CIR vs YMCA

Facts:
Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and
activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious,
educational and charitable objectives.

YMCA earned income from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants
and canteen operators, and from parking fees collected from non-members. Petitioner issued an
assessment to private respondent for deficiency taxes. Private respondent formally protested the
assessment. In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA. The CTA ruled in favour of the YMCA. The CA
reversed the decision of the CTA, but upon MR of the YMCA eventually affirmed the decision of the CTA.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

Issue: W/N the CA departed from the findings of fact of the CTA.

Ruling:

Clearly, the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the aforementioned issue, as indeed
it was expected to. That it did so in a manner different from that of the CTA did not necessarily imply a
reversal of factual findings.

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It has been held that
[t]here is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts.[16] In the present case, the CA did not doubt, much less change, the facts
narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the law to the facts. That its interpretation or conclusion is
different from that of the CTA is not irregular or abnormal.

FELIX VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALMARIO GO

MANUEL, respondents.

Facts:

In 1991, private respondent, Almario Go Manuel filed a civil action for sum of money
with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 against petitioner,
Felix Villanueva and his wife Melchora. The subject matter of the action involved a
check dated June 30, 1991 in the amount of P167,600.00 issued by petitioner in favor of
private respondent. The check supposedly represented payment of loans previously
obtained by petitioner from private respondent as capital for the formers mining and
fertilizer business. The check when duly represented for payment was dishonored due
to insufficiency of funds. A demand was made upon petitioner to make good the check
but he failed to do so. Private respondent then filed a criminal complaint for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22[2] before the Cebu City Prosecutors Office and the
subject civil complaint for sum of money. Petitioner, on the other hand, avers that his
principal obligation only amounts to P23,420.00.
 On July 27, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent
Apparently aggrieved, both parties appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner prayed for the reversal of the trial courts decision and contended that his
principal obligation is only P23,420.00, while private respondent sought interest of ten
percent (10%) of the principal obligation; twenty-five percent (25%) as attorneys fees,
as well as moral and exemplary damages.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

Issue: W/N the issues raised would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal
of the findings of the trial and appellate courts.
Ruling: (FINALITY OF FONDINGS OF FACT)
The petition should be denied.
Time and again it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law
allegedly committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed
conclusive.
As such, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[6] The rule, however, admits of
the following exceptions: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[7]
After a review of the case at bar, we consider petitioner to have failed to raise
issues which would constitute sufficient ground to warrant the reversal of the findings of
the trial and appellate courts.

FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in civil case entitled "Republic of
the Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages on the theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal
defendants in the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth,
extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust
and brazen abuse of power; (2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to
be incorporator, director, board member and/or stockholder of corporations beneficially held
and/or controlled by the principal defendants; (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in
unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary
obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth ; (4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage of his position as
Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties
as such Chairman, acting in concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of
government funds; and (5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be
used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders
and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or member of corporations
beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent recovery
of assets illegally obtained.

On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents was denied by
respondent court in its resolution dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of
Particulars, alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public
officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in both
capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars that would
inform him of the factual and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know
with certainty the particular acts allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with
culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein.

In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying his motion for a bill of
particulars as well as its resolution, dated 29 May 1989, which denied his motion for
reconsideration; to compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of particulars, or that
said respondent be ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 should
they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and to enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from
further proceeding against petitioner until the bill of particulars is submitted, claiming that the
respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in promulgating the aforesaid resolutions and that there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy for him in the ordinary course of law other than the present
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the disputed resolutions.
HELD:

Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of
mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary
fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible
facts essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial
will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts.

The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is
perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the complaint how
petitioner allowed himself to be used as instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what
the concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and
what petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions,
orders, and/or policies. Moreover, the complaint does not state which corporations petitioner is
supposed to be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More
significantly, the petitioner's name does not even appear in annex of the complaint, which is a
listing of the alleged "Positions and Participations of Some Defendants". The allegations in the
complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely
articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence,
without the particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the
petitioner can not intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.

Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of

corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification
purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and inferences in the
complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material
facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the
defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that
he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.

The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions. The
petition is granted and the resolutions in question are annulled and set aside. The respondents
are ordered to prepare and file a Bill of Particulars containing the facts prayed for by petitioner,
or otherwise, respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude the herein petitioner as
defendant in the above-mentioned civil case.

Sandiganbayan: Allegations are sufficient to constitute cause of action in the complaint

Defendant: That particulars sought are evidentiary in nature, which are not essential in
the pleading (complaint)
Where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in a form of
conclusions, the proper recourse would be a motion for bill of particulars
( particular acts constituting the defendants acts or ommsions in this case)
Petitioners acts in the execution of the plan to accumulate ill gotten wealth not
stated.
The chairman of COA does not participate or personally audit all disbursements
and withdrawals of the government funds, as well as transactions involving
government property. (all allegations are merely conjectures/assume)

Note:
Complaint; defined as a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action, omitting
the statement of mere evidentiary fatcs.
Ultimate facts: essential facts constituting the cause of action (essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving
the statement of the cause of action insufficient)
Right and duty, directly makes up the acts or ommisions of the defendant. Does not refer to probative matters
particular to evidence. (principal, determinate, constitutive facts where the entire cause of actions rests.
Elements; essential elements of the cause of action, legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the said right
Evidentiary facts: Those facts necessary for determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon which
the conclusions of the ultimate facts are based.

FAR EAST MARBLE (PHILS.), INC., LUIS R. TABUENA, JR. and RAMON A.
TABUENA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.
Facts:
n February 5, 1987, herein respondent Bank of the Philippines Islands (BPI) filed a complaint for
foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin against petitioner Far East Marble (Phils.), Inc. (Far
East), Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena, Jr. which was docketed as Civil Case No. 87-39345
of Branch XIV of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila.
On March 10, 1987, Far East filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim admitting the
genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes attached as Annexes A, B, and C to the
complaint, but alleging further that said notes became due and demandable on November 19, 1976,
respectively. On the basis of the maturity dates of the notes, Far East thereupon raised the
affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of cause of action as it denied the allegation of the
complaint that BPI had made previous repeated requests and demands for payment. Far East
claimed that during the more than 10 years which elapsed from the dates of maturity of said
obligations up to the time the action for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage securing said obligations
was filed, it had not received from BPI or its predecessor any demand for payment and thus, it had
"labored under the belief that they [the obligations] have already been written off" in the books of BPI.
Moreover, Far East denied the genuineness and due execution of the trust receipts and of the
Statement of Account (pp. 78-79, Rollo). A motion to hear affirmative defenses was attached to the
answer.
On March 16, 1987, BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear affirmative defenses, alleging that
its cause of action against Far East have not prescribed, since within 10 years from the time its
cause of action accrued, various written extrajudicial demands (attached thereto as Annexes "A"
and
"A-1") were sent by BPI and received by Far East. Moreover, BPI offered several written documents
whereby Far East supposedly acknowledged its debt to BPI (Annexes "B" to "B-6). Withal, BPI
maintained, the ten-years prescriptive period to enforce its written contract had not only been
interrupted, but was renewed.
On the same date, BPI filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that since Far East had
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes and the deed of chattel
mortgage annexed to its complaint, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, thus entitling
BPI to a favorable judgment as a matter of law in regard to its causes of action and on its right to
foreclose the chattel mortgage.
The trial court ruled in favour of Far East (prescriprion)

An appeal therefrom was forthwith interposed by BPI, assailing the findings of the trial court with
respect to its finding that BPI's cause of action has prescribed and the consequent denial of the
motion for summary judgment.

On June 26, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the June 1, 1987 order of
the court of origin and remanding the case to said court for further proceedings, "including the
resolution anew of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment . . ., reception of the evidence of the
parties and, thereafter, to decide the case as the facts may warrant." (pp. 98-99, Rollo.)

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Far East

Issue: W/N the trial court erred in believing that the interruption of the prescriptive period to institute
an action is an ULTIMATE FACT which had to be expressly and indispensably pleaded by BPI in its
complaint, and that failure to so alleged such circumstance is fatal to BPI's cause of action.
Ruling:

We believe and hold otherwise.

Section 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause or causes of action." Further elaborating thereon, Section 1 of Rule 8 declares
that every pleading, including, of course, a complaint, "shall contain in a methodical and logical form,
a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts . . . omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts." "Ultimate facts" are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis
of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant (Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic of the Phil., et al., 204 SCRA 428 [1991]), while "evidentiary
facts" are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.

What then are the ultimate facts which BPI had to allege in its complaint so as to sufficiently
establish its cause of action?

Basically, a cause of action consists of three elements, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2)
the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 193 SCRA 732 [1991]); Rebollido vs. Court of
Appeals et al., 170 SCRA 800 [1989]). These elements are manifest in BPI's complaint, particularly
when it was therein alleged that: (1) for valuable consideration, BPI granted several loans,
evidenced by promissory notes, and extended credit facilities in the form of trust receipts to Far East
(photocopies of said notes and receipts were duly attached to the Complaint); (2) said promissory
notes and trust receipts had matured; and (3) despite repeated requests and demands for payment
thereof, Far East had failed and refused to pay.
Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that "despite repeated requests and demands for payment,
Far East has failed to pay" is sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action. Besides, prescription is not
a cause of action; it is a defense which, having been raised, should, as correctly ruled by the Court
of Appeals (DBP vs. Ozarraga, 15 SCRA 48 [1965]), be supported by competent evidence. But even
as Far East raised the defense of prescription, BPI countered to the effect that the prescriptive
period was interrupted and renewed by written extrajudicial demands for payment and
acknowledgment by Far East of the debt.

In the case at bar, the circumstances of BPI extending loans and credits to Far East and the
failure of the latter to pay and discharge the same upon maturity are the only ultimate facts
which have to be pleaded, although the facts necessary to make the mortgage valid
enforceable must be proven during the trial.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOODGOVERNMENT),

vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago together with
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria
Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case
was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated
one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed
pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.

After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer,
jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL
OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS" dated Nov. 3, 1987. 1 The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, 2 and
the movants, a reply to the opposition. 3 By order dated January 29, 1988, the Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and
accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations. 4

Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25." 5 Basically, they sought an
answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint)
who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in
the . . case?" 6 The PCGG responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being
impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under
any
guise." 7

On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded
Complaint. 8 As this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of particulars, through a Manifestation
dated April 11, 1988. 9

Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, 10 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for bill of particulars,
and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual basis. Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out
impertinent pleading dated February 9, 1988. The Sandiganbayan declared inter alia the complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear
enough," there are adequate allegations . . which clearly portray the supposed involvement and/or alleged participation of defendants-
movants in the transactions described in detail in said Complaint," and "the other matters sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature
which should be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper . ." It also opined that "(s)ervice of interrogatories before joinder of issue and without
leave of court is premature . . (absent) any special or extraordinary circumstances . . which would justify . . (the same)."
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim under date of July 18,
1988. 11 In response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with Motion to Dismiss Compulsory Counterclaim " 12

The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989. 13 On July 25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-TRIAL. 14 The pre-trial
was however reset to September 11, 1989, and all other parties were required to submit pre-trial briefs on or before that date. 15

On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff," 16 and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' 17 as well as a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents. 18

The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's
amended complaint, through such questions

for instance, as

1. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 1 . ., what specific property or

properties does the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco,
Jr. and Santiago for being ill-gotten?

3. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 10 (a) . . what specific act or

acts . . were committed by defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in "concert with"
defendant Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic
plan of said defendant Marcos to accumulate ill-gotten wealth?"

5. In connection with . . paragraph 13 . ., what specific act or acts of the defendants

Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago . . were committed by said defendants as part, or in
furtherance, of the alleged plan to conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos?

7. In connection with . . paragraph 15(c) . . is it plaintiff's position or theory of the

case that Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said corporation,
are beneficially owned by either or both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos
and that the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, as well as, the other stockholders
of record of the same corporation are mere "dummies" of said defendants Ferdinand
and /or Imelda R. Marcos?

On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for examination
and copying of

1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which the verification of
the Amended Complaint asserted that the allegations thereof are "true and correct;"

2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented

and . . marked as exhibits for the plaintiff;" and

3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any)
and the decision (of the Chairman and members) to file the complaint" in the case at
bar.

By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the
Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents
(production being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989), respectively.
On September 1, 1989, the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25,
1989 (allowing production and inspection of documents). It argued that

1) since the documents subject thereof would be marked as exhibits during the pre-trial on
September 11, 1989 anyway, the order for "their production and inspection on September 14 and 15,
are purposeless and unnecessary;"

2) movants already know of the existence and contents of the document which "are clearly
described . . (in) plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief;"

3) the documents are "privileged in character" since they are intended to be used against the PCGG
and/or its Commissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order No. 1, viz.:

(a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for
anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order.

(b) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce

evidence in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.

It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories, 19 which the
Sandiganbayan treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of August 21, 1989 (admitting the Amended Interrogatories). The
opposition alleged that

1) the interrogatories "are not specific and do not name the person to whom they are
propounded . .," or "who in the PCGG, in particular, . . (should) answer the interrogatories;"

2) the interrogatories delve into "factual matters which had already been decreed . . as part of the
proof of the Complaint upon trial . .;"

3) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of fact . . which defendants . .
sought to . . (extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of Particulars;"

4) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition, which is prematurely filed and
irregularly utilized . . (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its evidence."

Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September 18, 1989.

After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first,
denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second,
reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff
(PCGG). 20

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan erred in issuing the resloutions.

Ruling:

Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules of Court:
interrogatories to parties , 26 and production and inspection of documents and things. 27 Now, it appears to the Court that among
far too many lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes
and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them which is a
great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the
experience of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up adjudication. 28 Hence,
a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.

The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential
function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the
pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that determination of the
facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may
be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally.

Modes of discovery

Interrogatories

It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to
present to the court all the material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or concealing
nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of
pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his knowledge.

Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the pleadings filed by
the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts" are set forth in the pleadings;
hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of a party's claims or defenses is limned in his
pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." 31

Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally or
"not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable . . (an adverse party) properly to
prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a "more definite
statement" may be ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office of a bill of particulars is,
however, limited to making more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading It is not its
office to supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said evidentiary details are
made known to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of
fact arising from the pleadings.

The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial.
Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the trial if not indeed even
before the pre-trial should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not
only those known to them individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other words,
the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make
this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The
experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation,
accomplished one of the most necessary of modern procedure: it not only eliminates unessential
issue from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game
with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably
increased. . ." 32

As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded
inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and
fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the
pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2)
as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to
enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the
issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. 33

To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as
when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all
facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which
are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the
relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected
in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions) 34 which generally allows the examination of a deponent

1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the
pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party;"

2) as well as:

(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things" and

(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."

Production of Documents

On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of
documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons
under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.

To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the
law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the
action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party;
contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as
established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the
disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts
thereof; staying further proceedings. 38

Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave
and without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules . . ., limitations inevitably arise when it
can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. 39 And . . . further limitations come into existence when the
inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege." 40

In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into
are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the
bounds of the law.

It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism, in relation of

course to the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be resolved.
The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules
of Court cannot be sustained.

One last word. Due no doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature, purposes and
operation of the modes of discovery earlier
mentioned, 54 there also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application of said modes is a complicated matter, unduly
expensive and dilatory. Nothing could be farther from the truth. For example, as will already have been noted from the preceding discussion,
all that is entailed to activate or put in motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, is
simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of least questions with the request that they be answered
individually. 55 That is all. The service of such a communication on the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of answering
the questions "separately and fully in writing underoath," and serving "a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within
fifteen (15) days after service of the interrogatories . . ." 56 The sanctions for refusing to make discovery have already been
mentioned. 57 So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than the service on a party of a letter or other written
communication containing a request that specific facts therein set forth and/or particular documents copies of which are thereto appended,
be admitted in writing. 58 That is all. Again, the receipt of such a communication by the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation
of serving the party requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested
or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the matters of
which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted." 59 The taking of depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral
examination or by written interrogatories) while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless by no means as complicated as seems to be the
lamentably extensive notion.

FORTUNE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner Fortune Corporation against respondent Inter-
Merchants Corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. SP-3469, before the Regional Trial Court of San
Pablo City, Branch 30. After respondent corporation had filed its Answer, petitioner served the
former with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The interrogatories
were answered by respondent corporation through its board chairman, Juanito A. Teope.

The pre-trial conference was thereafter scheduled for January 9, February 12 and April 22, 1992.

On March 26, 1992, however, petitioner served upon private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition
Upon Oral Examination 2 dated March 26, 1992, notifying the latter that on April 7, 1992, at San Pablo
City, herein petitioner would take the deposition of said Juanito A. Teope, in accordance with Section 15,
Rule 24.

Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff's
Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination, 3 dated March 27, 1992, alleging inter alia that : (a)
herein petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the written interrogatories which
practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case; (b) there is absolutely no
sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition; (c) such taking would cause
annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, Juanito A. Teope; (d) Mr.
Teope has no intention of leaving the country; and
(e) the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits.

The trial court thereafter issued on April 3, 1992 an order 4 that the requested deposition shall
not be taken. ( First, that the proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written
Interrogatories; Second, that the proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in
court; and Third, that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity
to ask clarificatory questions, if any, on the proposed deponent who appears to be a vital
witness.)
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed an original action
for certiorari before the Supreme Court which was docketed as G.R. No. 101526. However, in a
resolution dated May 20, 1992, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration
and adjudication on the merits.

Issue: Whether or not the said order, based on the three reasons stated therein, is arbitrary or
whimsical because it is contrary to reason, logic or equity;

Ruling:

Rule 24 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. By leave of court after jurisdiction has
been obtained over any defendant or property which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be
taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories.
The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 23.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined
in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.

The seeming unreceptive and negative attitude of lawyers and the courts towards discovery
procedures has heretofore been observed and discommended by the Court in this wise:

. . . Now, it appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers (and not a few
judges), there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about
the nature, purposes and operations of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet
unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them which is a great pity
for the intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled
with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience of other jurisdictions convincingly
demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up
adjudication. . . . . 5

It would do well, therefore, to point out the finer attributes of these rules of discovery, the availment
of which, we are convinced, would contribute immensely to the attainment of the judiciary's
primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases.

The rules providing for pre-trial discovery of testimony, pre-trial inspection of documentary evidence
and other tangible things, and the examination of property and person, were an important
innovation in the rules of procedure. The promulgation of this group of rules satisfied the long-felt
need for a legal machinery in the courts to supplement the pleadings, for the purpose of disclosing
the real points of dispute between the parties and of affording an adequate factual basis in
preparation for trial. The rules are not grounded on the supposition that the pleadings are the only or
chief basis of preparation for trial. On the contrary, the limitations of the pleadings in this respect are
recognized. In most cases under the rules the function of the pleadings extends hardly beyond
notification to the opposing parties of the general nature of a party's claim or defense. It is
recognized that pleadings have not been successful as fact-sifting mechanisms and that attempts to
force them to serve that purpose have resulted only in making the pleadings increasingly
complicated and technical, without any corresponding disclosure of the issues which it will be
necessary to prove at the trial. Thus the rules provide for simplicity and brevity in pleadings,
which in most cases will terminate with the answer; and at the same time adapt the old and
familiar deposition procedure to serve as a device for ascertaining before trial what facts are
really in dispute and need to be tried. Experience had shown that the most effective legal
machinery for reducing and clarifying the issues was a preliminary examination, as broad in
scope as the trial itself, of the evidence of both parties. 6

Stated otherwise, the rules seek to make a trial less a game of blind man's buff and more a
fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.

We agree with petitioner's submission that the fact that petitioner had previously availed of
the mode of discovery, which is by written interrogatories supposedly covering all claims,
counterclaims and defenses in the case, cannot be considered "good cause", because: (a)
the fact that information similar to that sought had been obtained by answers to
interrogatories does not bar an examination before trial, and is not a valid objection to the
taking of a deposition where there is no duplication and the examining party is not acting in
bad faith; and (b) knowledge of the facts by the petitioner concerning which the proposed
deponent is to be examined does not justify a refusal of such examination.

Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued
if the following requirements are complied with:
(a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined;
(b) that the motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice
of such motion has been served to the other party.

People of the Philippines vs Abelardo Parungao

FACTS

The accused-appellant Parungao was arraigned and tried separately for the information filed
against him and the other 15 jail-breakers of the the Provincial Jail of Pampanga of the crime
of robbery with homicide upon which on the incident of the jailbreak 2 jail guards were killed
on the discharge of their duties and of the missing 6 firearms and for serious physical injury
caused to the other jail guard, he was convicted as a co-conspirator and principal by
inducement. Unsatisfied with the lower court's ruling hence the case was elevated to the
court of appeal upon which the accused- appellant contended that the testimonies of the 4
witnesses presented by the prosecution are merely hearsays of which the witnesses testified
and conveyed matters to court that are not of their own personal knowledge and were merely
narrated to them with the other detainees.

ISSUE

The admissibility of a hearsay evidence.

RULING

The court ruled in favor of the accused-appeallant, acquitting him of the crime charged
against him, citing that Generally hearsay evidence are inadmissible however when not
objected may result in its being admitted, but the same should not mislead into thinking that
its admission is equated with weight evidence. That hearsay evidence whether objected to or
not be given credence for it has no probative value.

The court also emphasizes that the trial court gravely erred in giving weight to the hearsay
evidence that was presented since it it is violative of the hearsay rule and same was
unconstitutional for said act-the accused was not given an opportunity to meet the witnesses
face-to-face and to subject the source of the information to the rigid test of cross-
examination.

Conspiracy against the accused-appellant has not been established beyond reasonable
doubt.

PRATS & COMPANY, a registered partnership, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, a corporation, defendant-
appellee.

Abad Santos, Camus, Delgado and Recto and Ohnick and McFie for appellant.
Gibbs and McDonough for appellee.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila by Prats & Co., a
mercantile partnership, for the purpose of recovering from the Phoenix Insurance Co., of Hartford,
Connecticut, the sum of P117,800.60, with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to have been
sustained by the plaintiff, on August 21, 1924, from a fire, it being alleged that said loss was covered
by policy of insurance No. 600217, for the sum of P200,000, issued by the defendant company to
the plaintiff. For answer, the defendant, Pheonix Insurance Co., admitted the insurance of the policy
of insurance but, by way of special defense, alleged, among other things, that the fire in question
had been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and that the plaintiff had submitted under oath to
the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss, in contravention of the express terms of the policy. Upon
hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint with respect to the
obligation created by the policy which was the subject of the suit, but ordered the defendant to pay to
the plaintiff the sum of P11,731.93, with interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account of
moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant, of remnants of the insured stock.
From this judgment the plaintiff appelaed.

first, that the fire was set by the procurance or connivance of the plaintiff for the purpose of
defrauding the insurer; and secondly, that the plaintiff, after the fire, submitted to the defendant a
fraudulent claim supported by the false proof, in violation of the terms of the policy.

Issue:

Ruling:

The finding of the trial court in the effect that the plaintiff had submitted false proof in the support of
his claim is also, in our opinion, well founded. That conclusion appears to have been based upon
three items of proof, and with respect to at least two of these, we think that the conclusion of his
Honor was correctly drawn. These two facts are, first, that the plaintiff had submitted a claim for
jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P12,800 when th erule value of said jewelry was about P600;
and, secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance company the value of
goods which had been surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire. Neither of
these two facts are consistent with good faith on the part of the plaintiff, and each constituted a
breach of the stipulations of the policy against the use of fraudulent devices and false proof with
respect to the loss.
The other point relied upon by his Honor to sustain the conclusion that the plaintiff had attempted to
deceive the defendant with respect to the extent of the loss was at least competent in its general
bearing on the good faith of the plaintiff, even if, as is probably true, not alone sufficient to constitute
a breach of the same stipulations. The point is this: After the fire the plaintiff presented to the
adjuster certain cost sheets and cpies of supposed invoices in which the prices and expenses of
importation of a quantity of goods were stated at double the true amount. The adjuster soon
discovered the artificial nature of these documents, and, with his consent, they were withdrawn by
Prats and subsequently destroyed. At the hearing Prats stated that these documents had been
fabricated in order that they might be exhibited to intending purchasers of the goods, thereby making
it appear to them that the cost of the mercahndise had been much greater than it in fact was a
ruse which is supposed to have been entirely innocent or at least not directed against the insurer.
But a question naturally arises as to the purpose which these documents might have been made to
serve if the fire, as doubtless intended by its designers, had been so destructive as to remove all
vestiges of the stock actually involved. Upoon the whole we are forced to state the conclusion, not
only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or connived therein, but also that it submitted
fraudulent proof as the trial judge found.

Before concluding this opinion we are constrained to make a few observations with reference to the
trial of this case and the inordinate amountof time consumed in the proceedings. We are told in the
appellant's brief that the trial of this case covered a period of almost two years, in which fifty
separate sessions were held, without counting the numeruos hearings upon the taking of the
deposition of Francisco Prats, a partner in the plaintiff firm, whose testimony was taken at the
instance of the defendant. Taken all together, the time thus consumed was out of all proportion to
the difficulties of the case. An examination of the voluminous transcript reveals at least part of the
reason for this inordinate consumption of time; since we find that far too much of the space in the
transcript is taken up with the record of petty skirmishes in court resulting from objections over the
admission of evidence.

In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectivly and
expenditiously administered in the courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof
are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objection to its
materiality or technical objection to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of any
intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the
proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no
indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely
accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later.
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides a judge of first
instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out,
the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the
effects of error without returning the case for a new trial, -- a step which this court is always very
loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the
question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either
litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final
consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial.
If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court
then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.

What has been said above finds special relevancy in this case in view of the action of the trial
court in refusing to consider the proof referred to in the opinion showing that the plaintiff,
while engaged in assembling its stock, procured maritime insurance upon a fictitious
importation of silk. We earnestly commend the maintenance of liberal practice in the
admission of proof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO PRECIOSO,

Facts:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1985 at about 9:30 o'clock in the evening more or less,
particularly at the residence of Mrs. Irene Galvadores situated at Sitio Andanan, Barangay
Maygatasan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent, with unity of purpose conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a firearm (shoot arm) with intent to gain
and by means of force and violence against persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, stea(l) and carry away cash money in the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, jewelries valued at FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS, car
stereo valued at TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS, three (3) pieces of calculator(s) valued at
ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS, assorted personal belongings valued at SEVEN
THOUSAND (P7,000.00) PESOS to the total amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Rafael Galvadores and on the occasion thereof the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation and in pursuance to (sic) their conspiracy succeeded, (sic) in having sexual intercourse
with Leah Alimpoos three (3) times and Teresita Pescador once both of minor age against there (sic)
will and a woman (sic) of good reputation.

The crime was committed, according to the Solicitor General in the brief filed for the People, in the
following manner, to wit:

About 9:30 p.m. on 6 August 1985, Leah Alimpoos, who was sleeping at the
Galvadores' store at Sitio Andanan, Maygatasan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, with her
niece, Maryjane, and Paquito Camarin, a househelp, was awakened by four armed
men. The faces of the four were covered with handkerchiefs and stockings and only
their eyes and mouths were visible. Despite this, the frightened girl recognized
appellant Rolando Precioso, a neighbor, through his voice and general physical
appearance. The men instructed her to wake up her elder sister, Irene Galvadores,
on the pretext that Maryjane was suffering from a stomach ache (May 2, 1986 tsn, pp.
3-8).

Appellant Precioso and two of his companions then escorted Leah to the house,
which was ten (10) meters away from the store. As instructed, the hapless girl
shouted, "Ne, mata kay guisakitan si Maryjane ng tiyan" (Ne, you wake up because
Maryjane has a stomach ache) (Ibid., p. 9; April 21, 1986 tsn, p. 10; August 18, 1986
tsn, pp. 10, 22).

Rafael Galvadores and his wife, Irene, were roused from their sleep. Rafael called
out to Teresita Pescador, a househelp, who was sleeping with their daughter, Ana, in
another room to open the door (August 18, 1986 tsn, p. 22).

Teresita, who had just awakened, did as told and was surprised to see the three
armed men rushing inside and telling her not to move and to keep quiet. She
immediately recognized appellant Precioso, one of their neighbors who frequented
the store, through his physical appearance, his clothes and his voice (May 2, 1986
tsn, pp. 38-40).
 The three intruders then told Teresita to wake up the Galvadores couple. When the
couple went out of their room, appellant Precioso herded them to the sala of the
house, and forced Teresita and Ana into the couple's room. At the sala, Rafael was
made to lie down on his stomach, as the men ransacked the house looking for
valuables (Ibid. , pp. 39-42; August 18, 1986 tsn, pp. 11, 14, 24).

Later, Rafael and Leah were brought to the store by appellant Precioso, where
Rafael was made to lie down on his stomach again. While one of the men pointed a
gun at him, appellant Precioso forced Leah to lie down, removed her panties, and
raped her in the presence of Rafael, Paquito and Maryjane, all the time threatening
Leah with death if she would not keep quiet and submit to his lust. The poor girl was
unable to do anything, but cry. Appellant Precioso removed the cover of his face to
kiss Leah, allowing Leah and Rafael to recognize him (May 2, 1986, tsn, pp. 12-14;
August 18, 1986 tsn, pp. 24-28).

Back at the house, appellant Monforte dragged Teresita to the garage where he
removed her panties and raped her at gun point. Struggling and crying, Teresita
scratched his face, as a result of which his mask fell off, allowing her to see his face.
When he was finished, appellant Monforte sent her back to the room of the
Galvadores couple (May 2, 1986 tsn, pp. 44-47).

After raping Leah, appellant Precioso brought her back to the sala of the house. A
few minutes later, appellant Monforte brought her to the pigpen at the back of the
house. He threatened her with a gun, told her to lie down, hit her at the back just at
the top of the shoulder, and then raped her. At the time of the rape, Leah was able to
see his face since the handkerchief over his face was removed (May 2, 1986 tsn, pp.
15-17).

After raping her at the pigpen, appellant Monforte brought Leah to the side of the
house and raped her there a second time. Afterwards, he brought her to the house.
Leah went directly to her room where she continued crying (Ibid., pp. 19-21).

About 11:00 p.m., appellants and their companions left, taking with them P6,000.00
cash, pieces of jewelry valued at P4,000.00, three pieces of calculators valued at
P1,000.00, car stereo worth P2,000.00, personal belongings valued at P7,000.00,
and assorted stocks in the store valued at P10,000.00 (August 18, 1986 tsn, p. 15). 3

Issue: whether or not question of credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies

Ruling: (Direct evidence- directly from witnesses, testimonial) Evidence in the form of testimony
from a witness who actually saw, heard, or touched the subject of questioning

The issues on appeal hinge on the question of credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies.
Once again, we reiterate that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses' testimony
is accorded great respect on appeal, 6 and the records do not show that the court below disregarded
any consideration which would warrant a departure from this jurisprudential dictum. Appellate courts will
generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court in the raison d'etre that the latter is in a better
position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying, subject to exceptions which do not obtain in the present case.

The transcripts of the notes taken at the trial reveal that the witnesses for the prosecution
testified in a clear, consistent and forthright manner. The testimonies of the complainants
were basically congruent with and mutually corroborative of each other, and were confirmed
by those of the other prosecution witnesses. Their minor errors and inconsistencies do not
affect the substance of their declaration or adversely reflect on their veracity.

In contrast, the testimony of appellants consist merely of denials and alibi, without any other credible
evidence to sustain their exculpatory claims and defense. We have consistently ruled that denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which
deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of
credible witnesses. Ergo, as between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the
negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.

Expertravel & Tours Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, KAL etc. G.R. No. 152392,
26 May 2005
Facts:

Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South Korea and has
been granted license to do business in the Philippines. On 6 September 1999, KAL, through its legal
counsel, Atty. Mario Aguinaldo filed a complaint against ETI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, for the collection of sum of money totaling PhP260,150.00 plus attorney's fees and exemplary
damages. The complaint was attached with verification and certificate of non-forum shopping wherein
indicated that Atty. Aguinaldo is the agent and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the
said complaint.

ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to
execute the above-mentioned verification and non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. KAL, thereafter, opposed the motion contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident
agent and was registered as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It was also alleged
that Atty. Aguinaldo also served as the company's corporate secretary.

During the hearing, Atty Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through the
resolution approved by the KAL Board of Directors during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999.
Thereafter. KAL submitted an Affidavit executed by its General Manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the
board of directors conducted a special teleconference which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also
averred that in that Teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty.
Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the said complaint. Furthermore,
Su Kyoo Kim alleged that the corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.

Trial Court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty.
Aguinaldo and Su Kyoo Kim. ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order alleging that it is
inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any
prior hearing.

CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and ruling that the verification and certificate of non-
forum shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Is the petitioner correct in assailing that until and after teleconferencing is recognized as a legitimate
means of conducting meetings, gathering quorum of board of directors, such cannot be taken judicial
notice of by the court.

Held:
The petition is meritorious.
It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the
failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused. The certification is a peculiar and personal
responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other
pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Hence, the certification
must be accomplished by the party himself because he has actual knowledge of whether or not he has
initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or tribunals. Even his counsel may be unaware
of such facts. Hence, the requisite certification executed by the plaintiffs counsel will not suffice.

In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be signed, for and on behalf of
the said corporation, by a specifically authorized person, including its retained counsel, who has personal
knowledge of the facts required to be established by the documents.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
either:
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable.

In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be
made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication
(three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms,
teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of
miles.

This type of group communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types:
(1) video conferencing - television-like communication augmented with sound;
(2) computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and
(3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or
telecopying.

The Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of
persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate governance.

Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along
with the respondents Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there
had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically
authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum
shopping.

The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never took
place, and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondents Board of Directors during the said
teleconference was a mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert the
dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.

Petition granted.

(irregularities with the date of the resolution)

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and
other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On
November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings
were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the
President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment
trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel
resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and
local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC
declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada
and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for
WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases
filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming Estrada to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office.

Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent

disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when
respondent Arroyo took her oath as president.
The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of
the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of

the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as President
until President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Ruling:

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his
guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the
criminal cases in violation of his right to due process.

In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and
content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected
the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the
subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are
basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of
an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long
experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether
they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page
Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they
considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties.
The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the
generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak
well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification
of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their
bombardment of prejudicial publicity. (emphasis supplied)

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant
this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to
discharge his burden of proof.[131] He needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoingpreliminary
investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent
Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the
minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because
of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to
come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman
himself with bias. To quote petitioners submission, the respondent Ombudsman has
been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the
threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs. [132] News reports have also been
quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of
the petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner
will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The
accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject
of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent
Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we
adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of
respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their
own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their
superiors.[134] They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to change their
recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe
deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file
the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of probable
cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the
proper court.

MAXICARE VS ESTRADA (GR NO. 171052 JANUARY 28, 2008)

Philippine Health-Care Providers Inc. vs Estrada

GR No. 171052 January 28, 2008
Facts:
Maxicare is a domestic corporation engaged in selling health insurance plans
whose Chairman Dr. Roberto K. Macasaet, Chief Operating Officer Virgilio
del Valle, and Sales/Marketing Manager Josephine Cabrera were impleaded
as defendants-appellants. On September 15, 1990, Maxicare allegedly engaged
the services of Carmela Estrada who was doing business under the name of
CARA HEALTH SERVICES.to promote and sell the prepaid group practice
health care delivery program called MAXICARE Plan with the position of
Independent Account Executive.
Maxicare formally appointed Estrada as its General Agent, evidenced by a
letter-agreement dated February 16, 1991. The letter agreement provided for
plaintiff-appellees Estradas compensation in the form of commission.
Maxicare alleged that it followed a franchising system in dealing with its
agents whereby an agent had to first secure permission from Maxicare to list a
prospective company as client. Estrada alleged that it did apply with
Maxicare for the MERALCO account and other accounts, and in fact, its
franchise to solicit corporate accounts, MERALCO account included, was
renewed on February 11, 1991.
Plaintiff-appellee Estrada submitted proposals and made representations to
the officers of MERALCO regarding the MAXICARE Plan but when
MERALCO decided to subscribe to the MAXICARE Plan, Maxicare directly
negotiated with MERALCO regarding the terms and conditions of the
agreement and left plaintiff-appellee Estrada out of the discussions on the
terms and conditions.
Issue: Whether or not Estrada is entitled to the commission despite her
admission that the negotiation between her and MERALCO failed.

Held: Yes. The statement in Annex F amounted to an admission, provides a

contrary answer to Maxicares ridiculous contention. We intoned therein that
in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the trial
court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented.

As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule
that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not
require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission
was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such
admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an
admission by denying that he made such an admission.

For instance, if a party invokes an admission by an adverse party, but cites

the admission out of context, then the one making the admission may show
that he made no such admission, or that his admission was taken out of
context.

This may be interpreted as to mean not in the sense in which the admission is
made to appear. That is the reason for the modifier such.

In this case, the letter, although part of Estradas Complaint, is not, ipso facto,
an admission of the statements contained therein, especially since the bone of
contention relates to Estradas entitlement to commissions for the sale of
health plans she claims to have brokered. It is more than obvious from the
entirety of the records that Estrada has unequivocally and consistently
declared that her involvement as broker is the proximate cause which
consummated the sale between Meralco and Maxicare.

Moreover, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires the purpose for
which the evidence is offered to be specified. Undeniably, the letter was
attached to the Complaint, and offered in evidence, to demonstrate
Maxicares bad faith and ill will towards Estrada.
UFC vs CA

Facts:

On February 14, 1961 Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. and Victoriano V. Francisco filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, against, the Universal Food Corporation, an action for rescission of a
contract entitled "Bill of Assignment." The plaintiffs prayed the court to adjudge the defendant as
without any right to the use of the Mafran trademark and formula, and order the latter to restore to
them the said right of user; to order the defendant to pay Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. his unpaid salary
from December 1, 1960, as well as damages in the sum of P40,000, and to pay the costs of suit. 1

On February 28, the defendant filed its answer containing admissions and denials. Paragraph 3
thereof "admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs' complaint." The answer further
alleged that the defendant had complied with all the terms and conditions of the Bill of Assignment
and, consequently, the plaintiffs are not entitled to rescission thereof; that the plaintiff Magdalo V.
Francisco, Sr. was not dismissed from the service as permanent chief chemist of the corporation as
he is still its chief chemist; and, by way of special defenses, that the aforesaid plaintiff is estopped
from questioning 1) the contents and due execution of the Bill of Assignment, 2) the corporate acts
of the petitioner, particularly the resolution adopted by its board of directors at the special meeting
held on October 14, 1960, to suspend operations to avoid further losses due to increase in the prices
of raw materials, since the same plaintiff was present when that resolution was adopted and even
took part in the consideration thereof, 3) the actuations of its president and general manager in
enforcing and implementing the said resolution, 4) the fact that the same plaintiff was negligent in
the performance of his duties as chief chemist of the corporation, and 5) the further fact that the said
plaintiff was delinquent in the payment of his subscribed shares of stock with the corporation. The
defendant corporation prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and asked for P750 as attorney's
fees and P5,000 in exemplary or corrective damages.

On June 25, 1962 the lower court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint as well as the defendant's claim
for damages and attorney's fees, with costs against the former, who promptly appealed to the Court
of Appeals. On February 13, 1969 the appellate court rendered the judgment now the subject of the
present recourse.

(That as far back as 1938, plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. discovered or invented a formula for
the manufacture of a food seasoning (sauce) derived from banana fruits popularly known as
MAFRAN sauce; that the manufacture of this product was used in commercial scale in 1942, and in
the same year plaintiff registered his trademark in his name as owner and inventor with the Bureau
of Patents; that due to lack of sufficient capital to finance the expansion of the business, in 1960,
said plaintiff secured the financial assistance of Tirso T. Reyes who, after a series of negotiations,
formed with others defendant Universal Food Corporation eventually leading to the execution on
May 11, 1960 of the aforequoted "Bill of Assignment"

Thereafter, however, due to the alleged scarcity and high prices of raw materials, on November 28,
1960, Secretary-Treasurer Ciriaco L. de Guzman of defendant issued a Memorandum (Exhibit B),
duly approved by the President and General Manager Tirso T. Reyes that only Supervisor Ricardo
Francisco should be retained in the factory and that the salary of plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr.,
should be stopped for the time being until the corporation should resume its operation. Some five (5)
days later, that is, on December 3, 1960, President and General Manager Tirso T. Reyes, issued a
memorandom to Victoriano Francisco ordering him to report to the factory and produce "Mafran
Sauce" at the rate of not less than 100 cases a day so as to cope with the orders of the corporation's
various distributors and dealers, and with instructions to take only the necessary daily employees
without employing permanent employees (Exhibit B). Again, on December 6, 1961, another
memorandum was issued by the same President and General Manager instructing the Assistant
Chief Chemist Ricardo Francisco, to recall all daily employees who are connected in the production
of Mafran Sauce and also some additional daily employees for the production of Porky Pops (Exhibit
B-1). On December 29, 1960, another memorandum was issued by the President and General
Manager instructing Ricardo Francisco, as Chief Chemist, and Porfirio Zarraga, as Acting
Superintendent, to produce Mafran Sauce and Porky Pops in full swing starting January 2, 1961 with
further instructions to hire daily laborers in order to cope with the full blast protection (Exhibit S-2).
Plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. received his salary as Chief Chemist in the amount of P300.00 a
month only until his services were terminated on November 30, 1960. On January 9 and 16, 1961,
defendant, acting thru its President and General Manager, authorized Porfirio Zarraga and Paula de
Bacula to look for a buyer of the corporation including its trademarks, formula and assets at a price
of not less than P300,000.00 (Exhibits D and D-1). Due to these successive memoranda, without
plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. being recalled back to work, the latter filed the present action on
February 14, 1961. About a month afterwards, in a letter dated March 20, 1961, defendant, thru its
President and General Manager, requested said plaintiff to report for duty (Exhibit 3), but the latter
declined the request because the present action was already filed in court (Exhibit J).

Issue: whether by virtue of the terms of the Bill of Assignment the respondent Magdalo V. Francisco,
Sr. ceded and transferred to the petitioner corporation the formula for Mafran sauce.

Ruling:

The Bill of Assignment sets forth the following terms and conditions:

THAT the Party of the First Part [Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr.] is the sole and exclusive
owner of the MAFRAN trade-mark and the formula for MAFRAN SAUCE;

THAT for and in consideration of the royalty of TWO (2%) PER CENTUM of the net
annual profit which the PARTY OF THE Second Part [Universal Food Corporation]
may realize by and/or out of its production of MAFRAN SAUCE and other food
products and from other business which the Party of the Second Part may engage in
as defined in its Articles of Incorporation, and which its Board of Directors shall
determine and declare, said Party of the First Part hereby assign, transfer, and
convey all its property rights and interest over said Mafran trademark and formula for
MAFRAN SAUCE unto the Party of the Second Part;

THAT the payment for the royalty of TWO (2%) PER CENTUM of the annual net
profit which the Party of the Second Part obligates itself to pay unto the Party of the
First Part as founder and as owner of the MAFRAN trademark and formula for
MAFRAN SAUCE, shall be paid at every end of the Fiscal Year after the proper
accounting and inventories has been undertaken by the Party of the Second Part and
after a competent auditor designated by the Board of Directors shall have duly
examined and audited its books of accounts and shall have certified as to the
correctness of its Financial Statement;

THAT it is hereby understood that the Party of the First Part, to improve the quality of
the products of the Party of the First Part and to increase its production, shall
endeavor or undertake such research, study, experiments and testing, to invent or
cause to invent additional formula or formulas, the property rights and interest
thereon shall likewise be assigned, transferred, and conveyed unto the Party of the
Second Part in consideration of the foregoing premises, covenants and stipulations:
 THAT in the operation and management of the Party of the First Part, the Party of the
First Part shall be entitled to the following Participation:

(a) THAT Dr. MAGDALO V. FRANCISCO shall be appointed Second Vice-President

and Chief Chemist of the Party of the Second Part, which appointments are
permanent in character and Mr. VICTORIANO V. FRANCISCO shall be appointed
Auditor thereof and in the event that the Treasurer or any officer who may have the
custody of the funds, assets and other properties of the Party of the Second Part
comes from the Party of the First Part, then the Auditor shall not be appointed from
the latter; furthermore should the Auditor be appointed from the Party representing
the majority shares of the Party of the Second Part, then the Treasurer shall be
appointed from the Party of the First Part;

(b) THAT in case of death or other disabilities they should become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their respective position, then, their shares or assigns and
who may have necessary qualifications shall be preferred to succeed them;

(c) That the Party of the First Part shall always be entitled to at least two (2)
membership in the Board of Directors of the Party of the Second Part;

(d) THAT in the manufacture of MAFRAN SAUCE and other food products by the
Party of the Second Part, the Chief Chemist shall have and shall exercise absolute
control and supervision over the laboratory assistants and personnel and in the
purchase and safekeeping of the Chemicals and other mixtures used in the
preparation of said products;

THAT this assignment, transfer and conveyance is absolute and irrevocable in no

case shall the PARTY OF THE First Part ask, demand or sue for the surrender of its
rights and interest over said MAFRAN trademark and mafran formula, except when a
dissolution of the Party of the Second Part, voluntary or otherwise, eventually arises,
in which case then the property rights and interests over said trademark and formula
shall automatically revert the Party of the First Part.

Certain provisions of the Bill of Assignment would seem to support the petitioner's position that the
respondent patentee, Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. ceded and transferred to the petitioner corporation
the formula for Mafran sauce. Thus, the last part of the second paragraph recites that the
respondent patentee "assign, transfer and convey all its property rights and interest over said Mafran
trademark and formula for MAFRAN SAUCE unto the Party of the Second Part," and the last
paragraph states that such "assignment, transfer and conveyance is absolute and irrevocable (and)
in no case shall the PARTY OF THE First Part ask, demand or sue for the surrender of its rights and
interest over said MAFRAN trademark and mafran formula."

However, a perceptive analysis of the entire instrument and the language employed therein 3 would
lead one to the conclusion that what was actually ceded and transferred was only the use of the Mafran
sauce formula. This was the precise intention of the parties, 4 as we shall presently show.

Firstly, one of the principal considerations of the Bill of Assignment is the payment of "royalty of
TWO (2%) PER CENTUM of the net annual profit" which the petitioner corporation may realize by
and/or out of its production of Mafran sauce and other food products, etc. The word "royalty," when
employed in connection with a license under a patent, means the compensation paid for the use of a
patented invention.
 'Royalty,' when used in connection with a license under a patent, means the
compensation paid by the licensee to the licensor for the use of the licensor's
patented invention." (Hazeltine Corporation vs. Zenith Radio Corporation, 100 F. 2d
10, 16.) 5

Secondly, in order to preserve the secrecy of the Mafran formula and to prevent its unauthorized
proliferation, it is provided in paragraph 5-(a) of the Bill that the respondent patentee was to be
appointed "chief chemist ... permanent in character," and that in case of his "death or other
disabilities," then his "heirs or assigns who may have necessary qualifications shall be preferred to
succeed" him as such chief chemist. It is further provided in paragraph 5-(d) that the same
respondent shall have and shall exercise absolute control and supervision over the laboratory
assistants and personnel and over the purchase and safekeeping of the chemicals and other
mixtures used in the preparation of the said product. All these provisions of the Bill of Assignment
clearly show that the intention of the respondent patentee at the time of its execution was to part, not
with the formula for Mafran sauce, but only its use, to preserve the monopoly and to effectively
prohibit anyone from availing of the invention. 6

Thirdly, pursuant to the last paragraph of the Bill, should dissolution of the Petitioner corporation
eventually take place, "the property rights and interests over said trademark and formula shall
automatically revert to the respondent patentee. This must be so, because there could be no
reversion of the trademark and formula in this case, if, as contended by the petitioner, the
respondent patentee assigned, ceded and transferred the trademark and formula and not merely
the right to use it for then such assignment passes the property in such patent right to the
petitioner corporation to which it is ceded, which, on the corporation becoming insolvent, will become
part of the property in the hands of the receiver thereof. 7

Fourthly, it is alleged in paragraph 3 of the respondents' complaint that what was ceded and
transferred by virtue of the Bill of Assignment is the "use of the formula" (and not the formula itself).
This incontrovertible fact is admitted without equivocation in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's answer.
Hence, it does "not require proof and cannot be contradicted." 8 The last part of paragraph 3 of the
complaint and paragraph 3 of the answer are reproduced below for ready reference:

3. ... and due to these privileges, the plaintiff in return assigned to said corporation
his interest and rights over the said trademark and formula so that the defendant
corporation could use the formula in the preparation and manufacture of the mafran
sauce, and the trade name for the marketing of said project, as appearing in said
contract ....

3. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's

complaint.

Fifthly, the facts of the case compellingly demonstrate continued possession of the Mafran sauce
formula by the respondent patentee.

Finally, our conclusion is fortified by the admonition of the Civil Code that a conveyance should be
interpreted to effect "the least transmission of right," 9 and is there a better example of least
transmission of rights than allowing or permitting only the use, without transfer of ownership, of the
formula for Mafran sauce.

The foregoing reasons support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals 10 that what was actually ceded
and transferred by the respondent patentee Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. in favor of the petitioner
corporation was only the use of the formula. Properly speaking, the Bill of Assignment vested in the
petitioner corporation no title to the formula. Without basis, therefore, is the observation of the lower court
that the respondent patentee "had been remiss in the compliance of his contractual obligation to cede and
transfer to the defendant the formula for Mafran sauce."

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
HON. FELINO D. ABALOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch II, 16th Judicial
District, and MOHAMMAD USSAM DAMBONG, respondents.

Facts:

This is a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction, to
annul an order of Honorable Felino D. Abalos, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Sulu,
directing that the testimony of a rebuttal witness for the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 3158 of
said Court be stricken from the records. Soon after the filing of the petition herein, We issued a
temporary restraining order directing that the continuation of the trial of said case be suspended until
further orders.

On or about March 9, 1966, an information was filed with said court, presided over by respondent
Judge, accusing Mohammad Ussam Dambong, Jikiri Dambong, Amiril Habissi and Ahmad Intoman,
of the crime of double murder upon Abdulhadi Maoludani and Maoludani Habissi, with multiple
frustrated murder upon the persons of Sarahani Maoludani, Marajuko Maoludani and Abdulrajik
Maoludani, allegedly committed on February 6, 1961, in Guimba Asin, municipality of Panamao,
province of Sulu. When the case was called for trial, the prosecution introduced evidence tending to
show that defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong had, on February 6, 1961, gone to the place
aforementioned, accompanied by his co-defendants, and then fired at and killed Maoludani Habissi
and Abdulhadi Maoludani, as well as shot and wounded the other persons named in the information.
After the reception of said evidence for the prosecution, the defense proceeded with the presentation
of its own evidence, in the course of which, defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong testified that
the casualties and the injuries adverted to above were due to shots fired, not by him, but by
Abdulkadil Habbisi because, as a police sergeant in the performance of his duty, he (Mohammad
Ussam Dambong) had merely fired into the air, to stop a fight between two (2) groups of persons, to
one of which the victims belonged. The defense having, thereafter, completed the introduction of its
evidence, on April 24, 1968, the prosecution called Majid Andi as rebuttal witness.

After the preliminary questions propounded to him, the defense objected to further questions, upon
the ground that Madjid Andi appeared to have witnessed the occurrence and that his testimony
should have been introduced when the prosecution presented its evidence in chief. Respondent
Judge sustained the objection, but, later, reconsidered his resolution, as the prosecution explained
that it had discovered Madjid Andi sometime after the introduction of its evidence in chief and that
the testimony of said witness would merely rebut that of defendant Mohammed Ussam Dambong.
Thereupon, the prosecution resumed the examination of Madjid Andi, who said that he was present
when the shooting involved in the case took place, that Maoludani Habissi and Abdulhadi Maoludani
were shot by defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong, not by Abdulkadil Habbisi, and that the latter
was not even at the scene of the occurrence. The prosecution then asked Madjid Andi whether
Mohammad Ussam Dambong was in the courtroom. The defense objected to this question as
improper for rebuttal, and one that should have been asked during the presentation by the
prosecution of its evidence in chief. Respondent Judge sustained the objection and ordered the
testimony of Madjid Andi stricken from the record, as improper for rebuttal.

The prosecutor having announced that Madjid Andi would be its last witness and that he (prosecutor)
would appeal from the resolution of the court as soon as copy thereof had been furnished him,
respondent Judge incorporated his aforementioned resolution in an order, dated May 2, 1968,
directing that the testimony of said witness, be "discarded from the records on the ground that the
testimony are answers to questions not proper in rebuttal" and stating that "from the observation of
the Court, the witness in rebuttal should have been presented as a witness in the presentation of the
evidence in chief of the prosecutor", and declaring that the case would be deemed submitted for
decision on May 15, 1968, unless the parties sought permission to file memoranda on or before said
date.

Hence, this original action for certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary mandatory injunction, filed
by the prosecution against said respondent Judge and Mohammad Ussam Dambong, for the
purpose stated at the beginning of this decision. In his answer to the petition herein, respondent
Judge reiterated the views expressed by him during the trial, as well as in the resolution and the
order complained of. Respondent Mohammad Ussam Dambong filed an answer defending the
position taken by respondent Judge. Such position is utterly untenable.

Issue:

whether or not respondent Judge erred in ordering the testimony of Madjid Andi stricken from the
records,\

Ruling

Under the circumstances, it is obvious that, in directing that the testimony of Madjid Andi be stricken
from the record and not allowing said witness to identify the person who committed the crime
aforementioned, respondent Judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction.

Trial courts have ample discretion to determine whether or not the parties should be allowed to
introduce evidence in rebuttal. Moreover, its resolutions on these matters are interlocutory in nature
and will not generally be reviewed, except on appeal taken from a decision rendered on the merits.
Judicial discretion, however, is not unlimited. It must be exercised reasonably, with a view to
promoting the ends of justice, one of which is to ascertain the truth. Hence, whenever discretion is
vested, it must be understood to be a sound one, inasmuch as the interest of justice, equity and fair
play cannot be advanced otherwise. This is particularly with respect to rules of procedure, especially
those governing the admission or exclusion of evidence. As a matter of general practice, it is
deemed best to resolve doubts in favor of the admission of the contested evidence, without prejudice
to such action as the court may deem fit to take in deciding the case on the merits.1 This practice has
added importance as regards the evidence for the prosecution in criminal cases, for, once the
accused has been acquitted, there is no means to secure a review by appeal, no matter how
erroneous the action of the lower court may have been. Hence, We have been constrained to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal action involved in the case at bar, to forestall a possible
miscarriage of justice.

We, likewise, called attention to the following view, expressed in Prats & Co. v. Phoenix Insurance
Co.3 as far back as February 21, 1929:

In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and
expeditiously administered in the courts where trivial objections to the admission of proof are
received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case
of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the
development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not;
 and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence,
the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that
the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of
the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in
judging the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When
such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon
appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error
without returning the case for a new trial a step which this court is always very loath to
take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the
question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much
harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is
its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material
from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is
prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the material
before it necessary to make a correct judgment.

and commented that:

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions
arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion
of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.

as We granted a similar writ, in People v. Yatco,4 against another trial court that had ordered the
exclusion of an extrajudicial confession sought to be introduced as part of the evidence for the
prosecution.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROLAND TACIPIT, accused-appellant.

Facts:

Onelia Pamittan, was a 17-year old high school student at the Abulug School of Fisheries in Abulug,
Cagayan at the time of he commission of the offense. She had a friend, Eden Molina, who studied at
the same school and lived about two (2) kilometers from the school.

In the afternoon of January 3, 1991, Eden invited some of her friends, including the complainant,
over to her house. When the group arrived at Eden's house, at about 4:30 p.m., the accused-
appellant Roland Tacipit was already there with Eden's brother, Elmer Molina, the latter being a
friend and co-worker of the accused. Previous to this meeting, the complainant already knew the
accused since he lived only a few meters from her home. She also knew the accused to be a
married man.

After partaking of a snack of tinubong (native rice cakes), the group decided to go home. At this
point, the version given by the prosecution and the defense differed. According to the complainant,
as she was about to leave the Molina house, the accused restrained her, held her left hand and her
notebooks and told her friends to go ahead. Despite her cries and pleas for help, the owners of the
house did nothing to help her. On the other hand, defense witness Elmer Molina alleged that the
complainant and the accused were sweethearts. They left the house together, with their hands over
each other's shoulders. At any rate, it is undisputed that the complainant left the Molina household
with the accused.
On the way, they passed through a coconut plantation of a certain Guillermo Agustin. By then, it was
already getting dark. There, the accused took hold of the wrists of the complainant and wrestled her
down to the ground. He tore off the T-shirt and skirt she was wearing and pinned her hands across
her stomach. The accused then removed her shorts and panty and ravished her. After the carnal act,
the accused accompanied the complainant to a point near her home and before leaving her,
threatened to kill her or her family if she reports the matter to anyone. The complainant, however, did
not heed the warning and immediately upon arriving at her house, reported the incident to her uncle,
Ernesto Marantan, with whom she was residing. Marantan looked for the accused that same evening,
but after failing in his search, he reported the matter instead to the barangay captain.

The following day, the complainant accompanied by her mother, aunt and cousin, reported the
incident to the police at the municipal building. She submitted her clothing for examination and after
being investigated, submitted herself for medical examination.

On January 5, 1991, the complainant executed a sworn statement narrating the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime and filed the corresponding complaint for rape. After a
thorough investigation which resulted in the finding of probable cause, the municipal trial court
issued a warrant of arrest against the accused.

On February 18, 1991, an information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor against the accused, as
follows:

The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, upon complaint filed by the offended party,
Nelia T. Pamittan, in the Municipal Trial Court of Abulug, Cagayan, appearing on
page 1, the record of the case, and forming an integral part of this Information,
accuses Roland Tacipit y Manglapuz of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
under Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about January 3, 1991, in the municipality of Abulug, province of Cagayan

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Roland Tacipit y
Manglapuz, with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, and with
the use of deadly weapon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with the offended party, Onelia T. Pamittan, a minor, seventeen
(17) years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p, 7)

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.

As his defense, the accused claimed that he and the complainant were sweethearts since October 3,
1990 and that the complainant voluntarily yielded herself to him. As proof of their relationship, the
accused presented a ring engraved with the name "Onelia" and alleged that it was given to him by
the complainant as a token of her love. Defense witness Elmer Molina corroborated the testimony of
the accused, stating that he courted the complainant but was spurned by her because she was
already the accused's sweetheart.

On the other hand, these contentions were firmly denied by the prosecution. The complainant
testified that she knew the accused to be a married man and he never visited her house to court her.
She also denied that Elmer Molina courted her or that she told him that he was the accused's
girlfriend. As for the ring, the complainant denied ownership thereof. True enough, when the ring
was tried on her hand, it was loose and did not fit her finger (Rollo, p. 23).
The trial court, after consideration of the evidence presented, rendered the forequoted judgment
against the accused. Hence, the present appeal

Issue: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 1N GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE OTHERWISE
DOUBTFUL THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION AND IN DISREGARDING THAT OF THE
DEFENSE.

Defense

The defense argues that the weight of the evidence presented by the prosecution is grossly
inadequate to overthrow the presumption of innocence granted by law to the accused. It is the
contention of the accused-appellant that the testimony of complainant relied upon by the trial court in
convicting him is incredible and not worthy of belief. There are inconsistencies in said testimony. It is
also saddled with flaws which show her tendency to exaggerate things (Rollo, p. 61-64).

Secondly, the accused argues that the physical evidence as well as the actuations of the
parties concerned are not consistent with the allegation of rape but with carnal knowledge
done with the consent of both the accused and the complainant. As proof, the accused
pointed out the lack of external injuries on the body of the complainant. This fact negates the
employment of force by the accused on the complainant and rules out struggle or any other
form of resistance on the part of the complainant.

Ruling:

There is present in this case clear, convincing and competent physical and testimonial evidence to
support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused. The testimony of
complainant Onelia Pamittan, was found by the trial court to be replete with details, negating the
probability of fabrication. Although the trial court did not accord credence to that part of her testimony
relating to how she ended up leaving the Molina household with the accused, the same did not
militate against the credibility of the complainant as a prosecution witness.

As far as alleged inconsistencies in her testimony are concerned, this Court has ruled time and
again that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor
details, and not in actuality touching upon the basic aspects of the whys and wherefores of the crime,
do not impair their credibility (People vs. Custodio, 197 SCRA 538 [1991] citing People vs. Muoz,
163 SCRA 780]. This is especially true in the crime of rape where the victim cannot be expected to
remember with accuracy the details of her humiliating experience. At best, this Court relies upon the
fact that the trial court found the complainant to be a credible witness. As often repeated by this
Court:

. . . the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and
most competently performed by the trial judge, who, unlike appellate magistrates,
can weigh such testimony in the light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct and
attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate
between the true and the false. Appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack
of it, accorded by the trial court of the testimony of witnesses unless it be clearly
shown that the latter court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and
circumstances of significance in the case (People vs. Simbulan, 214 SCRA 537
[1992]).

The appeal at hand presents no compelling reason to deviate from this general rule.
Anent the contention of the accused that the sexual act was committed with the mutual consent of
the parties, the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently rebutted his point.

For one, although there was an absence of external injuries on the body of the complainant,
the clothes worn by her at the time of the offense speak well of the use of force and the
presence of a struggle. As the trial court noted:

Her T-shirt was torn which corroborates her testimony that it was forcibly
removed. It also proves that she offered resistance to the criminal advances of
the accused. Her shorts, like her panty, had blood stains. Her panty was
detached from her shorts. Her bra was torn, also denoting that it was forcibly
removed. These physical evidence . . . are consistent only with the force and
compulsion applied on her; they prove she offered resistance and her
defloration was against her will. (Rollo, p. 27)

The actuations of the complainant subsequent to the commission of the crime are likewise
consistent with her allegations of rape. Her immediate revelation of the incident to her uncle
upon arrival as well as her swift recourse to the barangay Captain and the police authorities
are not acts of a woman savoring an illicit tryst but that of a maiden seeking retribution for
the outrage committed against her.

Thus, the accused's reliance on the defense that he and the complainant were lovers is unfounded.
But even if it were true, such relationship would not give the accused the license to deflower the
complainant against her will, and will not exonerate him from the criminal charge for rape.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the testimonies of either the complainant or even the accused
himself which could indicate any sort of special relationship between the two. The alleged
proof of such relationship, the ring with complainant's name engraved on it, does not even fit
the fingers of the complainant. Their actuations with respect to each other before, during and
even after the commission of the crime were consistent with the contention of the
complainant that they are nothing more than acquaintances. The evidence of the prosecution,
therefore, completely negates the existence of any relationship between the accused and the
complainant.

Finally, the accused's act of accompanying the complainant up to a point near her house does not
appear to be a gesture of love. If the accused was not obsessed with a sense of guilt, he could have
accompanied the complainant to the home since it was already dark at night. Rather than a
demonstration of his freedom from guilt, the actuation of the accused in the premises appears to be
no less than a calculated move to ensure that the complainant will keep her silence about the sordid
incident perpetrated against her will.

EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,

vs.
RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.

Facts:

Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case
coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of
the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, nor
become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors
to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that
such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-
incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to
Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.

Issue:

whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if
she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of
Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States and practically all
state constitutions and in the common law rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

Ruling:

We can only consistently consent to the retention of a principle which would permit of such a result
by adhering steadfastly to the proposition that the purpose of the constitutional provision was and is
merely to prohibit testimonial compulsion.

Thus, the always forward looking jurist, Mr. Justice Holmes, in the late case of Holt vs. United States
([1910], 218 U. S., 245), in resolving an objection based upon what he termed "an extravagant
extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to
be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." (See
also, of same general tenor, decision of Mr. Justice Day in Adams vs. New York [1903], 192 U. S.,
585.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has seemed to limit the
protection to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The constitutional
limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt." (U. S. vs. Tan Teng [1912], 23
Phil., 145; U. S. vs. Ong Siu Hong [1917], 36 Phil., 735, and the derivatory principle announced in 16
Corpus Juris, 567, 568, citing the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands as authority.)

It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested

physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any
more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being
made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.

Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an
examination of the person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should,
nevertheless, be understood as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The
writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner.
So ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VALERIANO

AMESTUZO y VIAS, FEDERICO AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO
BAGAS y DALUHATAN and DIASCORO VIAS y ODAL, accused,
ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN, accused-appellant.
Facts:
The incident happened at the compound of Block 5, Road 32, Phase II of the Sacred
Heart Village in Kalookan City (pp. 6-7, TSN, July 2, 1991). In the compound are the
main house where Mrs. Perlita Lacsamana resides and another house which serves as
the office and quarters for Lacsamanas employees. In between of these two houses is
about three (3) meter-wide area where the dirty kitchen and the garage are found. In
the first floor of the main house is the masters bedroom, and on the second floor is the
guestroom (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 2, 1991).

While at the masters bedroom on that particular evening at about 9:30 p.m.,
Lacsamana overheard her maid, cried aray, aray, aray. She immediately went out but
as soon as she opened the door of her room, two (2) men (one of them is accused
Amestuzo while the other one remains unarrested) poked their guns on her. At gun
point, Lacsamana, Lea, Edwin, and Belen were forcibly brought to the second floor of
the main house. Thereat, Lacsamana saw four (4) other male persons ransacking her
premises. The said male persons, armed with guns and knives, tied her including all
her employees and members of her household with the use of torn electric fan wire
and television wire. After that they were told to lie down with face against the floor
but a minute later she was asked where the masters bedroom is and when she
answered that it is on the ground floor, she was again forcefully brought down. On her
way down, she saw, aside from the six (6) male persons who were inside her house,
two (2) other male persons (later identified as accused Ampatin and Vias) outside the
main house but within the compound (pp. 8-10, TSN, July 2, 1991).

Once they were already inside the masters bedroom, the six (6 ) armed male persons
(two (2) of them were Amestuzo and Bagas) ransacked the same and took all her
monies, jewelries, shoes, jackets, colored television and imported wine. Likewise,
aforesaid accused ate the foods found by them in their kitchen. (pp.10-11, 13, TSN,
July 2, 1991).

After ransacking the room, two (2) of the accused, one (1) of them is Amestuzo,
brought Estrella Rolago inside her room and afterwhich she was in turn brought to the
guest room. Thereat she heard Rolago pleading Maawa kayo, maawa kayo then after
ten (10) minutes, Rolago, with bloodstain on her shorts, was brought in back to the
guest room (pp. 13-14, TSN, July 2, 1991). Rolago was raped by Amestuzo (pp. 17-20,
TSN, July 3, 1991).

Almost simultaneously, Bagas likewise sexually assaulted and ravished Fe Catanyag

(pp. 38-40, TSN, July 3, 1991; pp. 2-5, TSN, July 4, 1991). Thereafter, Bagas shouted
at her to stand up and although she was experiencing pain on her private part which
was bleeding at that time, she stood up, dressed up and proceeded to the servants
quarter (pp. 4-5, TSN, July 4, 1991).
Thereafter, Mrs, Lacsamana shouted for help. Sensing that the accused had already
left, they locked the door. With the help of her employer and co-employees, more
particularly Nanding, she and Rolago were brought the nearby Neopolitan Clinic and
from there they proceeded to the St. Lukes Hospital where Dr. Brion treated Catanyag
and Rolago (pp. 6-7, TSN, July 4, 1991; pp. 19-20, TSN, July 3, 1991).[3]

On November 28, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment convicting all the accused.
This is an appeal from the decision dated November 28, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
131, Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. 36930 finding accused-appellant Albino Bagas guilty of the
complex crime of robbery in band with double rape and sentencing him accordingly.

Issue: W/N the trial courts error in giving due weight to the open court identification of him which was
based on a suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification,

Defense:

On February 26, 1991, four days after the alleged incident, a group of policemen together
with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NIA
Road, Pasay City where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were
looking for a certain Mario and searched the first and second floors of the building. Failing to
find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, Niloloko
lang yata tayo ng taong ito and Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino. It was at this juncture that Ampatin
pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon.
Thereafter, he was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused
Ampatin. While on board the jeep, accused Ampatin told him that he (Ampatin) committed an
error in pointing him out to the police, namumukaan lang niya ako, napagkamalian lang niya
ako. They were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed under
detention together with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias. When the complainants
arrived, accused-appellant was brought out, instructed to turn to the left and then to the right and
he was asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and
Vias. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants that
accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy,
kicking and hitting him. They only stopped when one of the policemen intervened.

Ruling:

The manner by which (witnesses) were made to identify the accused at the police
station was pointedly suggestive, generated confidence where there was none,
activated visual imagination, and all told, subverted their reliability as eyewitnesses.

In Tuason vs. Court of Appeals,[18] an NBI agent first pointed the accused to the witnesses
after which the latter identified the accused. The Court held that such identification was doubtful
as the same was not spontaneous and independent as there was improper suggestion coming from
the NBI agent. We ruled that a show-up or the presentation of a single suspect to a witness for
purposes of identification is seriously flawed as it constitutes the most grossly suggestive
identification procedure now or ever used by the police.
Likewise in People vs. Meneses,[19] where the accused was presented to the lone witness as
the suspect in the crime inside the police investigators office, the Court pronounced that although
the police officer did not literally point to the accused as in the Tuason case, the confrontation
and the identification proceeding therefrom was objectionable.
The Court also finds that the trial court erroneously rejected accused-appellants alibi.
Accused-appellant clearly and positively testified that at the time of the crime, February 22,
1991, he was working as a shell cutter in a factory in Pasay City where he was a stay-in
employee. He rendered overtime work until ten oclock in the evening that night because they had
to rush work. After ten p.m., he, together with his stay-in co-workers, went to sleep. Four days
later, he was arrested when accused Ampatin randomly pointed him out to the police.[20]
This testimony of accused-appellant was materially corroborated by two of his co-
employees who were with him on the night of the incident. Rodolfo Rosales, his co-worker,
testified that he worked overtime until 10 p.m. in the Pasay City factory together with accused-
appellant. Upon finishing work, they went to sleep in their quarters on the second floor of the
building because they were stay-in employees of the factory.[21] Another co-worker of accused-
appellant, Clemente Gahelan, was similarly offered as a witness to corroborate Rosales
testimony and his testimony was duly admitted by the prosecution.[22]
The employer of accused-appellant Rolando Ocasla, likewise testified that on the night of
the incident, accused-appellant worked overtime in his factory until 10 p.m. After 10 p.m., he
personally locked the door of the premises which was the only means of ingress and engress, as
he always does because it was his means of preventing any pilferage of materials. He was the
only one who had keys to said door. Around five a.m. of the following day, he woke up accused-
appellant and told him to drink his coffee. He also declared that there was nothing unusual about
accused-appellants behavior either, before, during or after the date of the alleged crime.[23]
The defense of alibi or denial assumes significance or strength when it is amply
corroborated by a credible witness.[24] And to be given weight, accused must prove not only that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he was so far away that it was
physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission. [25]
In this case, we find accused-appellants alibi sufficiently corroborated by the testimonies of
his co-workers and his employer who categorically stated that they were with accused-appellant
on the night of the crime. There was no evidence that these witnesses were related to accused-
appellant; neither was it shown that they had any personal interest nor motive in the case. As
impartial credible witnesses, their testimonies cannot be doubted absent a clear showing of undue
bias or prejudice, or convincing proof of the impropriety of their motives to testify for the
accused.

The testimony of witness Rosales corroborates Ampatins declaration in court that he does not know
herein accused-appellant and merely pointed to him out of fear of the police. These testimonies remain
unrebutted by the prosecution as the arresting officers were not presented to refute or deny the
same. The foregoing testimonies exculpating accused-appellant have sufficiently cast at least a shadow
of doubt as to his guilt.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DOMICIANO BERAME alias DOMING, defendant-appellant.

Facts: