Braunfeld v.

Brown
1961
Facts of the Case
Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail
clothing and home furnishing store in
Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was
prohibited by his faith from working on
Saturday, the Sabbath. The Pennsylvania
blue law only allowed certain stores to
remain open for business on Sundays.
Braunfeld's store was not one of those
types allowed to be open. He challenged
the law as a violation of the religious
liberty clauses because he needed to be
open six days a week for economic reasons
and was prohibited from doing so by a
tenet of his faith and the blue law.
Question
Did the Pennsylvania blue law violate the
First Amendment's protection of free
exercise of religious beliefs?
Conclusion
Decision: 5 votes for Brown, 4 vote(s)
against
Legal provision: Equal Protection
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that
the Pennsylvania blue law did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause. The freedom to
hold religious beliefs and opinions is
absolute; however, the freedom to act
(even in accordance with religious
convictions) is not totally free from
government restrictions. The Court found
that the Sunday Closing Law had a
secular basis and did not make any
religious practices unlawful. The blue law
is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance unless the state can
accomplish its secular goal of providing a
uniform day of rest for all through other
means. That an indirect burden, such as
economic sacrifice, may be a result of the
statute, does not make the blue law
unconstitutional.
Cantwell v. Connecticut
1939
Facts of the Case
Jesse Cantwell and his son were
Jehovah's Witnesses; they were
proselytizing a predominantly Catholic
neighborhood in Connecticut. The
Cantwells distributed religious materials
by travelling door-to-door and by
approaching people on the street. After
voluntarily hearing an anti-Roman
Catholic message on the Cantwells'
portable phonograph, two pedestrians
reacted angrily. The Cantwells were
subsequently arrested for violating a local
ordinance requiring a permit for
solicitation and for inciting a breach of the
peace.
Question
Did the solicitation statute or the "breach
of the peace" ordinance violate the
Cantwells' First Amendment free speech
or free exercise rights?
Conclusion
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court
held that while general regulations on
solicitation were legitimate, restrictions
based on religious grounds were not.
Because the statute allowed local officials
to determine which causes were religious
and which ones were not, it violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Court also held that while the
maintenance of public order was a valid
state interest, it could not be used to
justify the suppression of "free
communication of views." The Cantwells'
message, while offensive to many, did not
entail any threat of "bodily harm" and
was protected religious speech.

Everson v. Board of Educ
1946
Facts of the Case
A New Jersey law allowed
reimbursements of money to parents who
sent their children to school on buses
operated by the public transportation
system. Children who attended Catholic
schools also qualified for this
transportation subsidy.
Question
Did the New Jersey statute violate the
Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment as made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Conclusion
No. A divided Court held that the law did
not violate the Constitution. After
detailing the history and importance of
the Establishment Clause, Justice Black
argued that services like bussing and
police and fire protection for parochial
schools are "separate and so indisputably
marked off from the religious function"
that for the state to provide them would
not violate the First Amendment. The law
did not pay money to parochial schools,
nor did it support them directly in
anyway. It was simply a law enacted as a
"general program" to assist parents of all
religions with getting their children to
school.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania
1942
Facts of the Case
The Borough of Jeannette,
Pennsylvania mandated that all
solicitors that sold goods within the
borough purchase a solicitation
license. Robert Murdock was a
Jehovah's Witness who canvassed door
to door within Jeannette, offering
religious texts in exchange for
donations. He and other Jehovah's
Witnesses were arrested for their
solicitation of their texts. They were
convicted and fined for violating
Jeannette's ordinance. The Jehovah's
Witnesses appealed to the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania, alleging that
the ordinance violated the Free
Speech, Free Press, and Free Exercise
of Religion clauses of the First
Amendment. The Superior Court
upheld the ordinance and their
convictions, and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania declined to hear their
appeal.
Question
Did Jeannette's ordinance violate the
Freedom of Speech, Press, and
Religion clauses of the First
Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court reversed the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania and held the ordinance
unconstitutional. Writing for the
majority, Justice William O. Douglas
characterized the Jehovah's
Witnesses' activities in the borough as
"more than preaching" and "more than
distribution of religious literature."
Their door-to-door activities, though
unconventional, "occupie[d] the same
high estate under the First
Amendment as do worship in the
churches and preaching from the
pulpits." The Court recognized the
need of the Jehovah's Witnesses to
sustain themselves. Though the
organization solicited donations in
their distribution of literature,
"freedom of speech, freedom of the
press, freedom of religion are available
to all, not merely to those who can pay
their own way." While the borough did
have an interest in preserving the
public peace, the Jehovah's Witnesses
were soliciting "peacefully and
quietly." The ordinance did not further
the borough's interest in restricting
the activities of the Jehovah's
Witnesses, and was therefore
unconstitutional.
Shertbert v. Verner
1962
Facts of the Case
Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-
day Adventist Church, was fired from her
job after she refused to work on Saturday,
the Sabbath Day of her faith. The South
Carolina Employment Security
Commission denied her benefits, finding
unacceptable her religious justification for
refusing Saturday work.
Question
Did the denial of unemployment
compensation violate the First and
Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion
Decision: 7 votes for Sherbert, 2 vote(s)
against
Legal provision: Free Exercise of
Religion
Yes. The Court held that the state's
eligibility restrictions for unemployment
compensation imposed a significant
burden on Sherbert's ability to freely
exercise her faith. Furthermore, there
was no compelling state interest which
justified such a substantial burden on this
basic First Amendment right.
US v. Seeger
1965
Syllabus
These three cases involve the
exemption claims under 6(j) of the
Universal Military Training and
Service Act of conscientious objectors
who did not belong to an orthodox
religious sect. Section 6(j) excepts from
combatant service in the armed forces
those who are conscientiously opposed
to participation in war by reason of
their "religious training and belief,"
i.e., belief in an individual's relation to
a Supreme Being involving duties
beyond a human relationship but not
essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code. In all the cases,
convictions were obtained in the
District Courts for refusal to submit to
induction in the armed forces; in Nos.
50 and 51 the Court of Appeals
reversed, and in No. 29, the conviction
was affirmed.
Held:
1. The test of religious belief within
the meaning of the exemption in 6(j)
is whether it is a sincere and
meaningful belief occupying in the life
of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly
qualified for the exemption. Pp. 380 U.
S. 173-180.
(a) The exemption does not cover those
who oppose war from a merely
personal moral code, nor those who
decide that war is wrong on the basis
of essentially political, sociological or
economic considerations, rather than
religious belief. P. 380 U. S. 173.
(b) There is no issue here of atheistic
beliefs, and, accordingly, the decision
does not deal with that question. Pp.
380 U. S. 173-174.
(c) This test accords with long
established legislative policy of equal
treatment for those whose objection to
military service is based on religious
beliefs. Pp. 380 U. S. 177-180.
2. Local boards and courts are to
decide whether the objector's beliefs
are sincerely held and whether they
are, in his own scheme of things,
religious; they are not to require proof
of the religious
Page 380 U. S. 164
doctrines, nor are they to reject beliefs
because they are not comprehensible.
Pp. 380 U. S. 184-185.
3. Under the broad construction
applicable to 6(j), the applications
involved in these cases, none of which
was based on merely personal moral
codes, qualified for exemption. Pp. 380
U. S. 185-188.
326 F.2d 846 and 325 F.2d 409
affirmed; 324 F.2d 173 reversed.
Walz v. Tax Commission of the
City of New York
Syllabus
Appellant property owner
unsuccessfully sought an injunction in
the New York courts to prevent the
New York City Tax Commission from
granting property tax exemptions to
religious organizations for properties
used solely for religious worship, as
authorized by the state constitution
and the implementing statute
providing for tax exemptions for
property used exclusively for religious,
educational, or charitable purposes.
Appellant contended that the
exemptions, as applied to religious
bodies, violated provisions prohibiting
establishment of religion under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Held:
1. The First Amendment tolerates
neither governmentally established
religion nor governmental interference
with religion. Pp. 397 U. S. 667-672.
2. The legislative purpose of tax
exemptions is not aimed at
establishing, sponsoring, or supporting
religion, and New York's legislation
simply spares the exercise of religion
from the burden of property taxation
levied on private profit institutions.
Pp. 397 U. S. 672-674.
3. The tax exemption creates only a
minimal and remote involvement
between church and state, far less
than taxation of churches would
entail, and it restricts the fiscal
relationship between them, thus
tending to complement and reinforce
the desired separation insulating each
from the other. Pp. 397 U. S. 674-676.
4. Freedom from taxation for two
centuries has not led to an established
church or religion, and, on the
contrary, has helped to guarantee the
free exercise of all forms of religious
belief. Pp. 397 U. S. 676-680.
24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d 517, interest of parents with respect to the
affirmed. religious upbringing of their children.
Pp. 406 U. S. 213-215.
Wisconsin v. Yoder
1972 2. Respondents have amply supported
their claim that enforcement of the
Syllabus
compulsory formal education
Respondents, members of the Old requirement after the eighth grade
Order Amish religion and the would gravely endanger if not destroy
Conservative Amish Mennonite the free exercise of their religious
Church, were convicted of violating beliefs. Pp. 406 U. S. 215-219
Wisconsin's compulsory school
3. Aided by a history of three centuries
attendance law (which requires a
as an identifiable religious sect and a
child's school attendance until age 16)
long history as a successful and self-
by declining to send their children to
sufficient segment of American
public or private school after they had
society, the Amish have demonstrated
graduated from the eighth grade. The
the sincerity of their religious beliefs,
evidence showed that the Amish
the interrelationship of belief with
provide continuing informal vocational
their mode of life, the vital role that
education to their children designed to
belief and daily conduct play in the
prepare them for life in the rural
continuing survival of Old Order
Amish community. The evidence also
Amish communities, and the hazards
showed that respondents sincerely
presented by the State's enforcement
believed that high school attendance
of a statute generally valid as to
was contrary to the Amish religion
others. Beyond this, they have
and way of life, and that they would
endanger their own salvation and that Page 406 U. S. 206
of their children by complying with the
carried the difficult burden of
law. The State Supreme Court
demonstrating the adequacy of their
sustained respondents' claim that
alternative mode of continuing
application of the compulsory school
informal vocational education in terms
attendance law to them violated their
of the overall interest that the State
rights under the Free Exercise Clause
relies on in support of its program of
of the First Amendment, made
compulsory high school education. In
applicable to the States by the
light of this showing, and weighing the
Fourteenth Amendment.
minimal difference between what the
Held: State would require and what the
Amish already accept, it was
1. The State's interest in universal
incumbent on the State to show with
education is not totally free from a
more particularity how its admittedly
balancing process when it impinges on
strong interest in compulsory
other fundamental rights, such as
education would be adversely affected
those specifically protected by the Free
by granting an exemption to the
Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and the traditional
Amish. Pp. 406 U. S. 212-29, 406 U. S.
234-236.
4. The State's claim that it is
empowered, as parens patriae, to
extend the benefit of secondary
education to children regardless of the
wishes of their parents cannot be
sustained against a free exercise claim
of the nature revealed by this record,
for the Amish have introduced
convincing evidence that
accommodating their religious
objections by forgoing one or two
additional years of compulsory
education will not impair the physical
or mental health of the child, or result
in an inability to be self-supporting or
to discharge the duties and
responsibilities of citizenship, or in
any other way materially detract from
the welfare of society. Pp. 406 U. S.
229-234.
49 Wis.2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539,
affirmed.
Zorach v. Clauson
1952
Syllabus
Under 3210 of the New York
Education Law and the regulations
thereunder, New York City permits its
public schools to release students
during school hours, on written
requests of their parents, so that they
may leave the school buildings and
grounds and go to religious centers for
religious instruction or devotional
exercises. The same section makes
school attendance compulsory;
students not released stay in the
classrooms, and the churches report to
the schools the names of children
released from public schools who fail
to report for religious instruction. The
program involves neither religious
instruction in public schools nor the
expenditure of public funds.
Held: This program does not violate
the First Amendment, made
applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment. McCollum v.
Board of Education,333 U. S. 203,
distinguished. Pp. 343 U. S. 308-315.
(a) By this system, New York has
neither prohibited the "free exercise"
of religion nor made a law "respecting
an establishment of religion" within
the meaning of the First Amendment.
Pp. 343 U. S. 310-315.
(b) There is no evidence in the record
in this case to support a conclusion
that the system involves the use of
coercion to get public school students
into religious classrooms. Pp. 343 U. S.
311-312.
303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E.2d 463,
affirmed.
The New York Court of Appeals
sustained N.Y. Education Law 3210
and the regulations thereunder
permitting absence of students from
the public schools for religious
observance and education, against the
claim that the program thereunder
violated the Federal Constitution. 303
N.Y. 161, 100 N.E.2d 463. On appeal
to this Court, affirmed, p. 343 U. S.
315.