board of stewards
which among others, is given the power to "annul
any race before the horses reach their destination if
in their opinion there is a bad start or any other
incident takes place that makes such action
necessary" Hence, there are two groups of officials
who act in every race whose functions are different
from the other: the board of judges and the board of
stewards. The judges determine who the winners
are, their decision being final and irrevocable; the
stewards, on the other hand, are given the power to
annul any race if in their opinion there is a bad start
or some good reasons exist justifying it. And over
these officials we have the Commission on Races
which is charged with the duty to supervise their
action and the performance of their duties in
connection with the races.
The action taken by the Commission on Races
cancelling or annulling the race held on July 23,
1950 for the reason that there was a faulty start on
the part of some horses was in excess of the
authority granted to it by law. As defined by this
Court, supervision only means overseeing or the
power or authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. It is different from control
which includes the power to alter, nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer may do in the
performance of his duties, as well as to substitute
the judgment of the superior for that of his
subordinate (Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51
Off. Gaz., [6] 2884). This power of control has been
withheld from the Commission.
However, considering that respondents have acted
in their official capacity in the honest belief that they
had such power as in fact they acted on the matter
only after an on the spot investigation, we hold that
they cannot be held liable for damages. In this
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sense, the decision of the Court of Appeals should
be affirmed.
59. Donato vs Phil Marine Officers Assoc.
105 SCRA 1317
Facts:
Appeals by certiorari from a decision of the
CIR, Teodora Donato, an operator of fishing boats,
was accused of unfair labor practice within the
meaning of section 4(a) (1) and (4) of RA No. 875.
The complaint alleged that on Sept. 2, 1955, said
Teodora Donato discriminately discharged Melanio
Morales, one of her employees, by reason of his
membership in the complaint union.
The Cir found that the charges
substantiated and rendered the appealed judgment,
ordering the petitioner herein to reinstate to Morales
to his position with back pay, at the rate of P4.00 a
day.
Issue: Whether findings of facts by CIR are binding
on SC
Held:
The findings of fact of Court Industrial
Relations that Morales was an employee, not a mere
servant, of the petitioner and that he was dismissed
because he joined a labor union, not being
unsupported by substantial or creditable proof, are
binding upon the SC. However, the court acted
without authority and without jurisdiction in fixing
the amount of back pay at P4.00 a day because (1)
that the amount was not in issue and was entirely
outside the complaint for unfair labor practice
based on improper dismissal and (2) violation of the
Minimum Wage Law, as well as the collection of
underpayment, fall under the jurisdiction of the
regular court, not the Industrial Court.
Decision Modified
60. DAUAN vs. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
FACTS: This case involves claims to 14.25 hectares
of public land in Bambancsg, Sto. Domingo, Nueva
Vizcaya. The land was originally applied for as
homestead by Jose Aquino. Upon his death, Aquino
was succeeded by his children who sold their rights
to the land to Serapio Dauan.
Dauan filed an application for a homestead of the
land but there is considerable dispute as to whether
this application was approved by the Director of
Lands. Meanwhile, Dauan sold his rights to various
portions of the homestead to the appellants without
securing the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and both parties took the
ATTY. CABRAS
view that, if Dauans application had been approved,
then the transfer of rights to appellants must be
approved by the Secretary; otherwise, no such
approval was necessary. It appears that Dauan sold
his rights to one-half of the land to appellant Simon
Ilarde and that he sold his rights to 4 hectares to
appellant Lord Calangan and to 3 hectares to
appellant Basilia Tomas. Calangan and Tomas in
turn sold their rights to some part of the land to
Santos Baysa. These sales were all made without
the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources.
Dauan, the appellee, asked the Bureau of Lands to
cancel the application for free patents which the
appellants filed, covering the portions of the
homestead sold to them. Appellee questioned the
validity of the sales, claiming that the agreement
was that of a loan and that at any rate the supposed
sales were void for having been made without the
prior approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. On the other hand, appellants
maintained that their agreement with the appellee
was that of a sale and, that as the homestead
application of appellee himself had not been
approved by the Director of Lands, no approval by
the Secretary of the subsequent sales to them was
necessary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyances to the
appellants, made without the previous approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
is valid.
RULING: No. Here the question was whether from
the evidence submitted by the parties it could fairly
be concluded that appellees homestead application
had been granted. Were the matter a simple process
of ascertaining from the records whether the
application had been granted, we would agree with
appellants that it is a question of fact But precisely
because the records of the Bureau of Lands had
been destroyed during the war that circumstantial
evidence had to be introduced and it is a rule now
settled that the conclusion drawn from the facts is
a conclusion of law which the courts may review.
We hold that the conveyances to the appellants,
which were admittedly made without the previous
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, are void and, consequently, that
appellants return the possession of the land in
question to the appellee upon the return to them of
the purchase price they had paid to the appellee. We
do not forget, of course, that a transfer of rights
without the previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources shall result in
the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the
patent of the appellee but the cancellation is not
automatic and as long as the Government has not
chosen to act, the rights of appellee must stand.
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61. REYES VS REYES
FACTS:
This is a petition to review the decision of the
majority of the members of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, denying a claim for
compensation of petitioners for the death of
Victoriano Santiago, driver of a jeepney operated by
the respondent. The said deceased was the driver of
an autocalesa belonging to respondent and was last
seen operating said autocalesa in the evening of
September 26, 1955. In the morning of September
27, 1955, his dead body was found in Tayabas,
Quezon obviously a victim of murder by persons
who were at large and whose identities were not
known. Apparently the driver must have been
attacked with blunt instrument or instruments as
an examination of his head disclosed that it was
heavily fractured, fragmenting it into many pieces,
crushing and lacerating the brain. The respondent
contended that there is a specific instruction to the
deceased to follow the route prescribed by the Public
Service Commission. The decision of the majority of
the members of the Commission concludes that the
deceased willfully violated Public Service
Commission rules and regulations and, therefore,
death did not arise out of or by reason of his
employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law establishes the presumption
that the ordinary course of business has been
followed.
HELD:
Inasmuch as the law establishes the presumption
that the deceased followed the law and regulations,
it was incumbent upon respondent to prove that the
deceased voluntarily went out of his route and drove
his jeepney towards the province of Quezon. In the
absence of evidence to that effect, it must be
concluded that the deceased was forced by
circumstances beyond his will to go outside his
ordinary route. There being a presumption under
the provisions of Section 43 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act that the deceased died while in
the course of his employment, his death must be
presumed to have arisen out of said employment.
Consequently, his heirs are entitled to receive the
compensation provided for by law.
62. ABOITIZ V PEPITO
FACTS:
heirs of Pepito filed to Department of Labor
anotice and claim for compensation, asking for
ATTY. CABRAS
death benefits, and describing the circumstances of
the alleged death of Demetrio Pepito on the night of
November 30, 1961 in the following manner, viz:
"While the vessel was navigating from Surigao to
Tandag, the herein deceased was lost or reported
missing as per record of the deck log of the M/V P.
Aboitiz".
without hearing, the Regional Administrator issued
an award for death benefits to respondents, planted
upon the ground that "the right to compensation of
the claimant has not been controverted by
respondent within the period provided for by law."
HENCE, the petition
HELD: Legal implications such as right to
compensation, succession, the legal status of the
wife are so important that courts should not so
easily be carried to the conclusion that the man is
dead.2 The result is that death cannot be taken as a
fact.
Non-controversion in compensation cases, as in the
case of pleadings in ordinary civil cases, simply
means admission of facts, not conclusions of law.
The mere failure to controvert the statement that
Demetrio Pepito is believed to be "dead" or
"deceased" because he "was lost" or was "reported
missing", does not import an admission that the
man is actually dead, but that he was just lost or
missing. Petitioner was directed to pay
compensation without inquiry into the fact and
circumstances of death. This trenches upon
petitioner's right to due process enshrined in the
Constitution.
ART. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for
all purposes, including the division of estate among
the heirs:
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.6
With the known facts, namely, that Demetrio Pepito
was lost or missing while the boat was navigating,
he could have been in danger of death. But of
course, evidence must be taken that his existence
has not been known for four years or thereafter
The SC order that the appealed decision be set aside
and to direct that the record be returned to the
wokmens compensation commission
1. To hold a hearing, with notice to the parties, to
determine (a) whether Demetrio Pepito is alive; or (b)
whether he should be presumed dead, under the
provisions of paragraph 3, Article 391 of the Civil
Code; and (c) the circumstances of death if it be
found or presumed that he died; and
2. To render judgment accordingly.
63. Fortunato Ortua vs Singson Encarnacion
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
FACTS: The principal facts admitted by the
pleadings may be stated as follows: In January,
1920, the petitioner Fortunato Ortua filed an
application with the Bureau of Lands for the
purchase of a tract of public land situated in the
municipality of San Jose, Province of Camarines
Sur. Following an investigation conducted by the
Bureau of Lands, Ortuas application was rejected,
allowing him, however, to file a sale or lease
application for the portion of the land classified to
be suitable for commercial purposes. Two motions
for reconsideration of the decision were filed and
denied. On appeal to the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (Agriculture and
Commerce), the decision was affirmed.
It should be explained that one condition for the
purchase of a tract of public agricultural land,
provided by the Public Land Law, Act No. 2874, in
its sections 23 and 88, is that the purchaser shall
be a citizen of lawful age of the Philippine Islands or
of the United States. Fortunato Ortua in his
application stated that he was a Filipino citizen, but
the Director of Lands held that on the contrary,
Ortua was a Chinese citizen. The Dir of Land
established the ff facts: Fortunato Ortua was born
in 1885 in Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, Philippine
Islands, being the natural son of Irene Demesa, a
Filipina, and Joaquin Ortua, a Chinese. In 1896
Fortunato was sent to China to study. While he was
in China his father and mother were legally married.
Fortunato returned to the Philippines in 1906, that
is, when he was twenty-one years of age. And that
even if presumptively Fortunato Ortua was a
Philippine citizen, certain acts of Ortua were pointed
to as demonstrating that he had forfeited his
Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: WON the question of law arising from the
undisputed evidence was correctly decided by the
Director of Lands.
HELD: NO.
ON QUESTION OF FACT. A decision rendered by
the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, upon a question of
fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by
the courts, in the absence of a showing that such
decision was rendered in consequence of fraud,
imposition, or mistake, other than error of judgment
in estimating the value or effect of evidence,
regardless of whatever or not it is consistent with
the preponderance of the evidence, so long as there
is some evidence upon which the finding in question
could be made.
There is, however, another side to the case. It
certainly was not intended by the legislative body to
remove from the jurisdiction of courts all right to
review decisions of the Bureau of Lands, for to do so
would be to attempt something which could not be
ATTY. CABRAS
done legally. Giving force to all possible intendments
regarding the facts as found by the Director of Lands
ON QUESTION OF LAW. The decision of the
Director of Lands approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce on a question of law, is
in no sense conclusive upon the courts, but is
subject to review. Any action of the Director of Lands
which is based upon a misconstruction of the law
can be corrected by the courts.
The Director of Lands gave too much prominence,
we think, to two minor facts, susceptible of
explanation. When Ortua returned from China at
the age of twenty-one, it was the most natural thing
in the world for him to land as a Chinese, for this
would facilitate entry and obviate complications.
Again, when Ortua applied for the registration of a
boat, there may have been any number of reasons
why he did not care to appeal from the decision of
the Insular Collector of Customs. On the other
hand, some consideration should be given to the
intention of the petitioner, and he vigorously insists
that it is his desire to be considered a Philippine
citizen. He has taken a Filipino name. He has gone
into business and has improved the property here
in question to a great extent. There has been no
implied renunciation of citizenship, because the
petitioner has been domiciled in these Islands
except for a short period during his infancy when he
temporarily sojourned in China for study. On the
contrary, he states that he has always considered
himself to be a Filipino, and that he has elected to
remain as a Philippine citizen. Therefore, on the
facts found by the Director of Lands, we hold that
clear error of law resulted in not considering
petitioner a Philippine citizen and so qualified under
the Public Land Law to purchase public agricultural
lands.
64. QUESTION OF LAW
G.R. No. L-14280 May 30, 1960
JUAN YSMAEL & COMPANY, INC. vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
FACTS:
On November 27, 1957, the petitioning Union, a
legitimate labor organization duly registered with
the Department of Labor, filed a petition praying for
the aforesaid certification, upon the ground that it
is a labor organization composed of all the salesmen
working for the Ysmael Steel Manufacturing Co.,
which is operated by the Company, as a subsidiary
thereof, both of which are employers of the
aforementioned salesmen; that there are in the
Company two (2) other labor unions, namely, the
Ysmael Steel Labor Organization (PAFLU), the
membership of which is composed mainly of manual
factory workers (non-supervisors), and the Ysmael
Steel Employees Union, the membership of which is
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composed of supervisors, non-supervisors who are
technical employees, office non-technical employees
and clerical factory workers, and that the members
of petitioning Union are not included in or
represented by any of said two (2) unions in their
collective bargaining agreement with the Company,
for the economic factors affecting the members of
petitioning Union are different and they constitute a
separate and distinct union for an appropriate
bargaining unit.
The Company filed an answer objecting to the
petition upon several grounds, which were, in effect,
overruled by the Court in the order appealed from.
The Company assails the same as null and void
for alleged want of a clear and distinct
statement of the law and facts on which it is
based, in violation, it is claimed, of Article VIII,
Section 12, of the Constitution. The pertinent
part of the order appealed from reads as follows:
At the hearing of this case on February 11, March
12, 26 and May 5, 1958, the following facts appear
to have been established in evidence: That the
petitioning Union is duly registered by the
Department of Labor and is, therefore, a legitimate
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(f)
of the Act; that the Company is a corporation
engaged in the manufacture of steel equipment,
machines, etc., owned and operated by the Juan
Ysmael & Company, Inc; that at the time of the
instant petition for certification was filed, there were
twenty (20) salesmen or commission agents working
for the Company, but that as of March 26, 1958,
only fourteen (14) of them were left; and that neither
of the two unions existing in the Company, namely
the Ysmael Steel Employees' Union, represents the
members of the petitioning Union in any of their
respective collective bargaining agreement with the
Company.
Furthermore, after a careful examination of the
records, particularly the respective memoranda filed
by both of the petitioning Union and the Company,
and after a mature consideration of all the proofs
submitted in evidence in this case by both parties,
the Court believes and so holds that there exists an
employer-employee relationship between the
members of the petitioning Union and the Company;
that all the salesmen working with the Company
may constitute a distinct and separate appropriate
unit for bargaining purposes with the Company;
and that the members of the petitioning Union
constitute the majority of the salesmen working for
the Company. The certification of the petitioning
Union, therefore, as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the salesmen
working with the Company is in order.
ISSUE:
Whether the findings constitute compliance with the
constitutional mandate invoked by the company
ATTY. CABRAS
HELD:
The foregoing findings constitute a substantial
compliance with the constitutional mandate
invoked by the Company. In any event, this Court
held in Talabon vs. Provincial Warden (78 Phil., 599;
44 Off. Gaz. 4326) that failure to comply with
said requirement of our fundamental law does
not nullify or affect the validity of the decision
or order in question.
(another issue, not sure if related to the topic
QUESTION OF LAW)
The main issue is whether the members of
petitioning Union are employees of the Company, for
purposes of certification of the former as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
salesmen of the latter. The Company maintains the
negative upon the ground that the members of
petitioning Union are mere commission agents or
sales representatives, whose form of selection and
engagement is different from that of the employees
of the Company, for unlike such employees,
commission agents are not required to undergo
physical examination, to submit a police clearance,
and to punch the bundy clock, and are not provided
with identification cards. It is further urged that
commission agents are paid neither wages nor
salaries, but are granted commissions, the amount
of which depends on their sales, and that their
conduct as agents is not subject to the control or
supervision of the Company, which, moreover, has
no power of dismissal over them.
The aforementioned difference in the manner of
"selection and engagement" does not prove,
however, the alleged absence of employer-employee
relationship. Most business enterprises have
employees of different classes, necessarily requiring
different methods of selection and contracts of
services of various types, without detracting from
the existence of said relationship. Besides, the very
evidence for the Company shows that commission
agents are dispensed from physical examination
and from punching the bundy clock because their
duties are extraneous to the factory work and they
have no fixed hours to contact their customers.
Again, the records disclose the following facts,
among others:
1. One who wishes to be a commission agent must
file an application therefor. Then he is given a two-
month probationary period, within which technical
men of the Company train him. On the basis of his
performance during said period, the Company,
thereafter, decides whether or not he will be taken
as a regular commission agent.
2. His duties as such include the following: (a) One
hundred per centum (100%) "loyalty to the
Company", and "disloyalty of any form or free-
lancing for any other company during their tour of
duty, will be sufficient cause for cutting allowances
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
and withdrawal of the authority to sell for the
Company." (b) He must check in at 8:00 a.m., to
"report daily all visits made", and "any
misrepresentation with regard to coverage will be
sufficient cause for cutting allowances." He was,
also, required, before, to check in at 4:00 p.m., but
subsequently, this requirement was eliminated. (c)
He "must list in his daily report all items offered to
customers, plus results." (d) He "has to visit his
accounts at least twice every month", and "if he fails
to visit an account within two (2) months, he shall
automatically lose any claim to his account."
3. The Company directs the details of the work of
making sales, through a sales manager, under
whose authority commission agents are.
4. As the agents or salesmen report for work each
morning, they are given transportation allowances
of P1.50 or P2.00 each. They have, also, a drawing
allowance, the amount of which varies depending
upon past performances, deductible from future
commissions.
5. The Company exercises the power of dismissal:
(a) by cutting off these allowances, when the agent
makes a misrepresentation with regards to coverage
or report on daily visits made, or is guilty of
disloyalty in any form or free-lancing for any other
company during his tour of duty; (b) by withdrawing
the authority to sell in case of such disloyalty or
free-lanching, or when an agent fails to make any
reasonably good sale within a reasonable period;
and (c) by forcing him to resign for any compelling
reason, as the company has done in the case of
commission agents Jose S. Esquivias, Melecio Data
and Felicidad Sinope.
6. The company has adopted the foregoing norms
unilaterally generally by the promulgation of
pertinent rules without the intervention or
consent of the agents, and without any objection on
their part. Both parties have thereby indicated that
the Company has full authority to determine the
manner and conditions under which the agents
shall perform their duties. In other words, the
Company has control over the conduct of its
salesmen or agents. Thus, absence of any duty on
their part to keep regular office hours, submit a
police clearance and punch the bundy clock, and of
other additional duties, is due, not to lack of power
or authority to impose the same, but merely to a
policy of the management which deems it, for the
time being, either unnecessary or inexpedient or
both, owing to the peculiar nature of the task of
commission agents.
7. All sales of products of Ysmael Steel
Manufacturing Company are seemingly effected
through the aforementioned salesmen or
commission agents. There are no other persons,
apart from the sales manager and sales supervisor
of the Company, charged with the duty to sell
ATTY. CABRAS
therefor said products.
8. The salesmen or agents in question are, according
to the assistant general manager of the Company,
registered as members of the Social Security
System, established by Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1792, sections 9 and
8(d) of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 9. Compulsory coverage. Coverage in the
System shall be compulsory upon all employees
between the ages of sixteen and sixty years,
inclusive, if they have been for at least six months
in the service of an employer who is a member of the
System ... .
SEC. 8. Terms defined. For the purposes of this
Act, the following shall, unless the context indicates
otherwise, have the following meanings:
(d) Employee. Any person who performs services
for an "employer" in which either or both mental and
physical efforts are used and who receives
compensation for such services.
Pursuant to section 2, paragraphs (c) and (d), of
Republic Act No. 875:
An employer includes any person acting in the
interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shall not include any labor organization (otherwise
than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting
in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization.(Sec. 2[c], Rep. Act No. 875.)
The term "employee" shall include any employee and
shall not be limited to the employee of a particular
employer unless the Act explicitly states otherwise
and shall include any individual whose work has
ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any labor
practice and who has not obtained any other
substantially equivalent and regular employment.
(Sec. 2[d], id.)
In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered
opinion that the lower court did not err in
holding that the members of petitioning Union
are employees of the Company within the
purview of the terms "employer" and "employee"
as defined in the Industrial Peace Act for
purposes of certification of said union as the
bargaining representative of its salesmen or
commission agents.
65. Question of Fact
GONZALES VS VICTORY LABOR UNION
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Gonzalez was engaged in
trawl fishing, and among his employees were Julian
Beltran, Severino Apawan, Ponciano Sayan, Quirico
Mendez and Virgilio Baes - all of them working in
petitioner's fishing boat, the M/L Emiliana.
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On March 31, 1962 the Acting Prosecutor of the
Court of Industrial Relations filed a complaint
against petitioner, charging him with unfair labor
practice in dismissing said employees without
just cause but by reason of their membership in
VICLU and thereby interfering and coercing them in
the exercise of their right to self-organization.
Gonzales denied that he dismissed them for their
union affiliation, and alleged that their dismissal
was for cause, they having been found to have
connived with each other in pilfering the catch
of the fishing boat and selling the same to the
public for their personal benefit. Petitioner further
denied that he had knowledge, prior to the filing of
the complaint, of the complainants' membership in
the labor union. After trial, the court below, in a
decision penned by Presiding Judge Jose S.
Bautista, held herein petitioner guilty of unfair labor
practice.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before
the Court en banc, but the motion was denied in a
minute resolution signed by Presiding Judge
Bautista and concurred in by Associate Judges
Arsenio I. Martinez and Baltazar M. Villanueva. An
extended dissent, however, was filed by Associate
Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne, with the concurrence of
Associate Judge Amando C. Bugayong.
ISSUE: Whether the findings of fact are binding
upon the Court
RULING: No.
In this case we are again faced with the
application of the substantial evidence rule,under
which the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial
Relations are not disturbed on appeal as long as
they are supported by "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."
There is one circumstance which, at the very
outset, has detained the Court from accepting the
findings of fact in the decision appealed from as
conclusive, namely, that the said decision was
rendered by an almost evenly divided court and
that the division was precisely on the facts as
borne out by the evidence. In such a situation the
Court feels called upon to go over the record and, in
order to determine the substantiality of the
evidence, consider it not only in its quantitative but
also in its qualitative aspects. For it to be
substantial, evidence must first at all be credible.
The circumstances found by the Court,
objective as they are, lend strong support to the
testimony of petitioner Gonzales and of his witness
Felipe Jubay, to the effect that they had received
evidence, consisting of reports from different
sources, that whenever the boat arrived at Cebu
after a fishing trip respondents would sell fish at
very cheap prices; that Gonzales investigated them
one by one and was convinced of their guilt; that he
ATTY. CABRAS
was not yet through with the investigation, but they
failed to return after February 7, 1962; and that he
did not know they were members of any labor union.
The bare testimony of respondents,
complainants below, is insufficient to establish the
charge of unfair labor practice under the standard
fixed by law and enunciated in the decisions of this
Court.
66. Suarnaba vs WCC (Workmens Compensation
Commission
Facts:
This case involves the decision of WCC regarding the
claim of Rosita Suarnaba for death benefits as the
widow of Ireneo Suarnaba, employee of private
respondent Clavecilla Radio System. At first the
Regional Office of the Department of Labor in Ilo-ilo
favored Rosita and awarded her with P4,986.00
representing death benefits and reimbursement of
medical expenses. However, upon review, the
Commission (WCC) sustained the compensability of
the claim but found the evidence submitted by
petitioner to prove that she is the widow of Ireneo
Suarnaba as insufficient and barred from recovering
any benefits. According to the Commission, The
certification issued by the Assistant Parish Priest in
Iloilo attesting to the fact that they were married
cannot be considered authentic document to prove
filiation between the deceased and the herein
claimant but only a proof of the solemnization of
their marriage sacrament. The Commission instead
sentenced Rosita to pay the sum of P1,000 to the
WCC fund in accordance with Sec 8 of the
Workmens Compensation Act.
As a defense, counsel for the petitioner argues that
marriage may be proved by parol evidence; that
petitioner submitted her affidavit to the effect that
she and the late Ireneo Suarnaba were married in
the Catholic Church of Sta. Barbara in Iloilo City, as
shown by the Marriage Registry of said place,
attested by Fr. Samandra in a Certificate of Marriage
which was made an integral part of her affidavit
because she lost her Marriage Contract during the
Japanese Occupation and can no longer retrieve it.
She also mentioned witnesses that could attest that
they frequently see the petitioner herself as the one
collecting the salary of Ireneo. This, according to
them is a clear indication that Rosita and Ireneo
have entered into a lawful marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the facts support the claim of Rosita
Suarnaba that she is the rightful widow of the
deceased Ireneo Suarnaba? Yes
Ruling:
The petition is invested with merit. The
Commissions decision under review should be set
aside as contrary to the evidence on record.
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A cursory examination of the records shows that
private respondent (Clavecilla Radio System)
through its General Manager, Manuel Padua, stated
in the Employers Reports of Accident and Sickness
that petitioner Rosita Suarnaba is the wife and one
the dependents of the deceased. In view of this
admission by private respondent, herein petitioners
status as the legal wife of its deceased employee, the
same may be considered as duly established
without the need for further proof, since the
Employers Report serves as Answer. Aside from this
the Certification of Death submitted by the
petitioner when she was claiming for the benefits
indicates her as the surviving spouse of the
deceased employee of the respondent. Moreover,
under its rules, The hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy in
workmens compensation cases shall be without
regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical
rules on evidence. Substantial evidence, whenever
necessary, shall be sufficient to support a decision,
order or award. Respondent Commission
disregarded this rule by negligently failing to
consider the several pieces of evidence extant in the
record of this case which clearly establish the
material status of petitioner. Petition granted.
67. Community Sawmill Company vs CIR
Facts:
A petition for certiorari to review an order of
the Court of Industrial Relations, denying a motion
for the reopening of a case wherein petitioner
company as respondent was required to pay the
total amount of P128,920.50 by way of back wages.
Petitioner would seek a reduction of its liability for
such payment on the ground that its responsibility
to pay compensation ought to have ceased as far
back as November 30, 1975, when it closed shop.
The total amount of back wages if the
claimants from the time they were dismissed up to
November 11, 1961 is P128,920.50. Record further
shows that counsel for respondent company or
sawmill received a copy of this Order on December
13, 1961. Considering that the Motion to Re-open
was filed on December 28,1961, there is no doubt
that the same was filed after the Order had long
become final and executory. These facts shows that
the motion has no basis.
Issue:
Whether or not petition to reopen the case
and petition for certiorari to review by the petitioner
company be granted
Held:
No. The care taken by the labor tribunal to
take into consideration the equitable aspects of this
ATTY. CABRAS
controversy is manifest in this portion of the opinion
of then Judge Ansberto Paredes: If as contended,
respondent company had ceased operation on
November 30, 1957, the back wages should end up
to the date and no more. This must be so if such
contention were true, for even if the workers
concerned were not separated from work they could
not have worked after November 30, 1957, because
of alleged stoppage of operation. To give them back
wages thereafter would be place them in a position
better than that of dismissed.
Even as the Motion to Re-open, which is
verified, admits that a copy of the Oder approving
the Examiners Report and directing the deposit of
P128,920.50 with the Court, was received on
December 13, 1961, the same motion attempts to
justify its belatedness by alleging, among others,
that Lee Koc, the respondents former Manager,
came to the undersigneds office after many weeks
of absence. Counsel for respondent Community
Sawmill had been put on notice respecting the
period covered by the back wages since he received
on November 21, 1961, a copy of the Court
Examiners Report. It was his duty to inform his
client about the Report From the affidavit of Lee Koc
attached to the Motion to Re-open as well as his
testimony, counsel for respondent sawmill could
have easily contacted Lee Koc because the latter
admitted having resided in the compound of
respondent sawmill even during the time the
operation of the sawmill allegedly had ceased. But
this in not all. Respondent company claims that
since. It ceased operation on November 30, 1957, it
did not operate anymore because it leased the
sawmill and otter machineries to the Mindoro
Eastern Sawmill.
Even a cursory perusal of the order of Judge
Paredes, affirmed in a resolution by the Court of
Industrial Relations en banc on February 16, 1965,
did indicate that the imputation of arbitrariness,
allegedly consisting of imposing a liability for back
wages on petitioner even after it had ceased
business operation is devoid of support in the
evidence. It cannot be denied that painstaking care
was taken by the then Judge Paredes to appraise
the competent and credible evidence of record.
Under the circumstances, it did require a certain
degree of temerity on the part of petitioner to raise
an issue that it ought to have known would be
disproved by the very actuation of its officials. It was
indicative of the stubbornness on its part to refuse
compliance with what the law requires. Such being
the case, the allegation of blatant disregard of the
proof submitted as to petitioner having ceased to do
business as of November 30, 1957 clearly lacks of
foundation. No due process question arose.
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68. PAL VS. CONFESOR
This petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) seeks to annul the
Orders dated June 30, 1993 and July 30, 1993 of
respondent Secretary of Labor Nieves R. Confesor
which directed the inclusion of benefits worth at
least P1.268 billion in its collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with the respondent Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA).
FACTS: On September 30, 1992, the non-
representation aspects or economic package of the
1989-1992 CBA between PAL and PALEA expired.
That same day, PALEA expressed its desire to
renegotiate the CBA and submitted its proposals for
an economic package that would cost PAL P16.1
billion.
Negotiations soon began thereafter. PAL presented
its proposed economic package amounting to P1
billion. This was rejected by PALEA. The parties
continued their negotiations, but were unable to
reach an agreement.
On May 3, 1993, PALEA declared a deadlock in the
negotiations and filed on the following day a notice
of strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB).
According to PAL, the estimated cost of the foregoing
PALEA demands which are easily computable
amounts to P3.4 billion.
On May 21, 1993, PAL wrote respondent Secretary
requesting that she assume jurisdiction over the
dispute in view of the importance of its business and
to prevent PALEA from going on strike.
On May 31, 1993, respondent Secretary issued an
order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
She also ordered the parties to submit their
respective position papers within ten (10) days to
facilitate the resolution of the dispute.
Secretary of Labor rendered decision in favor of
PALEA.
PAL argues that respondent Secretary had gravely
abused her discretion, amounting to lack of excess
of jurisdiction, in awarding P1.268 billion in benefits
in favor of PALEA as the same was based on
probabilities and conjectures not supported by
evidence.
On the other hand, PALEA argues that the issues
questioning the validity of the award involve the
findings of fact of respondent Secretary which
cannot be reviewed in a petition for certiorari.
Furthermore, PALEA argues that the subject matter
involved pertains to the field of expertise of
respondent Secretary and therefor her appreciation
of the evidence should be respected by this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue concerning the
validity of the award involve question of fact which
ATTY. CABRAS
cannot be reviewed in petition for certioari.
HELD: No, it does not involve question of fact but
question of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that
certiorari is the proper remedy because there is
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction where the respondent board, tribunal or
officer exercising judicial functions exercised its
judgment in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner.
While it is true that findings of fact of the Secretary
of Labor are entitled to respect by this Court, we are
inclined to review her findings since the
fundamental issue here is the survival of the
company. Besides, her findings are not based on a
thorough examination of the parties' contending
claims but merely on their respective position
papers. There was no trial wherein the adversarial
process would ensure a better presentation and
appreciation of the evidence.
After going over the record, we find that respondent
Secretary gravely abused her discretion when she
based her award in favor of PALEA on the
assumption that PAL would earn P3.4 billion pesos
during the three-year contract period. The
assumption finds no basis on the evidence adduced
before her.
Despite her recognition of PAL's unstable financial
performance and the possibility that its earnings in
the foreseeable future could be held down by the
factors she enumerated above, respondent
Secretary proceeded to forecast that PAL would
make a projected net profit of P1.128 billion for FY
1992-1993, and P3.4 billion for the three-year
contract period.
Subsequent events have shown the error in
respondent Secretary's projections. The actual net
income earned by PAL for FY 1992-1993 was
P1,025,665.00, which fell short of respondent
Secretary's projection by P87.813 million. Clearly,
there is no way PAL could realize the income
projected by respondent Secretary.
After making her projection of PAL's net profits for
the three-year contract period, respondent
Secretary then allocated one-third of the projected
profits as labor costs to be paid to PALEA under the
so-called "traditional budget-management
approach." This Court is unaware of such a budget-
management approach being traditional in this
jurisdiction. Given the fact that neither of the
parties cited the same in their position papers filed
before her, respondent Secretary should have
explained more thoroughly her application of said
"traditional approach."
In fine, this Court finds that respondent Secretary
had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in failing to give weight to the
evidence presented by PAL and in applying the so-
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called traditional budget-management approach.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE
COURSE and the same GRANTED.
69. G.R. No. 60054. July 2, 1991.*
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
LABOR ARBITER ANDRES LOMABAO, and JOSE
M. MASAYA, respondents.
FACTS:
ANTONIO SANCHEZ a resident of Sta, Ana,
Manila was found to have an illegal connection of
electricity and upon inquiry it was found out that
one of the electric companys bill collectors, JOSE
MASAYA made such connection and received P200
for the job.
An administrative inquiry ensued where JOSE
MASAYA expressly admitted to the criminal act.
At the conclusion of the investigation,
Masaya was put on preventive suspension and
Manila Electri Company sought clearance to
terminate Masaya from the Ministry of Labor.
A week later, Jose Masaya filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against MERALCO, Both actions
were brought before Labor arbiter Lomabao, who
eventually ruled in Masayas favor, and ordered
MERALCO to pay complainant backwages and
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
On appeal of MERALCO, the NLRC affirmed the
arbiters decision, and affirmed his ruling as follows:
x x while it is true that in administrative
proceedings, substantial evidence only is required,
the instant case is an exception for the reason that
respondent-appellant in this case is charging
complainant-appellee of a criminal offense, and,
therefore, it is incumbent upon the former to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the crime,
failing which, complainant-appellee must be
absolved from responsibility. The alleged admission
of complainant-appellee during the investigation
conducted by the legal department of respondent
appellant does not, if at all, prove beyond reasonable
doubt the criminal act allegedly committed by
complainant-appellee in the absence of any showing
that he was given the opportunity to be heard by
counsel or at least, a representative to confront his
accuser.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the quantum of proof required for
administrative proceedings involving criminal
violation is proof beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD:
NO. The Court has ruled that the ground for an
employers dismissal of an employee need be
established only by substantial evidence, it not
ATTY. CABRAS
being required that the formers evidence be of such
degree as is required in criminal cases, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt. It is absolutely of no
consequence that the misconduct with which an
employee may be charged also constitutes a
criminal offense: theft, embezzlement, assault on
another employee or company officer, arson,
malicious mischief, etc. The proceedings being
administrative, the quantum of proof is governed by
the substantial evidence rule and not, as the
respondent Commission seems to imagine, by the
rule governing judgments in criminal actions.
It was thus serious error, and grave abuse of
discretion for the Labor Arbiter and the respondent
Commission, for the reasons given, to reject and
exclude from consideration the express admissions
made by Masaya during the administrative
investigation conducted by Meralco.
70. Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. Department of
Agriculture & Natural Resources, 75 SCRA 285
Facts
Petitioner is, a domestic mining corporation engaged
in the exploration and development of certain
mineral claims. Private respondent Sofia V. Reyes
filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim
against petitioner's Lode Lease Application covering
three mining claims in Benguet, Mountain Province.
Petitioner countered with a motion to dismiss,
alleging as one of three legal objections the failure of
such adverse claim to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 73 of the Mining Act. The
private respondent then submitted an opposition
with the Bureau of Mines thereafter dismissing the
adverse claim. The private respondent filed an
appeal with the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
At first, the action taken by respondent Department
was the dismissal of such appeal, but on a second
motion for reconsideration, it issued an order in
favor of private respondent. Hence this certiorari
petition.
Issue
Whether the petition should be granted.
Held
No. This petition lacks merit. It must be dismissed.
First, Petitioner lost sight of the fundamental
doctrine that a decision rendered by the Director of
Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive
and not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the
absence of a showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or
mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating
the value or effect of evidence, regardless of whether
or not it is consistent with the preponderance of the
evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon
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which the finding in question could be made. Here
such a stage has not been reached. Precisely, the
assailed order spoke of no "hearing on the merits,
therefore it is but right and proper in the interest of
justice that a formal hearing on the merits be
conducted. There is, therefore, an element of
prematurity.
71. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY vs. PSC,
G.R No.10903, 18 January 1957
FACTS: Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company(BLTBC) filed a petition for mandamus and
contempt with a prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order to compel Land Transportation
Commission(LTC) to act on its letters wherein it
sought deferment of action on any request of
Eastern Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. (ETBC) for the
issuance of plates covering units involved in its
lease agreement with petitioner for the alleged
nullity of an order of Commissioner Cadiao of the
Public Service Commission(PSC) granting the
petition of ETBC. Petitioner contends that it is
beyond the jurisdiction of the PSC, on the ground
that the matter involved is pending resolution in
arbitration proceeding and PSC was without
jurisdiction to continue with the case until final
judgment is rendered by the CFI of Laguna.
In an amended petition, It was alleged that
ETBC in cooperation with LTC caused the
registration of the units for use in the disputed lines,
that the delay in deciding its petition to vacate the
order is part of the scheme of respondent under
which the order of denial would be issued at the last
minute to give petitioner no chance to take
seasonable action.
ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: YES. What is involved in this litigation,
namely, a "petition to acquire and register the units
or trucks required to operate the lines of respondent
ETBC." after it had decided not to renew or extend
its lease contract with petitioner, is properly
cognizable by the Public Service Commission. The
plea of lack of jurisdiction is therefore unavailing. It
should suffice to dispose of this petition, were it not
for the additional allegation that in the issuance of
the order of November 2, 1967, there was no hearing
accorded petitioner. Such an allegation is without
basis as set forth in the motion to dismiss. Petitioner
"did not disclose that the respondent PSC, through
Associate Commissioner Josue L. Cadiao,
conducted a full hearing on the dispute under
Public Service Commission. What was not disclosed
was specifically set forth in the motion to dismiss.
It has already been a settled doctrine that a
plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie
ATTY. CABRAS
where a defect consisting of an absence of notice of
hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged
aggrieved party having had the opportunity to be
heard on a motion for reconsideration. "What the
law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice,
but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard. As was stated in a recent
decision, what "due process contemplates is
freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is
fairness or justice, the substance rather than the
form being paramount,".
72.
Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs Zulueta, et. al.
No. 46853 (January 30, 1940)
68 Phil. 45
FACTS:
In this case, the petitioner, Manila Trading
and Supply Co. filed a petition for certiorari to
review the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations directing the reinstatement of laborer
Filomeno Ramolio. Filomeno Ramolio was
suspended for a breach of duty. The breach
consisted in that as the gatekeeper of the petitioner,
he permitted, contrary to instructions, one of the
customers to pass thru the exit gate without paying
for work done on the car. The respondent court
found that the laborer was guilty of the breach
imputed to him but deciding that suspension from
June 30 to July 28, 1939 was a sufficient
punishment and ordered his immediate
reinstatement. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
The Court of Industrial Relations denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari shall
continue.
HELD:
The court finds that an employer cannot
legally be compelled to continue with the
employment of a person who admittedly was guilty
of malfeasance of misfeasance towards his
employer, and whose continuance in the service of
the latter is patently inimical to his interests. The
law, in protecting the rights of the laborer,
authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction
of the employer. There may be of course, be cases
where the suspension or dismissal of an employee
is whimsical or unjustified or otherwise illegal in
which case he will be protected. Each case will be
scrutinized carefully and the proper authorities will
go to the core of the controversy and not close their
eyes to the real situation.
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73. No. L-47182-83. October 30, 1978.*
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (BISIG NG
MANGGAGAWA SA UTEX), petitioner, vs.
CARMELO C. NORIEL as Director of the Bureau
of Labor Relations, Department of Labor;
UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS WORKERS UNION-
ALU and UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC.,
respondents.
TOPIC: Questions of Discretion
FACTS: This is a certiorari proceeding
assailing the decision of respondent Carmelo C.
Noriel, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
reversing an order of the Med-Arbiter calling for a
certification election.
Noriel directed the respondent Union to renegotiate
with the management of the Universal Textile Mills
instead of issuance of a certification of election as
mandated by law.
ISSUE: WON administrative agency are
vested with discretionary powers.
HELD: Yes, this is not to deny that an
administrative agency entrusted with the
enforcement of a regulatory statute is vested with
discretion. Such discretion, however, is not
unbounded.
Where, as in this case, the Labor Code itself sets
limits, they must be observed. That is the only way
to manifest fealty to the rule of law. We turn again
to Article 258. Its least sentence specifically defines
what must be done by the Bureau of Labor Relations
once the certification election is conducted; it must
certify the winner as the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of all the employees in the
unit. That is the extent and scope of the authority
entrusted to respondent Noriel as Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations.
He cannot go further than that. Yet, in the assailed
order, he would direct respondent Union to
renegotiate with the management at Universal
Textile Mills the benefits and other conditions of
employment for the second and third year of the
contract within three (3) months from receipt of this
Resolution and to submit the renegotiated benefits
to the workers for acceptance and ratification
through a secret balloting to be supervised by this
Office. And this, too, without the benefit of a
certification election mandated by law. The failure
to abide by what the Labor Code categorically
requires is thus plain and manifest. What was done
ATTY. CABRAS
by respondent Noriel is bereft of support in law. To
countenance it would be to foil the statutory
scheme. There can be no other conclusion except
that his assailed order is tainted with a serious
jurisdictional defect. This is then the proper
occasion for the exercise of the corrective authority
of this Tribunal.
Writ granted and decision nullified, reversed, and
set aside.
74. LUPO VS. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD
190 SCRA 69
Facts: Petitioner substantially assails the
Resolution dated September 30, 1988 of the
Secretary Rainerio O. Reyes of the Department of
Transportion and Communications which
suspended her for one year and disqualified her for
promotion for a period of one year and also, the
Order of July 5,1989 of Chairman Onofre A. Villaluz
of the Administrative Action Board of said
department which set Adm. Case No. AAB-034-88
for trial.
Issue: Whether or not the rules of procedure has
been complied with?
Held: No, From the very start, the basis upon which
this case was investigated had been defective and
irregular. For the letter-complaint of Fructuoso
Arroyo was not verified and yet, the same was
haphazardly made the basis of the informal inquiry.
It should be stressed in par. (a) of Sec. 38 of the Civil
Service Law mandates that administrative
proceedings may be commenced against an
employee by the head of the department officer of
equivalent rank or upon sworn written complaint of
any other person. It should also be noted that under
paragraph (b) of said Section, a respondent is given
the option to elect a formal investigation of the
charge against him if his answer is not found
satisfactory. In the case of petitioner, it appears that
when her answer to the unverified complaint was
found unsatisfactory, she was never given a chance
to decide whether or not to submit herself to a
formal investigation.
The Memorandum of Telecom Investigator
Calapano to the Regional Director is merely
recommendatory since it was only the outcome of a
fact finding investigation based on the unverified
complaint. Note that the informal investigation was
only an inquiry into the alleged dishonest acts of
petitioner in which case the Memorandum could not
be made as the basis for any final resolution of the
case. The legal and proper procedure should have
been for the Regional Director of Region V, the alter
ego of the department secretary to initiate the formal
complaint on the basis of the results of the inquiry
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
of the Telecom Investigator. Instead of observing the
mandatory rules on formal investigations as
prescribed by PD No. 807, the DOTC Secretary cut
corners and apparently railroaded this case by
rendering the assailed resolution.
It should be noted that the Telecom Director
who was supposed to review the findings of the
Telecom Investigator merely affixed his approval
within the Memorandum, thus obviously indicating
that he never reviewed the merits of the case.
It appears highly irregular that Asst.
Secretary Sibal of the DOTC, in his letter dated
August 2, 1989 to Chairman Villaluz of the
Administrative Action Board, informed the latter
that his Office did not file any administrative
complaint against petitioner nor had it filed a formal
charge against her for whatever administrative
offense. Note that even with this letter, Chairman
Villaluz proceeded to order the hearing of this case.
This is a clear indication that for lack of
coordination among the DOTC authorities and the
Regional Office, the mandatory requirements of due
to which petitioner was entitled were irreverently
ignored.
Thus, in the case of Jose Rizal College v.
National Labor Relations Commission the SC
reiterated the cardinal primary requirements of
due process in administrative proceedings.
Evidently, respondents denied petitioner her
right to a formal and full-blown administrative
proceeding which she never had.
75. Provident Tree Farms Inc. vs. HON.
DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., Presiding Judge
Branch 48, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and
A. J. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Facts: Petitioner is a Philippine corporation engaged
in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in
its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it
supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for
production of matches. In consonance with the state
policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in
industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the
Revised Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI
a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban
against importation of wood and "wood-derivated"
products.
On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J.
International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4)
containers of matches from Indonesia, which the
Bureau of Customs released on 12 April 1989, and
two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore
on 19 April 1989. The records do not disclose when
the second shipment was released.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Court of Manila a
complaint for injunction and damages with prayer
ATTY. CABRAS
for a temporary restraining order against
respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to
enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-
derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs
from allowing and releasing the importations.
PTFI prays for an order directing the Commissioner
of Customs to impound the subject importations
and the AJIC be directed to pay petitioner
P250,000.00 in actual damages, P1,000,000.00 in
exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
Court on its 28 July 1989 order dismissed the case
on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to
determine what legal or illegal importations.
In this present recourse, PTFI seeks to set aside the
8 February 1990 order of respondent court and
prays for the continuation of the hearing in Civil
Case No. 89-48836
Issue: 1.Whether or not the Courts may order to
impound, seize or forfeit the imported matches.
2. Whether or not the absence of procedure for the
enforcement of the import ban under the Tariff and
Customs Code as premised by petitioner reduces
the jurisdiction of the Bureau Customs.
A.1 The enforcement of the importation ban under
Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is
within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of
Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the
Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of
Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal
basis. To allow the regular court to direct the
Commissioner to impound the imported matches,
as petitioner would, is clearly an interference with
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge
to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based
on his determination and declaration of the
invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation
of the prerogative and an encroachment on the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other
words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau of
Customs 15 as well as the prayer for injunction
against importation of matches by private
respondent AJIC 16 may not be granted without the
court arrogating upon itself the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
A.2 The claim of petitioner that no procedure is
outlined for the enforcement of the import ban
under the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does not
at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs over the subject matter. The enforcement
of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence
of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of
Customs has the power to "promulgate all rules and
regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of
this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Finance." 17 Moreover, it
has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does
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not require any particular method of procedure to
be followed by an administrative agency, the agency
may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its
functions.
76. G.R. No. L- April 30, 1966
21685
PETITIONER- CLETO ASPREC
APPELLANT
RESPONDENTS- VICTORIANO ITCHON,
APPELLEES JOSE SUGUITAN, FELIPE
P. CRUZ, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, NICANOR G.
JORGE, ANTONIO
NOBLEJAS,1 and JACINTO
HERNANDEZ
Facts:
An administrative complaint for unprofessional
conduct was filed against Asprec with the Board of
Examiners for Surveyors. The complaint alleged
that Asprec received compensation from Hernandez
but failed his obligation to survey and deliver a plan
to Hernandez. The board found for Hernandez and
revoked and required surrender of Asprecs
certificate of registration as a private land surveyor.
Office of the President affirmed. Asprec went to CFI
on certiorari which was denied. Appeal of CFI
decision to SC.
Issue/s:
Whether Asprec was denied his day in court
Ruling:
No, Asprec was not denied his day in court.
Ratio Decidendi:
From the facts, petitioner has had more than ample
opportunity to defend himself before the board. But
he and counsel did not appear at the last and
stipulated date of hearing without cause or without
any excuse at all. Presence of a party at a trial,
petitioner concedes, is not always of the essence of
due process. Really, all that the law requires is that
parties be given notice of trial, an opportunity to be
heard. More than this, the date of trial had been
previously agreed upon by the parties and their
counsel. He has forfeited his right to be heard in his
defense.
Doctrine Learned:
ATTY. CABRAS
Administrative due process requires delivery of
notice of trial, an opportunity to be heard.
77. SEC. OF JUSTICE V. LANTION
GR 139465, OCT. 17, 2000
Topic: Administrative procedure; adjudication
process; Due process
Facts:
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration
that focuses in the decision of this Court, by a vote
of 9-6, which dismissed the petition at bar and
ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant him a reasonable period within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence
This case merely involves the case of Extradition
Proceeding the guarantee of rights available to an
extraditee. The Private Respondent, an extraditee,
demands the Constitutional guarantee, available to
an accused, of due process of law and the twin-
pillars of it, which is notice and hearing. The case is
concerned on the following law and treaty P.D. No.
1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition
Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as
well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of
the petition for extradition in the extradition court.
Issue: WON the private respondent is entitled to the
due process right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Held:
No, the private respondent is NOT entitled to the due
process right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
The Court holds that private respondent is bereft of
the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. x x x There is no
provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in
P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to
demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice
copies of the extradition request from the US
government and its supporting documents and to
comment thereon while the request is still
undergoing evaluation. The Court cannot write a
provision in the treaty giving private respondent
that right where there is none. It is well-settled that
a court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by
the insertion of any clause, small or great, or
dispense with any of its conditions and
requirements or take away any qualification, or
integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of
equity, or general convenience, or substantial
justice.
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the
State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that
the private respondent has no right to due process
at all throughout the length and breadth of the
extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process
requires a determination of what process is due,
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when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated
otherwise, a prior determination should be made as
to whether procedural protections are at all due and
when they are due, which in turn depends on the
extent to which an individual will be "condemned to
suffer grievous loss." The Court had explained why
an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which
implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an
extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the
evidence against him once the petition is filed in
court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis
of the request for his extradition is merely moved to
the filing in court of the formal petition for
extradition. The extraditee's right to know is
momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process to accommodate the more
compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of
potential extraditees which can be precipitated by
premature information of the basis of the request for
his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of
the extradition proceedings is the need to be more
deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of
the government, the Executive, which has been
endowed by our Constitution with greater power
over matters involving our foreign relations.
Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a
static but a moving balance which can be adjusted
as the extradition process moves from the
administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the
execution stage depending on factors that will come
into play. In sum, the Court rule that the temporary
hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and
hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process
which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness
should he decide to resist the request for his
extradition to the United States. There is no denial
of due process as long as fundamental fairness is
assured a party.
Referential Syllabus:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition;
Court holds now that private respondent is bereft of
the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process.We now hold that
private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. x x x There is no provision in
the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069
which gives an extraditee the right to demand from
the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the
extradition request from the US government and its
supporting documents and to comment thereon
while the request is still undergoing evaluation. We
cannot write a provision in the treaty giving private
respondent that right where there is none. It is well-
settled that a court cannot alter, amend, or add to
a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or
ATTY. CABRAS
great, or dispense with any of its conditions and
requirements or take away any qualification, or
integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of
equity, or general convenience, or substantial
justice.
Same; Same; Same; Extradition proceeding is not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It
is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the
guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state
where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused
cannot be invoked by an extraditee, especially by
one whose extradition papers are still undergoing
evaluation.
Same; Same; Same; Differences between an
extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding.
There are other differences between an extradition
proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while
criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules
of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow
admission of evidence under less stringent
standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to
be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may
be ordered extradited upon showing of the
existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a
criminal case where judgment becomes executory
upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him.
Same; Same; Same; Private respondents plea to due
process collides with important state interests
which cannot also be ignored for they serve the
interest of the greater majority.To be sure, private
respondents plea for due process deserves serious
consideration involving as it does his primordial
right to liberty. His plea to due process, however,
collides with important state interests which cannot
also be ignored for they serve the interest of the
greater majority. The clash of rights demands a
delicate balancing of interests approach which is a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law. The
approach requires that we take conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation.
These interests usually consist in the exercise by an
individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand,
and the governments promotion of fundamental
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
public interest or policy objectives on the other.
Same; Same; Same; The time for the extraditee to
know the basis of the request for his extradition is
merely moved to the filing in court of the formal
petition for extradition.We have explained why an
extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process. As
aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-
US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee
sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against
him once the petition is filed in court. The time for
the extraditee to know the basis of the request for
his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court
of the formal petition for extradition. The
extraditees right to know is momentarily withheld
during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process to accommodate the more compelling
interest of the State to prevent escape of potential
extraditees which can be precipitated by premature
information of the basis of the request for his
extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the
extradition proceedings is the need to be more
deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of
the government, the Executive, which has been
endowed by our Constitution with greater power
over matters involving our foreign relations.
MELO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition;
Petitioner is well versed in the use of a hold
departure order which could easily lay his fear of
private respondents flight to rest.And as regards
the apprehension of flight, petitioner is well versed
in the use of a hold departure order which could
easily lay his fear of private respondents flight to
rest. In accordance with Department Circular No. 17
issued on March 19, 1998 by then Secretary of
Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, a hold departure order
(HDO) may be issued by the Secretary of Justice
upon the request of the Head of a Department of
the Government; the head of a constitutional body
or a commission or agency performing quasi-judicial
functions; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
for the Judiciary; or by the President of the Senate
or the Speaker of the House of Representatives for
the legislative body when the interested party is the
Government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law (Paragraph 2 [d], Department
Circular No. 17 [Prescribing Rules and Regulations
Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders]).
This provision can easily be utilized by petitioner to
prevent private respondents flight.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; To
grant the respondent his right to know will not, in
any significant way, weaken or frustrate compliance
with treaty objectives.After going over the grounds
ATTY. CABRAS
given by the Government in support of the motion
for reconsideration, I regret that I cannot go along
with the new ruling of the Courts recent majority. I
am convinced that there is greater reason to strike
the balance in favor of a solitary beleaguered
individual against the exertion of overwhelming
Government power by beth the Philippines and the
United States. To grant the respondent his right to
know will not, in any significant way, weaken or
frustrate compliance with treaty objectives. But it
will result in jurisprudence which reasserts national
dignity and gives meaningful protection to the rights
of any citizen who is presumed innocent until
proven guilty.
Same; Same; Same; No provision in the Treaty
mandates that an extraditee should be kept in the
dark about the charges against him until he is
brought to trial.There is no provision in the Treaty
which mandates that an extraditee should be kept
in the dark about the charges against him until he
is brought to trial. The Treaty deals only with the
trial proper. It cannot possibly cover everything. Our
law and jurisprudence are not superseded by the
mere absence of a specific provision in a treaty.
What is not prohibited should be allowed.
Same; Same; Same; A proposed extraditee should
not be denied a reasonable opportunity to prepare
for trial.A proposed extraditee should not be
denied a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial.
In an extradition trial, there may be reasons for the
exercise of special care and caution. It is not a
casual occurrence to give up your citizen to another
countrys criminal justice system. I do not want to
sound unduly jingoistic but in certain Western
countries, especially those using the jury system, a
second-class citizen or a colored non-citizen may
not always get equal justice inspite of protestations
to the contrary. The prospective extraditee,
therefore, deserves every lawful consideration which
his poor third-world country can give him.
78. Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532, [Nos. 24844
&24853], 26 October 1967)
Facts: Pedro Gatchalian, a minor, arrived at the
Manila International Airport together with four
other persons and sought entry as a Filipino citizen.
Not satisfied with his papers, the immigration officer
referred the case of Pedro Gatchalian to the Special
Board of Inquiry. This body, after due hearing,
rendered decision admitting Pedro Gatchalian and
seven others, as Filipino citizens. Submitted to the
individual members of the Board of Commissioners,
the decision was marked "noted" by Commissioners
Talabis and De la Rosa respectively, while
Commissioner Galang voted to "exclude" the
persons subject of the decision few days later. Pedro
Gatchalian was issued an identification certificate
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by the immigration authorities, attesting to his
admission as citizen of the Philippines as per
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated July
6, 1961. Months after, the Secretary of Justice
issued a memorandum order directing the
Immigration Commissioners to review all cases
where entry was allowed on the ground that the
entrant was a citizen of the Philippines.
In July, 1962, the Board of Commissioners reversed
the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and
ordered the exclusion of Pedro Gatchalian, for being
improperly documented. Macario Arocha, on behalf
of Pedro Gatchalian, petitioned the Court of First
Instance of Manila for a writ of habeas
corpus claiming that the detention of Gatchalian, a
Filipino, by the Immigration Commissioner is
violative of said petitioner's constitutional rights.
During the trial, the issues in controversy centered
on the actual date of rendition of the
Commissioners' decision, reversing that of the
Special Board of Inquiry; and the validity of that
Commissioners' decision, admittedly issued motu
proprio and without affording petitioner opportunity
to be heard. It was therein petitioner's contention
that the decision was originally dated July 20, 1962,
which date was erased and superimposed with
another figure to read July 6, 1962. On the other
hand, respondents alleged that the erasures were
made to correct clerical mistakes.
In its decision, the court sustained petitioner's
theory that the decision of reversal of the Board of
Commissioners was antedated and issued beyond
the prescribed one-year period. Holding that the
decision of the Special Board of Inquiry, admitting
the Philippine citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian had
already become final, the Court ordered his
immediate release from detention and enjoined
respondents, permanently, from arresting,
deporting and otherwise depriving him of his liberty.
On the strength of a writ of habeas corpus issued by
the Court, Pedro Gatchalian was released from
custody of the immigration authorities. Notified of
the abovementioned decision of the lower court,
respondents filed notice to appeal therefrom.
Issue/s: Whether or not the decision rendered by
the Board of Commissioners was beyond the one-
year period. (No)
Held: Whereas the pivotal point of the case hinges
upon the true date when the Board of
Commissioners of Immigration reversed the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry for the
purpose of determining whether or not such reversal
was rendered within the one-year period set by Sec.
27(b) of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended by
ATTY. CABRAS
Republic Act 503, which empowers the former
Board to review the latter's decision either upon
appeal or motu proprio, otherwise the original
decision admitting immigrant petitioner-appellee
would have become final and definitive; where the
originally typewritten date of July "20" 1962 had
been erased and then superimposed by "6" so as to
rectify a clerical mistake not only on the decision of
reversal but also on the notice of appellee's counsel
and on the warrant of exclusion; and where there is
a showing that the reversal was actually rendered
on July 6, 1962, such rectification or correction, in
the absence of any evidence on record, does not
constitute sufficient ground for holding that the
three members of the Board of Commissioners are
acting as a board, regardless of the date when the
decision in extenso was prepared, written and
signed, because such decision in extenso must
relate back to the day the resolution was actually
adopted; and where the correction of the date July
"20" to July "6" is susceptible of an explanation that
it was on July "20" that the reasoned and extended
decision was typewritten in final form, it was error
for the lower court to rule that the reversal decision
was rendered beyond the one-year period.
79. Arocha vs Vivo supra
In re: Form and Promulgation of Judgment
In the instant cases, the decision of the Board of
Commissioners (Exh. 5), the notification to
appellee's counsel that such decision was rendered
(Exh. 6), and the warrant of exclusion (Exh. 7), bear
the date July 6, 1962, or within one year from the
reviewed decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. It
is contended, however, that in all of these
documents, the date of promulgation of the decision
appeared to have been originally written as July 20,
1962, but the number "20" was erased and
superimposed by "6".
Appellant Commissioner of Immigration insists that
these erasures and substitutions were corrections
made only to rectify clerical mistakes. Besides,
according to appellant, there is proof that the
decision was actually rendered on July 6, 1962,
pointing to a certification of the Secretary of the
Board of Commissioners that the said body voted to
exclude the applicants in the said cases and to the
minutes of the meeting of that Board.
As previously stated, the Court of First Instance
agreed with the appellee that the erasures indicated
that the original date was July "20" but that the
figures had been erased and retyped as "6"; and
concluded that the Commissioners' decision and the
warrant of exclusion had been antedated, in order
to bring the decision within the one-year term fixed
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
by Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act 613, as
amended, wherein the proceedings before the Board
of Special Inquiry may be reviewed and revoked,
either upon appeal or motu proprio by the Board of
Immigration Commissioners. The Court below held,
therefore, that the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry, declaring Pedro Gatchalian to be a Filipino
citizen had become final and definitive.
We do not believe that the mere fact of a retyping of
dates on the face of the documents, without further
evidence of record, suffices to convict the three
members of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners of maliciously antedating their
decision, considering the presumption of regularity
in official actuations, and the serious implications
of the charge, which amounts to no less than a
falsification of official documents. Such an offense
cannot be lightly inferred, but must be clearly
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In the official minutes of the Board's proceedings,
no alteration in dates appears in these Exhibits. And
it goes without saying that the operative date of the
Commissioners' action is that when the resolution
of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a
Board, regardless of the date when the decision in
extenso was prepared, written and signed.
It is argued for the appellee that the minutes in Exh.
5-A refer only to the cases of Gloria, Francisco and
Benjamin Gatchalian. But the designation of the
case is "Gloria Gatchalian et al." No reason is shown
why the case of these three should be considered
and voted upon separately, considering that the
claims to citizenship and entry of all were based on
the same circumstances, applicants being the
descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino,
and that all their applications for entry were in fact
jointly resolved by the Board of Inquiry in one single
decision (Annex 1, petition, G.R. No. L-24844).
We, therefore, conclude that the Court below erred
in finding and declaring that the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry in the case of petitioner-
appellee had become final and unreviewable, and
that its review and revocation by the Commissioners
of Immigration was null and void.
Appellee also argues that the decision of the Inquiry
Board had become non-reviewable since 1961
because of its confirmation by the majority of the
preceding Board of Commissioners. It is pointed out
that two members of the latter board (Talabis and
De la Rosa) in reference to said decision had marked
"Noted" over their own signatures, while only the
third Commissioner made of record his adverse
opinion. Such argument is untenable.
First, even disregarding the ambiguity of the term
"Noted", the former Immigration Commissioners
appeared to have acted individually in this
particular instance and not as a Board. It is shown
by the different dates affixed to their signatures that
ATTY. CABRAS
they did not actually meet to discuss and vote on
the case. This was officially made to record by the
Secretary of Justice in his Memorandum Order No.
9, on January 24, 1962, wherein he stated.
Individual action by members of a board plainly
renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as
a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of
Commissioners precisely in order that they should
deliberate collectively and in order that their views
and ideas should be exchanged and examined
before reaching a conclusion (See Ryan vs.
Humphrise, LRA 1915F 1047). This process is of the
essence of a board's action, save where otherwise
provided by law, and the salutary effects of the rule
would be lost were the members to act individually,
without benefit of discussion.
The powers and duties of boards and commissions
may not be exercised by the individual members
separately. Their acts are official only when done by
the members convened in session, upon a
concurrence of at least a majority and with at least
a quorum present. (42 Am. Jur. 389, sec. 74).
Where the action needed is not of the individuals
composing a board but of the official body, the
members must be together and act in their official
capacity, and the action should appear on the
records of the board. (Penn R. Co. vs. Montgomery
Co. Pass. R. Co., 167 P 2d. 62, 27 LRA 766).
Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of
different individuals, that board can act officially
only as such, in convened session, with the
members, or a quorum thereof, present. (State vs.
Kelly, 21 ALR 156
80. G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983
Villadolid vs Inciong
G.R. No.L-53349 March 25, 1983
Ricardo Valladolid, the death of Joseph, was
employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone
switchboard operator. He was subsequently
transferred to the position of clerk-collector by Mrs.
Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM.
On February 24, 1979, JRM sent a letter to
Valladolid signed by Daniel T. Yu, advising him of
his preventive suspension effective February 26,
1979 preparatory to the termination of his services
10 days from receipt of a copy of the application for
clearance to dismiss him. The grounds given were:
(1) Willful Breach of Trust for having divulged, in
various instances, confidential business matters to
competitors of the company; and (2) Gross Neglect
of Duty for having been absent without leave or
notice for more than 25 days, to the detriment of the
company.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Valladolid, in his affidavit dated March 29, 1979,
denied having committed any breach of trust. In
corroboration, he presented the affidavits of Mr.
Manuel Yu dated March 20, 1979 and March 29,
1979, wherein the latter stated that Valladolid was
"one of Copacabana's most hard-working and
efficient employees;" that Valladolid's work is "mere
routinary collection and clerical in nature which do
not involve trust (or) confidential business or trade
secrets which he may 'divulge' to other companies."
Deputy Minister of Labor ruled in favor of Villadolid
ordering his reinstatement without backwages.
JRM filed a petition that; Deputy Ministry acted in
excess of his jurisdiction when, without any
statutory authority or transcending beyond his
jurisdiction, that he absolutely disregarded
procedural requirement in the hearing of the
present controversy, thus depriving petitioner of its
right to due process.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of Regional
Director committed error on his decision.
Held:
No error was committed by respondent Regional
Director in ordering his reinstatement without
backwages.
JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 5
days from December 30, 1978, and thereafter for 15
days, but denies that he notified the company of his
absences subsequent to this. The Regional Director
ruled that the absences of Valladolid were
unauthorized but did not amount to gross neglect of
duty or abandonment of work which requires
deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear
showing in terms of specific circumstances that the
worker does not intend to report for work. We agree.
But as Valladolid had been AWOL,
Constitutional provision requiring that decisions of
court must contain a statement of facts and the
conclusions of law upon which it is based applies
only to courts of record, not to the Ministry of Labor;
Reasons; Proceedings in the NLRC non-litigatious
and summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities.Nor is the questioned Order of the
Deputy Minister of Labor violative of Section 9,
Article X of the Constitution, which requires a
statement of the facts and the conclusions of law
upon which it is based. That prescription applies to
decisions of Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor
is an administrative body with quasi-judicial
functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V, states that
proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious and
summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities obtaining in courts of law. As the
Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings
of fact and the conclusions of law drawn from those
facts by the Regional Director, there was no
necessity of discussing anew the issues raised
therein.
ATTY. CABRAS
81. NERIA vs. COMMISSIONER
FACTS: Pio Neria with his widowed mother (Dolores
Neria) and two younger brothers (Felix and Manuel
Neria), arrived at the Manila International Airport
from Hongkong on board a Cathay Pacific Airways
plane. The petitioner was armed with Certificate of
Registration and Identity 621, issued by the
Philippine Consulate in Hongkong. The immigration
inspector at the airport, not satisfied with the
petitioners travel documents and those of his
companions upon primary inspection thereof,
referred the matter of their admission to the Board
of Special Inquiry for investigation to determine
filiation and paternity to a Filipino citizen
Accordingly, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
conducted a hearing at which time the petitioner
offered oral and documentary evidence to support
his claim for admission as a Filipino citizen. After
the conclusion of the investigation, the said board
deliberated on the case and unanimously voted for
petitioners admission. The Immigration authorities
issued Identification Certificate to the petitioner,
attesting that he was admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines per decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1. The Secretary of Justice issued a
Memorandum Order declaring that all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on Appeal from, or on review motu
proprio of, decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry
are set aside. In compliance with the above directive,
the Board of Immigration Commissioners,
composed of Acting Commissioners proceeded to
review motu proprio the entire proceedings had
before the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 relative to
the petitioners, case and that of his supposed
relatives. The new Board of Immigration
Commissioners found that the petitioner had not
satisfactorily established his claim for admission as
a Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and
ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the
Philippines as an alien not properly documented for
admission and be returned to the port from where
he came or to the country of which he is a national.
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said
decision. This motion was denied by the new Board,
and the petitioner was informed of this denial by
letter.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, praying the Court of First Instance of
Manila to restrain the Commissioner of Immigration
and the Board of Immigration Commissioners from
arresting and expelling him, and prohibit them from
taking any further steps or actions contrary to the
decision rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1. This petition was given due course, and a writ
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
of preliminary injunction was issued as prayed for.
But later on this petition was dismissed, without
prejudice and without costs.
The present petition for habeas corpus was filed. Pio
Neria seeks to inquire into the legality of his arrest
by agents of the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration, and his subsequent detention or
confinement at the Bureau of Immigrations
detention station at Engineering Island, Manila.
The petitioner claims that the warrant of exclusion
issued by the respondent is illegal because it is
based on a decision rendered by the Board of
Immigration Commissioners without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in
violation of section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613, as
amended.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the new
Board of Immigration Commissioner is null and void
for having been rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
RULING: The petitioners argument, at all events, is
without merit. Section 27 (b), provides that
proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiryits
appraisal of a case on the merits, the result of its
deliberation, its decision and notice thereof to an
alien, and the time when an appeal may be brought
therefromshall be conducted under rules of
procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of
Immigration.
It is of no moment that before the present petition
for habeas corpus was instituted, the petitioner had
previously filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The dismissal of that petition was
without prejudice, and, therefore, avoided the
effects of the Rules of Court provision (Rule 30, sec.
3, now Rule 17, sec. 3) that dismissal for failure to
prosecute is equivalent to an adjudication on the
merits [with prejudice]. The -order of dismissal
therein did not settle the legality of the acts of the
Board of Commissioners, nor the legality of
petitioners arrest and detention. The order
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition
simply recites that the same is dismissed without
prejudice and without costs.
82. Police Commission vs. Hon. Judge Lood
FACTS:
Respondent Ibea had been dismissed from the
police service by the then Mayor Braulio Sto.
Domingo pursuant to the decision of petitioner
commission finding him guilty of serious irregularity
in the performance of duty on complaint of Jose Lee,
Jr. Respondent thereafter filed his complaint with
respondent court seeking his reinstatement. He was
sustained by respondent court which rendered its
decision declaring the decision of the Police
Commission as null and void and ordered the town
ATTY. CABRAS
mayor to reinstate the plaintiff to his former position
as patrolman in the Police Department. Respondent
court ruled that the decision of petitioner
commission was based on incomplete records as
there was no transcript of the testimonies of
witnesses or minutes of the proceedings before the
Board of Investigators and that the commissions
conclusion was without factual basis and was in
violation of administrative due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in
disturbing the findings of facts of the Police
Commission, an administrative agency duly vested
by Republic Act No. 4864 with the power and
authority to render decision in administrative cases
against policemen and whose decision is final.
HELD:
The record amply shows that petitioners decision
was supported by substantial evidence consisting of
the affidavit-complaint (which was duly affirmed
when complainant Jose Lee, Jr. appeared and
testified before the board) and the documentary
evidence duly marked by the board as exhibits for
the complainant (and which were not questioned by
respondent). As uniformly held by the Court, it is
sufficient that administrative findings of fact are
supported by evidence on the record, or stated
negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not
shown to be unsupported by evidence. As
expounded by Justice Laurel in the leading case of
Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
substantial evidence is all that is needed to support
an administrative finding of fact, and substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Respondent court therefore erred in choosing to
believe the theory of the defense put up by
respondent Ibea on the equally erroneous ground
that there was no evidence to support the findings
of the Police Commission. In effect, respondent
court substituted its own judgment for that of the
Police Commission which is final, contrary to the
prevailing principle that in reviewing
administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot
reexamine the sufficiency of the evidence as if
originally instituted therein, and receive additional
evidence that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned. The findings of
fact must be respected, so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if not
overwhelming or preponderant.
83. PMC V ANG BISIG NG PMC
FACTS:
During the period 1947 to August 3, 1953,
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
the schedule of shifts in the PMC (Philippine
Manufacturing Company) was from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m.;
from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. and from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m.
This schedule was adopted by the company and the
employees, who are members of respondent Ang
Bisig ng PMC, agreed to the same and worked in the
shifts during the period mentioned.
The union asked the Court of Industrial Relations to
order the company to pay 50 per cent extra
compensation for work done from 12:01 a.m. to 7
a.m. from 1947 to August 3, 1953, whenever the
period mentioned fell on a Sunday or a legal holiday.
PMC contended that since there was an agreement,
the period between 12:01 a.m. and 7 a.m. of Sunday
should be considered a part of the Saturday
workday and therefore work done during that period
was not entitled to any extra pay.
CIR: ruled in favor of Respondents. Denie the
motion for reconsideration.HENCE, the petition of
the case
PMC contended that they were denied of due
process in violation of Sec 1 Commonwealth act no.
103 which provides:
. . . Should any party aggrieved by a ruling or
decision of any of the judges, request a
reconsideration hereof, or at the request of any of
them, the judges shall sit together, and the
concurrence of at least three of the five Judges shall
be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision,
order or award.
ISSUE: W/N the PMC was denied of due process?
HELD:
1. NO.The hearing of a motion for
reconsideration in oral argument is a matter
which rests upon the sound discretion of the
Court of Industrial Relations. Its refusal does not
constitute a denial of due process in the absence of
a showing of abuse of discretion.
Neither may it be said that the judges of the
Court of Industrial Relations did not, as required
by law, "sit together" in resolving the company's
motion for reconsideration because as held
in Tolentino, et al. v. Angeles, et al., 52 O.G. No. 9,
4262, "the fact that they (the judges) signed the
resolution means that they sat together in
consultation and in passing upon the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners." More recently,
this Court ruled that "the requirement that a
motion for reconsideration shall be resolved by
the court en banc, the judges sitting together,
simply demands that all the available judges
shall take part, for as long as three at least of the
judges attending concur, it is enough for the
pronouncement of the decision or award
For while the resolution may have been prepared by
ATTY. CABRAS
one judge, yet it cannot be inferred from this
circumstance alone that no previous deliberation
was held. On the contrary, it is safe to assume that
the resolution was the result of a previous
consultation among the judges
2. The point rather is whether, on the assumption
that the agreement is valid, work done on Sunday
or legal holiday as a result of the schedule is to be
paid extra compensation and we said it should be.
84. Mison vs Coa
Facts:
The case is about customs case no. 813 where the
commissioner of customs, MIson, declaring illegal
the seizure by elements of the Philippine Navy of the
M/V "Hyojin Maru" a vessel of Japanese registry,
and ordered the release of the vessel and its cargo
to the claimants, Chan Chiu On and Cheung I.
However, the vessel was never released because it
sank while in the custody of the bureau of customs
and it could not be salvaged. The claimants filed a
claim with the Commission on Audit for the
payment of the vessel.
Acting thereon "(b)y authority of the Acting
Chairman," Mr. Rogelio B. Espiritu, Manager,
Technical Service Office of the COA, denied the
claim for the reasons set forth in his registered letter
to the claimant's lawyer dated November 3, 1977-
captioned "Decision No. 77-142."
In a letter dated May 10, 1978, claimants counsel,
Mr. David replied that said Decision No. 77-142-
rendered only by the Manager, Technical Service
Office of the COA, and "not (by) the Acting
Chairman, much less . . . the Commission on Audit"
was void because the matter could validly be
acted upon only by "the Commission on Audit duly
constituted, by the appointment and qualification of
its Chairman and two Commissioners," "as
specifically provided by Section 2, Article XII-D of
the (1973) Constitution. In a 4th Indorsement dated
June 22, 1987 addressed "to the Auditor, Bureau of
Customs," Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting
"FOR THE COMMISSION," reconsidered Decision
No. 77-142 of Acting Commissioner of Audit
Tantuico, supra.
He declared that the vessel sank while in illegal
custody of the Bureau of Customs, which "should
have pre-eminently taken adequate measures to
preserve" it but did not.; hence, he declared that
"this Commission will interpose no objection" to the
instant claim, subject to the usual auditing and
accounting requirements." Petitioner seasonably
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari to nullify
said COA Decisions pursuant to Section 7, Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Issues:
Whether or not the decision to reverse the Espiritu
Decision was proper?
Held:
In the first place the "Espiritu decision" was void ab
initio. As manager of the COA Technical Service
Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power
whatever to render and promulgate a decision of or
for the Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman,
alone, had not that power. As clearly set out in the
Constitution then in force, the power was lodged in
the Commission on Audit, "composed of a Chairman
and two Commissioners." 20 It was the Commission,
as a collegial body, which then as now, had the
jurisdiction to "(d)ecide any case brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for
resolution," subject to review by the Supreme Court
on certiorari.
Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu
decision by the Acting COA Chairman was
inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an act
void ab initio because done absolutely without
authority. The act has to be done anew by the
person or entity duly endowed with authority to do
so.
Moreover, even conceding the contrary, no proper
ratification or validation could have been effected by
the Acting Chairman since he was not the
Commission, and he himself had no power to decide
any case brought before the Commission, that
power, to repeat, being lodged only in the
Commission itself, as a collegial body. it must be
made clear that the Espiritu Decision was not
merely "technically invalid," as the petitioner
describes it. It was substantively void ab initio,
because rendered without jurisdiction. It had an
essential inherent defect that could not be cured or
waived.
85. JURISDICTION
G.R. No. L-4572 May 22, 1953
DOLORITO M. FELICIANO vs. THE DIRECTOR
OF PATENT
FACTS:
An application for patent was filed with the
Patent Office.
Pending examination of the application, Meliton D.
Albaa filed a motion to intervene claiming that the
applicant-inventors had "sold and/or bartered and
assigned to him their right to contract or deal the
sale of their invention called Fel-Tap Meter Guard
and Detector to or though the Corporation that they
were then organizing under his direction and to fix
and decide on the purchase price of it to at least
P200,000 in installments cash and P300,000 in
ATTY. CABRAS
shares of stock of said Corporation.
The motion was denied on the ground under the
provisions of the Patent Law (Republic Act No. 165)
the Director of Patents has no jurisdiction or power
to decide the question submitted to him..
From the orders denying his motions to intervene
the movant has appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether the Director of Patents has the authority to
decide the question submitted to him
HELD: No.
What the appellant attempted to secure by his
motion to intervene is clearly beyond the
jurisdiction and authority of the Director of Patents
to grant. Despite the amendment to the first motion
to the intervene by which he claims assignment of
the invention, still it remains that the alleged
assignment is not the invention but it is an
agreement whereby he is to act as selling agent for
the inventors of the patent (if granted) and of the
invention covered thereby and to receive
compensation therefor.
Assignments of patents and inventions covered
thereby may be recorded in books and records kept
for the purpose in the Patent Office is presented in
due form;3 but the appellant does not ask for the
registration of the alleged agreement between him
and the inventors, because as it is not in due form
it cannot be recorded, but prays that the Director of
Patents compel applicant-inventor Maximo B.
Tapinio to sign the contract executed and signed by
the other applicant-inventor Dolorito M. Feliciano
on 14 March 1950 (Appendix I) and both applicant-
inventors to acknowledge it and another document
which by all indication refers to the minutes of a
meeting of the organizers of the Manufacturing
Corporation held on 30 March 1950, before a notary
public, and then to have both documents recorded
in the Patent Office and in the office of the Registrar
of Deeds.
Under the provisions of the Patent Law
(Republic Act No. 165), the Director of Patent
has no power and authority to compel the
applicant-inventors to do what the appellant is
asking them to perform. What the appellant
asked the Director Patents to do for him is
essentially a judicial function which would
require the determination or finding by a court
of competent jurisdiction as to whether there was
a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties
before it could compel the applicant-inventors to
perform what the appellant prays the court to order
them to do. Aside from want of authority and
power, the Director of Patent lacks the means
to make such determination and finding which
would be necessary before he could act on the
appellant's motion.
The orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
against the appellant.
86. JURISDICTION
SYQUIA VS BOARD
FACTS:
In December, 1974, private respondents
filed three separate complaints with respondent
Board of Power and Waterworks charging petitioner
as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments at
Malate, Manila with the offense of selling
electricity without permit or franchise issued by
respondent board, in that petitioner billed
respondents-complainants various specified
amounts for their electricity consumption at
their respective apartments for the months of May
to September, 1974 in excess of the Meralco rates
authorized by respondent board.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss the
complaints asserting that they involved
contractual obligations of respondents as
apartment tenants and were beyond respondent
board's jurisdiction was denied by the latter.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez,
Jr. concurred with petitioner and submitted that
respondent regulatory board acted without
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
complaints.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Board has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this case
RULING: No.
Respondent board as a regulatory board
manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed
by respondents against petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over
petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-
complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is
not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of
electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged he
additional cost of electricity for common facilities
used by the tenants (in addition to those registered
in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a
question that is purely civil in character that is
to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of
the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not
by the respondent regulatory board which has no
jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general
jurisdiction.
Respondent board in resolving the complaints
against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the
additional rising costs of electricity consumed for
the common areas and elevator service even at a
resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the
judicial function. Its orders were beyond its
jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.
ATTY. CABRAS
87. Go Tek vs Deportation
Facts:
Certain agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) searched an office located in Sta.
Cruz Manila which is believed to be a headquarters
of a guerrilla unit of the Emergency Intelligence
Section, Army of the United States and that among
those arrested threat was Go Tek, a china man and
an alleged sector commander and intelligence and
record officer of that guerrilla unit. It was further
alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go
Teks possession which is violation of article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code and rendered himself an
undesirable alien. The prosecutor prayed to the
President that the undesirable alien be immediately
deported because his presence in this country
having been, and will always be a menace to the
peace, welfare, and security of the community.
After a case was filed against him, Go Tek filed a
motion to dismiss contending that the board had no
jurisdiction in view of the obiter dictum discussed in
the case Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board and
that they may deport an alien only on the ground
specified under the law.
The Board denied Go Teks motion and reasoned out
that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the
state may exercise its rights to deport an
undesirable alien and that their function is just to
be a fact finding body and make recommendations
to the President.
The Trial Court granted a writ of prohibition in favor
of Go Tek and ordered the Borad to desist from
taking cognizance of Go Teks case. The trial courts
reason is that a mere ion of forged dollar checks is
not a ground for deportation under the Immigration
Law and that a conviction must first be given to Go
Tek before he may be validly deported otherwise the
deportation would be premature. In appeal, the
Board contends that the trial court erred in
assuming that the President may deport
undesirable aliens only to grounds enumerated by
law.
Issue:
Whether the Deportation Board can entertain a
deportation proceeding based on a ground not
specified under the Immigration Law and even if the
alien has not yet been convicted of the offense
charged? Yes.
Ruling:
Under existing laws, the deportation of an
undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the
President, after due investigation, pursuant to
section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and
(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
under section 37 of the Immigration Law. The State
has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens.
That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive
when he deems such action necessary for the peace
and tranquillity of the nation. There is nothing
illegal or unconstitutional in the provision defining
the power to deport aliens because the intention of
the law is to grant the Chief Executive full
discretion to determine whether an aliens residence
in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure
the security welfare or interest of the state. It has
been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and
exclusive judge of the existence of facts which
warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an
investigation conducted in accordance with sec. 69
of the Revised Administrative Code. No other tribunal
is at liberty to re-examine or to controvert the
sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. The
lower courts decision is reversed and set aside.
88. Vera vs Cuevas
Facts:
Consolidated Milk Company sells the
Darigold brand and Milk Industries sells Dutch
Baby brand (Milk Companies). Along with General
Milk selling under the brand Liberty, these three
milk companies are the plaintiffs of an action for
declaratory relief for an adjudication of their
respective rights and obligations in relation to the
enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against
their filled milk products. [Civil Case] Institute of
Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines,
Inc. is a corporation organized for the principal
purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest
the standards of local filled milk industry, of which
all the milk companies are members.
The milk companies get a preliminary
injunction against the CIR. Later, the CIR files for
an injunction against the Fair Trade Board from
hearing a special proceeding on a complaint for
misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or
misbranding involving the same milk companies.
The issue is who among the CIR and the FTB have
jurisdiction to decide the matter.SC says neither.
Section 169 of the Tax Code was enacted with other
provisions that have already been repealed,
resulting in Section 169 being repealed by
implication and becoming a declaratory provision,
losing its tax purpose. Without its tax purpose, the
CIR loses his authority to enforce it. Neither the CIR
nor the FTB have jurisdiction as the law that
repealed Section 169 (RA 3720) provides that the
Board of Food and Drug inspection and the Food
and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of
Health and Secretary of Justice have jurisdiction
over the matter.
ATTY. CABRAS
Issue:
Whether or not the Fair Trade Board has
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute alleged
misbranding, mislabeling, and/or misleading
advertisement of filled milk product
Held:
No. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax
purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost
authority to enforce the same. The Comissioners
contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce
Section 169 by virtue of Section 3 of Tax Code which
provides that the Bureau of Internal shall also give
effect to and administer the supervisory and police
power conferred to it by this Code or other laws is
untenable. The Bureau of Internal Revenue may
claim police power only when necessary in the
enforcement of its principal powers and duties
consisting of the collection of connected therewith.
The enforcement of Section 169 entails the
promotion of the health of the nation and is thus
unconnected with any tax purpose for in Republic
Act No. 3720
Republic Act No.3720 provides:
Section 9. Its shall be the duty of the Board
(Food and Drug Inspection), conformably with the
rules and regulation, to hold hearings and conduct
investigations relative to matters touching the
Administration of this Act, to investigate processes
of food, drug and cosmetic manufacture and to
subject reports to the Food and Drug Administrator,
recommending food and drug standards for
adoption. Said Board shall perform such additional
functions, properly within the scope of the
administration thereof, as maybe assigned to it by
the Food and Drug Administrator. The decisions of
the board shall be advisory to the Food and Drug
Administrator.
Section 26.
c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act
shall be conducted by the Board of Food and Drug
Inspection which shall submit recommendation to
the Food and Drug Administrator.
d) When it appears to the Food and Drug
Administrator from the reports of the Food and Drug
Laboratory that any article of food or any drug or
cosmetic secured pursuant to Section 28 of this Act
is adulterated or branded he shall cause notice
thereof to be given to the person or persons
concerned and such personor persons shall be given
an opportunity to subject evidence impeaching the
correctness of the finding or charge on question.
e) When violation of any provison of this Act
comes to the knowledge of the Food and Drudg
Administrator of such character that a criminal
prosecution ought to be instituted against the
offender, he shall certify the facts to the Secretary of
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
Justice through the Secretary of Health, together
with the chemists report, the findings of the Board
of Food and Drug Inspection, or other documentary
evidence on which the charge is based.
f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
requiring the Food and Drug Administrator to
ceritify for prosecution pursuant to subparagraph
(e) hereof, minor violations of this Act whenever he
believes that public interest will be done adequately
served by suitable written notice or warning.
From this, it is clear that the Comissioner of
Internal Revenue and Fair Trade Board, are without
jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged
misbranding, mislabeling, and/0r misleading
advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on the
matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and
Drug inspection and the Food and Drug
Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the
Secretary of Justice, also intervening in case
criminal prosecution has to be instituted.
89. ONGKINGCO (President of Galeria de
Magallanes Condominium Association, Inc.) vs.
NLRC
FACTS:
Petitioner Galeria de Magallanes
Condominium Association, Inc. (Galeria for brevity)
is a non-stock, non-profit corporation formed in
accordance with R.A. No. 4726, otherwise known as
the Condominium Act.
Galeria's Board of Directors appointed private
respondent Federico B. Guilas as
Administrator/Superintendent.e was given a
"monthly salary of P10,000 subject to review after
five (5) months and subsequently thereafter as
Galeria's finances improved."[2]
As Administrator, private respondent was tasked
with the maintenance of the "performance and
elegance of the common areas of the condominium
and external appearance of the compound.
However, on 17 March 1992, through a resolution
passed by the Board of Directors of Galeria, private
respondent was not re-appointed as Administrator.
As a result, on 15 May 1992, private respondent
instituted a complaint against petitioners for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of salaries with the
NLRC.
In response, on 22 July 1992, petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that it is the SEC, and
not the labor arbiter, which has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint.
Labor Arbiter Lorenzo granted the aforestated
motion to dismiss.
The NLRC, however, reversed the Labor Arbiter's
order. Petition for certiorari was filed.
ATTY. CABRAS
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue falls within the
jurisdiction of th NLRC.
HELD: No. The case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the SEC. Under P.D 902-A, the SEC
has exclusive jrisdiction over controversies in the
election or appointment of directors, trustees,
officers, or managers of such corporations,
partnerships or associations. P.D 902-A, Sec. 5(c).
The Solicitor General contends that the case at bar
falls outside the purview of the aforequoted
provision. He insists that private respondent was a
mere employee of petitioner corporation being
tasked mainly, as administrator/superintendent,
with the upkeep of the condominium's common
areas. He, thus, maintains that private respondent
cannot be deemed a corporate officer because "it is
the nature of one's functions and not the
nomenclature or title given to one's job which
determines one's status in a corporation.
The contentions of public respondent lack merit.
That private respondent is an officer of petitioner
corporation and not its mere employee cannot be
questioned. The by-laws of the Galeria de
Magallanes Condominium Association specifically
includes the Superintendent/Administrator in its
roster of corporate officers.
In the case at bar, considering that herein
petitioner, unlike an ordinary employee, was
appointed by respondent corporation's Board of
Trustees in its memorandum of October 30, 1990,
she is deemed an officer of the corporation. Perforce,
Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, which
provides that the SEC exercises exclusive
jurisdiction over controversies in the election or
appointment of directors, trustees, officers or
managers of corporations, partnerships or
associations, applies in the present dispute.
Accordingly, jurisdiction over the same is vested in
the SEC, and not in the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is given
DUE COURSE, the assailed resolutions of the NLRC
are hereby REVERSED and the Order of the Labor
Arbiter dated 29 December 1992 REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
90. Yu vs Defensor-Santiago
Facts
Petitioner Yu was originally a Portuguese
national who was naturalized as a Philippine citizen.
However, he petitioner applied for and was issued a
renewed Portuguese Passport by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. The
CID (Commission on Immigration and Deportation)
detained the petitioner pending his deportation
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case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a petition for
habeas corpus.
Issue
Whether a writ of habeas corpus should be issued
Held
No. The foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. In Board of Immigration
Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that
is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport 23 and represented himself as such in
official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship. Philippine citizenship, it must be
stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed
when required and suppressed when convenient.
91. BOISER vs CA
Facts
Petitioner Boiser and private respondent
PLDT entered into a contract denominated as
"Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound
itself to provide Premiere with long distance and
overseas facilities through the use of a PLDT relay
station. Petitioner on the other hand had the
obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities
provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay
switching services and qualified radio operators,
and otherwise maintain the required standards in
the operation of facilities under the agreement.
Later, without any prior notice to the petitioner,
respondent PLDT issued a "circuit authorization
order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees
Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the
connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities
of the petitioner's telephone system. To avert serious
consequences to the public and private hours
resulting from any disruption of the telephone
network and to the long distance and overseas
aspects of its business, the petitioner was compelled
to seek judicial relief. It filed a case with the CFI
which issued a TRO against PLDT.
The petitioner filed a petition with the CA alleging
that the CFI had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter because it is NTC that has jurisdiction.
ATTY. CABRAS
Issue
Whether the NTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held
The NTC has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT
has made no showing of any, not even by necessary
implication, to decide an issue involving breach of
contract. And as the Court stated in RCPI v. Board
of Communications, "if in the two cases before us,
complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Inocencio
allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach
of contractual obligation, ... the proper forum for
them to ventilate their grievances for possible
recovery of damages against petitioner should be in
the courts and not in the respondent Board of
Communications." Jurisdiction is conferred only by
the Constitution or the law. It cannot be conferred
by the will of the parties. The jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.
92. GORDON VS VERIDIANO
FACTS:
Food and Drug Administration and the
mayor of Olongapo City are in conflict over the
power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation
of drug stores in the said city. While conceding that
the FDA possesses such power, the mayor claims he
may nevertheless, in the exercise of his own power,
prevent the operation of drug stores previously
permitted by the former.
San Sebastian Drug Store and Olongapo City Drug
Store, both owned by Rosalinda Yambao were
covered by Mayor's Permits and licenses to operate
issued by the FDA. A joint team composed of agents
from the FDA and narcotics agents conducted a
"test buy" at San Sebastian Drug Store and was sold
200 tablets of Valium 10 mg. without a doctor's
prescription. A report on the operation was
submitted to the petitioner wherein it revoked the
Mayors permit. Vice-Mayor de Perio, caused the
posting of a signboard at the San Sebastian Drug
Store announcing its permanent closure. FDA
Administrator Arsenio Regala, directed the closure
of the drug store and lifted the same after noting
that the penalties imposed had already been
discharged and allowed the drug store to resume
operations. Yambao, through her counsel, wrote a
letter to the petitioner seeking reconsideration of the
revocation of Mayor's Permit. Having received no
reply, she and her husband filed with the RTC of
Olongapo City a complaint for mandamus and
damages, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, against the petitioner and de Perio.
Yambao requested permission from the FDA to
exchange the locations of drug stores for reasons of
"business preference." The request was granted. But
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
when informed of this action, the petitioner
disapproved the transfers and suspended Mayor's
Permit for the Olongapo City Drug Store.
Respondent judge issued an order directing the
maintenance of the status quo with respect to the
Olongapo City Drug Store pending resolution of the
issues. Petitioner wrote the FDA requesting
reconsideration of its order, allowing resumption of
the operation of the San Sebastian Drug Store but
the same was denied. The court declared the
Mayor's Permit for the San Sebastian Drug Store as
null and void. A writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction was issued and the said drug store
resumed in its normal business operation.
ISSUE: W/N FDA or the Mayor has jurisdiction in
revoking Yambaos permit.
HELD:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of
administrative authorities are accorded great
respect because of their acknowledged expertise in
the fields of specialization to which they are
assigned. Even the courts of justice, including this
Court, are concluded by such findings in the
absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion, which is not present in the case at bar.
For all his experience in the enforcement of city
ordinances, the petitioner cannot claim the superior
aptitudes of the FDA in the enforcement of the
pharmacy and drug addiction laws. He should
therefore also be prepared, like the courts of justice
themselves, to accept its decisions on this matter.
The indefinite suspension of the mayor's permit for
Olongapo City Drug Store was based on the transfer
thereof to the site of the San Sebastian Drug Store
as approved by the FDA but without permission
from the petitioner. On this matter, the Court
believes that the final decision rested with the
mayor. The condition violated related more to the
location in Olongapo City of business
establishments in general than to the regulation of
drug stores in particular. It therefore came under
the petitioner's jurisdiction.
The FDA would have the right to disapprove the site
of the drug store only if it would impair the health
or other interests of the customers in contravention
of the national laws or policies, as where the drug
store is located in an unsanitary site. But the local
executive would have reason to object to the
location, even if approved by the FDA, where it does
not conform to, say, a zoning ordinance intended to
promote the comfort and convenience of the city
residents. The challenged orders are modified in the
sense that the suspension of Mayor's Permit shall
be considered valid but only until the San Sebastian
Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store return
to their original sites as specified in the FDA licenses
ATTY. CABRAS
and the mayor's permits or until the request for
transfer, if made by the private respondents, is
approved by the petitioner.
93. Union Bank of the Philippines vs Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board
G.R. No. 95364 (June 29, 1992)
210 SCRA 558
FACTS:
In this case, Martha David purchased a
condominium unit from Fereit Realty Development
Corporation. Without her knowledge, and without
the approval of the National Housing Authority,
mortgaged the condominium project to Bancom,
predecessor-interest of Union Bank of the
Philippines as a security for loan. FDRC failed to pay
its obligation to Bancom. Martha David and Teresita
Quazon filed a complaint in the HLURB against
FRDC, UBP and FEBTC to annul the title of UBP
and FEBTC over Davids condominium unit and to
order the issuance of a new certificate of title in his
name. UBP and FEBTC filed their answer
questioning HLURBs jurisdiction over the case and
filed a motion on the same ground.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is correct on assailing
HLURBs jurisdiction.
HELD:
No. The act of a subdivision developer mortgaging
the subdivision without notifying an installment
buyer is violative P.D. 957. Case falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. Clearly,
FRDCs act of mortgaging the condominium project
to Bancom and FEBTC without the knowledge and
consent of David as buyer of a unit therein, and
without the approval of NHA (now HLURB) as
required by P.D. 957, was not only an unsound real
estate business practice but also highly prejudicial
to the buyer. David, who has a cause of action for
annulment of mortgage, the mortgage foreclosure
sale, and the condominium certificate of the title
that was issued to the UBP and FEBTC as highest
bidders at the sale. The case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of NHA (now HLURB) as
provided in P.D. No. 957 of 1976 and P.D. No. 1344
of 1978.
94. G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990.*
RP VS MIGRINO
TOPIC: Jurisdiction
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FACTS: Acting on information received by the
New AFP Anti-Graft Board, which indicated the
acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income,
private respondent Ret. Lt. Tecson was required by
the Board to submit his explanation/comment
together with his supporting evidence. Private
respondent was unable to produce his supporting
evidence because they were allegedly in the custody
of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The Board
proceeded with its investigation and submitted its
resolution, recommending that private respondent
be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act
No.3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as
amended. The case was set for preliminary
investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent
moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds:
(1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his
person; (2) that the action against him under Rep.
Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3)that E.O.
No. 14, insofar as it suspended the provisions of
Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was
inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having retired
from the AFP, he was now beyond the reach of Rep.
Act No.3019. The Board opposed the motion to
dismiss. The PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for
lack of merit. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration but was denied by the PCGG.
Private respondent was directed to submit his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence.
Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction with the RTC. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction on the principal ground that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of
PCGG v. Pena. Private respondent opposed the
motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the
opposition. The court judge denied petitioners
motion to dismiss. The respondent judge granted
the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from
investigating or prosecuting private respondent
under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing
of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos.
Petitioner strongly argues that the private
respondents case falls within the jurisdiction of the
PCGG. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the court could act on cases
with exclusive jurisdiction to Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
Yes, Petitioner assails the trial courts
cognizance of the petition filed by private
respondent. Particularly, petitioner argues that the
trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
PCGG. This matter has already been settled in Pea,
ATTY. CABRAS
supra, where the Court ruled that those who wish
to question or challenge the PCGGs acts or orders
must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is
vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The
Sandiganbayans decisions and final orders are in
turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by
this Court. [Ibid, at pp. 564-565]. The ruling inPea
was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R. No. 77816,
June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 363, Soriano III v. Yuson,
G.R. No. 74910 (and five other cases), August 10,
1988, 164 SCRA 226 and Olaguer v. RTC, NCJR, Br.
48, G.R. No. 81385, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA
478, among others, to enjoin the regional trial
courts from interfering with the actions of the
PCGG.
95. NASIPIT LUMBER VS. NLRC 177 SCRA 93
Facts:
Private respondent Juanito Collado was
employed by petitioner as security guard. In the
course of his employment, 4 crates of lawanit boards
were stolen. He was implicated in the theft and
thereafter placed under preventive suspension.
NALCO then filed an application with the Regional
Office of the Department of Labor for clearance to
dismiss Collado. The application was approved by
Officer-in-Charge Rey Seneres. The said officer
certified the case to the labor arbiter who, after
perusal of records, returned the case to the Regional
Director, who recommended that the case be
elevated to the Secretary of Labor. The acting
Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of Seneres
granting petitioners application for clearance to
dismiss Collado.
Collado then filed a complaint before the
District Labor Office for unjust dismissal and
reinstatement with backwages and benefits. NALCO
filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the
order of the Acting Secretary of Labor had become
final and executory, making the issue of illegal
dismissal res judicata. The Labor Arbiter ordered
NALCO to reinstate Collado without backwages.
Both parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC
modified the Labor Arbiters decision adding
backwages.
Issue: Whether or not the principle of res judicata
applies.
Held: The Court stated therein that the principle of
res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations
proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII,
Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are
non-litigious and summary in nature without
regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of
law. Said pronouncement is in consonance with the
jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
96. Under Enforcement of Agency Action and
Reorganization/Dissolution of Agencies:
GODELIVA S. DULAY, Petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE MINISTER OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
Facts:
Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this
Court and asks Us to confine public respondent
Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources within his jurisdiction and to uphold the
principle of res judicata in administrative
proceedings by nullifying (1) his February 24, 1978
order giving due course to the letter-petition of
private respondent Angeles D. Dico requesting for
the reopening of Fishpond Conflict case of Mrs.
Angeles Dico against Juan Quibete, Petronilo
Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay and
the "Cancellation of Fishpond Lease Agreement No.
2165 of Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay"
This present conflict stems from two earlier cases
decided by the Office of the President, both of
which have attained finality. To wit:
Re: DANR Case No. 2898
entitled "Angeles Dico
v. Juan Quibete
That by a barter agreement entered into between
Juan Quibete and Jose Padios sometime in 1932,
the former exchanged his parcel of land situated at
Sitio Palaypay, municipality of San Dionisio,
province of Iloilo, for the latter's fishpond area of
about 24 hectares located at sitio Talaba-an,
municipality of Cadiz (now Cadiz City), province of
Negros Occidental. That Juan Quibete, also in
1932, applied for a Fish and Game Special Permit
over the area .His application was approved on
February 10, 1949 and Fishpond Permit No. F-
738-E was issued.
Dico applied for fish pond permit over the same
area, and was disapproved due to the existing
permit of Quibete.
Quibete meanwhile sold and/or transferred his
rights and interests over the area under Fishpond
Permit No. F-738-E to one Petronilo Retirado.
Dico protested such transfer but was dismissed.
That after denial of a motion for reconsideration,
she appealed to the Office of the President. Her
appeal was in turn dismissed in the decision of
November 14, 1969.chanrobles
2. Re: DANR Case No. 3447
entitled "F.P.A. No.
V-3-3852, Angeles Dico,
Applicant-Appellant v.
Juan Quibete, Claimant-
ATTY. CABRAS
Appellee
Private respondent Angeles Dico filed with the
Director of Lands a free patent application (No. V-
3-3852) for a 4-hectare dry portion of Lot 489-C
covered by Fishpond Permit
No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete, the latter in turn
protested.
That the Director of Lands rejected said
application.
That a motion for reconsideration having been
denied, private respondent Dico appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
That private respondent Dico moved to reconsider
the Secretary's decision, Annex "F", but her motion
was denied on January 26, 1971. A second motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied per Order
dated May 5, 1971.
Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay)
succeeded to the rights and interests over the area
in question. On May 21, 1973, the heirs of
Petronilo Retirado executed a "Deed of Sale of
Fishpond Improvements and Transfer of Rights"
(Annex "J") transferring their rights and interests
in favor of the petitioner over a portion of Lot No.
489-Cconsisting of 19.15 hectares, more or less,
and covered by their Fishpond Permit No.
1582.chanr
On October 28, 1977, private respondent (Angeles
Dico) submitted a letter-petition to the respondent
officials (Annex "L") requesting for a "reopening of
fishpond conflict of Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete,
Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based
on newly discovered evidence". It was there alleged
that Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete
did not cover the area in question (Lot No. 489-C)
located in Sitio Talaba-an, Municipality of Cadiz
(now Cadiz City) but Lot No. 487 located in Barrio
Luna, Cadiz City. She prayed that petitioner's
Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2169 be cancelled
and, in lieu thereof, a new one be issued in her
name.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the
ground of res judicata.
Issue: Whether or not res judicata is applicable.
Ruling: Yes!
It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that
the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority,
have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect
of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res
judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority
applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts
of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction.
Page 71 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs.
Juan Quibete" was decided by the Office of the
President on November 14, 1969. 11Since the same
was not brought to the courts for judicial review, the
same has long become final and
executory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico vs.
Juan Quibete" involved Free Patent Application No.
V-3-385 of private respondent Dico. The Director of
Lands in a decision dated May 30, 1967 rejected her
application. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources affirmed the same on July 9,
1970. 12The findings of fact in said DANR case,
which were found by the Secretary to be the same
facts in DANR Case No. 2898, are deemed
conclusive by operation of law. 13Said DANR case,
not having been brought likewise to the courts for
judicial review has also become final and executory.
The matter having become final as of August or
September 1970, 27it was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of public respondent Director of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give
due course to private-respondent's letter-petition of
October 28, 1977 requesting for a re-opening of the
fishpond conflict involved herein.
Petition Granted
97. G.R. No. May 17, 1993
101426
PETITIONER PHILIPPINE AMERICAN
GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC.
RESPONDENTS COURT OF APPEALS and
TRANSPACIFIC TOWAGE,
INC.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari where
Philippine American General Insurance Company,
Incorporated (Philamgen) assails the decision of the
Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila and entered a new
one dismissing the Philamgens complaint which
sought to collect the sum of P1,511,210.00 from the
Transpacific Towage, Inc.
Davao Union Marketing Corporation of Davao City
shipped on board the vessel M/V Crazy Horse
operated by the Transpacific Towage, Inc. cargo
consisting of construction materials consigned to
Bicol Union Center insured by Philamgen.
The vessel M/V Crazy Horse arrived on September
7, 1985 as scheduled at the port of Pasacao,
ATTY. CABRAS
Camarines Sur. Bicol Union Center was also notified
forthwith of the arrival time. Unfortunately, the
discharging, could not be effected immediately and
continuously due to the ff:
1. the buoys were installed only
on September 11, 1985;
2. the discharge permit was
secured by the consignee
only on September 13, 1985;
3. a wooden catwalk had to be
installed and extension of
the wharf had to be made,
which was completed only on
September 26, 1985;
4. the discharging was not
continuous because there
were intermittent rains and
the stevedores supplied by
the consignee did not work
during the town fiesta.
Pending discharge of the cargos remainder,
a strong typhoon named Saling hit the area.
As a result, the vessels anchor chain
stopper released its clutch; the vessel was
dragged against the rocks, eventually
destroyed and partially sank. People of the
barrio came and started looting the vessel.
As a result, nothing was left of the remaining
cargo.
Forty (40) days from the time the vessel
arrived and thirty-four (34) days from the
time actual discharge of the cargo
commenced before Saling came.
The total number of cement bags damaged
and/or lost was 26,424 costing
P1,056,960.00 while there were 4,000 pieces
of the GI sheets unrecovered, the cost of
which was P454,250.00.
Hence, as the insurer, Philamgen was bound to pay
Davao Union Marketing Corporation the sum of
P1,511,210.00. Then, it sought to recover what it
paid from Transpacific Towage, Inc. but
Transpacific refused to do so. Thusly, Philamgen
filed a complaint for the collection of sum of money
before the RTC.
Transpacific, as one of its arguments for the
dismissal of the case, said that the doctrine of res
judicata applies in the case at bar, because the
Board of Marine Inquiry rendered a decision (acting
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
on the marine protest filed on 19 October 1985 by
the shipmaster of M/V Crazy Horse) holding that
said shipmaster was not guilty of negligence as the
proximate cause of the grounding and subsequent
wreckage of M/V Crazy Horse, hence,
recommending that the captain, his officers and
crew be absolved from any administrative liability
arising out of the subject incident.
RTC ruled that although the immediate cause of the
loss may have been due to an act of God, the
defendant carrier had exposed the property to the
accident because of unreasonable delay anchoring
its decision on Article 1740 of the Civil Code which
provides that if the common carrier negligently
incurs in delay in transporting the goods, a natural
disaster shall not free the carrier from
responsibility.
CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled
instead that private respondent, as a common
carrier, is not responsible for the loss of the insured
cargo involved in the case at bar, as said loss was
due solely to a fortuitous event. According to the CA,
the delay in fully unloading the cargo from the vessel
was occasioned by causes that may not be
attributed solely to human factors, among which
were the natural conditions of the port where the
M/V Crazy Horse had docked, the customs of the
place and the weather conditions.
Issue/s:
1. Whether delay for the unloading of the Cargo is
attributable to Transpacific so as to not exempt it
from liability due to fortuitous event?
2. Whether the case filed by Philamgen is barred by
the doctrine of res judicata?
Ruling:
1. No, the delay in the discharge was not negligence
attributable to any party, in particular, to
Transpacific.
2. No, the case is not barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither
of the parties herein could be faulted for such delay,
for the same (delay) was due not to negligence, but
to several factors earlier discussed. The cargo
having been lost due to typhoon Saling, and the
delay incurred in its unloading not being due to
negligence, private respondent is exempt from
ATTY. CABRAS
liability for the loss of the cargo, pursuant to Article
1740 of the Civil Code.
2. The resolution of the present case is not barred
by the judgment of the Board of Marine Inquiry. One
of the requisites of the principle of res judicata is
that there must be, among other things, identity of
subject matters and causes of action between a first
and second case in order that the judgment in the
prior case may bar that in the subsequent case.
The cause of action in the marine protest was to
enforce the administrative liability of the
shipmaster/captain of M/V Crazy Horse, its
officers and crew for the wreckage and sinking of the
subject vessel. On the other hand, the cause of
action at bar is to enforce the civil liability of private
respondent, a common carrier, for its failure to
unload the subject cargo within a period of time
considered unreasonably long by the petitioner.
While it may be true that the Court is bound to
accord great weight to factual findings of the
Board,9 we hold that the protest filed before it and
the present case assert different causes of action
and seek different reliefs.
Doctrine Learned:
Res judicata doctrine does not apply to courts where
prior decision was done by Board of Marine Inquiry.
98. APOLEGA V. HIZON
25 SCRA 336
Topic: Enforcement of Agency Action and
reorganization/dissolution of agencies
Facts:
This case involves a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction in
connection to the writ of execution from the
Department of Labor through its Regional Offices
deputized officials. Petitioner is the employer of the
respondents late husband. The respondents late
husband was a former employee of the petitioner
which suffered injury from the render of service to
the latter. As result of the injury, the employee filed
a claim for compensation for the injury sustained.
The Regional Director issued an award requiring
petitioner to pay the claimant for a sum of money.
Petitioner was given a letter from the Chief
Administrative Section in connection with claim
which the former fails to answer. Due to the injury,
the respondents husband died. A year after the
husbands death, petitioner, as guardian ad litem of
their minor children, filed a death compensation
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
claim which was granted.
The petitioner filed a "Motion to Vacate the Award
and Motion to Dismiss the Case," which was granted
but was not acted upon by the petitioner. The award
became final and executory and remanded the case
to the Regional Office a quo for appropriate action.
Thus, the petitioner elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, alleging, among the others, that the
Commission or the duly deputized officials in the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor have no
authority to issue writs of execution, and questions
the constitutionality of Section 17, Republic Act
4119, which amended Section 51 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act and vests such authority in the
Commission and its duly deputized officials.
Issue: WON the Commission or the duly deputized
officials in the Regional Offices of the Department of
Labor have no authority to issue a writ of execution.
Held:
Yes, the Commission or the duly deputized officials
in the Regional Offices of the Departme nt of
Labor have authority to issue a writ of execution.
Originally the power to enforce a final award made
under the Workmen's Compensation Act was vested
"in any court of record in the jurisdiction of which
the accident occurred" (Sec. 61, Act 3428).
Subsequently, pursuant to Republic Act 997, as
amended by Republic Act 1241, and as effected by
Reorganization Plan 20-A adopted in 1956, the
authority to enforce awards was transferred from
the courts of justice to the Regional Administrator
and the Workmen's Compensation Commission,
This Court, in a number of cases, nullified writs of
execution issued by the Regional Offices and by the
Commission on the ground that Reorganization Plan
20-A, insofar as it purported to grant such power,
was without legislative authority or sanction.
As the law now stands, however, the power to
enforce awards under the Workmen's
Compensation Act is expressly vested in the
Commission or the duly deputized officials in the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor (R.A.
4119). This grant of power does not contravene the
Constitution. Execution is a necessary step in the
enforcement of the award, and while it is procedural
in nature and therefore essentially falls within the
rule-making power of this Court, it may be legislated
upon by Congress under its constitutional authority
to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure x x x." (Section 13,
Article VIII, Constitution of the Philippines). In
Republic Act 4119 the legislative intent to vest in the
Commission the power to enforce its awards is clear,
in contrast of Republic Act 997, which did not
authorize the Reorganization Commission to
transfer such judicial power from the courts of
ATTY. CABRAS
justice to the officials appointed or offices created
under Reorganization Plan 20-A. In Lo Chi, et al. v.
De Leon, et al., L-18584, Jan. 30, 1967, where the
Regional Administrator issued a writ of execution to
enforce a compensation award, we held that
"inasmuch as the writ of execution WAS issued by
Regional Administrator De Leon on Dec. 2, 1960,
before the effectivity of Republic Act 4119, the said
writ is there-fore null and void," thus impliedly
upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act
4119.
Referential Syllabus:
Workmen's Compensation Act; Claim for
compensation; Effect of failure to controvert claim;
Where allegation of lack of notice and hearing
cannot be sustained; Case at bar.In the present
case, petitioner's (employer) allegation of lack of
notice and hearing cannot be sustained Petitioner
failed to controvert the claims (injury and death) for
compensation, as required by Section 45 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. By reason of such
failure petitioner waived his right to present
evidence concerning the claims and therefore
cannot complain that he was not duly heard. Under
the circumstances the hearing officer could make
the award without the necessity of a formal hearing,
treating the claim as uncontested and thus
dispensing with the reception of evidence. As to the
failure of the claimant to f ile the claim within the
time prescribed in Section 24 of the Act, the same
was non-jurisdictional and did not constitute a bar
to the proceeding, considering that the employer did
not suffer by such delay or failure.
Same; Effect of partial payment of benefits.Where
the employer had paid the total amount of
P530.00P480.00 when the employee was still alive
and P50.00 after his death, such partial payment of
benefits renders it unnecessary to file the claims
(injury and death) within the time limit provided for
under Section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4119.
Same; Power to enforce awards; Original and
present law; Constitutionality of Republic Act No.
4119 upheld.Originally the power to enforce a
final award made under the Workmen's
Compensation Act was vested "in any court of record
in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred"
(Sec. 61, Act 3428). Subsequently, pursuant to
Republic Act 997, as amended by Republic Act
1241, and as effected by Reorganization Plan 20-A
adopted in 1956, the authority to enforce awards
was transferred from the courts of justice to the
Regional Administrator and the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, This Court, in a
number of cases, nullified writs of execution issued
by the Regional Offices and by the Commission on
the ground that Reorganization Plan 20-A, insofar
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
as it purported to grant such power, was without
legislative authority or sanction.
As the law now stands, however, the power to
enforce awards under the Workmen's
Compensation Act is expressly vested in the
Commission or the duly deputized officials in the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor (R.A.
4119). This grant of power does not contravene the
Constitution. Execution is a necessary step in the
enforcement of the award, and while it is procedural
in nature and therefore essentially falls within the
rule-making power of this Court, it may be legislated
upon by Congress under its constitutional authority
to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure x x x." (Section 13,
Article VIII, Constitution of the Philippines). In
Republic Act 4119 the legislative intent to vest in the
Commission the power to enforce its awards is clear,
in contrast of Republic Act 997, which did not
authorize the Reorganization Commission to
transfer such judicial power from the courts of
justice to the officials appointed or offices created
under Reorganization Plan 20-A. In Lo Chi, et al. v.
De Leon, et al., L-18584, Jan. 30, 1967, where the
Regional Administrator issued a writ of execution to
enforce a compensation award, we held that
"inasmuch as the writ of execution WAS issued by
Regional Administrator De Leon on Dec. 2, 1960,
before the effectivity of Republic Act 4119, the said
writ is there-fore null and void," thus impliedly
upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act
4119.
99. Merano vs. Tutaan (115 SCRA 343, [No. L-
56833], 20 July 1982)
Facts:
The National Labor Relations Commission in
a decision ordered San Miguel Corporation to
reinstate Ramon V. Merano to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and other rights and
benefits to which he is entitled under existing laws
and with backwages from December 16, 1977 up to
his reinstatement.
Pursuant to that decision, Merano was paid
P53,949.16 as monetary award up to August 31,
1980 but he was not reinstated. San Miguel
Corporation opposed the reinstatement due to his
supervening physical unfitness and asked that it be
allowed to pay Merano separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.
The NLRC in its en banc resolution of June 11, 1981
ruled that because Merano could no longer be
reinstated due to his illness, he should be paid his
additional backwages and separation pay up to that
date at the rate of one months salary for every year
ATTY. CABRAS
of service, a fraction of at least six months being
considered as one year.
Even before the issuance of that NLRC resolution of
June 11, 1981, or on February 10, 1981, Merano
filed in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City a
special civil action of mandamus against San Miguel
Corporation and the Labor Arbiter who functioned
as the execution arm of the NLRC.
Respondent Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan, in his order
of April 20, 1981, dismissed Meranos petition on
the ground that he had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the case which falls within the
competent of the NLRC.
Issue/s: Whether or not the trial court judge was
wrong in dismissing the case. (No)
Held: Respondent judge did not err in dismissing
Meranos petition for mandamus on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance is
not the proper tribunal to pass upon Meranos
complaint against the failure of the Labor Arbiter to
enforce the NLRCs decision to reinstate him to his
former position of sales staff assistant. The labor
tribunal has the same rank and is in the same
category as the Court of First Instance.
100. GSIS vs. CSC
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the order of
the Civil Service Commission(CSC) dated June 20,
1990 which directed the Government Service
Insurance System(GSIS) to pay the compulsory
heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio
Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal
separation up to the date of their demise. The Order
dated November 22, 1990, however, denied herein
petitioners motion for reconsideration of CSCs
Order dated June 20, 1990. Deceased Elizar
Namuco and Eusebio Manuel were illegally
dismissed by the GSIS for allegedly being involved
in irregularities in the canvass of supplies and
materials
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has
the power to execute its judgments, final orders or
resolutions?
RULING:
Ruling: The Civil Service Commission has the
power to execute its judgment, final orders or
resolutions. The CSC is a constitutional commission
invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not
only with the authority to administer the civil
service but is also vested with quasi-judicial powers.
It has the authority to hear and decide
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly
with it or brought to it on appeal. The grant to a
tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power or the
authority to hear and adjudge cases, normally and
logically is deemed to include the grant of authority
to enforce or execute the judgments it thus
renders unless the law otherwise provides. It is
quite obvious that the authority to decide cases
would be inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see that what has been decided is
carried out. The writ of execution issued on June
20, 1990 is valid. The Court upholds the same,
simply because there is no fair and feasible
alternative in the circumstances. The binding force
of Resolution of July 4, 1988, for all intents and
purposes, is that it makes exoneration in the
administrative proceedings a condition precedent to
payment of said back salaries, it cannot however
exact an impossible performance or decree a useless
exercise such as that the subsequent disciplinary
proceedings is an empty, and inutile procedure as
to the deceased employees, they cannot possibly be
bound by any substantiation in the said
proceedings of the abovementioned charges.
101. NATIONAL LAND TITLES and DEEDS
REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION vs CSC
G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993.
Facts:
Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws
graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was
appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under
permanent status. Said position was later
reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant
to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also
appointed under permanent status up to September
1984. She was for two years, more or less,
designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order
No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981)
which authorized the restructuring of the Land
Registration Commission to National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration and
regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein,
petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as
Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984,
under temporary status, for not being a member of
the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of
Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner
Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion
remained unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner
Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While
said case was pending decision, her temporary
appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a
Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then
Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified
ATTY. CABRAS
petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services
as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that
she was "receiving bribe money".
However, in its Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988,
the Civil Service Commission directed that private
respondent Garcia be restored to her position as
Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the
NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right
theory the new requirement of BAR membership to
qualify for permanent appointment as Deputy
Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under
said Executive Order, would not apply to her
(private respondent Garcia) but only to the filling up
of vacant lawyer positions on or after February 9,
1981, the date said Executive Order took effect.
since private respondent Garcia had been holding
the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II from
1977 to September 1984, she should not be affected
by the operation on February 1, 1981 of Executive
Order No. 649.
Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to
assail the validity of the above Resolution of the Civil
Service Commission. It contends that Sections 8
and 10 of Executive Order No. 649 abolished all
existing positions in the LRC and transferred their
functions to the appropriate new offices created by
said Executive Order, which newly created offices
required the issuance of new appointments to
qualified office holders. Verily, Executive Order No.
649 applies to private respondent Garcia, and not
being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated
to her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds
II.
Issue: Whether or not a law abolishes an office is
one of legislative intent about which there can be no
controversy and if there is an explicit declaration in
the law itself.
Held:
A closer examination of Executive Order No.
649 which authorized the reorganization of the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) into the National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA), reveals that said law in express terms,
provided for the abolition of existing positions.
Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law
mandates that from the moment an implementing
order is issued, all positions in the Land
Registration Commission are deemed non-existent.
This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of
a position does not involve or mean removal for the
reason that removal implies that the post subsists
and that one is merely separated therefrom.
Executive Order No. 649 authorized the
reorganization of the Land Registration Commission
(LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC
and required new appointments to be issued to all
employees of the NALTDRA.
There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a
valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the
Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII of the
1973 Constitution. The power to reorganize is,
however; not absolute. This court has pronounced
that if the newly created office has substantially
new, different or additional functions, duties or
powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an
office different from the one abolished, even though
it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office
it will be considered as an abolition of one office and
the creation of a new or different one. The same is
true if one office is abolished and its duties, for
reasons of economy are given to an existing officer
or office. Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to
improve the services and better systematize the
operation of the Land Registration Commission. A
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar
membership to qualify for key positions in the
NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing
circumstances and new development of the times.
Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the
position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have
such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot
hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The
additional qualification was not intended to remove
her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed
concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
102. CRISOSTOMO vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was
appointed by the President of the Philippines as the
President of the Philippine College of Commerce
(PCC) on July 17, 1974. During his incumbency as
president of the PCC, two administrative cases were
filed against petitioner for illegal use of government
vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials
belonging to the college, oppression and
harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and
dishonesty. The administrative cases, which were
filed with the Office of the President, were
subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation. On October 22, 1976,
petitioner was preventively suspended from office
pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, as amended. In his place
Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-
charge on November 10, 1976, and then as Acting
President on May 13, 1977.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, converting the
Philippine college of commerce into a polytechnic
ATTY. CABRAS
university, defining its objectives, organizational
structure and functions, and expanding its
curricular offerings.
Mateo continued as the head of the new University.
On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting President
and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of
six (6) years.
On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of
Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of
the charges against him. On February 12, 1992,
petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a
motion for execution of the judgment, particularly
the part ordering his reinstatement to the position
of president of the PUP and the payment of his
salaries and other benefits during the period of
suspension.
The motion was granted and a partial writ of
execution was issued by the trial court on March 6,
1992. On March 26, 1992, however, President
Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as
acting president of the PUP, following the expiration
of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who
had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of the
five nominees considered by the President of the
Philippines for the position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of the PCC
into PUP abolished the PCC.
RULING: No. In part the contention is well taken,
but, as will presently be explained, reinstatement is
no longer possible because of the promulgation of
P.D. No. 1437 by the President of the Philippines on
June10, 1978. P.D. No. 1437 did not abolish, but
only changed, the former Philippine College of
Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, in the same way that
earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what
was then the Philippine School of Commerce into
the Philippine College of Commerce. What took
place was a change in academic status of the
educational institution, not in its corporate life.
Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its
curricular offerings, and the changes in its
structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when
the purpose is to abolish a department or an
office or an organization and to replace it with another
one, the lawmaking authority says so.
But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of
president of the PUP could not be ordered by the
trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had
been promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of
state universities and colleges at six
(6) years, renewable for another term of six
(6) years, and
authorizing the President of the Philipp
ines to terminate the terms of incumbe
n t s w h o w e r e n o t reappointed.
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103. Blaquera vs. Civil Service Commission
FACTS:
The petitioners and intervenors who are
permanent employees in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) filed
this petition for prohibition and mandamus to stop
the respondents from removing them from their
positions in the DENR pursuant to the 1987
reorganization of that department under an
Executive Order. To carry out said reorganization,
the DENR Secretary submitted to the Department of
Budget and Management a staffing pattern
consisting of 24,614 positions. The DBM released a
revised staffing pattern containing 23,612 positions
only which was 1,002 positions less than what the
DENR Secretary requested and which still did not
include the positions of the petitioners. The DENR
requested the DBM to restore 839 positions which
DBM had disapproved earlier. The request was
approved after long negotiations between the DENR
and DBM, subject to the condition that these
positions shall be coterminous with the appointees
but not to exceed three (3) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not reorganization is a
recognized valid ground for separation of civil
service employees.
HELD:
The right of the State to reorganize the
government resulting in the separation of career
civil service employees under the 1987 Constitution
is beyond dispute but said reorganization, ouster
and appointments of successors must be made in
good faith. That the reorganization of the DENR was
not intended to achieve economy and efficiency, is
revealed by the admission in the public
respondents Comment that the new staffing pattern
of the department contains 991 positions more
than the total number of permanent positions in the
DENR before the reorganization. Since the abolition
of their positions will not conduce to either
efficiency or economy in the Service, which are or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
the principal justifications for any government
overhaul, then, obviously, the reorganization of the
DENR is not justified. The conversion of the
petitioners from permanent to coterminous
employees is a wholesale demotion of personnel
which is tantamount to removal without cause and
without due process. The Court held that the
removal of the petitioners and intervenors from
office is declared null and void. The respondent
Secretary of the DENR or his successor in office, is
ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former
or equivalent positions in the DENR.
ATTY. CABRAS
104. DTI V CSC
FACTS:
EO 133 was promulgated (reorganizing the
Dept of trade and industry )which provides that the
NACIDA(natl cottage industry development
authority) was to be reorganized into the CITC
(cottage industry technology Center) and attached
to DTI. Pursuant to EO 133. DTI issued
Memorandum Circular no. 28 expressing the
guidelines for the evaluation and the placement of
DTI personel.
Espejo, who was a Division Chief II, Public Relations
and Management Staff Service, of NACIDA, was
assessed and evaluated and found that Espejo not
to be sufficiently qualified for retention. A
termination later was issued to her. Later, she was
offered the position of Industrial Development
Specialist, Operations Department, CITC, which
was four (4) ranges lower than her previous
position. She turned down the offer; instead, she
appealed her case to the DTI-RAB.
DTI RAB in favor of DTI
CSC ruled that Espejo should be given any position
comparable to her previous position(Division Chief
II)
ISSUE: W/N Espejo should be given position
comparable to her previus postion?
HELD:
YES. Republic Act No. 6656, "An Act to
Protect the Security Tenure of Civil Service Officers
and Employee in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization," in part, provides:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career
service shall be removed except for a valid cause
and after due notice and hearing A valid cause for
removal exists when pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization, a position had been abolished
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the
exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes
allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of
any or some of the following circumstances may be
considered its evidence of bad faith in the removals
made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a
claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an
aggrieved party:
(a) Where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned;
(b) Where an office abolished and another
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST
performing substantially the same functions is
created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by less qualified
in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of officers in
the department of agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the
same functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of
separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
"(i)t is a paramount principle in Public Officers Law
that the power to abolish public offices rested in the
legislature is not absolute, (and that it) is subject to
the limitations that it be exercised in good faith,
should never be for personal or political reasons,
and cannot be implemented in a manner contrary to
law." It may be recalled that after 02 February 1987,
any reorganization undertaken by government is
also circumscribed by the provisions and
safeguards of the new Constitution.
Section 18 (e) of E.O. No. 133 provides that NACIDA
is merely reorganized as CITC, and its functions
other than technology development and training,
were transferred to the Bureau of Small and
Medium Scale Business Development (BSMBD) and
relevant operating units of the Department (DTI).
Thus, the function of NACIDA are merely
transferred to other units of DTI, it follows that its
personnel performing particular functions shall also
be transferred to the corresponding units.
We find particular merit on the evidence submitted
by Espejo that incumbents were replaced by those
less qualified in terms of educational qualification,
performance and merit. Espejo "undoubtedly
possesses education and work experience to
perhaps, merit retention in the service."(CHIEF OF
DIVISION for 11yeears/MASTERAL DEGREE)
105. Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of
Appeals
FACTS:
The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was
created by PD No. 272, in order, generally, to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry in
the Philippines. Initially, it was created for a term of
5 years but when its original term expired, its term
was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly
owned subsidiary of the National Development
Corporation which is an entity wholly owned by the
National Government embarked on an expansion
program which includes the construction of a steel
ATTY. CABRAS
mill in Iligan City. Proclamation No. 2239 was
issued by the President withdrawing from sale or
settlement a tract of land in Iligan City to be used
by the NSC. However, certain portions of the public
land under Proclamation 2239 were occupied by
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Co. (MCFC). LOI No. 1277
was issued directing NSC to negotiate with the
owners of MCFC for and on behalf of the
Government for the compensation of MCFCs
present occupancy rights on the subject land. The
LOI directed that ISA may exercise the power of
eminent domain should the negotiations fail. The
negotiations failed and ISA commenced
expropriation proceedings against MCFC. While
trial was on-going the statutory existence of ISA had
expired prompting MCFC to file the dismissal of the
case since ISA has ceased to be a juridical person.
The trial court granted MCFCs motion to dismiss
anchoring on the Rules of Court that only natural or
juridical persons or entities authorized by law may
be parties to a civil case. ISA moved for a
reconsideration contending that despite the
expiration of its term, its juridicial existence
continued until the winding up of its affairs could be
completed. In the alternative ISA urged that the Rep.
of the Philippines should be allowed to be substituted
in its place. The RTC denied its motion for
reconsideration. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in
view of the expiration of ISAs term.
HELD:
There is no provision in PD No. 272
recognizing ISA as possessing general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the Government. ISA in fact
appears to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of
the Republic are case in corporate form, that is to say,
are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities,
sometimes with and other times without capital
stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical
personality distinct from the personality of the
Republic. The term Authority has been used to
designate both incorporated and non-incorporated
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.
The Court considers that ISA is properly regarded
as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate
and juridical person vested with full panoply of
powers and attributes which are compendiously
described as legal personality.
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS
agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as
well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert
back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the
Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of
law specifying some other disposition thereof such
as e.g. devolution or transmission of such powers,
duties, functions, etc. to some other identified
successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic
of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an
incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry
must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter
of that agency and, by way of supplementation in
the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since ISA is
a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and
liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into
the Government of the Philippines and hence
assumed once again by the Republic, no special
statutory provision having been shown to have
mandated succession thereto by some other entity
or agency of the Republic.
It follows that the Republic of the Philippines is
entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the
statutory term of ISA having expired. The expiration
of ISAs statutory did not by itself require or justify
the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
Further, no new legislative act is necessary should
the Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA,
in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation
proceedings.

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