Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 489

lli#~!

{6
~~~
.10i:i s''
Univerzitet u Novom Sadu
Filozofski fakultet
Odsek za sociologiju
kolska 2014/2015. godina

Prof. dr Ljubinko Pui


Ana Pajvani-Cizelj, asistent

RIDER
Tekstovi za vebanja

l
l
o
&'" ~ ~
~ .~

'
Univerzitet u Novom Sadu
Filozofski fakultet
Odsek za sociologiju
PREDMET: SOCIOLOGIJA OKRUENJA
Prof. dt Ljubinko Pui
Ana Pajvani-Cizelj, asistent
Generacija 2014/2015. kolsl<e godine

Napomene uz RIDER za predmet SOCIOLOGIJA OKRUENJA

Tekstovi koji su ovde sakupljeni predstavljaju deo grae koja neophodna da bi


studenti mogli da savladaju obavezni kurs na osnovnim studijama sociologije iz
predmeta Sociologija okruenja. Njihova prvenstvena svrha je da budu osnovni
usmeravajui materijal za razgovore studenata prilikom vebanja iz ovog predmeta.
Kako je Sociologija okruenja na studijskoj grupi za sociologiju nova oblast, to je
prilikom koncipiranja kursa korieno iskustvo onih akademskih sredina u kojima
studiranje sociologije okrue1~a ima tradiciju. Sastavni deo tog iskustva je i ova
zbirka tekstova-RIDER. To su tekstovi koji treba da pomognu studiranju, odnosno
razumevanju materije koja se izlae na predavanjima i koja se na vebama
produbljuje i proiruje.
Tekstovi u ovom RIDER u u principu prate teme koje se izlau tokom petnaest
nedelja predavanja. Osnovni kriterijum prilikom izbora tekstova, osim njihove
tematske povezanosti sa predavm~ima, bio je u potencijalnoj komunikativnosti sa
itaocem, odnosno u mogunostima da podstie razgovor i suprotstavljanje miljenja.
S obzirom da je re o tekstovima autora iz razliitih sredina, sa razliitim akademskim
interesovanjima, nivoom razvijenosti discipline i raznovrsnim kulturnim zaleima,
prirodna je njihova razliitost; kako u pogledu odnosa prema sociologiji okruenja,
tako i u odnosu na nain izlaganja i sam jezik. Na taj nain, studenti se upoznaju i sa
razliitim mogunostima prilaza vezama sociologije i okruenja i omoguava im se
kritiki pristup pojedinim temama ili njihovim interpretacijama.

Kako se literatura koja se odnosi na sociologiju okruenja veoma ubrzano


umnoava (pogotovo u razvijenim sredinama i to uglavnom na engleskom jeziku) to
tekstovi koji se u RID ERu nalaze treba da ispune bar jedan od dva dodatna uslova: da
budu od trajne vrednosti za socioloko razumevanje okruenja ili da predstavljl\iu
presek interesovanja u odreenom vremenu. Neke od njih, dodatno, obeleava i
izuzetna aktuelnost; izraena onoliko koliko se ubrzano menjaju drutveni uslovi
kojima se utie na okruenje.
Tekstovi u RIDERu prezentirani su u svom originalnom izgledu i na svom
originalnom jeziku, bez komentara kakve studenti sreu hrestomatijama. Meutim, svi
komentari na vebama ne samo da su dobrodoli, ve su i uslov da bi studiranje-
vebanje bilo uspeno.
Prof. dr Ljubinko Pui

Ana Pajvani, asistent -::-0""--..,._- -

--- -:----;~,~--- - - --.._--:~,::_:_~

SOCIOLOGIJA OKRUENJA
; - :i
-~~..:.

-~~~~- --~-- _-:.:<!~.

Tekstovi u RID ERu --~-o~-

l. Rudi Supek, Ova jedina zemlja, Globus, Zagreli; 1973,5-36.- -


2. Ljubinko Pui, "Sociologija okruenja u traenju svog akademskog i istraivakog
profila", Sociologija i prostor, 47, 183 (l), 27c42;200'},

3. John Barry, "The role of the environment~hl&t9~ically wjthin social theory" u: John
Barry, Environment and Social Theory, Routledi~.~bend~h, 2007, 30-50.

4. Iring J9'btscher, "Optimizam rasta i ekoloka~Jest ko Marxa i Engelsa" u: Iring


,Jetscher, Uvjeti preivljavanja ovjeanstv([:=Je li jo mogue spasili napredak?
Globus, Zagreb, 1989, 88-111.

S. Ivan Cifri, "Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki:C!_os" u: Ivan Cifri Moderno drutvo


- - -
i svjetski etos, Hrvatsko socioloko drutvo;Zag-tllb;-2000, 55-84.

6. Michael Goldman and Rachel A.-Sch1lt!fl~11,-'"''Closil1J~_ the "Great Divide": New


Social Theory on Society and Nature", :'_lnnllci_(~R.J?Vie_~;Ql_ Sociology, Vol. 26, 2000.
--~-o---

563-584, ~,- - -)!.'$.


. - --
,.-_;6..;:-~~'i--
-------
- = ~

7. Steven Yearley, "Environmenta\IsS\lf,l~S};Jhe Comp_f!ssion of Globe", u: Steven


l ' _- -- _-. ___:~"-~-~;--~-~~;:~~,~~\: -c__S-:i~

Yearley, Sociology, Environmentalisin, Glgbaliffllwn.<cR-jjnventing the Globe, SAGE


' - - ... , .. _;__' -~-.:::'~~-~-~-~ '-,_-~:.---;;;.
!' P\lblication, London, 1996, 27-61.
!- --~-o-~='

8. Michael Mayerfeld Bell, "Poptlhtti~n afilt>eY.eto;i]ljlt",


"-;.: ---
u: Michael Mayerfeld
i
.. - - ....,.-.-.. ..--,;:- -_- .

Bell, An Invitation to Environmental Sociolo,gii, Pineif~!ge Press, London, 1996,


103-141. ---~

9. Franses Mur Lape, Dozef Kolins, Piter Ros'er, Dvali_aest mitova o gladi u svetu,
Clio, Beograd, 2005: 7-36. -~--~---.,--

--:-:.,--- --

- -
--
,l
l O. Dozef R. de erden, "Odgovornosti prema svetu prirode: od antropocentrine ka
neantropocentrinoj etici", u: Dozef R. de erden, Ekoloka etika: Uvod u ekoloku
filozofy'u, Slubeni glasnik, Beograd, 2006, 161-181, 185-202.

ll. Urlih Bek, "O logici raspodele dobara i raspodele rizika", u: Urlih Bek, Rizino

drutvo: U susret novoj moderni", Filip Vinji, Beograd, 2001,31-73.

12. Dozef R. de erden, "Dubinska ekologija", u: Dozef R. de erden, Ekoloka


etika: Uvod u ekoloku filozofiju, Slubeni glasnik, Beograd, 2006, 325-356.

13. Michael Mayerfeld Bell, "The Ideology of Environmental Domination", u:


Michael Mayerfeld Bell, An Invitation to Environmental Sociology, Pine Forge Press,
London, 1996, 145-172.

14. Alan Irwin, "Science and the Social Construction of Environmental Threat" u:
Alan Irwin, Sociology and the Environment: A Critical Introduction to Society,
Nature and Knowledge, Polity, Oxford, 2001,70-89.

15. Rudi Supek, "Ekonomija i ekologija" u: Rudi Supek, Ova jedina zemlja, Globus,
Zagreb, 1973,230-247.

16. Vukain Pavlovi, "Ekoloki pokreti i zelene partije", u : Vukain Pavlovi,

Drutveni pokreti i promene, Slubeni glasnik, Beograd, 2006, 227-256.

17. Manuel Kastels, "Pozelenjavanje samoga sebe: Pokret za zatitu okolia", u:


Manuel Kastels, Mo identiteta, Golden marketing, Zagreb, 2002, 117-139.

18. Philip Sutton, "Sustaining the Environment" u: Philip Sutton, The Environment: A
Sociological Introduction, Polity, Cambridge, 2007, 126-143.
l '

19. Entoni Gidens, "Prirodna sredina" i "Ekoloka modernizacija", u Entoni Gidens,


! '
Evropa u globalnom dobu, Clio, Beograd, 2009, 191-203; 231-245.

20. Richard Douthwaite, "Is it possible to built a sustainable world?, in Critical


Development Themy, ed. Ronaldo Munch, Denis O Hearn, Zed Books, London, 1999,
157-178.

21. Merry Melor, "Gender and Environment", in Michael Redclift, Graham Woodgate
(eds.), The international handbook of environmental sociology, Edward Elgar,
Northampton, MA, USA, 1997, 195-204.
22. Klajv Ponting, "Teina brojeva", u: Klajv Ponting, Ekoloka istorija sveta:
ivotna sredina i propast velikih civilizacija, Odiseja, Beograd, 2009, 242-276.

22. Klajv Ponting, "Uspon gradova", u: Klajv Ponting, Ekoloka istorija sveta:
ivotna sredina i propast velikih civilizacija, Odiseja, Beograd, 2009,307-327.

24. Klajv Ponting, "Pojava bogatog drutva", u: Klajv Ponting, Ekoloka istorija
sveta: ivotna sredina i propast velikih civilizacija, Odiseja, Beograd, 2009, 328-356.

25. Klajv Ponting, "Pretnje globalnih razmera", u: Klajv Ponting, Ekoloka istorija
sveta: ivotna sredina i propast velikih civilizacija, Odiseja, Beograd, 2009, 395-423.

26. Klajv Ponting, "Senka prolosti", u: Klajv Ponting, Ekoloka istorija sveta:
ivotna sredina i propast velikih civilizacija, Odiseja, Beograd, 2009, 424-439.

27. Endru Hejvud, "Ekologizam", u: Endru Hejvud, Politike ideologije, Zavod za


udbenike i nastavna sredstva, Beograd, 2005, 279-305.
Rudi Supek

OVA JEDINA
ZEMLJA
Idemo li u katastrofu ili u Treu revoluciju?

III. dopunjeno izdanje

GLOBUS/ZAGREB
'i

li

Predgovor treem izdanju

Nije prolo vie od petnaest godina kako je odrana


1972. prva svjetska konferencija o zatiti ljudskog okolia
i pojavio se ovaj rukopis, a interes za ekoloka pitanja, koj a
su tada izgledala ograniena na strune krugove, sada
dobijaju ve iroke odjeke u svim slojevima drutva. Rekao
bih: eppur si muove! Jer se jo ivo sjeam sa kakvim je
nepovjerenjem doekana ova knjiga, i sa lijevih i sa desnih
pozicija. Prvi, veinom moji kolege, govorili su mi da sam
nasjeo amerikoj propagandi, a. oni drugi razoarano su
mi prigovorili, da su kupivi moju knjigu smatrali da u
u Ovoj jedinoj zemlji pisati o Hrvatskoj i njenom izrablji-
vanju, a ne o svim zemljama! No, ini mi se, da su od tog
vremena i oni na lijevo i oni na desno evoluirali nakon
svega to su proitali u dnevnoj, pa i strunoj tampi,
o pomoru naih riba, zagaivanju vode i zraka koje dnevno
piju i udiu, o polaganom umiranju naih uma i mora.
A sigurno je da ih je potresla i panika od radioaktivnog
oblaka nakon eksplozije nuklearke u ernobilu. Ta
besmirisna i nevidljiva smrt nadvila se nad glavama svih
ne priznavajui nacionalne granice i eljezne zavjese: svi
su se najednom nali u koljevci zajednike sudbine, to se
zove naa priroda i njeno tehniko unitavanje.
1972. godine u Stockholmu bili su to jo pionirski dani
ekolokog pokreta. Maurice Strong, generalni sekretar
konferencije Ujedinjenih naroda, elio je imati jednu pret-
hodnu konferenciju eksperata, nadajui se da e od njih
dobiti jasnije odgovore nego od slubenih vladinih genera-
cija. Tako sam se prvi puta naao u drutvu podijeljenih

5
struka, ije zbliavanje sam uvijek elio: prirodnjaka i dru-
tvenjaka, biologa, zoologa, demografa, ekonomista, soci-
ologa, etiara, pa i pjesnika i politikih aktivista, kao to je
bio predstavnik holandeskih Kabautera (zatitnika pri-
rode): gorua pitanja ljudske egzistencije prisilile su razno-
'l ,
vrsne znanstvene discipline da progovore interdisciplinarno l
zajednikim jezikom! Ljudski ivot je cjelina.
Interdisciplinarnu suradnju nalagala je i potreba za
drutvenom akcijom. A sa njome smo se odmah susreli za
r
vrijeme odravanja konferencije. vedski studenti zauzeli
su jedan park u Stockholmu da bi sprijeili sjeu stabala
koju je odredila gradska uprava. Na ulici je izazivala zani-
manje indijanska delegacija u ivopisnoj odjei. Dola je da
protestira protiv namjere neke amerike kompanije da trai
ugljen u njihovom svetom brdu Black Messa. U velikoj
.dvorani Doma kulture, gdje se skupilo preko tisue ponaj-
vie mladih ljudi, odrali smo protestni miting, na kojem su
uzeli rije Margaret Mead, poznata antropolokinja, profe-
sor Hassler, etiar, jedan budistiki sveenik i poznati
vijetnamski pjesnik, te, pored mene, i predstavnik Indija-
naca. Nije potrebno rei da je najbolji govornik bio indijan-
ski poglavica, iji govor je povremeno prekidao njegov
aman nekom pjesmom i plesom. Tako je zapoela moja
karijera kao Zelenoga. Zato sam uvijek odgovarao na l

poznatu porugu bavarskog konzervativca Franca Josefa
Straussa da su zeleni kao paradajz, jer kad dozrijevaju,
postaju crveni, sa protustavom: Crveni kad dozriju,
postaju Zeleni. Uostalom, nije li Moderna, a takoer
i suvremena antropologija, pokazala da razvitak ne ide od
l;
djetinjstva prema zreloj dobi, ve .obratno od zrele dobi
prema mladenakoj i djeakoj? l Stvaralaki potencijal je 1
najvei u mladoj dobi i otvara se prema mladosti, pa su
tako i genijalni ljudi najee Velika djeca. Piui l' .
nedavno o kreativnosti rekao sam da se >>ivot otvara
prema svojemu poetku. Ovo valja imati na umu, jer jo
uvijek susreemo u naem drutvu toliko konzervativnih
protivnika ekolokog pokreta. l
Bilo bi naivno misliti da se ekoloka svijest sastoji samo l.

6
od borbe protiv zagaivanja prirode. Dodue, kad svako-
dnevno gledamo u naoj zemlji ono to se dogaa i u svjet-
skim razmjerima, naime kako se nae rijeke bjelasaju od
mrtvih riba, otrovanih isputenim kemikalijama; kako nam
se neko bistre rijeke pretvaraju sve vie u kanale otpadne
vode, tako da se vie niti kupati ne moemo u njima,
a kamoli napiti se svjee vode; kako nam industrija truje
podzemne vode, jer su im ureaji za proiavanje pre-
skupi, ume nam usljed kiselih kia umiru, kao i vegetacija
po gradovima, a one nam daju kisik, neophodan za ivot;
kako iza posjeenih pomrlih uma ostaju gole vrleti, jer
erozija odnosi milijune tona dragocjenog humusa u more,
ono to j e zemlj a stvarala kroz stotine tisua godina, i to se
vie nikad nee vratiti.
I ova bi se naa jeremijada mogla nastaviti u nedogled,
i sa punim opravdanjem, jer se situacija u tom pogledu ne
poboljava, ve svakog dana postaje sve gora. Naroito
sada, kad su nesposobni rukovodioci uvalili zemlju
u goleme dugove, kad se pod svaku cijenu izvozi nae
prirodno bogatstvo, najee u obliku sirovina i poprera-
evina u industrijski razvijenije zemlje, kad koritenje
naih prirodnih ljepota, naih planina i morske obale, kao
u svim kolonijalnim zemljama, postaje privilegija samo za
strance, jer naa sirotinja nema za to sredstava. Kad bi joj
barem ostavili onaj zdravi ivot koji je nekada imala! Ali
novi barbari napuili su nae gradove i nemilosrdno ugroa-
vaju i rue ne samo nau kulturnu batinu, nae parkove
i staro zelenilo, ve i ostalu zemlju, jer ne znaju to je to
industrijska civilizacija, na koju se zaklinju, a jo manje
kakve su njene posljedice. Iako se mnogo govori o nekim
socijalistikim, pa i humanistikim idealima, kao realna
ivotna filozofija prevladava socijalni darvinizam: Nije
vano da li e ljudi deset godina krae ivjeti, vano je da u
ja deset godina due vladati!
Ne radi se samo o zagaivanju okolia i ugroavanju
osnovnih ivotnih uvjeta. Suvremena ekoloka kriza, pa
tako i svijest o toj krizi ide mnogo dalje. Prije svega, ona
stavlja u pitanje mitologiju industrijalizacije kao jedino

7
opravdanog cilja za itavo ovjeanstvo, to znai stalno
poveanje ivotnog standarda uslijed irenja industrijske
proizvodnje, sve veeg troenja energetskih izvora, ekono-
miju stalnoga rasta proizvodnje. Osnovna filozofija ovog
industrijskog optimizma je da sve zemlje moraju dosei l
ivotni standard to ga imaju danas vedska ili SAD.
Meutim, objektivna analiza postojeih ivotnih resursa l i

pokazuje da je ovakav cilj ista utopija. Ameriki ekonomi-


sta Herman Dabi je izraunao da ameriki nain ivota
troi danas jednu treinu postojeih mineralnih sirovina
(minerali plus nafta), iako ameriko puanstvo predstavlja
samo 6 posto svjetskog stanovnitva. To praktiki znai da
potpuno koritenje postojeih resursa moe koristiti samo
18 posto stanovnitva, dok 82 posto nema njima pristupa.
Tih 82 posto nema nikakvih ansi da ostvari ameriki san
o dobrom ivotu. Oni su osueni na siromatvo. Zemlja
l
! jednostavno nije toliko bogata da bi svima osigurala
podjednako visoki standard ivota. To su takozvane gra-
nice rasta, koje su mnogi osporavali, kad se prvi put
pojavio sa tom tezom Rimski klub, ali danas, hoe nee,
..
:. ii
moraju ih priznati. Sporno ostaje samo pitanje hoe li se
i sadanja eksploatacija neobnovljivih resursa (nafta,
i f
!

: l
l ugljen, plin, bakar, olovo, mangan, i druge rude) iscrpsti za l
pedeset, stotinu ili dvijestotine godina. U ivotu zemlje to
' l
;l
~ 1
ne znai nita. A tednja tih resursa znai za suvremenu l;
.l ekonomiju, prije svega, obustavu masovne potronje
:i l i masovne proizvodnje, dakle svakog luksuza i namiriva- l;
; !
' i
!
nje ovjeka u skladu sa njegovim stvarnim potrebama.
! Meutim, perspektiva postaje mnogo tamnija, kad se
' !
i
uzme u obzir sadanja pothranjenost ovjeanstva uz sve l
i l
l vei porast broja ljudi na naoj planeti. Ovom velikom
'''
brigom ljudske ishrane bavi se ve godinama agencija Uje- l
l .

dinjenih naroda za ishranu, F.A.O., ije su prognoze vie


nego pesimistike, usprkos vidljivih uspjeha zelene revo- r-,'
lucije, koja takoer ide svojemu kraju, jer se niti tlo ove
zemlje ne da beskonano izrabljivati. F.A. O. je jo sedam-
desetih godina proraunao da bi do konca 2.000. godine
broj ljudi mogao porasti na 6 milijardi (vjerojatno e on biti

8
i neto vii), a da to trai da se proizvodnja itarica povea
za 200 posto, a ivotinjskih proizvoda (meso, mlijeko) za
300 posto. Meutim, iskoritavanje poljoprivrednog tla,
ak i pomou naftinih derivata, to jest umjetnog gnojiva,
ide svojemu kraju, a samo izrabljivanje industrijskom
poljoprivredom unitava humus dotle da mnogi govore da
je najrealnije i najekonominije vratiti se na staru organsku
poljoprivredu. Potonja je, uostalom, i mnogo kvalitetnija,
kao to se moemo uvjeriti kad odemo na trnicu nekog
zapadnog velegrada, gdje se proizvodi organske seljake
proizvodnje prodaju dva i do tri puta skuplje od proizvoda
industrijske poljoprivrede.
Tu se susreemo sa pitanjem kvaliteta ivota, za koji
se danas svi zalau, pa je to uradio i sam papa Pavle VI,
iako kvalitet ivota pretpostavlja da je neophodno sma-
njiti broj gladnih usta. F.A.O. je utvrdio da e se broj
pothranjenih od milijarde i po do konca 2000 godine pove-
ati na 3 milijarde, a djece i ljudi koji danas umiru nepo-
sredno od. gladi popeti od 20 na 40 milijuna. Izlaz je,
dakako, u smanjenju populacionog prirataja, a to znai.
u kontroli raanja. Onoga to ve Kinezi, s uspjehom,
i mnogi drugi, s manje uspjeha, kao Indija, ve provode, jer
ne ele skupljati svakoga jutra leeve izgladnjelih po ploni
cima grada, kao to se danas dogaa u Calcutti. Racionalni
odnos prema prirataju, to jest prema razmnoavanju ljudi
znai prelaz iz jedne primitivne civilizacije, gdje je strah od
smrti ili pomanjkanje radnih ruku, odnosno ratnika, nala-
gao visoki prirataj (jer je i mortalltet bio visok),
u modernu civilizaciju, gdje ovjek misli ne samo na svoju
vlastitu dobrobit, nego i na dobrobit svoje djece i unuadi.
A to znai da i njima mora osigurati kvalitetan ivot.
A danas se moe lako izraunati to to znai u pogledu
kontrole raanja. Tu se nalazimo pred jednim od najteih
pitanja suvremenog ovjeanstva, jer jo uvijek nailazi na
predrasude, religijske, politike i moralne prirode, ali koje
e suvremeno ovjeanstvo morati rijeiti. Morati, ako ne
eli da to rijee oni koji ve danas to mogu uiniti socijal-
-darvinistikim putem upotrebom nuklearnog oruja.

9
Upravo, suvremeno naoruanje predstavlja najveeg
parazita na neobnovljivim resursima, i najveeg potroaa
beskorisne energije, jer bi se i 'manjim dijelom od onih
tisuu milijardi dolara, koliko se danas troi na naoruanje,
mogla rijeiti glad u svijetu i stvoriti uvjeti za zdraviji ivot.
Govorei o ratu zvijezda, jedan je ameriki fiziar pred
znanstvenim skupom rekao: Zamislite da je ova naa
dvorana ispunjena benzinom do pola ili jednog metra, a mi
! diskutiramo da li emo upotrijebiti jednu ili stotinu ibica
i
da ga zapalimo! Ne samo da se, danas, kad se zna da se
nuklearkama primie kraj, industrijske zemlje nastoje rije-
iti nuklearnog otpada (plutoniju treba 500.000 godina da
se raspadne) aljui ga u nerazvijene afrike zemlje, ve e
l one nastojati da prodaju i svoje zastarjele reaktore. Pri
l' tome treba imati u vidu da je ve nekih 300 kg plutonija
ukradeno, i da se atomska bomba moe isto tako pojaviti
u rukama neke gangsterske bande, koja e ucijeniti ovje
anstvo, kao i nekih fundamentalistikih febatika koji e
rado poslati ljude pred sud Alahu ili Bogu. Sredstva
dovoljna za unitenje ovjeanstva dali smo u ruke ljudima
koji zbog bilo koje pogreke u ljudskom faktoru, ue ili
,.._!
ire definiranom, moe izazvati opu katastrofu. Moralni
i-j
!J i egzistencijalni imperativ suvremenog ovjeanstva je da
:l
! postane svjestan ove opasnosti! Zato je napad na vojnu ll
:l
:j
:-!
tajnu, to su ga izvrili Reagan i Gorbaov, prihvaajui
H obostranu vojnu inspekciju nuklearnih postrojenja u vlasti-
d
l:!l toj zemlji veliki korak odstranjenju ove opasnosti.
q
u Naa industrijska civilizacija, koja poiva na iskorita-
'!
!
vanju neobnovljivih resursa (nafte, ugljena, plina, urana),
dola je danas u duboku krizu, ne zbog toga to ne bi mogla
jo i nadalje vriti svoje razorno djelovanje, nego to je sve l
\

vei broj ljudi svijestan kuda ona vodi, na kakvim pretpo-


stavkama poiva i kakve posljedice raa. l
l .
Govori se o brizi njutnovske paradigme: I to ne samo
stoga to je suvremena znanost opovrgla njeno nastojanje f ;
da sve kretanje prirode svede na mehanike zakone i jedno- L,
stavne odnose kauzaliteta, kakvi se primjenjuju u izgradnji
strojeva, ve i zbog uvjerenja ovjeka da e ovladati priro-

10
dom kao predmetom bezgraninog napredovanja, tehni
kog i moralnog. Bacon je ukazao put suvremenom industri-
jalizmu, kad je rekao da je znanost mo, a filozof ljudskog
rada i vlasnitva, Locke tu mo objasnio kao slobodno
rastvaranje i razaranje prirode. Negiranje prirode je put
prema srei, jer ljudi, govorio je, moraju postati potpuno
osloboeni robovanja prirodi. A ta priroda je u njutnov-
skom svijetu izgledala kao predmet beskonane eksploata-
cije, tako da je duh kapitalizma i industrijalizma govorio
kako mora razbiti poetno jedinstvo ljudske zajednice i pri-
rode, anorganskog tijela ovjeka, kako je govorio Marx.
Priroda postaje samo isti predmet za ovjeka, ista stvar
koristi; prestaje da bude priznata kao sila po sebi: pa
i teorijska spoznaja njenih samostalnih zakona ini se samo
kao lukavstvo, kako bi (spoznaja) sebi podredila ljudske
potrebe, ili kao predmet potronje ili kao predmet proiz-
vodnje. Kapital je voen tom svojom tendencijom preko
svih nacionalnih granica i predrasuda, tako i preko oboa-
vanja prirode, i premaio je u odreenim granicama samo-
dostatno, zakoeno zadovoljavanje postojeih potreba
i obnavljanje starog naina ivota. On je prema svemu
tome destruktivan i stalno revolucionaran, obarajui sve
zapreke koje bi koile razvitak proizvodnih snaga, proire-
nje potreba, raznolikost proizvodnje kao i eksploataciju
i razmjenu prirodnih i duhovnih dobara. Marx, ije su to
rijei, zaboravio je samo dodati, da e to prekoraivanje
svih granica i zapreka, radi sve vee proizvodnje i potro-
nje, postati dogma ne samo kapitalizma ve i socijalizma,
i da e se tako ponaati ne samo privatni ili korporacijski
ve i dravni kapital. Da li to vai i za samoupravni?
Razumije se, na njutnovskoj paradigmi poiva itava
filozofija Prosvjetiteljstva, vjera u stalni napredak i vlast
nad prirodom, kao predmeta bezgraninog koritenja i pre-
duvjeta za ljudsko blagostanje. Odatle i vjera u ljudski
razum, njegovu golemu stvaralaku snagu i mo nad priro-
dom i ljudima. Takav optimizam rodio je onaj prometejski
humanizam, shvaanje da materijalni i moralni napredak
idu ruku pod ruku, te da je prvi zapravo preduvjet za drugi.

11
Taj optimizam dijelili su i Hegel i Marx, samo to je kod
Hegela to dovelo do krajnjeg subjektivizma novog raciona-
lizma, a Marx je ve naslutio da se u toj jabuci krije crv,
iako nije znao kakav e trule on izazvati. U stvari, njut-
. i
novska paradigma nosi u sebi fatalnu proturjenost: njezin
: i
i racionalizam poiva na kvantifikaciji, na matematici, koja
svojom simbolikom funkcijom doista nadilazi subjektivi-
zam ovjeka i stavlja nas u vezu sa kozmikim procesima,
tako da mi moemo mnogo toga tono izraunati to inae
ne moemo predoiti. A, s druge strane, ona se smjestila
u subjektivizam euklidovske i nujtnovske vizije svijeta, sa
beskonanim i apsolutnim vremenom i prostorom, pa joj
i djelovanje u tom prostoru, iji je dio i naa zemlja, izgleda
beskonano. Ova potonja komponenta ve se je znan-
stveno pokazala pogrenom, ali se ovjek, koji je u nju
smjestio svoju praktiku djelatnost, naroito ekonomsko-
-proizvodnu, ponaa jo uvijek sasvim u njenom duhu. Na
to mnogi danas upozoravaju (Capra, Rifkin, Kuhn). Meu
tim, zemlja je ograniena kao i vrijeme u kojem ona stvara
.odreena dobra; na primjer, ivot kroz 4 milijarde godina,
pa i neobnovljive resurse. Zemlja je sustav koji je prema
van, to.jest prema svemiru, a to znai i energetski, otvoren,
ali je u svojoj materijalnosti, naroito s obzirom na bio-
sferu, strogo zatvoren sustav. Ponaati se prema njemu kao
da je beskonaan poput svemira, sa njutnovskog gledita, je
zabluda. To je ista utopija, ali znanstveno utemeljena l
\
utopija, jer je teorijski dugo vaila kao istinita. Primjena
znanstvenih dostignua, izgraena na inehanicistikom
shvaanju, danas nam najbolje pokazuje kolika je to l
zabluda! Neki jo uvijek spekuliraju da u zemljinu atmos-
.i feru mogu uvoditi energije koliko ele, a zaboravljaju pri
l
{ j

tome da bi poveanje prosjene temperature atmosfere


izazvalo topljenje polarnog leda: samo desetinom metara l
l
poveanog vodostaja potopila bi sve luke gradove i dobar
dio kontinenata.
Danas ekologijska svijest mora djelovati kao anti-uto-
pijska: staviti ovjeka u realne okvire i mogunosti ivota
na ovoj zemlji. Sanjarije o ivotu na nekim drugim plane-

12
tama prepustit emo drugima, koji pristaju da ive kao
privjesak neke tehnologije, koja ne poznaje povijest ov
jeka niti ljudskog drutva, niti ivih bia sa kojima ivi, niti
ove itave zemlje koja nam jedina pripada, a ija se povi-
jest, naalost, za nas vie ne moe ponoviti, tako da je
najbolje da posluamo savjet mislioca koji govori upravo
o Vjenom vraanju, a rijeima Zaratustre nas opominje:
Zaklinjem vas, brao moja, ostanite vjerni Zemlji!

Rudi Supek u Zagrebu, srpnja 1988.

13
l .
l
\

1'',
l .
l '
Poruka indijanskog poglavice bijelom ovjeku

Godine 1854. indijanski poglavica Seattle uputio je


pismo amerikom predsjedniku u Washington kada je ovaj
izrazio elju da kupi velika podruja indijanske zemlje i obe-
ao rezervat indijanskom narodu. To pismo jo i danas
plijeni dirljivom ljepotom izraza, dubokim osjeajem za
prirodu i ovjekovu okolinu i, neumanjenom snagom,
nakon vie od 130 godina, opominje i suvremenog ovjeka
svojom svevremenom porukom.

Moemo biti braa, poslije svega

Kako moete kupiti ili prodati nebo, toplinu zemlje? Ta


ideja nam je strana.
Ako mi ne posjedujemo svjeinu zraka i bistrinu vode,
kako vi to moete kupiti? l
l
Svaki dio te zemlje svet je za moj narod. Svaka sjajna
borova iglica, svaka pjeana obala, svaka magla u tamnoj
umi, svaki kukac, sveti su u pamenju i iskustvu moga
naroda. Sokovi koji kolaju kroz drvee nose sjeanje na
crvenog ovjeka.
Mrtvi bijeli ljudi zaboravljaju zemlju svoga roenja
kada odu u etnju meu zvijezdama. Nai mrtvi nikada ne L:
zaboravljaju ovu lijepu zemlju jer ona je majka crvenog
ovjeka. Mi smo dio zemlje i ona je dio nas. Mirisavo
cvijee nae su sestre, jelen, konj, veliki orao, svi oni su naa

15
braa. Stjenoviti vrhunci, soni panjaci, toplina tijela po nija
f
i ovjek -svi pripadaju istoj obitelji.
r . ,! : Tako, kad Veliki poglavica iz Washingtona alje glas da
'!'
; : eli kupiti nau zemlju, trai previe od nas. Veliki pogla-
'
.
il vica alje glas da e nam sauvati mjesto tako da emo mi
i
! sami moi ivjeti udobno. On e nam biti otac i mi emo
l
' biti njegova djeca. Mi emo razmatrati vau ponudu da
1 'J
t
kupite nau zemlju. Ali to nee biti tako lako. Jer ta zemlja
'~
je sveta za nas.
k
l

ll
; l
i Ta sjajna voda to tee brzacima i rijekama nije samo
;
i
ll
l
voda ve i krv naih predaka. Ako vam prodamo zemlju
l
' morate se sjetiti da je to sveto i morate uiti vau djecu da je

l
l
i
li to sveto i da svaki odraz u bistroj vodi jezera pria dogaaje
i sjeanja moga naroda. ubor vode glas je oca moga oca.
ll
! Rijeke su naa braa, one nam utauju e. Rijeke nose
i nae kanue i hrane nau djecu. Ako vam prodamo nau
'
zemlju morate se sjetiti i uiti nau djecu da su rijeke naa
! .\
braa, i vaa, i morate
. od sada dati rijekama dobrotu kakvu
;:!l' .

biste pruili svakome bratu.


''
i Mi znamo da bijeli ovjek ne razumije na ivot. Jedan
l;l'; dio zemlje njemu je isti kao i drugi, jer on je stranac koji
l i'
l' doe no~u i uzima od zemlje sve to eli. Zemlja nije njegov
l brat nego njegov neprijatelj i kada je pokori on kree dalje-.
l' l;
On za sobom ostavlja grobove otaca i ne brine se. On otima
zemlju od svoje djece i ne brine se. Grobovi njegovih otaca
! ; l' i zemlja to mu djecu raa zaboravljeni su. Odnosi se
il prema majci-zemlji i prema bratu"nebu kao prema stvarima
! l to se mogu kupiti, opljakati, prodati kao stado ili sjajan
ll:; l.: ~
nakit. Njegov apetit proderat e zemlju i ostaviti samo
pusto.
l Ne znam. Na nain je drukiji nego va. Izgled vaih
l
l gradova boli oi crvenog ovjeka. Ali moda je to jer crveni
l
'l ovjek je divlji i ne razumije.
. '!
.l
'i
Nema mirnog mjesta u gradovima bijelog ovjeka .
: lj
:i-.
.'
Nema mjesta da se uje otvaranje listova u proljee ili drhtaj
'! .
krilaca kukaca. Ali moMa Je to jer sam divlji i ne razumi-
jem. Buka jedino djeluje kao uvreda za ui. l to je to ivot
ako ovjek ne moe uti usamljeni krik kozoroga ili nonu

16
prepirku aba u bari? Ja sam crveni ovjek i ne razumijem.
Indijanac vie voli blagi zvuk vjetra kad se poigrava licem
movare kao i sam miris vjetra oien podnevnom kiom
ili namirisan borovinom.
Zrak je skupocjen za crvenog ovjeka jer sve ivo dijeli
jednaki dah- ivotinja, drvo, ovjek. Bijeli ovjek ne izgleda
kao da opaa zrak koji die. Kao ovjek koji umire mnogo
l
dana on je otupio na smrad. Ali ako vam prodamo nau [ :
zemlju morate se sjetiti da je zrak skupocjen za nas, da zrak
dijeli svoj duh sa svim ivotom koji podrava. Vjetar to je
mojem djedu dao prvi dah takoer e prihvatiti i njegov
posljednji uzdah. I ako vam prodamo nau zemlju morate je
uvati kao svetinju, kao mjesto gdje e i bijeli ovjek moi
doi da okusi vjetar to je zaslaen mirisom poljskog cvi-
jea.
Tako emo razmatrati vau ponudu da kupite nau
zemlju. Ako odluimo da prihvatimo, postavit u jedan
uvjet: bijeli ovjek mora se odnositi prema ivotinjama ove
zemlje kao prema svojoj brai.
Ja sam divljak i ne raumijem neki drugi nain. Vidio
sam tisue raspadajuih bizona u preriji to ih je ostavio
bijeli ovjek ustrijelivi ih iz prolazeeg vlaka. J a sam
divljak i ne razumijem kako dimei eljezni konj moe biti
vaniji nego bizon koga mi ubijamo samo da ostanemo ivi.
to je ovjek bez ivotinja? Ako sve ivotinje odu, ovjek
e umrijeti od velike usamljenosti duha. to god se desilo l
\ '
ivotinjama ubrzo e se dogoditi i ovjeku. Sve stvari su
povezane. t

Morate nauiti svoju djecu da je tlo pod njihovim sto- l


pama pepeo njihovih djedova. Tako da e oni potovati
zemlju, recite vaoj djeci da je zemlja s nama u srodstvu. !
Uite vau djecu kao to inimo mi s naom da je zemlja
naa majka. to god snae zemlju snai e i sinove zemlje. l
l

Ako ovjek pljuje na tlo pljuje na sebe samoga.


To mi znamo: zemlja ne pripada ovieku, ovjek pri- [ i

pada zemlji. To mi znamo. Sve stvari povezane su kao krv


koja ujedinjuje obitelj. Sve stvari su povezane.
to god snae zemlju snai e i sinove zemlje. ovjek ne

17
..

tka tkivo ivota, on je samo struk u tome. to g~d ini tkanju


ini i sebi samome.
v
Cak i bijeli ovjek, iji Bog govori i eta s njime kao
prijatelj s prijateljem, ne moe biti izuzet od zajednike
sudbine. Mi moemo biti braa poslije svega. Vidjet emo;
Jednu stvar znamo, koju e bijeli ovjek jednoga dana
otkriti- na Bog je isti Bog. Vi sada moete misliti da ga vi
imate kao to elite imati nau zemlju; ali to ne moete. On
je Bog ovjeka i njegova samilost jednaka je za crvenoga
ovjeka kao i za bijeloga. Ta zemlja je draga Njemu i ko-
diti zemlji jest prezirati njenog Stvoritelja. Bijeli takoer
trebaju prolaz; moda bre nego sva druga plemena. Zapr-
. ' ljajte va krevet i jedne noi uguit ete se u vlastitom
smeu.
Ali u vaoj propasti svijetlit ete sjajno, potpaljeni
snagom Boga koji vas je donio na tu zemlju i za neku
posebnu svrhu dao vam vlast nad njome kao i nad crvenim
ovjekom. Sudbina je misterija za nas jer mi ne znamo kad
e svi bizoni biti poklani i divlji konji pripitomljeni, tajni
kutovi ume teki zbog mirisa mnogih ljudi i pogled na zrele
breuljke zamrljan brbljajuom icom. Gdje je gutara?
Otila je. Gdje je orao? Otiao je. To je konac ivljenja
l i poetak borbe za preivljavanje.
U povodu Simpozija koji obuhvaa zatitu ovjekove
l okoline u uvjetima suvremenog prometa, moramo se
duboko zamisliii nad ovim proroanskim mislima, napisa-
nim jo u prolom stoljeu, a koje su aktualne i u sadanjoj
l ekolokoj situaciji u svijetu.
Treba, ve danas, zajedniki poduzeti sve to je mogue
lli da uskladimo suvremeno ivljenje sa ovjekovom okolinom,
da podjednako unapreujemo jedno i drugo, da vratimo
f!l . prirodu sebi samima i generacijama to dolaze.
Ostaje nam samo nada da e se jednog dana na naem
ljj Zrinjevcu i u ostalim gradskim parkovima ponovo oglasiti
ptice pjevice koje su i pred najezdom motorizacije napustile
na grad. Kao vjesnici novih ekolokih iih vremena, one
bi trebale svojim pjevom oiviti na lijepi Zagreb i ostale
gradove nae zemlje.

18
1~
i
'
l
l

Predgovor
Ova knjiga je napisana povodom prve konf~encije Uje-
dinjenih naroda posveene pitanjima ljudskog okolia i odr-
ane u Stockholmu od 6. do 16. juna 1972. Konferencija je
sazvana nakon to je u maju 1971. u Mentonu meuna
rodna konferencija strunjaka za ljudsku okolinu - eko-
loga, biologa, urbanista - uputila apel na OUN koji je
potpisalo 2200 uenjaka iz itava svijeta. U tom se apelu
upozoravalo na veoma ozbiljnu situaciju u koju ulazi ovje
anstvo u vezi s demografskom ekspanzijom, ruenjem
ravnotee izmeu ovjeka i biosfere te zagaivanjem oko-
lia.
Autor ove knjige imao je prilike da sudjeluje u nezavis-
noj konferenciji to ju je organizirala mirotvorna organiza-
cija Dai Dong, koja je imali!- zadatak da nezavisno od
utjecaja slubene politike pojedinih drava, a na osnovi l
l
uvjerenja samih strunjaka, podnese jednu rezoluciju kon-
ferenciji Ujedinjenih naroda. Ona se stoga odravala nepo-
sredno prije konferencije Ujedinjenih naroda u Stock- l.
holmu, a na njoj su sudjelovali uenjaci iz raznih zemalja l

i s raznih kontinenata. l
' Sam problem ljudske okoline na prvi je pogled vie
tehnike prirode, kao problem ouvanja prirode i gradova l
od zagaivanja, ali veoma brzo se moe vidjeti da je on
povezan s bitnim pitanjima ljudske egzistencije uope:
porastom puanstva i prenapuenou, iscrpljivanjem pri-
rodnih resursa, industrijskom civilizacijom, kapitalistikom l
l
l

eksploatacijom prirode i ovjeka, odnosno razvijenih Lc

j i nerazvijenih zemalja, i tako dalje. Na prvi pogled beza-

l 19
l.(
. i
zleni problem ljudskog okolia dirnuo je u osnovna pitanja
suvremene civilizacije i sudbine ljudske vrste.
Zato smo odluili da nae itaoce upoznamo na infor-
mativan i sintetiki nain sa itavom problematikom koja se
danas nalazi iza onoga to se zove ekoloka kriza. Kako
se radi o veoma bogatom materijalu, povezanom s mno-
tvom teorijskih i praktikih problema, nastojali smo da
prije svega pokaemo opsenost problema, njihovu sloe-
nost i isprepletenost, a naroito da upozorimo na drutvene
posljedice.
U ovoj knjizi nismo posebno razmatrali jedno od najve-
ih zala za ljudsku okolinu, koje istovremeno predstavlja
i najveu prijetnju za opstanak ljudske vrste, a to je rat.
Smatrali smo da ovaj problem trai da mu se posveti dosta
prostora, ali smo ujedno pretpostavili- da se o njemu dosta
pi~alo i pie, pa da je kao takav mnogo blii naim ita
ocima. Naravno, u okviru ove ekoloke problematike
nikad ne smijemo izgubiti iz vida ulogu rata i naoruanja
kao jednog od najveih zala suvremene civilizacije.
Takoer nam je bilo stalo do toga da ova pitanja, koja
su veini jo nepoznata, donekle osvijetlimo i s marksisti
kog stajalita. Uvjereni smo da ona u sebi sadre, kao sva
pitanja koja zadiru u samu jezgru ovjekove egzistencije
i u oblik ljudske civilizacije, revolucionarnu perspektivu,
koja s marksistikog gledita jo nije postala predmet
raspravljanja. Izjava u Mentonu, nezavisna konferencija
Dai Dong, kao i sama konferencija Ujedinjenih naroda
u Stockholmu jasno upuuju na to da se radi o problemima
ije konano i potpuno zadovoljavajue rjeenje pretpo-
stavlja drutvene promjene to vode svjetskom socijalizmu.

U Zagrebu, jesen 1972.


Rudi Supek

20
l '
Idemo li u katastrofu ili u Treu revoluciju? l

Zaklinjem vas, brao moja, ostanite vjerni Zemljii r:


Friedrich W. Nietzsche

Jo namje u sjeanju uzbuenje koje je izazvalo jato pataka


u alarmnom ureaju atomske obrane- napada. Atomska
se obrana, naime, sastoji u tome da u nekoliko sekundi
mora izazvati atomski protunapad, koji je isto tako totalno
razoran kao i oekivani napad. O preciznosti alarmnih
ureaja i o sekundama zavisi da li e totalno unitenje ljudi
imati taktiku prednost od nekoliko sekundi na jednoj ili
drugoj strani. Rezultat e, po miljenju eksperata, biti
u svakqm sluaju isti: opa smrt, jer postojee su zalihe
atomskih bombi dovoljne ne samo za jednokratno unitenje
ljudi nego ga mogu ponoviti deset i stotinu puta. Toliko je
velika ljudska strast za razaranjem, a koja se opravdava
eljom za sigurnou. l
No, moda je i pretjerano rei da su patke na ekranu i
atomske obrane izazvale tako veliko uzbuenje meu lju-
dima. Ono i nije bilo toliko kao to bi se moglo oekivati l
kad je u pitanju unitenje vaeg, mojeg i naeg ivota
i ivota svih ostalih. Zato? Razlog se moe naslutiti: ljudi
1
gaje veoma veliko povjerenje u nepogreivost moderne
tehnike. Oni su uvjereni da tehnika raspolae s dovoljno
sigurnim ureajima kako se nekom grekom atomski kio- l
bran nad naim glavama ne bi survao na nas. Oni ive
u dubokom uvjerenju da je uvijek mogue pronai neko j_'
tehniko rjeenje da se ouva naa sigurnost i spase nai
ivoti. l '
l
Zanimljivo je koliko je razvijeno to povjerenje suvre-
menog ovjeka u tehnika rjeenja! S kakvom bezbri-
nou ljudi ive znajui da se netko brine oko njihova

21
r

iznalaenja. Dobri, srednjovjekovni, ovjekoliki Bog nikad


nije uspio stvoriti takvu sigurnost meu ljudima, takvo
slijepo povjerenje u nepoznate i bezline vie sile kojima
rukoyode suvremeni tehniari i, dakako, politiari. ak
i oni najtvrdokorniji preziratelji i neprijatelji tehnike, koji
joj pokuavaju suprotstaviti viu misaonost kako bi prekrili
svoju individualnu nemo pred njenim modernim svevla-
em, ak i oni se ne razlikuju mnogo od ostaloga vulgusa
u tom vrstom uvjerenju kako tehnika rjeenja postoje.
Dolo je vrijeme da se ova slijepa vjera u tehnika
rjeenja razori, da se ljudima kae kako tehnikih rjee-
nja nema, i ne samo da ih nema nego da ih i ne moe biti!
A u pitanju je ovjekov ivot, i to ne bilo kakav ivot nego
upravo ljudski ivot; u pitanju je opstanak ovjeanstva,
i to ne bilo kakvog ovjeanstva, nego onoga koje ivi sa
svim drugim biljnim i ivotinjskim vrstama to tvore ivot
na ovom planetu.
Potrebno je otvoreno rei da suvremeno ovjeanstvo,
ako se nastavi mnoiti po sadanjoj stopi, srlja u katastrofu,
te da e se broj onih desetaka milijuna ljudi koji danas
u svijetu umiru od gladi u toku godine dana, naglo pove-
ati. Za prehranu stalno rastueg broja ljudi, s obzirom na
ogranienost prirodnih izvora, nema tehnikog rjeenja.
Potrebno je rei da se prirodni izvori koji su uvjet naeg
ivota, bioloki i mineralni, sve intenzivnije iscrpljuju i, uz
sve veu prenapuenost, primiu svojem kraju. Kako su oni
nastali kao plod tisua milijuna godina bioloke evolucije
i dugotrajnog rada same Zemlje, to ne postoji tehniko
rjeenje da se taj dugotrajni rad Zemlje zamijeni nekim
skraenim postupcima.
Potrebno je rei da Zemlja moe podnijeti daleko vei
broj ljudi od onih koliko ih ima danas, ali na tetu ostalih
ivotinjskih i biljnih vrsta, na tetu netaknutih livada i dje-
vianskih uma, na tetu ljudske samoe i dodira s priro-
dom. Nema tehnikog rjeenja da sauvamo doista ljudski
ivot i prirodni ivot ovjeka ako nas bude umjesto tri
milijarde - deset ili etrdeset milijardi, broj koji oekuje
nae unuke i praunuke.
l
22
Lagao bih kad bih rekao da nema rjeenja i za etrdeset
milijardi ljudi na ovom planetu. Ona su mogua. Ali to mi
vrijedi ivot ako budem ivio na 536. katu nebodera nekog
megalopolisa, jer su ve odavno preorali sve prizemnice
u predgraima, ako budem udisao kisik i pio vodu iz nekih
aparata na niim ili viim katovima ove kuerine; ako se
budem hranio veoma ukusnim naparfimiranim proteinskim
pilulama koje se prave od morskih algi i mikrobakterija
koje ive od mojih vlastitih tjelesnih otpadaka; to e mi
ivot, ako sam svoj ivot sveo na jedan krug materije koji se
kree kroz mene u ovoj istoj prostoriji u kojoj ivim kozmo-
nautskim ivotom. Uostalom, recimo da bi se takav ivot
mogao svidjeti, ali to e biti s mojim potomcima, kad ih l l,

umjesto etrdeset milijardi bude osamdeset?! Istina, za ovu i


i

situaciju mi dosada nitko nije predloio tehniko rje-


enje<<.
Doista, za ovakvu evoluciju nema tehnikih rjeenja,
ali postoje socijalna rjeenja. Socijalna rjeenja koja znae
i .
radikalne promjene u ljudskom odnosu prema proizvodnji,
l'
nainu ivota, odravanju bioloke egzistencije i reproduk-
cije, sistemu drutvenih vrednota i, konano, prema dru-
tvenoj organizaciji. tovie, ove promjene ne mogu biti
samo lokalne ili nacionalne, ve moraju biti planetarne, jer i ,
l .

su pitanja ljudskog opstanka nedjeljiva kao i sama Zemlja l


na kojoj ivimo.

Ljudska civilizacija prola je dosad kroz dvije revolucije


koje su temeljito izmijenile uvjete ljudske vrste na ovom
planetu. Da li se nalazimo na pragu Tree revolucije? Prve
dvije odvijale su se u znaku ekspanzije ljudske vrste na
l
l

Zemlji, trea bi morala postaviti granice toj ekspanziji.


Prva, agrama revolucija, uspjela je staviti u slubu ovjeka J
Sunevu energiju - procese fotosinteze u biljkama da bi
sluile za ishranu ovjeku i stoci koju je poeo udomaivati. l '
\_,
Druga, industrijska revolucija, donijela mu je vlast nad
novim izvorima energije, prije svega nad fosilnim gorivima,
ugljenom i naftom, kojima je pokretao parne i elektrine

23
motore te motore s unutranjim sagorijevanjem. A njima se
u najnovije vrijeme prikljuila i atomska energija. Potvrdila
se Baconova teza da je znanje mo, ali i Goetheova vizija
da e arobnjakov uenik osloboditi demonske prirodne
sile koje e zaprijetiti njegovom vlastitom postojanju.
ovjek je ivio kroz tisue i tisue godina kao grabe-
ljiva ivotinja. Sabirao je plodove na divljim stablima
i grmovima, lovio je ribu i postavljao zamke ivotinjama,
u krajnjim sluajevima nije se ustruavao ni da ubija druge
ljude i da ih jede. Jedan od najstarijih napisa iz Sumera
govori o tom dalekom dobu: Ljudska vrsta, kad je bila
stvorena, nije nipoto poznavala kruh da ga jede i odjeu da
se oblai. Ljudi su hodali vukui udove po tlu, jeli su travu
ustima kao ovce, pili su vodu iz barutina. 1
Ljudi u ono daleko doba ve su posjedovali razna orua
iz kremena u obliku bodea i sjekira, pa i strijele i lukove,
ali im je to oruje sluilo za nain ivota po kojemu se nisu
mnogo razlikovali od grabeljivaca.
Prema nalazima iz Jerihona u Palestini, Zagrosa u Kur-
distanu, Jarmoa iz Iraka, Tepe Sabaha u Iranu danas
moemo sa sigurnou zakljuiti da je do agrarne revolucije
dolo u toku osmog tisuljea prije nae ere na Bliskom
i istoku. Nalazi pokazuju da su stanovnici u tom podruju
posjedovali domau stoku, najprije koze i ovce, a zatim
konje, svinje i krave. Uzgajali su ra i dvije vrste penice.
Razvili su lonarstvo koje im je sluilo da pospreme etvu.
U Sjevernoj Americi, u Novom Meksiku, otkriven je
u peinama kukuruz koji je potjecao od oko 4000 godina
prije nae ere. Uenjaci nisu jo razjasnili pitanje da li je
agrama revolucija nastala na jednom podruju, pa se irila
l na ostale dijelove svijeta, ili je nastala spontano na vie
1
. raznih mjesta na kugli zemaljskoj.
Sa Bliskog je istoka nova privreda, zasnovana na poljo-
privredi; poela prodirati u Evropu tokom 4000 goillna
prije nae ere, pa je nalazimo izmeu 4500. i 2000. god. na
Balkanu, u vicarskoj, Njemakoj, Danskoj, zapadnoe-
1
J. Pirenne, Les Grands courants de /'histoire universel/e, Paris.

24
vropskim zemljama, da bi zatim prodrla na Britanske otoke
i Skandinaviju. Privreda zasnovana na lovu sauvala se
u eurazijskim tundrama sve do najnovijeg vremena. Dok je
agrama revolucija putovalaod Istoka na Zapad (Ex Ori-
ente lux!), industrijska revolucija e ii suprotnim putem, l
od Zapada na Istok. Marx je smatrao da mu njegova l

domovina Njemaka ni izdaleka ne prua onaj uvid ",


u posljedice industrijske revolucije koji e mu dati En- !
l
:
l

gleska!
Da bi ivio, ovjeku je potrebna energija; i on sam je
izvor energije. Da bi doao do hrane, on mora raditi, troiti
svoju energiju, a rauna se da ovjek prosjeno korisno
upotrebljava ili troi samo 18% od energije koju je konzu-
mirao. Covjek je transformator energije koji radi s prili
nim gubicima u toku transformacije. Ugljen koji proizvodi
elektrinu energ1ju daje vei iznos od 23%. Biljke iivoti-
nje su takoer transformatori energije. I valja odmah
dodati, ne naroito uspjeni. Tako je proizvodnja energije
jednog vola u odnosu na konzumirana ito samo l 0%. Zato
e nam trebati za vola deset puta vie zemlje da se proiz-
vede odreena koliina kalorija nego za ito. Teglea stoka
prema proraunima ne daje vie od 3 do 5% energije
u odnosu na krmu kojom se hrani.
. Biljni i ivotinjski transformatori energije postojali su
prije nego to se ovjek pojavio na Zemlji. I dugo vremena
se ovjek izdravao tako da je trao za njima. Sva njegova
mudrost se sastojala da razlikuje hranjive od nehranjivih.
Njegova vlastita efikasnost bila je veoma mala, jer je sav l;
ivot troio na to da trai i lovi hranu. I to svaki put kad je
l .
bio gladan. On jo nije znao stvarati vee rezerve hrane.
Agrama revolucija znai dubok prekid u nainu ovje l
kova ivota. Ona oznaava kraj divljatva, faze u kojoj se
ovjek bitno ne razlikuje od drugih ivotinja. Kao to kae
Cipolla, agrama revolucija nije bila nita drugo nego proces
pomou kojega je ovjek uspio upravljati i poveavati svoje
snabdijevanje biljkama i ivotinjama. 2
2
Carlo M. Cipolla, Histoire economique de la population mondiale,
ldees, Gallimard, Paris, 1965.

25
Otada dolazi do nove evolucije ljudske vrste koja sada
ima na raspolaganju kemijsku energiju biljaka i ivotinja,
toplinu koja nastaje sagorijevanjem biljaka, vunu snagu
ivotinje, a sve je to izazvalo naglo poveanje broja ljudi.
Nastala su sela i stadij divljatva je zavrio. Dolazi do
stalnog usavravanja poljoprivredne proizvodnje, pa je
nakon otkriatropoljnog sistema ovjek uspio da se stalnije
naseli na jednom tlu, jer nije bio vie prisiljen da se stalno
seljaka traei plodnu zemlju. U toku 4. milenija nalazimo
u Sumeru kota, i konji poinju sluiti za vuu kola, ali je
prolo jo tisue i tisue godina da bi se usavrio samar
i prestalo klati ivotinju. Izgleda da je on otkriven tek
u 4. stoljeu prije nae ere, otprilike kad i potkova. ovjek
je, dodue, pronaao nain da se koristi i energijom vjetra
i vode, ali se moe rei da je u cjelini 70 do 80% energije,
sve do poetka industrijske revolucije, dolazilo od biljaka,
ivotinja i ljudi.
Jedna od najvanijih posljedica poljoprivredne revolu-
cije bila je osjetljivo poveanje broja ljudi na Zemlji.
Rauna se da prije nje nije ivjelo vie od 20 milijuna ljudi
na itavom planetu. Ovu brojku valja smatrati maksimu-
mom. Od tog vremena prisustvujemo stalnom porastu
puanstva na Zemlji, pojavi brojnih sela i gradova, koji su
najvie imali 5 do 20 tisua stanovnika, ali je bilo i nekoliko
iznimaka, kao to su antikna Atena ili Rim koji su u nekim
periodima premaivali i 100.000 stanovnika. Tako uoi
industrijske revolucije oko 167 5. nalazimo da svjetsko
puanstvo iznosi izmeu 650 i 850 milijuna stanovnika,
koncentriranih uglavnom u Evropi i Aziji. To je ujedno
i najvei broj koji je puanstvo doseglo do tog doba, jer se
nalazilo u stalnoj ekspanziji, iako veoma sporoj, tako da je
od srednjeg vijeka, s razvitkom manufakture i ekspanzijom
gradova, prosjeni godinji prirast iznosio O,3 do O, 4 posto.
Industrijska revolucija zapoinje otkriem novih izvora
energije i usavrenim nainima njihova koritenja u proiz-
vodnji. U poetku glavnu rije ima para. Para i Englez
, . ine jedno, kae jedna stara engleska poslovica. Kasnije
e Lenjin rei da socijalizam znai vlast sovjeta plus elek-
r
! 26
l
'l

trifikacija. Novi oblici energije postaju simboli nove civili-


zaCIJe.
Dok je god. 1800. svjetska proizvodnja ugljena iznosila
samo 15 milijuna tona, ve god. 1950. ona dostie blizu
1500 milijuna tona. Potkraj 19. stoljea ugljenu se pridru- ! !
l
uje novi izvor energije - fosilna ulja, nakon to su Benz
i Daimler 1885. usavrili motor s unutranjim sagorijeva-
njem. Ve prije toga Faraday je postavio osnove za korite- l
nje elektrine energije. Dolazi do naglog porasta koritenja
energije u proizvodne svrhe i za poboljanje ivota. Svjet-
ska proizvodnja energije, vezane uz proizvodno-trgovake
djelatnosti, samo u stotinu godina, od 1861. do 1950. penje
se od jedne milijarde megavat sati na 21 milijardu, to
odgovara prosjenom porastu 3,25% godinje. Meutim,
porast energije u ovome stoljeu bio je jo mnogo bri i on
je iznosio barerri oko 6%. Ono to je vano utvrditi, jest
injenica da potronja energije raste mnogo bre nego
puanstvo, to znai da sve vea koliina energije stoji na
raspolaganju pojedincu u industrijaliziranim zemljama.
Dok su u fazi poljoprivredne civilizacije glavni izvor ener-
gije iva bia, dakle fizioloki izvori, sada glavni izvor lei
u podruju neive tvari- ugljenu, nafti- ali koji su takoer
nastali kao rezultat rada ivih bia kroz dugi vremenski
period, pa u tom pogledu predstavljaju neobnovljive izvore
energije za razliku od animalnih izvora koji su obnovljivi.
Sto znai ovaj nagli porast potronje u energiji, to
znamo iz dnevnog iskustva: rasvjeta u kuama, na ulicama,
centralno loenje, kuni aparati, automobili, mehanizirani
javni saobraaj, mehanizirana i automatizirana proizvod-
nja. Strojevi sve vie zamjenjuju rad ovjeka, ije se radno .
vrijeme smanjuje i on dobiva vie vremena za duhovne
djelatnosti. ivotni standard suvremenog ovjeka zavisi od 'l
mainizma i novih izvora energije, od jednoga novoga l.
odnosa s prirodom. Meutim, ovjek zaboravlja da on
danas u jednoj godini potroi takvu koliinu ugljena za koju
je bilo potrebno stotina vjekova da se proizvede u fazi
karbonizacije. I zato se postavlja pitanje: kako dugo e
ovjek moi rasipati ovu energiju?

27
d
i~
~~~ Rije rasipanje nije nimalo prejaka, jer valja znati da,
'll
na primjer, od 30 milijardi megavatsati energije koliko je
'l'
:l
i
:q
l
ovjek potroio god. 1952. samo jedna treina je korisno
lli: r upotrijebljena, dok su dvije treine izgubljene. I to na razne
'l naine. Zato, kad imamo u vidu snagu industrijske civiliza-
cije, ne smijemo nikada gubiti iz vida da je veina izvora
lj
l
energije neobnovljiva, te da se velike koliine, u stvari
1
l najvei dio nepovratno gubi. H. Thirring sasvim opravdano
il . konstatira da u toku ljudske povijesti to moe biti samo
jedna kratka epizoda u kojoj ovjek crpe iz fosilnih goriva
l da bi pokrio svoje potrebe u energiji (1958).
l Nakon agrarne kao i nakon industrijske revolucije
l vidimo da dolazi do demografske eksplozije, ali su karak-
teristike jedne i druge razliite. Dobiva se utisak da se

l
~
stvaranjem_novih uvjeta ivota prekida ustaljena ravnotea
u mnoenju ljudi, te dolazi do gibanja puanstva koje
izmie kontroli, a nakon izvjesnog vremena ponovo se

~
l
uspostavlja ravnotea. Ono to znamo o demografskoj
ravnotei u fazi poljoprivredne ekonomije jest da visokoj
i stopi nataliteta (35 do 59%o) odgovara takoer i visoka
j :
i stopa mortaliteta (30 do 40%o). U toj fazi nalazimo jake
oscilacije u prirastu koje su izazvane povremenim visokim
l' ;'
! ' mortalitetom (od 150%o do 500%o), prouzrokovanim epide-
~ ..
mijama, glau, ratovima, onim nevoljama koje je mata
srednjovjekovnih ljudi nazvala jahaima Apokalipse.
Dolazi, dakle, u nekim periodima do naglog smanjenja
puanstva, koje se postepeno ponovo upotpunjava.
S poetkom industrijske revolucije iezavaju ove jake osci-
lacije. Zahvaljujui poboljanim uvjetima ivota, prven-
stveno uslijed bolje ishrane i napretka medicine, stopa
smrtnosti poinje opadati, dok se relativno visoka stopa
raanja i dalje zadrava. To uvjetuje nagli porast stanovni-
tva. Nakon izvjesnog vremena poinje opadati i stopa
raanja i prirast se smanjuje. Dolazi do jedne nove ravno-
tee. Meutim, suvremena demografska ekspanzija uvjeto-
vana je injenicom da su se u nerazvijenim zemljama poele
l' primjenjivati mjere za suzbijanje smrtnosti, koje su prene-
sene iz razvijenih zemalja, a da je stopa. raanja ostala
l
28
l
visoka kao u narodima s izrazito poljoprivrednom kultu-
rom, tako da je kod njih dolo do naglog poveanja stanov-
nitva i neravnotee izmeu prehrane i mnoenja ljudi.
Dok su razvijene zemlje mogle napredak u proizvodnji
l. i

iskoristiti za bogaenje drutvenih slojeva, jer se stopa


l;
prirasta smanjila, dotle industrijalizacija u nerazvijenim l
zemljama, ak i onda kad ide brim i intenzivnijim tem-
pom, ne daje poveanje ve raa smanjenje ivotnog stan- l:
darda. Tempo industrijalizacije nije sposoban slijediti
tempo razmnoavanja ljudi. No, nee li i zemlje u razvoju, 'j '
koje sada pokazuju najveu demografsku ekspanziju, tako-
er ui u fazu nove ravnotee? Nee li i kod njih doi do
smanjenja stope raanja kako bi proizvodnja mogla sri.ab-
djeti sve vie ljudi?
Demografska istraivanja pokazuju da na ravnoteu
u biolokoj reprodukciji ljudi djeluju mnogi faktori, i da je
gotovo nemogue djelovati uspjeno na sve njih pomou
drutvene intervencije. Potrebno je izvjesno vrijeme, odre-
eni proces gomilanja razliitih uinaka ili utjecaja, da se
ponaanje ljudi izmijeni. Meutim, ono to ini suvremenu
situaciju kritinom jest da ovaj proces stabilizacije izgleda
suvie spor, da se jaz izmeu prenapuenosti i mogunosti
ishrane ne suzuje, ve se, naprotiv, iri. Meutim, ono to
ugroava svaku stabilizaciju u ovoj kritinoj situaciji ljudske l
vrste jest da se susreemo s novim problemom, a to je
iscrpljivanje prirodnih izvora na kojima poiva industrijska
civilizacija.
Sama pojava industrijalizacije izazvala je jako povea
nje stope prirasta puanstva. Tako je ona iznosila u svjet- l
skom prosjeku 0,7% u 1850-1900, l% u periodu l .
1900-1950, a danas je oko 1,7%. Sam proces stabilizacije l
na novoj razini (niska stopa raanja i niska stopa smrtnosti)
vai samo za manji, industrijalizirani dio ovjeanstva, dok l
l
najvei dio poinje tek koristiti napredak u znanosti i teh-
nici, pa je kod njih stopa prirasta preko 3% i do 4%. Tu lei l i

izvor glavne opasnosti. Prirast u svjetskim razmjerima ne l'


opada ve raste.
Neki biolog koji je promatrao dijagram mnoenja ov-

29
,.

jeanstva od agrarne revolucije, to jest od 10.000 godina


prije nae ere do danas, izjavio je da krivulja rasta nalikuje
na one krivulje koje opisuju koloniju mikroba u unutranjo-
sti organizma kad je naglo napadnut nekom infektivnom
boleu. Bacil ovjek osvaja Zemlju!
Ono to je situaciju nainilo jo alarmantnijom jest
injenica da ne postoji samo neravnotea u demografskoj
reprodukciji ljudi, pa ni samo neravnotea izmeu broja
ljudi i prirodnih resursa, ve je ovjek duboko poremetio
ravnoteu izmeu svojeg naina ivota i prirode, on je
ugrozio prirodnu okolinu i ivotne uvjete za svoj opstanak.
Ako elimo definirati ovjeka kao bie koje djelujui na
okolinu prisvaja i mijenja tu istu okolinu da bi stvorio bolje
uvjete za svoje postojanje, onda u ovom trolanom odnosu:
ovjek - djelovanje - priroda, sva su tri lana dola
u opasnu krizu. ovjek kao vrsta pokazuje izrazitu nerav-
noteu u pogledu svoje bioloke reprodukcije, ovjek kao
bie koje djeluje dolazi do granica svoje industrijske djelat-
nosti, ovjek kao bie koje mijenja okolinu bezobzirnom
eksploatacijom okoline stavio je u pitanje njeno vlastito
obnavljanje i postojanje, a time, dakako, i svoje vlastito.
Kritinost sadanjeg momenta proizlazi upravo iz kombina-
cije ovih triju vidova ili komponenata ljudske egzistencije.
I ako se moe govoriti da je u pitanju sama industrijska
revolucija ili, tonije, njeni rezultati, dakle industrijska
civilizacija kao takva, tada njene pokretake snage i struk-
tura moraju biti duboko izmijenjene, da bi se rijeili pro-
blemi to su tako iznenadno iskrsli pred ljudskom vrstom.
Iako se najee upotrebljava rije ekoloka kriza,
kriza se u stvari odnosi na samog ovjeka, to jest njegov
nain razmnoavanja i nain potronje, dakle na cjelinu
bioloke reprodukcije; zatim na nain njegove proizvodnje,
povezane s rasipanjem (u emu je kapitalistiki nain aku-
mulacije bitan) i iscrpljivanjem prirodnih resursa; i tek na
treem mjestu rije je o ekolokoj krizi, to jest o zagai
vanju prirode ili, to je znaajnije, o unitavanju biosfere,
dakle osnovnih uvjeta ivota na Zemlji. Kriza pogaa sva
tri bitna lana ljudske povijesne egzistencije, pa je stoga

30
ona u pravom smislu rijei kriza itave civilizacije, kriza
koja stavlja u pitanje industrijsko drutvo- naravno onakvo
kako se ono konkretno povijesno dosada oitavalo
'l'
-i itavu drutvenu organizaciju zasnovanu na industrijali-
zaciji. Mi smo prisiljeni da ponovo mislimo o itavoj povi-
jesnoj egzistenciji ovjeka, o nainu kako u borbi za opsta- l i
'
nak pronalazi naine da se odri, kako mijenja okolinu l .
i svoju vlastitu drutvenu organizaciju, kako mijenja pri- ll
rodu i vlastitu prirodu. Lewis Mumford) poznati historiar
urbanizma i moderne civilizacije, baca iz ove perspektive
svjetlo na nau suvremenu situaciju:
ovjek je postao moralna ivotinja u rano paleolitsko
vrijeme, a imao je vjerojatno vie odnosa suradnje sa
stvorenjima koja su dijelila njegova obitavalita nego to ih
ima danas. Paleolitski lovac moli za oprotenje ivotinju l .
'

koju je ubio za ishranu. Na osnovni moral, briga za ivot


i uzgoj ivota, vue svoj korijen ak od sisavaca, u brizi za
mladunad .. To je granitni osnov svakog morala, vrijedan
toga imena.
Tada dolazi veliki neolitski proces domestikacije, velika
promjena koja se sporo odvija, preobraavajui krajolik
i mijenjajui itav nain ivota. Ova promjena daje seksual-
nosti vei znaaj nego to ga je ona mogla imati prije.
U neolitikom ivotu kultura seksa, u domestikaciji biljaka
i ivotinja i ovjeka samoga, osvaja itavo obitavalite.
l
'Dom i majka' je ispisano iznad obraenog krajolika. ov
jek sada ima stalno boravite, sigurno snabdijevanje u hrani
i vidik na bioloki i kulturni kontirtuitet.
Povrh toga dolazi civilizacija okoline, koja je kozmika l
i urbana. Civilizacija prodire u asu kad ovjek promatra
dovoljno dugo zvijezde i planete da bi vidio kako njegov ll
itav ivot nije samo povezan s lokalnim tlom ve sa
'
Suncem i Mjesecom, te da zavisi od kretanja i energije koji l
postoje daleko izvan njegova vlastitog neposrednog obita-
valita.
To su tri velika obitavalita ovjeka, i sada vidimo kako
sva tri obitavalita iezavaju pred naim oima. Neka su
opasno ugroena, neka su ve temeljito izmijenjena. No,

31
.li
sadanja opasnost nije samo u tome da e neka rijetka
divlja ili neka dragocjena prirodna tvorevina kao rijeka
'P
ll Colorado biti unitena. Velika opasnost prijeti samom ljud-
'\',l
skom opstanku.
!il
A to je, zapravo, dovelo do ove opasnosti? injenica
da se ovjek predao ekspanzivnoj tehnologiji u kojoj mate-
til rijalni procesi premauju ljudsko poimanje i dljeve. 3
f_ Nema sumnje da temelj ljudske civilizacije i morala
Iii predstavljaju shvaanja i norme u vezi s biolokom repro-
dukcijom, odnos prema lanovima ljudske zajednice
'l'
i\ i prema potomstvu, buduim generacijama. Upravo ti
temelji su u pitanju. ovjek je, dodue, jedna od rijetkih
!ll vrsta koja se oduvijek, a s pojavom civilizacije sve vie
i vie, meusobno unitavala i istrebljivala. Iako je ve
veoma rano u svoje moralne doktrine uklesao stav ljubi
111
1 blinjega svoga, on kroz prole vjekove nije moralno
"' mnogo napredovao. Kad reporter sao.pava da su ameriki
11'1 imperijalisti za nekoliko dana na jednu siromanu zemlju
~
' .,'
kao to je Vijetnam sasuli vie bombi nego u toku itavog
i'11'11 drugog svjetskog rata, ovjek se danas manje uzbuuje
nego kad slua rezultate nedjeljnih utakmica, iako bi
lli -.: moralna reakcija bila da uzronike ovakvog rata potamani
kao pobjenjele pse. No, njegova ravnodunost nije mnogo
ll' vea ni onda kad se radi o njegovom vlastitom potomstvu,
li; j
'" u ime ijega odranja i budunosti je uvijek bio spreman
l
opravdavati pljakake ratove protiv drugih naroda. Rasi-
ll.' ' ,-~
panje prirodnih resursa, unitavanje biosfere proizvodnom
i.:\
bezobzirnou, nesmotreno razmnoavanje - sve to ugro-
ii ji ava danas ivot njegove djece i djece njegove djece. Ali on
'l i
;i kao da je isto tako ravnoduan prema njihovoj sudbini, kao
i 1'1 l i prema sudbini njemu dalekih pripadnika njegove vrste.
''l '
.. J Doista, ini se da su rezultati moderne civilizacije pojaali
' ll
'l
degeneraciju moralnih osnova ljudskog ponaanja. Ili se
:Hl
:{ samo radi o jednom priglupom tehnolokom optimizmu,
i;
- "
1 Hl 3
Lewis Mumford, uzeto iz knjige F. Fraser Darling i John P. Milton,
'il
. . -j
eds., Future Environments of North America, Doubleday Co, New York,
.. , 1966 .

32
koji vjeruje da ne postoje takva razaranja izazvana ovje
kom na ovom planetu za koja se ne bi moglo nai lijeka?!
Svijest o opasnosti dola je iz redova onih koji imaju
neposredni znanstveni uvid u prirodne procese i onih koji
su zadueni da pribave ljudima hranu i krov nad glavom, iz
redova prirodoslovaca. Poruka iz Mentona (1971), koju je
l;
'
potpisalo 2200 vodeih uenjaka u svijetu, meu kojima je l '
najvei broj upravo istraivaa prirode (i etiri nobelovca li
- Salvador Luria, Jacques Monod, Albert Szent-Gyorgyi
i George Wald) znaila je prvi alarm:
Iako smo iroko odvojeni geografski, s veoma razlii
tim kulturama, jezicima, pogledima, politikim i religijskim
pripadnitvima, mi smo ujedinjeni u naem vremenu zbog
zajednike dosad nikad postojee opasnosti. Ova opasnost,
kakvu ovjek s obzirom na njenu prirodu i veliinu jo nije
susreo, rodila se stjecajem vie raznih pojava. Svaka od njih
postavlja nas pred gotovo nerjeive probleme; a uzete
zajedno, one ne znae vjerojatno samo irok porast ljudskih
patnji u neposrednoj budunosti, ve mogunost iezava
uja, ili virtualnog iezavanja, ljudskog ivota na Zemlji.
Bez obzira na injenicu koliko e ovjeanstvo biti
sposobno da prije, to jest pravovremeno, ili kasnije, to jest
kad bude prekasno, uklanja ovu opasnost, ono stoji pred
zadacima to se odnose na totalitet ovjekove bioloke l
i drutvene egzistencije, koji stavljaju u pitanje kako njegov
l
nain ivota tako i sistem vrijednosti, i zato moramo govo- 1,
\ ,_;

riti o'potrebi nove civilizacije, o Treoj revoluciji.


Problemi koji se postavljaju pred ovjeanstvo su slije-
dei:
Potrebno je zaustaviti dosadanji prirast stanovnitva
ll .
u svijetu, jer sa sadanjim stopama rasta dolazi do prenapu-
enosti, oskudice u ivotnim sredstvima i do neravnotee
'l
s okolinom. Dok neki krajevi u svijetu podnose poveanje l.
puanstva, drugi su ve prenapueni. Ali glavni problem e
biti, kako uskladiti stope rasta da se stvori optimalni odnos l_:
izmeu mase ovjeanstva i ostale prirode, te da taj odnos
ne ide na tetu masovnog istrebljivanja i iezavanja runo-
.gih drugih ivotinjskih i biljnih vrsta.

33 l
Utvrivanje optimalne mase ljudi na Zemlji uvjetovano
je samom injenicom da je ona ograniena, kako po svojem
prostoru (biosferi) tako i po svojim resursima. Planovi
preseljenja suvine mase ljudi na druge planete su ista
iluzija, ak i onda kad bi to bilo tehnoloki rjeivo.
Ogranienost prirodnih resursa trai da se s njima najo-
preznije postupa, naroito s onima koji nisu obnovljivi, kao
to su fosilna goriva, a to trai takvu tehnologiju koja e
prvenstveno koristiti obnovljive resurse. To takoer trai
ravnomjernu raspodjelu prirodnih resursa meu sve ljude,
izjednaavanje njihovih ivotnih uvjeta u svjetskim razmje-
rima. Pri tome valja uvijek imati na umu ne samo danas
postojee generacije ljudi nego i budue. Valja radikalno
prekinuti s krajnjom neodgovornou sadanjeg ovjean
stva prema buduim generacijama. Univerzalnost ljudske
odgovornosti i morala nema samo svoju prostornu nego
i vremensku dimenziju.
Neophodno je ukloniti sadanju ekoloku krizu, i to ne
samo tako da se odstrane glavni izvori zagaivanja i kvare-
nja ljudske okoline, nego da se stvori uope zdraviji, pri-
rodniji, humaniji odnos izmeu ovjeka i prirode. To se
odnosi kako na ljudsku ishranu tako i na njegovo stanova-
nje i kretanje na Zemlji.
Kada je rije o ograniavanju ljudske mase na Zemlji,
o paljivom postupanju s prirodnim izvorima i zdravom
odnosu prema prirodi u procesima proizvodnje, tako emo
se rukovoditi naelom: Ne bilo kakav ivot, nego ivot
dostojan ovjeka! A to znai da teite ne pada na golo
samoodranje ljudske vrste ve na stvaranje uvjeta za kvali-
tetno bolji ivot. Bolji ivot znai bolji kvalitet ishrane, vie
prostora za ovjeka, vie komunikacija s neiskvarenom,
neindustrij aliziranom prirodom.
Mi emo se svakako suprotstaviti energino onoj tezi:
Zato da ne unitimo sve organizme i oistimo Zemlju za
ovjeka? ovjek moe da naini sintetike nadomjestke za
sve ono to inae proizvodi organski svijet.
Mi emo se energino suprotstaviti pretvaranju Zemlje
u megalopolis: Zato da ne prenesemo sve cvijee, bate,

34
( :
i

l
l
l
l
l

i
l .
l
l.
(

l
l
l
l .
l J

' '

l.

l:
l

l
"}~:i: "o;;~'
;-:;

ume, ptice i ivotinje u lonie, akvarije i vivarije naih


velikih kua? ovjek treba da ivi u prirodi, meu bilj-
kama i ivotinjama, a ne da biljke i ivotinje ive meu
ljudima, u ovjekovim nastambama.
Industrijska civilizacija zasnovana na gomilanju profita
truje sve prirodne izvore, truje ljudsku hranu ve u njenom
korijenju, pretvara ljudsku hranu ponovo u krmu za
masovno ovjeanstvo, koja im se servira na tekuoj vrpci
raznovrsnih konzervi i restorana sa samoposluivanjem.
Ishrana je izgubila u mnogoemu svoj ljudski oblik. Pored
ostaloga, opominje Lewis Munford, jedno od najveih ljud-
skih dostignua jest da je i~umio hranu, a ne prosto krmu.
Sve ivotinje jedu krmu. Covjek je izmislio hranu. Hrana
nije naprosto neto to vi stavljate u eludac i probavljate.
Hrana je prilika za drutveni in. Ona je prilika za susrete.
Ona je prilika za razgovor. Hrana je neto to podstie
osjetila. Vi ste ugodno raspoloeni dobrom hranom, dok
vam je odvratna loa i slaba hrana. Krajolik u kojem raste
dobra hrana je zdravi krajolik za ovjeka i ivotinje.
No, ova ista civilizacija, usprkos svojem naglaenom
. hedonizmu, ne kvari" samo fiziku hranu, ona zagauje
u jo veoj mjeri duhovim hranu. Jedan od osnovnih zada-
taka bit e da povedemo borbu protiv estetskog zagaiva
nja, za spaavanje estetskog izgleda ljudske okoline, za
uspostavljanje novih normi za lijepo i zdravo, protiv
poplave neukusa to ga raa komercijalizacija i publicitet
zasnovan na masovnoj potronji i podraavanju ljudskih
depova.
ovjek nee moi da uredi svoje odnose s okolinom
i piirodom ako ne izmijeni nain svoje proizvodnje, jer ono
to proizvodi uvjetovano je prvenstveno od toga kako
proizvodi, od proizvodnih odnosa, od ljudskih odnosa
u samoj proizvodnji. Bezobzirno iskoritavanje prirode
samo je posljedica bezobzirnog izrabljivanja ovjekove pri-
rode, ovjeka samog.
Naravno, da je u tom cilju potrebno ukinuti ne samo
kapitalistiku proizvodnju, koja se zasniva na stalnoj
i beskonanoj akumulaciji vika vrijednosti i vika rada,

35
nego i svaki oblik takmienja izmeu socijalizma i kapita-
lizma, koji dovodi do istih posljedica, jer socijalizam u tom
takmienju preuzima kapitalistiki ideal beskonane aku- l
l.
mulacije dobara.
Jasno je, da onoga asa kad smo postavili granice
u gomilanju materijalnih dobara, kad smo ljudima rekli:
Evo to je sva glina kojom ete zadovoljiti svoje stvaralake
potrebe, da e se tada odmah postaviti dva osnovna
pitanja: pravedne raspodjele prirodnih resursa i prave pri-
rode ljudskih potreba. Dva bitna oblika otuenja ovjeka
od ovjeka doi e u sredite ljudske panje, naime, prvo,
kako sprijeiti da gomilanje bogatstva, privatno ili dravno
vlasnitvo nad sredstvima za proizvodnju postane sredstvo
eksploatacije ovjeka; i, drugo, kako podrediti proizvod-
nju, odnosno opredmeivanje ljudskih moi, istinskim ljud-
skim potrebama, to jest ovjeku kao lanu slobodne ljudske
zajednice?
Jedno je nesumnjivo: nikakvo mogue rjeenje za
suvremenu ekoloku krizu nije mogue ako ne doe do
radikalnih reformi ljudskog drutva, jerje i sama ekoloka
kriza samo odraz dublje drutvene krize ovjeka, njego- l .

vog naina proizvodnje, njegovog odnosa prema vlastitim l


uvjetima ivota.
l
l
l:
l

1:

36
UDK 316.334.5
Izvorni znanstveni rad

Sociologija okruenja u traenju svog


akademskog i istraivakog profila

Ljubinko Pui
Filozofski fakultet, Odsek za sociologiju, Univerzitet u Novom Sadu
e-mail: pusic@eunet.rs

SAETAK U ovom radu razmatraju se neke okolnosti koje su bile podsticajnc ili su
na i;wesne naine onemogufwale da se :;odologija okruenja etablira kao jedna ce-
lovita, akademska i istraivaka socioloka disciplina. Praenje tih procesa zahte\'a,
ma koliko rcc.lukovan, osvrt na teorijsko nasledc sociologije, drutvene okolnosti u
kojima sc razvijala sociologija u pojedinim sredinama, ali i uslove dugotrajne zatvo-
renosti same sociologije. Dominantna razmatranja odnose se na: (a) probleme da
se u sociologiji prihvati injenica kako su "stvari okruenja" definitivno drutveno
uslov! jene, te da imaju drutvene posledice, (b) probleme sociologije da se oslobodi
predrasuda o fatalnosti 'biologizma' i vanosti 'socijalnog konstrukcionizma', kada je
ret o okruenju i (C) razrnatmnje uloge koje su za formiranje sociologije okruenja
imale socijalna ekologija i sociologija ivotne sredine, odnosno sociologija o okru-
enju.

KNuue ret~i: okruenje, socijalna ekologija, sociologija okruenja.

Primljeno: sijeanj 2009.


Prihvaeno: travanj 2009.

1. Uvod

uSocioloki svet" tokom poslednje etvrtine 20. veka obeleila je velika gusti na po-
kuaja da se etabliraju neke nove socioloke discipline. Sama pojava, kao i potreba,
nikako nije nova; gotovo tokom itavog svog akademskog i istraivakog ivota
sociologija se, znatno vie nego ostale drutvene nauke, nalazila pred izazovima
da proiri i obogati svoju predmetnost. Na neki nain to je i prirodno s obzirom o
da se savremeni svet ispostavlja u svom, ini se, neomec1cnom pluralizmu, gde
pojedini fenomeni, drutveni oblici, obrasci i procesi, gotovo svakodnevno izbijaju
iz nove drutvene prakse.

Danas, kada je pojam ekologije postao sastavni deo svakodnevnog ivota i uz


pomo kog pokuavaju da sc objasne mnogi savremeni procesi, nisu neoekivani
o
u
o
Cop}'right 2009 Institut za dru.tvena istmivanj;~ u Zagrebu - Institute for Social Re.sean.:h in Zo1greh Vl
Sv;~ praw pridrana - All right.s reser\'Cd

27
Sociolog ijo i prostor, 47 (2009) 183 {1): 27-42

ni mnogi i raznovrsni pokuaji da se unutar pojedinih naunih disciplina nade


prostor i za teme omeene interesovanjcm za ''ivotnu srcdinu". 1

1iadicionalne disciplinarne podele, pogotovo one koje se odnose na drutvene


nauke, sve manje uspevaju da zadre sadraje unutar svojih disciplinarnih zabrana:
oni se sve Cce prepliu i sve jasnije gube disciplinarnu ekskluzivnost. 2 11tkocte
je oevidno do koje mere je tokom posleclnje etvrtine prolog veka tradicionalna
unutarsocioloka disciplinarnost poela da se dekomponuje. Mnoga interesov.anja
za pojedinane drutvene probleme, novoispoljene (stare ili davno poznate) dru-
tvene fenomene, pojave i procese u megaproccsu ubrzanja drutvenih promena,
pokuala su da nadu svoj prostor unutar celine socioloke nauke. Posebna istra.i-
vat:ka interesovanja gotovo dnevno se u okviru medunarodne socioloke zajednice
"bore" za etabliranje svojih interesovanja i zauzirnanje nia u vidu posebnih socio-
lokih disciplina. Tradicionalna shema (strogih) disciplinarnih podela ne samo ela
je dovedena u pitanje ve je, ini sc, uveliko razgracfena. U takvom kolopletu ideja,
potreba, ali i unutranjih i nedovoljno artikulisanih potreba, nastale su i svakod-
nevno nastaju nove subdisciplinarne podele. Brzina i snaga drutvenih promena
koje su karakteristine za potonje vreme, poznato je, posledino izazivaju sve vie
razliitih odgovora na optedrutvcnc procese i dobijaju sve ve<.'i broj posebnih
interesovanja koja trae svoje disciplinarne oslonce u etabliranoj sociologiji. Me~
dutim, mnoga :mhdisciplinarna interesovanja ih tu ne nalaze, te pokuavaju da
oforme "svoj krug ideja" za koji veruju da moe da se Hi inkorporira u socioloki
mejnstrim, ili pak da ofonni neku komplementarnu teorijsku, analitiko-metodo
loku konstrukciju i crnpirijsku praksu. Deo problema koji bar poslednjih dvadese-
tak godina stoje pred sociologijom suoenom sa mnogobrojnim subspecijali.<itikim
iza:r.ovima, moe se videti i na sledee naine. Prvi je takozvana "balkani7.acija
discipline" a drugi je esto nedostajue "intelektualno jezgro'' kod pojedinih, po-
sebnih sociolokih interesovanja (Dunlap, 2001.:54-55). Danas je ovo manje-vie
opte mesto u analizama savremene socioloke prakse i razmatranjima uzroka
i posledica "naruavanja" konstrukcije sociologije kao opte teorijske discipline.
Ivloda se tek u ovakvoj praksi jasnije vidi ideja B. Pergera o tome da "sociologija
ne predstavlja toliko naunu oblast, koliko perspektivu: ako zataji perspektiva ne
ostaje nita" (Berger, 1994.:42).

o 2. Neke prelomnice na putu konstituisanja discipline


"o
Socioloko interesovanje za okruenje predstavlja, medutim, put koji je trasiran
znatno pre reenog talasa pojavljivanja novih i jo vie novo-starih sociolokih

m
o 1 Pri tome, potreban je izveswn analiliki napor ne bi li se ispravno razumeJu da li je re
o o ekologiji ili o ivotnoj sredini. VeC i iz ovako naizgledne lapidarnosti, moe biti jasno do
v koje mere postoji pojmovni galimatijas u onon1e to Cemo, z:t ovu priliku, nazvati "stvari
o
okruenja".
"' 2 O tome je vrlo iscrpno pisano u: Vo!crstin, limmuel i drugi (1997.).
28
Lj. Pui: Sociologija okruenja u traenju svog akademskog i istraivakog profila

subdisciplina. Istraivaka interesovanja za okruenje i oblikovanje teorijskog


aparata traju svakako vie od pola veka. Ukoliko bismo govorili o ranim in-
tercsovanjhna za veze drutveno-prirodno, tada bi nas to izvesno vratilo u
drugu polovinu 19. veka, to ovom prilikom nije naa namcra.3 injenica koja
na ovom mestu pobuduje nau panju, odnosi sc na praktino veoma kasno
etabliranje ~wc/ologije okruenja kao jedne celovite, akademske i istraivake
sociolol<e discipline. Put dolaska do nesumnjivog prepoznavanja sociologije
okruenja kao takve, svakako vodi od socijalne ekologije, preko sociologije
ivotne sredine. Bez ove dve medufaze ne bi bilo mogue ela se teorijski i
istraivaki oblikuje ni sociologija okruenja. iv1eutim, ono to na tom putu
neprekidno skret~e teorijski i istraivaki tok jeste stavljanje "ekoloke krize" u
prvi plan (Cifri, 1989.:325). Nalazimo da insistiranje na ideji da je razvoj ovih
disciplina uslovljen razvojem ekoloke krize, iako ona predstavlja podsticaj,
nije dovoljan uslov za razvoj jedne discipline. S tim u vezi kriza sama po sebi,
pa ni ona koja se odnosi na okruenje, ne moe biti centralna taka idejne
konstrukcije sociologije ivotne sredine. Zapravo, re je ne samo o ogranie
nom sadraju ve, sa jedne strane o nedovoljno preciznorn, a sa druge strane
nedovoljno prostranom pojmu. Upravo zbog toga govorimo o sociologiji okru-
enja, kc:to o onoj sociolokoj disciplini koja je zainteresovana i za probleme
ekoloke krize, ali nije direktan njen "proizvod". S obzirom da je re o veoma
mladoj posebnoj sociologiji, nije neobino to iz mnoine interesovanja za
probleme okruenja nije proistekao nauni konsenzus o njenom predmetu i
metodu (Pui, 2001.:350).

Od poetka osamdesetih godina prolog veka poinjalo je da biva jasno kako


razumevanje drutvenih posledica naruenog okruenja trai svoj jasan teorijski
okvir. Stvarnost okruenja, koje je sve vie devastirano, definitivno vie nije mogu-
e posmatrati van dominantne uloge oveka. Samim tim i sadrinski i pojmovno
okruenje postaje sve slojevitije. Kako su mnogi novi oblici drutvene stvarnosti
oblikovani u direktnoj vezi sa okruenjem, to je razumljivo da ni sociologija nije
mogla ostati po strani. ini se da je Hanigcn potpuno u pravu kada. tvrdi da se
celokupna teorijska osnova sociologije okruenja koagulie oko dve vrste proble-
ma: (a) posleclica koje su izazvane destrukdjom prirode i (b) podizanjem svesti o
znaaju okruenja (Hannigan, 1997.:13).

Da bi se bolje razumela pozicija iz koje je sociologija okruenja uspehl da pronade o


~
svoj disciplin;:trni put, neophodno je razmotriti bar etiri pitanja. Prvo, koliko je
o
sociologija u kanjenju za istraivanjima okruenj:.t? Drugo, zbog ega je sociologija
imala problem da prihv;:Iti ekoloka pitanja? Tree, da li je sociologija okruenja us-

m
3 U takozvanoj ekolokoj literaturi esto se moe sresti ideja da je sve to e voditi drutve- o

ne nauke ka 'stvarima okruenja" poelo delom Prirodna istorija Ernsta Hekela iz 1868. o

godine, zapravo korgenjem pojma 'ekologija'. Rekli bismo da se ovde pre radi o samo jed- v
o
nom od moguih, ali .wak<tko ne i o fundamentalnom tragu za razumevanje uloge ekologije ~

u drutvenim naukama i posebno u sociologiji.


29
Sociologija i prostor, 47 (2009) 183 (1): 27-42

pela da pronae svoje pravo mesto unutar sociologije? etvrto, koja su istmivaka
interesovanja sociologije okruenja?'1

Kanjenje sociologije za istr;:tivanjima koja su orijentisana ka okruenju u neku


ruku predstavlja "normalno stanje petrifikovanih pravila" veoma sporog otvaranja
sociologije kao opte teorijske discipine. Interesovanje za okruenje (envajronmen-
talizam5) deo je generalno ubrzanog ritma drutvenih promena tokom druge polo-
vine 20. veka. Neka vrsta podsticaja za diskurs o pitanjima veze izmedu drutvenog
sveta i okruenja nastaje sa izvetajem o granicama rasta Rimskog kluba. Afada
su u prvom krugu onih koji su izvetaj pripremali bili naunici iz kompjuterskih
nauka, futurolozi i ekonomisti, bilo je jasno da su uzroci i posledice poremeenog
prirodnog okruenja drutveno zadati. Ekonomija, kao jedina zastupljena drutve-
n<l nauka u ovom istraivakom projektu i sama je irnal<l problem sa neprepozna-
vanjem drutvene prirode okruenja, te je razumljivo to nije bila u stanju da takvu
orijentaciju ponudi i drugim drutvenim naukama.

U prvim koracima tada preduzetih, uglavnom ekonomskih analiza, videlo se da


moderni problemi - koji su nastali zbog ovekovog delanja -ustvari vode poreklo
iz fizikih mctaholizama poznatih u funkcionisanju industrijskog drutva. r dok su
ekonomistima ipak bile poznate kategorije poput potronje i proizvodnje, po prvi
put takva svoja interesovanja dovode u vezu sa "proizvodnjom" i "potronjom"
prirodnih resursa. Kada je re o sociologiji, neka prethodna interesovanja u ovom
kontekstu bila su poznata prevashodno u oblasti industrijske sociologije i gotovo
nijedne druge socioloke subdisciplinc. Nedugo zatim i pojedini filozofi poeli su
da postavljaju pitanja o etikim znaenjima okruenja (mada je rc<': o pitanjima koja
su postavljana jo u starom veku). Ra%umljivo je da ni medu filozofima nije bilo
naunog konsenzusa o znaenjima ekoloke etike. "Razliite teorije ekoloke etike
nude razliite odgovore na ovo pitanje" (de arden, 2006.:40). Svoja interesovanja
sredinom sedamdesetih godina prolog veka vrlo lako pronale su politike nauke,
prvenstveno zainteresovane za institucionalne oblike upravljanja, kontrolu i dono-
enja odluka u "stvarima okruenja".

Od poetka poslednje prolovekovne etvrtinc interesovanje sociologije za "stvari


okruenja" neto je pojaano i kretalo se u dva osnovna pravca. Prvi predstavljaju
empirijska istraivanja u kojima centralno mesto zauzima propitivanje pretpostav-
o ljcnih vrednosti materijalistikog sveta, odnosno konzumcristiCkc civilizacije, tc
pokuaj da se uspostavi vrednosna korespodencija sa postmaterijalistikim vred-
o

4 Ovakva i manje-vie slin.t pitanja postavljaju sc u gotovo svim pokuajima da se napravi


pregled puta kojim je prola sociologija okruenja. Jedan od, ini sc, cclovitijih tekstova
m (premda sa pogledima koji odgovaraju nemakoj sociolokoj perspektivi), a koji smo ovom
o prilikom imali na umu, je: Huber Josep, "Environmental Sociology in Search of Profile",
o Sociology aud ,Ecology, the German Societ}' of Sociolog}', Bremen, 2001.
5 Pojam okruenja u najpriblinije odgovara pojmu environment u engleskom jeziku. Tako-
o
~
de, za imenicu environmelllalism u srpskom jeziku ne postoji jedan celovit izraz koji bi se
mogao upotrebiti. Zbog toga koristimo izraz "interesovanje za okruenje".
30
Lj. Pui{: Sociologij"a okruenja u traenju svog akademskog i istraivakog profila

nosnim orijentacijama. U teorijskom diskursu pak, bio je to snaan zalet u jo uvek


trajuu kritiku modernosti. Drugi pravac predstavljalo je socioloko fokusiranje
novih drutvenih pokreta. U tom smislu bili su interesantni i oni pokreti koji su za
predmet svog "pokretanj<t" imali neke probleme naruavanja prirodnog okruenja,
ali i mnogi drugi pokreti koji su bili rezultat naruavanja tradicionalnog drutvenog
ambijenta. Znaajno je i to da "novi drutveni pokreti" nisu imali dovoljnu snagu
da ozbiljnije zainteresuju akademsku sredinu za postavljanje pitanja o vrstini svo-
jih istorijskih temelja na kojima su poivale gro:micc petrifikovanih disciplinarnih
naela. Nijedan pravac, medutim, nije otiao dalje od prakse p~trtikularizama, tc
nije postavljao pitanje da li je pri svemu tome potrebna neka druga i drugaija,
celovitija teorijska i istraivaka sociologija. Nije bez znaaja ni to to su oba ova
kruga, akademski i istraivaki, rasli na zapadnocentrinoj kulturnoj podlozi, ne
uvic1ajui koliko je svet u kojem su narueni odnosi prirodno-drutveno, prostrani-
ji. Samim tim i potreba za izuavanje promenjenih sistema vrednosti bila je kultur-
no redukovana. 6 Podstic<tji koji su iz pravca envajronmentalista dolazili do pojedi-
nih sociologa bili su preslabi da bi mogli da izazovu ozbiljnija unutardisciplinarna
osveenja i ela sociologiju okruenja predstave kao promotora nunih promena7
Dok je sociologija pokazivala sve znake indiferentnosti za nove umuardisciplinar-
ne promene, kada je re "o stvarima okruenja", neke drutvene nauke poput psi-
hologije, ekonomije, politikih nauka, prava i filozofije, ak i pedagogije, h;koristile
su tu ansu i poele "stvari okruenja" da ugradnju u svoju predmetnost.

Ovde se s razlogom postavlja pitanje zbog ega je akademska sociologija imala to-
liko problema da zvanino prihvati "stvari okruenja" kao svoj predmet? ini se da
je teko protivreitij. Huberu kada kae da je uobiajeni odgovor koji se sree- da
je to zbog toga to problemi okruenja nisu shvatani kao prirodni predmet socio-
logije. To je, medutim, samo deo mogueg odgovora na koji se odmah nadovezuje
i sledee pitanje: Zbog ega je sociologija samo 20 godina k::1snijc prepoznala da
"stvari okruenja'' ili, jo nedovoljno odredeno, "problemi ekologije'', predstavljaju
fundamentalno politiko pitanje takve vanosti koje se moe porediti sa nacional-
nim pitanjima, ustavnim pitanjima, ukljuujui ak i pitanja razvoja sveta?

Kako na pitanja o razlozima za pozicioniranje sociologije koja se nalazi na prilinoj


distanci od prirodnog okruenja nije mogue ponuditi jednoznaan zadovoljava-
jui odgovor, skloniji smo da to vidimo kao splet okolnosti u kojima sc razvijala
sociologija u pojedinim sredinama. Nije izvesno da bi uoptavanje prilika u kojima
je sociologija okruenja pronalazila svoj akademski i istraivaki put, moglo jedna-
o

6 Jednom prilikom, vie kao ilustraciju ne-sporazumevanja i ncr<tztuncvanja razliCitih kul-


turno-genetikih obntzaca drut\':.t, naznaili smo da, dok u Nemakoj pokreti zelenih
predstavljaju znaajnu politiku snagu unutar parlamenta, u afrikoj dravi Mali zadugo nije m
rnogul<e oekivati da se pojavi pokret zelenih. o
7 Izraz "envajronmentalisti" koristimo uz sav oprez koji zahteva njegova direktna neprevo- o
divost, pfemda se koristi i u naoj literaturi. U svakom sluaju, podrazumcvanm nairi skup
o
svih pojedinaca koji se samostalno, spontano, organizovano ili institucionalno, akciona ili
pa.si\no interesuju za "stvari okruenja" a ne .samo za zatitu ivotne sredine. "'
31
Sociologija i prostor. 47 {2009) 183 {1): 27-42

ko da vai za sve sredine. injenica je da su se neka pitanja, koja e ui u agendu


"stvari okruenja" u poslednjih dvadeset godina, ranije otvorila u razvijenim za-
padnim sredinama. s Premda su mnogi tragovi naruenog odnosa prirodno-dru-
tveno tu bili jasno vidljivi, ni drugde, pa ni u manje razvijeninl sredinama, za uvid
u tako neto nije bilo neophodno izvebano analitiko oko niti posebno podeen
nauni instrumentarij. Pre hi se moglo govoriti da je tome doprinela ukupna dru-
tvena klima u kojoj za oblikovanje i iskazivanje pluralizma interesa u gotovo svim
oblastima ivota nisu bili neophodni dravni ni institucionalni podsticaji (kako je,
inae, bilo u zemljama u kojima se aktivno och,ijao komunistiki odnosno soci-
jalistiki projekat). Naime, dobro je poznato kako je prevalentan deo sociolokog
korpusa u drugoj polovini prolog veka bio zasnivan (i) na ideolokoj konstrukciji.
Ukoliko bismo se ipak opredelili da potraimo neku vrstu najmanjeg zajednikog
imenioca sociolokih interesovanja koja su prethodila sociologiji okruenja, tada
bismo ugledali nekoliko teorijsko-akademskih i istraivttko-empirijskih krugova.

U prvom krugu teorijskog naslecfa koje je moglo da stvori podsticaj ili pak da
usporava razvoj sociologije zainteresovane za okruenje, koji ]. Huber naziva "in-
stitucionalnom sociologijom", jasnije od ostalih vidi se strukturalizam na tragu Ivi.
Vebera, G. Zimcla, E. Dirkema V. Zombarta iR. Darendorfa . .Medutim, ni u jednom
od tih velikih sociolokih krugova i teorijskih projekata nije bilo dovoljno prostora
za uoavanje eksplicitnosti veze izmedu drutva i "stv<tri okruenja". Zttpravo, u
svakom od njih postojala je bar po jedna kljuna nit iz koje se moglo naslutiti ili
je to bilo ne ismrie eksplicitno pokazano - da su problemi drutva istovremeno i
problemi okruenja - odnosno da su problemi okruenja istovremeno i problemi
dmtva. U principu, sve bi to mogla ela bude povoljna teorijska podloga za izua
vanje svesti o okruenju, za izuavanje ekolokog naina miljenja i suprotstavlje-
nih kulturnih paradigmi o prirodi i izuavanje uloge ljudi i drutva prema prirodi.
Ali, kao to znamo, to se uglavnom nije dogodilo kao jedan si.stematian socioloki
projekat.

Drugi krug ideja ispisuje tradicija marksizma, odnosno "filozofija pmxisa." 'I\i pre
sveg<1 mislimo na pokuaje marksizma da objasni uticaje ljudske proizvodnje na
produktivnost i regenerativne mogunosti prirode. Verovatno bi bilo predaleko ii
do njihovih pretea u "stvarima okruenja" (kakvih pokuaja ima), te se naprezati
da se u idejama Vilima Petija i fiziokrata iz 18. veka pronalaze ti tragovi. Ono to
o pak ne bi bilo pravedno odrei to su zasluge marksizma za uvocfenje pojmova,
odnosno ideja o prekomernoj eksploatacija eko-sistema, kolonizaciji okruenja,
o ekolokoj transformaciji, industrijskom metabolizmu i industrijskoj ekologiji ili en-
tropiji ekonomije (Huber, 2001.:4). Medutim, njihova opoziciona otrica vladajuim
stremljenjima vremenom je slabila, tako da su se u dubini 20. veka primeivali
samo njihovi tragovi.

o 8 Za pregled razvoja sociologije okruenja u SAD veoma je instruktivan tekst: Dunlap,


v Rilley (2001.): "The Evolution of Environmental Sociolog)': A Brief History and Assessment
o
~
of the American Experience", u: Frey, R. Scott, Tbe Environmeut and Sociely, Allyn and
Bacon: i3-62.
32
Lj. Puit: Sociologija okruenja u traenju svog akademskog i istraivakog profila

ini se da se idejama K. Marksa i F. Engelsa danas pridaje vei znaaj nego to su


one, po sadraju koji se odnosi na vezu izmedu prirodnog i ljudskog, zaista imale.
Kako tvrdi Hanigcn, ini se da tad nije ba bilo jasno kako bi tc veze trebalo da
izgledaju. Marks i njegova rana saradnja sa Engelsom samo su se marginalno od-
nosili na degradaciju okruenja per se, ve je to pre svega bilo usmerenje ka analizi
drutvene strukture i drutvenih promena (Hannigen, 2006.:8). Ono to je iz nji-
hovih ideja u vidu naslea direktno "doprlo" do savremenih zmienja, bila je uloga
drave u destrukciji okruenja. Jedna od naje~e korienih ideja koja sc koristi
u objanjcnjitna 1\farksove uloge u "stvarima okruenja" je takozvana "metaboliCka
pukotina". U originalnom tekstu to je "metabolika" veza izmedu ljudi i prirode a
u neomarksistikoj interpretaciji to je najblie onome to bismo nazvali ekoloka
odrivost (Foster, 2001.:80).

Ovo je, moda, bila jedinstvena prilika da kritike teorije "naprave iri prostor" za
nove socioloke pristupe, teorijske konstrukcije i istraivake projekte koji bi pos-
peili stasavanje sociologije zainteresovane za okruenje. Smatramo da je socijalna
ekologija, koja je kao akademska disciplina kod nas stasavala na tragu ovakve
kritike teorije, vremenom proirila svoja istfaivaka interesovanja (prvenstveno u
smislu transclisciplinarnosti) i postepeno prerasla u sociologiju okruenja?

Trei krug ideja koji je "bio blizu mogunosti" da reinterpretira znaenja prirode u
najire okvire sociolokog promiljanja, ali nije iskoristio tu ansu, odnosi se na kri-
tike teorije razvijane prvenstveno u okvirima ''Frankfurtske kole". Spremnost da se
vidi i analizira neulepana slika drutvene stvarnosti bila je fokusirana i na destruk-
tivnu snagu moderne nauke i tehnologije, ali bez dovoljno jasno razraene ideje o
tome kako one utiu na besprimerno iskoriavanjc prirode i naruavanje okruenja.
Ponekad se prilikom analize znaaja ovog kruga ideja prcnaglaava njegova uloga
u poslednjoj etvrtini 20. veka, te se delovanje j. Haberm<Isa vidi kao neka vrsw
krunskog podsticaja za nastanak i razvoj ''zelene kritike", odnosno neke vrste pretee
pokreta zelenih (posebno u Nemakoj). Aktuelizovanje kritikog pristupa novog so-
ciolokog senzibiliteta, u kome t<e sc "stvari okruenja" nad na samom poetku teo-
rijskog diskursa, nastupie tek sa U. Bekom i njegovim idejama o rizinom drutvu.

Smatra se da etvrti mogu6 impul::; u otvaranju sociologije ka "stvarinw okruenja''


pripada zagovornicima sistemskih teorija i funkcionalne sociologije i to u jednom
irokom luku od T. Parsonsa do N. Lumana. 'l\1 se pre svega misli na evolutivne o
teme Parsonsove sociologije koje se odnose na povezivanje njegove teorije soci- ~

okulturne evolucije sa teorijom organske evolucije, te na "optu teoriju delanja" o

(Ha ines, 1987.). U irokom spektru sociolokog interesovanja N. Lumana posebno

9 Gotovo u svakoj sredini unut::lf evropske socioloke scene osamdesetih godiml prolog
m
veka mogli bi sc pronai sociolozi koji su svojim intercsovanjima dali doprinos otvaranju o
sociologije ka "stvarima okruenja". Recimo da su u bivoj Jugoslaviji pre svih to bili Rudi o
Supek, Ivan Cifri i Danilo . i\Jarkovi, na primer.
o
O znaaju socijalne ekologije Z<! razvoj prostorno zainteresovanih sociologija. posebno ur- ~

banc sociologije, pisali smo na drugim mestima (Pui, 1997.:54-58).


33
Sociologija i prostor, 47 (2009) 183 {1): 27-42

se istiu njegove analize o vezama izmedu drutva i okruenja i proirenje tradi-


cionalnog razumevanja pojma ekologije.l 0 Zaista, u istraivanjima "stvari okrue-
nja" koja su dola na red sociolokog interesovanja od kraja devedesetih godina,
sistemske teorije ostavile su znaajnog, pogotovo metodolokog traga.

U svom relativno sporom "otvaranju ka novim problemima" koji su gradili drutve-


nu stvarnost, kao i prema ostalim drutvenim naukama, sociologija je i u odnosu na
"stvari okruenja" esto koristila saznanja i dostignua ve etabliranih subdisciplina,
kao i njihove metodoloke aparate i analitike instrumente. Povremeno, to je dovo-
dilo do nejasnih granica i preplitanja pojmova i sadraja izmedu komplementarnih
drutvenih nauka. Tako je, na primer, "stvari okruenja" sociologija radije videla
kao deo socijalne psihologije (odnos ljudi prema pojedinim pitanjima naruenog
kvaliteta okruenja) ili antropologije (ll srnislu evolutivnih veza izmedu prirode i
oveka). Ove nauke, medutim, bile su zainteresovane samo za pojedina pitanja
medusobne veze ljudi i okruenja a ne i za celinu odnosa drutveno-prirodno. Sve
to kao nije bilo dovoljno ela bi se videlo kako "stvari okruenja" ne predstavljaju
parcijalne drutvene probleme i da je potrebna neka vrsta sinteze. Sve negde do
osamdesetih godina prolog veka sociologija kao da je svaki put kada se nade u
blizini pojmova kao to su priroda ili ekologija, oseala nelagodu, smatmjui da
oni i proizilazed sadraji "pripadaju nekim drugim naukama". ak i kad su poeli
da se pojavljuju prvi drutveni pokreti koji su se interesovali za "stvari okruenja'',
sociologija ih je radije videla kao naturaliste, vitaliste, komunitarce ili alternativce a
ne kao novu drutvenu snagu koja trai odgovarajud socioloki "tretman".

Sve bi to moglo da predstavlja skicu za ram unutar kog bi stali razlozi kojima
se sociologija rukovodila kada je odbijala da u S\'Ojc okrilje primi i pojmove i
sadraje "stvari okruenja", te da otvori ekoloko pitanje. Za to vreme, u tehni
ko-tehnolokim, prirodnim, komplementarnim drutvenim naukama i generalno
u drutvu, itekako su bili prihvaeni pojmovi koji su imali veze sa ekologijom i
okruenjem. 11

lO Ideje koje govore o razvoju pojma "okruenja" sve do modernih znaenja gde se soci-
oloki jasno razdvaja drutveni sistem od "prirodnog" okruenja, zatim funkcije znanja o
ekologiji kao pretpostavci za drutvenu komunikaciju, ptt sve do onih znaenja etike koja
o se odnose na okruenja, sistematski su izloene u: Niklas Luhmann (1986): Hcological Co-
"o mmtmication, University of Chicago Press. Interesantno je, medutim, da ta knjiga nije imala
velikog odjeka u sociologiji a nije uspela da zaivi ni kao ekoloko tivo. Ve i to dovoljno
jasno govori da uslovi za nast<lnak nove sociologije okruenja u okviru sociologije tada jo
uvek nisu bili dovoljno sazreli.
jedno od posebnih, ~tli S\'akako korcnski vanih pitanja kada je rc o zasnivanju discipline
m sociologije okruenja, odnosi se na "ekoloki etos", U poslednje dve decenije o tome je
o mnogo pisano, ali nalazimo da je jedan od interesantnijih prilaza onaj koji je dat u: Cifrit',
o 2000,,216-237.
v 11 Sam autor bio je sudeonik u naporima i svedok potekoa koje su na pot"ctku novog
o
milenijuma pratile pokuaje da se sociologija okruenja ustanovi kao akademska disciplina
"' unutar studija sociologije kod nas.
34
Lj. Pui: Sociologija okruenja u traenju svog akademskog i istraivakog profila

Kako smo ve rekli, uslovi u kojima su se razvijale pojedine socioloke discipline


nisu bili, niti su i danas, jednaki u svim sredinama. Bilo bi prilino smelo i ve-
rovatno netano ukoliko bismo smatrali da je evropska socioloka tradicija neto
blia uslovima u kojima su se razvijale prostorno orijentisane (ili je bolji izraz
prostorno senzitivne) sociologije, pre svega urbana sociologija. 12 Danas je mogu-
e nai dovoljno tekstova o razvoju sociologije okruenja u SAD i svi su oni sa-
glasni bar u jednoj stvari: razvoj ove sociologije u svim razvijenim sredinama na
Zapadu bio je stepcnast i sve do poetka devedesetih godina prolog veka nije
se moglo govoriti o njenom stabilnom razvoju i shodno torne njenom formalnom
etabliranju. Talasi ra:diitog intenziteta interesovanja nisu bili samo rezultat nau
ne inertnosti, ve su bili pod veoma snanim uticajem politikog oblikovanja jav-
nog mnjenja, pogotovo u vreme predsednikovanja R. Regana (Dunlap, 2001.:46) .
.Medutim, ono to se za razvoj ove discipline ini vanijim, jesu bar dve injenice
socioloke naravi. Prva je da je sociologija dugo bila pod uticajem socijalnog
konstruktivizma i teorija o ljudskoj izuzetnosti. Tek spremnost sociologa da se
van ove dve teorijske konstrukcije suoe sa injenicama o drutvenim uzrocima
i drutvenim posledicarna naruenog okruenja, otvorila je mogLK'nost da se
sociologija oluuenja a ne sociologija o okruenju oblikuje kao relevantna soci-
oloka disciplina. "Po optem miljenju, najvei doprinos sociologije socijalnom
konstrukcionizmu dala je Bergerova i Lukmanova knjiga Socijalua konstrukcija
stvarnosti" (2001.:41).

Sa druge strane, amerika sociologija se od sredine sedamdesetih godina prolog


veka razvijala (i) zahvaljujui mnotvu empirijskih istraivanja. Kako e Dunlap
primetiti, dok se evropska (prvenstveno britanska) sociologija trudila da uoblii
teorijsku osnovu sociologije okruenja, amedka je tragala za podacima in silu.
Lokalizovanost problema okruenja pratila je najvei broj ovih empirijskih istrai-
vanja. Bilo je to vreme kada procesi globalizacije, premda ve dovoljno uoljivi, jo
uvek nisu uspevali da zainteresuju nautm javnost. Otud su amerika empirijska
istraivanja esto imala snana obeleja lokalizama. Teme poput: "Sociokulturni
faktori koji utiu na potronju ili uvanje energije", "Drutveni faktori poveane
potronje energije", ''Lokacije zagadujuih industrija u podrujima sa siromanijim
stanovnicima'' (tzv. 'okruenjski rasizam'), i sline, bile su sasvim standardne. Na-
ravno, nije mogue tvrditi da je jedan ili drugi put sociolokog oblikovanja discipli-
ne "bolji", ali je injcnica da je zajcdniki rezultat bio povoljan po etabliranje ove
posebne sociologije. Unutar Amerikog sociolokog drutva javlja se sve vei broj o
lanova u sekciji za "sociologiju okruenja", objavljuju se analitiki i esto provo-
o
kativni tekstovi i razvijHju novi univerzitetski kursevi. To korespondir~l sa meduna-
rodnom sociolokom scenom jer se slini procesi, pogotovo oni koji se odnose n;.l
novo interesovanje na univerzitetima i u islra7Jvaldm institutima, javljaju u Japanu,
Skandinaviji, Brazilu i Kanadi.
m
o
o
12 Seticmo se da su, pre nego to je evropska urbanosocioloka. tradicij<t pocla da obli-
kuje nau urbanu sociologiju, prvi impulsi bili vezani za <lmcrit~ku urbanu sociologiju i
posebno za ikaku kolu.
35
Sociolog ijo i prostor, 41 (2009) 183 (1): 27-42

Snana konstrukcionistika orijentacija, koja je "dospela'' iz sociologije nauke i


postmoderne diskurs analize, bila je veoma uticajna meu evropskim sociolozima
okruenja, ali manje nego to je to bilo u SAD-u. Neki manje ortodoksni oblici
konstrukcionizma analizirali su vanost uloga koje imaju razliiti akteri poput ak-
tivista, naunika i politiara kojima je bilo svojstveno drutveno prepoznavanje i
definisanje uslova okruenja kao "problema" ~ bez poricanja objektivnog postoja-
nja takvih problema ... Oni su, dakle, pre poznavali objektivno postojanje problema
okruenja i nisu insistirali na tome da je rc o drutvenim konstrukcijama. ak i
poznati kanadski sociolog Don Hcnigcn, autor znaajne knjige o koristima chu-
tvenokonstrukcionistikog prilaza sociologiji okruenja (Hannigan, 1997.:58-75),
porie postojanje ekstremne konstrukcionistike perspektive koja bi ila samo za
tim da mnoge globalne probleme vidi kao iskljuivo "proizvode" medija ili ekolo-
kih aktivista, bez realne osnove (Dunlap, 2001.:54).

Za razumevanje okolnosti u kojima kod nas pokuava da se razvije sociologija


okruenja, takoe je od izuzetne vanosti (ne)postojanje odgovarajuih empirij-
skih istraivanja. Mada, moglo bi se rei da to nije samo osobina ove posebne so-
ciologije, ve pre stanje koje obelcava generalnu poziciju sociologije u srpskom
drutvu. Premda se ne moe govoriti o tome da je nae drutvo ikada isuvie
bilo zainteresovano za empirijska istraivanja, ono to je spajalo teorijski diskurs
i empirijsku provem bili su pre svega individualni napori pojedinih sociolog<t,
generalno u periodu do devedesetih godina prolog veka. Pa i tada, interesova-
nje za pojedina socioloka istraivanja pre je bilo stvar pojedinih institucija koje
su bile zainteresovane za pitanja drutvene stvarnosti u onim oblastima za koje
su same zainteresovane.I3 r danas, u drutvu koje jo uvek trai svoj pravi izraz
koji bi odgovarao nedefinisanim "modernim potrebama", socioloka istraivanja
nalaze sa na samim marginama drutvenog interesovanja. Retka istraivanja po-
stoje jo samo zahvaljujui entuzijazmu pojedinaca ili nekoj vrsti redovne prak-
se u okviru vanuniverzitetskih institucija, odnosno pojedinih naunih instituta..
Medutim, koliko je narna poznato, opsenijih istraivanja koja bi se odnosila na
"stvari okruenja" i za koja bi sociologija predstavljala konkretan istraivaki
okvir, nema. H

l3 Poznato je da je u oblastima prostorno orijentis~mih sociologija, ponajpre u okviru urb:t-


o
ne sociologije, bilo istraivanja za koja su bile zainteresovane pojedine gradske institucije
koje su se havile urbanistikim planiranjem i projektovanjem, kao i one koje su upravljale
gradskim gradevinskin1 zemljitem. U nekim od njih, pogotovo u veim gradovima, stavka
"istraivanja" postojala je kao deo redovne prakse u okviru godinjih planova rada. U vre-
menu njihove prvenstveno trine orijentacije koja je stupila na scenu poetkom devedese-
tih godina prolog veka, bez obzira na javni karakter i "javni servis" koji je iz tog znaenja
m proizilazio, kao i na njihovo elitno materijalno pozicioniranje, fundamentalna istraivaka
o praksa potpuno je nestala.
o I4 Takoe nalazimo da je interesantno da se odredena emprijska istraivanja obavljaju u
okvirima akademskih institucija koje su za "stvari okruenja" zainteresovane iz ugla drugih
naunih oblasti: na tehnikim t~tkultetima, kao i u okvirima departmana za geografiju, pro-
storno planiranje, umarstvo i poljoprivredu, na primer.
36
Lj. Pui: Sociologija okruenja u traenju svog akademskog i istraivakog profila

Iz prakse razvoja sociologije okruenja u razvijenim sredinama znamo da je ne-


ophodno da ovaj istraivako-empirijski korak, prethodi uvrivanju akademsko-
teorijskog poloaja "novih" sociolokih suhdisciplina. U reenoj srpskoj drutvenoj
stvarnosti u kojoj ne postoji izraena potreba vanakademske javnosti za saznava-
njem injenica o toj stvarnosti putem rezultata temeljnih (empirijskih) sociolokih
istraivanja, iskustvenu praksu u razvijenim sredinama moemo donekle da "upo-
trebimo" kao alibi.l5 Iz tih iskustava poznato je da je, na primer, izraena empirijska
orijentacija savremene amerike sociologije okruenja predstavljala njenu tendenci-
ju da sc izbegne snana i striktna socijalno-konstrukcionistik<l perspektiva koja je
tokom proteklih etvrt veka bila dominantna u drutvenim problemskim teorijama
i posebno unutar sociologije nauke. Istovremeno, pred nama je i iskustvo agresivno
"proizvedenih" zahteva postmoclernizma (postmoderna diskurs analiza) kojima so-
ciologija nije uspela da se odupre. Setiemo se da je ta orijentacija uspela da "ispri-
a priu'' o tome da okruenje (i nai odnosi sa njim) predstavlja "istu drutvenu
konstrukciju" kao da je to, na primer, stvar "jezika, diskursa i moi onih koji su u
igri''. Poslcdica je bila da je .snaga konstrukdonizma poricala znaaj prirode kao
relevantne injenice u odnosu na ljudsko iskustvo. Upravo takva jedna perspekti-
va izbegavala je mogunosti ispitivanja veza izmedu okruenja i drutva (Dunlap,
2001.:53). Takva redukcionistika uloga u odnosu na drutvenu prirodu okruenj;l
imala je ogromne negativne posledice ne samo na razvoj sociologije okruenja, ve
i na oslobadanje sociologije od jednostranog pogleda na drutvenu stvarnost.

Kada je re o poloaju sociologije okruenja kod nas, tada srenu okolnost pred-
stavlja injenica da je tokom poslednje decenije minulog veka ona uglavnom
generalno pozicionirana unutar evropske i ire medunarodne sociologije. 16

15 Nik;1ko nije bez znaaja .~to su se razna istraivanja vrlo razliitih ~tgcncija za istr~1ivanje
javnog mnjenja, sa jedne stwne, te nevladine organizacije, sa druge strane, i novinarske
ankete, sa tree strane, namemula kw relevantni izvori za stvaranje mozaike slike o stanju
drutva, pa i o pitanjima koja sc odnose na meduveze drutvo-okruenje.
l6 Ukoliko je za institucionalizaciju pojedinih sociolokih discipina relevantno njihovo pri-
su stvo u okviru dve vodee medunarodne socioloke asocijacije, tada sociologija okruenja
\'e<.( odavno ima zauzeto svoje mesto. U okviru ISA (International Sociological Association)
"Istraivaki komitet za okruenje i drutvo'' postoji jo od 1971. godine. U okviru iste or-
ganizacije ustanovljen je i redovni Newsletter of Researeb Com mi/fee 24 "Environment and
o
Societ}'''. J uokviru ESA (European Sociological Association) postoji Istraivaki komitet za
okruenje i druwo koji sc, osim problemima okruenja u drutvenom kontek;tu, zanima
i za pitanja odrivog razvoja, kao komplementarne socioloke oblasti. (Vie o tome moe
se nai na ;tdresi: http://esa-esn.org.) Pre kao kuriozitet koji govori o porastu interesovanja
nego kao upotrebljiv statistitiki podatak navodimo da je ''Sekcija za sociologiju okruenja''
Amerikog sociolokog udruenja (ASA) 1976. godine imala 290 lanova a u oktobru 2008.
godine okupljala je 461 lana. Procesi "sociolokog otvaranja" u Evropi su obino neto m
sporiji nego to je to u SAD-u. U Nemakoj je, redmo, sociologija okruenja institucionalno o

i "zvanino'' zaivela tek 1994. godine, kada je ''Sociologija i ekologija' podrana kao sekci- o
ja u okviru Nemal~kog sociolokog drutva, mada ak ni 1996. godine veina lanoYa nije v
o
uvaavala injenicu o novoj sociolokoj disciplini. Radije je bio u upotrebi naziv "socijalna
ekologija" i "sociologija i ekologija" "'
37
Sociologija i prostor, 41 (2009} 183 {1}: 27-42

3. Sociologija okruenja izmeu akademske i istraivake prakse

Ono to jeste vano za dodatno razumevanje mesta i uloge sociologa okruenja


u brzorastuoj sociolokoj zajednici, jeste da ~ociolog okruenja nije ekolog sensu
strictu. "Eko-sistemi i fiziki industrijski metabolizam, biljke i ivotinje, okeani i
planine, voda i zemljite, organski otrovi i smrtni rizici, nisu neto to se direk-
tno tie sociologa. Medutim, ono to sociologa interesuje jeste kako uslovi ivota
stanovnitva unutar svojih zajednica i organizacija uzrokuju takve posledice po
okruenje i kako se te poslcdice vraaju ljudima nazad. Druga vrsta dileme koja
ograniava ili pak usmerava ideju o sociologiji okruenja je ona koja sc nalazi u
uverenju ela je posao sociologa, u uem smislu rei (znai ne istraiva<! drutvene
stvarnosti /social scientist/ nego "istog sociologa"), ve odavno zadat: drutvene
strukture i njihova podela u smislu socijalne stratifikacije, drutvenih grupa, sta-
rosnih grupa, drulvenih uloga, ivotnih stilova i slino" {I-Tuber, 2001.:10), Dakle,
drutvene nauke stavljaju pred nas potrebu za znatno irim razumevanjem sveta
koji nas okruuje.

Ono to predstavlja "posebnu dra", ali istovremeno opstrukciju petrifikovanim


razumevanjima zadataka sociologije, jeste snana i sistemska otvorenost sociolo-
gije okruenja ka ostalim drutvenim i mnogim komplementarnim naunim dis-
ciplinama. Sloene probleme meduveze drutvo-okruenje-dmtvo nije mogue
razumeti ukoliko ne postoje uspostavljene funkcionalne veze sa mnogim drugim
naunim disciplinama. Uostalom, celokupna istorija razvoja sociologije okruenja
to pokazuje. Istorijski put razvoja sociologije okruenja u SAD i Velikoj Britaniji
pokazao je, izmedu ostalog, da je za "novo otvaranje" sociologije bilo presudno
uverenje sociologa da se njihovo poslcnitvo ne granii samo sa akademskim uzvi-
enostima, istraivakom pasijom niti majstorskim u meem. U vremenu koje pred
oveka neprestano postavlja nove izazove, itekako je potrebna i doza intelektualne
osveenosti o tome da drutvene nauke mor:aju potpuno ela se otvore. I. Volers!in
to naziva fleksibilnou, odnosno proirivanjem organizacija intelektualne aktiv-
nosti. "Biti sociologian nije iskljuivi deloluug osoba koje se zovu sociolozi. To
je obaveza svih naunika u oblasti drutvenih nauka ... Ukratko, mi ne verujemo
ela postoje monopoli mudrosti, niti zone znanja rezcrvisane za osobe sa posebnim
akademskim stepenima" (Volerstin, 1997.:123). Svakako da Volerstin nije prvi medu
znaajnim imenima na sociolokom globusu koji se dotakao pitanja revitalizacije
o sociologije i njenog odnosa prema ostalim komplementarnim i kontaktnim nau
nim disciplinama. Uviajui da je u krizi modernog doba i sama sociologija u krizi.
Ukoliko ne uspe da odgovori izazovima ozbiljnih drutvenih promena Piter Berger
je implicito dodirnuo i sve one "nepokrivene oblasti" u kojima treba da se ispolji
primenljivost i javni presti (Berger & Kelner, 1991.:167). Pre nego to e sociologija
prepoznati svoj interes za "stvari okruenja", to su ve uradile pojedine drutvene
nauke i ponudile se javnosli k:.1o one koje uoavaju, razumeju i nude odgovore na
probleme modernog nesporazuma izmedu drutva i okruenja. Ook e kasnije
o
Berger pojaavati svoj kritiki ~tkcenat u odnosu na izostaJu saradnju sociologije sa
v
o ostalim naunim disciplinama, mnoge drutvene n:mke ve e ostvariti ili obnoviti
~
svoja intcfdisciplinarna zanimanja i ukljuiti se u multidisciplinarn:J istraivanja.

38
Lj. Pui: Sociologija okruenja u traenju svog akademskog i istraivakog profila

Pre nego to sociologiji ponudi "recept'' za ukljuivanje u novu realnost interdisci-


plinarnosti i dugoronih intelektualnih pregnua, primetie da 'za razliku od ve6-
nc drugih naunika, sociolozi ni za jednu posebnu cmpirijsku oblast ne mogu da
tvrde da je njihova sopstvena. Oni uglavnom mogu ela ponude svoju perspektivu.
Slabosti koje sociologija ispolj<lV<I, unitavaju njenu perspektivu i ine je zastare-
lom" (Berger, 1994.:42). Moda pre nego ijedna druga oblast "stvari okruenja" su
ponudile (ili je tanije reeno - zahtevale) sociologiji da definitie svoju transdisci-
plinarnu perspektivu.

Kao i veina modernih sociolokih disciplina i sociologija okruenja u jedan od


svojih fokusa postavlja naine, oblike i fukdje ljudskog delovanja. Ra%ume se, ono
je i u ovom kontekstu "proizvod" mnogih oblika komunikacija i mentalnih proce-
sa, ali nikako nije psihologija koja se, takoe, i to veoma ekstenzivno i sistematski,
interesuje za ovu oblast. Sociologija okruenja interesuje se za komunikaciju i in-
teraktivne dinamike procese, posebno dinamikc diskurse, od kojih su neki ve<-1
odavno otvoreni u sociologiji, posebno onoj koja se specifino zanima za kulturu.
U sredinama u kojima je razvoj sociologije okruenja poeo ranije i koje iza sebe
imaju ve jasno definisan akademski i istraivaki prostor za "stvari okruenja",
nije bilo neobino to je upravo ona inicimla preispitivanje nekih definicija dru-
tvenih procesa i drutvenog delanja u ok\irima javne administracije, menadmen-
ta, ekonomije, rada, kulture, proizvodnje i tehnologije. Sa neto vie otpora, ali i
uz uvaav~lnje od strane "tradicionalne sociologije" u ovim sredin~1ma zapoet je i
proces nekih redefinicija sociologije kulture, sociologije znanj;:t, malo provetravanje
diskurs analize i istnlivakih pravaca na formativno~sistemskom nivou. To je bilo
mogue samo u uslovima kada je unutar institucionalne sociologije shv<leno i pri-
hvaeno da ovakva socioloka disciplina u svetu koji se ubrzano menja, odraava
svoj pun sadrinski i metodoloki smisao. Do poslednje decenije prolog veka go-
tovo da nije bilo nauke koja na ovaj ili onaj na<-~in nije u svoje istraivako interesu-
vanje ukljuila i "stvari okruenja", na naein i u obliku koji je bio prilagoen osnov-
nom disciplinarnom odredenju. Ukoliko je desetak godina pre toga bilo i izvesne
pomodnosti kao rezultat naglo poraslog interesovanja za "stvari okruenja" koje su
plasirali mediji i aktivistike grupe za zatitu okruenja, neki ozbiljni i nesumnjivi
podaci o globalnoj ugroenosti planete nisu mogli da se ignoriu. Lista istraiva
kih oblasti koje su bile zainteresovane za "stvari okruenja" uvek je dua nego to
je u odreenom trenutku to mogue sainiti. U tu listu svakako sc ukljuuju: (a) u
oblasti prirodnih nauka: fizika okruenja, hemija okruenja, ekolok<1 hemija, eko-
loka geo-hemija, ekoloka bio-hemija, ekologija, biologija okruenja, konzervacija
o
prirode i predela, geoloka ekologija, regionalna i urbana ekologija, poljoprivredna
ekologija, eko-toksikologija, medicina okruenja itd.; (b) u oblasti tehnikih nauka:
ininjerstvo okruenja ("potroen" vazduh, otpadne vode), upravljanje otpadom,
recikliranje i ponovno korienje, ekoloka obnova povrinskih kopova, okruenje
i procesni ininjering, biotehnoloki procesi ininjeringa, energetska tehnologija i m
okruenje, saobrat~ajna tehnologija i okruenje, Industrijska proizvodnja i dizajn za o

okruenje, ekoloka arhitektura, ekoloko gradsko i regionalno planiranje itd.; (e) o

u oblasti drutvenih nauka: upravljanje okruenjem (Environmental Management),


ekonomija okruenja/ekoloka ekonomija, zakonodavstvo okruenja, administra-

39
Sociologija i prostor. 47 (2009) 183 (1): 27-42

cija i planiranje okruenja, socijalna i ljudska ekologija (ekologija naselja), politike


nauke okruenja, sociologija okruenja, novinarstvo okruenja, psihologija okru-
enja/ekoloka psihologija, etika okruenja/filozofija okruenja, istorija okruenja,
obrazovanje i okruenje/obrazovanje za okruenje itd. (Huber, 2001.:9).

Naravno, mogue su i razne kombin~tcije izmedu pojedinih disciplina, oblasti i


interesovanja. ini se da nije nauno sebino ustvrditi kako sociologija ukljuuje
u svoje polje interesovanja gotovo celokupnu sferu drutvenih nauka, te da kao
svoj imanentan zadatak uestvuje u oblikovanju nekih oplih teorija o drutvu.
U drugom koncentrinom krugu njenih "zadataka" svakako je i subdisciplinar-
no usmeravanje i proirenje referentnog okvira. Sociologija okruenja predstav-
lja moda jednu od najdinaminijih posebnih sociologija koja mno.tvom novih
znaenja ispunjava taj okvir i istovremeno omoguava da sc sociologija ''otvori''
ka ostalim kontaktnim i komplement::lrnhn disciplinama. To, medutim, ne znai
kako se time pojedinim drutvenim naukama, koje su pre prepoznale znaenja
okruenja kao sopstvenu preclmetnost i koje su to iskoristile za razvoj sopstvenih
unutardisdplinarnih usmerenja, remeti referentni okvir. U "stvarima okruenja"
ima posla Z;1 sve drutvene nauke koje pokuavaju da uoe i objasne sve procese
"drutvene proizvodnje okruenja". S obzirom da su problemi okruenja problemi
drutva, t<tcla, kako kae ameriki sociolog okruenja M. Bel, ako postoje oni koji
stvaraju probleme okruenja, mora da postoje i oni koji te probleme reavaju (Bel,
1998.:2)..Moda ''reavanje" ba i nije pravi izr-az, ali u svakom sluaju je re o onim
sociolozima koji su posveeni tome da te probleme sa deskriptivig, prevedu na
eksplikativni i aplikativni nivo.

ini nam se moguim ela je upravo sociologija okruenja ''kopa koja je nedosta-
jala" pa da se u savremenim, turbulentnim civilizacijskim procesima, na kvalitetno
nov nain poveu drutvene nauke. Otud bi]. Huber mogao biti u pravu kad tvrdi
da uloga sociologije kao "sn:tbdevaa" generalnim teorijama svakako ne znai da
su ostale disciplinarne teorije viak. Razmiljanje u tom pravcu svakako je pogre-
no. Njeno je da omoguava da neke opte paradigme poslue kao platforma za
drutvene nauke, zajednike kategorije i modele, opta pitanja i usmerenja (Huber,
2001.:8). Kao to sociologija nikada ne moe da bude zamena za politike nauke,
ekonomiju, pravo, filozofiju, pedagogiju ili psihologiju, tako ni sociologija okru-
enja ne moe da obuhvati sva subclisciplinarna interesovanja drugih drutvenih
o nauka, ali moe da ih povee na jedan akademski i istraivaki podsticajan nain.
Uostalom, etablirajui se u vie od 150 studijskih program~! na univerzitetima irom
o
sveta, ona to i uspeva.

o
v
o

"'
40
Lj. Pui: Sociologija okruenja u traenju svog akademskog i istraivakog profila

Literatura

l. Bell, M. J\L 0998). An lnuitation to Environme1lfal Sociolog)~ london: Pine Forge


Press.
2. Ber, V. (2001). Socijalni koustrukciou/znm. Beograd: Zepter Book \X1orld.
3. Berger, P.; Kellner, H. (1991). Sociologija u IJO~'Om kljuu. Ni: Gradina.
4. Berger, P.~ Luckman, T. 0992). Socijabw komtmkcija zbilje. Zagreb: Naprijed.
5. Berger, P. 099-i). Sociologija: Povlaenje poziva. Pregled, 265:39-12.
6. Cifrk\ I. (1989). Socijalna ekologija: prilozi zasnivanju discipline. Zagreb: Globus.
7. Cifri, I. (2000), Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos. Zagreb: Hrvatsko socioloko drutvo i
Filozofski fakultet.
8. De arden, D. H. (2006). Ekoloka etika: lll.JOd u eko/okufilozq[iju. Beograd: Slubeni
glasnik.
9. Dunlap, R. (2001). The Evolution of Environmental Sociology: A Brief HistOf)' and
Assessment of the American Experience. U: Frey, lt S. (Ed.). Tbe Em;fronmem ami
Socie(J. Allyn and Bacon.
10. Foster,). B. (2001). tdarx's Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Emiron-
mental Sociology. U: Frey, R. S. (Ed.). The Environment and SocfelJ~ Allyn and Bacon.
11. Haincs, V. A. (1987). Biology and Sochtl Theory: Parson's Evolutionary Theme. Sociol-
ogy, 21 (1),19-39.
12. Hannigan,). A. (1997). Environmental Sociology: A Soda! Constructionist Perspective.
London: Houtledge.
13. Hannigan, J. (2006). HmJ/roumental Sociolog}~ Oxon: Routledge.
14. Huber,]. (2001). Environmental Sociology in Search of Profil e, Sociolog) and Ecology.
15. Pui, Lj. (1997). Grad, t!rulwo,prostor:sociologljagrada, Beograd: Zavod za udbenike
i nastavna .sredstva.
16. Pui, Lj. (2001). Odrivi grad: ka jednoj sociologiji okruenja. Beograd: Nezavisna
izdanja Sl. Mak~a.
17. Volcrstin, J. (et al.) 0997). Kako o/L'orili druftt;ene unuke. Podgorica: CID.

m
o
o

41
Sociologija i prostor, 47 (2009) 183 (1): 27-42

Origin<~ l scientific p:tper

Ljubinko Pui
Filozofski fakultet, Odsek za sociologiju, Univerzitet u Novom Sadu
e-mail: pusic@eunet.rs

Environmental sociology in search of its academic and research profite

Abstract

This paper looks at some circumstances which have encouraged or in certain ways discour-
aged the establishment of environmental sociolog}' as a complete, academic, research disci-
pline in ::;ociolog}' The examination of these processes requires at least a brief comment on
the theoretical heritage of sociology, social conditions in which sociology has developed in
different sochtl surroundings, as well as conditions which have determined its long-lasting
limitations. Special atten!ion has been given to (a) the acceptance of the fact that "environ-
mental things" are social!}' conditioned and have social consequences, (b) rhe refusal of
the J~ttal biological determinism and the importance of "sochtl constructiveness", when the
environment is in question and (e) the role which social ecology ;md the sociology of hu-
man environment have played in the fonmnion of environmental sociolog}'

Key words: environment, social ecology, environment~il sociology.

Received in Januar)' 2009


Accepted in April 2009

o
o
o
~

42
Routledge introductlons to environment series

Environment and
Social Theory
Second edition

John Barry

R~:;;~!~,~~~"'
LONDON AND NEW YORK
.. :J
l. ..

Routledge introductions to e.nvironment series Routledge introductions to environment series


Published and forthcoming titles

Titles under Series Editors: Titles under Series Editor:


Rita Gardner and AM. Mannion David Pepper

Environmental Science texts Environment and Society texts

Atmospheric Processes and Systems Environment and Philosophy


Natural Environmental Change Environment and Social Theory .
Biodiversity and Conservation
Ecosystems
Energy, Society and Environment,
second edition
Environment and
Environm~ntal Biology Environment and Tourism
Using Statistics to Understand the
Environment
Gender and Environment
Environment and Business
Social Theory
Coastal Systems Environment and Politics, se.cond edition
Environmental Physics Environment and Law Second edition
Environmental Chemistry Environment and So.ciety
Biodiversity and Conservation, second Environmental Policy
edition Representing the Environment
Ecosystems, second edition Sustainable Development
Environment and So.cial Theory,
second edition
John Barry

~) Routledge
~\.. Taylor&Fr..mchCtoup
LONDON AND NEW YORK
- .,

30 .. Environment and Social Theory

Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2001, which distinguishes 'derivativc' from 'dualist' accounts
of nature within the history ofWcstcm political thought. 2 The role of the
Sec also David Cooper' s 'The Idea of Environment' in David Cooper and Joy Palmer
(eds), The Environment in Question: Ethics and Global Issues, Lond~n.: Routledge, 1992,
environment historically
and Tim Ingold's 'Culture and the Perception of the Environment, m E. Croll and D.
Parkin (eds), Bush Base, Forest Fann: Culture, Environment and Development, London: within social theory ~::.;~,:,,
Routledge, 1992. Other good texts include Robert Boardman's The Political Economy of
Nature: Environmental Debates and the Social Sciences, Basingstoke: Palgravc, 2001,
and M. Rcdclift and T. Benton (eds), Social Theory and the Global Environment, London:
Routledge, 1994.

For an examination of the cultural dimensions of social-environmental relations sec


K Milton 's rcadablc and informative book Environmcntalism and Cultural Theory, Key i:SsUeS..

L=~don: Routledge, 1996. For an excellent and rcadablc account ofdi~fcrent o~


ideas the . ~On.;Wes_temv_iews~of-the envi.ronment
environment (such as wildcrncss, eountrysidc and city) sec John Renmc-Short, fmagmcd The' Jud~eo-.Chdstiarl :ieg_acy. ..
Country: Society, Culture and Environment, London: Routledge, 1991, and ~lizabeth
'rtieEnii9h.tEm"meht,'E!rivirohmeritand.-scit!ial
........... ... . ""' .. . .. . . theory:
...
Croll and David Parkin 's editcd volume, Bush Base. Forest Farm: Culture, Env1ronment The-iridiJstrial.teVOIUtion~-
and Development, London: Routledge, 1992. Other good texts include Neil Evcmdc~'s .ft1E~:ete-~9cratit. revolution: .
The Social Creation of Nature, Baltimore, MD. and London: The Johns. Hopktns
University Press, 1992, and David Golblatt Social Theory and the Env1ronment,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.
Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to set the scene for the later discussions ofthc role of
the environment in social theory by looking at how social theory has historieally
vicwcd and used the environment. _This chapter traces some of the historical
anteccdcnts of how previous human generations at different times, places and
within different cultures have conccptualised and though t about the environment
and social-environmental relations. A second aim will be to look at some of the
historical roots of Western social theorising about the environment in general, and
at the legaey of Judaeo-Christianity and the Enlightenment in particular. Finally,
a third aim is to look at some of the historical origins of the 'green' social theo-
retical perspcctivc1 focusing on certain antecedcnts of green though t in two broad
reactions to the Enlightenment: namely, the rcactions to the industrial revolution
and the French and American 'democratic revolutions' of the late eighteenth
century.

Historically, social theory has been largely concerned with reflecting on human
society, critically analysing it, proposing the best arrangement of society for human
beings. While there have been some notable exceptions, as wiii be discussed below,
: social theory has historically been ovcrwhclmingly antbropocentric; that is,
:largely concerned with humans, human interests and human social relations.
.. :J

32 Environment and Social Theory


The role of the environment historically 33

One has only to examine some of the great texts of social theory (covering such
is something that will be taken up in later chapters. It serves as an opposing view
disciplines as pOlitics, philosophy, sociology, history, economics) to quickly see
to the idea of human harmony with a bountiful nature which many suggest is
that 'the environment' as an explicit object of examination is either absent, or else typical of some aboriginal and 'hunter-gatherer' world views, which are discussed
is seen as a natural 'backdrop' against which human history, politics and social briefly below.
development takes place. Thus the environment (largely viewed as 'nature') is
often a mute or a passive object of human manipulation within the history of The oriental religious teachings of Confucianism Shintoism and Buddhism
social thought. It is rarely at the forefront of social theory historically, being seen each had their :Particular views on the proper place of the environment in their
as something that just is, standing over and above human affairs and the endur- particular worldview, and all had their own rules and principles concerning the
ing natural context within which those affairs occur. However, this is ~ot to say treatment and use of the environment. Generally speaking, Buddhism displayed
that the history of Western social thought has little to say about the env1ronment. a marked respect for the natural environment and a basic Buddhist belief is
For the most part the environment has been regarded as a necessary collectiO.n that all forms oflife (human and nonhuman) are interdependent, which includes
of resources or means to human ends, an attitude towards the natural environment the principle of ahimsa or avoiding harm to other living beings. Hindu religious
which still predominates today, but which is being challenged by greens and thought denoted particular ways_oftreating domestic animals, and forbade the
others who suggest that this attitude is both morally objectionable and results m eating of beef. Islam had its own particular set of rules, laid down in the Koran,
environmental problems for society. about the proper way of thinking and relating to the environment. As Morgan
pu ts it, 'Muslims have a stro.ng sense that the whole universe, sun. moon,
Non-Western views of the environment stars, trees, birds and flowers are God's creation and "signs" of His being, and
that humans are khalifa, vice-regents under God with responsibility to care for
While most of this book will concentrate on the relationship between Westem what God has made' (2001: 394). This idea of taking care of God's creation
social theory and the environment, where appropriate reference: will also be made is similar to the 'stewardship' tradition within Judaeo-Christianity which is
' discussed below.

ll
to non-Western perspectives and insights. This is particularly Important as there
is a strong argument to suggest that many of the environmental and soc~al One of the things which all the 'great religious' of the world share (Buddhism,
problems that we see around the world today, at least~ p~rt, may have to. do With Islam, Judaeo-Christianity and Hinduism), and which is important to note, is a
the predominance of a particular Western way of thmkmg about and mteract- common character as 'agricultural' religious. That is, these particular religious

l
ing with the environment and a distinctly Western or. European set of values, can trace their historical roots back to the period after (the majority of) humans
institutions and principles around 'modernity' and 'development', whic~ will had left the 'hunter-gatherer' stage of human social evolution and were prominent
be dealt with later in this chapter. Here all I wish to do is indicate that there IS and
in societ~es and empires which were overwhelmingly agricultural civilisations. A
has been a variety of non-Western social theorising about the envirorunent.
second issue of note is that moSt of the civilisations in which these religious
Historically, as in the Western world, most .non-Western social theo~sing about originated were also civilisations in which cities and towns were important places
the environment took religious and 'traditional' cultural forms (meamng that how of political, economic, religious and military organisation and power.
people thought about the environment was largely governed by m~s. and stories
Aboriginal peoples in Africa, Australia, the Americas and Asia also had their own,
which were handed down from one generation to the next as traditiOn). In the
usually spiritually informed, traditional ways of thinking about and treating their
Middle Eastern civilisations of Egypt and Mesopotamia we can find a wide
environments. The forms these traditional ways of thinking and acting took
variety of ways of thinking about the environment. According to Hughes, 'The
ranged from animism, a belief in spirits of the forest or of particular animals,
attitude of the peoples of Mesopotamia toward nature ... is marked by a strong
nature worship and sun worship. In general, in marked contrast to the Judaeo-
sense of battle. Namre herself was represented in Mesopotamian mythology
Christian religious worldview (and also to the other formal religions outlined
as monstrous chaos, and it was only by the constant labours of people and ~e
above), these traditional ah original cultures were less anthropocentric and more
patron gods that chaos could be overcome and order established' (1994: 34). Th1s
inclined to emphasise the continuity rather than the separation between the human
idea of the 'struggle against nature' is something that has framed much of the
and the nonhuman worlds. These more 'eca-friendly' worldviews have been a
debate about the relationship between human_society and the environment, and
constant source of inspiration for green forms of social theory and action. As Wall
34 Environment and Social Theory
The role of the environment historicarry 35
notes, 'Greens and fellow travellers have used existing huntcr-gatherer groups
Christian values and pcrspcctives have sha - .
and their ancient ancestors as an example of ecological good conduct' (1994a: inany of the practices institutions and 1turped ;n d contmuc to bc reflected in
20). However, this stratcrgy is not without its problems and critics. as I hope to show bciow is part l leu h cs o these 'sccular' societies. This
' ICU arY t e case with rega d t m '
For example, the 'ecological wisdom' of the American Indians has long been a theorising about the environment r o vvestem social
(contested and sought after) point of reference for many environmental arguments
For example, pro of of the continuin w. . .
and groups, on the grounds that the philosophy, worldview and associated ways in the anti-war argurncnts m d bg po er of Chnstran thinking could be scen
of living of American Indian cultures represent real world cxamples of 'living a e Y some Christia
ran pub1icity campaigns around th. tl n groups m America who
lightcr on the earth' and how to live in harmony and balance with the environ- e leme of What would J
attempted to provokc Ch . ( . csus d nvc?
which
ment. Equally, as Guha (1989) has correctly pointed out there is a tcndency ns tans m to reflecting on th_ . '
US-lcd war and invasion ofira ( d h . e connectiOn between the
amongst some Western social theorising about the environment to (selectively) q an t e environmental d 1
act) , the oii rcsercvcs of Iraq as f l . an mm an costs of that
read non-Western (usually Eastern) philosophical values and positions into h b. one o tle mam reasons D .
ow, y rcducing their dcpcndcnc .1 . or go mg to war, and
Western ecological thinking, such as the association of 'deep ecology' with cars, this could bc scen J"- . e on OI v~a buying smalier, more fuel-efficient
Buddhist or aspects of Hindu thinking, which does n'ot pay attention to or respect as rvmg accordmg to thci Chr' .
particular, this Christian . . r tstJan principic..<:. In
the cultural specificity of those non-Western forms of thinking and ways of cnvrronmcntal campaign "( .
incfficicnt SUV and light tru k . en Jciscd the rise of fuel-
life. Those who wish, for example, to make a case for the harmony between . . e ownershtp and use in A A .
Its website, 'The Lordship ofChri . mcnca .. ceordlllg to
Chinese, Indian or other Asian cultures and nature would do well to go to the is excluded from his Lordsh sTthcxtcnds throughout every area oflife. Nothing
original sources rather than to popular and selective Western interprctations of 1P IS mcludes our tra rt .
IS why the question "Wh t ld . nspo ation choJcc. This
the religious, cultural or folk wisdom ofthese non-Western sources (Elvin, 1998). a wou Jesus dnve?" _ th .
ponder seriously. Obeying J . IS one at all Christians should
However, as Milton points out: . . csus m our transportatiOn ch . .
ChrIsban obligations ' The . _ orces ts one of the great
The myth of primitivc ecological wisdom, however misleading it may bc, is America and Europ~ but i~a~:arg.n g_ef~crated a great deal ofpublicity both in
useful in drawing attention to the fact that a concern to protcct the environment .l. . o sigm ICant as a remind f l .
mo bI rsmg capacity of rclig . . er o t lC contmuing
from the effects of human activity need not be part of an oppositional ideology. wus sentiment m Western societies.
It may bc part of the cultural status quo, part of the way in which the members In the Jewish tradition the 'n tura! .
ak. , . ' a envrronment' was genc II
of a particular society has always understood their place in the world. m to WJ.lderness' and against which hu . ra y scen as something
(Milton, 1996: 33) at the same .time there arc mor h . m~ SOciety had to strugglc. However
e annomous v1cws on the t . '
and nature. It is worth noting th t J d . . In eractton of humanity
,._, th a u atsm m particular h h
The Judaeo-Christian legacy e propcr treatment of domesticatcd . l as muc to say on
of the environment even to subd amm~ s, and :orbadc the needless destruction
to Ives: ue one s cnemics (Swartz, 1996). According
To the extent that thcological debates about spiritual and worldly matters may be
said to constitute a form of social theorising, we can say that Judaco-Christianity The Torah orders the creation of rccn bel ..
was a limited, though nonc the less significant, reflection on the relationship and the laws against graftin d" g ts around ct ties (Numbers 35:4)
.. g tvcrsc sceds and cross b d' . ,
between human society and the natural environment. The importance of begin~ (Levtticus 1919) can b d ree mg amma! species
. e un crstood in modem t '
ning our analysis of the relationship between Western social theory and the dtvcrsity. Shabbat is a wcckl e. cnns as concern for bio~
environment with an examination of the Judaeo-Christian lcgacy cannot be l Wc arc called upon i JY rest
word. .hl
lO! humans anim 1
'
d
a s an the natur<! l
n CWJs aw to offer bl r
ovcrstatcd. For while many see Western societies and social theory as 'sccular' natural phenomena (rainbow 1. h . . cssmgs l Or all m;~,nner of
tg tnmg, shootmg sta
or non-religious, it remains the case that exploring their Judaeo-Christian origins of a tree etc) A most d . rs, t he fitrst blossoms
' ramattc ecological gestu Sl '
and con texts can be extremcly illuminating. Generally speaking, it is more accu- year r~t for the environment when ll fi Ids . rc IS zemita, the seventh
that mcditating on natu . ' a e hc faJiow. Maimonidcs declares
rate and useful to describe Western societies as 'post-Christian'. What is meant rc JS one of the key wa
commandmcnt to 'love God with all ;s a _person can fulfil the
by this is that, although it is no longer the case that these societies are deeply Hatorah 2:2). your heart (Mxshnc T orah, Ycsodci
Christian in the way they were in the past, it is still the case that Christianity and
(Ives, 2004: 2)
.:.1

36 Environment and Social Theory


The role of the environment historically 37
In contrast to some hunter-gatherer views of the environment, and more in
keeping with the Mesopotaroian view mentioned above, both the Jewish and the hW:O~ capacity to manipulate the world for human ends. Prometheans have
Christian views of the environment were not of a 'giVing environment' (Milton, an unlimited confidence in the ability of humans and their technolo ies to
ove:come any problems presented to them - including what can now begstyl d
1996: 116-18). The idea of the 'giving environment' denotes the (often mis- environmental problems' (1997: 45). e
leading) positive conception of the typical environment of hunter-gatherer
peoples, in which people simply picked or procured what they needed from the In the ~hristian Bible one can trace some of the roots of how the environment has
abundant resources of their immediate environment, without much effort In been VIe~ed and treated wi~in Western society and social theory. Typicall
marked contrast the Judaeo-Cluistian attitude to the environment is a combination ~eopl.e pomt to the passage m Genesis in which God orders Adam and Eve ~
of a negative view of 'wilderness' (viewed as chaos and a threat to human social dommate and subdue' the Earth and "go forth andmultiply') which demonstrates
order), coupled with a deep sense of how the environment requi:r:ed intensive the extremely anthrop?centric character of Christianity (see Box 2.1 ). This
human labour and effort, such as agricultural and animal husbandry practices, in ant~ropocentri~m Wlthm. Christianity is an attitude to the nonhuman world in
order that humans could survive and prosper from 'ungiving' and often hostile whl~h the t:nv~ronment lS viewed and valued instrumentally; that is, on this
natural envirorunents. particular readmg of the Bible, humans are permitted and indeed d
use the t:ncourage to
The latter idea of having to labour for a living in tht: world is directly related environment and value it only insofar as it is useful to human t:nd.
to the biblica1 story of Adam and Eve being banished from the Garden of Eden or purposes. In .other words, the environment has no value in itsdf (intrinsi;
(which was similar to the 'giving environment' of some hunter-gatherer peoples) ~=~~{ b~t has mstru~~n~al value; that is, its value or worth is given by how
for having defied God and eaten fruit from the tree of lmowledge. In banishing or mstrumenta1 It IS m fulfilling some purpose other than its own th
Adam and Eve from this comfortable environment in which all their needs ~eeds o: ends of so~e other entity. According to Lynn White Jr. (196; ~~a:
were met without having to work (and in which they along with the beasts were mfluential essay entitled 'The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Cri ,s' ) h.
vegetarian), God curses Adam and his descendants (i.e. all humans) to have to :eadmg. of ~hristiani~. what he calls the 'domination of nature>::;~t~ onan~
'work by the sweat of his brow'. The importance of the Garden of Eden story, Imperative. m. Genesis and biblical teaching makes Christianity therym t
as the Christian creation story, is not whether it is 'true' or not. Rather its signifi- anthropocentnc o: all re.ligions. Indicative of the superiority of humans over :e
cance lies in its being one of the first systematic and most powerful stories n~nhuman .world lS nOt jUSt that 'man' [sic] is created in the image of God, but
or narratives about the relationship between humans and the environment. As G d also glves Adam the power to name each creature. For White 'Chri t" .
such, we can say that this story constitutes an important attempt to theorise the ... not only established a duatism of man and nature but also inslsted ~::ntlty
God's w1t1 that m t 1 1S
environment and our proper rdationship to it. It contains many of the elements ' an exp Olt nature for his proper ends' (1967: 1205) and he
that surfac<::: later in social theorising about the environment. These include: a co.nclu~ed th~t _we sh~U continue to have a worsening ecologic crisis until we
particular conception of 'environment' and its status as the 'home' or 'proper reJe~t t e Christian axlOm that nature has no reason for t:x.istence save to serve
place' ofhwnans; the role oflmow1edge in how we think and ought to think about ma:'. (1967: 1206). However, for White this did not mean the abandonin of a
and interact with the envirorunent; the distinction between a 'giving' and a 'non- rehgwus approach to thinking about our relationship to natur . g l
Chr" e m genera or
giving envirorunent; the crucial role of human laboUr in our relationship to the C~st~an~ty m .Particular. White proposed that there were resources within
environment; and finally. the dangers inherent in particular forms of thinking . stdtamty which .could remedy the 'domination narrative. In particular he
about and using the envirorunent for humans. All of these, and others. are issues pomte to the teachmgs of St Francis of Assisi:
which arise in different forms of social theorising about the environment and will
be discussed in later chapters. The greatest spiritual revolutionary in Western history SamtF-" . d
ha h th uu.oCJS, propose
w t e ought was an alternative Christian view ofnature and man, la .
Aspects of the roots of this Judaeo-Christian attitude towards the environment toithetri dt b sre tton
' e. o su stltute the idea of the equality of all creatures inci d"
may be traced in part to ancient Greece and the story of Prometheus, the Greek ~~ for the tdea ofman 's limitless rule of creation. He failed. Both ~ur pr~~:~
hero who sto le fire from the Gods and which symbolises humanity's triumph over science and our present technology are so tinctured with orthodox Christian
nature viewed as an enemy or a denying force for hwnanity. According to Dryzek, ;;ogance to ward na_ture that no solution for our ecologic crisis can be expected
'In Greek mythology Prometheus stote fire from Zeus, and so vastly increased om them alone. Smce the roots of our trouble are so lar l l" .
rem d t ls . ge Yre tgtous tht:
e y mus a o be essentially religious, whether we call it that or not.' We
: "
~~~-----r:--
-- __ . ----
- ---

38 Environment and Social Theory


The role of the environment historical/y 39 ,
must rcthink and rc-feel our nature and de~tiny. The profoundly religious, but
hcrctical, sense of the primitive Franciscans for the spiritual autonomy of all
parts of nature may point a direction. I propose Francis as a patron saint for Box 2.1 Judaeo-Christian theory an'd the environment
ccologists.
'Then Go? ~aid, "Let us make man in our image, after our likcncss and let them
(White, 1967: 1207)
ha:~ don;;mon over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air and over the
In opposition to the 'domination' view, Passmorc (1980) also suggests an ~=rthc:,~o

;;/all :h~~ a~d ovcr.cvcry crccping thing that cr;cps upon the
crea e man m Ius ovm Image, in the image of God hc created him
alternative interpretation of Christian teaching about the environment. According
~ale a~d female hc ~rcatcd them. And God blessed them, and God said to them'
to him, there is a 'stcwardship tradition' derived from Christian though t in which Bc fruttful and mulbply, fill the earth and subduc it and have d 1
fi h fth d om1mon over t lC
the natural environment was 'God's Creation'. This stewai'dship tradition s oth e sea ~n over the birds of the air and over every living thing that mo ves
pre-dates Christianity, and its origins may bc found in the Greek philosopher ~~~~th~ ~:~~/~~dt~oearthdsaid, "BdehoJd, I have ~iven you every plant yiclding seed
Plato who in the Phaedrus wrote that "'It is everyvvhcrc the responsibility of e , an every tree With seed in its fru't h h
them for food"' (Gencsis 1: 26-9),. l , you s a11 ave
the animate to look after the inanirnate". Man ... is sent to earth by God "to
administer earthly things'', to care for them in God's name' (quo ted in Passmore,
J980: 28; sec Box 2.1 ). The domination of nature interpretation

This was also the Jewish position. As Swartz points out, 'And though their efforts 'Christ~anity in oppo~in~ and dcstroyingpagan animism made it possiblc to ex lo it
~;:~m a mood ofmdiffercncc to the feelings of natural objects' (White, 1~67:
to tame the land, to make it more productive and more dependable, were often
I
marvels of ingenuity, they understood, as well, the limits. to their mastery - for li
'[~the Christian separation of man from the animals and the christian view that
they knew God as Sovereign of the Land, and ... they acknowledged God's i na rc was made for man, there lie the sceds of an attitude to nature f:
ownership' (1996: 88). Since the natural world had not been made by humans, it
was not their exclusive propcrty to treat and use as they wished. Within the
stewardship tradition, rather than the nonhuman world being made for humans
l
l
propcrly dcscribab1c as "arrogant'" (Passmorc, 1980: 12). ar more

The stewardship tradition


(a position which did eventually come to dominate Western views of the environ-
l
ment), as stcwards of God's creation humans were in a sense made for the
nonhuman world, or rather they were God's 'managers' or stewards holding
responsibility for God's property. This meant that there were certain rules
l i~~~~~: fu~t~:ps~;~;uty .[of'thman' towards all nature and all life] clc:=~r when
am mto e Garden of Eden "to dress a d t k
to manage and protcct it' (Passmore, 1980: 29).
., .
n o ccp It , l. e.

~~n~:r~~~:;:::wards1~P Icgiti~atcs ~e _rcordcring of the non-human world in


governing how the environment, its plants, animals and so on were to be treated
One implication of the stewardship view, and one which will be picked up in the
conclusion, is that as stewards of creation, humans had an obligation to pass
~~~~::::e~ ~~:~~ew~~ :~~;Iv::,~::~;,~:~:~~::~~~~~~~n~;~i~~d;';
th ~ ~ to regard the mtcrcsts of future generations as well as
on the natural environment to future generations (sec Box 2.1). An important ose ofprescntly cxtsting persons' (Northcott, 1996: 129).
point here is whether this obligation meant passing on the environment in 'The end of man' s creation was th t h h ul b .
the same state as they found it, or whether humans were obliged to 'improve' the heaven and earth. th' . f1., a cs? d ctllcvtccroyofthegrcatGodof
ood m lS m cnor World; !us stcward ... bailiff oi' farmer of this
natural environment. A good example of this sustainability injunction (long g Iy farm ~f~hc lower world' (seventeenth-century Chief Justic s -M l
before the concept of 'sustainability' was conceived) is the following from the Hale, quotcd m m Passmorc, 1980: 30). e. tr att lcw
chan cell or of Rcichcnhall, an old Bavarian salt-works city in 1661, who stateQ.:
'God created the woodlands for the salt-water spring, in order that the woodlands The perfection of nature thesis
might continue eternally like the spring. Accordingly shall the men behave: They
'The word "nature" derives from th La .
shall not cut down the old trees before the yonng trees have grown up' (von Bu low, bc born", "to come into bein.. ; Its e l tm nascere, With .such mcartings as "to
1962: !59). potcntiaJ rather than the actu! W ctymeak,o ?gyh~ug~c:>ts, that ts, the cmbryonic, the
lik 'ts esp mt tsspmt,ofanarcastillinsomcth
As Passmore (1980) and others (e. g. Pepper, 1984) have pointed out, this Christian e l ongmal condition as "not yet developed" To "deve! 1 d'' . mg
op an , on th1s way
stewardship view, in which social-environmental interaction was governed by

continued
40 En~ironment
~--~--~------

and Social Theory


-- -.-~

"C ....
-
The role of the en~ironment historically 41

oflooking at man's relationship to nature 1 is to actllalise its potentialities, to bring


to light what it has in itself to become, and this means to perfect it' (Passmore,
1980: 32).
'The view that man has responsibility for handing over to his descc::ndants a nature
made more fruitful by his efforts is not ... an entirely contemporary innovation,
or an attempt to appeal to moral feelings which simply do not exist: it has deeper
roots in Western civilisation' (Passmore, 1980: 32) .

Ch eru bim
religious considerations, began to give way to a more interventionist- and l
anthropocentric viewpoint in which humans could use their God-given powers
Arch angels
of creativity and ingenuity to 'perfect' nature for 'the Glory of God' (see Box
2.1 ). The 'perfection of nature' idea resulted in providing a religious justifica- l
tion for what we would now call the 'development' of the environment. This Angels
,,
transformation of the natural world by humans in the West took many -forms,
' l

l!
from the creation of geometrically symmetricallandscape gardens of the famous
eighteenth-century landscaper 'Capability' Brown (in contrast to the messy, Man
irregular patterns of 'wild' or 'natural' environments), to the straightening of l
rivers and the draining of swamps.
Woman
Another extremely important contribution which Christian thinking made to l
theorising the environment is the 'Great Chain of Being' (though strictly speaking
Animals
this pre-dates Christianity and may be found in other religious and non-religious
thought). The essence of this view, as the name suggests, was that the world was l
made up of a hierarchical set of relationships with God at the top of the chain and Plants
clay/dirt at-the bortom, with angels, men, women, animals and plants in between
l
(see Figure 2.1). Thomas Aquinas gave clear expression to this idea:
Metals
As we observe ... imperfect beings serve the needs of more noble beings;
plants draw their nutrients from the earth, animals feed on plants, and these in , ,Y, l
tum serve man's use. We conclude, then, that lifeless beings exist for living Minerals
beings, plants for animals, and the latter for man.... The whole of material
nature exists for man, inasmuch as he is a rational ;animal. ... We believe all l
corporeal things to have been made for man's sake.
(Quoted in Kinsley, 1996: 110)
However, it is interesting to note that in both Jewish and Cluistian theology there
have been those who have rejected this hierarchical view. For example, the Jewish
kabbalist (mystic) Maimonides declared: 'lt should not be believed that all the
beings exist for the sake of the existence of humanity. On the contrary, all the
beings too have been intended for their own sakes, and not for the sake of
something else' (in Swartz, 1996: 93). A similar argument was advanced by

-~--~~------------
42 Environment and Social Theory
The role of the environment historically 43.
St Francis of Assisi who famously prcachcd to the animals and developed a
to human manipulation and transfo t. fi .
Christian panthcism in which the natural environment partook of the divinity and vulnerability became outri ht ex loi:; IOn. rom the s~xteenth century on, this
grace of God, and was not simply a set of spiritual!y mcaninglcss or empty era in the cightecntll ccnturyg B p l . on WI~h the commg of the Enlightcnmcnt
resources to bc used. For his ecological awareness and earth-sensitive theology in Ycxp OI tati on IS meant th t th f h .
1979 the Catholic Church made St Francis the patron saint of animals and ecology. :~n~::sv~~:e~n!!ercssasrienggulyia~cd by morali (religiouslya bas:~~ec~n:i~:;:~;:~:~
ofthis d l m. non~mora ' cconomtc tcnns. A consequence
Despite these and other counter-currents, the dominant attitude of Judaco- eve opmcnt was an eroston of th b d
Christianity to the environment has been one based on the Great Chain of Being. ilicgitimatc abuse', such that the eri tria~ oun. a_ry between legitimate <~sc, and
The hicrarchical arrangement of entities implied different grades of value or with the environment were ' fit' 'ordcctstons about how humans mtcract
of'righf and 'wr ' . pro 1 or usefulness' rather than ethical notions
importance such that those above were more valuable/important than those below. ong.
Often there arc also gradations within these broad categories, such that certain
metals, for example, were more valuable than others (gold was higher than
The Enlightenment, environment and social theory
copper), or within the animal category (cows were higher than rats). This divine
order, in which there is a place for every living and non-living thing (both natural
and supernatural), "is something which still frames how many people view and ' 'The Enlightcnmcnt' (which may also bc termcd 'moderni , . .
think about the natural environment. Both in evcryday life and in social theory ~. as the series of interconnectcd d
. .
. . ty ) xs often understood
an sometimes radica! changes th t 1 k 1
we find that this Great Chain of Being idea operates, such that humans arc ~' wxtlun Europe in the mid- to late . h - - . a oo p ace
i of human though t and action Th- ct_g_ teen th century, across nurncrous fields
regarded as 'higher' or 'more important' than animals or plants, and indeed this
also lcd to views in which certain human beings were 'higher' than others (white l as the dawning of the 'age of ere .Is no ?ne exact date to which we can point
though t to which we ea tra rcthason ' nor ts. ~ere one ritcr or school of social
w.

European males being higher or superior to all others). More popular repre~
sentations of this idea is the commonplace designation of certain animals
as superior to otlms such as the !ion as the 'king of the jungle', as in the popular
l n ce e exact ongms of the
European intellectual politicaJ . momcntous changes in
time. In terms of tra;ing and ~n~;~~~~cinand soci_alli~e which occurred at this
relationshi:P between social theory and tl1Cg the histoncal (and contemporary)
children's animation, The Lion King. Or as the pigs in George Orwel!'s Animal of central significancc N t l d h . ~nvtromnent, the Enhghtenment is
Fann might put it, 'All animals are equal, but some animals arc more equal 0 on Y o t e ongms of many
problcms Ii-e in the Eniightcnmcnt (p . l - . c~cnt envuonmental
than others.' Some of the roots of'grccn' "tj _ ariCU arJy th: mdus~nal revolution), but
The Great Chain of Being idea linked with the 'perfection of nature' view in that in the various reactions to the~ ~~~~s o and altemaiJves to mdustrialism also Jie
those higher up the chain could lcgitimately transform and 'improve', 'perfect' an important turning point i ~ Ig l enmcnt. Hence the Enlightenment represents
or manage those entities below. Thus human transformation of the nonhuman As Porter points out 'Then Eclpglacc of the cnvxronmcnt within social theory.
' n I 1tenment believcd . I .
environment was permissible within the framework of the Great Chain of Being. themselves by improving n tu - . pcop e could Improve
. a rc, oucnng a programme f I
As the eighteenth century drew near the Christian legitimacy associated with this science, technology and industry' ( . ) . o progress t Irough
1994 174
interventionist-instrumental view of the environment became increasingly diffi- belief in progress and in th . . . A typical example of the pro found
cult to sustain in the face of growing intellectual and practical challenges to e Improvement of humanity b U l" .
o f reason (particularly scientific kn o l d . . y IC app Icatron
the Christian worldview. Thus by the time of the Enlightcnmcnt and the begin- Enlightenment thinking is the r. ll we ge and Its technological application) in
nings of the industrial revolution in Europe, human use of the environment1 Condorcct: o owmg passage from the French philosopher
particularly in agriculture, rudimentary commercial manufacturing, landscaping,
the scientific harvesting of forests and the creation of waterways, had largcly A vCry small amount of ground will bc able t
ceased to be legitimated by the idea of 'God's creation' which implied that supplies of greater utiHty or higher qualit . o pro~ucc _a great quantity of
smaiJer outlay the rnanu'act f . y, n:ore goo s Wtll bc obtained for;~
there were moral or normative limits to what humans could do to the enVironment ' J; ure o arttc 1cswdl bc a hi d .
in raw materials and will k b e eve Wtth less wastagc
Human transformation and use of the natural environment became increasingly . ma e etter use of them Th
medtcal practicc which wr"ll b e Improvement of
divorced from a strict medieval Christian framework from the sixtcenth to the ' ccomc more cfficaci th
reason and social order, wiJl mean the end of in . ous WJ t11~ prog~css of
eighteenth centuries. If the environment was becoming incrcasingly vulnerablc and illnesses brought on by l' .{ fcctrous a~d hcredttary dJscascs
e Imate, AOOd, or workrng conditions. It is
44 Environment and Social Theory The role of the environment historically 45

reasonable to hope that all other diseases may likewise disappear as their systemati~ study of the new capitalist economic system, with its novel free
distant causes are discovered. Would it be absurd, then, to suppose that this market, pnvate property-based economy. At the same time, the industrial revo-
perfection of the humanity species might be capable ofinfinite progress? lution deno ted radical changes in the type of economy a~d form of social
(Condorcet, 1995: 35-7)
~rgani~ation. The shift from a Iargely rural, agricultural economy to an urban,
The important point to note about the Enlightenment is that human progress and mdustrial and class-b~sed economy created a new type of society, a 'modern' one,
improvement is premised on the more effective exploitation of the natural base~ ~n ~anufac~~~~ technological innovations, machinery and a complex
environment. As the passage from Condorcet above shows, Enlightenment social specialisatiOn and dtvtsiOn of labour, in comparison to the feudal social order
theory had at its heart the exploitation of the natural enviro~ment _by the use which preceded it.
of scientific knowledge and the application of technology to mdustnal produc-
Like all social change, the industrial revolution created 'wiilllers' and 'Iosers'
tion. For purposes of exposition, what I intend to do in this section is simp.lifY the and was accompanied by _social upheaval, unrest, suffering and pain. Chief arnon~
:Enlightenment into two component aspects, namely the industrial revolutwn and the 'losers' were the peasantry or 'conunoners' who as a result of the enclosure
the democratic revolution. movement (the privatisation of Iari.d to which 'commoners' once had rights of
access) were forced into the emerging industrial urban areas and became the
The industrial revolution industria~ w~rking class, who resisted the erosion of their way of life, status
and relat~ve Independence. As a popular anti-enclosure rhymn had it, 'The Law
By the term 'industrial revolution' is mean t the various chang_es that t~ok place il do th pumsh man or woman who steals the goose from off the common, but Iets
in European economic life both in terms of concepts, theones. and 1deas and r the g~eater felon Ioose, who steals the common from the goose . Another form
in terms of actual practice during the period from about the stxteenth to the
nineteenth centuries, which laid the basis for the emergence and development of i"'. ofreststance to the industrial revolution were the 'Luddites' in the early nineteenth
century (181 1-16) who smashed machinery, the introduction of which was
modern industrial society and a capitalist organisation of the economy. Britain
is often seen as the cradle of the industrial revolution, in that it was the first
l' causing unemployment and thus great social hardship. This will be discussed
in Chapter 6.
country to transform itself along industrial lines. As the 'workshop of the world',
As the industrial revolution continued there was also what one may call a
Britain exhibited many of the features which later industrial societies would
Rom~~tic and negative reaction, one that is particularly important for later social
develop, and Britain became the model for industrialisation.
theons~g about the environment in general, and green' social theory in particu-
Central to the industrial revolution is a particularly instrumental attitude towards lar. This Romantic backlash against the industrial revolution was motivated
the natural environment. The environment was seen as a collection of means for by how the .latter was destr~ying and dis:figuring the natural environment, turning
human ends, raw materials for the factories, machines and new pr.oductive tech- one: beautiful landscapes mto ugly, overcrowded citi~s. polluting factories and
nologies which were being invented. Science was seen.~s unlock~ng th~ sec~ets mirung operations. 'Was Jerusalem builded here, among these dark satanic
of nature, developing new insights into its inner workmgs, and m conJunctlo~ mills?' as the poet William Blake iraphically put it in reference to the ne~ mines
with teclmology provided more effective ways in which humans could e~pl01t mills.and factories which were dis:figuring the English countryside, and which
it. In this way the natural environment became 'disenchanted', where once It was were at the heart of this new and poiiuting economic system. From the Romantic
a meaningful order now under the cold, scientific light of reason, it simply becam~ perspective there was also something arrogant about human domination of
a collection of means (Barry, 1993). That is, whereas once the environment was the natural world. As Thomas Carlyle put it, 'For all earthly, and some unearthly
variously seen as 'enchanted' (as in folk legends) or imbued with spiritual sig- purposes, we have machines and mechanical furtherances .... We remove
nificance (as in Christianity where the natural environment was 'God'screation'), m~untains, and make seas our smooth highway; nothing can resist us. We war
with the industrial revolution, the environment was transformed and reduced With rud~ Natur~; an~ by our resistless engines, come off always victorious, and
to being a store of raw materials for human economic purposes. By 'disen~hant loaded With spotls' (m Clayre, 1977: 229). This theme of a 'war' against nature
ing' the natural environment is mean t the draining or eroding of meanmg or JS sometbmg that will also be discussed in Chapter 4.

significance from it, other than its status as a set of means for human ends. Other
nt!W fo1ms of knowledge included the emergence of 'political economy' as the
'~m----------- ....-:--",-..------ ~--- ----- ...-- . ------ .....:---- - --------- --___ - .~

The role of the. environment historically 47


46 Environment and Social Theory
The democratic revolution
consequences. By the 19th
Industrial capitalism launched the
century Britain had become the By the democratic revolution is mcant the radical changes that took place politi-
Modern Age, and ripped into the
'workshop of the world'.
available raw materials with no cally during the late eighteenth and ninetcenth centuries in theory and practice.
regard tor environmental The two key historical events herc arc the American Revolution (1775) and the
French Revolution (1789). The main aspects of the democratic revolution
conccrnCd the principle of po pul ar government - that is, government by the
people, of the people and for the people- to replace rule by unelccted monarchics,
aristocrats and the Church. The slogan of the French Revolution ('liberty, equality,
fratcmity') ncatly sums up the essence of the democratic imperative of the
:i
Enlightenmcnt, banishing the divine right of kings and the authority of organised
~
'-1
religion. Other salient aspects of tbC democratic imperative of the Enlightenmcnt
~~ included the use of the vocabulary of rights in political, social and moral
though t, the increasing emphasis on the individual (both as citizen and produccrl
consumer); the emergence of representative government arid liberal democracy;
the establishment of constitutions, the separation of state powers and the rule
of law rather than of man, and finally the creation of nation-states. Writers such
as Thomas Painc, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, William Godwin and
Montesquieu wrote about, justified, suppo:rted and/or took part in this democratic
Having exhausted the supply of revolution.
fresh trees the industrialists
solved the fuel shortage with While less obvious than in the case of the aims of the industrial revolution. the
fossmsed trees- coal. democratic revolution was equally based on a particularly instrumental attitude
towards and use of the natural environment. In the first case most supportcrs
and theorists of democracy argued that this new form of government required
material wealth (based on the exploitation of the natural world), and in this sense
the industrial revolution was a necessary condition for the flowcring of democratic
pol iti cs. As Tocqueville noted:
General prosperity is favourable to the stability of all government<:. but more
particularly of a democratic one, which depends upon the will of the majority,
and especially upon the will of that portion of the community which is most
The steam-engine chumed. The
Canals, roads and railway l~n~s exposed to want. When the people rule, they must bc rendered happy or they
cotton-mills hummed. The iro~
criss-crossed the country. Bntam will ovcrtum the state: and miscry stimulatcs them to those cxccsscs to which
industry boomed. New coal-pitS
throbbedwith industrial activity, to
were opened. Towns grew in_to ambition rouscs kings.
quote the school history books.
cities and village workshops mto But what else happened? (1956: !29-30)
factories.
Second, the democratic revolution was a property-owning democracy in the sense
that democratic rights were not extended to everyone. Only men with propcrty
Figure 2.2 'Ecology and Industrial Capitalism'
were permitted to vote, and an important imp1ication of this is that it served to
Source: croalf and Rankin (1981}
further legitimate tl1e idea ofprivate property in land. That is, extending the right
to vote impl ied extending privatc property in land to more and more people. This.
of course, meant not only regarding the natural environment as raw materials but
48 " Environment and Social Theory
The role of the en11ironment hlstorically .. 49
also as priva_te and transferable property, which could be traded, bought and sold
like any commodity in the emerging market economy. This property-based view
~n':'ironment offered by the Enlightenment, viewed as a combination of two revo
utwns: the ~dustrial an~ democratic. An awareness of both Judaeo-Christiani~
of democracy was especially clear in the American case, largely because the
American democratic revolution was strongly grounded in the political philo-
~ndthe Enhghtenment xs necessary as historical and conceptual legacies and
rameworks to understand the character of social theory and the environment.

sophy of John Locke for whom the goal of government was primarily to protect
life, individual liberty and private property. Locke>s ideas will be discussed in
Chapter 3. As the American Declaration of Independence puts it, 'We hold Summary points
these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Right, that among these Up until the Enligh~ez_unent, most social theorising about the environment
~re Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness'. According to Kramnick, in the took the form ofrehgzous, mythical or 'traditional' accounts of the origins
context of the Enlightenment, 'Govemment's purpose was to serve self-interest, ofthe natural world, humans; and the 'proper' relationship between the two
to enable individuals to enjoy peacefully their rights to life, liberty and propertY. Anal~si_ng the J~dae~-Chri~ti~n worldview and its teachings is important i~
not to serve the glory of God or dY"asties' (!995: xvi). exammmg the h1st~ncal ongms of the relationship between Western social
theory and the envrronment
Another dimension to this land-ownership issue was the special status of
agricultural life and those who work the land. According to William Je:fferson, There are competing v_iews ~bout the 'ecological' character of Christianity.
one of the fotinding fathers of America, 'cultivators of the earth are the most ?n the~ne hand, there ts the domination of nature interpretation ofGenesis
virtuous and independent of citizens', adding, in a statement which echoes the m the B1ble. On the other, there is the 'stewardship' view where humans are
anti-urbanism and anti-conunercialism of some green thinking, that "Merchants ~tewar~ or caretakers (not owners) of 'God's creation', and also the
have no country. The mere spot they stand on does not constitute so strong an
attachment as that from which they draw their gains' (quoted in Miller, 1988:207,
210-11). Echoing some of the issues raised in the previous chapter concerning
li
,.

'
perfectiOn of nature' thesis where humans are ob!" d
rf t' 'd
pe ec or evelop' nature.
' 1ge or encouraged to

The Enlightenment (or 'modernity') marks a decisive change in how


European CIVthsatiOn though! about and used the natura l enVIronment.
. w1th
the status of countryside and town/city, Jefferson thought that to dwell in the . .
the ad:ent _of the ~~ustnal revolution, nature became 'disenchanted'.
M
country was to dwell in virtue, while living in the city, separated from nature, was !
to risk corruption (Rennie-Short, 1991). !he h1stonc~l ong1~s of social theorising about the environment may be
Thus the Enlightenment or modernity is an absolutely key moment in the aced to the mdustnal and democratic revolutions, and reactions to them.
relationship between social theory and the environment, since it represented a
radical change both in theory and practice about how the natural envirorunent was Further reading
viewed, valued, used and conceptualised.
For. authoritative and scholarly accounts of the theoretical histozy of Western soci ty
socJal theozy and th e
Conclusion e environment see John Passmore's excellent Man 's Responsibi/i
for Nature, London: Duckworth (2nd edn), 1980, and Clarence Glacken's magistcrial (an~
This chapter has explored the historical relationship between social theory and extremely long!) Trace~ on the Rhodian Shore, Berkeley: University of California Press
the environment by outlining two opposing ways in which the environment has 1967. A more focused account of the history of thinking abo t th . ,
fi d u e env1ronment may be
been theorised in Western social thought. On the one hand, we have the religious oun l.n Donal.d W~rster's Nature 's Economy: A History ofEcological Ideas, Cam brid e:
approach of Judaeo-Christianity, and the various ways in which it has th.eorised Camb~dge Umverslty Press (2nd edn), 1994. Keith Thomas' Man and the Natural Wo ;d
the environment and the proper relation between humans and the environment. Changmg Altitudes in England 1500-1800 Harmondsworth p 1983 ' .
d engum 1s a very
These include the narrative of the Garden of Eden, the competing interpretations rea abl.e account which looks at some of the historical changes in Engl~ d
the Enhghterunent.
tha;
precc::d d
e
of the Christian attitude to the environment (namely the domination of nature view
and the stewardship tradition), and finally the idea of the 'Great Chain of Being'.
On the: other, we have: the profoundly secular approaches to theorising the
~useful overview of the historical place of the environment within Western thoughr is
erek Wall's re<:~der Green History London Routledg 1994 h" h .
.... w IC contams manv
. J ,1

50 .. Environment and Social Theory

edi ted original articles, and AlasdairClayre's edi ted volume Nature and Industrialization,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. David Pepper has written two books which cover 3 The uses of 'nature' and
some of the issues discussed in this chapter: The Roots of Modern Environmentalism,
London: Croom Heim, 1984, and Modern Environmentalism: An Introduction, London: the nonhuman world in
Routledge, 1996.
social theory
"~-~;s.
An excellent anthology exploring the relationship between religion and nature is Roger
Gottlicb's editcd volume, This Sacred Earth: Religion, Nature, Environment, London: " :.< ._,",::::~ ': ....,
Routledge, 1996. while for a more in~dcpth analysis of the Christian perspective sec
Pre-Enlightenment and
Michael Northcott's The Environment and Christian Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge Enlightenment accounts
University Press, 1996, and Michael Barnes (cd.), An Ecology of the Spirit, Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 1994. On Islam and its at~ tudes to the environment see
F. Khalid and J. O'Brien (eds), Islam and Ecology, London: Casscll, 1992; forHinduism
secR. Prime, Hinduism and Ecology, London: Cassell, 1992; on Buddhism see M.E.
Tucker and D.R. Williams (eds), Buddhism and Ecology, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999.

For an introduction to some of the non-Westcm approaches to thcorising the environment,


sec Peter Marshall's Nature's Web: Rethinking Our Place on Earth, London: Casscll,
ll
1995; Baird CallicotfsEarth 's Jnsights: A Multicultural Survey ofEcological Ethics from
the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994, and Hclaine Sclin's edi ted volume Nature Across Cultures: Views ofNature
and the Environment in Non-Western Cultures, Boston, MA: Kluwcr Academic, 2003.
ll
l
Introduction

The ai~ of t~i~ chapter is to outlinc some of the ways in which the n nh
world, rts entrtxcs, proccsses and princi les have - o. u_m~n
the history of social theory Of p f u/ . been used (and abused) WJt!nn
theorists have appealed to s~mc n~t;~n :;.:;;~ortance IS the ways in which social
legitimate or illustratc their theories about e natural ?r~er' or 'nature. to justify,
Just as religious though t both . E - and prescnptrons for the social order.
mc~aphors and Icssons for iliustr~~on~i~o~n'sdla~ssc:hp~rc I~ok~d to nature for
soctal theory since the Enlightcnment has also ans o: .mmans, modem
references to the nonhuman world Th- .d f made both positlvc and negative
book', or like a book from wh h. e l ea o ~aturc as a 'text', such as 'God's
rc wc can read, rf we kn (tbr h .
mystical experience) the langua f tu ow oug scJcncc or
simply a store of means to hum ge o dn)a. rc or so~cc of meaning (as opposed to
and is an enduring feature ofh::~ ~~~~~~mcthmg that has a very long history
!RING FETSCHER

UVJETI
PREIVLJAVANJA
v v
COVJECANSTVA
Je li jo mogue spasiti napredak?

GLOBUS l ZAGREB
3. Optimizam rasta i ekoloka svijest
kod Marxa i Engelsa

. '
\

Materijalne i socijalne granice rasta uzdrmale su optimizam


napretka trino-ekonomskih teoretiara kao i dravno-soCijali-
stikih. Protiv Marxa i marksista danas se podiu iste optube
kao i protiv advokata neogranienog kapitalistikog ekonomskog
razvoja. Njima se imputira da ne uviaju. ogranienost zemlje,
granice optereenja ekosfere, iscrpljivanje resursa i time postaju
sukrivci sve-svijetskog razaranja okolia, emu smo mi danas
svjedoci. Da bi se provj~rila opravdanost te optube bit e nuno
konzultirati napise kasnog i mladog Marxa kao i Engelsove
radove. Pritom e se pokazati da u napisima obojice postoje
osnove jedne ekoloke kritike industrijskog kapitalizma kao
i dijelovi koji na prvi pogled izgledaju kao poturanje mogunosti
neogranienog ekonomskog rasta i tehnikog napretka. Zbog
argumentacije i stoga jer ova crta daleko snanije dominira
u njihovoj teoriji, elim poeti s onim izjavama klasika koje
govore o neogranienom ekonomskom i tehnikom rastu, da
bismo u drugom djelu skicirali njihovu ekoloku kritiku. Na kraju
u raspraviti predodbe o drukijem nainu ivota, koje je prije
svega razvio Marx za budue besklasno drutvo i koje nije
orijentirano na neogranieno maksimiranje proizvodnje i rasta.

l. Optimizam rasta u Marxa i Engelsa

; .
U svome Nacrtu kritike nacionalne ekonomije Friedrich
r
i .
Engels je ve 1843 izrazio svoju vjeru u neogranieni napredak
proizvodnje. Da bi osporio maltuzijansku tezu o hiperpopulaciji,
Engels argumentira na sljedei nain: Povrina zemljita je
ograniena, u redu. Radna snaga koja se upotrebljava na toj
povrini raste sa stanovnitvom; pretpostavimo ak da poveanje

88
prinosa usled poveanja rada ne raste uvek srazmerno sa radom;
tada ostaje jo trei element, nauka, koja ekonomisti, naravno,
nikad nita ne znai, a njezin napredak tako je beskrajan i u najma-
nju ruku isto tako brz kao i porast stanovnitva. A nauka napreduje
barem istom brzinom kao i poveanje stanovnitva; ono se umno-
ava u odnosu na broj posljedne generacije; nauka napreduje
u odnosu na masu saznanja koje joj je ostalo od prethodne
generacije, dakle pod najobinijim uslovima takoe u geometrij-
skoj progresiji - pa ta je nauci nemogue? Smeno je meutim
govoriti o prenaseljenosti sve dotle dok u dolini reke Misisipi ima
dosta neobraene zemlje da bi se tamo moglo preseliti celokupna
stanovnitvo Evrope, sve dok se uopte, tek treina zemlje moe
smatrati obraenom i dok se proizvodnja samo ove treine moe
poveati za est puta primenom sada ve poznatih poboljanja. 1
Ovaj Engelsov iskaz iz godine 1843. sljedeih desetljea poka-
zao se sasvim sigurno.tonim. Uz pomo nauke prihod sa zemlje
mogao se nevjerojatno umnogostruiti. Unato tome, danas su
jasno vidljive granice tog rasta, iako jo nisu svuda dostignute.
Primjena prirodne nauke na agrarnu proizvodnju silno je pove-
ala prihod sa zemlje, ali injenica da postoje granice koje se ne
mogu nadii ostaje ipak istinita. Upravo moderna industrijska
agrama proizvodnja, naime, dovodi- kao to je to spoznao Marx
- do opasnih ekolokih smetnji.
No pogledajmo najprije entuzijastiki opis napretka proiz-
vodnih snaga koji Marx daje u svojim spisima: U Komunisti
kom manifestu glasi: Buroazija je u svojoj jedva stogodinjoj
klasnoj vladavini stvorila masovnije i kolosalnije proizvodne snage
nego sve prole generacije zajedno. Potinjavanje prirodnih sila,
mainska proizvodnja, primjena hemije u industriji i zemljoradnji,
parobrodarstvo i eljeznice, elektrini telegrafi, privoenje poljo-
privredi itavih dijelova svijeta, pretvaranje rijeka u plovne, itave
mase ljudi kao da su nikle iz zemlje - koje ranije stoljee je slutilo
da su takve proizvodne snage drijemale u krilu drutvenog radaP
Ma koliko da je otra kritika negativnih strana razvoja kapita-
listikog naina proizvodnje kod Marxa, on je uvijek isticao

1
Marx Engels Dela, Beograd, Tom 4. str. 41., Institut za meunarodni
radniki pokret, Prosveta (ubudue MED.)
2
MED, tom 7, str. 384.

89
' '

neobino brz, kolosalni razvoj proizvodnih snaga kao zaslugu


i ujedno kao nunu pretpostavku za budue socijalistiko dru- l
tvo. 1

S rastom proizvodnje i proizvodne snage rada, buroazija je i


ujedno kozmopolitski oblikovala proizvodnju i potronju svih
zemalja- iskaz, koji je istinit tek danas u punom opsegu. Ona je l
postavila na mjesto starih lokalnih i nacionalnih samodovoljno-
sti i..zatvorenos.ti svestrani p~om~.t, svestranu uzajam~u ovisnost 1
naCIJa. 3 Ta svjetska komumkac1p ne stvara samo SVJetsko tri-
te, ve i svjetsku literaturu. Svuda se nadilazi idiotizam seoskog 1
ivota, bornirane ogranienosti agrarnog naina ivota, a Marx :
to pozdravlja kao uvjerljiv napredak.
Naravno, u tom napretku koji je pribavljen ovjeanstvu
kapitalistikim nainom proizvodnje, rije je o dijalektikom
procesu koji dobrobit cjeline realizira na tetu pojedinaca. Ali taj
je nain napretka prema Marxovu uvjerenju neminovan tako
dugo dok udrueni proizvoai ne budu svjesno preuzeli
u svoje ruke drutvenu proizvodnju. Ricardo je stoga bio pot-
puno u pravu kada je smatrao za svoje vrijeme kapitalistiki
nain proizvodnje kao naj korisniji nain proizvodnje uope.
4

On hoe proizvodnju proizvodnje radi i to s pravom. Ako bi se


htelo tvrditi, kao to su Ricardovi sentimentalni protivnici inili,
da proizvodnja kao takva nije svrha, onda se zaboravlja da
proizvodnja proizvodnje radi ne znai nita drugo do razvitak l
ljudskih proizvodnjih snaga, dakle razvitak bogatstva .lJudske pri-
rode kao svrhe po sebi. Ako se dobro pojedinaca protustavi toj 1 .
svrsi, kao to to ini Sismondi, onda se time tvrdi da se razvitak 1 '
vrste mora zaustaviti da bi se obezbedilo dobro pojedinaca, da se .,
dakle ne bi, na primer smeo voditi nikakav rat, u kome pojedinci 1
svakako propadaju. (Sismondi je u pravu samo u pogledu onih l.
ekonomista koji tu suprotnost zabauruju, poriu.) Ljudi ne
shvataju da taj razvitak sposobnosti vrste ovek, iako se u prvi mah
vri na raun veine ljudskih individua i itavih ljudskih klasa, (
naposljetku savlauje taj antagonizam i poklapa se s razvitkom
pojedinaca individue, da se prema tome vii razvitak individualno- 11
sti otkupljuje samo jednim istorijskim procesom u kome se indivi- L

3 MED, tom i, str. 385.


4 MED, tom 25, str. 92.

90
...

i-. due rtvuju; da ne govorimo o jalovosti takovih utenih razmatra-


nja, budui da interes vrste u ljudskom carstvu, kao i u ivotinjskom
carstvu, uvek pobeuje na raun interesa individua. 5
Nasuprot ovom modernom shvaanju prema kojem je proiz-
vodnja za volju proizvodnje, gdje je bogatstvo i umnoavanje
\- blaga prava svrha privrede, ini se uzvienim stari pogled, gdje
ovjek, svejedno u kojem borniranom nacionalnom, religioznom,
politikom odreenju se prikazuje kao svrha proizvodnje. Ali
ova uzvienost je samo privid jer in fact, ako se zdere ogranieni
graaski oblik, ta je drugo bogatstvo do u univerzalnoj razmjeni
proizvedena univerzalna potreba, sposobnosti uitka, proizvod-
nih snaga itd. individua? Puni razvoj ljudske vladavine nad
prirodnim snagama, onim takozvane prirode kao i svoje vlastite
prirode? Apsolutno razvijanje stvaralakih predispozicija, bez
druge pretpostavke osim prethodnog historijskog razvoja. 6
Naravno, U graanskoj ekonomiji --,- i u epohi proizvodnje kojoj
ona odgovara -javlja se puko razvijanje lJudske unutranjosti kao
potpuno ispranjenje, to univerzalno opredmeenje kao totalno otu
enje; a rjeenje svih odreenih jednostranih svrha kao rtvovanje
samosvrhe jednoj posve vanjskoj svrsi. Tako dugo dok udrueni
proizvoai svjesno ne organiziraju zajedniki proizvodnju i time
kontroliraju svoje vlastito podrutvljenje ne moe drukije. Iz tog
razloga Se djetinjasti stari svijet pojavlJuje s jedne strane kao vii.
S druge strane, on to i jest u svemu gdje se trai zatvoren lik, oblik
i odreeno ogranienje. On je zadovo !Juje na ogranienom stanovi-
tu; dok moderno ostavlja ovjeka nezadovoljenim, ili je, kad se
pojavljuje u sebi zadovoljno - banalno. 6
U istom manuskriptu Marx je izradio jo jednom proturjeje

5
Ibidem, Ova analogija ljudskog svijeta sa ivotinjskim i biljnim svijetom
ini mi se problernatinorn. Ona postaje, prije svega tada, potpuno moralno
upitna, kada se rtvovanje individua ne legitimira filozofski povijesno samo
unatrag<<, ve i unaprijed:_ usprkos torne to bi se ono dalo izbjei. Jedno je
naknadno (teodiceetiko) opravdanje rata kao nude, kao konano ipak korisno
za povijesni napredak ovjeanstva, drugo je svjesno prihvaanje rata, nude
i patnje u ime (uvijek neizvjesne) pretpostavke da e zbog navedenog rezultirati
budui napredak. Zar tada nije vie moralno zaustaviti, kanalizirati i kontrolirati
upitni napredak- u interesu individua? Marx suvie olako odbacuje humanitarnu
kritiku kolonijalnog izrabljivanja kao neplodno uzvieno promatranje i time
nekritiki slijedi uzor Hegelove filozofije povijesti.
6
MED, tom 19, str. 323.

91
dosadanjeg napretka i jo se jasnije ograuje od svakog nostal-
ginog zaaranja prolosti. Sa svjetskim tritem, sa svjetskom
razmjenom roba, nastaje objektivni sklop individua koje se ' '
ujedno doivljavaju o visnima o tom sklopu. Izvorno, u malim
autarkinim zajednicama grupe ljudi su ivjele potpuno izolirano
od drugih grupa. Marx govori o: krvavim lokalnim sklopovima li
l
koji se temelje na prirodnim - i gospodarskim - i kmetskim odno-
sima. 7 Nasuprot ovome nuno se treba opredijeliti za svjetski,
kozmopolitski sklop. Taj svjetski sklop nije nita prirodno, ve je 11
neto historijski nastalo. Taje povezanost njihov proizvod. Ona je
historijski proizvod. Ona pripada odreenoj fazi njihovog razvitka
;' Otuenost i samostalnost u kojima ona jo egzistira prema individu-
ama dokazuje samo da su one jo u stvaranju uslova svog drutvenog l,

ivota umjesto da su ga zapoele od tih uslova. To je samonikla


'l
l ' povezanost individua unutar odreenih ogranienih odnosa pro-
l '
' l izvodnje. 7
,! !i Nasuprot individuama (i klasama) stoji njihov svjetski sklop
l :
l posredstvom svjetskog trita kao neto strano i samostalno, uspr-
l '
! .
l : kos tome to su ga oni sami stvorili. Tek e socijalistiko drutvo
' ' -takva je marksistika pretpostavka- nadii taj karakter stranosti
i samostalnosti. Objektivno postojei sklop je nuna pretpostavka
za ovu buduu drutvenu organizaciju. Dosad egzistira samo
sklop samoniklih, iznutra od individua odreenih, borniranih
! proizvodnih odnosa/ upravo kapitalistikih. Ali ubudue trebaju
l: na to mjesto, na mjesto okolnosti borniranih individua stupiti
univerzalno razvijene individue, iji drutveni odnosi kao vla-
l; stiti, zajedniki odnosi su podreeni njihovoj zajednikoj kontroli,
l
\ '
l stupanj i univerzalnost razvoja snaga pri kojima ta individual-
nost postaje mogua, pretpostavlja upravo proizvodnju na bazi
l razmjenskih vrijednosti koje tek s openitou otuenja individu~
uma od sebe i od drugih proizvodi i openitost i svestranost
l
'
njegovih odnosa i sposobnosti. 7
Hod kroz kapitalistiki nain proizvodnje je- prema ll-tfarxu
- nuan, jer se samo kroz njega proizvodi onaj udovino velik
produktivitet ljudskog rada i onaj univerzalitet individualnog umi-
jea i potreba, to e konano omoguiti razvoj univerzalnih
individua. Dotad stvari stoje drukije: Na ranijim stupnjevima

7
MED, tom 19, str. 66.

92
'1"''R'c{c
;

razvoja pojavljuje se pojedini individuum p unije upravo zato to jo


nije razvio puninu svojih odnosa i suprostavio je sebi kao od sebe
nezavisne drutvene snage i odnose. Kao to je smijeno eznuti za
onom prvobitnom puninom, isto tako je smijeno vjerovati da se
mora ostati pri ovom potpunom ispranjenju. Graansko shvaanje
nije nikada otilo dalje od suprotnosti prema ovom romatiarskom
pa e ga stoga to romantiarska shvaanje kao legitimna suprotnost
pratiti sve do njegovog blaenog kraja. 8
Ima malo Marxovih izjava u kojima dolazi do izraaja tako
jasno odbijanje jedne romantike nostalgije kao i pozitivistikog
opravdanja socijalnog statusa quoc Romantika zaklinjanje U
stara dobra vremena je tako dugo opravdano proturjeje
otuenom svijetu razvijenog kapitalizma dok ovaj nije zamijenjen
slobodnom asocijacijom proizvoaa.
Uvijek kada Marx i Engels govore o napretku, to svijet
zahvaljuje kapitalistikom nainu proizvodnje, ovaj se mora sau
vati u pamenju samo kao pretpostavka koju napredak akceptira,
samo kao pretpostavku za jo izostalu emancipaciju ovjeanstva
(odnosno proletarijata) od otuenih drutvenih odnosa.
Misao da se za volju povijesnog napretka mora prihvatiti
nuda, bijeda, patnja i smrt u borbi, je od Hegela. Marx je to
preveo u jezik ekonomije i nemilosrdno primjenjivao. Jednako
kao u novinskom lanku o Britanskoj vlasti u Indiji (od 25. 6.
1853.) kao i u manuskriptu Kapitala od 1861/63, Marx citira
Goetheovu pjesmu o Suleiki, da bi doveo do izraza dijalektiku
muke i volje za napredak.
Prema jednom izvjetaju o ekonomskom unitenju indijske
kune tekstilne idustrije britanskim kapitalizmom Marx razmilja
na sljedei nain: Koliko god se ovek morao da gnua kad vidi
kako se mnotvo 'radenih, paterijarhalnih, i bezazlenih drutvenih
organizacija raspada i rastavlja na svoje jedinice, baeno u more
jada, dok istovremeno njihovi pojedini lanovi gube svoj drevni
kulturni lik i svoja nasledna sredstva opstajanja ne smerno pri
tome zaboraviti da su idiline seoske zajednice, ma koliko, moda
izgledaju bezazleno, oduvek bile vrsta osnova orijentalnog despo- .
tizma, da su sputava/e ljudski duh u najue mogue granice, inei
ga prilagodljivim instrumentu sujevjerja, robom tradicionalnih

8
MED, tom 19, str. 66/67.

93
normi, otimajui mu svu veliinu i istorijsku energiju. . . N~
smerno zaboraviti da su ove male zajednice bile ukaljane kastin-'
skim razlikama i ropstvom, da su one pojarmile ovjeka spoljnim
okolnostima umesto da ga pretvore u gospodara okolnosti .. ,l
Engleska je, izvesno, izazivajui socijalnu revoluciju u Himdu- .
stanu, kao motiv imala samo najnie koristljublje i pokazivala(
glupost u nainu na koji je ostvarivala svoje interese. Ali ne radi se
o tome. Radi se o tome da li ovjeanstvo moe ispuniti svojejl
opredjeljenje bez radikalne revolucije drutvenih odnosa u Aziji?
Ako ne moe, Engleska je sila, ma koliko bili njeni zloini, 1
nesvesno orue istorije u ostvarivanju te revolucije. l
Onda, ma kakvo ogorenje prizor raspadanja jednog starog 1
sveta se probudio u nama, imamo pravo da pred istorijom uzvi-l
knemo sa Goetheom:
'Nad tom mukom zar da plaem,
Kad nam od nje bolje ne bi
A zar Tim ur, svo jim maem,
Bezbroj dUa nesrubi?' 9
l
Dok se kod ovog teksta, za opravdanje, jo moe tvrditi da se l
pomou socijalne revolucije u Indiji onemoguuje osnova orijen- 1
talnog despotizma i time se vladavine kao Timurova ine nemo- \
guim, druga Marxova upotreba Goetheova citata ne doputa
vie takovu interpretaciju. Ovdje je jo samo rije o tome da se \
patnja koju je kapitalizam donio individuama nuno legitimira
napretkom produktiviteta. U manuskriptima (predradnje za i
Kapital) iz godine 1861/1863 glasi: l
U engleskim rudnicima tjedno u prosjeku pogiba 15 ljudi. '
U toku deset godina, ukljuujui 1861, poginulo ih je 10.000, l
uglavnom zbog okorijele krtosti vlasnika rudnika ugljena. Ope
nito, ta se injenica ne smije zanemariti. Kapitalistika proizvod- \,
l ._-
: . nja je ... ekonominiji oblik ostvarenog rada nego ikoji drugi
oblik ljudske proizvodnje i ivoga rada, napajajui se ne samo
mesom i krvlju i miiima nego mozgom i ivcima. Zapravo,
samo po cijenu potpunog zanemarivanja individualnog razvoja 1
osigurava se razvoj ovjeka uope u onim povijesnim epohama L,
koje prethode socijalistikom ustrojstvu ljudskog roda.
9 MED, tom 12, str. 110/111.

94
, ..,.

'Nad tom mukom zar da plaem,


Kad nam od nje bolje ne bi
A zar Timur, svojim maem
Bezbroj dua ne srubi?>l 0

Dakle, i ovdje: napredak roda na troak individua. Na koncu


budueg razvoja stoji opi ovjek, svestrano razvijen ovjek
koji kao lan slobodne asocijacije proizvoaa, racionalno regu-
lira jednako kako i svoju razmjenu tvari s prirodom tako i svjesno
oblikuje svoj nain podrutvljenja . Zbog njega se moraju pretrp-
jeti nuda, patnja, bol, otuenje i zbog ovog cilja oni su za Marxa
opravdani
Imanentni zakoni kapitalistikog naina proizvodnje prisilja-
vaju na stalni r.ast proizvodnje i produktivnosti, ta se spoznaja
stalno ponavlja i u zavrnom obliku Kapitala. Prirodna nauka
i tehnika koje se na njoj temelje razvijaju se najprije samo kroz taj
nain proizvodnje i njenu primjerenu i upotrebljivu formu. Iako
je Marx taj sklop samo rijetko jasno izloio, ipak je on to jasno
spoznao. Umanuskriptu Rezultati neposrednog procesa proiz-
vodnje, on opisuje prijelaz od formalne prema realnoj supsum-
ciji rada pod kapital. Samo je formalna supsumcija rada pod
kapital onda kada kapitalistiki poduzetnik (najmodavac ili npr.
unajmitelj) stavlja pod svoju komandu, a da ne mijenja konkretni
oblik poljoprivrednog ili obrtnikog rada. On e se jedino pobri-
nuti da se taj rad sprovodi kontinuiranije i intenzivnije i to na
due vrijeme. Ova formalna supsumcija rada pod kapital odgo-
vara proizvodnji apsolutnog vika vrijednosti pomou produenja
radnog vremena. Da razvijenije kapitalistike proizvodnje dolazi
tek kada komanda kapitala nad radom mijenja sam proces rada,
kada je rad kapitalu realno supsumiran- kako kae Marx. Ovo
se dogaa pomou sve vie napredujue podjele rada unutar
poduzea, pomou svjesne primjene prirodne nauke, mehanike,
kemije itd. za odreene svrhe, tehnologije itd. 11 Ujedno slijedi
proizvodnja na viem nivou. Tek sada postaje mogua primjena
nauke, ovog opeg proizvoda drutvenog razvoja na neposredni

10
MEGA, 2. Abteilung, 3, l, str. 252.
11
Karl Marx, Resultate des unmittelbaren Produktionsprozesses. Archiv
sozialistischer Literatur 17, Frankfurt 1969. str. 50.

95
proces proizvodnje. Nuno se sve ovo postavlja kao proizvodj 3
snaga kapitala, ne kao prizvodna snaga rada, ili samo kao proL.
vodna sn,ag~ rada a.~o j~ ova iden.tina s k.apit~lom (tj. k[ 'l
i opredmecem rad koJI pn pada Kapitalu). Time Je puno vl t
razvijena mistifikacija koja u kapital odnosu stoji, nego to je t(J
bio sluaj sa formalnom supsumcijom rada pod kapital. S dru! ;,
strane ovdje stupa historijsko znaenje kapitalistike proizvodnje i tc
probijajui upravo kroz preobrazbu neposrednog proizvodnog p1~l,
cesa i razvojem drutvenih proizvodnih snaga rada. I 2
Marx, dakle, vidi sasvim jasno da je oblik industrijske proi .
vodnje, a time i proizvodne tehnike, odreen kapitalizmom. CL
je n~~avno i~ostavio. navesti. koje. prom_jene morajL~ pod~tzr~
u nacmu prmzvoenp (kao 1 sam1h prmzvoda) sami asocira..
proizvoai da bi proizvodnja bila za proizvoae a proizvodi
pri dobili optim.~lnu u?otrebn.u vr~~edn?st. Ali sigurno da sv~j ~
rasta realnog vzska vnjednostz, kOJI stOJI kao pogonska snaga IZc
realne supsumcije rada pod kapital i njegove promjene, nu1: J
mora imati kao rezultat drugi oblik proizvodnih tehnika kh(
i samih proizvoda, nego budua proizvodnja upotrebnih vrije1~-
nosti koju planiraju svjesno asocirani proizvoai. l
Realna supsumcija rada pod kapital ima za posljedicu ~'1
individualni radnik prestaje proizvoditi potpuni proizvod i j( '
samo obavlja djelomine funkcije u kompleksnom procesu proiz
vodnje robe. On je time, i ne samo zbog ovoga, podre~ '
kapitalu, jer ne posjeduje vlastita sredstva za proizvodnju, ve(
i stoga to nije vie izuio vlastito umijee koje ga osposoblja1 1
proizvoditi cijeli proizvod: Uveana produktivnost i kompleJL;
nost ukupnog proizvodnog procesa, njegovo bogaenje je dak. 1(
kupljeno kroz redukciju radne moi ll svakoj posebnoj funkciji sr .
f
.
do puke apstrakcije - jednostavnom svojstvu koje se pojavljuje
!
u vjenom istom istog djelovanja i koje konfiscira ukupnu proU
vodnu mo radnika, njegove mnogostruke mogunosti. 13
Marx stalno naglaava da je nuno prolaenje kroz izrazi!'
otuenje, ospoljavanje u otuenjom obliku svih proizvodmf
1 i
l :
snaga koje su u ovjeku (kao kapitalu supsumirane snat ~
j ;
u obliku prirodnih nauka i tehnike), da bi se dostigao on1cr
1
.
'l 12
Ibidem .
' 13 MEGA, 2. Abteilung, 3, l, str. 252.

96
ha stupanj proizvodnosti na ijem temelju postaje mogua socijali-
:~z- stika organizacija proizvodnje. No, on ujedno i predpostavlja da
. ~ao. imanentna proturjeja kapitalistikog naina proizvodnje dovode
. ~e do toga da dinamika razvoja proizvodnih snaga u uvjetima kapi-
~ to talizma ve mlitavi prije nego to su zadovoljene potrebe dru-
~- .Je tveno razvijenih individua. U treem tomu Kapitala ova
i to imanentna granica kapitalistikog naina proizvodnje opisuje se
! 1 o- na sljedei nain:
Granica kapitalistikog naina proizvodnje ispoljava se: l.
u tome to razvitak proizvodne snage rada stvara u vidu padanja
ln profitne stope takav zakon koji na izvesnoj taki najneprijateljskije
zeti istupa prema sopstvenom razvitku, pa zato stalno mora da se
m savlauje putem krize.
odi 2. U tome to umesto da o proirenju ili ograniavanju
1a proizvodnje odluuje srazmera proizvodnje prema drutvenim
ll a potrebama drutveno razvijenih ljudi, o tome odluuje prisvajanje
~10 neplaenog rada i s razmera toga neplaenog rada prema opredme-
L1o enom radu uope ili, da se izrazimo kapitalistiki profit i sraz-
ied- mera toga profita prema primenjenom kapitalu, dakle izvesna
visina profitne stope. Zbog toga za proizvodnju nastupaju granice na
da takvom stepenu proirenja proizvodnje koji bi se pod drugom pretpo-
. o stavkom, naprotiv, pokazao kao daleko nedovoljan. Ona se zaustav-
OIZ- lja ne tamo gdje to nalae zadovoljenje potreba, ve gdje to nalae
,en proizvodnja i realizacija profita. 14
ve Ovo je klasino mjesto za tezu koja je poslije uvijek iznova
?Va postavljena, naime da je nuno socijalistiko preoblikovanje pro-
: ;s- izvodnih odnosa da bi se osigurao daljnji razvoj proizvodnih
. akle snaga. J. V. Staljin je u svojoj brouri 0 dijalektikom i historij-
:v e skom materijalizmu izrazio nadmo socijalizma nasuprot kapita-
'juje lizmu u odgovarajuoj formuli:
iz- U socijalistikom poretku, koji je za sada ostvaren samo
u SSSR-u, osnova produkcionih odnosa jest drutveno vlasnitvo
ito nad sredstvima za proizvodnju. Tu nema vie ni eksploatatora ni
~,lih
eksploatiranih. Proizvodi se raspodjeljuju prema radu - u skladu
r~.ge
s principom: 'tko ne radi, ne treba ni da jede'. Uzajamni odnosi
1aJ ljudi u procesu proizvodnje imaju ovdje karakter drugarske sarad-
nje i socijalistike uzajamne pomoi trudbenika, slobodnih od

14
MED, 23. Kapital, tom III, str. 218.

97
eksploatacije. Ovdje se produkcioni odnosi nalaze u potpm
i '
' .
skladu sa stanjem proizvodnih snaga, jer se drutveni kara1.-
procesa proizvodnje pojaava drutvenim vlasnitvom nad sp
' ..
i i :
; : {
stvima za proizvodnju . .. Zbog toga se ovdje proizvodne sn
h ~ :' razvijaju ubrzanim tempom, jer redukcioni odno~ i, koji su s nji~
l :
l,' i ;
. i' '
l
u skladu, daju iroko polje za takav razvitak. )
1
l'
i j J ako naglaavjanje osloboenja proizvodnih snaga od rl
i :
! ! hovih okova izraava se u konkretnim argumentima industriA

lJl
l
ii !l
zacije postrevolucionarne Rusije. Iako se u caristikoj Rht
proizvodne snage oigledno jo nisu razvile do onih gral .
~ r i imanentnih kapitalizmu, tamo je - na temelju posebnih uv1,
JI, i imperijalistikog razdoblja- dola na vlast jedna revolucionr

l~ ~
fl
r. i
li
1
'
~
.
socijalistika partija. Ona je stoga stajala- prema Lenjinu- p .
zadatkom da tek stvori industrijsku osnovu za stabiliziranje so;
jalistikog drutvenog poretka. U svome lanku Velika ini~
l~ tiva Lenjin pie u lipnju 1919: >>Produktivnost rada konano
f najvanija, odluujua za pobjedu novog drutvenog pare!
'r l
il ! ;
Kapitalizam je proizveo radni produktivitet koji nije postaja6
vrijeme kmetstva. Kapitalizam se moe i bit e konano pobijel~
poto e socijalizam razviti novu produktivnost, daleko veu. T
l
''
jedan teak i dugotrajan zadatak. 16
Taj cilj, naravno, Sovjetski Savez do dananjeg dana
l
t
1 ostvario. U toku svojih daljnjih izvoda Lenjin istie brigu jedf~
l stavnog radnika koja nesebino teki rad nadilazi u korist povi ~
... 1
. ' nja radnog produktiviteta kao znak novog komunistiki
' .
tl:; morala. Ve je Lenjin prok)amirao moto da treba >>sustii i A
~
~
j
stii ekonomske razvijene zemlje, 17 a Staljin je u svom govoru~
. '
J t
'~ rezultatima prve petoljetke, 7. sijenja 1933. konstati~~i
:l' Temeljni zadatak petoljetke je >>nunost da se otkloni tehniL.
i ekonomska zaostalost Sovjetskog Saveza, koja ga je osudila1 ;
l .:
.
:'j
j
ne ba zavidno postojanje; nunost da se stvore pretposta0.-i
l koje bi omoguile ne samo sustii tehniki i ekonomski napre
nije zemlje, ve tokom vremena i prestii. 18
. l .
\
j.
., l.
l
:i
l o

15 J. V. Staljin, u: Historija SKPB, kratki kurs, Kultura, Zagreb, 1947,[


!
1311132.
16 W. I. Lenjin, Ausgewiihlte Werke, Moskau, Bd, 9, 1936, str. 475.

17 W. I. Lenjin, Siimtliche Werke, Moskau, Bd. XXI. str. 240.


18 J. W. Staljin, u: J.Staljin, Pitanja lenjinizma, CDD, Zagreb 1981.

98
Time to je jedna revolucija, prema samorazumijevanju soci-
jalistika, pobijedila u zaostaloj agrarnoj zemlji, pomaknuo se
i- akcent postrevolucionarnog zadatka od preoblikovanja ve pot-
.: .' puno razvijene industrijske proizvodnje pomou udruenih proiz-
voaa i u njihovom neposrednom interesu, na zaostalo stvaranje
industrijskih pretpostavki navedenog preoblikovanja. Ve kod
11- Marxa samo skicirana, a nigdje izriito tematizirana kritika kon-
,l kretnog oblika proizvodne tehnike, kako je taj oblik nastao
' lJl u kapitalistikim uvjetima, izostala je kao i kritika upotrebne
:< vrijednosti do tada U robnom obliku proizvedenih produkata.
l .l Rukovodstvo Sovjetskog Saveza je uostalom bilo uvjereno da e
1a podrutvljenjem sredstava za proizvodnju prestati za kapitali-
: l stiku proizvodnju karakteristino razaranje okolia. Ako se
:1- planski razvija proizvodnja u interesu cjelokupnog drutva, tako
; . glasi teorijsko razmiljanje, tada nee biti mogue da pojedinana
;e tvornica prebacuje ~>trokove na drutvo i emitira otrove u oko-
linu zagaujui dimom i zagaujui vodu. Engleski ekonomist
A. C. Pigou je ve 1912. u svojoj knjizi (Wealth and Welfare)
pokazao da se kapitalistika poduzea jedino interesiraju za
privatne trokove, a optereenje okolia prebacuju kao Soci-
jalne trokove na drutvo. Zagaenje zraka u velegradovima,
koje proizvodi zajednici visoke gubitke za ouvanje zdravlja,
istou, odjee, stanovanje, trokove za umjetno svjetlo itd.
o-
nastaje jer nema naina da se zagaivau nametnu socijalni
l
trokovi za njegove operacije. 19 Poljski socijalist Oskar Lange
)g
izraava u svojoj knjizi Economic Theory of Socializm uvjere-
[
nje da e takvi socijalni izdaci biti u socijalizmu ukljueni
u ': u bilancu. Na taj nain ne bi uope moglo doi do teta po okoli,
\
r''
to je sluaj u kapitalizmu. No ni u Sovjetskom Savezu se nije
[ !
uspjelo sprijeiti goleme tete za okoli. Poticaj za rast industrij-
1a
ske proizvodnje kroz sistem premija u pravilu je bio jai nego
strah pred prijetnjom kazne i uspostavljanje restriktivnih normi
d-
za dozvoljeno optereenje okolia. Sustizanje i prestizanje naj-
razvijenijih kapitalistikih industrijskih zemalja uspjelo je ak,
na tom nepoeljnom podruju prije nego drugdje. 20
l .

19 A. C. Pigou, Wealth and Welfare, 1912, str. 159.


20
Oskar Lange i Fred Taylor, Economic Theory of Socialism, Minneapolis
1938.

99
T !
'

2. Kritika ekolokih posjedica kapitalistike poljoprivrede,


i industrije kod Marxa i Engelsa l
Ako se razvoj industrijskog sistema u realno postojee! l
socijalizmu ne eli priznati kao ozbiljenje socijalizma kojem su
se nadali Marx i Engels, mora se tek dokazati da su obojica, osi1 11
ostalog, ukazali na konzekvence kapitalistike industrije i agronb~
mijve koje .raz.araju prirodu. P~tom se m~ra barem n~znap
u cemu b1 b1la zapravo odlucna nadmoc novog drustvenog
poretka ako nije - kao to to poturaju mladi Engels i Staljj<
u mogunosti beskonanog rasta proizvodnje. Oba pitanja s t
utoliko povezana to samo uz odustajanje od cilja neogranieno~
rasta proizvodnje socijalistika slika budunosti ne kolidira ~ L
u meuvremenu oitim granicama rasta ..

Ekoloke primjedbe kod Marxa


U poglavlju Mainerija i krupna industrija u prvom taJu
Kapitala Marx je upeatljivo istaknuo sudbonosne posljedi(/~
industrijalizirane poljoprivrede: l
A svaki napredak kapitalistike poljoprivrede nije samo
napredak u vjetini pljakanja radnika, nego u isto vreme i u vetij ~
pljakanja zemlje; svaki napredak u poveavanju njene plodnosti
za neko dato vrijeme ujedno je i napredak u upropaivanj;
trajnog izvora te plodnosti. to vie neka zemlja, npr. SjedinjeAe
Drave Severne Amerike, polazi od krupne industrije kao osn~
vice svog razvitka to je ovaj proces razaranja bri. 21 (str. 364)
Na koncu poglavlja Marx saima svoju tezu i pojanjava q~,
kad je rije o ovom procesu nije u pitanju samo poljoprivreda v~'
i industrija: Kapitalistika proizvodnja, dakle, razvija tehniku
i kombinaciju drutvenog procesa proizvodnje samo istovremeni\ .
potkopavanjem izvora svakog bogatstva: zemlje i radnika. 22
Sline formulacije se, osim ostaloga, mogu nai- na relativn
skrivenim mjestima- u Teorijama o viku vrijednosti: Anticl-
pacija budunosti- zbiljska anticipacija - nalazi se uope same> 1

u proizvodnji bogatstva samo u odnosu prema radniku i zeml),

21
MED, tom 21, Kapital l, str. 446.
22
Ibidem

100
Oboje mogu preranim umorom i troenjem, kroz ometanje rav-
notee izdataka i prihoda, biti realiter anticipirani i razotreni.
Obima se to dogaa u kapitalistikoj proizvodnji. 23
Neto prije ovog mjesta Marx primjeuje da se kapitalistika
su proizvodnja baca na zemlju tek kada je ve njen utjecaj zemlju
zamorio i razorio prirodne predispozicije 24 Potom pozitivno
u- formulira - s obzirom na budui socijalistiki drutveni poredak
i'"i - pa u istom sklopu glasi da ona (zemlja) treba drugaije
drutvene odnose da bi se zbiljski prema svojoj prirodi mogli
eksploatirati. 24
! l Bitni poticaj svojim uvjerenjima o razornom djelovanju ukup-
nih naina proizvodnje Marx duguje bavarskom agronomu Karlu
!. .l Nikolausu Fraasu (181 0-1875) iju je knjigu Klima i biljni svijet
u vremenu, prilog povijesti obih (Landshut 1847 .) otkrio tek
1868, i u pismu Fridrichu Engelsu oduevljeno komentirao:
Veoma je zanimljiva Fraasova knjiga (1847) ... naime kao dokaz
da se u istorijskom vremenu flora i fauna menjaju. On je darvin ist
_J prije Darvina i doputa nastajanje i samih vrsta u istorijskom
ce vremenu. Ali ujedno i agronom. On tvrdi, da se zajedno sa
kulturom - i ()dgovarajui njenom stepenu -gubi Vlanost, koju
10 seljaci toliko vole (zato putuju biljke od juga na sever), i najzad se
. i poinju stvarati stepe. Prvi uticaj kulture je koristan, no na kraju
~ii ona izaziva pusto usled obeumljavanja itd. Ovaj ovek je isto tako
l uen filolog (pisao je knjige na grkom) kao. to je i hemiar,
agronom itd . ...
Zakljuak je taj, da. kultura ako se razvija stihijski a ne usme-
(l-

rava se svesno (do toga, naravno kao buruj nije doao), ostavlja
iza sebe pustinje: Persija, Mesopotamija itd, Grka. Dakle i opet
l ;
nesvesna socijalistika tendencija. 25
Moda ak ova posljednja Marxova primjedba nije sasvim
i l
tona, budui da Fraas u svojoj Povijesti poljoprivrede, ili
povijesnom pregledu napretka poljoprivrednih spoznaja
")
u posljednjih 100 godina (Prag 1852) spominje Fouriera kao
smjernog i humanistikog socijalista i to s oitim simpatijama .
.10
l.
Ovaj odnos ini mi se upravo stoga zanimljivim jer upravo

23
MEGA, 2. Abteilung, 3, 4, str. 1445.
24
Ibidem
25
MED, tom 39, str. 49.

101
Fourier estoko kritizira izrabljivaki karakter civilizacije prerrl .
prirodi, a za drutvo harmoniensa postulira promijenjeni, pk.
jateljski i kooperativni odnos izmeu ovjeka i prirode. 1 .

Ne moe se iskljuiti da podatke o razaranju uma u drugo&;


tomu Kapitala Marx moe zahvaliti upravo Karlu Nikolaus\'~
Fraasu. Tamo Marx pie:
Dugo vrijeme proizvodnje (koje ukljuuje relativno malF,
radno vrijeme), s obzirom na dugotrajnost obrta, ini uzgoj um,l
nepovoljnom privatnom - pa stoga kapitalistikom privrednom.
granom, koja je uvijek bitno privatna, iako umjesto pojedinano1
kapitalista nastupa udrueni. Razvoj industrije i kulture uope se
oduvijek pokazao U razaranju uma, da je sve to je uinjeno Z\ ,
uzgoj i odravanje bezmalo nebitna veliina.
26
l ..
No, sasvim sigurno Friedrich Engels duguje svoju panju zJ
razorno djelovanje neplanirane industrijske proizvodnje n<
prirodu itanju Fraasove knjige. U Anti Duhringu (1878) kao
i u Dijalektici prirode Engels ponovo ukazuje na opasnosti
neogranienog zagaenja i optereenja prirode. Tako opisuj~,
npr. stalno .seljenje tvornica iz grada u selo: Prvi zahtjev parnog
stroja kao i glavni zahtjev gotovo svih privrednih grana krupnt
industrije je relativno ista voda. Tvorniki grad pretvara svu vodi{
u smrdljivu kloaku. Upravo koliko je gradska koncentracijd .
temeljni uvjet kapitalistike proizvodnje, toliko tei svaki pojedi- .
nani kapitalist da se makne od velikih gradova i preseli u seosk~
pogon. To se moe studirati u podrujima tekstilne. industrije
La~cashi':a i Yorkshira; kapita!istika k~upna ~n~u~trija tam~ .
pr01zvod1 nanovo velegradove, ;er neprekidno b;ez1 IZ grada na
selo. 27 Sasvim slino, kao to je to ve Marx uinio u prvo mw
tomu Kapitala, Engels govori o pogrenom krunom tokul
izmeu ovjeka i prirode i misli da se ovaj moe ukinuti ukida--.
njem kapitalistikog karaktera industrije. 28 Tek tada e, naime,\ 1
biti mogue realizirati raspodjelu proizvodnih mjesta po elji
i planski i time obazrivo s obzirom na sauvanje ostalih eleme-j
nata proizvodnje, dakle, zemlje i zraka.
Jo upe~atlji:'ij.e su rijei koji.ma Engels u >~DijalektiCi pri~L
rode (napisanoJ IZmeu 1873. 1 1883) ukazuJe na opasnosti
26
27
MEW 24. Str. 246 i dalje.
Friedrich Engels, Dialektik der Natur, MEW 20, 453.
l
28
Ibidem

102
vakog odnosa prema prirodi: Ali ne laskajmo sebi suvie
naih ljudskih pobeda nad prirodom. Za svaku takvu pobedu
iac;fnaJn se sveti. Istina, svaka od njih ima u prvom redu one
\Iitffli~;~~~~~:.~~~.~na
,)
koje smo rni raunali, ali u drugom i treem redu ona
druge, nepredviene posledice, koje veoma estoponi-
''"'''"~ one prve. Ljudi koji su u Mesopotamiji, Grkoj, 1Vfaloj
i drugde iskriti ume da bi dobili ziratnu zemlju nisu ni
.. da su time poloili temelje sadanjoj pustoi tih zemalja,
, ",!,r.<!H
1
. ih zajedno sa umama i centara za skupljanje i zadravanje
29 Engels oigledno pridodaje Fraasovom primjeru i vla-
.. mu je bio osobito blizak s obzirom na njegov interes za
>Ljudi koji su rasprostranjivati krompir po Evropi nisu
s tim branjastim gomoljikama ujedno rasprostranjuju
'utcrzu. I tako nas injenice na svakom koraku podseaju na
nipoto ne vladamo prirodom kao to osvaja vlada tuim
. , kao neko ko stoji izvanprirode, nego da svojim mesom,
. mozgom njoj pripadamo i usred nje stojimo, i da se sva naa
njom sastoji u tome to nad svim ostalim stvorovima imamo
da moemo saznavati i pravilno primenjivati njene

spoznaja zakonitosti - makar i kompleksnih struktura


ekosistema, to je u ono doba bilo za nauku nepoznato
nije dostatna tako dugo dok strukturalna prisila pona-
.soczo>eKononz.~kog sistema onemoguuje generalnu obazri-
td:JIDdlJSe, Engels :misli na ovim podrujima da mi u stvari,
danom uimo da tanije razumevamo njene zakone i da
. blie i dalje posledice naih zahvata u obiajeni tok
: Osobito posle ogromnih uspeha prirodnih nauka u ovom
'""''' r . .smo sve vie u stanju da upoznajemo, s time i savla-

. i udaljenije prirodne posledice bar najobinijih naih


u oblasti proizvodnje. I ukoliko se vie to bude deavalo,
. e vie ljudi ne samo opet oseati nego i znati da ine
!}Mtt-ll..Jt.r< s prirodom. 31 Ali njemu je ipak jasno da bi se ovo
\'!&!!>\aW potrebno je vie nego puka spoznaja, naime, potpuni
naeg naina proizvodnje zajedno sa naim sadanjim
)~\/)!;,~'ff~~!:::_ drutvenim poretkom.
31

;p~~;~,<;;i.;!c;.}:~. MED. tom J 1. str. 3 72


!bi <.lem
31
lbidem, str 373.

103
Engels jasno spoznaje, kao i. kasnije Pigou, da uzimanje
u obzir ovakvih dalekih posljedica nuno nadilazi vidno polje
individualnog kapitalistikog poduzetnika i njegovih kalkulacija,
jer on se >~brine jedino oko neposrednog efekta koristi svojeg l
djelovanja." 2 Sasvim jednako ponaa se i klasina politika
ekonomija, socijalna znanost buroazije. Nasuprot prirodi
kao i drutvu dolazi do izraaja pri dananjem nainu proizvodnje
l'
samo prvi neposredni uspjeh; a tada se jo udimo kada su
udaljene poslJedice ovog djelovanja sasvim druge, najee sasvim l i
i~

neoekivane. 32
!l
'

Bez sumnje, Marx se s tom Engelsovom idejom potpuno


slagao. U treem tomu Kapitala on daje buduim asociranim ll l
proizvoaima sljedee upozorenje, koje pojanjava koliko je
ll
vano ouvanje i poboljanje prirodnog temelja ljudskog ivota: l
Sa stanovita jedne vie ekonomske drutvene formaciJe izgledae
privatna svojina pojedinih individua na Zemljinu kuglu isto tako
apsurdna kaov
privatna svojina nekog ovjeka na nekog drugog
ovjeka- Cak ni neko celo drutvo, naciJa, pa ni sva istovremena
drutva zajedno nisu vlasnici zemlJe. Oni su samo njeni posednici,
uivaoci, i imaju je kao boni patres familias ostaviti pobol,janu
sledeim generaciJama. 33
32
Ibidem l
33
MED. tom 23, Kapital III, str. 646/647.
Ovi Marxovi citati ine jasnim da Marshall l. Goldman nije u pravu kada
u The Spoils of Progress, Enviromental Pollution in the Soviet Union<< (Mit 'l .. i
"~

Press, Cambridge 1972), u inae izuzetnoj studiji o razaranju okolia u Sovjet-


skom Savezu misli da se Engels pred Marxom istie viom svijeu o potencijalima
industrijske civilizacije koji razaraju okolinu. Engelsov citat iz dijalektike pri-
l'
rode uvjerljivo se moe izvesti iz Marxove preporuke itanja Fraasa. Inae, ini se
da Goldmanu nisu poznati citirani dijelovi iz Kapitala<< i Teorija o viku
r-{
vrijednosti<<. On pogreno zakljuuje o ekolokoj nunosti recayclinga<< koju
Marx opirno opisuje u Kapitalu<<: Marx also devoted some attantion to
recycling but mainly in relation to its impact on the prices of raw materials. Ovo
znaajno mjesto kod Marxa glasi:<< Sa sve veom pretenou gradskog stanovni-
l'
tva koje ona gomila u velikim centrima, kapitalistika proizvodnja gomila s jedne
strane istorijsku pokretaku snagu drutva, a s druge strane ometa razmenu l
materije izmeu oveka i zemlje, tj. vraanje zemljitu onih njegovih sastavnih
delova koje je ovek potroio u obliku hrane i odela, ometa, dakle, veiti prirodni
uslov trajne plodnosti zemljita. Time ona ujedno razara telesno zdravlje gradskih
radnika i duhovni ivot seoskih radnika. Ali razarajui uslove razmene materije,
koji su nastali samoniklo, kapitalistika proizvodnja prisiljava da se ta razmena
sistematski uspostavi kao zakon koji regulie drutvenu proizvodnju u obliku koji

104
To nedvojbeno znai da e asocirani proizvoai pri organiza-
svoje proizvodnje morati voditi brigu o tome ne samo da se
,~{~I~~t~~:dda kao prirodna osnova ljudske egzistencije uva, ve tovie
~~1 olazeim generacijama ak poboljano predaje. Danas se
.,..,..,..,vto ovako ne moe tvrditi za postojea industrijska drutva, ali
za ona koja se nazivaju realno postojeim socija-

3. Proizvodnja i potronja u besklasnom drutvu

Socijalizam se moe sauvati kao ideal - s obzirom na gra-


rasta- jedino ako je njegova bitna karakteristika ne neogra-
'"'''"L rast proizvodnje i maksimalna potronja, ve tovie pro mi-
em za individue istinski zadovoljavajueg naina ivljenja .
.. evanje misli o napretku kao puki rast proizvodnje i pro-
(ili ak rast bruto-socijalnog prihoda) je- na Zapadu
i na Istoku - sve vie zaputa/o predodbu o drukijem,
alitativno boljem nainu ivota. Iz tog razloga spoznaje se tu

~m'v'"~ punom razvitku ovekovom.<< (MED, tom 21, Kapital tom l, str. 446.)
razliku od ponekih dananjih mistifikacija prirode<< Marx je dakle uvjeren da
navedeni kruni tok ubudue mora uspostaviti s punom svijeu, jer je do sada
>>sluajan<< i ne bez tekog tereta po ovjeanstvo i prirodu. Justusa von
Marx na ovom mjestu hvali u jednoj biljeci, jer je ukazao na razvitak
}eJ~at1vr1e strane moderne agronomije i to sa znanstvenog stanovita<<, i jer je
navrata razvio misao o nunosti >>krunog toka<< izmeu proizvodnje hrane
uaga.uJa u zemlju potroenih sastojaka kroz gnojiva. Tako u knjizi koju Marx
orrnn:'1e osim ostaloga pie: >>Meu njemakim seljacima dri se za najistaknuti-
onoga koji uspije donijeti na trite najveu koliinu ita i mesa bez upotrebe
iva, da, on je ponosan na svoje uspjehe a drugi hvale njegovu vjetinu ... niti
razuman ovjek ne moe trajno oekivati i sauvati ovakav nain proizvodnje
tome vjerovati da ova pljaka nee imati posljedice po evropske zemlje, kao to
imala u drugim... Ako je sa uvanje plodnosti polja dato od boanskog
u njegove ruke, tada je on odgovoran za svu bijedu koju priprema
'iP.c""''" djelovanje njegovim potomcima, tada je to grijeh prema bogu i ljudskom
ako ovjek rasipa bez ikakove koristi uvjete, za koje zna da su sluili za
:<'lr7.av~,,.". vlastitog ivota i vlastite djece i da su od prirode odreeni da slue
u nove i uvijek slijedee generacije, i njih izdvaja iz krunog toka, nam-
, s predumiljajem, jer mu drugije postupanje priinjava odreene trokove
Y'''"''<'!>L>uu.<< (J. v. Lie big, Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung auf-Agricultur und
;J~f'.~~hysi[ologi.e, 1862, str. 112). Liebig ponajprije naglaava nunost da se koriste
uu''"" i ivotinjske fekalije za .gnojenje polja, a ne da se beskorisno preputaju
ekama i morima.

105
'' .'

i tamo, nasuprot upravo iznesenom, kako mogu biti korisne


fantazije ponekih utopista - npr. Fouriera. Ernst Bloch nije bio
sasvim u krivu kad je postavio skeptika pitanje da li razvoj
j :
socijalizma od utopije k znanosti nije moda korak koji vodi
u prazno!
: i
Ne moe biti sumnje da je Marx smatrao rast proizvodnje
l;
i produktivnosti rada jednom nunom pretpostavkom budueg
besklasnog drutva. Jednako toliko jasna je njegova uputa da e l:
- zbog tendencijskog pada profitne stope - kapitalistiki nain
proizvodnje izgubiti svoju dinamiku prije nego to postigne pri-
eljkivani optimum produktivnosti rada i upotrebnih vrijednosti.
Unato tome, onaj pravi cilj, smisao revoluCionarnog ukidanja
dosadanjeg naina proizvodnje, nije motiviran bezgraninim
rastom proizvodnje i mase robe, ve emancipacijom ovjeanstva
(ili radnike klase kao i kapitalista), osim ostalog i od onih p risi la
koje su tipine za kapitalistiki nain proizvodnje. Kako je Marx
krivo pretpostavljao da e granice kapitalistike dinamike biti
dostignute u dogledno vrijeme, 34 uvidio je, dodue, opasnost
razaranja okoline kao i tete po zdravlje radnika, ali je pretpo-
stavljao da e obje tendencije uskoro biti okonane socijalisti
kom revolucijom. Budui da je sasvim drukije: u ekonomski
i tehniki zaostalim zemljama su uspostavljene u ime socijalizma l
birokratske diktature koje su poticale ubrzanu industrijalizaciju !
zemlje. U kapitalistikim zemljama se mogla - osim ostaloga l
i pomou drave blagostanja, konjukture vojne industrije i animi-
rano konkurencijom sistema - ouvati pa i poveati dinamika
naina proizvodnje na teret prirodne okoline. Zato se mora
pomaknuti kritiki akcenat socijalistike analize. Nije vie prije-
tea stagnacija, ve sve vie rastua opasnost razaranja okoline

34
Suvremena ekonomska teorija, koja se intenzivno bavi Marxom i njego-
vom kritikom politike ekonomije, dovodi u pitanje >>zakon o tendencijskom
padu profitne stope<<. Marx je konstatirao bri rast konstantnog kapitala<< no to
se kompenzira brzim pojeftinjenjem (eklatantan primjer za to je razvoj kompju-
terske tehnike i primjena mikroprocesora). Tehnikom viku utroka ne kore-
spondira nuno i ekonomski viak utroka. I ovo bi moglo objasniti trajanje
dinamike rasta industrijskog kapitalizma. Naravno i danas profitiraju pojedinane
firme kao i cijele industrijske grane i industrijske zemlje od tehnike prednosti
i na taj nain postiu i Marxu poznati ekstraprofit, koji nestaje tek izjednaava
njem proizvodnog nivoa.

106
"'l "0"'~
'

razlog za promjenu naina proizvodnje. Walter Benjamin je


profetskim senzibilitetom saeo ovu preorijentaciju u sljedeu
metaforu: Marx kae da su revolucije lokomotive svjetske povi-
jesti. No moda je tome sasvim drukije. Moda su revolucije
konice za opasnost za ljudski rod koji putuje u ovom vlaku. 35
e Benjamin duguje ovaj uvid vlastitom eshatolokom miljenju
eg koje ne vidi osloboeno ovjeanstvo kao rezultat bezgraninog
napretka, ve kao oekivani ulom Sasvim drugoga u svjetsku
:m povijest. Osjeaj da tako dalje ne moe, dovodi - ako nedo-
staje perspektiva utopijske nade ili neki eshaton - lagano do
oajanja. U treem tomu Kapitala Marx objanjava: Carstvo
slobode poinje u stvari tek tamo gdje prestaje rad koji je odreen
n nevoljom i spoljanjom svrsishodnou; po prirodi stvari, ono
va dakle, lei s one strane oblasti same materijalne proizvodnje. Kao
a god to divljak mora da se bori s prirodom da bi zadovoljio svoje
rx potrebe, da bi odrao i reprodukovao svoj ivot, tako to mora
:J initi i civilizovani ovek, i on to mora u svim drutvenim oblicima
'"t i pod svima moguim nainima proizvodnje. S njegovim razvit-
kom proiruje se ovo carstvo prirodne nunosti, jer se uveavaju
:- potrebe; ali se u isto vreme uveavaju proizvodne snage koje te
:ki potrebe zadovoljavaju. Sloboda se u ovoj oblasti moe sastojati
a samo u tome da podrutvljeni ovek, udrueni proizvoai, raci-
JU onalno urede ovaj promet materije s prirodom, da ga dovedu pod
1 svoju zajedniku kontrolu, umesto da on njima gospodari kao neka
11- slepa sila; da ga vre s najmanjim utrokom snage i pod uslovima
'-a koji su najdostojniji i najadekvatniji njihovoj ljudskoj prirodi. Ali
, _a to uvek ostaje carstvom nunosti. S one strane njega poinje
' P.- razvitak lfudske snage, koji je svrha samo sebi, pravo carstvo
slobode, ali koje moe da procveta samo na onom carstvu nunosti
kao svojoj osnovici. Skraenje radnog dana je osnovni uslov. 36
U skicama za Kapital (Grundrisse) iz godine 1857/59 i 1861/63
lill Marx neto jasnije i optimistinije objanjava promjene koje e se
)
zbiti s ovjekom i ljudskom djelatnou u uzajamnom odnosu pod
re-
uvjetima Slobodnih udruenih proizvoaa. Za njega je sva-
kako sigurno da e vea produktivnost rada biti temelj za radi-

st i 35
Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Frankfurt 1980, Bd. I, 3, str.
1232.
36
MED tom 23. Kapital, tom III, str. 682.

107
f i .,

:! kalne promjene, iji smisao nije iscrpljen uveanjem materijalne


.'
t l proizvodnje .
. '
! ;
i j Od centralnog znaenja za ukidanje kapitalistikog naina
il proizvodnje je nadilaenje mjerenja drutvenog bogatstva (ili
i: vrednovanja) prema drutveno potrebnom vremenu, koje je
ll
l '
opredmeeno u samoj robi. Paradoks ovog mjerenja je karakteri-
l: stian za kapitalizam, a on je u tome to vrijednost upotrebnog
. l
predmeta kao robe pada s rastom produktivnosti rada i time
povezanim manjim utrokom vremena za proizvodnju. Inae je
l i.i'

kapitalistiki nain proizvodnje samo utoliko zainteresiran za


utedu nunog radnog vremena koliko se na ovaj nain moe
uveati mogunost sticanja surplus radnog vremena (relativni
viak rada). Taj se paradoksalni odnos treba konano ukinuti
novim nainom proizvodnje: Stvaranje velike koliine slobodnog
vremena - izvan potrebnog radnog vremena za drutvo uope i za
svakog njegovog lana (tj. prostor za razvoj punih proizvodnih
snaga pojedinaca, a dakle i drutva), to stvaranje ne-radnog vre-
mena na stanovitu kapitala, kao i na svim ranijim stupnjevima,
pokazuje se kao ne-radno vrijeme, slobodno vrijeme za neke.
Kapital tome dodaje da on svim sredstvima umjetnosti i nauke
poveava viak radnog vremena mase, jer se njegovo bogatstvo
sastoji direktno u prisvajanju vika radnog vremena, jer je njegov
cilj direktno vrijednost, a ne upotrebna vrijednost.37 Kapitalistiki
nain proizvodnje proizvodi protiv svoje volje mogunosti za vie
slobode i to za cijelo drutvo, ali je njegova tendencija u tome da
se uveano slobodno vrijeme odmah opet pretvara, u viak
radnog vremena. Ovo protuijeje - tako glasi kod Marxa na
ovom mjestu- dovodi do toga da masa radnika mora sama sebi
prisvojiti viak radnog vremena, ime se konano ukida protur
jeno postojanje slobodnog vremena. Tada e se pod promije
njenim uvjetima: ... s jedne strane, potrebno radno vrijeme
dobiti svoju mjeru u potrebama drutvenog individuuma, a s druge
e strane razvoj drutvene proizvodne snage rasti tako brzo da e,
premda e sada proizvodnja biti sraunata na bogatstvo svih, rasti
l
i slobodno vrijeme svih. Jer pravo bogatstvo jest razvijena proiz
vodna snaga svih individua. Mjerom bogatstva tada vie nipoto
. [";
i

Temelji slobode, Osnovi kritike politike ekonomije, (dalje Grundrisse),


37

Zagreb 1977. Naprijed, str. 296.

108
nee biti radno vrijeme, nego slobodno vrijeme. Radno vrijeme
kao mjera bogatstva pretpostavlja da je samo bogatstvo zasnovano
na siromatvu i da slobodno vrijeme egzistira u suprotnosti i zah-
valjujui suprotnosti prema viku radnog vremena. To drugim
rijeima, znai postavljanje cijelog vremena individuuma kao rad-
nog vremena i stoga degradaciju individuuma na golog radnika,
njegovo potinjavanje pod rad. 38 Rije je o zbiljskom bogatstvu
drutva i svih individua. Pri racionalnoj organizaciji drutva
svima e pripasti redukcija radnog vremena na temelju rasta
produktivnosti rada: Prava ekonomija - uteda - sastoji se
u utedi radnog vremena (u minimumu, i redukciji na minimum,
trokova proizvodnje); ali ta uteda je identina s razvitkom
proizvodne snage. Dakle, nipoto ne odricanje od uivanja, ve
razvijanje snage, sposobnosti za proizvodnju, i stoga razvijanje
kako sposobnosti tako i sredstava uivanja. Sposobnost uivanja
je uvjet za uivanje, dr.kle njegovo prvo sredstvo, i ta je sposob-
nost razvijanje jedne individualne predispozicije, proizvodna
snaga.
Uteda radnog vremena jednaka je poveanju slobodnog
vremena, tj. vremena za pun razvitak individuuma, razvitak koji
sa svoje strane djeluje povratno na proizvodnu snagu rada kao
najvea proizvodna snaga. 39
Budue drutvo razlikuje se stoga ne samo od svih dosada-
njih, jer individuama stoji na raspolaganju vie dobara za zadovo-
ljenje vlastitih drutveno razvijenih potreba, ve prije svega
zbog potpunog razvoja idividua. Time se mijenja i karakter
njihova rada i uzajamnog ivota. Iako Marx na ovom mjestu
podsjea da rad ne moe postati igra, kako to eli Fourier, no
ipak priznaje Fourieru zasluge da je formulirao kao krajnji
cilj. . . prevazilaenje ne samo raspodjele, ve i samog naina
proizvodnje u vii oblik. 39 Slobodno vrijeme- koje je i dokolica
i vrijeme za viu djelatnost -pretvorilo je svog vlasnika prirodno
u jedan drugi subjekt i kao drugi subjekt on tada ulazi i u nepo-
sredni proces proizvodnje. 39
Proizvoai mogu u buduem drutvu, tako glasi Marxova
predodba, na temelju svog potpunog i svestranog razvoja sasvim
38
Grundrisse, Ibidem, str. 297.
39
Grundrisse, Ibidem, str. 301.

109
drukije proizvoditi nego u uvjetima drutvenog ureenja k ,j
uvijek privlai neobrazovanu (jer je jeftina) radnu sncig~
a produkciju tako oblikuje da se moe obavljati uz minim 1
duhovnog napora. Svakako, Marx pretpostavlja da e rast prL
vodne tehnike ii ususret objektivno promijenjenim djelat~il
potrebama. Tada je proizvodni proces: ... u isti mah discipll, :,
u odnosu na nastajueg ovjeka, i djelatnost, eksperimentaln
nauka, materijalno stvaralaka i opredmeujua se na~ ;,
u odnosu na nastalog ovjeka, u ijoj glavi egzistira akumuliran
znanje drutva. Za oba, ukoliko rad zahtijeva praktinu upotr~ 1
ruku i slobodno kretanje, kao u poljoprivredi, to je u isti rlt(J
i tjelesna' vjeba. 39 Karakter rada e tada za sve izgubiti odV 1c
koje je do sada uglavnom imao, pod uvjetima industrijalizactt
pojedinani proizvoa vie nije supsumiran pod stroj i u ov(
opredmeenoj znanosti, koja nam se suprotstavlja u liku kapit~ :
svjesno okree- zajedno sa drugima- prirodnu nauku i tehnik
prema obradi prirode. OviJ.ll moe rad, kako to Marx na jednj ~
mjestu primjeuje, postati travail attractif, i izgubiti odbijajw
i otueni karakter. 1

Za razliku od Adama Smitha, koji zamilja rad jedino usuv'..,


menom repulzivnom karakteru, Marx naglaava da ... individ,,~
u normalnom stanju zdravlja, snage, djelatnosti, vjetine ii
i potrebu za normalnom porcijom rada. 40 Dodue, mjera rad
je ostala izvanjska, kroz svrhu koju treba postignuti kao i k1
prepreke koje se trebaju nadii za postizanje cilja, ali uprav
ovim nadilaenjem prepreka idividua se ozbiljuje i ispal} .
vlastita subjektivnost. Ono to se u Kapitalu opisuje kao ci,;
stvo nunosti Marx ovdje spoznaje kao korisnu preprekc4
i ujedno istie da ciljeve drutvenog rada postavljaju sal
podrutvljene individue, a nisu vie dani prisilama strukturalni!
odnosa. Sigurno da se ljudi moraju prehranjivati, odijevati, tij l
od zime itd. uz poino rada, ali mjera za to potrebnog rada ini s
Marxu - u usporedbi s radnim uinkom koji je potreban l ,
potrebe komfora koji je svjesno postavljen - oigledno tak
malom da jedva ima teinu. Rad koji je stvorio subjektivne kl:
i objektivne uvjete vlastitog ozbiljenja, stoga se moe promatr -
kao suprotnost prema ropskom i najamnom radu, kao samostr

"' Grundrisse. Ibidem

110
Y-.

ranje rada. Konano Marx saima uvjete koji moraju biti ispu-
njeni da bi rad postao travail attractif: On moe sauvati ovaj
karakter jedino l) da je postavljen njegov drutveni karakter, 2) da
je znanstvenog karaktera, ujedno opi rad, ne napor ovjeka kao
odreene dresirane prirodne sile, ve kao subjekt koji se pojavljuje
u proizvodnom procesu ne u pukoj prirodnoj samonikloj formi,
ve kao djelatnost koja regulira sve prirodne sile. 40
Kao primjer za ovakav sasvim ozbiljan i naporan, ali po sebi
zadovoljavajui i privlaan rad, Marx usputno spominje kom-
poniranje. Moda ovo i nije sluajno da se vraa na paradigmu
koju je jo 1844. imao u vidu u ekscerptu kritike John S. Milla,
kada je opisivao odnose ljudi u emancipiranom drutvu. 41
Da bi se pojasnilo da predodbe budunosti Marxu nisu
identine s drutvom maksimalne proizvodnje i maksimalne
potronje, bilo je nuno pozabaviti se njegovim shvaanjem
promjene naina ivota i samih ljudi. Socijalistiko i komuni-
stiko drutvo u njegovim oima treba donijeti ne samo puki
kvantitativni porast mogunosti konzuma i slobodnog vremena,
ve potpunu promjenu kako karaktera djelatnosti tako i (impli-
citno) kvalitetu proizvoda i socijalnih odnosa meu individuama.
Onaj tko je zadovoljan vlastitom djelatnou i priznat od ostalih
lanova drutva nema potrebu stvarati kompenzaciju pomou
stalno rastue- a ipak nikad potpuno zadovoljavajue- potro-
nje, pa stoga njega vie ne moraju straiti prirodne ni socijalne
granice rasta. Emancipirana drutvo bi se u Marxovoj intenciji
prije svega rijeilo one lude prisile koja do sada u industrijskim
drutvima konkurencije i poduzeima tjera k stalnom proirenju
reprodukcije i akumulacije kapitala i .time na besmislen nain
ugroava okolinu i zdravlje ovjeka.

1
' Rani radovi, Naprijed, Zagreb. 1976.

ll l
Ivan Cifri

MODERNO DRUTVO
l SVJETSKI ETOS
Perspektive ovjekova nasljea

4t2

Zagreb, 2000.
RAZVOJ J OKOLI
Biblioteka asopisa
nSocijafna eko/ogijau

KNJIGA 10
Ivan Cifri

Izdavai:
Hrvatsko socioloko drutvo
Filozofski fakultet
i o 000 Zagreb, l. Luia 3
i MODERNO DRUTVO
Zavod za sociologiju
Filozofskog fakulteta u Zagrebu l SVJETSKI ETOS
Filozofski fakultet
1o 000 Zagreb, l. Luia 3
(Tel. (Oi) 6120 225) Perspektive ovjekova nasljea

Urednik:
Ivan Cifri

Za izdavaa:
Vjekoslav Afri

Recenzenti:
Vjekoslav Mikecin
Nikola Skledar

Kompjutorski prijelom:
Tercija, Zagreb
B. Magovca i5

Naklada:
400 primjeraka

Tisak:
M.A.K. Golden, Zagreb
A. Prosenika i 1 Zagreb, 2000.
II.

'Moderno drutvo
i svjetski etos
.. ...
,, :
"r:
.".}T

i
l

l
l

Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 1)

GLOBALIZIRANJE SVIJETA

Poticaji promjenama

Posljednja desetljea u:;>mjerena na pronalaenje uinkovitijih


rjeenja razvoja, uvjetovana su pogoravanjem socijalnih .i eko-
lokih uvjeta. Teoretski diskurs o tome, pokuaj je odgovora na
ekoloku krizu i na nove poticaje za prevladava;nje neeljenih
posljedica razvoja. Svjetske ekoloke strategije doivjele su evo-
luciju ciljeva u kojima se vide promjene njihovih ciljeva - od
>>zatite okolia i saniranja ekolokih posljedica (World Conser-
vation Strategy) na rjeavanje uzroka, razvojne ciljeve (Ekodeve- l
lopment) i odrivu budunost (Sustainable Development); (Bruck-
meier, 1994). Radi se o izvanjskoj prisili na razmiljanja o bu- j
dunosti, o objektivnim uvjetima borbe za ivotni prostor izaz-
vanim njegovim pogoranjem: iscrpljivanjem resursa (Meadows,
1992), klimatskim promjenama (Benedick, 1997; IPCC, 1996), l'
poveanjem svjetskog puanstva (Ehrlich, 1970} i problemima
prehrane (Schug, 1996). Ovi eksterni imbenici postaju razvojno /,
limitirajui u dananjim uvjetima ivota i sve vie potiu raspra-
. ve i iniciraju pitanje instrumenata svjetske ekoloke politike (Si-
morris, 1996). Termin svjetski<< odnosi se na meunarodnu ra-
zinu sa sve brojnijim akterima meu kojima dominira uloga ne-
kolicine najrazvijenijih nacionalnih drava. j_;
i Meutim, izvanjske okolnosti nisu jedini poticaj uinkovito-
~ sti i traenju novih rjeenja. Postoje i subjektivni, unutarnji ov-
~ jekovi poticaji promjenama. Nedvojbeno je da je ovjek - iako
r razliito nazivan: homo politicus (Aristotel), homo economicus,
tf homo oecologicus (Meinberg, 1995), bie prakse, proizvoa
smea - svestrano bie, ukljuujui i naziv "radoznalo bie<<.
,.
56 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

Iz njegove antropogene radoznalosti, bioloke kodiranosti


samoodranja (Verbeek, 1995), proizlaze njegovi trajni nagoni i
potrebe za otkrivanjem i oblikovanjem neega novog. U tom pro-
cesu ovjek, kao >>radoznalo bie<< razara i stvara - preoblikuje i
oblikuje. To je u prirodi njegova bia (Gehlen, 1962). DosadarDe
posljedice stvaralake i razarake dimenzije ljudskih potencijala,
naalost idu u prilog razarakoj strani, iako se u evolucijskim
relacijama moda nebi tako sudilo. Jer, u tom kontekstu >>raza-
ranje<< se moe tumaiti kao komplementarni proces >>stvara-
nju<<. Meutim, problem nije individualne niti samo bioloke na-
ravi. Razaranje i stvaranje (preoblikovanje) imaju obiljeje ko-
lektivnog djelovanja i to mnogih narataja, a danas je prepoznat-
ljivo u brzim socijalnim promjenama pa i socijalnoekolokoj kri-
zi. Ekoloke posljedice kao tragovi radoznalosti uvjetovane su
vjerojatno >>drutvenom (kulturnom) radoznaloU<< koja je u
razliitim drutvima razliito razvijena i usmjerena. Zato je veo-
ma izazovno istraiti koliko je u svemu tome udio drutvenog
potencijala a koliko genetski naslijeenog i u ovjeku kodiranog
kao zadane strukture. Znanost je to raspoloiva sredstvo iji
smisao je u tome da u zadovoljavanju radoznalosti omogui ov
jeku korak naprijed u spoznavanju neistraenog univerzuma i _l

'
kompleksnih sustava >>prirode (Kanitscheider, 1996). 1
ovjekova radoznalost je antropoloko obiljeje, poticaj u l
l
traenju novih odgovora o samom sebi i o novim mogunostima !>
egzistencije. Iz dananje perspektive razvoja ovjekova subjek- f
tivna radoznalost nije dovoljna. U traenju boljih rjeenja iz-
vanjska prisila uvjetovana je objektivnim stanjem ivotnog pro-
stora koje je ovjek sam oblikovao i postala je >>antropoloka
kompenzacija i korekcija posljedica neograniel}e i katkad du-
gorono >>nerazumne drutvene radoznalosti. Covjeku su ne-
poznate granice njegovih spoznajnih mogunosti jer je istodobno
subjekt spoznaje i dio objekta spoznaje. Kad bi ih znao vjerojat-
no bi, koristei svoj um i razum i povijesno kumuliranu mu-
drost, birao najbolje solucije. Moemo vjerovati da ovjek tako i
danas ini ali globalne posljedice nisu ba uvjerljive.
To znai da postoje i subjektivni motivi kao poticaji koji pro-
izlaze iz individualnih obiljeja ljudskih sposobnosti: ponajprije
naslijeenih biolokih osobina, inteligencije, mate, itd. ali i iz
drutvenih motiva i drutvenih uvjeta kao objektivnih imbeni
ka kreativnosti: destruktivnosti i konstruktivnosti. ovjek kao
cjelovito prirodno bie rezultat je genetskog nasljea i drutve-
nih utjecaja. Individualno prirodno nasljee bez izvanjskih utje-
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 57

caja ostaje neiskoriteni prirodni potencijal. Te dvije dimenzije-


bioloka i sociokulturna, pretpostavke su za ekoloki etos u ko- ll
l jemu je ugraen osjeaj neovisnosti i samoodgovornosti ali i uva-
avanje vrijednosti prirode. l .

l
l Globaliziranje promjena, ekolokih posljedica
konflikata .
l~'
l. Globaliziranje promjena. Za raspravu o problemu svjet-
skog etosa nedvojbeno su vani suvremeni procesi globalizira-
nja, regionalnog diferenciranja (organiziranja) i fragmentiranja
unutar modernih drutava. Sva tri procesa utjeu na dekompo-
niranje tradicionalnih kulturnih osnova njihova etosa i formi-
ranje novog pogleda na prirodu s novim eslo suprotstavljenim
interesima, dominacijom tehnikog svijeta i vladavine prava.
Svijet se sve vie organizira po naelima velike tvornice u
kojemu nema mjesta niemu za to se ne zna emu slui i kome
pripada. Postfordizam, izrastao na koritenju prirodnih >>otoka
pozitivne sintropije (Altvater, 1992) obiljeava novo >>Sistemati-
ziranje<< svijeta kao nastanak nove organizacije - poretka vieg l
reda, ali s vie entropije, svakako i kulturne entropije. Otuda i l
aspiracije za podjelom preostalog slobodnog teritorija Zemlje iz-
meu nekolicine drava.
Povezivanjem kao i regionaliziranjem svijeta reguliraju se
globalni odnosi u podruju ekonomije (trita) i ljudskih prava. i j

Meutim, dosad na globalnoj razini oblikovanje novog morala


(etosa) ostaje problematino. Razlozi se mogu traiti u razara-
nju socio-kulturnih osnova ali se moe postaviti i pitanje kakvu l
bi ulogu imao moral, zbog njegove relativnosti. Naela praved-
nosti<< i jednakosti<< konzumiraju se trinom racionalnou i l
zatitom ljudskih prava. Ekonomski etos modernog drutva i
pravni etos demokratskog drutva nalaze svoje mjesto u poli-
tiki prihvaenoj meunarodnoj konfiguraciji<<, Naelo univer-
l
zalnosti<< koje se odnosi na djelovanje pojedinca i ekoloki etos,
trai svoje mjesto a neodvojivo je od nekih drugih naela, prim- L
jerice, naela Solidarnosti<<. Kritika ekonomske paradigme mo-
dernog drutva pogaa ekonomski et'os, a koordinacijsko naelo
meunarodnog prava slabi snagu pravnih uporita. Zato umje-
sto meunarodna pravne subordinacije nastupa politika i mo.
Globalizacijske posljedice su nadkulturne<< utoliko to uni-
. verzalizirajujednu kulturu a minimizirajui prijete mnogim dru-
58 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

gima kulturama; nisu nadkulturne utoliko to o njihovom re-


zultatu i uspjehu odluuje nekolicina (razvijenih) suverenih na-
cionalnih drava s uvjetovanim konsenzusom. Zato se u procesi-
ma >>nadkulturnog<< jo uvijek ne mogu sagledati sve posljedice.
Globalizacija je u rukama svjetske moi - nekolicine najrazvije-
nijih nacionalnih drava i meunarodnih korporacija. U eko-
lokoj problematici globalizacija nosi neke osnove novog svjet-
skog ekolokog etosa ali moe afirmirati neke zajednike vrijed-
nosti razliitim kulturama i ovjeku kao biu - ono univerzalno
u ovjeku i kulturi. Trite povezuje svijet putem jednog tipa ra-
cionalnosti - globalne racionalnosti, ali ponovno podvaja svijet
na toj istoj racionalnosti. Umjesto dosadanjeg globalnog tuma-
. enja odnosa u svijetu preko struktura sjever-jug<< ili ortodok-
sije nove meunarodne podjele rada<< (A Lipietz), primjerice
francuska regulacijska teorija to tumai nastankom meuna
rodne konfiguracije<< odnosno meunarodnih reima<< i rei-
mom reima<<. Tako Altvater kae: Raznolikost nacionalnih
drava znai upravo takvu raznolikost politikih centara moi u
globalnom prostoru. Ekonomska mo se regulira na tritu, po-
litika mo putem hegemonijalnog poretka, dakle reim reima<<
(Altvater, 1992:205). Globalizacija pretpostavlja stanje nere-
da<<, kaosa<< kojega treba dovesti u red. Ali na globalnoj razini
se ipak ne radi o jedinstvenom svjetskom sustavu nego o odnosi-
ma nacionalnih drava (Bruch, 1996:241). Potreba za uinkovi
tim reguliranjem novih interesa u globalnim procesima stvara
nadnacionalne<< (meunarodne) institucije, pa nastaje iroka
mrea tih institucija s razliitom uinkovitocu, ali one funkcio-
niraju vie na pravnim a ne obiajnim i etikim naelima.
U svakom sluaju svijet je suoen s novim internacionalnim
strukturama, reimima regulacije u meunarodnim odnosima,
koje se sustavno kvantitativno poveavaju i sve vie poseu u
kompetencije suverenih nacionalnih drava. Ekoloka dimenzija
meunarodne konfiguracije legitimira se preko predstavljanja
problema kao globalnih, u prijevodu "zajednikih<< ovjeanstvu.
To zajedniko definira se kao ono to se ne ukljuuje u nacional-
nu politiku (Beck, 1998:28) i njome nije odreeno. Zato su zah-
tjevi za svjetskim ekolokim etosom<< sve glasniji.
2. Globaliziranje ekolokih posljedica. S globalizira-
njem svijeta globaliziraju se i ekoloke posljedice. Ekoloka kri-
za se moe razliito shvatiti: kao sastavnica evolucijske promje-
ne (bioloka); kao razvojna kriza (socijalna) i kao kulturna (du-
hovna) kriza.
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 59
v
Zivotni vijek je prekratak da veini ljudi na Zemlji omogui
empirijsko iskustvo evolucije. To dodue nita ne znai za svako-
dnevni ivot jer ljudskoj radoznalosti nema kraja. Pitanje koje
izaziva je slijedee: je li ekoloka kriza (ekoloka drama ovjean
stva kako se obiljeava suvremenost svijeta - esto u vrlo kata- 11
strofinim scenarijima) istodobno i mogua evolucijska kriza, od-
nosno potencijalni evolucioni Skok<<, Dananji narataji moda
imaju privilegiju to su svjedoci priprema potencijalnog koevolu-
ll
tivnog koraka koji e vjerojatno uslijediti primjenom genetskih
tehnologija. Sa stajalita zemaljskih a pogotovo kozmikih zakona
(Verbeek, 1994) dananja ekoloka kriza nema znaenje krize ko-
ju joj pripisujemo. Mi je danas tako vrednujemo u kontekstu po-
sljedica djelovanja nekoliko generacija i nama shvatljive kauzal-
nosti. Zemlja podlijee kozmikim zakonima po kojima je ono to
. mi nazivamo >>sluajnost<<, moda samo jedna toka u pravilnosti, l
tj. zakonitosti u razdoblju vie tisua ili milijuna godina. U tak-
vom razumijevanju ekoloke krize znanstvenici upozoravaju da i
iz velikih katastrofa moe uslijediti evolucioni >>skok<< kojega da-
nas mnogi ne ele prihvatiti a ele ga razumjeti.
Evolucija se moe shvatiti kao povijest kozmosa, Zemlje,
ivota i ovjeanstva kao prijelaz iz biosfere u >>razumski sloj<<
odnosno >>noosferu<< (Bondarenko, 1985:29; de Chardin, 1979) je i
razumije kao poveanje stvaranja u svjetskoj slici evolucije (Alt-
ner, 1992:39) to je s teorijom otvorenih sustava<< otvorilo pro- l
l .

ces dijaloga, primjerice, izmeu teologije stvaranja i znanosti o


evoluciji.
Bojanovsky (1994) je pokuao protumaiti tendencije mile-
nijskog sociokulturnog razvoja u kontekstu promjena zemljopi-
snih i ekolokih okolnosti kao temelja razvoja drutva i kulture,
pa tako i industrijske civilizacije koja je nastala u odreenim kli-
matskim uvjetima i jedino u Europi. Arheoloka i antropoloka
istraivanja i kompjutorske simulacije scenarija omoguavaju da
saznamo kakav je bio odnos ovjeka prema sebi, svijetu i prirodi
u nekim kulturama i davnoj prolosti - sve iz razloga potencijal-
nog koritenja tih spoznaja. U tom kontekstu esto se oslanjamo
na materijalne dokaze. uvanjem materijalnih nalaza uvaju se
raznolike ljudske kulture kao ljudska rodna kultura. Meutim,
treba uvati ive kulture<< da ne postanu vrlo brzo tek arheo-
loka i ina mjesta istraivanja prolosti kao neke ,;pogrene<< sa-
danjosti.
Izmeu zatite prirode i zatite kulture postoje neke slino
sti. Dijelove prirode titimo onda kada saznamo da bi za sebe
60 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

mogli izgubiti neto vrijedno i neponovljivo. tite se kao dijelovi


prirode, jer se ne titi dovoljno cijela priroda, to pokazuju prim-
jeri razliitih statusa prirodnih prostora i vrsta (Zakon o zatiti
prirode, 1994). Slian odnos se moe vidjeti i u kulturnom pogle-
du. Industrijska civilizacija frontalno agresivno nastupa prema
svim pred-industrijskim kulturama, a ipak nastoji ouvati pro-
lost ili njezine ostatke kao kulturne oaze. To je bilo karakteri-
stino za kolonijalno i postkolonijalno razdoblje. Danas se pro-
blem kulturne zatite aktualizirao ba unutar same industrijske
kulture kao pitanje multikulturalnosti, a u posljednjem deset-
ljeu i kao pitanje >>etvrtog svijeta<< u kontekstu bioloke razno-
likosti i indigenog znanja.
Postoje moda >>jednostavnija<< shvaanja i tumaenja ak-
tualnog socijalnoekolokog stanja ne kao ekoloke nego kao
>>razvojne krize<<. Razvoj, kao niz veih ili manjih poeljnih pro-
t mjena, sam po sebi uvjetuje neke >>krize<< kao promjene s noviDJj
i boljim rjeenjima openito za ivot ljudi. Zato neki !!:lJ.!~.i_a~}
\ postoji globalna ili civilizacijska ekolo~a.kriza'Znego-niz...pl!tf_!~
\ ja:l1i1nnje.iv11:llrfz'au.--_pojecliffi.m-8ektorima., k<:lo to su. ener.z!3t-
s.KICi1fsirov1rrska--kr1a~ 1rriza-okoli8. itd. Meutim, danas nitko
vi"e'ne rYeg'i'fa"'anitVtmeuzrcrke'tirn{ri'a:~Fo-dvci8nJe--prfr;d;,:1h
stirfija"''rra""ifff'eia:Soc!Jtl:lD.og,raciO'naJ.i~p ostao j e vrijednosni i
drutveni problem, a potom i znanstveni (Krolzik, 1979). Indu-
strijska drutva u prvi plan istiu vanost drutvenih vrijednosti
povezanih s problemima proizvodnje a postmoderna drutva is- l
! .
tiu vrijednosti povezane sa stilovima ivota i u svezi s potro-

l
njom. Te promjene neki objanjavaju PF~l!l:jenam~i.Y.Iik.<:lnosti od
materijalistikih<< prema postmaterijalistikim<< (Inglehart,
1977). Odgovore na nestaice kao dramatine, katkad i eufo-
rine psiholoke i duhovne reakcije irih razmjera, nalazimo u
korekcijama i sustavnim promjenama strategija i modela razvoja
s uvoenjem novih indikatora praenja i kriterija valoriziranja
l
('1 st~nj a. ~i~.~,.~~~~Jl~S,~a,.j~. i..s,!~~-~~-'1'1.?, .~PE9.~~Sl.~'"_l,L!i9j~m1J:.,~E!.- ~ti_E3
l \ ~~~~--~~JE3~):UJe_s. poJU:?~ ''E~'f?J.~' -~ -~t~.ktmn~:Pf<~-~J:ene~< -l;I??~
\l staJe traJnO stafiJEfrtr5Clernog drustva l SVlJta,,_Svt]et ZlYl U >>krlZl << l
~liO >,normalhomstanju<<. Socija.lria dubina krize interpretativno
se konvertira u pojavh.e i prolazne oblike vrijednosti, medijski po-
praene kao novi nain zadovoljavanja potreba.
l
Za temu o ekolokom etosu znaajne su i promjene koje se
zbivaju unutar modernih drutava u kojima se - zbog smanjene
uloge pojedinca u odluivanju i prenoenja kljunih radnih funk-
cija na tehniku i druge institucije - poveavaju socijalno kon-
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 61

struirani ali i objektivni socijalni i ekoloki rizici. Problem odgo-


vornosti a time i etosa postaje jedna od vanih tema u politici,
profesiji i znanosti.
S promjenama u socijalnim skupinama nestaje i osnova do- l'
l
sadanjih etosa. Migracije i globalna socijalna pokretljivost ut-
jeu na formiranje drutvenih skupina koje trae svoj politiki,
kulturni i socijalni identitet, to se izraava kao problem multi-
kulturalizma modernog drutva. Etniciteti, marginalne grupe
(auslenderi, siromani, homoseksualci itd.), nestanak obitelji s
nekoliko generacija, nezaposleni itd. zadravaju ili mijenjaju
svoje navike i obiaje, nain miljenja i stil ivljenja. Vrijednosti,
obiaji i moral, primjerice pripadnika nekih stranih kultura, re-
ligija ili nezaposlenih u Njemakoj, razlikuje se od onih kod sta-
rosjedilaca i onih koji imaju zaposlenje. Osim toga u svijetu jo
uvijek postoji aparthejd, i javno izraavanje rasistikih ideja.!
Etos konzumnog drutva sudara se sa sve stroim ekolo-
kim kriterijima, potrebom samoograniavanja i smanjenja ra-
stronosti. Istodobno se taj etos proirio planetom. Povratak na
tradicionalni etos nije jednostavno mogu kao to je teko odri-
canje od ustaljenih navika i stvorenih potreba. Formalno i me-
dijski visoko vrednovane ekoloke ideje probijaju se sve do ideja
o globaliziranju individualnog ponaanja s osnovama u novom l
ekolokom etosu. t

Globalizacijski procesi destruiraju identitet lokalnih i nacio-


nalnih zajednica i kultura a time i njihov etos. U njima ostaje
praznina obiajnosti koju popunjavaju brze promjene - dogaa
l'
nja i sadraja ali bez uspostavljanja novog etosa. U toj ritmikoj
praznini nastaje potreba za novom regulacijom odnosa ovjek
l
-priroda, pa tako i za novom konstrukcijom prirode i okolia:
Tradicionalni regulacijski sustavi nadomjetaju se novim insti-
tucijama i pravnim regularna. Tako se umjesto etosa kao jam-
stva moralnosti (lokalne kulture, predtnoderna drutva), pravo
postaje jamstvo jednakosti postupanja institucija i pojedinaca
koje nadilaze norme nacionalne drave. U tom je kontekstu ra-
zumno oekivati (zahtijevati) i globalni ekoloki etos, a s druge L
strane opravdano je postaviti pitanje 'nJoe li uope globalizacija
,_.._,.,.,.....~.,._,..4 .._-.,~.-~._-=..-=-"d"'"='-~=--r....,.""""'-..._'"'"""~~L..,.....-o=~"-<

Ir
1Iznoenje rasistikih ideja u javnosti se dvojako prima. S jedne strane u

D~
kontekstu pouka 20. stoljea a s druge u kontekstu sasvim drugaijeg rasizma
.:--- to se potencijalno moe oblikovati pod utjecajem znanosti i primjeni kao gen-

~\
; . < . skoj manipulaciji. Uzevi ih zajedno pitanje je da li se time smanjuje osjetljivost
javnosti na rasistike ideje i smatra ih neim normalnim<<?
62 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

, inicirati i globalni ekoloki etos? O tom pitanju postoje optimi-


,-stilli i pesiinis1iiifoagovor1. Optimisti se vezuju uz nunost i
potrebu svjetskog ekolokog etosa, a pesimisti uz empirijsko sta-
nje i posljedice globalizacijskih procesa za raznolikost kultura.
Ekoloka kriza prema nekima zapoinje s moderniziranjem
a kasnije se samo nastavlja. Teina suvremene (jer o ekolokim
se krizama moe govoriti i u prolosti) ekoloke krize je u tome
to su sva tri vidljiva aspekta (bioloki, socijalni i duhovni) kon-
centrirana u kratkom vremenskom razdoblju od nekoliko ivih
narataja i na ogranienom prostoru raznolikih ekosustava
Zemlje. U interpretaciji promjena u prirodi i okoliu i novog so-
cijalnog stanja dvije su, dakle, temeljne orijentacije: jedna ga ob-
janjava kao socijalno-ekoloku krizu, a druga kao novi si-
stemski tip, drutveno prirodno stanje (Moscovici, 1982; Has-
senpflug, 1993; Gorg, 1999).
3. Globaliziranje konflikata. S globaliziranjem promjena
i ekolokih posljedica globaliziraju se socijalne i ekoloke nape-
tosti, to izaziva konflikte i otvorene sukobe izmeu drava.
A. Svjetska ekoloka drama manifestira se kao svjetska so-
cijalna i kulturna drama ovjeanstva. Jedni to stanje ob-
janjavaju kao posljedicu razvoja zapadne civilizacije a drugi kao
nestanak smrt predmodernih kultura i civilizacija.
Shvatimo li ekoloku krizu u antropocentrinoj dimenziji,
tj. ne samo kao stanje pogoranja uvjeta ovjekovog ivotnog
prostora i njegove ogranienosti - nestaice prirodnih, osobito
obnovljivih resursa- nego kao stanje (a) odnosa drutva (kultu-
re) prema prirodi i (b) kao mjesto (stanje) ovjeka u kulturi, on-
da nam je prilino jasno da je ekoloka kriza posljedica socijal-
nog (kulturnog) stanja - socijalne (kulturne) krize.
Ta kulturna kriza povijesno se pretvara u ekoloku dramu
to nije prvi i jedini sluaj u ljudskoj povijesti, ali je jedinstven
po razmjerima i moguim posljedicama. U ljudskoj su povijesti
poznata razaranja prirodnog okolia (Mensching, 1989) k~w po-
jedinane kulturne drame, ali ne dananjih razmjera. Primjeri-
ce, jo uvijek neobjanjena naputanja nekih naseobina (Machu
Picchu). 2 J esu li ekoloki ili neki sasvim drugi imbenici -
moda spiritualne naravi - uzrokovali njihov nestanak? Moda
to potvruje teoriju dugih valova po kojoj je civilizacija na izvje-
2
Nestanak drevnih kultura posljedica je panjolskih osvajanja i razaranja
(Azteka u Meksiku -.Herman Cortes, Maya u Gvatemali i Hondurasu- Pedro de
Alvorado i najbolje ureeno carstvo Inka u J. Americi - Francisco Pizarro).
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 63

stan nain slina ivom organizam koji raste<<, doivljava proc-


vat<< i konano >>propada (Toynbee) ili se u raznim okolnostima
mijea<< s drugom kulturom.
U modernom drutvu nestaju neposredni odnosi izmeu o
vjeka i prirode, izmeu ovjeka i ovjeka, karakteristine za
predmoderna drutva. Odnosi postaju apstraktniji i posredova-
niji ljudskim proizvodima - tehnikom kulturom i njenim insti-
tucijama. Posredovanje je toliko poveano da se objektivna
stvarnost zamjenjuje virtualnom i tako ovjek sve vie udaljuje
i izolira od svog prirodnog svijeta i ahuri u konstrukciji i vir-
tualnosti. Paradoks je u tome, to ovjek (moderno drutvo) ob-
jektivno ovisi o prirodi a subjektivno ju sve manje doivljava kao
svoju stvarnost, egzistencijalnu osnovu i konano kao sudbinu.
Naravno, ni prirodni svijet ne ostaje intaktan. Pored >>organske<<
prirode nastala je >>kapitalizirana<< i konstruirana priroda
(Hecht, 1998:262; Eder, 1996).
U tom smislu moemo razlikovati tri razliite percepcije
prirode koje odgovaraju i injeninom stanju.
Prvo, jedna percepcija prirode izaziva divljenje i doivljaj
ljepote, cjelovitosti, neega mistinog, svetog, pravi edenski vrt.
Otuda ovjekova elja i potreba za ponovnim pribliavanjem iz-
vornoj prirodi i uivanjem u njezinim ljepotama. Rije je o div-
ljoj prirodi kao i o tijekom povijesti kultiviranoj prirodi. Izvor-
na priroda postaje privlana osnova modernog turizma koji svo-
jom masovnou unosi u nju i najnie civilizacijske norme. Na- l

suprot divljem, iracionalnom i nekontroliranom, stoji naelo re- l;


gulacije, kontrole, stalne ljudske intervencije, svjesnog podinja
vanja i fizikog oblikovanja prirode prema zahtjevima duha vre- l i

mena. To je percepcija dvorske prirode (Sieferle, 1989).


Dvorskoj prirodi suprotstavljan je seoski ivot. i' .'

Drugo, priroda se percipira kao izvorite korisnosti, kao


predmet eksploatacije, to kod ovjeka izaziva doivljaj uspje-
ha - otuda drutveni interes za njezinim podinjavanje i domi- l i

nacijom nad njom. Moderno drutvo je izraslo na >>tvrdoj<< obradi


prirode. Samorazumijevanju graanskog drutva (slobodnog tri- ~
ta) primjerena je slika prirode na naelu samoregulacije. Fret-
postavilo se da se priroda moe sama neogranieno obnavljati,
pa se moe neogranieno i troiti. Pretpostavka Dominacija nad
prirodom mogla se uspostaviti tek Osloboenjem<< prirode od
naela kontrole, tj. njezinim slobodnim raspolaganjem, to se
dogodilo u graanskom drutvu. Tako nastaje slika prirode koju
Sieferle naziva graanska priroda.
r
!
64 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

Worster pokazuje postojanje dvije tradicije u povijesti eko-


loke misli: arkadijska slika - doivljaj prirodne idilinosti,
zadovoljstva i mira, zajednice ovjeka s prirodom; vrijeme ro-
mantizma; druga je imperijalna slika- simbolizira mo ov
jeka nad prirodom, koritenjem tehnike i znanja (Worster,
1994). Na taj nain se suprotstavljaju dvije slike ivota, dva ste-
reotipa o ljudskom ivotu- ruralno kao seoska idila i ista priro-
da, i urbano - gradski ivot zagaena priroda.
Trea suvremena percepcija prirode je >>unakaena priro-
da. Posljedice industrijskog djelovanja na prirodu izraavaju se
kao defektnost prirodnog, okoli kao zagaena priroda, pa per-
cepcija takve unakaene prirode izaziva odbojnost i distancu -
otuda elja za bijegom od takve prirode. Povijesno (i aktualno) je
to vidljivo na primjeru urbane segregacije i bijegu bogatih u re-
zidencijalne etvrti daleko od tvornikog dimnjaka. Danas nisu
ni ti prostori vie zatieni. Primjer odnosa prema takvoj per-
cepciji prirode (okolia) je nimby-sindrom na razliitim razi-
nama. Kao kompenzacija ovjekovog otuenja od prirode pojav-
ljuje se plastino cvijee, namjetaj itd. - prirodu i kultiviranu
prirodu zamjenjuje kultura plastike.
N a jednoj sasvim drugoj razini kulturna drama se izraava
kao potencijalni i stvarni sukob kultura. Ovdje se misli samo
djelomino na tezu o civilizacijskom sukobu (Huntington) i to
utoliko ukoliko ga se promatra kao odnose praktine kulturne
moi. Vie je rije o injenici da se utjecajem industrijske kultu-
re potiskuje<< (ukljuujui marginaliziranje i razaranje) pred-
moderna kultura to se interpretira kao civiliziranje manje civi-
liziranih, a ukupni povijesni tijek obiljeava kao civilizacijski
razvoj. Tu injenicu -jednostavno gubitka kulturne raznoliko-
sti, za koju ovdje nisu potrebne posebne potkrijepe, moemo
nazvati >>kulturna entropija.
B. Svjetska ekoloka drama izraava individualnu dramu
ovjekove egzistencije. Ekoloke posljedice ne pogaaju samo po-
jedinca nego sve kulture i cijeli ljudski rod. Ekoloki konflikti u
vremenskoj dimenziji pokazuju spiralni tijek (Prittwitz, 1990).
Razrjeavanje jednog konflikta ponovno izaziva novi konflikt
zbog novih interesa aktera na vioj razini to potencira socijalne
tenzije.
U prostoru socijalnih i ekolokih konflikata kao posljedica
drutvene i individualne kreativnosti i destruktivnosti dvojako
se reagira: s jedne strane bezbrino s pouzdanjem u nastavak
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 65

razvojnog puta, a s druge strane poveava se ljudski egzistenci-


jalni strah. On se moe prepoznati u injenici da ovjek nije vie l
toliko siguran i uvjeren daje dobitnik<< nego da moe biti i veli- l
ki gubitnik<<. ovjeka obuzima strah od posljedica vlastitog i
na u obliku nesigurnosti i strepnje za budunost. U empirijskim
istraivanjima utvrena je i vrlo pesimistina slika budunosti
(Cifri, 1990:238-260; 1994:179-214). Prepoznatljiva je pukoti-
. na (ponor) izmeu znanstvenih spoznaja i tehnikih postignua
s jedne i posljedica prakse u nepromijenjenoj paradigmi djelo-
vanja to pokazuje i tehniki imperativ: sve to se moe
uiniti, uiniti e se; istrai sve to je u podruju tvojih teh-
nikih mogunosti, potie razvoj znanosti; visoka sigurnost u
parcijalnim znanstvenim spoznajama a visoki rizici i nesigur-
nost ukupne znanstvene spoznaje, ovjeka dovode u sumnju u
smjer razmiljanja i mo razuma. Pomanjkanje moi ovjek do-
ivljava kao gubitak i duhovnu prazninu.
Materijalnoj nesigurnosti pojedinca u modernom drutvu
dodana je i njegova duhovna nesigurnost. Duhovna sigurnost
pojedinca u predmodernom drutvu nije bila upitna, jer je religi-
ja (sveto) u kojoj je ovjek nalazio kriterij ponaanja i koja je
ivotu davala smisao a drutvu i pojedincu oblikovala simbole i
etos posredovanja. Razaranjem (>>odaravanjem<<) predmodernog
i stvaranje (zaaravanjem<<) modernog svijeta ovjek je postao
razmrvljene bie na razmrvljenom i tehniki posredovanom ra- l
du (Friedman, 1959'), a po svojoj naravi tei integritetu osobno-
sti u cjelinu i sudjelovanje u cjelini svijeta. Razaranjem misti l
\ i
nosti prirode i kreiranja okolia razaran je ljudski duh. Zato
ekoloka kriza kao izvanjska kriza izraava krizu unutarnjeg
ovjekovog jedinstva i duhovnog identiteta, pa je moderni ovjek l
u stalnoj potrazi za svojim identitetom. Naravno, ovu tvrdnju ne
treba uzimati samo pesimistino ili kritino, nego i afirmativno,
jer iznova potie pitanja to je ovjek i gdje mu je mjesto na svi-
l i

jetu, svemiru i transcendentnom.


Socijalna (kulturna) i individualna drama posljedice su ma-
l
nipulacijskog odnosa i duha. Manipulacija prirodom i ljudima
ima istu logiku i isti izvor: manipulacija u drutvu/kulturi (Wil- b
fred, 1996:77). Gubitkom smisla za svetost i misterioznost, pri-
roda je postala objekt manipulacije a ne svijet suradnje. Taj pro-
ces zapoinje desakraliziranjem prirode, zatim deontologizira-
njem boga (religije) a zavrava s profaniranjem svetog i sakrali-
ziranjem profanog. Sekulariziranjem drutva na mjesto >>reli-
gijski svetog nastupa sekularna sveto<< u kojemu moderno
66 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

drutvo nalazi novi smisao i misterij<< stvaranja. Upravo taj


smisao i misterij predmet su razliitih kritika, pa i socijalnoeko-
loke. Moderno je drutvo iz profane prakse stvorilo nove mito-
ve i kultove a pojmovi kao >>moderna<< i modernizacija<< - na-
zoni u svakodnevnoj svijesti ali i znanstvenom diskursu - obi-
ljeeni su kao socijalni mitovi<< za razliku od prirodnih mito-
va<< (Schnadelbach, 1989:25). I sama >>moderna<< je socijalni mit
(Wehling, 1992), jer (prema Schnadelbachu) oznaava totalizi-
ranje heterogenih povijesnih procesa u velike objekte. Nova pro-
fana mitologija ne uspijeva uspostaviti novu materijalnu (koja je
ranije ovisila o prirodnim uvjetima) niti duhovnu sigurnost. So-
cijalni mitovi i sekularna sveto prilino su relativni i podloni
empirijskim promjenama za razliku od religijskih. Promjene vri-
jednosti, o kojima mnogi govore, osobito teza o pomaku s mate-
rijalistikih na postmaterijalistike vrijednosti (Inglehart, 1989)
ili njihove isprepletenosti nisu samo pozitivistika spoznaja nego
posljedica ljudske potreba za novim vrstim uporitima djelo-
vanja. Tenja modernog ovjeka za (religijski) >>svetim<< je zah-
tjev za uspostavljanjem naruene unutarnje ovjekove ravnotee
i ravnotee s vanjskim svijetom - odgovor su na porast nesigur-
nosti i na potrebu vjerodostojnog identiteta. ,,Qdaravanje svije-
ta<< (Max Weber) otvorilo je pitanje njegove nove i drukije za-
aranosti<<, Jer, svijet nije samo profano, on je i neto arobno,
misteriozno, i kao simbolini svijet potreban je ovjeku. ovjek
ne moe, iako sustavno pokuava, spoznajno i tehnoloki svijet
tako razodjenuti da izgubi svaki drugi smisao osim profanosti i
svakodnevnice. To moemo razumjeti i kao vjerojatnu prijetnju
novim zaaravanjem svijeta<<.

SMISAO EKOLOKOG ETOSA

Smisao ekolokog etosa uvijek je isti: opstanak - ouvanje soci-


jalnog i kulturnog identiteta neke zajednice njezino reproduci-
ranje, odranje stabilnog ponaanja pojedinaca i kolektiviteta re-
guliranjem moralnih normi o odnosu ovjek-priroda u konkret-
nim relacijama. Po tome se smisao ekolokog etosa predmoder-
nih drutava ne razlikuje od onog u modernim drutvima. Da-
nas ga potresaju promjene socijalnih i kulturnih struktura te
oslabljena funkcija lokalne zajednice i njezine ekoloke uloge.
Lokalna zajednica u modernom drutvu sve manje funkcionira
kao obiajna socijalna zajednica jer nije reproduktor stabilne
'~"'"
!

Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 67

kulture, a gotovo da uope ne funkcionira kao >>ekoloka zajed-


nica<<. Uzrok je u tome to je sociokulturni temelj ekolokog eto- l
l sa trajno doveden u pitanje (Luhmann, 1997:157). l

l
l Socijalna i ekoloka bilanca

Paradigma industrijske civilizacije postala je ograniavajui im


benik njenog razvoja. Radi -se o >>ekonomskoj paradigmi<< i libe-
ralnoj ekonomiji (Hampicke, 1992) na kojoj je izgraen moderni
svijet i koju proiruje kao opevaeu u sav ostali svijet, bez ob-
zira je li ovaj s tim >>suglasan<< ili nije. Kriza modernog drutva
moe se razumjeti i kao sukob ekonomske<< i >>ekoloke<< para-
digme - ekonomskih aktivnosti i nunosti ekoloke ravnotee,
kratkoronih i kumulativnih nestaica (Simonis, 1994). S jedne
strane postoji je ekonomska prezahtjevnost prema ekolokim
kapacitetima, a s druge strane prezahtjevnost ekolokih kriteri-
ja prema mogunostima ekonomije. To otvara pitanja etiriju ra-
zina bilanciranja stanja: >>bilance blagostanja<<, >>socijalne bilan-
ce<<, >>ekobilance<< i >>ljudske bilance<< (Mi.iller-Wenk, 1978). Kriti-
ka te paradigme, tj. svijest o njezinim posljedicama, smatra se
prvom pretpostavkom njezine promjene i nastanka nove para-
digme. Rizino je zagovarati pojednostavljeni paradigmatski obrat
kao spasonosno rjeenje u ekolokoj paradigmi. (To je u eko- l
lokoj svakodnevnici esto postalo popularno, ali pozitivno ut-
jee na osvijetenost, iako se radi samo o verbalnoj sintagmi
dvostrukog znaenja: kritika postojeih odnosa i zahtjev za uva-
l;
avanjem ekolokih uvjeta). Jednako tako moramo biti svjesni l:
stvarnih disciplinar~nih ogranienosti rjeenja, koja se nude i koe
ja, kolikogod teila cjelovitosti, objektivno ne mogu izbjei re-
dukcionizam pristupa (Scharping/Gorg, 1994). Stoga smo suoeni l'
s ekolokim, ekonomskim, sociolokim, tehnolokim, itd. a na-
roito politikim redukcionizmom kao. empirijskom injenicom.
Primjenom znanstveno-tehnikih postignua ubrzava pro-
l.
mjene u svijetu. Znanost i tehnika su primarno u funkciji ubrza-
vanja promjena u svijetu pa tek onda u funkciji njegovog po- ~-
pravljanja (antropologija stvaranja). Posljedice ubrzanja ne rje-
avaju se istom brzinom kojom nastaju, pa postaju sve nepred-
vidljivije i rizinije (Beck, 1986), a objektivno stanje svijeta se
pogorava (antropologija razaranja). Iako stvaranje i razaranje
u koevolucijskom pogledu predstavljaju jedan proces - proces so-
cijalnokulturne evolucije (Bojanovsky, 1994). U empirijskom po-
68 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

gledu oni su razdvojeni pa je pretpostavka njihova povezivanja i


integralnosti nova spoznajna i djelatna paradigma.
Neki autori istiu da o svjetskom ekolokom etosu<< ima
smisla govoriti ako u njegov diskurs ukljuimo perspektivu
rtve (Wilfred, 1996:68). Wilfredovo razmiljanje postavlja pi-
tanje tko ili to je rtva? Je li rtva priroda podreena kulturi i
drutvu? Da li su to predmoderne ktJlture (indigene, agrarne) ili
je rtva ovjek podreen tehnici? Sto ili tko openito jo nije
rtva! Po jednom drugom kriteriju pak, o ekolokom etosu ima
l
l
smisla govoriti ako poemo od ideje postojanja empirijski >>jed-
nog jedinog svijeta<< pa njegov legitimitet traimo u novom, uni-
verzalnom etosu. Budui da ekoloka kriza simbolizira stanje
ekoloke nestabilnosti, ekoloki etos je potreban upravo radi
ouvanja stabilnosti. Stabilnost je mogua uspostavljanjem iz-
l!
vanjske kontrole - ekonomskim, tehnikim, politikim, itd. me- it
hanizmima. instrumentima i internaliziranjem drutvenih
vrijednosti u procesu socijalizacije, tj. oblikov[J.njem tradicije. U
sreditu motiva prvoga tipa stabilnosti lei >>interes<< i s njim po-
l
i
'
vezani pravo i znanost, a kod drugoga su >>potrebe<< i s njima po- l
vezani moral i religija.
Ideali autonomije i subjektiviteta epohe moderne - konkre-
tizirani i fetiizirani u oblicima drutava - s ubrzanjem ritma
promjena doveli su modernog ovjeka u situas:iju da zaboravlja
pretpostavke, uvjete i posljedice djelovanja. Stavie, posljedice
koje su do juer bile ekoloke pa i antropoloke medijske top-te-
me i koje jo nisu nale adekvatne moralne odgovore, danas vrlo
brzo ustupaju. pred injenicom novih medijski prezentiranih
problema i moguih socijalnih posljedica znanstveno-tehnikih
uspjeha. Socijalni prag osjetljivosti se tako smanjuje - drutvo
postaje manje senzibilna, a time se smanjuju ljudske i socijalne
reakcije. Dobar primjer za potiskivanje, umanjivanje i zaborav-
ljanje aktualnih pitanja bila je vijest o kloniranjem proizvedenoj
ovci Dolly (kao i vijest o kloniranju majmuna) to je kao senzaci-
ja trajalo samo nekoliko dana ili tjedana. Pitanje kloniranja i-
votinja, sa svim moguim posljedicama, potisnuto je pred pita-
njem o kloniranju ovjeka. Vijest o njegovom kloniranJu ili pro-
izvodnji genskom manipulacijom moda e doivjeti medijsku
sudbinu spomenute ovce. Razgovor o kloniranju ]judi djeluje na
javnost tako da je problem kloniranja ivotinja, a time i kloni-
ranja kao metode, >>apsolvirana tema<<. Moda ista sudbina. eka
dan;1s aktualnu temu genetskog inenjeringa s obzirom na vijest
o dekodiranju ljudskog genoma. Svijest o moguim posljedicama
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 69

ovjekovog djelovanja vjerojatno je povezana sa svijecu o smrti


- o tome da uskoro neemo biti na ovom svijetu koji ostaje i po- l
slije nas- pa nas zaokuplja toliko, koliko jo moemo konzumi-
rati svijet<<. To potwuje injenica da i narataji modernog dru- 1i
tva prakticiraju >>dobar ivot<< naroito poveanom potronjom
materijalnih dobara. Brzina kojom to ine na ogranienom pro-
storu i promjene koje nastaju, oteavaju zadravanje stabilnih l
vrijednosti za prosudbu potencijalnih posljedica u naoj svijesti.
Time se samo prividno moe smanjiti ovjekova odgovornost za
svijet kao cjelinu.

Ogranienost ekonomske paradigme


Pitanje svjetskog etosa, odnosno >>svjetskog ekolokog etosa<< za
mnoge kulture nije shvatljivo, jer ive (a) u svojoj samodovoljno-
sti kulturnih obrazaca posredovanja izmeu socijalne zajednice i
prirode (okolia) i (b) shvatljivoj ogranienosti prirodnih dobara
i ovisnosti o prirodi, a (e) kultura je za njih svijet. Povremeni fi-
ziki sukobi s drugim zajednicama (narodima, kulturama) -ag-
resivnost i osvajanja- nisu motivirani univerzalnom etikom/eto-
som kao legitimiranjem postupaka osvajaa niti naelima za ko-
jih se eventualno bore (sloboda, jednakost...) nego jednostavnim
uvjetom svog opstanka ili irenja. To naravno ukljuuje i religij-
skim fanatizmom motivirane ratove. Meutim, injenica je da su
osvajai (pobjednici) poraenima doputali kulturnu i religijsku
slobodu. Etos predmodernih kultura je dovoljan za oblikovanje
odnosa prema prirodi i za uspostavljanje moralnog djelovanja
lanova zajednice, iako ne pretendira na univerzalnost.
Pitanje svjetskog etosa praktino je locirana u doba krize
industrijske kulture i njezinih perspektiva. Potreba za univer-
zalnim ekolokim etosom temelji se na dvije pretpostavke. Prva
je dominacija svjetskog ekonomskog etosa koji se uspostavlja s
globaliziranjem trinog drutva i njegovih naela organizacije
drutva i ivota. Druga pretpostavka je ogranienost ekonomske
paradigme tog modela drutva u uinkovitosti njegovih univer-
zaliziranih vrednota i globalnih tokova u novim uvjetima trajnih
nestaica i ogranienosti prirodnih resursa krajem 20. stoljea.
Ekonomski etos bio je dovoljan za globaliziranje u uvjetima
jednog tipa racionalnosti - ekonomsko-tehnike racionalnosti,
dovoljne za univerzalnost i globalnost. Danas mu treba komple-
mentarni etos - ekoloki etos - kao novo vrijednosno uporite,
~
'J'
l
70 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos l
l
!f,

jer se mijenja duh vremena<<. U minimalnoj varijanti svjetski


ekoloki etos moe se doivjeti kao >>nova dimenzija legitimite-
ta ekonomskog i kulturnog poretka, a u optimalnoj kao >>nova
paradigma. U predmodernim drutvima ekoloki etos je granica
svakog drugog etosa, jer se iz odnosa prema prirodi uspostavlja-
ju drutveni odnosi. Otuda se zahtjevi za >>svjetskim ekolokim
etosom mogu se shvatiti kao (a) zahtjev za novim etikim pro-
storom djelovanja industrijske (zapadne) civilizacije, ali i kao (b)
motiv nove paradigme univerzalne kulture homo sapiensa. Niti
najotriji kritiari kapitalizma, industrijskog drutva (kulture) i
moderne ne mogu zaobii istinske motive- nastale ba u toj kul-
turi - u traenju univerzalnih izlaza iz sveope socijalnoeko-
loke krize. Ali, isto tako ne moe se osporiti ni ozbiljan prigovor
da tih i takvih zahtjeva ne bi bilo da je industrijsko drutvo (kul-
tura) u stanju pronai izlaze iz krize unutar sebe i bez daljnje
ekspanzije i agresije prema drugim kulturama i prirodi. To po-
tvruje tezu da su zapadna kultura i industrijsko drutvo parci-
jalni, iako se sustavno ire i predstavljaju kao univerzalni i glo-
balni. Oito ta izvanjska (teritorijalna) univerzalnost i global-
nost ima unutarnje pukotine koje trae promjene ili prijete slo-
mom. Ostaje pitanje moe li je novi etos trajno >>spasiti ili je
>>svjetski ekoloki etos samo nova aktualna formula ideje odri-
vosti i >>Odrivog razvoja. Ako se zadri ekonomska paradigma,
tada se radi samo o pronalaenju formule privremenog izlaza
jednog modela i u tom smislu o novom povijesnom skandalu.

Ekoloki etos - globalni izazov

Moda e se nekima uiniti nepotrebnim i suvinim pitanje na


koga se odnosi i komu je upuen zahtjev za svjetskim ekolokim
etosom. To ne bi udilo, pogotovo ako se razmilja u nekim
opim kategorijama kao ovjek, evolucija, priroda ili holistiki.
To bi se moda inilo u antropolokom kontekstu nekog filozof-
skog sustava u kojemu rije ovjek ima ope znaenje ljudske
vrste. Ali, ako se ima na umu poznatu injenicu da su u global-
nim strategijama razvoja zahtjevi openiti i upueni svima, to
je rezultiralo njihovom samo djelominom uinkovitocu, onda
ima razloga postaviti prethodno pitanje.
Problem ekolokog etosa odnosi se prije svega na samu in-
dustrijsku kulturu (drutvo). Svjetska socijalnoekoloka kriza
nastala je u najrazvijenijim drutvima, a proirila se i na neraz-
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 71

vijena drutva. Zato je i zabrinutost za stanje i ekoloko po-


naanje najvea u najrazvijenijim zemljama. U njima se trae
novi izlazi, zahtijevaju promjene vrijednosti, orijentacija i po-
naanja - od pojedinaca, privatnog i javnog sektora - kao put
prema novom ekolokom etosu, promjeni naina djelovanja in-
stitucija i aktera na drukijim. osnovama. Kad bi ta drutva
uspjela oblikovati uinkoviti ekoloki etos i njime regulativno
utjecati na socijalnoekoloke procese, vjerojatno se u njima ne bi
postavljalo pitanje svjetskog etosa kao globalni i univerzalni
problem ..
Zahtjev za svjetskim ekolokim etosom upuen je svima
to se moe kritiki interpretirati kao manjkavost mehanizama
same kulture da ovlada svojim vlastitim posljedicama. Ta manj-
kavost je dijelom i posljedica suprotnosti izmeu nastavka (eko-
nomskog i kulturnog) ekspanzionizma i kulturne relativnosti.
Kao i druge kulture/drutva, moderno drutvo ima svoj ekoloki
etos, koji je etiki racionalno, tj. djelotvorno funkcionirao u raz-
voju modernog drutva sve do krize njegove racionalnosti koji
izaziva ekoloka kriza. Etos zapadnoeuropske kulture sadri
elemente >>partikularne univerzalnosti<< dovoljne i pogodne za
njezin samorazvoj. Socijalnoekoloka kriza signalizira sudar
ekolokog etosa modernog drutva i ekolokih uvjeta opstanka.
Racionalni ekoloki etos pokazao je unutarnji konflikt same kul-
ture moderne, konflikt izmeu globalizacije i parcijalne regula- l
cije svjetskih pitanja. Tako je takav ekoloki etos sa stajalita
prirodnih uvjeta ivota pokazao znakove univerzalne iracio-
nalnosti.
l:
U jednom sluaju bi se moglo govoriti o racionalnosti ove
univerzalne iracionalnosti<<- u sluaju promatranja problema s
l'
evolucijskog stajalita i na njemu utemeljenog etosa - biolokog,
genskog etosa<<. U kontekstu zemaljskih evolucijskih procesa, l
rekli bismo da se na Zemlji neka skupina antropoida (hominida)
razvila vie od ostalih i da je uspjela, zahvaljujui ovladavanju l
novim znanjima i njihovom primjenom, kontrolirati znatno vie
prostora potrebnog za njihov nain ivota i kulturu nego ostale
skupine homo sapiensa. Ta injenica bi se onda mogla uzeti kao ~.
osnova za njihova prava na ivotni prostor a njihov etos- etiki
naturalizam<< - kao jedini moralno ispravan i racionalan.
72 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

KULTURA l RELIGIJA - TOPOS ETOSA


Svaka kultura ima svoj etos, a svaka kultura je partikularna i
relativna u odnosu na ljudsku kulturu. Za sebe je cjelina jer
omoguava odvijanje svih drutvenih funkcija. Etos kulture tvo-
re nekad vrca a nekad labavija povezanost etosa lokalnih za-
jednica i kulturnih tradicija. Obiajnost se moe najbolje empi-
rijski identificirati na razini lokalne kulture i zajednice. U okvi-
rima neke kulture i kulturne tradicije zajednice meusobno raz-
likuju njihovi etosi - obiaji i norme koje odreuju to je moral-
no ponaanje a to nije. One su konkretna empirijska racional-
nost ivota u zajednici. U svaki taj etos ugraen je opevaei
obrazac kulture to lokalno raznolike etose odrava na trasi<<
neke kulturne tradicije ili kulture. To moe biti sustav vrednota
a naroito jezik koji spaja pripadnike razliitih zajednica i raz-
liitih ili slinih obiaja, a moe i fiziki imbenik- primjerice ri-
jeka o kojoj ovisi ivot razliitih (etnikih, religijskih) zajednica.
Integrativni kulturni mehanizmi osiguravaju opstanak cjeline i
povezanost s njezinim dijelovima. Slino se moe analizirati od-
nos razliitih kultura i religija na svjetskoj razini u ijim etosi-
ma nalazimo neto zajedniko u vrednotama meu ljudima i iz-
meu ljudi i okolia (solidarnost, suosjeanje, nadu, vrijednost
ivota itd.). U svim kulturnim i religijskim tradicijama postoje
narodne mudrosti o djelovanju i ouvanju prirodnih osnova ivo-
ta. Po njima pripadamo svi jednom ljudskom rodu i ovjean
stvu. Zato rasprava o ekolokom etosu ili sudbini Zemlje mora
biti interkulturalna i interreligijska.
Religija i kultura dvije su isprepletene dimenzije ivota u
zajednici i drutvu. Na zemljopisnom prostoru jedne kulture (ci-
vilizacije) susreemo razliite religije i obrnuto na prostoru jed-
ne religije vie kulturnih tradicija ili kultura. Religijski je etos
katkada u konfliktu sa sekularnim etosom. Kultura (materijalne
i duhovne tvorbe) se odnosi na prolost i svjetovnost ivota, a re-
ligioznost na pitanje vjenosti i budunost ivota. Kultura je ta-
koer svojevrsni projekt, tovie mit koji nudi horizont u koje-
mu moemo neposredno i osobno iskusiti cjelovitu stvarnost
(Panikkar, 1996:59). Religijska dimenzija ljudskog stvaranja
protkana je milju o svetom, o smislu ivota i svega stvaranja,
pa u sebi sadri sakralnu transcendentnu dimenziju. Sakralno
jami razliitim kulturama identitet ali ne samo duhovne zajed-
nice nego i socijalne/kulturne zajednice. Svjetske religije - od
budizma, judaizma, islama do kranstva- sadre konkretizira-
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 73

ni etos svakodnevice ivota: zapovijedi i zabrane. Svete knjige i


drugi tekstovi izvor su tumaenja odnosa ovjeka i prirode i ob- f .

navljanja etosa pripadnika iste religije (Gerlitz, 1998). l


U povijesti su religioznost i religija bili relevantni imbenici
ekolokog etosa, a time i stvaranja kulturnih tradicija. I danas l'
religije u svijetu pokreu razliitu drutvenu empiriju - od pot-
pore progresivnim drutvenim ciljevima do vjerskih konflikata. [
U katolianstvu je vrlo znaajan senzibilan pristup prema ne-
kim pitanjima relevantnim za suvremenu ekoloku tematiku,
primjerice odnos prema spolovima, neroenom djetetu, porastu
materijalizma i rastronosti drutva itd. Za problem svjetskog
ekolokog etosa relevantna je ekumenska pozicija suradnje i di-
jaloga izmeu religija i kultura, dijaloga koji ima cilj pronai i
osnaiti ono zajedniko to ljude razliitih religija povezuje, a ne
to ih razdvaja. Povezuju ih ideali, sakralnost, transcendentnost
a razdvajaju manifestni oblici pojavnosti i predstavljanja. U tom
smislu nezaobilazna je uloga religija za ivot suvremenog svije-
ta. Naravno, postoji i niz otvorenih pitanja i sumnji u ekoloki
orijentiran dijalog zapadne i istonjakih kultura i religija. Dok
jedni strahuju da bi istonjake religije ugrozile neke elemente
zapadne kulture, drugi smatraju da je potrebno meusobno ue
nje zajednikog iskustva (Macer, 1994:108).
Potisnutost religije, njezine dominantne interpretativne i
kontrolne uloge nad vrijednostima i ponaanjem u epohi moder-
nog sekularizma, danas se ponovno empirijski preispituje: unu-
tar religijskih institucija i u drutvu. Ekoloki znaci vremena
postavljaju pitanje nastupa li vrijeme povratka religije i njezine
znaajne uloge u oblikovanju ekolokog etosa, jer neka pitanja
oito nisu u podruja znanstvenih spoznaja nego vrijednosti i re-
ligioznosti. Time se, iako moda skromno, otvara i pitanje da li
su se epistemoloka paradigma i znanost moralno iscrpili? Po-
vratak religioznosti (new age) u modernom drutvu i utjecaji
drugih religija na zapadnoeuropsku kulturu, podrazumijevaju
filtriranje<< njihovih vrijednosti kroz kulturu sekulariziranog
drutva a ne automatizam povratka ranijoj izvornosti.
Osim vanost religije i kulture u povijesti drutava, teko se
moe prihvatiti kulturni ili religijski normativni relativizam kao
osnovu svjetskog, tj. univerzalnog ekolokog etosa, smatra Pa-
nikkar. Temeljni razlog je u tome to ni jedna kultura, religije ili
ideologija nije rekla ili mislila sve to se moe rei ili misliti (Ke-
ssler, 1996:4). Pa ipak neke vrijednosti koje istie kranstvo,
kao to su >>vjera<<, nada<< i ljubav<< (l Pavla 13, 1-13; Auer,
74 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

1985) nadilaze granice jedne religije i njezin kulturni (normativ-


ni) relativizam. Sasvim je logino od svjetskih religija oekivati
otpore ideji svjetskog etosa jer svaka od njih predstavlja totalni
fenomen<< koji pokriva sva podruja ivota dotine kulture i ob-
jektivno sadri neke univerzalne vrijednosti, iako svaka aspirira
na univerzalnost.

. v
PRISTUPI SVJETSKOM EKOLOSKOM ETOSU
Razmiljanja o ekolokom etosu i svjetskom ekolokom etosu
sadre u sebi viziju pluralnosti drutva i svijeta, ideje o sinkro-
nosti raznolikih svjetova. Meutim, ta razmiljanja impliciraju i
misao o jednom drutvu i idealnom stanju ljudskog ivljenja. Tu
misao susreemo u povijesti socijalnih ideja, bilo kao idealnu sli-
ku (paradigmu), savreni svijet od kojega moemo saznati o ne-
dostacima naeg svijeta i prema kojoj slici moemo teiti urediti
i >>popraviti na realni i nesavreni svijet, bilo kao povijesno
ostvarljivu hipotezu. Velike klasine socijalne utopije - otoke
utopije<< (primjerice, ona T. Morusa) opisivale su idealni i poelj-
ni svijet bez tenji da ga se ostvari, dok su neke mod.erne poli-
tike utopije zamiljale to pQstii (primjerice, Blochova princip
nada). Ekoloki diskurs afirmirao je ideju o utopijama kao soci-
jalnim energijama (Pavlovi, 1987). Danas su rasprave, barem u
Njemakoj, ponovno aktualizirale bilanciranje istraivanja o
politikoj utopijskoj tematici (Wosskamp, 1985; Neustiss, 1986;
Saage, 1997).
Diskurs o svjetskom etosu upozorava i na moguu iscrplje-
nost<< duhovnih potencijala etikog reguliranja ponaanja. Pita-
nje je, jesu li uistinu iscrpljeni kulturni kapitali modernih dru-
tava i je li industrijska civilizacija moralno iscrpljena, pa nove
etike impulse treba traiti (a) u osnovama nekih drugih kultu-
ra i religija, primjerice istonjakim ili ih (b) usprkos tome tra-
iti u duhovnim obzorima iskljuivo modernog drutva te u nji-
ma oblikovati svjetski etos.
S tim u svezi je pitanje zato je uope potreban svjetski etos,
ako se radi samo o prolaznoj krizi duhovnosti i unutarnjeg
stanja modernih drutava, o krizi koju e to drutvo ionako sa-
mo svladati. Prvo, nije rije samo o duhovnoj krizi, niti o prolaz-
noj, niti samo o onoj u razvijenim drutvima. U pitanju su per-
spektive opstanka ovjeanstva to se osobito odraava na ne-
razvijena drutva. Kriza postaje novo normalno fiziko i
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 75

duhovno stanje svijeta. Drugo, moderno drutvo se suoava s


novim problemima regulacije ivota. Potiskivanjem socijalne
uloge religije i porastom sekularne uloge primijenjene znanosti,
na mjesto pravila utemeljenih na religioznosti, u svakodnevnici lL
se uspostavlja ivot zasnovan po pravilima znanosti, koja i sa-
ma trai moralna uporita. Tree, zbog manjka utopijskog mi-
ljenja i ogranienja ekspertnog znanstvenog znanja, drutvo j )
treba nova uporita za regulaciju ivota, pa otuda nada da bi u
novom socijalnoekolokom stanju ekoloki etos bio pogodno re-
gulacijsko uporite ..
U razmiljanjima o svjetskom ekolokom etosu postoje raz-
liiti pristupi o tome to bi svjetski etos trebao biti i kako bi bio
>>konstituiran. To je razumljivo s obzirom na dananju svjetsku
raznolikost kultura, religija i drutava.

ll .

l
l

l
76 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos
r
:l
1
J
nosti, religiji itd. (Kiing, 1990:16; 1993:488). Minimalni etiki !
konsenzus bio bi plod rada eksperata na temelju zajednikih t~
univerzalnih vrijednosti to ih nalazimo u svjetskim religijama. i'
U ovom kontekstu posebnu analizu zasluuje odnos izmeu '
1
. procesa globalizacije i svjetskog etosa. Naime, proces globalizaci-
je danas je epohalni kulturni izazov a u mnogim aspektima iza-
l!

zov je budunosti ovjeanstva, bez obzira to se u politikom di-


skursu esto svodi na problem odnosa nacionalne drave i me-
unarodnih integracija. U njemu jedni vide velike preteito po-
!
zitivne strane, osobito u porastu globalne racionalnosti moder-
nog drutva kao i u irenju univerzalnih<< vrijednosti zapadne
civilizacije, kao to su tehnoloki progres, demokracija, porast
sloboda i prava pojedinca itd. Drugi pak u globalizaciji vide iz-
vjesne opasnosti dominacijejedne kulture, nerijeen problem in-
dividualnog i kolektivnog identiteta i odnosa prema tradiciji, itd.
u kontekstu procesa diferenciranja u modernim drutvima. N o, !
bez obzira na sve ovo, glavno je pitanje to globalizacija empirij- l
ski znai; stvara li svjetske strukture u smislu svjetskog drutva l'
kao razvijenijeg stupnja ovjeanstva ili vie ograniava suvere-
nitet modernih drava (Altvater/Mahnkopf, 1997) izdvajajui se li
kao globalno drutvo. Ako nastaje svjetsko drutvo onda vjero-
jatno treba: i neki svjetski etos, jer ovjek je i moralno bie. Tako
se otvara prostor za interdisciplinarni i interkulturalni diskurs
o pitanjima svjetskog etosa. U tom pogledu svjetski etos je jedna
vrsta reflektiranja moderniteta i provokacija nostalginoj ili
konstruiranoj tradiciji. i

. l
l

Dominacija jedne kulture - kulturni relativizam l


Drugi pristup svjetskom ekolokom etosu vodi u razmiljanje da
se jedna od nekolicine svjetskih kultura/civilizacija prihvati kao
osnova svjetskog etosa. Njezine osnovne vrijednosti, osobito ve-
zane uz odnos prema prirodi, postale bi univerzalne i normativ-
ne i za sve druge kulture i ljude. Svaka kultura ima relativno
znaenje pa bi to znailo normiranje jedne relativnosti kao uni-
verzalnosti. U sadanjim okolnostima vjerojatno najvie izgleda
za status normativnog relativizma ima zapadnoeuropska civili-
zacija s kranskim osnovama zbog toga to su neka njezina.
naela ve prihvaena u drugim kulturama i to u odnosu na
njih raspolae s eksternim sredstvima - znanstvenim, tehni
kim, ekonomskim i financijskim itd.
rc'
''
'

Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 77

Nije nova ideja da jedna kultura nadvlada druge i njima do-


minira. Ona je poznata u staroj, ali i u novijoj povijesti. Povijest
se moe promatrati i kao stalna interkulturna napetost - od ko-
l
operacije, preko kompeticije do otvorenih sukoba. Protagonisti
ideje kulturne dominacije uvijek su implicirali viziju totalnog l''
svijeta, to ga se moe i silom oblikovati. Uostalom niti jedna ve-
lika drava, imperij nije nastao bez primjene sile i bez nasilja. Za ll
autoritarne sustave ona prikriva mogunost kulturnog hegemo-
nizma i moe postati ekoloki alibi za totalitarizam i nasilje. Za
prosvjeivanje, pa makar i ekoloko, ideja oblikovanja ovjeka po
mjeri takvog, samo jednog kulturnog svijeta, ve je kulturno i ci-
vilizacijski kompromitirana a to bi se moda ponovno dogodilo.
Nametanje vrijednosti jedne kulture ili religije drugim kul-
turama i religijama, znaio bi novi povijesni obred dodat~
nog rtvovanja kultura. U predmodernim drutvima prinoenje
rtve u razliitim prigodama imalo je duboki sakralni smisao a
predstavljao je i funkcionalan kulturni in. Za razliku od tih
drutava u kojima je kultura rtvovanja imala svoj puni egzi~
stencijalni smisao, u ivotu modernih drutava radi se o rtvo-
vanju kulture. To je dovelo do gubitka unutarnjeg osjeaja so-
lidarnosti s drugima, kako na individualnoj tako i na kolektivnoj
razini. Solidarnost izmeu zajednica danas glibi kulturne i svodi
se na pravne osnove, Tako su se u procesu >>civiliziranja<<- povi- l
. jesnom irenju industrijske zapadnoeuropske kulture- na indu-
strijskom rtveniku nale mnoge agrarne i uope predmoderne
kulture. Da bismo kao ljudski rod bili >>uspjeni<< ne treba rtvo- l !
vati druge kulture! Ali, ne radi se o uspjenosti ljudskog roda
nego o uspjehu samo odreenih drutava. Istra'ivanja velikih ci-
,.
vilizacija i kultura ne bi smjela sluiti samo znanstvenim ciljevi-
ma nego da svi koriste ta znanja kao ope dobro i moda od dru-
gih neto naue o smislu ivota u zajednici i prirodi. l

Zahtjevi za promjenom
l'
p
Prije svakog razmiljanja zadaje se pitanje: je li uistinu danas
svijetu potreban ekoloki etos- svjetski etos, da bi se mogao da-
lje razvijati, odrati kao antropogeni svijet i konano preivjeti
sva iskuenja? Zar ne postoji i danas, ako ne svjetski etos, ipak
neto to regulira ciljeve, odreuje norme i ponaanje svijeta, jer
ne moe se negirati ulogu drutva koje u svijetu ima kljunu
ulogu u odreivanju njegovih perspektiva. to je industrijsko
. .. ;
~,.,
.

'r

76 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos


1i

<
nosti, religiji itd. (Ki.ing, 1990:16; 1993:488). Minimalni etiki l
'l
konsenzus bio bi plod rada eksperata na temelju zajednikih
univerzalnih vrijednosti to ih nalazimo u svjetskim religijama.
'
!

U ovom kontekstu posebnu analizu zasluuje odnos izmeu


i
. procesa globalizacije i svjetskog etosa. Naime, proces globalizaci- ii
je danas je epohalni kulturni izazov a u mnogim aspektima iza-
j .
zov je budunosti ovjeanstva, bez obzira to se u politikom di-
skursu esto svodi na problem odnosa nacionalne drave i me-
unarodnih integracija. U njemu jedni vide velike preteito po-
zitivne strane, osobito u porastu globalne racionalnosti moder-
nog drutva kao i u irenju Univerzalnih<< vrijednosti zapadne
civilizacije, kao to su tehnoloki progres, demokracija, porast
sloboda i prava pojedinca itd. Drugi pak u globalizaciji vide iz-
vjesne opasnosti dominacijejedne kulture, nerijeen problem in-
dividualnog i kolektivnog identiteta i odnosa prema tradiciji, itd.
u kontekstu procesa diferenciranja u modernim drutvima. N o, !
bez obzira na sve ovo, glavno je pitanje to globalizacija empirij- l
ski znai; stvara li svjetske strukture u smislu svjetskog drutva l'
kao razvijenijeg stupnja ovjeanstva ili vie ograniava suvere-
nitet modernih drava (Altvater/Mahnkopf, 1997) izdvajajui se l
kao globalno drutvo. Ako nastaje svjetsko drutvo onda vjero-
jatno treba: i neki svjetski etos, jer ovjek je i moralno bie. Tako l
se otvara prostor za interdiscip1inarni i interkulturalni diskurs l
l
o pitanjima svjetskog etosa. U tom pogledu svjetski etos je jedna
vrsta reflektiranja moderniteta i provokacija nostalginoj ili
konstruiranoj tradiciji.

Dominacija jedne kulture - kulturni relativizam

Drugi pristup svjetskom ekolokom etosu vodi u razmiljanje da


se jedna od nekolicine svjetskih kultura/civilizacija prihvati kao
osnova svjetskog etosa. Njezine osnovne vrijednosti, osobito ve-
zane uz odnos prema prirodi, postale bi univerzalne i normativ-
ne i za sve druge kulture i ljude. Svaka kultura ima relativno
znaenje pa bi to znailo normiranje jedne relativnosti kao uni-
verzalnosti. U sadanjim okolnostima vjerojatno najvie izgleda
za status normativnog relativizma ima zapadnoeuropska civili-
zacija s kranskim osnovama zbog toga to su neka njezina.
naela ve prihvaena u drugim kulturama i to u odnosu na
njih raspolae s eksternim sredstvima - znanstvenim, tehni
kim, ekonomskim i financijskim itd.
'f'''
''
'

Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 77

Nije nova ideja da jedna kultura nadvlada druge i njima do-


minira. Ona je poznata u staroj, ali i u novijoj povijesti. Povijest
se moe promatrati i kao stalna interkulturna napetost- od ko-
l
operacije, preko kompeticije do otvorenih sukoba. Protagonisti
ideje kulturne dominacije uvijek su implicirali viziju totalnog
svijeta, to ga se moe i silom oblikovati. Uostalom niti jedna ve-
lika drava, imperij nije nastao bez primjene sile i bez nasilja. Za
autoritarne sustave ona prikriva mogunost kulturnog hegemo-
nizma i moe postati ekoloki alibi za totalitarizam i nasilje. Za
prosvjeivanje, pa makar i ekoloko, ideja oblikovanja ovjeka po
mjeri takvog, samo jednog kulturnog svijeta, ve je kulturno i ci-
vilizacijski kompromitirana a to bi se moda ponovno dogodilo.
Nametanje vrijednosti jedne kulture ili religije drugim kul-
turama i religijama, znaio bi novi povijesni obred dodat~
nog rtvovanja kultura. U predmodernim drutvima prinoenje
rtve u razliitim prigodama imalo je duboki sakralni smisao a
predstavljao je i funkcionalan kulturni in. Za razliku od tih
drutava u kojima je kultura rtvovanja imala svoj puni egzi
stencijalni smisao, u ivotu modernih drutava radi se o rtvo- l
vanju kulture. To je dovelo do gubitka unutarnjeg osjeaja so-
lidarnosti s drugima, kako na individualnoj tako i na kolektivnoj
razini. Solidarnost izmeu zajednica danas glibi kulturne i svodi
se na pravne osnove, Tako su se u procesu civiliziranja<<- povi- l
. jesnom irenju industrijske zapadnoeuropske kulture- na indu-
strijskom rtveniku nale mnoge agrarne i uope predmoderne
kulture. Da bismo kao ljudski rod bili >>Uspjeni<< ne treba rtvo- l
vati druge kulture! Ali, ne radi se o uspjenosti ljudskog roda
nego o uspjehu samo odreenih drutava. Istra'ivanja velikih ci- l
vilizacija i kultura ne bi smjela sluiti samo znanstvenim ciljevi-
ma nego da svi koriste ta znanja kao ope dobro i moda od dru-
gih neto naue o smislu ivota u zajednici i prirodi. l

l
Zahtjevi za promjenom
l'
1-,
Prije svakog razmiljanja zadaje se pitanje: je li uistinu danas
svijetu potreban ekoloki etos- svjetski etos, da bi se mogao da-
lje razvijati, odrati kao antropogeni svijet i konano preivjeti
sva iskuenja? Zar ne postoji i danas, ako ne svjetski etos, ipak
neto to regulira ciljeve, odreuje norme i ponaanje svijeta, jer
ne moe se negirati ulogu drutva koje u syijetu ima kljunu
ulogu u odreivanju njegovih perspektiva. Sto je industrijsko
78 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

(postindustrijsko) drutvo, zapadnoeuropska industrijska kultu-


ra (civilizacija) ako ne dominatne odreujue strukture u svije-
tu. Ta drutva imaju i ureuju vrsta naela ponaanja u razlii
tim sektorima - od gospodarstva do znanosti, koja oblikuju >>duh
vremena<<. U njima su tri bitne strukture koje ureuju ivot mo-
dernog drutva ali s procesima globalizacije ire svoja pravila u
svoju drutvenu i kulturnu okolinu, u nerazvijena drutva,
predmoderna drutva (kulture). To su: trite, (viestranaje)
demokracija i pluralizam vrijednosti. U tim okvirima odvi-
ja se ivot pojedinca i skupine s ljudskim pravima i etosom, koji
se temelje na vrijednostima kompeticije, jednakosti i uni-
verzalnosti. Naravno, praksa je neto drugaija.
Projekcija sadanjeg stanja koje inae podlijee kritici i zbog
kojeg se i otvaraju pitanja svjetskog etikog reguliranja ponaa-
nja, Vjerojatno ne bi dovelo dalje od konfrontacija u okvirima po-
stojeeg diskursa s argumentima u prilog pesimistinih ili pak
optimistinih oekivanja: da je svijet lo<< i da ga treba promije-
niti ili da je svijet dobar<< i da ga treba samo poboljati.
U opem sumiranju ekolokog diskursa posljednjih deset-
ljea, prepoznatljivi su nedvojbeni i smisleni zahtjevi za promje-
nama odnosa modernog drutva prema prirodi, to implicira i
promjene unutar same kulture. Ti zahtjevi se razliito akcenti-
raju i oblikuju. Problem nije samo ekoloki, ekonomski ili poli-
tiki nego njihov zajedniki i mnogo kompleksniji. Zato jedni
kau da se radi o pitanju ivota i smrti- to ukazuje na religioz-
ne i metafizike aspekte za koje nam je potreban mir, distan-
ca (interkulturalnost), kontemplacija (sinteza teorije i prak-
se) (Panikkar, 1996:60); drugi pak govore o vremenu preokreta
(Eppler, 1975; Capra, 1986), o nunosti promjene civilizacijskog
smjera<< ili o dokidanju civilizacije smrti. Naravno, totalnu
reviziju smjera nije mogue doslovno provesti jer se drutvene
promjene ne dogaaju iskljuivo prema teoretskom (modelskom)
obrascu, prirodnom determinizmu ili slobodnoj volji vladara. Za-
to je rije vie o simbolinom izrazu objektivnih zahtjeva za
usmjeravanjem promjena u poeljnom smjeru. To neki nazivaju
promjena paradigme<<, >>novo miljenje, novi humanizam,
novi etos (Auer, 1985:301), itd. a uglavnom imaju neko upo-
rite u prosvjetiteljstvu kojega istodobno kritiziraju. U tom kon-
tekstu se raspravljaju i raznolika shvaanja o ureivanju sva-
kodnevnog ivota: o svjesno ivljenoj dovoljnosti - o etici dovolj-
nosti, o dobrovoljnom samoograniavanju (Illich, 1973), o pra-
vednoj podjeli prirodnih resursa itd.
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 79

Najece je kritiziran antropocentrizam, antropocentika


razvojna paradigma i prirodoznanstvena spoznajna paradigma.
U ovom kontekstu antropocentrizam je zanimljiv utoliko to po-
stoje miljenja da antropocentrinu paradigmu treba zamijeniti
biocentrinom, ekocentrinom, fiziocentrinom ili kozmocentri-
il nom- ovisno o kriteriju koncipiranja odnosa prema prirodi, tj. o
i
tome to se uzme kao kljuna vrijednost. U tom kontekstu ra- l
sprave o ekolokom etosu i ekolokoj etici zanimljive su dvije te-
ze - pitanja koja su usmjerena na problem odgovornosti antro-
pocentrine orijentacije i uspostavljanje >>novog humanizma<<
(Teutsch, 1993).
Ekodiktatura. Prvo je teza da je priroda osnova ekolo-
kog etosa<< i etike. U tom kontekstu susreemo i nazive kao
etika okolia<<, etika Zemlje (Leopold, 1949), >>etika ivih bi-
a<< (M. Teutsch), itd. kao i pojam etiki naturalizam. Uz
malo razmiljanja postaje jasno da prirodni zakoni ne mogu biti
etiki zakoni, da se iz njih ne mogu izvesti moralna pravila -
ljudska etika, jer se ovjek u svom kulturnom razvoju uspio oslo-
boditi nekih prirodnih ogranienja. Naime, moe, ali uz sasvim
odreene posljedice koje bi diskreditirale njegovu ljudskost. Pri-
rodni poredak moe biti samo poticaj vrednoti ljudskog samo-
ogranienja. Jer, primjerice etiki naturalizam<< znai prihvaa-
nje prirodnog reda koji ovjeku dozvoljava uspostavljanje zako- l
na prava jaega bez ogranienja, tj. zakona samo u svoju korist
(Teutsch, 1993:58). Etiki naturalizam omoguava prirodno
opravdavanje raznolikih oblika socijalnog i kulturnog podinja-
vanja. Zato etiki naturalizam<< treba samo diskurzivno shvati-
ti kao simboliki izraz kritike antropocentricne etike i elje da \.
se ona mijenja, tovie da se sadanji antropocentrizam korigira,
ali ne i da se doslovno zamijene uporita etike pozicije. Jer, to l,
bi bio povratak na stanje koje negira ljudska postignua slobode,
demokracija i konsenzusa. Nasuprot >>tvrdom<< antropocentriz- 1

mu, neki autori zagovaraju relativni antropocentrizam<< (Po- l .


zai, 1991:94), dok neki drugi ukazuju na mogui ekoloki totali-
tarizam i upozoravaju na problem ekodiktature (Kloepfer, l~
1992; Weizsacker, 1992;Vollmer, 1992) i ekolokog imperi-
jalizma (Crosby, 1991). Kolikogod su verbalne i praktine ak-
cije razliitih ekolokih udruenja (osobito Greenpeace<<-a) po-
trebne, korisne, a vrlo esto i globalno simpatine<<, ostaje, ali
ne samo akademsko, pitanje: ako su- prvenstveno tehnoloke-
posljedice modernog razvoja ekoloki ekscesne i opasne za svijet
te se doivljavaju kao svjetski industrijski terorizam<<, moe li
r
l
80 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

jedna druga opcija (zeleni) uistinu predstavljati alternativu i,


kako neki upozoravaju, kao manjina >>terorizirati svijet<<?
Provincijalni antropocentrizam. Druga teza se odnosi
na kritiku >>antropocentrinog humanizma<< po kojemu je >>ov
jek mjera svih stvari<<, a time i mjera prirodnosti i prirode. Ba
zato to on to jest i jedini kao najrazvijenije prirodno bie to
moe biti, on snosi svu odgovornost za ono to ini i ne ini. Iz
toga slijedi da ovjek odreuje to je pravo ili krivo i da je u po-
loaju ostvarivanja prava jaega u odnosu na druge vrste. U
kontekstu socijalnoekoloke problematike problem antropocen-
trizma je dvojaki problem. S jedne strane to je pitanje selektiv-
nosti i kriterija >>mjere<< a s druge strane to je pitanje shvaanja
to je u ovom sluaju >>antropos<< u empirijskom pogledu.
Industrijska civilizacija nas ui da zaboravimo neke ranije.
ideale dobrog ivota, da ne ograniavamo umjetno stvorene
potrebe sve veeg stjecanja i potronje materijalnih dobara i da ,
prihvatimo protagoniste njihovih uzora. Infinitizam modernog .
l

drutva moramo zamijeniti nekim drugim idealima i prenositi ih


na nove narataje. Razliita istraivanja pokazala su da mladi
izraavaju potrebu i za drugaijim vrijednostima kao to su
osobno samopotvrivanje i subjektiviranje (Bolts, 1995:69). Uva-
avanje asketskih vrijednosti ne znai odbacivanje pozitivnih
steevina modE;)rne niti povratak u prolost, nego znai ugrai
vanje novih vrijednosti koje mogu takoer pridonijeti 'ostvari-
vanju ovjekove slobode. Sloboda je ovjekova rodna sudbina i
nije mogua bez doze stoicizma i ograniavanja potreba. Da bi-
smo kao pojedinci ili zajednica dobili priznanje drugih pojedina-
ca ili zajednica i osjeali se vrijednima, ne moramo sakralizirati
bogatstvo i luksuz kao vrednote. Nekih se potreba<< jednostav-
no moramo odrei kako bismo odbacili diktaturu konzumizma i
u novom stoljeu pokuali ivjeti s novim vrijednostima. Zato ih
treba prevrednovati sukladno novim ekolokim intencijama -
jednostavnosti, ravnotee, prirodnosti, raznolikosti itd.
ovjek kao mjera svih stvari pretpostavlja selektivne krite-
rije definiranja ovjeka. Radi se o selektivnom antropocen-
trizmu, tj. o antroposU<<, slici ovjeka jedne rase i kulture, o
ovjeku zapadnoeuropskog drutva koji je postao mjerilo svih
stvari uspostavljanjem svojih opevaeih kriterija. Covjek to i
jeste i bit e sve dok to bude njegova civilizacija za druge civili-
zacije. Dakle, nije rije o ovjeku<< kao vrsti nego o ovjeku jed-
ne kulture, razvojne i prostorno-vremenske dimenzije -rije je o
provincijalnom antropocentrizmu<< (Wilfred, 1996:76). Ako ta-
.,,,""'' '
\~-~(/-'
..

ij

"!' Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 81


i
l
i
)
} ko shvatimo problem antropocentrizma u ovom kontekstu, onda
je kritika antropocentrizma povijesno, socijalno i etiki precizno
. i
'-;l adresirana a legitimirana idejom svjetskog drutva i svjetskog
i etosa.
:l
i Kada se kritiki govori o antropocentrizmu, onda se ponaj-
j prije misli na zapadnu civilizaciju: Pritom nije kljuni problem
prijelaz (zamjena) od jednog centrizma<< u drugi >>centrizmu<< -
primjerice od >>antropocentrizma<< prema >>kozmocentrizmU<<,
Problem je u tome to je sasvim konkretni >>antropos<< u jednoj
kulturi uzdignut na razinu ljudske vrste, a jedna konkretna kul-
tura (civilizacija), naime zapadnoeuropska, izjednaena s kultu-
rom (civilizacijom) kao takvom. Sa stajalita >>etikog naturaliz-
ma<< priroda je ovjeku kao najrazvijenijem biu u prirodi trajno
na >>raspolaganju<<. Povijesno najrazvijenijoj skupini ljudi i pra-
vilima njihova ivota trebali bi biti podlone sve druge skupine.
(Naalost, to je empirijski uglavnom tono, ali nije moralno pri-
hvatljivo). Glede antropocentrizma, smatra Wilfred, ekoloko se
pitanje odnosi na problem >>prijelaza od anti-humanogu auten-
tino humano<<, koje u sebi nosi skrb i podrku biolokoj raznoli-
kosti prirode.
,.,
J
U modernizaciji kao procesu sustavne transformacije svijeta
_:~ prepoznajemo duboke promjene kao znakove ozbiljne krize, koju
'j
se razliito razumije i tumai - kao evoluciju ili propast, ali i l
razliito reflektira na cjelinu svijeta. Neki te promjene doivlja-
vaju u pesimistinom obzorju, kulturoloki kao mogue Spengle-
rovo shvaanje propasti Zapada, a drugi kao opu katastrofu u
l
kojoj su mali izgledi za spas svijeta. 3 Ako svijet ne moe >>Spasiti<<
nastavak njegove transformacije (razvojni zamah, metamorfo- l
ze), pitanje je je li pravi izlaz u radikalnoj promjeni svijeta i to
bi ona imala biti? Vjerojatno bi pretpostavljala prvo, promjenu l
prirodoznanstvene spoznajne paradigme i antropocentrine he-
gemonijalne<< paradigme tumaenja svijeta kao procesa njegovog
>>odaravanja<<, racionalnosti i promjene vrijednosti; naputanje
l'
ekonomske paradigme to ukljuuje drukije vrednovanje i us-
l mjeravanje tehniko-ekonomskih inovacija, socijalne inovacije i
l promjene ponaanja (Loske, 1995). Komparativna istraivanja
promjena drutvenih vrijednosti (Inglehart, 1989) samo dokazu-
3 U idovskoj tradiciji postoji legenda o Galamu, biu nadnaravne snage ko-
jega treba stalno drati pod kontrolom, Simbole Golema susreemo kasnije u
Frankentajnu a danas u moguem proizvodu znanosti putem genetskog ine-
njeringa koji moe izmai ljudskoj kontroli i razorno povratna djelovati.
82 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

ju nastavak procesa transformacije njegove duhovne dimenzije -


evoluciju, s naznakama jo uvijek neizvjesnih uinaka novih vri-
jednosnih orijentacija i vrijednosnih konfiguracija ivotnih stilo-
va i odposa prema okoliu u mjeovitim tipovima<< (Reusswig,
1994; Stulhofer/Kufrin, 1996:178).
U dosadanjem povijesnom razvoju zapadne civilizacije i in-
dustrijskih drutava krize su se u pravilu pojavljivale u prostoru
manje razvijenih drutava (kultura), pa je isto tako mogue i s
dananjom socijalnoekolokom krizom. Razvijeni svijet nee jed-
. nastavno propasti. On e, kao i do sada, svoje unutarnje razvoj-
ne tegobe eksternalizirati i prenijeti na ostatak svijeta<<. Vjero-
jatno e biti prije rtvovan ostali su-svijet. Dosada je >>provinci-
jalni antropocentrizam<< iz krize poraao nova rjeenja, esto
bolna. Takoer ne treba zaboraviti glavni argument da je u dru-
tvima tog antropocentrizma koncentrirana najvea znanstvena
i tehnika mo razvoja koja je dosad uope postojala - stvorena
struktura megamaine,,, koja im daje vee anse opstanka nego
drugima. Time on u posljednjih stoljea kao i danas djeluje kao
povijesna poluga izabranog naroda.

Pluralni ekoloki etos - univerzalno u relativnom

Spomenuti pristupi svjetskom ekolokom etosu pokazuju i neka


svoja ogranienja. Osobito su upitna ona to ukazuju na mogue
tendencije vrijednosnog totalitarizma. Zato nam se ini prihvat-
ljiv pristup to ga moemo nazvati pristup pluralnog ekolo-
kog etosa, koji ne zagovara konstruiranje jednog, jedinstve-
nog i opevaeeg svjetskog etosa. Polazi se od teze da je una-
to relativnosti svake kulture, svakog ekolokog etosa, u njima
sadrana ekoloka univerzalnost prepoznatljiva u dominantnoj
interpretaciji odnosa ovjek-priroda. Isto tako prihvaamo ideju
o postojanju ovjeku zajednikog cilja- ouvanja prirodnih i kul-
turnih bogatstava Zemlje to se izraavaju kao raznolikosti -
kao ovjekov antropoloki, upravo rodni interes.
U nekoliko teza izloit e se neki elementi u pristupu plural-
nom ekolokom etosu, odnosno svjetskom ekolokom etosu.
Termin Svjetski etos - to se obino vezuje uz ideju Weltethosa
Hansa Kunga kao ekumenski projekt koji se odnosi ponajprije na
svjetske religije- teko je zamisliv bez implicitnog ili eksplicitnog
dodatka ekoloki. Jer, danas pojam svjetski, planetarni ili glo-
Globalizacija i svjetski ekoloki etos 83

balni ne znae mnogo ako ne pretpostavljaju ekoloku dimenziju.


[
U shvaanju svjetskog ekolokog etosa polazimo: -

i
- od injenice da postoji bogatstvo raznolikosti na Zemlji -
bogatstvo u prirodi i kulturama. Prirodne raznolikosti plod su l :

evolucije a kulturne raznolikosti razvoja ljudske kulture. Suvre- i


meni svijet shvaamo kao pluralni svijet - svijet brojnih i razno-
likih kultura, religija i drutava za iji opstanak je vrijedan sva-
ki ljudski angaman; nema nevrijedne kulture;
- od teze da svaka kultura i religija u sebi sadre neke uni-
verzalne rodne antropoloke karakteristike preko kojih ovjek,
iako ivi u jednoj kulturi, rodno komunicira s cjelinom stvarno-
sti - ljudima, svemirom i boanskim. Dakle, one svom etosu
sadre univerzalna naela koja definiraju odnos ovjeka i priro-
de, tj. sadre ekoloki etos; ekoloki etos je jedna dimenzija eto-
sa neke zajedrtice, tim potrebnija i znaajnija to je vei stupanj
posredovanosti izmeu ovjeka i prirode;
- od poimanja etosa neke zajednice (kulture, drutva) kao
stabilnog mehanizma ureivanja socijalnog prostora i ponaanja
ne samo za lanove unutar zajednice nego i prema drugim zajed-
nicama (kulturama); kao konsenzualnog sustava s temeljnim
stavovima i praktinim racionalitetima (Irrgang, 1996:217) koje
oblikuje kultura i uvaava pojedinac, a u kojemu je sadran i
ekoloka dimenzija - odnos prema prirodi i okoliu; l
- od etosa kao osnove utvrivanja faktinog morala - prak-
tinih pravila za drutveno ponaanje - nunog za ostvarivanje
>>dobrog ivota<< pojedinca i zajednice. Svaka kultura definira
l
>>dobar ivot kao ideal i etike mehanizme ostvarivanja ansi
dobrog ivota za pojedince i socijalne podskupine; l
- od uvaavanja injenice da su svaka kultura i religija par-
tikularna kao to je i svaki u njima oblikovan etos partikularna, l
odnosno relativan, tj. da vai samo u konkretno prepoznatljivoj
socijalnoj zajednici. Kulture i drutva (zajednice) prepoznaju se
po razliitim formama ali u kojima se izraava isti moralni sa-
draj. Partikularnost i relativnost oznaavaju stvarne konkret-
ne oblike normi u kojima se mogu prepoznati i univerzalno va-
ee vrijednosti kao idealne vrijednosti;
- od teze da svaka partikularna kultura i njezin etos - po-
stoji kao pluralizam etosa lokalnih zajednica odnosno kultura i
kulturnih tradicija. Unutar jednog drutva povijest je diferenci-
rala raznolikosti obiajnih i moralnih formi koje se prepoznaju u
nekoj kulturi kao prostorne (lokalne, regionalne) ili sociokultur-
84 II. Moderno drutvo i svjetski etos

ne (religijske, etnike) specifinosti. Etos je mogu samo u kon-


kretnoj sociokulturnoj osnovi, tj. u nekoj ljudskoj zajednici. Zato
su veoma vane dimenzije rasprava o svjetskom ekolokom eto-
su, one to se odnose na lokalne razine zajednice.
-od injenice da jo ne postoji jedno svjetsko drutvo<< koje
bi u vlastitim kulturnim tradicijama moglo utemeljiti svoj/e
etos/e - obiajnost. Ali, ve je izgraena arhitektura koja omo-
guava zajednitvo komunikacija na interkulturnoj (meuna
rodnoj) razini. Svjetski etos koji ne bi priznavao neke oblike za-
jednitva i sebe mislio ili prakticirao kao jedinstven etos bio bi
novo rtvovanje kultura<<, jedna nova ideologija;
- od injenice da se pitanje svjetskog ekolokog etosa po-
stavlja u najrazvijenijim drutvima (kulturama) ali kao opi pro-
blem ovjeanstva, a da je stvarni motiv zahtjeva za njegovim
uspostavljanjem unutarnja granica ekonomskog etosa modernog
drutva. Trokovi nastali u sukobu ekonomske i ekoloke racio-
nalnosti unutar modernog drutva, ne mogu se vie kompenzi-
rati jednostavnim mehanizmima eksternalizacije, jer se cjelo-
kupni industrijski sustav sudara s prirodnim granicama (kapaci-
tetom) a ne dravnim granicama.
- od teze da. ekoloka komunikacija postaje sve vanija za
budunost ovjeanstva. Danas je tehnika komunikacijski i po-
sredujui imbenik izmeu ovjeka i prirode i izmeu razliito
razvijenih drutava. Tehnika razdvaja i povezuje razliita dru-
tva. Ali, priroda je sve znaajniji oteavajui imbenik u komu-
nikaciji i razvoju, pa raspodjela<< prirode nije pitanje tehnikog
pristupa nego zajednikih vrijednosti ovjeanstva.
Raznolikost kultura, usporavanje ritma promjena i uvaa-
vanje novog drutvenog prirodnog stanja<< - novih okolnosti u
globalnom okoliu - ne prijei da i partikularni ekoloki etosi na
svojim razinama djeluju univerzalno kao imbenici ouvanja
ekolokog humaniteta. Pluralni ekoloki etos nije konzerviranje
stanja niti neka nova moralna konstrukcija svijeta, nego stalni
egzistencijalni dijalog izmeu ivih kultura (koje ne optereuju
poruke duhova predaka, nego duhovi buduih narataja) koje
meusobno sudbinski vezane ue zajedno i usporedo ivjeti. Jer,
; ,

ivot ljudske vrste i nije drugo do stalno uenje o nainima


su-ivljenja.
Closing the "Great Divide": New Social Theory on Society and Nature
Author(s): Michael Goldman and Rachel A. Schurman
Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26 (2000), pp. 563-584
Published by: Annual Reviews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/223457
Accessed: 12/02/2009 05:58

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Tenns and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/tenns.jsp. JSTOR's Tenns and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained pri or pennission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non~commcrcial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=annrevs.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or pr in ted
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build tmsted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platfonn that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Annual Reviews is co11aborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annual Review of
Sociology.


http://www.jstor.org
Annu. Re\'. Sociol. 2000. 26:563-84
Copyright 2000 by Annual Reviews. All rights resened

CLOSING THE "GREAT DIVIDE": New Social


Theory on Society and Nature

Michael Goldman and Rachel A. Schurman


Department of Sociology, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801;
e-mail: mgoldman@uiuc.edu, ras2@uiuc.edu

Key Words environmental sociology, ecological Marxism, political ecology,


ecofeminism, science studies, social theory
Abstract 1\venty years ago, two environmental sociologists made a bold call
for a paradigmatic shift itl the discipline of sociology-namely, one that would bring
nature into the center of sociological inquiry and recognize the inseparability of na-
ture and society. In this essay, we review recent scholarship that seeks to meet this
challenge. The respective strands of this literature come from the margins of environ-
mental sociology and border on other arenas of social theory production, including
neo-Marxism, political ecology, materialist feminism, and social studies of science.
Bringing together scholars from sociology, anthropology, geography, and history, each
of these strands offers what we consider the most innovative new work try ing to move
sociology beyond the nature/society divide.

INTRODUCTION

Jorge Luis Borges once remarked that the absence of camel s in the Koran
reveals the book's authenticity. It has roots in a culture in which carnels are
taken for granted. By the same logic, the neglect of nature in contemporary
Western social theory perhaps shows the extent to which the massive
appropriation of natural resources upon which the modem world depends
has come to be assumed as a fact of life. Yet if one instance of habituation
expres ses a millenarian dynamic between society and nature, the other
reflects the abrupt rise of a short-term perspective that threatens the future of
both nature and humanity.
(Coronill997, p. 21)

1\venty years ago, a bold and prescient call for a paradigmatic shift in the discipline
of sociology catapulted the field of environmental sociology onto the scene. 1\vo
early pioneers, Riley Dunlap and William Canon, emerged from Earth Day and
other politica! demonstrations to argue that sociology, despite the appearance of a
wide range of competing social theories, was actually composed of minor vari ants
of a single paradigm, the "human exemptionalism paradigm" (Catton & Dunlap

0360-0572/00/0815-0563$14.00 563
564 GOLDMAN SCHURMAN

1978, Dunlap 1997). From Marxism to symbolic interactionism, all were closely
linked by the common trait of anthropocentrism. Social dynamics that produce
environmental degradation and resource depletion would remain undertheorized,
or worse, ignored, they argued, without a "new ecological paradigm" to displace
the chauvinisms of the old. Moreover, the environment should not be introduced
as just another new variable or theme, but as a radically new way of thinking
about society. As the sun rose on the antinuclear, antitoxics, and limits-to-growth
movements, Dunlap and Catton asked sociology to retool with a lens that brings
nature into the center of sociological inquiry and recognizes the inseparability of
nature and society.
Dunlap and Catton's call to sociology has turned out to represent an exceedingly
difficult challenge. ln part, this has to do with the history of the discipline. Because
early theorists were trying to establish the need for a separate science of society,
nature was not a major concem or concept for exploration in classical sociological
theory. These classical sociologists sought to emphasize that which was outside
the domain of the dominant physical and natural sciences to legitimate themselves
and their discipline; the desire by some to distinguish their perspective from the
dominant scientific perspective of biological determinism also contributed to this
tendency. This was true of Marx and Engels, for example, who were in vigorous
debate with Malthusianism. ln emphasizing the social construction of natural lim-
its, they underemphasized the importance of the biophysical world (Bent on 1989)
and the inextricability of nature and society.
A second reason nature has not been better integrated into sociological the-
ory is related to the powerful influence that Enlightenment though! has had on the
structure and production of sociological knowledge. Although the subdiscipline of
environmental sociology has burgeoned in recent years, most of the literature treats
nature as a discrete and external object of study, one that can be known through
the application of an objective, dispassionate science. Yet as environmental histo
rian s, sociologists of science, and environmental philosophers have pointed out,
the Enlightenment ontology of nature as primordial, autonomous, and mechanis-
tic is highly problematic (Merchant 1980, 1989; Latour 1993; FitzSimmons &
Goodman 1998). Not only is the idea of nature socially constructed, but the "nat-
ural" is deeply embedded in all social forms (cf Williams 1980).
Over the past decade, environmental sociology has focused on the study of
"greening" as a new social trend that has worked its way into many of our major
social institutions. Environmental sociologists have investigated attitudinal, behav-
ioral, and consumer shifts, finding that the health of the biophysical world really
does matter to people, that many are willing to make changes consistent with this,
and that some social groups are particularly sensitive to environmental steward-
ship concerns (M oh ai 1992, Scott & Willi ts 1994, O zanne et al 1999). They have
analyzed state regulatory regimes, industrial production practices, and waste dis-
posal regimes (Schnaiberg & Gould 1994, Szasz 1994, Mol 1995, Sonnenfeld
1998), revealing the nexus among social protest, governmental regulatory ac-
tivity, media coverage, and industrial receptivity, or "ecological modemization"
CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE 565

(Spaargaren & Mol 1992, Freudenburg & Gramling 1994). They have brought
attention to the worst social inequities related to environmental pollution, degra-
dation, and disasters, helping to establish that environmental racism/injustice-or
the disproportionate displacement of waste and pollution on people of color and
working-class communities-is prevalent throughout the United States and be-
yond (Bullard 1990, 1993; Bryant & Mohai 1992). In addition, they have tracked
the rapid growth of environmental movements and collective behavior around en-
vironmental issues, finding new social movements that are vast, differentiated, and
highly strategic (Gottlieb 1993, Bullard 1993, Hofrichter 1993, Gould et all996).
These contributions have been productive and useful and have begun to in-
fluence other areas of sociology (e.g. social movements, development studies)
in important ways. Because others have successfully reviewed this literature
(Buttel1996, 1997; Pulido 1996; Dunlap 1997; Redclift & Woodgate 1997; Szasz
& Meuser 1997; Mol & Spaargaren 2000) our focus in this review is on litera-
ture that grapples specifically with a retheorization of the nature/society divide.
The respective strands of this literature come from the margins of environmental
sociology and border on other arenas of social theory production. Bringing to-
gether scholars from sociology, anthropology, geography, and history, each of these
strands-ecological Marxism, new political ecology, environmental feminism, and
sociology of knowledge and science-offers what we consider the most innovative
new work trying to make a paradigmatic shift away from nature/society dualisms.
At its best, we argue, this work brings into focus four critical insights: (a) not
only must society be studied as constitutive of nature and vice versa, but nature
must be understood as an actor with a conjoined materiality with society (Freuden-
burg et al 1995, Pickering 1996, Demeritt 1998); (b) sociology must become a
reftexive science that understands knowledge (including ecological knowledge)
as situated, partial, and internal to exercises of power, and people (as subjects
and scientists of inquiry) in their organically embodied and ecologically embed-
ded contexts; (e) studies of nature-society relations need to consider ecological
processes, political-economic stmctures, and meanings, values, and agency as
necessary and complementary components of analysis; and (d) the boundaries
assumed by traditional units of analysis (e.g. nation, economy, biology, cultnre,
or species) are inherently unstable and permeable (cf Buttel 1998). To the extent
that environmental sociology can further develop these insights and incorporate
them into its theoretical and empirical core, we suggest that it would not only
advance the subdiscipline, but could greatly affect the discipline of sociology as a
whole.

ECOLOGICAL MARXISM
Many have argued that the theoretical limit of the Marxist-socialist project has been
its preoccupation with a productivist paradigm that endorses unlimited economic
growth and ignores environmental degradation (Habermas 1984, Goldblatt 1996).
566 GOLDMAN SCHURMAN

Yet a new wave of social theory seeks precisely to overcome these charges (see
O'Connor 1988, 1998, and much of the work published in the journal Capitalism,
Nature, Socialism; Toledo 1989; M O'Connor 1994; Benton 1989, 1993, 1996;
Redclift & Benton 1994; Leff 1995; Harvey 1996; Foster 1999, 2000).
This theory is not rooted in nineteenth-century politics but in observations of
current political and environmental trends--e.g. air, land, and water pollution,
workplace and community-based movements against toxic poisoning and other
threats to human health-with hardly a trace of the "normative presuppositions of
unprincipled vanguardism" (Goldblatt 1996). It is neither stuck in an evolutionary
model of progress, nor does it glass over the contradictions of economic rationality.
On the contrary, it explicitly theorizes these contradictions, recognizing the rela-
tions between nature and society as profoundly dialectical (Goldfrank et al 1999).
Over the past decade, Marxist political economy has taken a major step for-
ward with James O'Connor's theoretical work on the current contradictions of
capitalism (1988, 1994, 1998). O'Connor has revitalized the Marxist notion of
contradiction by introducing nature alongside capital and labor as a fundamental
category. In addition to the prim ary contradiction, which exists between capital and
labor and reflects an overproduction or realization crisis, is a second contradiction
that exists between capital and labor on the one hand, and nature on the other.
Under certain circumstances, argues O' Connor, capitalism today undennines its
own production conditions, namely, human nature (labor power), nonhuman na-
ture (the extemal biophysical world), and the built environment (including public
space and infrastructure). As ecosystems become heavily polluted and mined,
workers and communities poisoned, and infrastructure destroyed, capitalists suf-
fer a cost crisis due to the high costs (economic and noneconomic) of revitalizing
degraded production conditions. To overcome these new barriers to expansion, cap-
ital must either restructure production conditions in productivity-enhancing ways,
or seek more social forms of reproducing the conditions of production. O'Connor
(1994) suggests that the latter does not seem likely to occur today because of the
large measure of regulation and planning required, which is anathema to current
ideological trends in most liberal democracies. More likely, individual capitals
will seek to lower their production costs through technological innovation, e.g.
through genetic engineering or by employing "toxic-eating" microorganisms to
clean up toxic spills. As this happens, "we [will] enter a world in which capital
does not merely appropriate nature, then tum it into conunodities ... but rather
a world in which capital remakes nature and its products biologically and physi-
cally (and poli tic ally and ideologically) in its own image." (O 'Connor 1994, p. 158;
emphasis ours).
Ted Ben ton is another sociologist actively pu sh ing Marxist sociology in a more
ecological direction (Benton 1989, 1993; Redclift & Benton 1994). His work
can be seen as an important touchstone for scholars trying to retheorize nature-
society relations through the prism of nature-based productive activities. Taking
Marx's focus on the labor proces s as his starting point, Ben ton argues that different
kinds of human activities have distinct "intentional structures" that go beyond
CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE 567

the primary ideal type identified by Marx (productive-transformative intentional


structures). By ignoring appropriative labor processes such as fishing or felling
trees, and ecoregulatory activities such as agriculture, Ben ton con tends that "Marx
underrepresents the significance of non-manipulable natural conditions of labor
processes and overrepresents the role of human intentional transfonnative powers
vis-a-vis nature" (Benton 1989, p. 64).
For Benton, ecoregulatory practices are labor processes that aim to sustain,
regulate, or reproduce rather than transform the conditions of agricultural pro-
duction. Benton suggests that the work of transformation in seed and livestock
production is actually carried out by organic and inorganic natural proces ses such
as photosynthesis and metabolism, which are "relatively impervious to intentional
manipulation." (Ben ton 1989, p. 68) There are strong parallels here with the work
of Stephen Bunker (1985, 1989, 1992; also see Barham et all994), who has also
attempted to theorize the difference between industrial or transformative activities
and resource extraction, and was one of the first sociologists seeking to ecologize
Marxism. Building on the work of both of these authors, a recent paper by Boyd
et al (1999) develops the idea of nature as actor in nature-based industries (e.g.
mining, agriculture, or silviculture), arguing that a direct reliance on the biophys-
ical world introduces a unique source of surprise, opportunity, and risk into the
capitalist production process.
Approaching the idea of nature in capitalist production from the field of semi-
otics, Martin O' Connor (1993) suggests that capital's response to ecological crisis
has been to represent formerly noncapitalist realms-the biophysical world, non-
industrialized economies, and the household-as reservoirs and stocks of "capi-
tal" and therefore no longer extemal to capitalism. Once particular conditions of
production are colonized in this way, argues O' Connor, it becomes possible to
justify their rational and ecological management by economic actors. That is, in
the semiotic shift toward the capitalization of nature, environmental degradation
and resource exhaustion are being diagnosed as management problems rather than
as a crisis or breakdown; this management exercise then becomes a new source of
dynamism for capitalism.
David Harvey, perhaps the most accomplished theorist of urban geography and a
major contributor to the ecological reformation of Marxism, takes us in yet another
direction (Harvey 1996). Instead of romanticizing the imagined world of nature,
Harvey focuses on the built environment-arguably the most common environ-
ment today, especially to the working class and, in some countries, for minority
ethnic groups. Harvey argues that nature is so mediated by capitalist structures
and practices that there is no other way to think of nature as currently experienced
except as a product of capital. Jn fact, Harvey's attention to the urban environ-
ment could be read as a corrective to the mainstream US environment movement's
parochial interpretation of environmental issues (see also Di Chiro 1998).
Besides reconceptualizing the idea of nature vis-a-vis capitalism, ecological
Marxists are also emphasizing how social movements and other agents of change
respond to capital-driven ecological transforrnations. James O'Connor (1998)
568 GOLDMAN o SCHURMAN

perceives many of today's social movements, from the pu blic health movement to
women's movements to movements of people of color, as a direct response to the
ecological contradictions of capitalism. Harvey (1996) has a similar interpretation
of the environmental justice movement as it unfolds in multiple local-to-global
sites around the world. Harvey draws together Raymond Williams' idea of "mil-
itant particularism" with his own notion of "global ambition" as a practical way
to overcome the pitfalls of "localist" politics. These politics often exclude peo-
ple with whom there could be potential solidarity, such as people from different
ethnic groups or nations but similar locations in relation to contemporary cap~
italism (see also Schaeffer 1997, Gille 2000). Daniel Faber's work on U.S. en-
vironmental movements makes a clear link between changes in U.S. capitalism,
social movement politics, and state regulatory practices (Faber 1998). He shows
that local-based environmental activists have stopped numerous planned municipal
incinerators and forced many public and private employers to clean up neighbor-
hoods and make workplaces s afer. These successful actions have, in tum, fed into
national and international political strategies for greater democratic participation
in decision-making processes over the means of production and the circulation of
toxic waste (see also Schaeffer 1999).
ln all of these discussions, the social "production of nature" is central (Smith
1984, 1998). Significantly, when ecological Marxists use the concept of produc-
tion, they do not relegate themselves only to the corridors of Fordist factories.
lndeed, their scholarship reveals an understanding of production in the broadest
terms-as social, economic, cultural, and ecological production, circulation, and
consumption. Nature is, or natu res are, internal to these transformations (LeFebvre
1991). This intellectual project-to comprehend both the social production of na-
ture and the natural production of society-is enormous. Now we will turn to
another literature that takes up this challenge from a different perspective.

NEW PO LITI CAL ECOLOGY


Refashioning traditional methodologies from geography and anthropology with
new tools from cultural and postcolonial studies, the new political ecology is a
flourishing terrain of scholarship that emphasizes locality-based studies of people
interacting with their environments. Whereas once this field was largely a remake
of cultural ecology with research on poverty and ecological stress in peasant pro-
duction practices, recently it has taken remarkable strides to retheorize not only
place-based analysis, but also social theory of nature in general. The formidable
task of new political ecology has been to articulate the natural as constitutive of the
social, and vice versa, unpacking these relations for a better understanding of the
po liti cal, ecological, and cultural. The literature has taken three approaches in its
latest inquiries: theorizing environmental struggles as both material and symbolic,
discursive practices as embodying power relations, and, unconventionally, land
use practices in the highly industrialized North.
CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE 569

Along the first of these lines, Rocheleau and Ross (1995) analyze the roles of
trees as "tools and text." They show how different social groups in the Dominican
Republic utilized the Acacia tree, as well as ideas about Acacia trees, in their ef-
forts to establish claims to land and other productive resources. Similarly, Donald
Moore's (1996) work on environmental struggles in Zimbabwe emphasizes the
symbolic aspects of peasant land claims. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci and
Raymond Williams, Moore contends that symbolic struggles effect material trans-
fonnation, and that CU1tural meanings are constitutive forces, that is, shapers of
11

history, and not simply reflections of a material base" (Moore, p. 127). A number
of scholars have interrogated the gendered nature of struggles over meaning (e.g.
Carney 1996, Bassett 1999, Rocheleau & Ross 1995), showing, for instance, how
men and women mobilize differing cultural understandings to justify their claims
over particular resources.
The inspiration for many of these analyses of ideology, symbolism, and the
cultural construction of meaning was Nancy Peluso's (1992) pioneering study of
the struggle between the Indonesian State and forest dwellers over the Indonesian
teak forests. Building on the works of E. P. Thompson and James Scott on cultures
of resistance, Peluso shows how the Indonesian State sought to maintain control
of the forests through a certain conception of property rights and an ideology of
criminality, and how forest dwellers challenged those conceptions by engaging in
"criminal behavior" and developing a counter-discourse on what is a fair, legal,
and legitimate use of the forest.
The account by Michael Watts ( 1998) of the putatively environmental struggles
over oil in southern Nigeria reveals an extraordinary social movement configura-
tion that created a new politics based on a constructed hybrid identity. Although
this "black gold" was found in the swamps where they lived, the Ogoni people
accumulated no oil wealth; moreover, the exploitation of oil helped destroy the
environment on which these people once thrived. Nonetheless, oil became more
than a natural resource for which the Ogoni had a natural affinity or on which they
built their natural/moral economy; it came to represent a discourse and artifact of
transnational petrol capital and the brutal state apparatuses that allowed for con-
stant oil spil! s and fi res, and murdered Ken Sara-Wiwa and other Ogoni leaders.
Watts' key contribution is his observation that this movement does not at all reflect
the imagined altemative movement that most seem to find dotting the postcolo-
nial map. The recent history of Ogoni oppositional politics reveals that a unified
conception of "Ogoniness" had to be inven ted for this moment, bringing together
the "locals" who otherwise did not have a common political identity, fighting for
rights to a nature (oil) for which they had no love, history, or locally privileged
knowledge.
Similarly, Fernando Coronil in The Magical State retells the modem history of
Venezuela from a new perspective that emphasizes oil and oil-producing land as
an autonomous force in the making of states and state-society relations. He argues
that the oil in petrostates such as Venezuela (and Nigeria) has an enorrnously
transforrnative effect on the body poli tic and the historical trajectory of a nation in
570 GOLDMAN SCHURMAN

terms of nationalism and state-building, wealth production and distribution, and


the subaltem modernity of a semiperipheral nation in the world-system (Coronil
1997).
A second, closely related line of the new po litica l ecology scholarship analyzes
alternative discourses on nature, the environment, and environmental degrada-
tion, seeking to understand the power dynamics circulating through Western truth
regimes related to North-South relations. Michael Dove (1993), for example, ex-
plores the way in which the Indonesian State, transnational nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), and Northern environmental movements frame the problem of
deforestation in the Indonesian rain forest as one of forest dweller impoverishment,
instead of as a reflection of the enormous inequalities characterizing Indonesian
society, as well as its relationship with the rest of the world. In a similar vein, Lucy
Jarosz (1996) analyzes colonial and postcolonial discourses on peasant land use
in Madagascar, revealing the state's efforts to control the terms of the debate as
to what counts as rational and irrational land use practices. Like Peluso, Jarosz
stres ses the way in which peasants' subaltern discourse s are developed as powerful
tools of resistance to state authority and as a basis for organizing against the state.
All of these works artfully combine political-economic analysis with much needed
attention to the discursive and ideological real ms and reveal how perceptions and
constructions of nature and poli ti cs actively shape material reality. They also re-
spond directly to Watts' criticism that political ecology's understanding of politics
needed to be broadened (Watts 1990, Peel & Watts 1996). Finally, discourse anal-
ysis has been used to explore and expose the power relations embodied in national
and global conservation agendas, including those of seemingly progressive envi-
ronmental groups (Peluso 1993, Schroeder 1995, Luke 1997, Goldman 1998).
A third approach in the new political ecology involves a shift to the North, where
scholars challenge the notion that urbanized and industrialized environments are
areas of no nature, with little effect on culture, politics, or identity. Studying the
North allows poli tica l ecologists to reconsidertheir assumptions about North-South
differences. For instance, in a study of two Chicano struggles in the southwest-
ern United States (the pesticide campaign of the United Farm Workers and the
Ganados del Valle Hi spano graz ing rights campaign), Laura Puli do concludes that
strugg! es over environmental issues are simultaneously struggles over livelihood,
an argument that has been made about many environmental struggles in the South
(Hecht & Cockburn 1990, Friedmann & Rangan 1993).
ln critical dialogue with scholars who analyze the role of race and ethnicity in
environmental politics, Pulido suggests that the literature on environmental jus-
tice/racism is effective in documenting the landscape of race-based injustice, but
does not capture the multifaceted dimensions of racism. When race becomes a
variable in studies on pollution, it can be effective in demonstrating a type of
racism in which race is statistically significant in the si ting of toxic producers. But
what about situations when it is not? Bee al.! se racism is so deeply implicated in our
institutions and material life, race-as-variable analyses often fail to capture many
structural, insidious, and enduring forms of oppression. Moreover, the evidence
CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE 571

presented by Pulido reveals an identity politics amongst oppressed minority and


ethnic communities that does not fit the common portrayal of these communities
as either closer to (e.g. Native Americans) or further from nature (e.g. African
Americans). Jn actively creating a new Hispano-pastoral culture to challenge
Anglo claims of superior environmental concerns, the Chicanos Pulido stud-
ies have effectively mobilized essentialist identities to their advantage (see also
Di Chiro 1998). In other words, what counts as nature and what works as nature
politics are two arenas that are being effectively remade by some environmen-
tal justice organizations and social movements as they confront their respective
adversaries and obstacles (Alston 1990, Hofrichter 1993, Szasz 1994).

ENVIRONMENTAL FEMINISM
In social theory, feminist theorists have always played a central role in working
through problematic ontological dualisms such as nature/culture, subject/object,
human/nonhuman, and the resulting naturalized classifications of sex, race, species,
and class (Soper I 995). There is common agreement amongst feminist theorists
that these distinctions emanate from a masculinist ideal of what it means to be truly
human, i. e. what characteristics do or do not qualify, which are attributed to nature
and which to culture, which to the animal kingdom and which to the human. From
there, however, agreement wavers; nowhere is it more true than with the wide range
of feminists who could fall under the rubric of environmental feminism, which,
for this essay, includes gender and feminist analyses of nature/social relations. A
brief perusal of works by Merchant (1980, 1992), Mellor (1997), and Sturgeon
(1997) shows that a diverse range of analytical frameworks exists on the question
of feminism and ecology.
Some find the origins of universalized oppression of women and nature rooted
in the Enlightenment and the (Western) scientization of society, with its conse-
quent objectification of nature as the formal object of dispassionate [read: male,
scientific] inquiry (Merchant I 980, I 992; Shiva I 989; Mies & Shiva 1993). Others
are less convinced by this macrostructural rigidity, yet maintain a strong critique of
dominant scientific practices and related oppressive effects for objects of science,
such as nature, and for subjects excluded from the scientific professions, such as
(until recently) women (Haraway 1991, 1997b; Martin 1994; Ginsburg & Rapp
1995; Downey & Dumit 1997). Nonetheless, the shared project of destabilizing
common myths around what is nature, culture, and biology, is yielding some of the
most fruitful scholarly work in social theory today. 1\vo substantive areas stand
out: gender and the environment, particularly in developing countries; and biotech-
nology and the poli tics of the body (human and nonhuman). These areas overlap
and cross-pollinate intellectually, with scholars borrowing from and contributing
to each other's work.
Through multiple lenses, feminists walk the tightrope of explicating what bio-
logical/ecological traits are meaningful for whom, and which are used as weapons.
572 GOLDMAN SCHURMAN

For example, an assumed promise of late capitalism is that we humans all have
the potential of transcending the biological limits of nature: to produce food with-
out soil, pro long human life with techno-surrogate body parts, and consume more
than the earth can sustain. Environmental feminists recognize that the promise of
Jimitless consumption exists, but only for the most privileged, for whom "[the]
Jimits are bome by others, including the earth itself" (Mell or 1997, p. 190). They
contend that biology does matter and, moreover, that it is a contested zone in which
constructed gender, race, class, nationality, and species differences have significant
consequences.ln contrast to the notion oftranscendence, which underlies Enlight-
enment thought on society's relationship to nature, environmental feminists the-
orize social-natural relations in terms of ecological embeddedness and biological
embodiment (Mell or 1997, Salleh 1997). This alternative perspective is associated
with the idea of immanence, or a reflexive awareness of one's position in nature.

Gender and the Environment


An important strand of recent feminist inquiry consists of gender analyses that em-
phasize the materialist and semiotic dimensions of the relationships of people to
each other and to nonhuman nature. The most sophisticated of this gender and the
environment (hereafter referred to as G&E) literature eschews the essentia!ist and
universa!izing character of the early "ecofeminist" literature (cf Starhawk 1990,
Shiva 1989) and the policy-oriented literature on women, environment, and devel-
opment emanating from the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and some inter-
national NGOs. Explicitly rejecting the notion that "women are to nature as men are
to culture; G&E scholars show how depictions of Third World women's sacred in
their naturalized indigeneity and affinity to nature, say much more about "the gaze
of western eyes" (Mohanty et al 1991) than they do about specific relationships
that women may have to the environment (Jackson 1994, Leach et al 1995).
G&E scholars argue that society-nature relations are patterned by gender, and
gender relations are fundamental to understanding resource access, use, and degra-
dation around the world (Agarwal 1992, 1994; Leach 1991, !994; Joekes et al
1995). Bina Agarwal (I 994), for example, deve! ops a gender analysis of land re-
lations in India to show how gender (as well as class/caste) relations at a variety
of levels (e.g. nation, village, household) mediate people's access to land and the
effects oflndia's land reform laws on women. Leach & Fairhead (1995) examine
gendered practices of gardening in Kuranko, Guinea, to illustrate how chang-
ing gender relations shaped, and were shaped by, local patterns of environmental
change. They also show how different land use practices by women and men cre-
ate gendered knowledges of agro ecological systems, a theme also highlighted by
Roche!eau (1995) and Mackenzie (1995).
Related to the notion that environmental know led ges are gendered is the point
that the very definition of environmental degradation vari es not only across differ-
ent societies and cultures, but also by gender, class, and race within a particular
society (Leach et al 1995, Joekes et al 1995, Shah & Shah 1995). Cecil e Jackson
CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE 573

(1994, 1995) takes this idea a step further by challenging the notion, common
among NGOs and multilateral development institutions, that the interests of women
and environmentalism are coterminous. She notes that the presumed synergy be-
tween women's interests and environmental interests derives from the observation
that "because of their daily tasks-growing food and gathering water, fuel and
fodder-poor women are especially dependent upon the natural resources of the
environment and the first to suffer when the environment becomes degraded"
(Davidson et al 1992, cited by Jackson 1995). However, as her study of conju-
gal contracts in southern Zimbabwe shows, the well being of particular groups of
women and of particular environments can also be at odds. More generally, she
observes that the dominant, yet often incorrect, as sumption of synergy can lead to
development projects that place extra burdens on women, as they are expected to
provide the labor to effect change (Jackson 1994).

The Polities of the Body


A second area of theorization is associated with recent work on the reinvention of
the body, particularly in the contested terrain of reproduction. One strand of this
literature focuses on the technologies of contraception and sterilization used, co-
ercively or otherwise, whereas another emphasizes the latest medical technologies
with which women interact in dealing with concerns about pregnancy and fertility.
The former reflects on the twin-headed hydra in public discourse on the fate of
the planet-overpopulation and environmental degradation-and how solutions
are typically sought in "depoliticized" global instruments of reproductive control,
namely, contraception and sterilization. The latter draws attention to the fluid di-
vide between private and public, for example pu blic discourse s on what parts of a
woman's body are hers and which are not and when public citizenship should be
awarded to a developing fetus and when it should not.
Over the years, feminists have shown that the discourse on population con-
trol/family planning has been characterized by zenophobism as well as reduction-
ism, which not only enables international and state agencies to manipulate the
bodies and rights of women but seeks to stabilize certain nations of family, race,
nation, and social order (Hartmann 1987, Mohanty et al 1991, Scheper-Hughes
1992, Ginsburg & Rapp 1995, Bandarage 1997). Although this critique of conven-
tional reproduction poJiti cs is not new, it has served as the basis for investigating
how other bodily interventions have proliferated in scope and scale (Franklin &
Ragone 1998). Both old and new studies help us rethink social theory in light of
the con tested terrain of human biology, nature, and technology.
Martin, Rapp, Ginsberg, Clarke, Cussi ns, and others have created a sub field of
inquiry on the anthropology of the body with global topics of exploration such as
AIDS (Booth 1998, Treichler 1999), viruses and immunities (Martin 1994), and
the trade in bodies, body parts, and body fluids. Many of these studies find kinship
networks that are effectively strewn across the planet, as far as a frozen embryo,
tissue, or sperm can travel, blurring traditional distinction s among-and requiring
574 GOLDMAN SCHURMAN

new ontological definitions of-animal, human, race, and technology (Cussins


1998). Such analyses lead to questions about the directions in which "possessive
individualist" capitalist culture is being taken, if parts of the person/body are being
spread across time and space. As Martin (1998, p. 78) asks: "Who is the owner
of these new bodies? How do these new techno-science incursions destabilize
existing ownership structures of nature and person hood?"
Some suggest that the body itself has become an accumulation strategy. Indeed,
capital accumulation now occurs within cell membranes functioning as microfacto-
ries within our bodies, giving new meaning to the idea of social (and natural) labor
and blurring the line between production and reproduction. Emily Martin (1998)
periodizes scientific and popular perceptions of the function of the human body in
western capitalist societies into a Fordist accumulation strategy of mass production
and distribution of commodified contraceptive and menstmal products, and a post-
Fordist regime of individualization and deep intervention in the form of surgical
interventions, feta! surveillance, and genetic testing. ln the latter, the body and bod-
ily practices are not just commodified, but nature is capitalized and remade (note
the overlap with J O' Connor, cited above). Others studying global biodiversity
and human genome proj ects-the collection of seemingly scarce global resources
(humanlnonhuman) for classifying, saving, and valorizing-reveal how emerging
markets for gene information represent new arenas for capital accumulation as
well as the reconstitution of meanings and structures of human and nonhuman
natures (Hayden 1998; Flitner 1998; Heath 1997; Haraway 1997a, b; Rose 1998;
Wilkie 1996). As Haraway (1997a) notes, some view the production and patenting
of transgenic organisms as the last straw for upsetting the "natural telos, or self-
defining pm-pase" of all life forms; whereas others (such as Haraway herself) see
much more ambiguity, contention, and potential political transformation in these
and other sociotechnological developments.
Feminist scholars of the body po litic and bio logic also inquire into the distribu-
tional implications of these interventions, asking questions such as: Which social
groups have access to these new reproductive technologies, and which are provid-
ing the raw material for the cell, tissue, and body-parts trade? Could these scientific-
corporate incursions into the bodies of indigenous peoples (the ambition of the
alternative Human Genome Diversity Project) and ecosystems (the ambition ofbio-
prospecting projects) find some salve to modem diseases while also deepening local
and global structures of inequality? Are these new missions, endowed with rarefied
technical expertise and new strategies forcapitalizing nature, creating new forms of
race- and class-based exploitation (Haraway 1997b, Flitner 1998, Hayden 1998)?

SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE, AND POWER

As several scholars have astutely observed, environmentalism today (as scholar-


ship,politics, and activism) depends heavily upon environmental science for its rea-
soning and observations (Yearley 1994, Beck 1992, Buttel & Taylor 1994). From
CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE 575

global wanning to bacterial water contamination, most modem environmental


issues have become "knowable" only through particular scientific practices and
with technologies with limited accessibility (e.g. super-capacity computers, satel-
lites, or laboratory infrastructure). Even for those issues that first become pub-
lic through detection by those who are not professional scientists (e.g. people
living downwind from toxic incinerators), science has become a contested site
for problem definition, problem framing, and risk adjudication, with tremen-
dous legal, financial, and political ramifications (Irwin 1995, Agarwal & Narain
1991).
Recognizing that environmental science has been an undertheorized domain,
a handful of sociologists have begun to critically examine the practice of envi-
ronmental science and the production of scientific knowledge on nature and the
environment. Among the first to try to fill this lacuna were Buttel and colleagues
(Buttel et al 1990, Taylor & Buttel 1992, Buttel & Taylor 1994). In "How Do We
Know We Have Global Environmental Problems?," Taylor & Buttel (1992) used
The Limits to Growth study and the global climate change issue to show that "pol-
itics are woven into environmental science at its 'upstream' end" (Taylor & Buttel
1992, p. 406). They argued that global constructs of environmental issues involve a
universalizing discourse that steers us away from the difficult poli ti cs of enduring
structural inequalities and differentiated interests and toward technomanagerial-
ist remedies, preferred (and constituted) by elite, Northern-based scientists and
bureaucrats.
Although acknowledging the insights of Buttel and Taylor's "interest-based"
analysis of science, Brian Wynne (1994) argues that it does not fully capture "the
deeper sense in which scientific knowledge tacitly reflects and reproduces nor-
mative models of social relations, cultural and moral identities, as if these were
natural" (Wynne 1994, p. 176). Wynne contends there is a need to interrogate
science for its virtually invisible cultural constructions of the human subject (e. g.
as a rational, utility-maximizing actor) and its connections to the cultural milieu
of late modern society. The point of such an interrogation is not to debunk scien-
tific knowledge, but ratl1er to expose its unspoken social and moral commitments
(Wynne 1994, p. 188). Such cultural analyses of science underscore the point
that there is no one-to-one correspondence between nature and its representations,
and that all human understandings of nature are crucially mediated by social and
cultural practices, assumptions, and belief systems.
The "social studies of science" literature, of which Wynne is a part, has stim-
ulated innovative conceptualizations of nature-society relations and agency. The
most exciting of this work theorizes nature and society not as separate--<>r
separable-entities, but in terms of their "conjoined materiality" (Demeritt 1998)
or "conjoint constitution" (Freudenburg et all995). In these renderings of nature-
society relations, nature and society are effectively coproduced through the recip-
rocal and symmetric interplay of the social and the physical (Pickering 1996).
Bruno Latour (1993), operating within the framework of actor-network the-
ory, suggests that there is no such thing as pure nature or pure society, only
576 GOLDMAN SCHURMAN

nature-culture hybrids (for useful reviews of actor-network theory, see Hes s 1997
and the forthcoming book by CT Cussins). Following Michel Serres, Latour sug-
gests that nature-culture hybrids are "quasi-objects, quasi-subjects" which stand
in between the two Modern poles of Nature and Society. In this "Middle King-
dom," humans and nonhumans produce "artifactual nature" through their col-
lective associations, known as networks. Donna Haraway (1991) also develops
the idea of nature as artifact, introducing the notion of the "cyborg" to sug-
gest that we are all composed of the natural-technological-social. She uses the
metaphor of kinship to acknowledge that humans and nonhumans are active
partners in the enterprise of making nature, society, and what counts as real-
ity. These and other authors working in this vein (Pickering 1995, 1996;
FitzSimmons & Goodman 1998) advocate an understanding of agency that en-
compasses human as well as nonhuman actors, emphasizing the collective, rather
than individual, character of natural-social agency (Latour 1993, Callon & Law
1995).

'Green' Knowledge/Power
Whereas some look at the production of scientific knowledge from the perspec-
tive of political interests (e.g. Taylor & Buttel 1992), others take a different
approach by considering how particular cultural-social values become natural-
ized and diffused beyond the intentions of any particular interests (Mackenzie
1995; Escobar 1995; Luke 1997; Goldman 1998, 2000; Dari er 1999). These schol-
ars deploy a Foucauldian analysis of power/knowledge (Foucault 1980, Burchell
et al 1991) for which exercises of power and the accumulation of (environ-
mental) knowledge are co-constitutive, producing power relations and scientific
discourses that are intentional yet nonsubjective. These power/knowledge re-
lations are imbued with calculation, rationality, and a productive influence on
global norms of ecological and social governance (i.e. what constitutes the
eco-rational citizen or state). Hence, we find globalizing discourses of environ-
mentalism, reproduced by nonstate international institutions-e.g. NGO, inter-
governmental, and scientific networks-that energetically push to establish uni-
versalizing norms, behaviors, and procedures to regulate the security of the
environment. These power/knowledge incursions eli de heterogeneity and conflict
and instead represent the world as rational, consensual, and easily molded for
sustainability.
For example, tools such as environmental impact assessments and green cost-
benefit analyses are now commonly used by public and private agencies around
the world, and they are, in fact, often requirements for governments seeking in-
ternational debt relief and financial support from institutions such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Yet despite their practice in vastly
different settings (e.g. Laos, Lesotho, or Lithuania), environmental impact as-
sessments and cost-benefit analyses rarely reOect localized cultural forms and
norms. but. rather, newly contrived universal norms and models of sustainability,
CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE 577

resource valuation, and degradation. The kinds of questions this knowledge/power


literature asks include the following: What specific micro-technologies of power
do these new methodologies and sciences engender? What perspectives, issues,
and questions get disguised, buried, or eliminated (i.e. subjugated knowledges) in
the production and circulation of these universal scientific tools and models (i.e.
elite knowledge)?
Scholars working from this perspective have begun to theorize nature-society
relations in Foucauldian terms of biopolitics and biopower (Dean 1994, Burchell
et al I 991 ). For example, Arturo Escobar's (1995) analysis of development dis-
course deconstructs the concept of sustainable development as deployed in the
South by Northem-based institutions. Playing with Carolyn Merchant's trenchant
analysis of the Enlightenment, Escobar argues that these institutions have brought
about the semiotic "death of nature" and replaced it with the "rise of the envi-
ronment," a discursive strategy rooted in the destructive processes of post-World
War ll development and the proliferation of new goveming strategies of nature.
Everything in nature that is useful for increased industrial production falls un-
der the rubric of the environment; all else disappears. Moreover, localized forms
of knowledge become useful only in as much as they serve the new disciplinary
mechanisms oflocal"participation" and global integration. The new scientific dis-
courses of economism and ecologism coalesce under new regimes of power that,
Escobar concludes, do more to undermine ecological-social balances around the
world than to sustain them.
Studying the changing agrarian landscape in rural India, Akhil Gupta (1998)
argues that new technological innovations in biotechnology, intellectual property
rights, and bioengineered seeds and food products are factors in the respatializa-
tion of sovereignty, that is, who controls what farmers can grow on what land,
and the reconfiguration of socio-ecological relations. Gupta contends that new
global environmental regulations emanating from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit
and other global accords have given birth to new technologies of govemment un-
hitched from the nation-state and found in the realm of transnationality
(cf Ong 1999). In his work on the World Bank, Michael Goldman (2000) uses
the term eco-govemmentality to denote the rapid diffusion of power/knowledge
technologies that simultaneously operate on the levels of the individual, society,
and the state. These practices are at the center of new political ba tt les over what
counts as nature and environmental problems, and what constitutes an eco-rational
citizen.
According to these scholars, this type of green knowledge production has be-
come prolific, controversial, and hegemonic. Its "ways of seeing" have poured
through the arteries of popular, political, and economic networks that have as their
mission the accumulation of knowledge for the control of nature's value. It is a
process that frames current discourses of sustainability, and disguises the engines
of capitalist expansion as liberalizing and rational. In short, the production of
green knowledge should be understood as internal to, and constitutive of, new and
existing exercises of power.
578 GOLDMAN SCHURMAN

CONCLUSION

In this essay, we have tried to show that recent theorizing on social-natural relations
has been highly dynamic. From a multitude of perspectives, social theorists are
grappling with the entrenched idea that nature and society are phenomenologically
and scientifically distinct. In the process, new research agendas and methodological
approaches are being crafted. Because ecological (and social) problems traverse
conceptual, geographic, and species boundaries, human membranes as well as
cultures, these scholars suggest that social analysis must follow them wherever
they lead.
From this literature, we have also !earned to recognize nature-culture hybrids-
people, organisms, and things that are more complex than the distinctions between
human and nonhuman suggest. This idea is useful for understanding the pro-
duction and effects of new biotechnologies and commodities, which can lead
to new political identities, tools, and strategies. However, it is not useful-and
this is our biggest caveat-if the lens on this latest trend in commodity pro-
duction sidetracks social theorists into digging up the spectacular at the cost of
losing sight of the fundamental. Sociology remains at its best when it tries to
understand how new and enduring structures, institutions, and practices exploit
and dominate people and nature, as well as reveal new strategies for emancipa-
tory politics. We believe that once scholars begin to rethink the framework of
the society-nature divide, other cherished but ftawed ideas will also reveal their
weaknesses. We hope that from this process, a new sociological imagination will
spring.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We thank Tuba Osttiner for her very he! pfui research assistance on this article.

Visit the Annual Reviews home page at www.AnnuaiReviews.org

LITERATURE CITED
Agarwal A, Narain S. 1991. Global Warm ing in Social Justice, Race, and Environment.
an Unequal World: a Case of wironmental Washington, DC: PAN OS. 32 pp.
Colonialism. Centre for Sci. Environ. New Bandarage A. 1997. Women, Population and
Delhi, India. 88 pp. Global Crisis: A Political-Economic Anal-
Agarwal B. 1992. The gender and environ~ ysis. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books.
ment debate: lessons from India. Fem. Stud. 397 pp.
18:119-58 Barharn B, Bunker SG, O'Hearn D, eds.
Agarwal B. 1994. A Field ofOne's Own: Gen- 1994. States, Firms, and Raw Materials: The
der and Land Rights in South Asia. New \\Vrld Economy and Ecology oj Alumiman.
York: Cambridge Univ. Press Madison, \Vl: Univ. Wise. Press. 341
Alston D, ed. 1990. We Speak for Ourselves: pp.
CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE 579

Bassett TJ. 1999. Contested cropping: peasant Burchell G, Gordon C, Miller P. 1991. The
col/on and the spaces of gender po/itics Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality.
in northern Cote d'lvorie. Presented at Chicago, IL: Univ. Chicago Press. 307 pp.
Conf. on Peasants Comp. Interdiscip. Per- Buttel FH. 1996. Environmental and resource
spect.: Landsc. Identity Nat. Power, Univ. Ill. sociology; theoretical issues and opportu-
Urbana-Champaign nities for synthesis. Rural Social. 61:56-
Beck U. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New 76
Modernity. London: Sage. 260 pp. Buttel FH. 1997. Social institutions and en-
Benton T. 1989. Marxism and natural limits: an vironmental change. In The International
ecological critique and reconstruction. New Handbook of Sociology, ed. M Redclift, G
Left Re~< 178:51-86 Woodgate, pp. 40-53. Cheltenhaum, UK:
Benton T. 1993. Natural Relations: Eco/og)~ Elgar.
Animal Rights, and Social Justice. London: Buttel FH. 1998. Some observations on states,
Verso world orders, and the politics of sustainabil-
Benton T, ed. 1996. The Green ing of Marxism. ity. Organ. Environ. 11:261~86
New York: Guilford. 31 O pp. Buttel FH, Hawkins A, Power AG. 1990. From
Booth KM. 1998. National mother, global limits to growth to global change: contrasts
whare and transnational femocrats: the poli- and contradictions in the evolution of envi-
ties of AIDS and the construction of women ronmental science and ideology. G/ob. Envi-
at the \Vorid Health Organization. Fem. Stud. ron. Chang. l :57-U6
24:115-39 Buttel FH, Taylor P. 1994. Environmental so-
Boyd W, Prudham W, Schurman R. 1999. In- ciology and global environmental change:
dustrial Dynamics and the Problem of Na- a critical assessment. In Social Theory and
ture. Energy and Resour. Group, Berkeley, the Global Environment, ed. M Redclift,
Calif. T Ben ton, pp. 228-55. New York: Routledge.
Bryant Bl, Mohai P. 1992. Race and t/ze ln- 271 pp.
cidence of Environmemal Hazards: A Time Call on M, Law J. 1995. Agency and the hybrid
For Discourse. Boulder, CO: Westview. collectif. S. At/. Q. 94:481-507
251 pp. Camey JA. 1996. Converting the wetlands, en-
Bullard RD. 1990. Dumping in Dixie: Race, gendering the environment: the intersection
Class, and Environmental Quality. Boulder, of gender with agrarian change in Gambia.
CO: Westview. 195 pp. In Liberation Ecologies: Environment, De-
Bullard RD. 1993. Confronting Environmental velopment, Social Movements, ed. R Peet,
Racism: Voices from the Grassroots. Boston, M Watts, pp. 165-87. New York: Routledge.
MA: South End Press. 259 pp. 273 pp.
Bunker SO. 1985. Underdeveloping the Catton WRJ, Dunlap RE. 1978. Environmen-
Amazon: Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and tal sociology: a new paradigm. Am. Social.
the Failure of the Modem State. Urbana, IL: 13:41-49
Univ. Ill. Press. 279 pp. Coronil F. 1997. The Magical State: Na
Bunker SG. 1989. Staples, links, and poles in tllre, Mone;~ and Modernity in Venezuela.
the construction of regional development the- Chicago, IL: Univ. Chicago Press. 447 pp.
ories. Social. Forum 4:589~610 Cussins CT. 1998. Producing reproduction:
Bunker SO. 1992. Natural resource extraction techniques of nonnalization and natural iza-
and power differentials in a global economy. tion in infertility clinics. In Reproducing Re-
In Understanding Economic Process, ed. S production, ed. S Franklin, H Ragone, pp.
Ortiz, S Lees, pp. 61-84. Washington, DC: 66-101. Philadelphia, PA: Univ. Pa. Press.
Univ. Press Am. 245 pp.
580 GOLDMAN SCHURMAN

Cussins cr. 2000. Primate Encounters: Mod- the reproduction of food. In Remaking Real-
els ofScience, Gender, and Society. Chicago, ity: Nature at the Millennium, ed. B Braun,
IL: Univ. Chicago Press. In press N Castree. pp. 194-220. London: Routledge.
Darier E, ed. 1999. Discourses of the Environ~ 295 pp.
ment. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Flitner M. 1998. Biodiversity: of local corn-
Davidson J, Myers D, Chakraborty M. 1992. No mons and global commodities. In Privatiz-
1ime to Waste Poverty and the Global Envi- ing Nature: Politica/ Strugglesfor the Global
ronment. Oxford, England: Oxfam. 217 pp. Commons,ed. M Goldman,pp. 144-16. New
Dean M. 1994. Critical and Effective Histories: Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press
Foucault's Methods and Historical Sociol- Foster JB. 1999. Marx's theory of metabolic
ogy. London: Routledge. 237 pp. rift: classical foundations for environmental
Demeritt D. 1998. Science, social construc- sociology. Am J. Sociol. 105:366-405
tivism and nature. In Remaking Reality: Na- Foster JB. 2000. Marx's Ecology: Materialism
ture at the Millennium, ed. B Braun, N and Nature. New York: Mon. Rev.
Castree, pp. 173-93. New York: Routledge. Foucault M. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected
295 pp. Jmeniews and Other Writings, 1972-1977.
Di Chiro G. 1998. Nature as community: New York: Pantheon. 270 pp.
the convergence of environment and so- Foucault 1991
cial justice. In Privatizing Nature: Po/iti- Franklin S, Ragone H, eds. 1998. Reproduc-
cal Struggles for the Global Commons, ed. ing Reproduction. Philadelphia, PA: Univ.
M Goldman, pp. 120-42. New Brunswick, Pa. Press. 245 pp.
NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press. 257 pp. Preudenburg WR, Prickel S, Gramling R. 1995.
Dove MR. 1993. A revisionist view of tropi- Beyond the nature/society divide: learning
cal deforestation and development. Environ. to think about a mountain. Sociol. Forum
Conserv. 20:17-56 10:361-92
Downey GL, Dumi t J, eds. 1997. Cyborgs and Freudenburg WR, Gramling R. 1994. Oil in
Citade/s. Santa Fe, NM: Seh. Am. Res. Press Troub/ed Waters: Perceptiorts, Politics, and
Dunlap RH. 1997. The evolution of environ- the Battle over Offshore Oil. Albany, NY:
mental sociology: a brief history and assess- State Univ. N. Y. Press. 179 pp.
ment of the American experience. In The In- Friedmann J, Rangan H, eds. 1993. ln De-
ternational Handbook of Environmemal So- fense of Livelihood: Comparative Studies on
ciology, ed. M Rede! i ft, G Woodgate, pp. 21- Environmental Action. West Hartford, CT:
39. Chellenhaum, UK: Elgar. 485 pp. Kumarian Press. 219 pp.
Escobar A. 1995. Encountering Development: Gille Z. 2000. Cognitive cartography in a
The Making and Unmaking of the Third European wasteland: multinationals and
World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. greens vie for village allegiance. In Global
290 pp. Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and
Faber D, ed. 1998. The Struggle for Eco- lmaginations irt a Postmodem World, ed.
logical Democracy: Environmental Justice M Burawoy, JA Blum, S George, Z Gille,
Movemellfs in the United States. New York: T Gowan, et al, pp. 345-78. Berkeley, CA:
Guilford. 366 pp. Univ. Calif. Press. 611 pp.
Ferguson J. 1990. The Anti-Politics Mac/tine; Ginsburg FD, Rapp R, eds. 1995. Conceiving
"Development," Depoliticization, Bureau- the New World Order: The Global Politics
cratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis, MN: of Reproduction. Berkeley, CA: Univ. Calif.
Univ. Minn. Press. 320 pp. Press. 450 pp.
FitzSimmons M, Goodman D. 1998. Incorpo- Goldblatt D. 1996. Social Theory and the Envi-
rating nature: environmental narratives and ronmelll. Boulder, CO: Westview. 247 pp.
CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE 581

Goldfrank WL, Goodman D, Szasz A, eds. est interventions. In Citadels and Cyborgs:
1999. Ecology and the IVor/d-System. Lon- Anthropological Interventions in Emerging
don: Greenwood Sciences and Technologies, ed. GL Downey,
Goldman M, ed. 1998. Privatizing Nature: Po- J Dumit,pp. 67-82. Santa Fe, NM: Seh. Am.
litica! Struggles for the Global Commons. Res. Press. 312 pp.
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press. Hecht S, Cockburn A. 1990. The Fate of the
252 pp. Forest: Developers, Destroyers and Defend
Goldman M. 2000. 'Greening' the Globe: The e rs ofthe Amazon. New York: HarperCollins.
New Politics and Science of the n0rld Bank. 357 pp.
Soc. Dep., Univ. III. Urbana-Champaign Hess DJ. 1997. Science Studies: An Advanced
Gottlieb R. 1993. The Transfonnation of lmroduction. New York: N. Y. Univ. Press.
the American Environmental Movemelll. 197 pp.
Washington, DC: Island Press. 413 pp. Hofrichter R, ed. 1993. Toxic Strugg/es: The
Gould KA, Schnaiberg A, Weinberg AS, eds. Theory and Practice of Environmental Jus
1996. Local Emiromnental Struggles: Citi- tice. Philadelphia, PA: New Society Pu bl. 260
zen Activism in the Treadmill of Production. pp.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 239 Irwin A. 1995. Citizen Science: A Study of
pp. People, E\pertise, and Sustainable Develop
Gupta A. 1998. Postcolonial Developmems: ment. New York: Routledge. 198 pp.
Agriculture in the Making of Modem India. Jackson C. 1994. Gender analysis and environ
Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press. 409 pp. mcntalisms. In Social Theory and the Global
Habennas J. 1984. The Theory of Communica- Environment, ed. M Redclift, T Benton, pp.
tive Action. Boston, MA: Beacon 113-49. New York: Routledge. 271 pp.
Haraway DJ. 1991. Simians, Cyborgs, and Jackson C. 1995. From conjugal contracts to
Women: The Rdnvenlion of Nature. New environmental relations: some thoughts on
York: Routledge. 287 pp. labor and technology. Inst. Dev. Stud. Bull.
Haraway DJ. 1997a. Mice into wormholes: a 26:33-39
comment on the nature of no nature. ln Jarosz L. 1996. Defining deforestation in
Citade/s and Cyborgs: Anthropological Jn. Madagaskar. In Liberation Eco/ogies: En
tenentions in Emerging Sciences and Tech vironment, Development, Social Movements,
nologies, ed. GL Downey, J Dumi t, pp. 209- ed. R Peet, M Watts, pp. 148-64. New York:
44. Santa Fe, NM: Seh. Am. Res. Press Routledge. 273 pp.
Haraway DJ. 1997b. Modest Witness at Second Joekes S, Leach M, Green C, eds. 1995. Gen-
Millennium: FemaleMan Meets OncoMouse. der relations and environmental change. !DS
New York: Routledge. 287 pp. Bull. (Suppl.)26(1) 102 pp.
Hartmann B. 1987. Reproductive Rights and Latour B. 1993. We Have Never Been Modem.
Wrongs: The Global Politics of Popula Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. 157
tion Control and Contraceptive Choice. New pp.
York: Harper & Row. 368 pp. Leach M. 1991. Engenderingenvironments: un
Harvey D. 1996. Justice, Nature and the Ge derstanding the West African forest zone.
ography of Difference. Cambridge, MA: IDS Bull. 22:17-24
Blackwell. 468 pp. Leach M. 1994. Rainforest Relations: Gender
Hayden CP. 1998. A biodiversity sampler for and Resource Use Among the M ende o/Gola,
the millennium. In Reproducing Reproduc Sierra Leone. Washington, DC: Smithsonian
tion, ed. S Franklin, H Ragone, pp. 173-206. Inst. Press. 272 pp.
Philadelphia, PA: Univ. Pa. Press Leach M, Fairhead J. 1995. Ruined settle-
Heath D. 1997. Bodies, anti-bodies, and mod- ments and new gardens: gender and soil
582 GOLDMAN SCHURMAN

ripening among Kuranko fanners in the duction: Ecological Modernization Theory


forest~savanna
transition zone. IDS Bull. in the Chemical Industry. Utrecht, The
26:24-32 Netherlands: Van Arke!. 452 pp.
Leach M, Joekes S, Green C. 1995. Gender re- Mol APJ, Spaargaren G. 2000. Ecological mod-
lations and environmental change. IDS Bull. ernisation theory in debate: a review. Emiron.
26:1-8 Poli t. 9: In press
LeFebvre H. 1991. The Production of Space. Moore DS. 1996. Marxism, culture and po-
Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 454 pp. litica! ecology: environmental struggles in
Leff E. 1995. Green Production: Toward Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands. In Libera-
an Environmental Rationalit). New York: tion Ecologies, ed. R Peel, M Watts, pp. 125-
Guilford. 168 pp. 147. New York: Routledge. 273 pp.
Luke TW. 1997. Ecocritique: Contesting the O'Connor J. 1988. Capitalism, nature, social-
Po/itics of Natttre, Economy, and Culture. ism: a theoretical introduction. Capital. Nat.
Minneapolis, MN: Univ. Minn. Press. 253 pp. Sac. 1:11-38
Mackenzie E 1995. Selective silence: a feminist O'Connor J. 1994. Is sustainable capitalism
encounter with the environmental discourse possible? In ls Capitalism Sustainable? Po-
in colonial Africa. In Power of Development, litica! Economy and the Politics of Ecol-
ed. J Crush, pp. !OG--12. New York: Rout- ogy, ed. M O'Connor, 152-175. New York:
ledge. 324 pp. Guilford
Martin E. 1994. Flexible Bodies: Tracking Im- O'Connor J. 1998. Natural Causes: Essays in
munity in American Culture from the Days Ecological Marxism. New York: Guilford.
of Polio to the Age of AIDS. Boston, MA: 350 pp.
Beacon. 320 pp. O'Connor M. 1993. On the misadventures of
Martin E. 1998. Fluid bodies, managed nature. capitalist nature. Capital. Nat. Soc. 4:1-40
In Remaking Reality: Nature at the Mille O'Connor M, ed. 1994. ls Capitalism Sustain-
nium, ed. B Braun, N Castree, pp. 64-83. able? Political Economy and the Politics of
New York: Routledge. 295 pp. Ecology. New York: Guilford. 283 pp.
Mellor M. 1997. Feminism and Ecology. New Ong A. 1999. Flexible Citizenship: The Cul-
York: N. Y. Univ. Press. 221 pp. tural Logics of Transnationalif)~ Durham,
Merchant C. 1980. The Death of Nature: NC: Duke Univ. Press. 322 pp.
Women, Ecolog)~ and the Scientific Revolu Ozanne LK, Humphrey CR, Smith PM. 1999.
timt. San Francisco: Harper & Row Gender, environmentalism, and interest in
Merchant C.l989. Ecological Revolutions: Na forest certification: Mohai's paradox revis-
ture, Getu/er and Science in New England. ited. Soc. Nat. Resour. 12:613-22
Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. N. C. Press Peet R. Watts M, eds. 1996. Liberation
Merchant C. 1992. Radica/ Ecology. London: Ecologies: Environment, Development, So-
Routledge. 276 pp. cial Mo1ements. New York: Routledge. 273
Mies M, Shiva V. 1993. Ecofeminism. London: pp.
Zed Books. 328 pp. Peluso NL. 1992. Rich Forests, Poor People:
Mohai P. 1992. Men, women, and the environ- Resource Control and Resistance in Java.
ment: an examination ofthe gender gap in en- Berkeley, CA: Univ. Calif. Press. 321 pp.
vironmental concern and activism. Soc. Nat. Peluso NL. 1993. Coercing conservation? The
Resour. 5:1-19 poli ti cs of state resource control. Glob. Env-
Mohanty Cf, Russo A, Torres L. 1991. Third iron. Chang. 3:199-217
World Women and the Politic s of Feminism, Pickering A. 1995. The Mangle of Practice:
Bloomington, IN: Ind. Univ. Press Time, Agency and Science. Chicago, IL:
Mol APJ. 1995. The Refinement of Pro- Univ. Chicago Press. 281 pp.
CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE 583

Pickering A. 1996. Further beyond the tion: foresting Gambian gardens. Alllipode
society/nature divide: a comment on 27:325-42
Freudenburg, Frickel, and Gramling. Social. Scott D, Willits FK. 1994. Environmental atti-
Forum 11:151-57 tudes and behavior. Environ. Beha v. 26:239-
Pulido L. 1996. Environmentalism and Eco- 60
nomic Justice: 1\vo Chicano Strug gles bi the Shah MK, Shah P. 1995. Gender, environment
Southwest. Thcson, AZ: Univ. Ariz. Press. and livelihood security: an alternative view
282 pp. point from India. IDS Bull. 26:75-82
Redclift M, Benton T, eds. 1994. Social The- Shiva V. 1989. Staying Alive: Women, Ecology,
ory and the Global Environment. New York: and Development. London: Zed Books. 224
Routledge. 271 pp. pp.
Redclift M, Woodgate G, eds. 1997. The Inter- Smith N. 1984. Uneven Development: Nature,
national Handbook of Environmental Sociol- Capital and the Produclion o/Space. Oxford,
ogy. Cheltenhaum, UK: Elgar. 485 pp. UK: Blackwell. 295 pp.
Rocheleau D, Ross L. 1995. Trees as tools, trees Smith N. 1998. Nature at the millennium: pro
as text: struggles over resources in Zamrana- duction and re-enchantment. In Remaking
Chacuey, Dominican Republic. Antipode Reality: Nature al the Millennium, ed. B
27:407-28 Braun, N Castree, pp. 271-85. New York:
Rocheleau DE. 1995. Gender and biodiversity: Routledge. 295 pp.
a feminist political ecology perspective. IDS Sonnenfeld DA, 1998. From brown to green?
Bull. 26:9-16 Late industrial, social conflict, and adoption
Rose H. 1998. Moving on from both state and of environmental technologies in Thailand's
consumer eugenics. In Remaking Reality: pul p industry. Organ. Environ. ll :59-87.289
Nature at the Millennium, ed. B Braun, N pp.
Castree, pp. 84-99. New York: Routledge. Soper K. 1995. What is Nature? Culture, Poli
295 pp. ties and the Nonlmman. Oxford, UK: Black
Salleh A. 1997. Ecofeminism as Politics: Na well. 289 pp.
ture, Marx and the Pos/modern. London: Zed Spaargaren G, Mol APJ. 1992. Sociology, en-
Books. 208 pp. vironment, and modernity: ecological mod-
Schaeffer RK. 1997. Understanding Global- ernization as a theory of social change. Soc.
ization: The Social Consequences of Poli! Nat. Resour. 5:323-44
ica/, Economic and Environmemal Change. Starhawk. 1990. Power, authority and mystery:
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 360 pp. ecofeminism and earth-based spirituality. In
Schaeffer RK. 1999. Success and impasse: Reweaving the World, ed. I Diamond, OF
the environmental movement in the United Orenstein, pp. 73-86. San Francisco, CA:
States and around the world. In Ecology Sierra Club. 320 pp.
and the IVor/d-System, ed, \VL Goldfrank, D Sturgeon N. 1997. Ecofeminist Natures: Race,
Goodman, A Szasz, pp. 189-211. London: Gender, Feminist Theory, and Political Ac-
Greenwood. 295 pp. tion. New York: Routledge. 260 pp.
Scheper-Hughes N. 1992. Death \Vitho/11 Weep- Szasz A. 1994. EcopopuUsm: Toxic Waste
ing: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil. and the Movemem for Environmental Jus
Berkeley, CA: Univ. Calif. Press. 614 pp. tice. Minneapolis, MN: Univ. Minn. Press.
Schnaiberg A, Gould KA. 1994. Environmellf 216 pp.
and Society: The Enduring Conflict. New Szasz A, Meuser M. 1997. Environmental in
York: St. Martin's. 255 pp. equalities: literature review and proposals for
Schroeder RA. 1995. Contradictions along the new direction in research and theory. Curr.
commodity road to environmental stabiliza- Social. 45:99-120
584 GOLDMAN SCHURMAN

Taylor PJ. Buttel FH. 1992. How do we know Wilkie T. 1996. Genes 'R' Us. ln Future
we have global environmental problems? Natural: Nature/Science/Culture, ed. G
Science and the globa lizali on of environmen Robertson, M Mash, L Tickner, J Bard, B
tal discourse. Geoforwn 23:405-16 Curtis, el al., pp. 133-45. New York: Rout-
Toledo V. 1989. The ecological crisis: a sec- ledge. 3 10 pp.
ond contradiction of capitalism. Capital. Nat. Williams R.1980. Prob/ems in Materialism and
Soc. 3:84-88 Culture: Selected Essays. London: Verso.
Treichler PA. 1999. How to Have Theory in 277 pp.
an Epidemic: Cultural Chronicles of AIDS. Wynne B. 1994. Scientific knowledge and the
Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press. 477 pp. global environment. In Social Theory and the
Watts M. 1990. Land Degredation and Soci- Global Emironment, ed. M Redclift, T Ben-
ety. (Review) Capitalism, Nat. Soc. 3:123- ton, pp. 169-89. New York: Routledge. 271
31 pp.
Watts M. 1998. Nature as artifice and arti- Ycarley S. 1994. Social movements and en-
fact. In Remaking Reality: Nature at the vironmental change. In Social Tllemy and
Millennium, ed. B Braun, N Cast ree, pp. 243- the Global Environment. ed. M Redclift,
68. New York: Routledge. 295 pp. T Benton, New York: Routledge. 271 pp.
SOCIOLOGY,
. ENVIRONMENTALISM,
GLOBAUZATION

Reinventing the Globe

Steven Yearley


SAGE Publications
London Thousand Oaks New Delhi
SOCIOLOGY,
ENVIRONMENTALISM,
GLOBALIZATION

Reinventing the Globe

Steven Yearley


SAGE Publications
Global Environmental Issues 27

damage it caused was extreroely remote. CFCs sprayed in Edinburgh were


not likely to affect the ozone layer over the city, nor indeed over London or
2 even Great Britain. The CFCs were carried by winds and only gradually
worked their way into the upper atmosphere. The most extreme loss of
Environmental Issues and the ozone in fact occurs at the two poles, where presumably there is less call for
deodorant. So, pollution emitted in Britain, or Japan, or Brazil conld end
Compression of the Globe up causinj> a problem across the o~er side of t_he glo~. .
People had long got used to tbe Idea that pnvate Cl!lzens or coroparues
could pollute their local environment, with loud noise, smelly industry or
whatever. But here was a startling example that showed that modem
Introduction substances and modem technology (CFCs were developed around 1930 but
their use grew rapidly in the boom decades after mid-century, rising by. 13
A~ w~s pointed out in the Preface and in Chapter l, there are reasons for per cent annually in the 1960s (Benedick, 1991: 26)) could ~use pollut:on
thinking that environmental threats and environmental awareness ought on a global scale. Such pollution coropresses the wodd radically, allowmg
to display the logic of globalization. After all, we commonly hear that us to despoil the environment of our 'neighbours', thousands of kilometres
environmental problems threaten the globe. Such a threat to the planet, away on the planet. . . . . . .
even _more th~n :vorid-wide_ cnltura! homogeneity, shonld perhaps lead us This case is also striking because the danger IS IDSldious and Siruster.
to shift our thinking, analysiS and policy-making onto a global level. Some Before the scare, the authorities (at least in roost of Europe and in the
ecological problems, such as global wanning, actually carry claims to majority of industrializing countries) and the few citizens who had heard of
globality in the very names by whic)l they are known, while other prob- CFCs were complacent since CFCs themselves are not directly harmful to
lems, such as acid rain, lend themselves to depiction in terms of threats to human beings and animals, and because none of us ever sees the ozone
the well-being of the planet. At the same time, many environmental layer. Yet the ultraviolet radiation which enters through the 'holes' in that
organizations make much of their global character, claiming as noted "j layer can promote skin cancers, one of the dread diseases in the ind':"-
earlier to be Friends of the Earth (FoE), EarthFirst! or the World Wide ~ trialized countries. CFCs changed from being hannless, benefie1al
Fund for Nature. The aim of this chapter is to review leading coutem- ~ molecules into an invisible cancer-provoking menace.
por~ envi~onm~ntal issues in order to assess the extent to which they can ~
be s:ud to give eVIdence of globalization or to demonstrate the compression Dumping out of Sight
of the globe. To get this review underway, let us begin with two illustrative
examples. Kassa Island lies just off the coast of Guinea, a former French colony in
the west of Africa, a little north of the Equator. In 1988, the thirtieth
Eating Away the World's Ozone Layer :unrlversary of the country's independence, it was discovered that a large
quantity (the Guinean authorities estimated around 15,000 tonnes) ot
In the late 1980s unprecedented anxiety was displayed by members of the incinerator ash from Philadelphia had been dnmped on the island.
public in several European countries about the ozone-depleting chenrlcals According to the US Environmental Protection Agency, the ash from such
(chlorofiuorocarbons or CFCs) which were to be found in the majority of incincrators includes dangerous materials such as heavy metals (the genera:
aeros?! spray cans. Through the awareness-raising activities of groups such term for various toxic metals, for example, cadnrlum) and poisonou'
as Fnends of the Earth (FoE, 1989) and through the response of the media, organic compounds known as dioxins. The people of North America ar<
some manufacturers and a number of retail outlets, the public came to increasingly aware of the potential dangers from such materials and do no
accept that whenever they squirted deodorant sprays or many polishes and wish to have them disposed of in their own locality. Hence they wer<
spray foams, polluting chemical gases escaped into the atmosphere. These shipped over five thousand kilometres to Guinea and, just to make sun
gases are dangerous because they encourage the breakdown of the earth's that local people did not object too much, they were redescnl>ed a
protective ozone-layer - a stratum of the atmosphere in which naturally 'building materials' (The Independent 17 June 1988: 8). Of course this asi
occumng molecules of the gas ozone, a gas which filters out harmful could be used in the construction business but it is safe to assume that i
ultraviolet radiation. are particularly numerous. would not be a popular building material. To add to the intemationa
The striking thing about this form of pollution threat was that the flavour of the incident. the material was transported on a NorwegiaD
l!eo~rranhical connection between the release of the nollutant and the owned ship. Following the discovery of the nature of the ash, the Guinea:
28 Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 29

authorities arrested the Norwegian consul. Norway subsequently undertook likely to cause more pollution than their :Western EuroP':an counterparts
to remove the waste. because their cars are dirtier and less effie1ent. The same 1s true of power
In this second case too it is clear that people are capable of polluting the stations in the former state socialist countries: on average, for every useful
other side of the globe. But in this instance it is international trade rather unit of electrical power they generate, they cause more pollutwn. So,
than the transnational dispersion of molecules which links the world. From though wealth and pollution-generation are usually connected, they are not
these two examples we can see that (a) certain modem pollutants can completely bound to each other. .
contaminate the global environment while (b) the transnational nature of Finally as we shall see in this chapter and the next (and ":' we saw w1th
modern trade allows the waste from industrialized regions and countries to !Cassa Island), some people cause ecological problems deliberately; they
pollute every region of the world. dump substances into the environment because _1t s~ves them. money _or
In this chapter I shall examine the way that pollution and other en- trouble. Others despoil the environment, but Wlth little pracncal chmce
vironmental problems simultaneously illustrate and are brought about by about what they do, while there are some people who have pollunon
the compression of the world. I shall review the principa! environmental dumped on them, without even getting the benefit of the processes which
problems, in each case concentrating on and assessing the global nature caused it in the first place. . . .
and gl o balizing character of the issue. Overall, then, while pollution and environmental despohanon are very
widespread experiences, their origins are far less umfonnly distnbuted, ":nd
sometimes those who cause such problems and benefit from them_ are ~ch
How Environmental Problems Can Compress the World and powerful enough to try to Jimi~ the impact on the~selves by 1mp_osmg
it on others. We can therefore antiClpate that _there Will be ~any dimen~
The cases of ozone-depleting pollution and the international voyages sions to the globalization of environmental problems, depending on how
undertaken by American incinerator rubbish symbolize in a striking way and why environmental harm is spread. . . .
the theme of this chapter, that the world' s growing environmental problems The experience of po!lution and the groWlng concern Wl~ en~rronmental
are connecting the lives of people in very different societies. And while issues more generally haVe lent themselves to presentati.on m terms of
individuals can try to minimize the impact on their own lives, it is ulti- globalization. Environmental writers and c~mpaigners ~a~e put a ~reat
mately impossible to hide oneself away from these phenomena altogether. deal of effort into getting people, as the saymg goes, to -~ global . As
No humans and virtually no plants or animals are exempted from these will be seen in the next chapter, the image of a global 1dent1ty has been
problems. That is not to say that all forms of pollution and environmental built up through the use of terms such as 'spaceship earth', throu~h the
hazard are now global in scale. They are not. A good deal of pollution, for much-used pictures of the globe suspended in space and ~ough a strmg of
example, is still local or restricted to a region. Moreover, the impact of any conferences and seminars focusing on 'global' themes. Envlfonm~ntalissue~
given pollutant is liable to be modified by the details of the local geology sound even more significant if they are described as global enVIronmental
and geography. But as we shall see, most forms of pollution and other issues. n
environmental problems have increased' markedly in the last third of the As we have seen with the issue of ozone depletion, some po ut.Ion
twentieth century and continue to grow. Also. more and more of that problems can plausibly be presented as global by their very nature. At least
pollution has an international spread so that in the closing years of the on the face of it it is in virtually everyones mterest to oppose such forms of
twentieth century no one is immune from all of it. pollution. And tlus is the message that some environmentalist~ tcy to draw
But while the experience of suffering from pollution and certain kinds of from the fact that we are all 'space crew' on our global spaceship. A sense of
environmental degradation are nowadays almost universal, the rest of the global identity is supposed to promote the idea that we face envu~nmental
story displays far greater inequalities. Some of the world' s people make far hazards together. Yet many other 'global' forms of pollull?n and
more of a contribution to causing pollution and loss of environmental value environmental harm get to have global effects because they are dispersed
than do others - and of course wild animals and plants which suffer from through trade and the spread of industria!ization, not because they are
pollution cannot really be said to create any. Of the people causing poliu- iilherently global. It would be wrong therefore to assume that responses to
tion, some derive more personal benefit from each unit of poilution caused pollution problems are globally harmonious. There may be ~ome common
than do others. For example, Europeans typically create more pollution 'ilireats, but other environmental hazards result from people m one part of
than Africans because more of them can afford cars, washing machines, the globe displacing their problems on to other parts: ~urthermore, certam
goods with masses of packaging and so on. In o_ther words, the wealthier {:irids of pollution and ecological damage are dirmru~hing m the North
society tends also to be the more polluting society. But, for every kilometre ':; ":(Oeause of tighter regulations or because of technologlCal advances) even
h ... , ,r~...;.,." ,..,... .. '"'n,,.....,. .. .., :..., ,.J... .. t',..._....,..,,: e> ..... .;,.,. YT.... : .... - ~-..t "0-~-- "0~---- --- .. , .. ~,;-,.! ").:;,. .i.!1-
1
"'"'-~~- --- -- .. l..-; ____ ..,~-!- .. t.. ... u .... A.,..-A.,_u... lr.1'\P'r1 wf\rJcl. hecaUSC of the
( ,

30 Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 31

growth ~f industrializa~on. Differ~nt parts of the globe may thus be recent years has meant that some forms of land contamination in the North
expcnencmg markedly different enVlronmental-quality trends. are declining, the world-wide growth of manufacturing and chemical plants
To assess the global significance of environmental problems we need to dictates that overall the problem is on the increase. It is in danger of
examine the kinds of pollution and other hazards which are important becoming a fully world-wide problem because of the spread of polluting
today and to. look at how they arc distributed internationally. Those issues industrial activity.
are covered m most of the rest of this chapter. There is also the related Land is also polluted when waste is dumped in quarrics, gravcl pits,
question about how e~actly '!'ollution' and environmental problems are to drained lakes or specially-dug holes. Landfill, as this waste disposal
be de?ned. For. the time bemg I shall work with an implicit notion of method is known, is still the commonest disposal technique in Britain and
pollution, rctummg to the question of definitions later on, in the section in' most States in the USA (although incineration is also common); the
after next. refuse varies from packaging from shops and builders' rubble, through
mixed domestic waste (typieally a mix of paper, metals, glass, plastics and
other rubbish) to industrial wastes, which may include highly toxic and
The Globe's Env:ironmeotal Problems: Pollution
corrosive material. Until recently, dangerous wastes were deliberately
'diluted' with ordinary refuse, a practicc which was made to sound more
To get a sense of how significant a phcnomenon international pollution is
scientific by being labclled 'co-disposal'. As world industrial production
and to be ab~e ~o assess whether and why it is increasing, we need to have a continues to rise and as trade brings manufactured and packaged goods to
wa! of class1fymg types of pollution. The commonest method of classifi- more and more people, these waste disposal practices arc sprcading
~tion f?cuscs on the medium in which the pollution ends up, whether that throughout the globe.. Pollution from landfill is already causing environ-
IS the a1r, water or land.
mental problems in the so-called 'newly industrializing countries' (NICs)
Land Pol/ution such as Taiwan, Mexico and BraziL In the countries of the North, the
dumping of material is now supposedly regulated, though the prescncc in
!3eginniug with the last of these, we can take a brief look at each medium the market of suspect private operators and periodic arrests for illegal
m tum. Land tends to be polluted either because humans have buried dumping still give cause for alarm.
~ngs _in it o: carried out messy operations on it. For example, it is Of course, regulation - however effective - does not address the root of
mcreasmgly bemg f~und that current and former industrial sites are heavily the problem, the generation of waste. Since the industrialized countries
pollu~ed. In the. U mted States and Britain, for instance, the places where continue to expe.rience economic growth - if not every year, at least on
che~cal factones or town-gas production works have been located, average - the amount of waste tends to grow corrcspondingly. In response,
espec~al!y when t?e~ have been there for decades, an; typieally heavily some attempts are being made to take material out .of the 'waste stream' so
contaiDinated. This Issue was highlighted in the United Kingdom in the that it does not need to be disposed of; this can bc achieved through
early 1990s b:"'ause en;ironmental eampaigners wanted the British govern- reducing packaging and cutting down on wastage, and by reusing and
m~nt to pubhsh a register of contaminated sites (Watson, 1993; see also recycling materials. While very significant changes in the amount of waste
Fnends of the Earth, 1992a). The authorities resisted this demand argning produced can be envisaged, at least in principlc, companies' marketing
that only very few sites were actually dangerous to human health 'aud that divisions are generally reluctant to reduce their use of packaging. For
public disclosure of information about the other 'contaminated' sites would example, beer companies commonly differentiate their products with dis-
ca~se unnecessary anxiety a~d lead property-owners to see the value of tinctive bottles. Except in cases where there are buge sales of a particular
their land and bnildings decline dramatically. Even buildings on converted brand, there are practical difficulties in organizing the reuse of bottles. It
l fanul~nd can be contaminated, because of the residues from agricultural may not even make a lot of environmental sense to try, for instance, to
l' chCIDicals, as the US Env:iromnental Protection Agency found to its
embarrassment at one of its own regional offices in New York state (!'lew
send back from the N ethcrlands the distinctive bott!e of a Mexican beer.
Standard bottles would make the issue simplcr but this is resisted by
''J ' York Times, 6 March 1995: B6). companies who do not want to surrender what they perceivc as a unique
! Of itself, one would perhaps not expect contaminated land to constitute feature which assists sales of their producL Both economic growth and
i muc.h more than a local problem. However, it can be of much wider
SigDificance. For example, as was indicated by the example of Kassa Island
global trade accordingly tend to increase the need for waste disposaL
But even if regulators the world over were to control tightly the
and as we ~hall see again later on, one country's land may be contaminated substances entering dumps and to impose mandatory targets for recycling,
!' by .the actio~s of other countries. In that way, land contamination can there would still be considerable problems since rainwater secping into
' easily be an mtemational issue. Furthermore, while increased fcgulation in these sites ean wash out chemicals which can then bc transported into water
:.. . ~-
Global Environmental Issues 33
32 Sociology. Environmentalism. Globalization

supplies, especially if the linings of the dwnp-sites tear or degrade. Natural by neighbouring firms as an opportunity to dump their wastes too (see
decay in the dwnps also gives rise to methane gas which can ignite or cause Rose, 1990: 56-63). . . . f
explosiOns. The story with sea pollution is essenually sllllllar though the extent o
These problems, of methane gas production and of water leaking, deliberate dumping of hazardous wastes has possibly been even greater:
indicate that pollution incidents in the three media. (land, water and air) are Man coastal towns around the UK simply discharge untreated sewage doym
not really distinct. These connections are acknowledged in recent British, pipe;' into the sea while, in other cases, the waste is ~t~d bu't) th~r~sulttnJ
European and US legislation which promotes the idea of integrated slud e is taken out by boats (colloquially known as 'bo oats an ump
pollution control; in o~her words it aims to stop people overcoming their offs:ore Some waste is incinerated at sea before being dump:J. Nuclear waste
used to be sealed in metal or concrete containers and dropped mto deep areas of
solid waste problems by - for example - burning their refuse, only to give
rise to air pollution. the sea. (Yearley, 1992a: 34-5)
There are, however, recent signs of progress. The sea dumping _of nuClear
Water Pollution waste has already been halted (though not renoun;:ed entrrely) ~nd
according to the international agreement known as the London Dumpmg
Turning to the second mediwn, water pollution also has many causes. ''on' all industrial waste dumping at sea was to be stopped by 1995
Rivers have long been used to transport filth away from towns and sadly
e(Susskind,
onven w.
1994: 161). Further, in line Wlth an agreement among
European
this process has intensified in the last century. Rivers have been contami- Union member states, other marine pollution (for example from sew~ge
nated in three main ways. First, hwnan sewage has been expelled into sludge) will be greatly reduced by 1998. However, the London Dumpmg
rivers; this problem is magnified around towns and large cities because of Convention has only 66 signatories and the _Eur?pean agreeme~t apphes
the sheer density of hwnan populations. In underdeveloped countries, city only to EU states; surreptitious sea dwnpmg 1~ ext_r~mely difficult. to
populations have recently grown at extremely high rates adding vastly to monitor in any case. Elsewhere in the world, grow:ng Clt1es and expanding
water pollution and often overwhelming sewage treatment facilities. Poor industry mean that marine pollution is on the mcrease. The threat of
countries can afford little expenditure on such infrastructural items - a nuclear pollution of the seas may also have been renewed rece~tly Wlth the
situation which has tended to worsen in the last decade for reasons which end of the Cold War. Nuclear submarines are costly to mamtam and there
are considered in the next chapter. But urban populations have not been is a possibility that obsolete vessels may sink and not be recover~d, or even
the only cnlprits. There has been repeated river pollution from farms, both be deliberately jettisoned at sea (see The Guardzan, 3 June_ 1995._ ll).
eftluent from animal husbandry (slurry from animal wastes and the highly The seas are also subject to pollution wh~n boats, espec1ally oil tankers,
polluting effiuent from silage making) and the accwnnlated contamination are wrecked. The general issue of marine oil pollution ha_s be~ a co~cern
from chemicals spread on the fields. Fertilizers, for instance, get dissolved since the 1920s, especially in the UK and the USA, countnes :"'tb relatively
by rainwater and enter watercourses; there they fertilize the growth of lengthy coastlines (see Mitchell, 1993: 195). In the past ~rty years this
microscopic plants (algae and the like), reducing water quality. issue has been highlighted time and again through a sen~s of huge and
These problems too have increased at a global level as more land has distressing oil spills, including the Exxon Valdez m A!aska m 1989 and the
been brought into intensive cultivation either to trade or to feed growing Braer wreck on Shetland in 1993.
populations and as the spread of agribusiness has meant that fertilizer and Yet s risingly enough, oil spills from wreck~ ships are not the major cause o:
pesticide use in the underdeveloped world has accelerated. The recently oil Po~tion at sea. The United Nations EnVIronmex:t Pro~e ... reckons
negotiated GATT settlement, which is designed to promote unrestricted that 500 000 tonnes of the 1.6 million annually dischar~ed mt~ the. ~ea by
international trade, will tend to encourage intensive cultivation in under~ 1
/ shipping is released accidentally; the remainder is non-accidental 1n ongm and
'. '
developed countries and will thus add to the pressures for world-wide results from r~gular discharge by ships odinf.con;a m;at~Sb~:ti~~telc~~:;~~
used for flushing out tanks. [Yet accor g o 1 e . .
agrochemical use. Sciences [m]ore oil enters the oceans from automob1le exha_usts, and from oil-
r:
'l'
i !
Finally, industrial wastes have also been dwnped into rivers. In Northern
countries, industry frequently took advantage of the nineteenth-century
changes i~ city garages that are then dumped down the drain, than from any
other source. (Elsworth, _1990: 240)
sewerage systems to dispose of waste from factories; consequently a good
!) deal of industrial waste can be disposed of free or very cheaply through the More recent figures supplied by Mitchell (1993: 185) suggest that this
pattern may be changmg, "th b o th a ne t dimi"nution in overall
. manne
.. oil
sewers. Factories also experience spills, \Vhen materials inadvertently (or so W1
If it is said) overfiow into watercourses. \Vhen these episodes are put down to pollution and greater than average reductions in non-acc1d~ntal disc~ges
accidents, companies are rarely punished very severely. Environmental at sea. Accidental discharges may now make up a significantly hi?h~r
Ir N":rf"Pn+~ ryp. th~n J;l~utr.rth :<::nPP~$.tS. All the same. it is evident that while a
'l campaigners are convinced that spills bv. one comnanv are freauentlv used
--------------~----

34 Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 35

series of large oil spills has dominated media coverage and popular and with US acid pollution whi~h ended up in Canada. In 1990, both
awaren:ss of marine pollution, most oil pollution derives from myriad Sweden and Norway suffered sulphur depositions at least double the size of
small d1scharges. These are so extensive that the world's oceans are now their sulphur omissions (The Economist, 1992: 202).
affected world-wide. Though spilled oil does eventually evaporate or At prcsent policy measures are being implemented to . reduce acid
become broken down by bacteria, traces of oil can be found in sea water emissions in most Northern and former Soviet-bloc countnes, m many
the world over. And since the seas are linked throughout the world they cases through the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention
unfortunatcly serve as a means for spreading pollution internationally. (LRTAP). Set up in 1979, the LRTAP Convention was accepted by the
vas! majority of European States, the USSR, and Canadaand the USA. In
Air Pollution Lcvy's view (1993: 83-4) 'The vast membership is probably a sign of the
convention's perceived role in furthering dtente.? The L~TAP <?~~vent:Ion
The third medium into which ellluents and contamination can be dis- has a number of curious features. In the first place, It was IDilially an
charged is the air. In the industrializcd world people have been familiar agreement simply to coordinate national research. progr~mes an~ to
with air _POllutio~ for many years and the chronically poor air quality in report on policy measures; only later were a~tual atr pollutlon rcductt~ns
London m the lnlddle years of the twentieth century has become legendary. negotiated and signatories of the convention di~ not eve~ hav7 to subscx:be
At prese~ t, our air is polluted in a variety of ways but the chief culprits are to these. Second, Canada and the USA were mvo!ved m this convention
the burmng of fuels for heating or power generation, the exhausts from even though they were unalfected by transboundary acid pollution, the
motor vehicles, and emissions from factory chimneys and incinerators. parties' main concern, from the other countries. ~eir. involv:ment was
Given that we all have to breathe the air and that it cannot be filtcrcd again linked to diplomatic interests at stake, though It did p.r~v1dc further
before use, air pollution is probably the most pervasive environmental Ieverage for the Canadian authorities concerned about actdtc crrussx~ns
problem - although some entrepreneurs have tried to come up with a from their southern neighbour. Lastly, it was !iterally concerned With
privatized solution, so that for example Japanese commuters have been ;, transboundary air pollution. For example, Levy (1993: 92) reports that the
offered the chance to buy 'gulps' of clean air on the way to the office. i; Soviet Union was willing to sign up to an agreement to reduce trans-
Some dangerous and polluting gases are formed in very large quantities. 1 boundary S0 2 pollution, secure in the knowledge that this could bc
For i~tance, the acidic gas sulphur dioxide (known by its chemical symbol ij achieved not by cutting overall omissions but by shifting production to
:i' SO:z) IS formed from the inevitable impurities in fuels when coal or oil is ~ power stations in the east which would primarily cause pollution within the
bumt in power stations or in people's homes, in .tires and boilers. It is bad USSR itself. With prcdominantly westerly winds, Soviet powcr stations
for people because, in the long term, it can attack the lungs and because it were much likelier to cause domestic acid pollution than transboundary
aggravates asthma as well as bronchial and other respiratory problems. It is effects. None the less, many countries did sign up to a 1985 protocol to the
also ba~ for the enviro~~nt in general because its acidity encourages the convention demanding 30 per cent cuts in sulphur omissions. Similarly,
'' destruction of many bUilding stones and because it can attack trees and twenty-three countries agreed to a further protocol three years later to
'
l : acidify rivers, spoiling conditions for fish and aquatic life. Other acidic
gases - various oxides of nitrogen (collectively referred to as NOJ - are
stabi!ize or reduce NO, omissions (Levy, 1993: 97). Subsequently, the
countries of the EU formed a joint agreement to cut omissions from power
'. prod~ced from power stations and cars; they too irritate lung tissuc and
ii stations and other large plant; in Britain this is largely being achieved by
l; con~nbute to atmospheric acidity. Both these types of gas arc formed by the substituting gas for dirtier coal (which would otherwise be very expensivc
li rmllions of tonnes each year (in Britain alone the amounts of sulphur from
SOz and of NO, discharged in 1990 were approximately 1.9 and 2.6 million
to clean to the new European standards).
Since the LRTAP Convention only applies to northern industrial coun-
l,.i
'.l
tonne~ r~ectiv~Iy while France, with its large nuclear power~generating
capacity, still Clnltted 0.7 and 1.8 million tonnes (The Economist, 1992: 202;
tries, the production of acid pollution is still increasing elsewhere in the
l
world as industrialization procecds and the low-cost British 'solution' of
sec also Fnends of the Earth, 1990: 2-6)). Being produccd by motor traffic using gas clearly cannot be adopted the world over - there is simply not
l a~d ~y homes, as well as industry, these gases are highly pervasive. Acid
l. ram IS caused when they are transported in the atmosphere and then
enough natural gas for industry in China, India, Latin America and the
former Soviet Union to last many years into the future, as will be seen later
l washed down by rain, snow and so on. Since these gases are released in
i l: such large quantities and since they arc released from tall stacks as well as
b~ ground-lev~! cars, they can be carried over large distances by prevailing
in the chapter. In any case, when burned without elaborate emission
control devices, coal is a cheaper fuel and is therefore likely to appeal to
i/
rl l
WI~ds. In th!s way one country' s omissions can. end up polluting a
ne1ghbour's rur, as happened with British acid rain blown to Scandinavia
developing economies.
Other forms of air pollution are less pervasive but can bc equally
ii:! alarming. With S0 2 and NO.. wc at least know what the culprits arc. But
l
36 Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 37

in other cases of air pollution it is far harder to establish the exact identities effects for decades. They are globally inescapable. But, as we shall see in
?f :vaste gases. Thus, e~~sions from various factories, chemical plants and the next two chapters, the response to this global problem was in fact far
% mcmerators may contam cocktails' of gases, some of which are harmful in from uniform across the globe. While environmental groups were
~ themselves and others which may be hazardous in combination. So far this campaigning for the removal of CFCs from aerosols in Britain late in
il form of air pollution has received less attention than the acid gases because the 1980s, they had been banned from most aerosol products in the USA in

~
i'
l acid rain is a comparatively well understood problem suffered by large 1978, almost ten years earlier. Such a disparity over policy towards an
',
i
numb~rs of people. The only exception is for pollution by VOCs (volatile apparently global threat between policy-makers in leading areas of the
orgamc compounds), a rather loose ~basket' of chemicals including many industrial world must cause us to question any idea that global threats
solvents, used in a wide range of industries. The 1991 Geneva Protocol of inevitably or automatically give rise to transnationally unified responses.
the LRTAP Convention commits a small number of northern countries to The final example to be discl!Ssed here is equally well known and every
various levels of regulation of these compounds; however, few countries bit as qualified to be called global. It is the problem of global wanning or
even have good inventories of these substances and monitoring systems are the enhanced greenhouse effect. Despite the fluctuations of tbe seasons and
poorly developed (Levy, 1993: !OO; Susskind, 1994: 167). Wbile it has been even despite the occasional growth of massive ice sheets covering the
relatively easy to mount campaigns around the theme of acid rain and to northernmost and southernmost lands, the average temperature of tbe earth
interest politicians and policy-makers, there has been slight interest in has remained very stable for the last million years (Ross, 1991: 85). From
myriad other sources of air pollution. There has been little official or public the hottest to the coldest periods, the overall average temperature change
engagement with pollution from hospital incinerators and, until recently has been around s centigrade (9 Fahrenheit). When one considers that
only a little more in the emissions from waste incinerators (Connett and this is less than temperature changes common in one's garden, or even in
Connett, 1994). To date, circumstances have tended not to promote so many houses, just in a day, this long-term stability seems remarkable. The
much public and political interest in the other types of air pollution. Earth's warmth is largely due to the heat arriving from the Sun. This beats
Finally, there are two very important air pollution problems which are the Earth and the Moon alike. But the Earth is conspicuously warmer than
highly general. The first was described at the very start of this chapter, the the Moon (by about 33" c<;ntigrade on average) and this difference is
pollution which is depleting the ozone layer. As Benedick, who led the US attributable to the greenhouse properties of the atmosphere (Ross, 1991:
delegation in the international negotiations to combat this pollution noted: 77). In a rough way, we can say that the atmosphere acts like the panes of
[such] issues exemplif[y] the in~erc?nnec~edness. of life and .its natural support glass in a greenhouse, letting heat in but slowing down its escape. 1 With no
systems on Earth. Modern scumtific discovenes are revealing that localized atmosphere, the Moon experiences no greenhouse warming.
activities can h~ve gl_?bal ~nsequences and that dangers can be slow and perhaps Some gases in the atmosphere are better at perfonning this insulating
?arely _perceptlble m the1r de_velopment, yet with long-term and virtually role than others. For example, nitrogen - the gas which is much the
Irreversible_e~e~ts. The ~oncept lS not obvious: a perfume spray in Paris helps to
destroy an InVISlble gas m the stratosphere and thereby contributes to skin cancer
commonest in the atmosphere - is a poor insulator. By contrast, methane
deaths and species extinction half a world away and several generations in the and carbon dioxide are effective insulators. The more insulators there are,
:i future. (1991: 3) the warmer the Earth' s surface and the immediate surrounding atmosphere
."i' would become. The current anxiety is that since the insulating gases are
'
.i ~e CFCs in aerosols are the most well publicized problem here, it is present in the atmosphere in extremely low concentrations, human activities
Important to realize that CFCs are also used in refrigerators, freezers and which cause more of these gases (the burning of fuels to produce carbon
'
j
similar heat-regulating appliances and as gases for blowing foams (such as dioxide, or decay from waste tips and leaks from gas fields leading to
t the bubble-filled plasti~s used for lightweight containers and for insulating increases in methane) could alter the temperature balance. Nitrous oxide, a
.j. matenal). Other chermcally-related compounds can exhibit similar 'ozone- gas released by agricultural practices, notably those using nitrogen
eating' characteristics, including tbe smothering gases in certain kinds of fertilizers and the various CFCs and halons are also effective greenhouse
fue extinguishers (halons) and some solvents in common use in such gases. R;latively small quantities of this atmospheric pollution could raise
products as dry-cleaning kits and typing-correction fluids. the global temperature to unprecedented levels, taking it outside of the
As Benedick points out, these ozone-destroying chemicals demonstrate temperature band within . which the Earth has been confined since
the hazards of transnational pollution terrifyingly well since they tend to prehistoric times.
have their chemical impact tbousands of kilometres away from the place This is an unusual form of pollution since we are not worried about the
they were released (climatic factors concentrate their activity around the toxic nature of the gases; indeed both methane and carbon dioxide are
poles) and because they allow solar radiation to harm people, animals and natural ingredients of the atmosphere and would not be directly harmful
planthfe across the other s1de of the planet. These chemicals exert their unless their concentrations were multiplied many times over. We arc: not
Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 39
38

worried about breathing them in or about inunediate health effects. Rather, Radiation and Associated Pollution
we are worricd about a long~term consequence of the gases' release: the
concern is that global warming would be extremcly disruptive, possib!y Although an overview of the three media int? which ~ol~ution can enter
catastrophic. For example, a rise in world tempcratures would lead to would appear to bc cxhaustive, there arc tn fact significant type~ of
expanding deserts, to probabie loss of wildlife as temperature bands on the pol!ution which fall outside thi~ classification. The first and most notonous
earth's surface shifted (forests for example cannot easily 'migrate'), a of these is radiation, the collective term for partlcles and energy released by
corresponding disruption to agriculture and food supply and, because the radioactive materials. Since the discovery of radioactivity at the end of the
ovcraiJ temperature is rising, a melting of ice sheets and an expansion of ninetecnth century, radioactive substances have been used more and m~rc,
the water in the seas. Resulting changes in sea levels would lead to predominantly but by no means exclusively in the North. These m_atenals
flooding, particularly of low-lying countries without sea defences and of have been employed in nuclear weapons, m nuclear pow~r, m X-raytng and
port cities which, by their very nature, arc seldom far above current sea other diagnostic techniques, in radiation treatment and ~n numerous other
level. uses. As is well known, radioactive materials are potcntlally very harmful.
This form of pol!ution stands out not just because of the unusual threat High doses of radiation can kill by attacking the central nerv?us system or
it poscs, but also because it is almost thorough!y global. Because. of air bone marrow; radiation can also promote canccrs and ?enc~c dcfccts_ an_d
currents, the co2 produced in one place can affect the temperature cause other more diffusc ill health. The threat from radioact:I.ve matena~ ts
virtually anywhere on the globe. Unlike a waste dump or a chemicals spil!, greatly increased if the material is ingested, for example by_ eati.ng
the threat is not localized, but very highly dispersed. Furthermore, the contaminated food or by breathing in minute dust-borne radiOactive
uncertainty about the exact impact of global warming means that no particles. Working from inside ~e body, low-e~ergy radiation which would
country or group can be sure of the impact on them. A little warming not ordinarily penetrate the skin can harm maJOr body org~. . .
might produce benefits for a few areas, with warmer summers and milder Po!lution of this kind is alarming both because of the mv!Slble. yet
winters in Canada for example. But the difficulties of climate prediction frightening threat it poses and because the danger is hard to _gn_ard agai~st.
mean that no one knows with any degree of certainty what the impact in Gamma radiation can penetrate buildings while alpha radiation-ciUittmg
their area will be, though flood prone countries such as the Netherlands substances can occur in the air wc breathe or in food and water. T_hc
and Bangladesh must see themselves as in the first line of likely victims. pollution risk is generally higher around nuclear installations (in the IUid-
Finally in this section it should be emphasized that both those major 1990s there are reckoned to be some 440 nuclear power statiOns m
global air pollution prob!ems have intensified in recent years. While, as will operation world-wide (New York Times, 14 March 1995: C!l)), but it can
be scen in Chapter 4, there is now an international treaty designed to bc much more widely spread. As the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear
cut ozone-depleting pollution, the amount of pollution already in the power plant in the Ukraine in 1986 showed, the risk of c~ntamina~on. from
atmosphere will continue to destroy ozone for decades to come. World nuclear accidents extends across nations and contments. Snrularly,
carbon dioxide emissions are virtually bound to risc as industrialization pollution from nuclear testing has been spread around the atmosphere
proceeds, so that global totals are likely to increase whatever the countries for decades.
of the North do and, so far, their progress on limiting grcenhouse gas Much of the world' s uranium is mined in countries of the South, often
emissions has been meagre (see Susskind, 1994: 174). The situation is from low-grade ores. This means that there is a vast rcsidue ~f ~ne
similar with regard to meth"ane and nitrous oxide too; human production of 'tailings' left behind, waste material which inevitably has some radioactive
l '
these gases tends to grow in line with mounting waste disposal, increases in contamination. Thus, the production of fuel for French or Swedish or
l
land committed to agriculture and livestock keeping, and the growth in British nuclear power gives rise to radioactive pollutants elsewhere on the
fertilizer use. Bizarrely, the 'greenhouse' gaius resulting from eventual globe. Furthermore, after energy has been generated the nuclear industry is
reductions in CFC pollution may bc offset by the fact that atmospheric left with large quantities of contaminated waste, and as the Citizens of
ozone itself tends to promote global warming. Equally ironieally, it is Northern countries show themselves increasingly reluctant to have 1t
i suggested that acid pollution in the air may diminish incoming solar disposed of near them, there has been the prospect of Northern countries
l' '~ 'l radiation, so that S02 may bc acting as an anti~greenhouse agent. Any trying to find other geographical outlets for it. Among Northern countncs,
l improvements in acid regulation may thus exacerbate global warming. All Britain is currently unusual in offering a crcproccssing' service for other
.,,j, countries' nuclear waste at THORP (the thermal oxide reprocessing plant),
, l' the same, no matter how complieated the atmospheric chemistry finally
turns out to be, it is clear that these two examples both indicate that located at Sellafie!d. The extremely costly plant was opened, despite
l
l./
l international solutions and policies are needed if global pollution problems extensive objections and protests, in the hope that it could provide a
are to bc taclcled. conunercially profitab le way of dealing with waste. Before any reproccssing
,il
40 Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 41

was undertaken, agreements had been signed with Japanese and German unnatural. The danger which cornmentators now fear is that the disease,
nuclear agencies. Thus, Japanese waste is transported almost half the way having leaped from one species to another through ingestion, could pass to
round the globe for treatment at THORP, treatment which is bound to beef-eating humans. Since the BSE scare first became publicized at the end
cause some pollution to the surrounding area and to the Irish Sea. In this of the 1980s, measures have been taken to stop cows being fed such
case therefore, the Japanese nuclear industry will release some radiation at material and regulations introduced to stop possibly infected cattle material
plants in Japan (no plants can be run without emitting some radioactive (their .brains and spina! cord essentially) from entering the human food
pollution, even if it is believed to be medically harmless). But it will also chain; miscellaneous cow-meat pieces were formerly used in meat pies and
cause some radioactive contamination at the source of the fuel and some other convenience foods.
more, affecting Britain and the Irish Sea, during reprocessing. Similar Although this example stands out as particularly alarming, it is not the
reasoning applies to the case of the reprocessing arrangements bet\Veen ouly example of food pollution. Great ,public arudety was stirnulated in the
Japan and the French nuclear industry. USA in 1989 around a chemical known as Alar, a plant growth regulator
The globalizing aspects of the nuclear business are also shown by the fact used on apples and other fruit Evidence suggested, though there was doubt
that, as the industry has fallen out of public favour in the North, new about how definitive the evidence was, that Alar could cause cancer
'promising' locations for nuclear power generation have been found in the especially in children. The celebrated actor Mery! Streep was closely
South and in the formerly-cornmunist countries of Eastern Europe. The associated with publicizing these possible risks. I have already mentioned
roanufacturers of nuclear power stations have been extremely active in the possibility that agricultural chemicals can enter the water supply; since
prornoting their product in South-East Asia, in Hungary and in other insecticides are designed to kill certain animals there is clearly a danger that
Eastern European countries with a heritage of nuclear power. New instal- they will harm broader communities of creatures. Early work on long-
lations arising from these promotional activities 'Will produce their own lasting pest-control chemicals in fact indicated that they could accurnulate
waste disposal problerns within the next few years. biologically through the foodchain. A hawk which ate lats of birds which
Lastly, it is often said - and quite correctly - that there is a level of had eaten lats of contaminated insects could get a lethal dose of such
naturally occurring 'background' radiation. Life on earth has evolved to toxins. But the Alar case was different. This was not a roundabont threat
withstand some radiation. But the sheer growth of human interest in caused by pollution of the environment, but the danger of directly ingesting
radioactive rnateri.als in the last hundred years has effectively increased that a deadly substance which had been deliberately spread on foodcrops. Since
'natural' level. By mining and grinding radioactive ores, for example, we agrochemicals are now manufactured for a world market and extensively
add to the background levels. This too can be seen to be part of inter- traded internationally, food pollution too roost now be regarded as a global
national, indeed literally global pollution. risk.
There is one final twist to this type of pollution threat Since the
Polluted Foodstuffs and Genetic Pollution prosperous North imports a lot of exotic fruit (mangoes, passion fruit, even
out-of-season strawberries) as well as meat and vegetables from the South,
A second additional pollution hazard comes abcmt through the pollution of the environmentally aware Northern citizen has to worry abont agricultural
foodstuffs. Of course, this may be a consequence of other forms of pollu- practices not only at home but in the coUntries where these crops are
tion. Plants which are fed with contaminated water, for instance, may grown. One rnay he able to regulate the chemicals in use on the farms of
themselves come to be contaminated. But there are specific cases which the North but it is far harder to regulate the South where Northern
cannot easily be accornmodated within the classification developed earlier inspection agencies cannot oversee the actions of growers, whether they are
on. indigenous farmers or plantation managers for Northern transnationals. As
A graphic example is provided by the case of the cattle disease bovine . we shall see later on, Susan George (1992) speaks of this kind of 'feedback'
spongiforrn encephalopathy (BSE). Otherwise known as 'mad cow disease', from practices in the South as the 'booro~g phenomenon' since
BSE is a disease of the cow's central nervous system which was first Northern countries may find that hazardous material exported to the South
identified in 1985; to date it has chiefiy affected herds in Britain and returns to them on ~eir food.
Ireland. It is believed to be closely related to the degenerative disease, We are, as the saying has it, what we eat. We build our bodies ont of the
scrapie, which has been found in sheep for at least two hundred years. The molecules we put into them as food. Ingestion is thus a very direct way in
key point is that the cattle disease is believed to have originated when which people can suffer from pollution and it too is an international issue
'-~-- ............"+ ~v~o: nsed to make a high-protein cattle feed. since agricultural production is itself a highly international business.
A third and increasingly important alternative form of pollution can be
~ '~ !_ - - ........ +."...-.; ... ~tlnn of
42 Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 43

natural genetic resources. Three quick exarnples will illustrate what is at by deliberate export, through chemicals sprayed on a field, by a decision to
stake here. First, consider the case of ornamental ducks. Down the years relocate a factory or by the release of a baeterium.
people have taken colourful ducks from their native areas and brought
them to ponds and gardens from where - inevitably - they escape. In the
early 1990s, there was a case where introduced American drakes were Defining Pollution
arriving early on the Spanish nesting sites of a closely related European
duck and striking up relationships with all the females before the natural At this stage, someone might reasonably argne that I have been a little too
males bad begun to swing into action! The genetic stock is in danger of easy on myself. Although I have discussed many forms of pollution which
U!lllatural, unplanned change. A similar example concerns farmed salmon. arise in the modern world and triedto snggest how they each have a global
Such salmon bave not faced natural selection to ensnre that they are good reach, one might still say that I have not tackled head-on the question of
survivors; indeed they have in all likelihood been humauly selected for what pollntion is. At an evcryday level this is not usnally a controversial or
quite different attributes sneh as rapid weight gain and tolerance of over- especially complex issne. Most people wouid probably share ideas about
crowding. When they escape, which they may do in relatively large what substances are polluting. But maybe I have chosen cases of pollution
numbers through spills and leaks, they interbreed with river salmon which tend to confirm my general argument. Accordingly, it is worth
causing an upset to natural selection. The qualities of the natural salmon, taking a minor detour to look at the definitional question, which is of
qualities which have ensured their survival for thousands of years, may interest in its own right and a practical matter for at least the following
thus bc lost. three reasons.
The final example of genetic pollution is the starkest; it deals with First, it is often hard to decide exactly which substances should bc
genetically Cngineered organisms. There is currently great commercial viewed as pollutants. While it might initially seem tempting to suggest that
pressnre for the development of genetic engineering, the technology which all pollution must stem from non-natural substances, a definition based on
allows the molecular building blocks of life to be mauipulatcd and that idea wonld not stand up; Human and domestic animal scwagc is
'customlzed' (see Goodman and Redclift, 1991: 167-200). For example, it perfectly natnral but in many societies it causes a pollution problem.
may be possible to take the genetic elements which code for disease resist- Equally, cattle naturally discharge methane gas. As cow numbers have
ance in certain plants and introduce those elements into foodcrops, so that increased, this has come to make a considerable contribution to the
the need for pesticides could bc reduced. Plants, viruses, bacteria or animals greenhouse effect, so much so that New Zealand scientists have apparently
which have been treated in this way are referred to as 'GMOs', genetically introduced anti-flatulence tablets for the nation's cattle (The Guardian, 3
modified organisms. The compauies producing these GMOs clearly want June 1993: 12). And other natural phenomena, notably volcauic eruptions,
permission to bave them used widely, which implies tbat they will escape prodnce toxic and environmentally damaging gases which, when produced
the exbaustive control exercised in laboratory conditions. Enginecrcd by human processes, are regarded as pollutants. Conversely, some
viruses will move around with the creatures they occupy. Engineered substances which would not occur in nature uuless they had been produccd
bacteria cannot easily be both widely used and closely contained. There will by people (sneh as rare and highly reactive metals) break down or rccom-
inevitably be some risk of genetic pollution and in this case it will be bine into naturally occurring substances and arc ~thus not necessarily a
pollution by genetic material unprecedented in nature. pollution problem. The complementary argnment is also heard, to the effect
To conclude this. whole section on the types of pollution it is worth that other human-made substances, such as some plastics, arc so inert that
stressing four general points. First, on a world-wide scale, pollution prob- they pose no threat of contamination to the natural world.
lems are increasing. As economic growth continues and spreads, more of In the case of some pollutants it is also extremely difficuit to sort out the
the planet experiences more pollution, spread more widely. However, and 'human' from the 'natural' element. We have already encountered this
this is the second point, not all forms of pollution are increasing. Several problem in relation to the 'natural' background radiation level. It is prob-
pollutants are being snceessfully regulated in the West (notably acid gases) lematic to determine what level should be taken as the natural baseline.
- though the West's reductions are usnally offset by increases elsewhere - Similarly, there appears to be a growing world-wide problem caused by
and some (notably marine oil pollution and CFCs) are being tackied blooms of toxic phytoplankton, microscopic marine plants which can
internationally. Third, some forms of pollution appear to be inherently p01son fish and contaminate shellfish. According to the New York Times,
global (greenhouse gas pollution for example) while most other 'global' hugo blooms of these plankton 'have been recorded for centuries but
nroblems are rendered global by the effects of international trade and the scientists say they are now increasing rapidly' (6 March 1995: A2). I~ any
,....... - '' ... 1.. ... ............. ,....,.<::<:~>:<: hv which
particular case, it is impossible to say whether the bloom is natural or
-~-- ---u ....: ...... ...:.,.tr+ ........... ~n",.. liff':.
44 Sociology. Environmentali'sm, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 45
Second, some substances are very subtle pollutants and it is hard to globalization of environmental debates. It is as important to examine how
know whether they are hazardous or not. Often, complex scientific investi- the category of 'pollutant' comes to be constructed as it is to try to offer
gations are needed to try to determine whether substances are dangerous one' s own definition of the problem.
and these scientific tests may be inconclusive or controversial. The mem-
bership of the category 'pollutants' is thus not cut-and-dried. For example,
it took many years before scientists realized how CFCs could be a The Globe's Environmental Problems: Resource Depletion
dangerous form of pollution and years more to reach agreement about how
serious the threat was. There may be other substances which we treat as ~e the threats from pollution are very widespread and serious they are
perfectly innocuous which will turn out to be environmentally damaging in not our only environmental problems, nor are they the only ones plausibly
as-yet unanticipated ways. qualifying for 'global' status. The other major threat identified by
Finally, in case this whole question about defining a polllltant seems envi~onmentalists and planners is that we may run out of resources,
'academic', it is important to remember that the difficulties mentioned particularly energy resources, certain minerals, soil and water. The two
above will lead to problems with the legal definition of pollutants. And, in issues are linked, however. As resources become scarcer. poorer quality
tum, this matters in a practical way because polluters and those accused of seams have to be mined, less and less accessible sources of energy are
pollution will often try to use the law to protect themselves from attack and exploited and so on. Accordingly, the degree of pollution caused tends to
prosecution. Unless societies have procedures for identifying what sub- rise. None the less the two issues are, in principle, distinct.
stances count as pOllution, it is impossible to outlaw or regulate them. This Of the resource issues, the one which generally causes most concern, is
was a problem in the West African countries targeted by European and e?ergy. This is because, unlike water or metals or bw1ding stones, conven-
North American waste exporters in the late 19&0s (see Yearley, 1992a: 35- tlonal energy resources can only be used once. If steel is used to make a
7); in many cases the trade was initially legal precisely because the receiving car, the metal (or at least most of it) will still be there when the car is
countries - having no experience of certain toxic industrial chemicals - had traded-in a few years later. But the fuel which powered the car lasts only
no laws regulating their disposal until it is burned; the energy is used up and cannot be recovered.
In his recent study of pollution control policies, Weale has defined There are two particularly significant points about energy resources. The
pollution as: first is that the energy market is conspicuously global. All states in the
the introduction into the environment of substances or emissions that either
contemporary world 'rely on fossil fuels (petrol, gas and coal) and the trade
damage, or carry the risk of damaging, human health or well-being, the built is world-wide. Frequently, tankers registered with one country collect oil
environment or the natural environment There is no' implication in this definition from a second, deliver it for further treatment or. for marketing in a third,
that (!le substances involved stef;U purely from human sources. . . . The and it is consumed in a fourth. It is therefore extremely common to talk of
assumption is simply that emissions or substances introduced into the energy as a global issue. The second is that, in principle at least, politicians,
environment in quantities or concentrations greater than those that can be i
t'
coped with by the cleansing and recycling capacity of nature constitute pollution. busmess leaders and planners have been well aware for over two decades
(1992: 3) that world oil and. gas reserves are limited and are likely to be exhausted in
t
a few decades.
Helpful though such definitions are, it is clear that they do not solve all the A variety of responses has been tried. One can attempt to get the most
practical problem.s, since elements of the definition such as damage to
l,
! out of existing resources; reserves of petrolewn can be made to last longer
human 'well-being' are likely to be understood in a wide variety of ways. if oil is used more efficiently. Since oil resources are consumed chie:B.y for
Even apparently factual components of the definition, such as 'the cleans- transport, for agriculture, and for heating/air conditioning' and power in
'll ing and recycling capacity of nature' may be open to conflicting interpret- homes and industry, a number of responses has been devised. Cars can be
ations as will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4. Fu.rthermore. pressure groups, made more fuel-efficient, low speed limits can be imposed, motorists can
i industries and gove=ents spend a lot of energy trying to redraw the be encouraged to share vehicles, or there can be incentives to switch to
i! precise boundaries around 'pollution' in ways which favour their objectives,
so - as with so much in the realm of the social sciences - we cannot
public transport. Similarly, power stations can be redesigned to run more
efficiently or 'district heating' systems can be developed to use the surplus
,,,\ assume that the definition is a static thing. heated water from power stations to heat homes or offices (this is known as
"
ll Accordingly, in my review of world-wide pollution issues I have tried to combined-heat-and-power ~ CHP). Although these options are well under-
!l take a broad interpretation of the term. As I shall argue in the next two stood, they are little used. For example, Britain bas next to no CHP
chapters, the question of defining- pollution and other forms of Capacity. In the USA, there are pressures for deregulation of the electricity
.....,_.; ....................... t:ll hll'l.::.rrl is ln fact one kev component of processes in the supply market which will favour low-cost generation over en~:::rgy-effi.cient
;; '
; ' Global Environmental Issues 47
Sociology. Environmentalism. Globalization
46
but slightly dearer production. Speed limits in the USA, which w~rc allowing the reaction to continue, rather than arresting it, as in other fission
lowcred in the 1970s to save on fuel, have near!?' all been r:used agam. reactors), fast-breeder technology would allow the s;unc fuel reserves to last
World car consumption is steadily rismg and bxg traffic Jams are now several times as long. But fast-breeder reactors have proved technically very
demanding and extrcmely expensive. There has also. been enormous public
routine in many Third-World cities. . . d
Alt ti ly one can hope that new reserves wxll continue to be faun . disquiet about this technology, not least because plutonium - a primc
For t~':~as~e~enty years or so - when dire predictions of fuel shortages ingredient for building nuclear weapons - forms part of the fuel material.
w finds have repeatcdly stretched the anticxpated At present, plutonium is one of the waste products of nuclear reactors and
baveeencob romon - ne 1 d
ne of fossil fuel reserves. In the 1990s very large ox~ cxp oratxon an . poses formidable disposal problems. Fast breeders offer a route for burning
1 up this plutonium. But many environmentalists and also lobbyists and
graromes are underway off the coas t of Vxetn;un and to the
extraction pro d politicians concerned with nuclear proliferation worry that the adoption of
th f China. Further oil and gas is likely to be found m conteste waters
0 fast-breeder technologies would legitimate increased production of 'refined'
sourth f B . and "'Ound the uninhabited Spratly Islands, some or all of
no o runex - . Chi T. plutoni~ in many countries of the world, giving rise to new risks from the
which are currently the subject of ownership .cl:ums by ~a, :uw~,
v the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunex (The Ec~nomzsc, 29 Apn! spread of nuclear weapons.
1 ;;~:) New finds could extend the anticipated life of o!l fo: a few years, The third kind of nuclear power operates on a significantly different
. d dc or two There may even be novel, nnexploxted forms of basis. Rather than extracting energy from the breakdown of big atoms (of
mayb e a cca her lengthen the life
. of petroch ermca 1s. F or uraniUm, plutonium and so on), it aims to derive energy from fusing special
reserves w hieh .could furt f S. atoms of hydrogen toge.ther into helium. Although the form of hydrogen
encan Association for the Advancement o cxencc
l t the Am
exarope,a
1995 delegates discussed the potentxal o gas Yd
. f' h t'
.ra e , a required occurs very infrcquently, there is so much hydrogen on Earth (the
conference m d hi h oceans are - of course - composed of hydrogen and oxygen) that fusion
bstance essentially consisting of methane trappe m 1ce, w e
cnnons sn . d 1 ti der power could provide electricity for centuries. At present, nuclear fusion has
can be found under permanently frozen soxl an m certam. oca ons un.
th bed This methane-rich ice will actually burn and rmght be plentiful only been achieved under controlled cxperimentixl conditions for cxtrcmely
en:~~~ to ~eet US natural gas needs for decades (New. York Times, 21 short periods. In any caie, there is room for doubt that fusion stations
February 1995: CS). But however successful these alternatives arc, they do ' would be viewed as significantly safer or prave any more economically
not extend the life of oil and gas more than a fcw decades. In any case, j' viable than fast breeders.
with rapid economic growth in areas such as South-East Asxa, world li Though nuclear poweris 3.n alternative to the use of fossil fuels, when
environmentalists talk of 'alternative energy' they usually mean renewable
demand is likely to rise at least as fast as new finds. '
Last! one can look at alternatives. For about three decades after the t sources of energy. '\Vhile cach unit of energy can only bc used once, so that
yw, rld wo the favoured 'alternative' among governments lD the
Second o th s a..., . t d 'th
j fossil and nuclear fuels must one day become exhausted, there are several
ways of 'harvesting' power from renewable sources. In effect, these
West an d m e ovt
'et Bloc consistcd of vanous options .
assocm e Wl
Crudely expressed, there are three kinds of baSlS or
. [i l 'renewables' use the radiated energy of the Su,n or the gravitational force
l
nucear power 1 fi
generating power from nuclear reactions. There ts sunp e ss:on, w ~ uses
bih t of the Moon. The most well known ex;unples are wind-powercd gener-
the energy ernitted from the radioactive decay of metixllic u:an;um or
associated substances (Patterson, 1976: 97-8). This lS the pnnc1ple on
which virtually all the reactors in the world. ~perate at the .moment and :he
l ~
ators, hydroclectric power stations, various devices, such as cstuary
barrages, which harvest tidal energy and 'biomass'. Biomass refers to
systems of cultivating fast-growing crops for fuel, for ex;unple by coppicing
only basis for reactors producing electncxty at anythi~g approaching !' willow. It is also possiblc to grow oil-bearing crops. and even to nse alcohol
commercial levels.' There is probably only "?ough uraruum left to .last - for example from fermented sngar - as a fuel. In these cases, of course,
another hundred years or less if it is used m snnple :fiss10n rt~act~rs. G1vcn . t
}
land which could be nsed for food production has to be turned over to
that uranium is currently used to generate only a small rm~onty of :he l 'growing fuel'. However, with anything like current population levels (see
world's electrical power, any large increases in the use of atoiiDC generatiOn r below) there is no prospcct of cultivating enough food at the same time as
facilities would mean that the uranium would nm ~ut much sooner. ,
A way of making the radioactive fuel last longer lS to nsc so-called fast-
l)
raising crops to replace even a small percentage of global fossil fuel
consumption.
breeder' reactor technology. These reactors take advantage of the fact t~at ~ Also in this category are rather more 'hi-tech' alternatives including solar
radioactive decay produces other substances which are. themselves radw- \
l
collectors (for cx;unplc, arrays of mirrors which direct the Snn's rays to
ti Fast breeders effectively allow the nuclear reactions to accelerate, t:
heat water to drive a turbine), various devices which exploit the capacity of
~~:~~leasing more energy from the starting materials than regular fisswn. 't biological cells to split water molccx!les forming flaiDIDable hydrogen gas,
... _ -~-...................., fnr everv initial unit of nuclear fuel (by and solar cells which convert sunlight directly into electricity. According
'
-- ... - -.
48 Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization
Global Environmental Issues
49
to various visionary schemes, future energy demand could be met by Table 2.1 The distribution of the world's w 1
gantries of buge off-shore wind turbines, used to provide electricity to a er resources
super-insulated houses, offices and factories, fitted with extremely energy- Compartment
Volume of water
efficient equipment. Tropical countries kitted out with various solar (lU.lllions of cubic kilometres)
Percentage of global water
oceans
collectors could export electricity (though here again the demand for land llSO
lakes and rivers 97.9
to site these collectors could conffict with agricultnral needs; see Pimentel et ice Q.2
29 0.01
al., 1994: 360). org<Ul.ic matter 2.1
Just as the world contains only a finite store of petroleum, natural gas atmosphere
0.00006
0.013
and coal, there are limits to the amounts of mineral substances - metals, Total (appro<.)
precious stones, building stone, sands and gravel and so on. In some cases, 1379
though, the amounts of these materials are so large as to make the problem Source: derived from Silvertown (1990: 74).
an acadenric one. Sand, for example, is not scarce (though that is not to
deny that the removal of sand from certain beaches can be a problem for
the maintenance of local habitats). In any case, nrinerals can be recycled. for exports and the ~onuf t .
Old ships can be disassembled and reworked into ploughshares or guns. . d. . . . ~ ac unng needs of th W
m ustria!i.zing countries. Such . ta . e est or of rapidly
The metals from batteries can be recovered and reused. Even ol<l road environmentalists when th ~ ~ces cause particular ind.ignation among
surfacing can be recycled into new paths and roads. purposes, such as the white:e~:r t s ;:e used for apparently 'frivolous'
Inevitably, thore are practical linritations to this idea of recycling. because many of the substances usedoo pastes or detergents. Additionally,
Recycling or reuse is simplest when substances are easily separated and
- are denved from petrochenu al fum manufacture - pl asucs m
particular
.
collected. Glass bottles or alunrinium containers are good examples. Battle e s, ture shortages f il"
demands for nrineral substitntes. lik
Furth o o are ely to raise
tops, by contrast, readily get lost or caught up with general waste. No at ~ecycling, there are limits on the t~ore, n~ matter how good we get
practical sitnation would ever allow l OO per cent recycling. In any case, avrulable in the world Once ~ quantity of eacb metal that is
recycling itself always consumes energy, even just for gathering, sorting and in use there will be sh~rtage~ ~~e:":r~ all the nickel_or molybdenum is
cleaning the materials. But, in a society that is not short of energy, very figures,_ see Blunden, 199ia: 74). omplete recyclmg (for illustrative
high rates of recycling can be anticipated. A third ldnd of resource which is ~eldom
In any event, to date the industrial world has proved itself very adept at undoubted importance is water E "d tl thought about but which is of
substituting relatively plentiful substances for scarce ones. The price of water. And there is a natur~ ~ e_n y, the world contains an awfullot
mechanism obviously lends a hand here by making scarce minerals more land ultimately into the seas andcy e. ram falls, runs off and through the
expensive and giving people an incentive to come up with substitutes. In a processes constantly deliver fresh eva;orates to fall as fresh rain. Natural
famous public wager between an environmental pessi:mist (Paul Ehrlich) many places, we have been con:;,:, to land-bound humans. Bu~ in
and an economist (Julian Simon) who was optimistic about ~e inventive- Frequently, human settlements draw g tt faster than it is renewed.
ness of free-market capitalism, the economist bet that no significant sources, sources which have ulon water from underground artesian
accum ated ove th '
shortages would arise. during the !980s. Reftecting the view that shortages wbi ch are fed only slowly by_, O r ousands of years but
would drive up the prices of nrinerals, the bet actually took the form of a than they are being renewed. .......... n. n average we
are usmg these up faster
wager that the prices of a 'basket' of minerals would not rise through the As is indicated in Table 2.1 the 'wate ' . . .
1980s. The econonrist figured that any shortages would be more than l380 million cubic kilometres'ofwater ~~icle IS believed to involve nearly
compensated by the discovery of new sources and the adoption of IS held at any one time in the oce Th
nearly 98 per cent of this water
substitutes. The econonrist won the bet.comprehensively (Yearley, 1992b: Much, much less than l per centanfs.th e bulk _of the rest is retained in ice.
129; see also Tierney, 1990). . o ewatermtheo
year :'nd ' m any case, the great majorit f th cean _evaporates per
In coming decades, the search for nrinerals is likely to spread more and as rrun. Thus, while water is plain!". y o at falls back mto the oceans
more to the sea floors where biological and geological processes cause some .
t 0 th e l and reg~ons of the gl b Y hnot scarce
. ' the o - 'd li
~ount e vored' on
minerals to become concentrated. But, despite these new sources and the o e eac year IS v limi. d
greatly from re<>-ion to re<>-ion A . ery te . It also varies
potcntial recyclability of mineral substances, minerals are associated with .. o o . s consumpuon b . d
crb.zens continues to grow w t h ' y m ustry and private.
broader international environmental problems. For one thing. mineral a er s ortages can b .
even though, at a global level th arth . e expected to IntensitY
~ ---=~ . . . . . ,. h~hita.ts so that. forexample, the land- W.. . 'ee
ntmg m The Observer recently L
ISaverywt l
e p ace. .
diminishing water resourres: ean has captun:d the signi.ficance of
--.. ., ),
__r
Global Environmental Issues Si
Sociology~ Environmentalism, Globalization
50
th dth of the planet' s water. Less half their surface water flow from outside the country; examples range from
All land~bound life has to shar~ one tc~- f ou~~nd more than thrcc-quart~rs of Cambodia and Niger, through Urnguay and Romania to Luxembourg and
than three per cent. of the wthorld ~ wa~~~;~iiht per cent of the r~st lies deep the Netherlands.
that is frozen, matnly at e po cs.
Of course, disputes over river water are not only concerned with quan-
underground. . . h uld still in theory, bc more than enough. tities.. Water quality can also represent an international environmental
The tiny factlon that rem~~s~l~ of rai~ fall on the contincnts, enough. t?
Every year about 27,000 cub d a half feet of water. But nearly two-thirds of Il problem, as was mentioned in the section on pollution earlier in the
submergc them_ under twoo~~rds of what is left runs off in floods. Even the chapter, because when one nation's industry or agriculture pollutcs it, that
evaporatcs agam, ~d t-;; f . fall could still sustain more than double the commonly dccreases its value for countries further downstream. The
:1 remaining 3,400 cubxc J!llles oif ral~ 1't would fall evenly where people live. B?t majority of the world's major rivers do mark or cross international bound-
! world's prcscnt population -. on Y ycar to fill a small reservoir for cach of tls
while Iceland ge~ .cnouinhgh rb~ ~vekuwait with seven times as many people,
aries so that river pollution. is routinely a multinational niatter.
quarter- of a' million a ttan s, , ll r th Drawing the threads of this section on resource depletion together, the
i gl drop to share between a o em. d th first significant overall point to note is that in each case, it is common for
; l scarcely gets a sm e ld' trics - including many of those in Africa an e
l' ln all, 26 of the wor s coun th eed. Over the next 30 years another 40 analysts to talk about global amounts of each resource. Thus, we talk about
Middle East - get less :"~ter than '&.e~r o ulations outstrip their rainfall. The
'.,.' !l
ir.'~ '': nations are expected to JOcdtn ~cm, as ted t~ grpow tenfold from the prcscnt 300
bcr of people affect IS expcc . f th Janet
l how much water the world contains or how many years' oil and gas
remain. Even the world' s soil is discussed in these terms: Pimentel et al.
num b'll' e third of the projected population o ep .
1~ i : million to three J lOD - on ~ more than nature. Phoenix, Arizona, gets assert that 'Soil erosion worldwide is about 30 tonnes per hcctare per year.
Money, of course, c:mnts~ordev~n town of Lodwar in the far north of Kenya, ... Thus topsoil is being lost 20 to 40 times faster than it is being replaced'
li

f
i ,i
l the ~ame amount of rax:n : a:
m:~~ water. Immense sums have been spent. on
yet xts. peop~e use 20U~ci St tes Not a single drop of the great Colorado Rl~cr
\
i
(1994: 353). For cach of these resources, it has come to seem natural to talk
water m the western rut a . , G d Canyon, and draxns
about global reserves and potential global shortages. Yet - and this is the
~ i - which carved the world' s largest gorge at Anz~a s ~has all been c;l.an:u:ned second overall point - though it is sometimes conveniellt to envisagc a
., :\ a fifth of all the once-wild yrest- now r:achcs e sea. global amount of these things, in fact they are very unevenly dispersed

'l l
l and used for cities and agnculturc. (1993. IS) around the globe. For example, while the world is currently estimated to
>1
,,'l l Though nearly all the rivers iu the west of the USA are divert: f~r
have around 300 years' worth of coal at today's consumption rates
(Reddish, 1991: 10), the coal is not evenly spread. Latin American coun-
~- . e American agriculture and industry currently get by o y yf
h uman us ' . lies As Lean goes on to note, the west o tries have relatively meagre supplies while the USA sits on around fourteen
!S
times as much coal as all of Latin America combined. Of course, these
~~ siphoning off undergroll;nd supp .. vast and ancient under-

rJ .
th United States owes Its cont.mued fertihty to a . d
e d ea' the Ogallala aquifer. This thousand-mile broa aq er ts
uif' .

gro;;' ; to' hold as much water as one of the Great Lakes. But, as Lc~n
~",;'te~~:this is fossil
water, laid down agesh ago, ";-~c~x:~:t ~~ ;~~
l . h d' The water pumped out eac year
:r
estimates depend on calculations from cproven reserves' and will not take
into account new discoverics nor the matter of how likely mining oper-
ations are: there may bc coal under Oxford but it is bard to imagine a
policy of mining there. Other resources are also less easy to pin down than
coal. Natural gas for example is mobile. If it is extracted from one end of a
re~~~:s ~ 130 to 160 per cent according to Pimentel et al. (1994: 354). ~~ gas field, more tends to flow to that end. Thus Anglo-Dutch gas fields, for
~~esen~'rai'es of use, these authors estimate, the water supply may only ho example, are not easily divisible into UK and Dutch components since the
out for another forty years. . b lli ts gas itself can switch allegiances. In some cases, this gives countries an
Elsewhere in the world, water shortages ar: made e~dent d y t~~ ;.d incentive to extract it as soon as possible to prevent others bearing them to
etwecn nations for access to water for agnculture, or m us n . it. Lastly, whatever way these various resources happen to bc distributed,
~ estic consumption, and for power-gencration purposes. F?r _exa:nple,~f
:f
c~:tries locate~ upstream extra~t ~:"~~;~.~;~~~ ;~~ ;:;::;~~~~
supplies for nations at the m;o:,d the Eu hrates and Tigris rivers, Iraqis
there are strong grounds for believing that they are limited and that current
consumption patterns will take demand for several of these resources close
to their limits within a small number of decades. In that sense, it is possible
regio~ ?f ;J:~/~~~:;~s~:;;...~ted before the~ can feel the benefit. The use~f to cnvisage world-wide resource shortages.
comp a~n the River Jordan is also contested. ln Europe before . e
water ro~ Bloc there were Czechoslovak/Hunganan
disintegrati~u of ththe RiE.asternDan.ub~ into a huge hydroelectric scheme. The Globc's Environmental Problems: 'Over-population'
1 s to divert e ver dds th
p an has now withdrawn from the scheme and has been at o ::"'
A third major kind of environmental anxiety concerns the sheer size of the
Hunga~ _....: ..:...... ;..., ~lnv~kia over the future management . of__ ........
the nver.
~ :.,.,. nu,-...- human population itself. For many politicians, particularly those from the
52 Sociology. Environmentalism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 53

North~ 'over-population in unde:rdeveloped countries is self--evidently a stabilize population. Favoured policies include family planning advice and
leading environmental problem. However, this topic is treated with con- th': provision of contraceptives~ perhaps assisted by incentives such as tax
siderable delicacy by many. Northern non-governmental organm~ot10ns relief for parents who maintain a small family size.
(NGOs) even the ones who are !nost strident in denouncing other envlron- The contrary argument is that population is not of itself an environ-
mental hanns. at least in part because the discussion can so quickly be mental problem. The 'real' environmental harm associated with human
interpreted in the light of North-South inequalities and, potentially, of popula tions is related both to their size and the amount they consume.
racism. Advocates of this position point out that the (approximately) 25 per cent of
There is wide - thougb by no means all-embracing - agreement that the world's people in the industrialized North consume around 80 per cent
unless some means is found of limiting the world's human population, the of energy and other resources, leaving the poorest 75 per cent with only a
environmental iroplications will soon be globally severe. In the mid-1~9~s fifth of env1ronrnentally-harmful consumption. By this (admittedly rough)
the population stands at around 6000 ~llion people. At present rat_es 1! 1s calculation, the average Northern citizen is twelve times as environmeD.tally
projected to double in four decades (Punentel et al., 1994: 349). This total d:u_naging as the average person from the South. Spokespersons from the
and the recent increases in world population growth which have produced Third World thus argne that population reduction progranunes are, in
it are without precedent, and though humans are outnumbered by other effect, a play by the North to maintain the prodigallifestyles of its citizens
kinds of creatures (most notably insects and so on), people are coming to req~ed - in tnrn - by its economies. If. so the argument goes, the North
use up more and more of the biological production of the planet (Swanson, lm:uted >.ts average impact to that of the typical Southern individual the
1991: 187). .. total world ID:pact would fall by over 70 per cent. Accordingly, ;i the
Were food production geared entirely to providing a minimum nutntlO~S North was senous about wanting to limit the environmental harm caused
diet for everyone, it is more than likely that everybody could be fed .. This by human beings it ~ould move to limit consumption before limiting
abstract way of thinking carries certain fiaws with it; for example, it 1s not populanon smce that 1s where real reductions in pollution and resource
clear at what rate we can go on producing even basic foodstuffs such as depletion can be achieved.
cereals since at the moment their cultivation depends on fertilizers manu- This critical line of r~aso~ng is often complemented by a further argu-
factured from non-renewable chemicals. Futnre agricultural production ment, namely that families m underdeveloped countries commonly have
may have to decline. But, assuming it did not fall, it is still doubtful that large numbers of children for good, practical reasons. Among these reasons
the earth could support double the present population no matter how are .the im_.Portanoe of offspring for work on the family fann or in tbe
fanning- was :reorganized and whatever foreseeable agricultural innovations fanuly busmess and the need for numerous children to bear the costs of
were employed. In any case, the total population logica!ly cannot grow for caring for parents, io the absence of welfare, onoe they become elderly.
ever. At some point, there has to be a limit. Once the argument has reached Seen from thi~ perspectlve, a_f~ on !'amily planning and on the provis.ion
this stage it is common for some commentators~ drawing analogies with of contracepttves appears llllSgwded smce the policy assumes that families
responses to overcrowding in other mammal species .. to claiD: that_ ~nature' want and would benefit from small families. If, however, they do not, if.
will enforce the limit to population growth, even if we fail to, through they actually ~esire ~arge famili:', then officially sponsored family planwng
disease and conflict (Pimentel et al., 1994: 364). programmes nsk bemg oppress1ve.
What is often omitted from this argument, however, is the acknowl- . As well as _implyiog ~t officia.l programmes may be the wrong way to
edgement that we will never bave the chance to find out what that limit is limit P?Pulatton~ this pomt of YleW does have a positive policy recom-
because food and other resources are so uneveuly divided. Already, around mendanon. Its vww >.s that populanon stabilization follows from economic
one,quarter of the world population is reckoned to be malnourished and growth. Once ?arents are more .confident about their economic prospects
this is because hundreds of millions of people are too poor to buy the food an~ about th~ long-tenn secunty they will opt for smaller family sizes.
they need. Htmce, where some see an overpopulation problem, othe!s This, after all, lS _what appears to have happened in the West, where family
peroeive an inequality problem. . . S!Ze f~ll some time after iodustrialization. If one accepts this line of
Given these contrasting starting points, debates over world populatwn reasomng. t_he appropnate policy response to 'over~population' is to devise
can quickly become bogged down. Self-styled 'realists' from the Northern tr~de pohc1es and forms of technical and economic assistance which
political communities and establishment' .envirorunentalists t~d to argue
1
stmtulate economic growth in the Third World.
~---~ ... 1 ine:czualities are not gomg to be removed m the near Lastly on this point, it is difficult to disentangle the North's concerns
-~ 1 --.hrr.n were a self--contained about global population levels from particular Northern countries' worries
about immigration. The nations of the European Union have a special
:_ u..".-th Afril:"..a while the USA famously
'"t ..

'' _ _T i l

--
54 Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization
Global Environmental Issues
55
faces probiems over immigrants from Central America. The very idea that Within approximately the p t d d
countries should take responsibility for their own population levels implies population control and about : . sueca e a f:esh set of arguments about
that each country has a fixed population. Taken in a suspicious frame of have come to be aired publicly [pos~d w~shes of Third-World parents
mind, this looks like arguing that, rather than permit immigration into the movement as by environmentalis~ ~r ~:ptonc as muc~ by the womcn's

:=~ ~:;r~: ~~:p~wly;oic:~~s:w~ t~~:~~:e~ ~s~:~:el:~!:


prosperous North, the USA and the EU want underdeveloped countries to 0

take care of their own peoples. The obvious delicaey of these questions has
meant that many environmentalist and development NGOs in the North suggested that conventional f~J o wl':.n os of males. Similarly, it has beon
have trodden very carefully around the population issue (see Taylor, 1992). poorly directed towards women e;e;; th mn~ ?r?grammes and advice were
While Green Parties have often called for a planned reduction in popu- the physical consequences of l~rge farn:;;gs~~ ~~n:o:en who boa~ most o;
lations even within N orthem countries, NGOs - conscious of arguments fanuly contraceptive practices. Where . . omen who manage
about underdeveiopment and exploitation, and anxious not to advocate planning seemed to order Third W prevJOus discourses about family
policies which might impede self-development in the Third World - have behaviour for the sake of the ~o~~d J::'oples to change ~eir reproductive
been rather less vocal (Yearley, 1996). empower women to make their ' s more. recent _discourse offers to
Before taking these opposing arguments further, it is worth describing 1992) A d' J own reproducttve chOJces (see Harrison
. ccor mg y, at the 1994 UN o . . . . '
several other factors which have influenced the population argument. First, assumed interest of women was taken aJ' p~latxon SUill.IDJ.t I~ Cairo the
these contested positions have been elaborated in a context which is already
morally and religiously charged. Given that many Southern countries are
ment environmentalists than the radica! n:;mg closer :o that of establish-
be. This brought about the t'ro . 't . d-World cntique had tended to
Roman Catholic or have sizeable Roman Catholic populations (in effect . mc Sl uatton 10 which J th p .
former director of Friends of the Earth . L d o?a . on om tt,
Central and Sonthem America, the Philippines, many former French, the British Green Party fo m on on and a maJor Influence on
Belgian, Spanish and Portguese colonies) and that the Hierarchy opposes l . r many years, could write a
i eaUmg on UK environmental NGOs to be . . newspaper artic1e
'artificial' birth control, some governments have found it hard to make a issue (Porritt, 1994). At the time of the Cai/ess tin:ud about the population
formal commitment to family planning using modern contraceptives. to approach the Conservative . . o conference, he called on them
Fnrthermore, by implying that contraceptive abortion is commonly associ- Chalker), a woman who- he :~!:~::or Overseas. Development (Baroness
ated with family planning programmes, the Catholic Hierarchy has need to work through the empowe - ;as open .to arguments about the
attempted to broaden the appeal of its argument, for example to Islamic felt NGOs should be more strict ~e:'t o ~omen m the Third World. Hc
leaders and to the strong anti-abortion lobby in the USA. In this way, policies to cut the global rate of en Jn calling for mtemationally agreed
Jeftist critics of population control policies (who want a redistribution of popu atton growth
I shall retum to the many arguments ar d . .
wealth rather than Jimits on population size) have sometimes found chapters. For the moment the k . . oun ~opulatton In the following
i themselves making common cause with right-leaning religious authorities. 'global' coal or oil reserves thereey pomt_ xs .thd~t, JUst as with estimations of
As well as the apparently high-minded complications posed by religious ' are senous Ifiiculti 10 talici b
global population problem At th . es ng a out the
authorities, there are more down to earth reasons for governments to there are too many human~ on e stmp1est level, many would agree that
oppose family planning, at least for their own countries. In the past fifteen to limit (and probably reverse) ~~globe ":!that steps ought to be taken
!ation is a global issue But even u ure ~o
years, as mentioned in Chapter J, all round the world there have been wars
and threats of war over national boundaries - around Belize in Central i trends. In this sense, papu-
agreed, this leaves unr~solv~d the ~=:g that the. g~neral policy could be
America, between Peru and Ecuador, around Sierra Leone and Liberia, in
the former Yugoslavia, within Iraq, over Israel and Palestine, and within
l distributed. It also sidesteps the ::Uestion o~ ~owdlin:uts should be globally
per se or something more like per 't o . CC! mg whether population
the former Soviet Union. For such wars countries need annies, and for

l
the measure in question. cap! a enVIronmental harm ought to be
armies they need fit young soldiers. If you have an ethnic enemy, no doubt
you feel strongly that their population should be controlled, but you may
be inclined to make an exception for your own. This point throws into high
The Globe's Environmental Problems: Loss of Bio.fiversity
relief a more general issue, which is that talk of governments cox:nbining to

ll
limit world population implies that they may all be willing to play their
For many years, this fourth kind of env
part. In practice, countries may have rather different policy objectives in globe was symbolized in Euro e a d Ironmental problem facing the
mind when thinking about the numbers of their own citizens, than when wide!~ realized in the North ~at c~rt:: ~n~~ed States by the panda; it was
they are contemplating the abstract issue of the 'right' size for the global of exttnction. Once again, it should be ree~ profile spec!Os were m danger
problem is not fully separablo from other k!:edfthat t~s environmc?tal
,..",.... ....,,1::.tion.
, 0 cco10p.Jcal dcgr;Hl:JIHliL
Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 57
56
Animals and plants are affected by pollution, b~ the fouling of rivers a~d variation. The widespread official recognition of this terminology was
seas and by contaminated land. But the maJonty of spec1es loss, m reflected in the fact that a Biodiversity Convention was sigued by represen-
particular among the high-profile _animals (the 'charismatic megafauna' as tatives of over a hundred and fifty nations at the Earth Suturnit in 1992 (see
they are Usually tenned by env1ronmental commentators), .comes from Birnie and Boyle, 1992: 483-6; Susskind, 1994: 172).
another source. At first these animals suffered through huntmg; now the Through modern agricultural practices and through the destruction of
threat comes more often simply from habitat loss; humans chop down the habitats, humans are rapidly decreasing this biodiversity. Tens of thousands
trees or tarmac over the land where the s?ecies live. The fact tha~ elephants of species (including plants and insects) are reckoned to be lost per year
and rhino are still being killed for the~r tusks and horus mdicates that (Pimentel et al., 1994: 355). Over the roillennia, natural selection has given
hunting remains a threat to some species too. . . rise to a spectacular number of variations in the molecular basis of life. In
Most animals and plants have evolved _to cope wtth v~ry specific the second half of the twentieth century humans have done a great deal to
surroundings. Their numbers decline when the~r so';'ce of food lS damaged, reduce this variety. Such actions may well rob humans themselves o{ the
when their migratory routes are disrupted o:
t~el! breeding yattems are biological riches manifested in these disappearing species - for example, it
is often suggested that the loss of rainforest plants may deprive us of as-yet-
disturbed. Particularly in the West, where mdlgenous wildlife has been
greatly reduced since the onset of industrialization, global nature conser- und.iscovered medicines or that vanishing varieties of wheat may contain
vation activities have proved a popular success. Nature programmes on genes which would benefit agriculture in years to come. Furthermore, we
television have captured huge audiences and fund-raising activities to save may not ouly be, so to speak, killing off the genetic geese before they lay
the charismatic creatures - the elephant or panda or tiger - have regularly their golden eggs, but also endangering the adaptive capacity of large
been high earners. All the while, and despite this concern for overseas sections of the natural world itself by, for example, drastically reducing the
wi!dlife, intensive agricultural practices and the spread of subu_r~an n1lmber of types of grass which flourish or by limiting the biological
dwellings have been having a serious adverse effect on the remammg variability in the primates which remain.
(relatively unglamorous) indigenous wildlife in the West over the last three When we think about species loss and threats to biodiversity, there is a
tendency to focus on birds and terrestrial creatures with whales and
decades. . dolphins as the outstanding exception. However, the ;;,ternational fishing
This threat to wildlife can be seen as a candidate global envl!onmental
issue in at least two senses. First, the charismatic meg~auna have con:e to industry turns out to be a highly sigoificant area for disputes o.ver global
stand for humanity' s common duty to ensure the surv1val of o_ther bemg~, biological resources. Up until the late 1970s the seas beyond a narrow
particularly majestic or otherwise impressive creatures. In ~ case. 1t lS (usually three-nautical-mile) limit from the coasts were regarded as a
clear that many individual species are not of themselves an mtema~10nal common resource. No state or international body had particular juris~

issue. Europe, for instance, is not directly affected by threats to the rhino or diction; consequently the fishing fieets of the world went wherever the
to sloths since, in the natural state, these are not European creatures. None pickings were rich. Occasionally catches fell, but the fieets moved off
the less, the argument seeros to have been widely accepted - not least at an elsewhere and were generally able to find new fish stocks. In principle it
emotional level - that in some sense the world as a whole would be a was recognized that there was a danger of over-fishing but as long as
poorer place without dephants and lions, without blue whal~ and pandas. overall catches were sufficient little attention was paid to this potential
No matter that people in Britain, say, have pretty well elunmated all :he problem. This situation was very favourable to countries with distant-water
large fauna apart from farm animals and selected hunt-quarry ~pec1es, fishing fieets, whether privately owned (as with Japan, Norway and the
hundreds of thousands of people will give money_ ~d lend we1ght to USA) or state-supported (as with the then Soviet Union and East European
pressure groups which try to affect interna~ona1.pohct~s.m this area. countries). Boats roaroed the world, fishing the rich grounds off distant
The second and more roundabout way m which this tssue has become coasts. In many cases, as with south-west Africa, the coastal countries were
globalized is through the development of a langu~ge for talking. abo~t the in no position to. benefit from this activity at all. having only small-scale
worldcwide loss of species. The key term here lS b10log~cal .diverS1ty or fishing equipment and no rights over the fish taken. Gradually, through the
'biodiversity'. By using the tenn biodiversity 'we can generallZe concerns 1960s and 1970s the size and sophistication of these :fleets- together with
about the Joss of species iri many different localities up to a global level. some newly-em~rging fieets, for example in Peru and Thailand - rendered
Biodiversity refers to the amount of genetic diversity existing on the pl~et: the industry global. As Peterson notes, 'With sometimes the Soviets and
how many insects there are, how many types of parrot, how many vaneues sometimes the Japanese in the lead, distant-water fieets were pushing into
of maize and so on. Since all life is. at a fundamental level, based ?n new areas of the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the South Atlantic by the
~,.,..-lMinn~ on the same genetic materials (DNA), we can talk about spectes mid-1970s' (1993: 259).
... -----1..:1' ...... .,.tnr.:tl O"cnetic Such a global spread meant that it was no longer possible to respond to
. --..,,-.. _l
l
l'i 58 Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 59

shortages by moving on; there was nowhere left to move on to. The danger food for a compctitor and thus boost the compctitor's numbers and so on.
of over-fishing then became acutc. There were large, techmcally a_dvance~ It was therefore not easy to draw decisive conclusions about the practical
fleets working all over the oceans, with new countries eager to b_nng thcxr implications of the existing data on fish stocks.
boats into the business. In any case, fishing is difli.cult to superv1sc. There In summary, species loss can be seen as a global matter in several senses.
was a risk that too many adult fish would be taken to allow populatlOn First, some commercially important species - most conspicuously fish - arc
sizes to be maintained or even that smaller, younger fish would be caught hunted on a global scale, and poorly-rcgulated competition has tcnded to
with the result that there would be many fewer 'recruits' into t~e po'ol of lead to serious declines in their populations. Second, s.ome endangered
adults. Attempts at voluntary restriction usually failed because 11 was too species - such as the panda and the elephant - have acquired a global
tempting and too easy to chea!. And if you feared that others were significance. They somehow embody the Jrailty and the wonder of nature
cheating, it became 'rational' for you to cheat as well. and have become the focus for attempts at natnre conservation. Finally,
The pressures were moderate.d to some ex~ent after 1977 when 200~ through the concept of biodiversity, it has recently become topical to talk
nautical miJe Exclusive Econom1c Zones were mtroduced (Petcrson, 1993. of the overall loss of biological richness of the planet as a whole. Though
263-4). These gave countries legal jurisdiction over much, much gr~ater these are different senses in which threats to species have come to bc
areas of their coastal waters. According to Petersen this cffectxvely interpreted as problems of the global enviromnent, they can rcadily be
allocated nine-tcnths of all the fishing for edible species to territorial waters, related to other global cnviromnental problems. For example, the climate
since these fish by and large Jive on and above the nutrient-rich continental change which is anticipated from additional greenhousc warming is likely
shelves rather than in the deep ocean. It did not, however, reduce the 1ssue to shift climate bands on the Earth, changing the distribution of habitat-
of fishery managCment to a national level. There were two reasons for this. types. It is anticipated that this will cause further losses in biodiversity since
First countries allowed other nations' fishing fleets into their waters to fish vegetation, especially forest, is unlikely to bc able to migrate as fast as the
unde~ licence; the arrangements here were similar to other intcrnat~o~al climate shifts and because the creatures which live in the trees will lose their
commercial deals. Second, even if nine out of ten edible fish were hvmg habitats too. Finally, since trees constitute one major way in which carbon
within the coastal regions, that did not mean that these fish spent all of dioxide is taken out of. the atmosphere (all plants are bnilt of carbon
their lives in the coastal region of one particular nation or that the fish d1d 'manufactured' from carbon dioxide gas), the conservation of trOpical
not spend a fraction of their lives in internatio~al waters. 'In the first ~e, forests has often been argucd for on the grounds that it would help counter
some fish might be Mexican one day and Amencan the next. Heavy fishing greenhouse wanning. In effect, tropical countries are being asked to
in, say, the United States' w3.ters d~ring ~e fis~es', visit co~ d impact conserve their natural resources for the good of the international com-
seriously on Mcxico's reserves. Sirrularly,. Peruvtan fish which swam munity. Negotiation of this issue has proved complicated, as will bc seen in
outside the 200-mile limit and were systematically fished by Japanese boats the next two chapters.
could diminish Peru's expected reserves. If the fish happen to spend the1r
whole lives in your exclusive economic zone then you may have .an
economic interest in managing the stocks in a sustainable fashion. If, Conclusions
however, they only visit your waters on occasional 'outings'_.from other
nations' zones, then an interest in far-sighted management xs much less Th~ evidence reviewed in this chapter gives us good grounds for regarding
enVIronmental problems as increasingly globalized. Modern pollution is
clear. ifli. ul f very liter~ly, in Robertson's terms, 'compressing' the world as, for in~
As if these issues were not already complicated enough, !hc d e ty o
gaining authoritative knowledge about fish makes the question harder stlll. stance, nations arc obliged to worry about what their neighbours arc doing
Fish are difli.cult to observe and the people who have the most ready access about air pollution and emission control. The dim.inution of resources and
to data about them, trawler crews, have vested interests which might incline the lo~s of species are making people aware that there arc global Jimits to
them to withhold information or present impcrfect data. More complex the things and the creatures which they count on. To some extent at least
still, though recorded decline in fish numbers may indicate ovcr-fishin? and these considerations are giving citizens, governments and corporations ~
thus the need for Jong-term reform of the industry, such figures may s1mply sense that then! arc real global ties and, pcrhaps, in principle at least a
reflect a natural variation in population size, in which case the mdustry global i~entity for the occupants of spaceship Earth. In this chapter wc
does not need to be sealed down but has only to observe a temporary have reVIewed how pollution ties the lifcstyles and policies of people in one
reduction in the size of catches. Attempts at modelling fish populations part of the globe to the quality of life of their global neighbours. We have
were also affected by uncertainty about the effects of interspecies inter- scen also how trade and investment join with wind and air currents and
..... .. : ___ 1:'-- - - ..........."" .... ; ... ~ ....,;"ht o~nl~t.e its numbers, releasing more other natural proccsscs in determining the distribution of pollution ;md
: , ..

60 Sociology, Environmenta/ism, Globalization Global Environmental Issues 61

ecological problems across the globe. Such global ties continue to be global than others. Furthermore, as we will see in the next chapter, one has
intt::nsified. to take into account the fact that it benefits some people to advance claims
Yet while pollution, resource depletion, species loss and p_o~~lation about 'globality'. Clearly, environrnentalists look more important if, instead
hazards illustrate global connections and seem to offer the posstbthty for of complaining about a local grievance, they can lay claims to global
people to embrace a global identity, these. probleros also indicate that concerns. They benefit from upping the stakes. But, more insidiously, a
global relations are characterized by inequality and - often - by double nation or a company which benefits from a particular environmental policy
standards. Waste dumping continues, a minority of the world's populatton or reform may want to see that policy adopted as broadly as possible, in
continues to cause the majority of many forms of air pollution, and fish which case a 'global' label is very handy, as we saw in a preliminary way
stocks are hun ted almost to depletion in many parts of the world, primarily with the population issue. In other words, certain groups may have an
by the trawling fteets of the North and the former Soviet Bloc. Claims ideological interest in having specific environmental probleros tre.ated as
about over-population are met with counter-claims about the North's over- though they were global and therefore special. To put it crudely, there may
consumption. Furthermore, some forms of pollution reduction in the North be other reasons than pure environmental concern for wishing to see certain
are more than offset by the consequences of industrialization in the South. environmental issues handled as matterS of international, global pri'ority. It
In all, the image of a fragile globe, with limited resources, on which we all is to this issue of the 'globality' of global environmental probleros that we
depend has not yet reversed the tendency to pollute and despoil that globe. must now tum.
'Global' hazards are not necessarily unifying.
As this review has indicated, environmental problems are not all Notes
becoming graver. There has been international progress in limiting pollu-
tion from ozone-depleting chemicals, and marine oil pollution is declining. l The example of a glass grcenhousc: is often used to illustrate this point, though it is
But in many cases reductions in environmental harm caused within the equally frequcntly disputed by atmosphc'ric scientists. A garden greenhousc is effective mostly
North ire dwarfed by increasing damage in the South, brought about either because it traps wann air. Without the grceohouse roof, the wann air would tend to drift
by the displacement of the North' s problems or by 'development' within the upwards taking the heat with it .. With the Earth's atmosphere, of course, there is no 'roof', The
g:teenhouse effect works because the grcenhouse gases slow down the passage of heat. ln this
~~ . . . sense, they operate more like tbc im:ulating jacket around domestic hot water cylinders than
Following from the above conclusions is a further point, the realtzatwn panes of glass in a grcenhouse. But this analogy also has its weaknesses, most notably the fact
that environmental problems can become 'global' in different ways. Far that hot water cylinder jackets do not let the sun' s radiation heat the water in the cylinden. .On
from all environmental problems are inherently global. As mentioned balance, the greenhouse analogy is the best we have.
earlier, air pollution from vehicles and land contamin~tion are_ pred:o~i 2 I should like to thank Kay Milton for alerting me to the story about the American dfakcs
misbehaving in Spain.
nantly local. The dust, noise and loss of visual amemty assoctated Wlth 3 Although in northern Europe and the north of the USA it is easy to think of the need for
quarries are regionally concentrated. The effects of discharges from heating, with the increasing number; of office blocks and the growth of populations in Third-
chemical works are usually felt only locally. And even apparently major World urban areas, the greatest demand world-wide is soon likely to bc for cooling rather than
environmental catastrophes such as large tanker wrecks have their heating.
predominant impact in a restricted area.
Of course whenever such 'local' processes are repeated all over the world
they do in ~ sense become global phenomena. There can meaningfully be
international federations of anti-roining campaigners for example. Coastal
conununities the world over can join in their concerns about marine
pollution from oil tankers or about the loss of fish stocks. Such alliances
make particular sense when the campaign target is an international firm or
industry. Thus Rio Tinto Zinc, a buge. transnational mining concern which
has been the target of many anti-ntining actions, forms a focus for
international action at the local level. Local community groups facing the
prospect of having waste incinerators b~t in_ their re~on can collaborate
internationally, exchanging data and tac\lcalmformatlon.
But tltis should not lead us to assume that the local is always global. In
---~ . :~1-.. ..........nah inQ'enuitv. all environmental ,problems can be
AN INVITATION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL. SOCIOL.OGY

MICHAEL MAYJIRFI!:LO BI<I..L


Department af Sociology
Iowa State Uniwrsity
Amt$, Iowa

e PIN:!;! !"OROSC PRI!:5S


Thousand Oaks i.<lndon New Delhi
/

Sociology for a New Century


AN INVITATION TO
A Pine Forge Press Series
ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY
Edited by Charles Ragin, Wendy Griswold, and Larry Griffin

Sociology for a New Century brings the best current scholarship to


today's students in a series of short texts a\lthored by leaders of a new
generation of social scientists. Each book addresses its subject from a MICHAEL MAYERF.ELD BELL
comparative, historical, and global perspective, and, in doing so, connects J?epartment of Sociology .
social science to the wider concerns of students seeking to make sense of Iowa State University
our draroatically changing world. Ames, Iowa

Global Inequalities York Bradshaw and Michael Wallace


Schools and Societies Steven Brint
How Societies Change Daniel Chirot
Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World Stephen
Cornell and Douglas Hartmann
The Sociology of Childhood William A. Coriaro
Cultures and Societies in a Changing World Wendy Griswold
Crime and Disrepute John Hagan
Gods in the Global Village: The World's Religious in Sociological
Perspective Lester Kurtz
! ':
Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change John
Markoff
Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective Philip McMichael
Aging, Social Inequality, and Public Policy Fred C. Pampel
Constructing Social Research Charles C. Ragin
Women and Men at Work Barbara Reskin and Irene Padavic
Cities in a World Economy Saskia Sassen
Gender, Gamily, and Social Movements Suzanne Staggenborg ~!{~
- - PINE FORGE PRESS
Thousand Oaks London New Delhi
Forthcoming:
Families and Public Policy Diane Lye
:CHAPTER 4

Population and Development

God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization


after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism
of a si~gle tiny island kingdom [England] is today keeping
the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million
[India) took to similar economic exploitation, it would
strip the world bare like locusts.

-Mahatma Gandhi, 1928

Thomas Malthus's An Essay on the Principle of Population, originally


published in 1798, is assuredly one of the most controversial works of
all time. The book's basic argument is that, unless cbecked in some way,
population growth tends to continue until it runs up against
. environmental limits, causing poverty, hWlger, misery, and resource
Scarcity. The eventual result is a population crash. 1
Although Malthus's ideas seem like common sense, you could etch
glass with some of the critics' reactions. Friedrich Engels termed
Malthus'stheory a "vile and infamous doctrine; a "repulsive blasphemy
against man and nature; for it im.plied that the poor~ through their
alleged inability to control their reproduction, were to blame for their
own poverty.2 Others have called Malthus's theory "racist," for it
seeminglyplaces the bulk ofblame for environmental problems on poor
countries, and thus on people of color.) Still others, most notably
economists confident about the ability of hwnan ingenuity in a free
market economy to overcome just about any problem. have labeled
Malthus's views "nonsense:;\
There truly is a lot to object. to in Malthus's ideas as well as in many
of the later applications of his argument. Yet his book continues to be
the basic point of departure for discussions of the relationship between
population, development, and the environment. Two hundred years
later we are still arguing about M~lthus because, despite the
104 AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY CHAPTER~ POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 105

inadequacies of his book, it also forcefully states a basic incontrovcrtibie total. Becauscofcompounding' the size ofthe.mcrcmcnts can go up even xf .
truth: The world is only so big. It offers only so much room for development t h e gro wth
d rate. falls somewhat, although th e mcrcments
. .
will eventually
and only so many resources for people to consume. b cgm to rop if the growth rate falls uffi tl Co . xs. great
ew h ' . s cten Y mpoundmg
The idea that we might face limits does not mesh comfortably with the n s w en Y?u rc trymgto make riloncy, but the situation is rather gloomicr:
modem spirit of constant growth. It represents a direct challenge to the say ~althustans, when we consider the appetite of a growin ul . .
treadmills of production and consumption around which we have organized a fimte world. g pop ation m
so much of our lives. Much of the objection to Malthus can bc understood The rate of world population growth is in fact falling. The peak came in
as an ideological reaction to this challenge. ~h~ ~~;~~~~e; ~worlt population was growing at an annual rate of over
But Malthus also presented his theory of the relationship between
population and environment in a deterministic way-as something which
th J; h. ~ e ear Y 1990s, the rate had fallen to 1.48 percent 1 We
ere ore ave httlc cause for alarm, say some. .
is inevitable, beyond our control. In the previous chapter I argued against a
deterministic view of the economy and of technology. Malthus's critics are Exhibit 4.1 History of world popu""tion growth.
right that we should not accept a deterministic view of population and the
environment either.
Neither can we ignore the influence that the environment does indeed
10
.
. .. ,?
have on society, however. The relationship between so~iety and the
environment is a dialogue; each shapes, but does not determine, the other.
We need to avoid both the deterrninistic outlook of crude Malthusian
argurnents and the anything-goes outlook of crude anti-Malthusian
arguments. The goal of this chapter is to tread our way through the 7
problems of Malthusianism and anti-Malthusianism and to come to a
balanced understanding of the dialogic relationships between population, 2000: 6 billlon
6
development, and the environment.
~
e:
o 5 1987: 5 bllllon
=
03
THE MALTHUSIAN ARGUMENT 4 1974:4 bllllon
Many of the world's leading environmental thinkers a!gue that, dcspite_his
errors and overstatements, we still need to pay attention to the basic point 3 1960: 3 bllllon
of Malthus's thesis: the environmental and social threats posed by Sometime between
exponential growth in population, or growth that is con:stantly 2 Mor 1918and 1927:
compouncling.' Malthusians-those who agree with at least this much of beR!nning of 2 billion
Malthus-point out tllat, because of compounding, a constant rate of Around middle 19ih cenhny:
1 of 17111 cootury: 1 billion
population growth leads to accelerating effects. Since the annual rate of Half a billion
0.5
growth also applies to the additional increments ofprevious years, not only
will the number of people added each year go up, but the rate of the rise
'Will constantly accelerate. -.rt>" '-''<S>-.-'~<>" -.#-.<o<>() -.#,.._o,<>"~#
'
~" -.<S>
'l' ').
It's like a savings account. A deposit of $100 at a constant 10 percent
annual interest rate will increase year by year from $10, to $11, $12.10, Source: Croscttc (1996) and Ind end . .
Quality. of Life (!996). ep ent CommiSslon on Population and
$13.31, $14.64, and so on. Each annualincrementis larger by a wider margin
than the one before because the interest is applie.<i to an ever-increasing
~:--o-----:--
.. .l

CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 107


tOG AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY

Not so, respond Malthusians. Because of compounding, the size of new population will top out at betvveen 9 billion and 12 billion sometime late in
increments to the world's population has increased, even though the. growth the twenty-first century. 16

rate has declined. Today's slower growth rate is applied to a bigger Many Malthusians worry that we 'Will still have too many people, even if
p-opulation, so the world's average annual population increase has population growth eventually levels out. Because of the treadmills of
nevertheless jump~::d from around 50 million a year in the 1950s to around production and consumption, a constant population may still have: an
70 million in the !960s to approximately 82 million a year in the l980s and increasing appetite for material resources. Moreover, the same logic of
early 1990s.' The time it took to add a billion people to the world therefore compounding applies to consumption and production: A constant rate of
also sped up. It took fourteen years to go from 3 billion to 4 billion between growth means not only increasing effects but accderating effects. Currently,
1960 and 1974. It tookonlythirteen years to get to S billion in 1987.? population growth compounds this coropounding: Increases in population
Over 90 percent of the world's current population growth is t~ g ?lace come on top of accelerating per capita consumption and production. But
in poor countries. 10 Growth in rich and middle-income countnes lS far even if world population eventually stabilizes, environmental impacts may
slower. In Japan and twenty-four European countries the growth rate is continue to compound.
11
close to zero, ranging from plus to minus 0.3 percent a year. ln thirty-one The irnplications of compounding growth need to be considered carefully.
poor countries, however, population growth is currently2.5 percent or more On the one hand, growth in consumption, production, and population does
a year.12 This may not seem a substantially higher rate, but the power of not necessarily degrade the environment-at least" theoretically. In fact,
compounding can be surprising. A country that maintained a 3 percent population growth itself has no environmental consequence at all. Any
rate of grovrth for one hundred years would see its population increase environmental impacts depend on what is being consumed and what is
nineteen-fold.n In a country like Tanzania, which had 30 million people being produced by those increased numbers of people and on how they go
and a 3 percent growth rate in 1995, the population would grow to 570 about their consuming and producing. 17 Improved technology and social
million in 2095-larger than all but two countries today,lnilia and China. organization could possibly compensate for any potential impacts and even
It is important to distinguish between a population' s rate of growth and leave the environment in better shape than it was to-begin with. We could,
its level of fertility, the average number of children born to women m a after all, decide to send a good bit of the human population to another
population. Between 1980 and 1995, the world fertility rate dropped from plaf.l.et someday, if we gain the necessary technological means.
3.7 children to 2.9 children. ln poor countries the rate dropped from 6.3 to On the other hand, although there are no theoretically necessary
5.0, and in rich countries it dropped from 1.9 to l. 7. 14 But a drop in fertility environmental olltcomes, there are some theoretically likely environmental
does not necessarily translate into fewer numbers of children born .each outcomes of our current forms of consumption, producrion, and population
year. Earlier high levels of growth often result in a population with a large growth. Consider climate change, air and water pollution, deforestation,
proporti.on of young <idults in the prime of :their childbearing yea:s. Lower loss of habitat and biodiversity, soil erosion,soil impoverishment, per capita
fertility levels may thus result in just as many, or even more, b1rths-:-an declines in food availability, shrinking water supplies, social differences in
effect demographers term population mome-n tum. Because of populatwn the distribution of environmental goods and bads. Challenges to the three
momentum, it may be many years before a decline in fc:rtility leads to a c~ntral environmental issues-sustainability, environmental justice:, and the

slowdovm in population growth. nghts and beauty of natur~.::-are alreadywdl under way. Moving to another
Still. demographers expect that fertility declines will eventually result in planet to escape the pollution of ours is not currently a realistic option
a drop in the size of annual additions to the world population. Some recent (and in my judgment would be sad reason for planetary pioneering even if
estimates in fact suggest that the size of annual additions has already begun it were). We need, therefore, to be "taking population seriously>" according
to fall and that the world may not reach a population of 6 billion until the to _Frances Moore Lappe, a long-time critic ofMalthusian argume:nts who
year 2000 or slightly afterward-thirteen or fourteen years after theprevious m1ght not be expected to hold such a view. 13
billion was reached. 15 (Some of the recent fall, however, is attributable not In the remainder of this chapter, I will review the three main categories
to fertility declines but to high rates of AIDS deaths in sub-Saharan Africa of_ ~riticisms of Malthusian arguments: inequality critiques, techno logic
and to sharp declines in life expectancy in the former Soviet Union due to cntzques, and demographic critiques. Along the way, I will point out the
economic disloc;ation.) The United Nations now predicts that world environmental implications ofthese argume:nts in preparation for a final
. l. __
l

CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT l 09


1 oS AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY

Fourth, population issues arc fundamcntally related to sex. To talk about


section on the dialogic role of the environment as a social actor. Because
population control is to talk about sex and sometimes to talk about controlling
the .relationships betw'een popula~on, develop~~nt, aX:d environment are
sex. You do not have to be a deep student of social life to recognize that issues
dialogic and not deterministic, I will argue that 1t IS po~xbl~ to change those
relating to sexuality will likely bc highly controversial. Moreover, because sex
relationships should we see problems in the curren_t s1tuat10n.
is a subject many find embarrassing or even immoral to talk about openly,
But before we wade into all that, we should consider the cultural factors
mere discussion of contraccption and other issues relating to population
that make population a percnnially contentious and emotional issue.
control can make some people anxious.
Fifth, population issues are necessarily gender issues. Reproduction lies
at the center. of conceptions of appropriate gender relations and gt;;ndcr
identities, with all the implications that these relations and identities have
POPULATION AS CULTURE
for social powcr. Population control can threaten social powcr relations
Population is more than just numbers. "Population m:ans peoRle; as ~e built around gender by undermining the basis on which many people
r.ridcpendent Commission on Population and Q~ah:r of L1fc, wht~h legitimize these relations.
conducted a five-year international study of population x~sues, observed m Finally, family is a central source of social identity and feelings of
its 1996 final report. A South African witness in the heanngs convened by transcendence. It is from family relations, in part, that we understand who
the commission across the world put it this way: "Women hav~ children; we arc. Most of.us live through most of our adult years as parents, and wc
they do not have population." 19 Children are one of the most Important thereby gain a deep sense of who we are and who we should be. Without
,,
l sources of mean.i.Ug and purpose in human life; they are central to our someone to fill the role of a child, you cannot be a "mom" or a "dad.''
cultural values. Through children, we also gain. a sense of transcendence over the confincs
Population issues can fundamentally challenge these central values. !'ll of our own individual life, a kind of immortality. Although we have other
disc uss six ways: . . sources of transcendental values-such as religion, art, and the sense of
First, many people sense a hint of misanthropy m Malthus1an argum:nts. having made a contribution to society through our work-children remain
People have inherent value, inherent rights of existence, most of us beheve. a particularly direct and accessible sOurce. For many people, to suggest
People are also the source of most of ourcentral interests in life. To say that controlling population is to infringe on their principa! solution to the
we should have fewer people sounds to some like ~coplc hating: . problem of mortality: family.
Second, population issues rapidly connect to 1ss~es of raa~, ethmc, These rcactions are common, but they are not cultural necessities. Rather
national, and religious p ride. For some people, c~ntrollingpo~ulatton m_eans than misanthropy, population control could be scen as an enlightened form
diminishing the group. If our population shnnks, the feclmg som~n:nes ofbcing pro-people, for it may improve the quality ofhuman life. Instead
goes, our country "Will become less important in the wodd. &:d 'Wl.thm a .of diminishing the group, population control could be seen as a way to
country, subgroups sometimes feel a sense of what the psycholog1st Dorothy strengthen the group by making it more ecologicallysecure. A:; for religious
20
Stein terms "demographic competition." values, our various traditions have a 'Wide range of responses to population
Third the techniques ofpopulation control confrontsome religiOUS values. issues; for example, some accept contraception while others do not. Our
Concepcion and birth are processes that even in a scientific age still evoke level of comfort with sexuality is equally variable; pleoty of people feel little
awe and a feeling of mystery. Many people look to religionfor a framework of difficulty in opculydiscussing sexual matters. A:; for gender relations, cl1anges
understanding these mystcries. All the major ':'orld r~Igt.ons e:nphas1ze ~e i~ the balance ofpower betw'eeri women and men can be seen as libera ting
sanctity of life, of course, but they interpret thts sanct:J.ty m vanous ways: m rather than threatening. And instead of compromising family identity and
some cases, interpretations conflict with particula~ means ~f P?PU:atlon transcendence, population control can be scen as a more sure route to
control. Most notable is the contemporary Cathohc Church s reJection of improving the I.i(e chances of our families and children.
contraception as a means ofpopulation control. (The Catholic Church does I raise these counterpoints to illustrate the diversity of possible cultural
not reject population control, however-just contraception as a mearis of responses to the issues often raised by population control. Significantly, all
achieving it.) Moreover, population control threatens the shecr num~.er of these responses have moral implications. It therefore sccms unlikely that
the faithful, a fact that many religious leaders have nQ doubt pondcred..
.:
'-;~il'.:.:':-.--~

CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 111


tl O AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY

a substantial part of the Caribbean were also under the control of various
any of us can evaluate population issues in a mo rally neutral way. Nor sho~ld
empires a century ago. Much of the rest of the world was divided into spheres
we try to for it is these implications that, in large part, make population
of influence that achieved a simil'ar political result. Although colonization
issues so ;ignificant for us. But even though moral neutrality is not possible,
brought some benefits to the affected regions, Western Europe, Japan, the
we can still evaluate population issues in a reasoned way. United States, and the former Soviet Union gained the most from these
Being conscious of our O'Wll moral values seems a s~er ro~te to reason
relationships, groVo.ling in wealth while their colonial possessions, for the most
than falsely assuming that we have an unbiased perspecuve. W1th our m~ral
part,languished in poverty.
passions in mind-including any opinion~ we may have concermng
The period following World War II, however, saw a new global
sustainability, environmental justice, and the nghts and beauty of nature-
commitment to resolving these inequalities. The lessons of the war brought
let us now ~valuate Malthusianism and the critiques of it. about a new global consciousriess-a sense that we are all in this together,
that the rich countries should help the poor, and that the right of self-
determination applies to all countries. The United Nations was one product
of this new consciousness. Partly in response to this new sense of global
THE INEQUALITY. CRITIQUE OF
commitment, rich countries gave up their em pires. New states sprang up
MALTHUSIANISM everywhere as colonial powers pulled out. And in part, it must be said, the
Loolcing around the world, we can see an indis~utable associati~n between old empires folded up because the devastations ofworld war left few imperial
high levels of population growth, poverty, a Wlde_range of envrronmen:al COWltries with the financial or military means to maintain direct control
problems, and declines in per capita food productl.on. For exa:nple, Afric_a over their former colonies.
has the highest overall rate of population grovn:h of any cononen: and lS But the commitment to helping poor countries was, at least in part,
simultaneously experiencing substantial declines U:food produ~tlon per heartfelt.22 Many believed that poor countries could modernize just as the
capita as well as overgrazing, desertification, shortenmg fallow peno ds, and West and Japan did, once they were freed from colonial control. With
deforestation. . education, industrial infrastructUre, industrialization of agriculture, modern
The question is why. Malthus would likely have seen diagnostic eVldence political institutions, and lots of exports and imports to connect these
in Africa for his view that population growth eventually overwhelms the countries into the increasingly global economy, the poor countries could
productive capacity of the environment, leading to poverty and hunger. soon join the rich at the table of modern luxury and avoid the disma!
But the story is, at the very least, more complex. . . . prospect of Malthusian decline.
A long tradition of scholars has even argued that the direction ?f causality In a word, these poor countries lacked only one thing: de:velopment.
should be reversed. It is not population growth that causes enVIronmental Modernization would bring it. This is the basic tenet of an influential
decline and ultimately povorty and hunger; rather it is poverty and hunger perspective known as modernization theory, an idea associated with many
that cause environmental decline and population growth as the poor thinkers in many fields; within sociology, Talcott Parsons remains the best-
struggle to gain their living. To understand the origins of povertywe should known advocate.
look not to population pressur~. goes this co.unterarg~ent, but rather t.o Perhaps President Harry S. Truman best stated the underlying spirit of
the history of international development and the soc1al and econormc modernization. As he proposed in his inaugural address on January 20,
in~:quality it has fostered betw'een (and within) the countries of the world. 1949, "We must embark on a bOld new program for making the benefits of
our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism-
The Development of Underdevelopment exploitation for foreign profit-has no place in our plans. VVhat we envision
We sometimes forget. or at lt:ast overlook, that a scant century ago most of is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair
the poor countries of today were the colonial possessio_ns ?f mo~t of today's dealing:'"
rich countries. As recently as 1950, only three countr1es m Africa-Egypt, About this time (actually just a fewyears earlier, in july of 1944) ddegates
Ethiopia, and Liberia-could claim full inde?endence. (~ee Exhibit 4.2) from forty-four countries got together in a quiet country resort in a place
21
i/,
All of southern Asia) most of southeastern As1a and the Pac1fic Islands, and called Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to chart the course of the world
____
. .

CHAPTER 4 POPVLATJON AND DEVELOPMENT f 13


AN iNVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY
l! Z
Whatever the reaJ reasons were, the delegates set up two key institutions
at time, World War ll seemed on its way to an
economy after the war By th fl al that bave had an enormous influence on the subsequent course of economic
inevitable close. Led by John. Maynard Keynes, probably the most m uen!I development: the international Monetary Fund (IMP) and the International
economist of the twentieth century, the Bretton Woo~ delegates sought to Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or as it has come to be called, tbc
use the conclusion of World War II as an opportunity to fundamentally World Bank. Both institutions make loans to countries for development
reshape global society and economy. Their stated intent was to make sure purposes. The IMP gives mainly short-term loans to help countries balance
that such a calamity might never again occur. But ~ we sh~ sec, grounds their national budgets. The World Bank emphasizcs loans for major
exist for a more cynical interpretation of the result, if not the mtent. infrastructure projects intended to have long-term effects: dams, roads,
irrigation canals, schools, that kind of thing. Some of the money loan ed by
Exhibit 4.2 Colonial control of Africa: As ;ecer:tly as _1950, only 3 the Bretton Woods institutions: as they are often called, comes from capital
African countries-Egypt, Ethiopia, and Ltb~na-en;oyed complete
subscriptions from member countries, but most comes from the sale ofbonds.
political independence from European colomal powers.
Since that time, several other international or ..multilateral'' banks have
been founded, most with a regional focus, such as the Inter-American
Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Most of the capital
for international development loans comes from private foreign banks,
generally in the range of?S-85 percent of the total, depending on the year."
But loans from multilateral banks arc usually at least a part of most major
development projects. Conntrics use the seal of approval of a multilateral
loan to leveragc development funds from private sources, both domestic
and foreign. In addition to these sources, there has been an enormous
: :) proliferation of private international aid organizations and governmental
l 'l
aid agencies, whieb unlike the big development banks usually make gifts
'
l and not loans.
International development has become a major human activity, involving
movements of capital equivalent to hnndreds of billions of U.S. dollars
annually. The result of a half century of international development and
modernization, however, is continued disparities ln wealth between
countries. in fact, the gap between the rieb and the poor has widencd
substantially."
For example, between 1980 and 1992, per eapita GNP in the weaJthiest
countries grew by 2.3 percent, but per capita GNP in the countries the World
Bank defines as "low income" grcw by just 1.2 percent. In th~ "middle-income"
countries during this period, per capita GNP actually fell by 0.1 percent.
India and China are important occcptions, h,owevcr. India's per capita GNP
~ Independent states grew 3.1 pcreentbetween 1980 and 1992, and in China per capita GNP grew
r-----1 Area ui'Idet colonial ,.,'/ 7.6 percent.26 Considering that these are by far the tw'o largest poor nations
L---J control in 1950 (and by far the two largest of all nations) this is significant growth.
Nevertheless, taking a longer look shows an oyerall vv:idening gap even
with respect to India and China. For example, because of the United States'
Source: Freeman-Greenville (1991). huge economic head start, the difference in per capita GDP between the
United States and China increased by more than 30 percent between 1970
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 115
AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONME:NTAL SOCIOLOGY
\14

and l992.27 The. accurnulation of advantage, a process discussed in chapter some of the features Of both core and periphery, what they term
3, also works at the level of nations. semiperiphery regions. Examples of core countries would be the United
States, Japan, and the wealthier nations of Europe. Peripheral countries
Understanding Underdevelopment. The reason for the ever-widening gap include Uganda. Zaire, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Panama, and many
bet;v..reen rich and poor lies in the structure of the world economy., say a others. Countries like Costa Rica, the Slovak Republic, and Turkey would
number of social scientists.
be semiperiphery. According to wOrld systenis theorists, core, periphery,
The treadmill-driven tendency to seek new markets and new place~ for and seffiiperiphery relations can emerge not only between countries but
investment has sent the capital of wealthy nations overseas. Poor naoons within them as well.
have usually welcomed this investment, but most development funds have Figures on capital flows bear out the notion that, despite their
come in the form ofloans, not gifts. Although aid and charity accou:lt for a commitment to international development, the core nations have received
si nificant portion of the capital flow, the rest has been se~t With the the most benefit. Betw'een 1982 and 1987, for example. the net movement
g t non that it would be returned, with a comfortable margm for profit .of capital from poor countries to rich ones was $155 billion dollars. The
expec a hl fi bl tit ti n and
as well. The World Bank, for example, is a hig y pro ta e ms u o figures vary from year to year.ana in 1982 the net movement was over $20
its bonds are considered unusually secure investments. As ofl993, the World billion the other way-that is, to poor countries.:w But the dominant trend
Bank had cleared $14 billion in profit for its investors.zs over the half century since the Bretton Woods conference has been much
Meanwhile, poor nations have becoffi:e mired ~debt. Alth~ugh the. debt the same as it was during the period that President Truman termed the
crisis faced by developing countries has rece1ved much mtemat10~al "old imperialism:
on debt continues to rise. ,As of 1994, the extemal debt of developing
att etln ' b ) dthese
countries was over $2 trillion ($2,06? ?illion, to e pr~c1se ~an The Structural Adjustment Trap. The continued poverty of poor countries
countries were spending about $200 bill1~n a year to ?ay 1t off. . has been much exacerbated by a World Bank and IMF policy known as
To put the level of international debt m perspective, econom1sts oft~ structural adjustment, a term coined by. Robert McNamara, President of
cite the ratio of a country's annual external debt service to U:e value ~f 1ts the World Bank from 1969 to 1981." (McNamara was also U.S. secretary of
annual exports, the source of the funds needed to pay off foreign .creditors. defense during the beginning ofthe Vietnam War.) "Structural adjustment"
I d veloping nations today, that ratio averages 17 percent; 1~ several refers to a comprehensive program of radica! free-market changes, such as
i:
c~U:tries, it rises to over 30 percent; in Zamb_ia is a whoppmg 174.4 reducing public services, liberalizing trade, emphasizing export crops.
percent.3G These Countries therefore need to mamtam at least a 17 perce~t eliminating subsidies, and curbing inflation through high interest rates and
rofit margin on their exports (and return none of that 17 percent mar.~ reduced wages-what is euphemistically referred to as "demand
~o investors within their ovm borders) in order to pay offtherr de?t This lS management:' Structural adjustment programs have been instituted in
a highly unlikely scenario. The typical rate ofprofit for a co~oratlon rang~s dozens of countries since the late 1970s, from Africa to Asia to the Americas
only from 2 to 12 percent.l1 Moreover, the average econo~c gromh rate m to the former Soviet Union.
these countries is running at only about 0.4 percent. In short, most The idea ofstructural adjustment is to help--some say to force--countries
deveioping nations today owe far mo~e than they can comfortably pay back to reshape their economy so that they can pay off their mounting debts.
without impoverishing themselves still further. Private banks often reschedule and in some cases write off loans. but the
Data like these support the world systems theory advanced by Andre World Bank and the IMF have never done so out of fear of undennining
Gundar Frank. Immanuel Wallerstein, and others.33 Wor~d.~~stems theory their high bond ratings and thus being forced to raise the interest rates they
sees the process of devdopment as inherently uneq~. ~hVIdm~ the "':~rld offer investors. 36 So they encourage-again, some say force-debtor
into core regions and periphery regions. Because of differen:es m pohncal countries to adopt structural adjustment programs instead. Whether one
and economic power, wealth tends to flow to the core reg10ns from .the calls it help, enco1.;1ragement, or force, the two Bretton Woods institutions
peripheral ones, feeding the former and blee~g the latter. Thus over n:ne certainly give poor countries a compelling in.centive to adopt structural
development tends to exacerbate economi.c differ~nces mst:ad of leveling adjustment: no more World Bank and IMF loans unless they do, which also
them. World systems theorists also sometunes pomt to reg1ons that have -,! meanS a greatly reduced ability to attractprivate foreign capital.
!! '
___.J ::.._l
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVEL~PMENT 117
116 AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY

Free-market policies may not seem like such a bad idea. After all, these ~~~~~~ ;~TI~~ ~~;~ ~;~~~
arc the same policies .most VV:estern governments advocate for themselves
THE LOCAL CURRENCY MOVEMENT
these days. But the free-market policies increasingly adopted by rich
countries have been put into practice without anything like the severity I~ t?e world economic system tends to draw capital away from
and inflexibility.the World Bank and IMF bave imposed on poor countries p npheral areas and toward core areas, maybe the thing to do is
throughout the world. "Shock therapy" is what World Bank and IMF officials to make at least some capital inherently local
informallycall the regimen. The result has been devastating forth e marginal At least that's what Paul Glover and hundr.eds fb , .
Ith N Yi k o usmesses m
peoples of nearly everycountrythathas taken this stern medicine. Typically aca, cw or ,think ln!99!,Gloverestablishedithaca"hours"
under structural adjustment, basic social services such as education and a paper currency accepted only in Ithaca. The name ho un; refer;
health care have been sharply cut, and the price of formcrly subsidizcd to the local value of an hour's work at a fair w ge Th th, val
f"h". a.uscuc
foodstuffs like bread has gone sky high, leaving the poor in often dcsperate ~ a one- our note lS currently set at $10, which Gl over fi cs
circumstances.
;~the current averagewagc inthe Ithaca area. Over three hU:.:cd
Throughout the !980s, the heyday of structural adjustment, "IMF food aca bus~e_sses and a credit union now accept Ithaca hours;
riots'' plagued cities across Africa as starving people took to the streets. many pay "Willing employees at least partially in hours, enco ura .
sometimes toppling governments.37 And as investors have bought up the local economy to stay local. gmg
fannland to produce export crops for the newly liberalized export trade, Hours
th half h come in five denominations the
. two ho" th h
- ......., e one- our,
. displaced peoples have moved into more marginal lands, promoting . ~ . - our, the quarter-hour, and the eighth-hour VVhile.
deforestation aod laod degradation. With less productive land growing food VlSltmg Ithaca in 1996, l traded $2.50 fur a blue and purpl..quarte -
for local consumption, poor countries have found themselves more hour
Th note.
N It reads "Time Is Mon. ey" ' "In ltha ea "' vrc Trust " and
r
are 15 ote Is Us~ T:nder fo: Many Local Needs." On on'e side
,, '
dependent than ever on imports to meet their basic food needs. Moreover,
once displaced from their land, people in poor countries arc less able to th two panels prmted m a speoal thermal ink (invented in Ithaca)
compensate for the newly increased food prices by growing their own. "When ~t. disap pears if you press the warm th of your thum b against it
you are poor, it is very risley to be dependent on money to get enough to eat. follmg counte.rfeitcrs. Hours are printed on either locall;
Another result of structural adjustment is that many poor countries arc produced cattail or hemp paper. To date $62 000 worth fh
a cu1 .' o ours
in the unenviable position of exporting raw m.iterials elsewhere, only to re m CJI ation m Ithaca, and the promoters are incrcasin the
supply slowly to guard against inflation. (But in any ev tg th
~fan oflocallabo~n~the:
buy these materials back later as finished goods. Value is added elsewhere,
and these poor countries must pay for that added value out of their scant ;:ue hour is pegged against the value
stocks offoreign exchange funds, further crimping their ability to pay off an
l cal di .e more spcculatJ.ve value of commodity---~ =-wanges. ) The
foreign debts. The trade liberalization features of structural adjustment o p stri.1 1ct attorney . has given hours the full backingo f state law.
and a number of recent international treaties have also enabled companies eop e ove the tdea. Herc are some stories from a otluck
from rich countries to come into poor countries and set up low-wage supper held to celebrate Ithaca hours and the chang thp h
mought.1 . es cy ave
factories, later exporting the goods to places where people have enough
money to buy them. The governments of poor countries, eager to attract . Ramsey sells bagcls at a local bakery and accepts hours as
the foreign investment needed to fulfill structural adjustment plans, often payment. As he put it, ''Hours keep people in our communi
allow these companies to evadc the environmental and labor laws they would employed better than d?llars that leave the community. Dolla7,
have to contend with in their own countries. During the mid-1990s, for that go to large corporations do not reallytricklc back down Th
example, many lines of Nike sneakers were being assembled in Victnam by- concentrate
B b hcapital, making. the rich richer and th e poor poorcr.
. cr
women working twelve-hour days at twenty cents an hour to make shoes d a:b ara'' as a shoe-repm business that accepts hours As she
they could never afford themselves-to the embarras~ment of a number of es~I cd.' This money makes everybody more aware ~f what's
38
celebrities who were paid millions to endorse Nike products. abvailkabl: m the community. So it hclps community development
Y eepmg money local."
l t8 AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAl... SOCIOJ...OGY
CHAPTER 4 POPUJ...ATJON AND DEVELOPMENT 119

Tony sells stain ed glass and takes hours for payment. He agreed Food forA!!
that, because of hours, "local businesses circulate money within
the community better. Wal-Mart's profits go to Arkansas.'' Malthusians point not only to poverty but also to the 840 million people
But perhaps even more importantly, a local curre:O.cy like Ithaca who suffer from malnutrition as an indication of population pressures on
hours can change money from being merely a means of anonymous the land. Anti-Malthusian critics of this Position argue that> on the
exchange to a means of social connection. Bruce, a local jitterbug contrary, the world has plenty of food for everyone. The problem of food
and swing dance teacher, explained: "Dollars come and go so many shortages is really a problem of access to food and of overconsumption of
different ways that their social meaning gets lost. We' re making a food by those who do have access. The principa! names associated with
big cultwal change with hours-back to the community meaning this counterar~ent are Frances Moore Lapp6 and Amartya Sen.
of money!' One of the pomts that Lapp6 forcefully raises in a number of books is
No one in Ithaca is saying that all local economic exchanges that there is little corrdation, if any, between population density and hunger
should. be in hours. Their goal is not economic isolation. Nor is or betwe~n the amount_ of cropland per person in a country and hunger.
that the goal of the forty-tvvo other communities in the United The obv10us exa~p~e Is Europe, which has some of the most densdy
States and Canada that, as of June 1997, have started local populated countnes m the world and yet very little hunger. Africa, which
currencies.2 But in a world so driven by the single-minded ethic suffers from a far greater percentage of hunger nevertheless has a far lower
of competition, local currencies can help replenish one of our most population density. Of course, much of Africa is desert and cannot be
precious economic resources: community. farmed. But .even when considering the amount of cropland per person,
Notes Lappe finds no particular relationship with hunger. )apan has about ten
l These stories come from the Ithaca hours website, people for every acre of cropland and very little hunger. Tiny Singapore
www.newciv.org/worldtran:;/whole/ithacahours.html has 143 people for every acre of cropland and very litde hunger. But Chad
2 Ithac::a. hours website.
has 1:68 acres of cropiaJ:td for everyperson-17 times as much as Japan and
......................................... 240 tunes as much as Smgapore-and qui te extensive hunger. 40
Lappe also argues that, even at current population levels. the world has
Under these conditions, poor countries get the short end of the economic plen~ of food. Between 1990 and !995, the world produced an average of
stick of structural adjusnnent. Value is added in peripheral areas, but the 317 kilograms of gram per person each year, which is 1.87 pounds a day, or
peripheral areas do not get to keep much of that value. Local workers are about 2,805 calories;u That's not an extravagant amount, but it is sufficient.
paid almost nothing. and somebody else owns the products of their labor. I:Iowever, 37 to 40 percent of that grain, depending on the year, is fed to
By opelring up poor nations for increased foreign investment under such livestock. As many have pointed out, much of grains food value to humans
unequal terms oft:ra.de, structural adjustment assists in drainingvalue away is !ost because ~als eat not only to put on mass but also for energy to stay
from the periphery and toward the core. ali~e. Depending on the kind of livestock, it takes from 2 to 7 pounds of
Snuctural adjustment has been widely criticized, and the prestige ofboth gram to produce a po und of meat. 42 With their high meat di et, Americans
Bretton Woods institutions has been severely undermined. The World Bank co~ume _approxim_ately S?O kilograms of grain each year per person. In
itself is now rethink.i.ng the policy:~~ But the human and environmental Ind_ia. which has a dietlow rn meat, people conswne about 200 kilograms of
damage has been done, reinforcing centuries of un equal exchanges between g:~ per. person per year."" Changes in the diet ofthewealthyand a different
the rich and poor countries of the world. dlStnbutiOn of food co~d :aise the figure for India considerably.
The anti-Malthusian moral is this: The poverty experienced throughout ln place of Malthus1amsm, Lappe (along with her colleague Rachel
the world is not just a population issue. (Some say it is not a population Sch~an) advocates a po~er~structures perspective on food and population.
. issue at all.) Poverty cannot be understood apart from the history of Even though Japan and Smgapore have little cropland per capita, they are
development, a history that has favored some regions over others. Any wealthy countries; Chad and India have more cropland, but they are poor.
argument concerning the relationship between the environment and poverty And people who ar~ wealthy have a lot more power, a lot more ability to gain
needs to take this history into account. ~e f~od they reqwre, and a lot more "say in the decisions that shape their
lives, as Lappe and Schurman point out.""
120 AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 121

Lappe and Schurman argue that a power-structures perspective explains haywirc. Prices for rice in Bangladesh jumped by 18 to 24 percent at a time
not only inequalitics in access to food but also high rates of popula~on growth. 'When many people had little money on hand to make up the difference.
A lack of control over their lives leads poor people to regard children as an Because of fluctuations in the labor market and the rice market, they had lost
economic resource, they observe: "Living at the economic margin, many their entitlement to food. Somewhere between 26,000 and 100,000 died of
poor parents perceivc their children's labor as necessary to augmenn~eager starvation and malnutrition within three months.
family income. By working in the fields and around the home, children Similar kinds of argwnents have been applied to other famincs such as
45
also free up adults and elder siblings to carn outside income:' the infamous Irish potato faminc of the 1840s. VVhi.le millions 'starved
Given their lack of options, poor parents thus have a strong econom1c Irdand contim~ed to export large quantities of wheat to England (som~
incentive to have lots of children, the invcrse of Malthus's arguq1cnt that 800 boatloads m all) because of carlier export contracts.'48 In the recent
population growth, through enviromnental decline, leads to poverty. Rather, famincs in_ war-tom Somalia, Rwanda, and Burundi, there may not have
Lappe and Schurman respond, poverty and environmental declinc.lea_d to been suffiClent fo~d from l.oea! farms nor much exporting of food. But high
population grovvth by decreasing the power pe~ple ha:e over thcrr h':es, populat10n dens1ty relative to crop land was still not the cause of the
leading them out of desperation to seek economiC secunty through h~VIng starvation, some argue. Rather, because of the war, people were not given
access to food, nor could they plant in order to feed themselves. War brokc
large families.
down their systems of entitlement to food.
The Politics of Famine. Amartya Sen makes a similar argument concerning Sen's .argument has an irnp_ortant practical (and politieal) irnplication.
famine." Famines, says Sen, are caused not by a lack ofavailability offood but If there lS food available even m the midst of most famines, then the long-
rather by a lack of access to food. All societies have social syste.n:s ~fw~at Sen term solutwn to hunger m the world is not the importation of more food.
terms entitlements to food and other goods, such as the d1stnbut10n of ln the short term, in the midst ofa crisis when people are dying, food imports
ownership ofland to grow food and the ability to acquire food through tra~e, a~e ~req~ently necessary. But even if the long-term problem js the
usually through the medium of money. Entitlements allow people to gam distnbution of food, the long-term solution is not redistribution of food
command of food and other goods. It is breakdowns in these systems that rather it is redistribu~on of access to food, as Lapp and Schurman als~
cause fumines not environmental decline. argue. <""0at is need~d is not ensuring food availability;' says Sen, but
Sen makes' his case by analyzing four major famines in the twentieth guaranteemg food entltlement."~ 9 In other words, don't give the poor food
century: tbe Great Bengal famine of 1943, the Sahel famines of the ~970s, (except when they are starving). Rather, give them farms, give them jobs,
tbe Ethiopian famines of 1973 and 1974, and the Bangladesh famine of and g>ve them democracy.
1974. He argues that in each instance sufficient food to feed everyone was.
on hand in the affected countries. The problem was that people could not Limits of the Inequality Perspective
get access to the food.
. For example, in the 1974 Bangladesh famine, a series of summer ~oods on The ine_quali:rperspective makes an important case for the significance of
the Brahmaputra River largely wiped out one of the three ann_ual nee :r~ps the soc1al ongrns of ~overty, population growth, and hunger. A purcly
and damaged a second one. But food imports and stocks of nee r-~~:nng ~althus1a~ perspective, as nearly all scholars now agree, is clearly
from earlier harvests provided plenty of food throughout the cnsJS. The madequate. ~o
real problem was that the flood threw a lot offarmers and agriculturallaborcrs Yet there is much that the .incqualiiy perspectivcs of Sen Lappe and
out of work. With nothing to harvest from one rice crop and no chance :o Scburman cannot explain about hunger. Although Chad has; higher,ratio
plant the next because of the contiuuing floods, laborers could find no prud of ':"opland per person than )apan and Singapore, and a roughly equivalent
work. Farmers didn"t have much money either because they had nothing to ratio to_ ~any Eur?pean_ countries, not all cropland is equal in its
sell. Consequently, these laborers and farmers couldn't :-trord to buy ~u:h P!'~duct:J.v1ty. The climate m Chad is quite dry and.production per acre is
rice. Also the United Stateschoscthis moment to cut off1ts normal food a1d, qmte lo';. Much m~re si~ficant than cropland per capita is annual grain
because Bangladesh was exporting jute to Cuba. In anticipation of shortages pro~uct10n per capxta, w?ich runs at about 120 kilograms per person in
due to the flooding and to the loss of U.S. food aid, the rice mai'ket went Africa and nearly SOO kilograms per person in Europe. st The power-
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 123
122 AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY

the metals that went up in price, and Ehrlich would pay for all the metals
structures perspective. ofLapp~ and Schurman ne"eds to take into account
that went down. Ehrlich qui te honorably sent Simon a check for the $576.07
the spatial distribution of environmental productivity, not merely wave it
difference.) 55
aside. Environmental productivity is itself a source of social power.
. It was a foolish bet for Ehrlich to make, even from a Malthusian point of
Nor does entitlement breakdown seem sufficient to explain all famines, as
v1ew. Market forces are complex and reflect environmental conditions
a number of Sen's critics have argu.edY Six years ofwarfare in Europe between
crudely at best. Many of the costs of natural resource production are
1939 and 1945 severely disrupted systems of entitlement, as has the recent
externalized, disguising their true environmental (and social and economic)
strife in Yugoslavia. But the d.isruptions of war in Europe did not result in the
significance. Also. the prices of these metals have little to do with the
v-.ridespread starvation that Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia have suffered of
resource s~rc~ties-land, water, food-that would be significant to the poor
late. Europe has long had far more food production per capita. It is also
and margmahzed, those who are most likely to experience a Malthusian
strikingto consider the relatively minor disruptions that led to the Bangladesh
famine. At the peak of the famine, the price of rice rose only 18 to 24 percent. crisis_, if anyo~e ":ill. Even if the prices of the metals had gone up, t_he bet
would have srud lit?e about Malthusian shortages.
Bangladesh, however, is very poor. And with a population of some 115 million
in a region the size of Greece (which has a population one-tenth the size), the
country finds itself compelled to import much of its food. Most of the people A Cornucopian World?
of Bangladesh live very close to the margin they need to survive.
When you live close to the edge, both environmentally and economically, Althou~ the bet proved nothing, it did serve to highlight the debate between
even a minor disruption can have a big impact. Bangladesh and all the Malthus1an arguments and a kind of anti-Malthusian argument often called
countries that have experienced famine in the twentieth century are poor comucopia~~ of w~ch Simon is the most prominent proponent. Simon
countries -with unfavorable levels of grain production per capita. They have ~ontroverstally clauns that the solution to resource scarcity is actually to
very marginal systems ofboth food entitlement and food production." This mcrease population. People, says Simon, are the "ultimate resource." A
is a dangerous combination. When a country is too poor to easily command larger number of people means more brainpower and labor to work out
food imports and when it doesn't have much local food production to begin technological solutions to scarcity, Simon argues. 'When confronted with
with, it will have less food around for its people to be entitled to-even in scarcity, we apply our collective brainpower and find new sources of formerly
scarce resources and new techniques for extracting them. In some cases,
good times.
new technology will allow us to substitute different materials for ones that
hav: beco~e scarce~ what S~on calls the principle of substitutability.sti
Srmon otes a vanety of eVIdence to support his arguments. Population
THE TECHNOLOGIC CRITIQUE OF has successfully con:mued to increase, and increase rapidly, for the roughly
MALTHUSIANISM two hundred years smce Malthus first published his book, Simon notes. As
well, life :"'Pectancy has leaped to unprecedentedlevels, while infant mortallty
In October 1990, the anti-Malthusian economist Julian Simon won a much- has declined constderably. Standards of living for many of us today are
discussed bet with Paul Ehrlich, a biologist and a prominent figure in the a~torushing when co.mpa:e~ with living ~dards of the past, suggesting to
Malthusian tradition. Erblich is the author of the 1968 bestseller The Srmon that MalthUSlan limits are far from mescapable. The prices of most
Population Bomb, which predicted widespread famineand starvation within basic cornil_lodities have actually dropped over the decades, in line with the
ten years, and Simon and Erhlich have been publishing a series of re~ults.of Srmon's bet _with Ehrlich. Simon also disputes the significance of
::r. counterattacks on each other since the early 1980s. 54 Simon bet that the
. :~ i
ac1d ~~global warmmg. the ozone h ole, and species loss, arguing either that
price of five metals of Ehrlichs choosing--chrome, copper, nickel, tin, and these lSSUes have been exaggerated by envirorunentalists or that they represent
:, s~l ~ . tnngsten-would fall over the next ten years, as opposed to rising in the
'!11!,,' chall:nges that future teclmological innovation will overcome. He argues
1:: face of Malthusian scarciry. Ten years later, the price of all five metals had that, m ~ct, ~e state. ofthe ~n:Uo~ent is now much improved, painting to
' actually dropped, after taking into account inflation. (They had agreed to the drop m arr pollut10n <Illlsstons m the United States and the many advances
pay each other the difference in value accrued by the market movement of U: public health. 57

$200 worth of each metal over the ten-year period. Simon would pay for all
__ ,

CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 12.5


124 AN rNV!TATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY

B.ut Simon has many critics, and rightlyso. One pointthat is often raised The Boserup Effect
is Simon's neglect of social incquality. Although the hvcs of many have
improved~ since 1960 the percentage ?~the world's people _wh? live in Ester Boscrup has offered a closely related but more tcmperatc argument
poverty, facing hunger and .malnutntiOn throughout the1r lives, h~s for how population growth can, in some circumstances, stimulate
58
remained the same. The shcer number living in poverty has do~bled. It ts technological change. ln a famous study of agricultural devclopmcnt,
true that even the dcsperately poor are generally living longc_r, in part because Boserup suggcsts that population pressure iS a primary factor stimulating
of medical and other technological improvements, but hfe cxpectancy lS the adoption of more productivc farming practiccs. Mal thus hcld that
still very un even across the world. Simon paints an overly rosy picture of population pressure reduces food availability, but Boserup's view is tbat
the world. We can do better. population can increase food production by givjng people an incentive to
Simon's argument that niore people means more brainpower to w~rk switch to more intensive farming methods.
out problems is also rather dubious. Sure, tw"o people can come up Wlth Consider a low~population~density farming practice like shifting
more ideas than one (although theymayalsocomeupwith ~e same ~d eas). cultivation, in which farmers cultivate a particular parcel of land for a few
But by Simon's argument, the Roman Empire would still be.with_ us, years and then let it lie fallow fo'r twenty or thirty years before cultivating it
continuing to expand, ever increasing the n~mber of people enhst:d mto again. ln the interim, the forest grows back, rest oring the fertility of the soil
the task of solving the empire's problems. It lS clearly not the shecr Size o~ a and breaking the life cycle of crop pests. This is an effective and relatively
society that makes it innovative. Innovativeness depends on soc1~l low-labor method of farming. But it supports fcw people per acre. So as
circumstances that encourage creative thinking, such as dcmocrabc population grovrs, rural people shorten the fallow periods-already a
discussion and a good educational system, not mere nwnbers of people. ln technological change-until problcrns with fertility and cro p pests increase
fact, greater numbers of people may o~y increase a socicty's stock ?f and po.pulation prE!ssures rise even more. At that point, and usually
misguided ideaS,. if that society is set up m a way that s~amps everyone m reluctantly, villagers begin cropping fields annually and using small p low.,
, the same mold. Also, the kind of improvements that Sunon !oo~ to :u-e fertilizers, and pesticides to maintain fertility and control pcsts. Where
'l mainly high-tech. B.ut the bulk of population growth currently !S taking possiblc, and if pressures remain high, they may eventually irrigate their
' place among those who do not have the educational background to fields and purchase high-yielding hybrids rather than saving their own seed. .
contribute to high-tech solutions. In most cases, these more intensive practices require more labor and higher
Critics also doubt Simon's optimism about technology. As chapter 3 cash outlays, making villagers reluctant to sw:itch to them. But eventually
recounts, the pace of technological innovation seems to have slowed m people do s"Witch, if they can, as demonstrated by the dramatic increases in
recent decades. Also, there are limits to what technology can do. Tedmology food output in developing countries in recent decades.60
has indeed made possible substantial substitutions in_ the resources we But Boserup is no starry-eycd optimist. She has identified many
depend on, often in the face of scarcity, such as the techniques for the use of qualifications to this process, which is now sometimes called the Boserup
fossil fuel that resolved the fuel wood and water power shortag:" o.f early effect. First, technological change is not the same as innovation. Population
industrialism. But will technology always come to the rescue m tJ.me to pressures provide the incentive to adopt technologies that have been invented
prevent serious problems? This question is particularly germane as we elsewhere but that may not provc attractive until population pressures
encounter limits in resources that seem less substitutable, such as land fo.r override labor and financial costs. Such pressures also encourage innovation,
agriculture, habitat for biodiversity, fresh water, and clean air. ~d e:en ~f she suggcsts, but the principle at work is necessity, not Simonian collective
we come up with an innovation, new technology c_an _brmg w1th It brainpower. In any case, societies have most often advanced tecbnologically
unfortunate unintended consequences, such as the substl~tlon ofHCFCs, by introducing technologies already in use in other societies;' Boscrup vvrites.61
i a potent greenhouse gas, for ozone-depleting CFCs. Solvmg one problem Issues of in equality can also limit the influence of a B.oserup effect. The
'., often contributes to another. Moreover, waiting for a shortage to sb.mul_a~e investments required to increase the intensity of pr6duction may not be
innovation and substitution could put humanity on a path of cnsxs available in developing areas. And if farmers do attain sufficient capital to
management in 'Which we try to solveprobleJ!lS instead of avoiding them to intensify their operations through mechanization, they may also put farm
begin with. This is a risley strategy, especially for the world's poor.$ workers out of work, increasing povcrty and in equality. 6l
12.6 AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 12.7

Boserup further notes that in conditions ofvery rapid population growth, limit the potential of a Boserup effect. The problem of the unintended
economic development may be severely limited.6J Population density needs environmental consequehces of technological change, mentioned with
to be considered separate from population grovn:h.64 VVhereas population regard to Simon's theory of technological substitution, also applies to
density may provide the incentive to intensify production~ rapid population Boserup:s theory. New production strategies bring new consequences.
growth may overwhelm the economic and social resources that are essential Equally unportantly, because of the pressure to increase environmental
to intensification. Governments and local communities can be left yield.s quickly, more intensive production often proceedS by increasing the
constantly scrambling to provide a burgeoningpopulation with education, overall level of reso~rce use ~ather than by increasing the efficiency of
healthcare, poverty relief, and infrastructure improvements like roads and re~ource use._ Sometrmes effic1ency even declines, resulting in soil erosion,
irrigation. Rapid population grovvth also leads to a population with a high . so1l degradatlon, deforestation, and water shortages.
percentage of children requiring schooling and caregiving and thus
competing for scarce funds and adult labor. The Case ofMiracle Rice
The problem of rapid population growth can be particularly
pronounced in urban areas. \Vhen the population is generally poor, We hardly ever know ahead of tinle all the consequences of a technological
!'1. taxation does not yield sufficient funds to keep investing in new roads, change, and the story of the development of the high-yielding rice varieties
public transportation, sewage lines, clean-water supplies, school buildings, known as "miracle rice" is a clear example.
hospitals, phone lines, and power generation. Nor will people have enough During ~e 1960s ~d 1970s, intensi:fication ofagriculture swept through
money to attract much private investment to provide these services. _the developmg countnes, a transformation often called the green revolution.
Government officials and police receive low pay and turn to corruption Mechanization, irrigation, pesticides, a tenfold increase in fertilizer use, the
to maintain their incomes, making it even harder to coordinate rapid introduction ofhi~-yielding ~yb~ds, rural road construction to open up
growth. Kickbaclcs increase the cost of providing infrastructure, and new areas for cleanng and cultlvatlon-these practices allowed world grain
polluters avoid regulations through payoffs to officials. production to increase 2.6-fold between 1950 and 1984.u The per capita
Even when the population is wealthier, rapid growth presents a serious world grain harvest rose by 40 percent.67 Much of the gain was in rice, the
organizational problem. Mexico City, capital of one of the world's largest centerpiece of the die t of billions. The success of "miracle rice" is a good
middle~ income nations, is often pointed to as an example of the difficulty way to assess the green revolution and our common feeling oftechnological
of planning in the midst of rapid expansion. Despite the horrendous traffic optimism.lis
in the city, residents increasingly turn to cars, as an alternative to inadequate The working ~ves of roughl~ a billion people are devoted to growing rice.
public transportation, only making matters worse. Public transit services Average worldWlde conswnptwn per capita is 145 pounds (dry weight) a
simply can't keep up with the rapidly increasing demand of the rapidly year. ln Bangladesh.the average person eats 330 pounds a year-almost a
increasing population. Because of these planning difficulties, the likelihood pound a day. The nce-dependent countries are also where much, if not
of corruption increases. Thus, as industries and car owners bribe their way most~ ~f the world,s population growth is taking place. However, these
around regulations limiting polluting emissions, the 22 million people of countnes have little remaining land not already in paddies that could be
Mexico City expt:rience the worst .air quality of 3.ny city in the world. In brought into rice production. Increasing rice yields per acre and hectare is
1995) air pollution exceeded the World Health Organization's standard on clearly an important challenge.
321 days. )oggers wear facemasks. Wealthy children play indoors or inside The suce~ over the past forty years or so in meeting this challenge can
giant glass bubbles .. During one particularly bad S-day period in 1996, the be largely attnbuted to the work of the International Rice Research Institute
city's health care services attributed an increase of 400,000 patients and (IRRI), which was founded in the Philippines in 1959 with the goal of
300 deaths to air pollution.65 Los .Angeles may be a similar, albeit less extreme, ~creasing rice produ~on. The approach IRRI took was to develop new
example from a very wealthy country. nc_e that could accept high rates of fertilizer application and would also be
We need to make another important qualification to the Boserup effect. SUitable for mechanical cultivation. Most of the local rice varieties in use
Like Simon, Boserup does not allow a big role for the environment in her around th: develo~~g world at that time were susceptib!e to a problem
theories of technological change. But the environment can significantly . known as lodgmg, or falling over from growing too tall. This problem is
126 AN INVITATION TO _ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 129

not particularly significant when rice is harvc:ste~ by hand, s~ local f~rmers ~nanti~pated Consequences. IRRI's work has been widely praised for
never felt a great need to select against lodgmg m mamtrunmg ~hexr local rmprovmg the diet and health ofbillions. Critics, though, point to the killing
rice varieties. But this characteristic of rice had t~ be dealt With before of paddy fish br~ught abou: by using the new hybrids. One of the major
combines could be used. Also, lodging tends to get wo rs e with fertilizer use, sources of protem m the d1cts of many rice farmers had been fish from
as the plants shoot upwards in response to the easy flow of nutrients. their paddies. But the new pest problems associated with the use of hybrids
In rural Taiwan, some IRRl scientists found a wild variety of low-stature forced farmers. to apply pesticides at such high rates that the paddy fish
rice that they hybridized with conventional rice in 1966. The result was rice were killcd off m most areas. Consequently, some have argucd, mira dc rice
suitable for both heavy fertilization and mechanical harvesting. IRRI called has actually led to lower nutrition levels for local farmers at the same that it
this hybrid IRS, but it rapidly came to be called "miracle rice." Farmers across has allowed more people to bc fed.
southern and southeastern Asia gave up their local varieties and bought IRS, Then there are the social and economic complications. The new rice
and average yiclds ofricewent up 30 percent betw'een 1968 and 1981. farming re_quircs more capital per acre. Fcrtilizcr, pesticides, hybrid seed,
By the mid-1980s, though, the euphoria had pretty well w~m off. A host and c~mbmes cost money. Thus the new form of rice farming became
of interrelated problems with miracle rice had cmcrged: mcreased pest access1ble to only the wealthier members of rural villages. And soon they
damage, loss of genetic diversity, the killing of paddy fish, and increased were producing rice so chcaply that other farmers could not stay in the
social inequality. . . .. game, starting a production trcadmill that has thrown millions of farmers
Previously farmers had kept their own seed and selected 1t for su1tabil~ty off the land.
to local conditions. But with the coming ofiRS, a huge percentage of nee . Even wealthier farmers can manage the higher costs only if they have
land was soon planted with the same variety. A pest that could evolve to do bxgger farms. Formerly, tenant farming was very common in areas such as
well against that IRS would liave acre after acre of the same variety to flourish the Malay Peninsula. But now the landowners themselves need every piece
in. Moreover, simultaneous increases in irrigation led farmers to crop tw'o ?fland to pay for tra~ors ~d other improvements, and ten ants are finding
and three times a year in areas where they had previously cropped only lt hard to keep their holdings. The political scientist James Scott has
once or twice a year. Multiple cropping did wondcrs for rice output, but dcscri?e4 the social implications of intensive rice production in Malaysia.
the old pattern of drying out fields once a year used to interrupt the life He pomts.. out that the irrigation of paddies helped pro p el the move toward
cycles of pests and help to keep them in check. bigger rice fanns. Without irrigation, Iandowners would never have been
Farmers began applying the newly available pesticides, but ail too soon the able to achieve the big harVests necessary to fund the switcll to more intensive
pests started evolving to resist the pesticides. IRRl went back to work ~o production.69
develop a new hybrid-and then another and another and another as new Intensification has been hard~t on those who were too poor even to be
problems kept emerging. IR20 was resistant to a disease called tungro but an tenant ~rmers, as Scott has described for Malaysia. These villagers used
easy mark for brown plant-hoppers. !R26 could handle the plant-hoppers, to s~ve as field ~~rkers, but with the coming of combines to do the
but it was easily flattened by wind. . harvestmg and pesUc1des to do the pest control, they are incrcasingly out
IRRI researchers chcckcd their records and found that a v..rind-resistant of work. The village poor used to have a kind of unwritten contract with
variety had been recorded in some areas of Taiwan, the same arca from the wealthy. Poor villa~ers would work in the fields, but they expected
which the genetic material for IRS had come. But when the ~escarchers zakat-the Muslim tradit10n of chanty-especiallywhen times were hard.
But zakat is disappear~g now as the wealthy find they no longer really
went to Taiwan, they found that the wind-resistant variety had d1sappeared
~eed ~e p~or, furth:rmg the social inequalities brought about by the
from use. All the local farmers were planting rice hybrids from IRRI, and
xntcns1ficatxon of agnculturc and fueling the migration of rural peoples
no one had bothered to keep theseeminglyoutdated wind-resistant variety to the urban shanty towns. 70
going. Eventually IRRI found avarietyitcould use, and came out with IR36.
Since 1984, the rise in world rice yields has slowed considerably. More
Four years later, though, the brown plant-hoppers had cvolved ~d were and more farmers arc reaching the four-ton-per-hcC:tare level that seems to
:~;.
again attacking the crops. In a few years IRRl was up to IR72, w1th more be the practical maximum of current rice tcchnology. 71 Yiclds in China and
hybrid varieties to come, or so rice farmers must hope. India have been stable since 1990 and have actually fallen somewhat in Japan.n
Global yie!ds are still increasing, but at a s!owcr rate than population growth.
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 131
130 AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY

Worldwide per capita yield of all graiu dropped 7 percent between 1984 and THE DEMOGRAPHIC CRITIQUE OF
!996. (See Exhibit 4.3.)" Researchers at the Worldwatch Institute suggest MALTHUSIANISM
that the declining responsiveness of crops to further fertilization, as well as
"soil erosion, the conversion ofgrainland to nonfarm uses, and spreadingwater In 1945, the demographer Frank W. Notestein offered a simple model of
4 population that has since become central to the debate over population
scarcit( is limiting the growth of grain p rod uction.'
growth. Looking over European history, Notestein suggested that
Exhibit 4.3 World grain production pcr pmon, 1950-96: Despite a development and modernization initially raise population growth rates but
record harvest in 1996, the overall trend since the 1984 peak has been -eventually lead to a return to a stable population, albeit at a higher level.
persistently down. Notestein distinguished three stages:
Stage One: In premodern times countries experience high birth rates
and mortalityrates that roughly cancel each other out. Because of disease,
400 malnutrition, and accidents, average life expectancy is about thirty-five
..;--...._A. years. Children and infants are particularly hard hit because of the diseases
300
' and fragility of child.hood. Parents compensate by having a lot of children,
..r-"~ a practice supported by pro-natal social llorms and social institutions as
well as the common use of children as a source of household and
.(
agricultural labor.
Stage Two: With the beginning of modernization, new scientific
~iscove~ie_s l~ad ~o improved health and an increased food supply, and
100
mdustnahzatJ.on mcreases wealth. Mortality levels fall, but pro-natal social
norms continue to promote a high birth rate. Population growth rates climb,
o ' 1980 1990 2000 eventually to high levels.
1950 1960 1970
~tage Three: Finally, social norms and social institutions catch up with

Source: Brown et al (1997). the fact that children are quite.likely to survive, leadiug to a fall iu the birth
rate. Increased urbanization promotes a lower birth rate because children
Will this scarcity lead to another round of technological innovation? In are no longer seen as a labor supply for the farm. And with the coming of
1995, IRRl annoWlced another breakthrough, a new type of rice expected universal schooling. children become an economic burden rather than an
to increase yields by up to 25 percent, the first significant advance in rice econoinic resource. Changes in social structures associated with modemism
production in a decade. 7s And 1996 saw the first bioengineered variety of a lead parents to invest more in each child. Having fewer, better-educated,
major grain crop, Monsanto's Roundup-Ready Soybeans. The new soybeans better-financed children becomes more attractive than spreading a family's
can telerate higher application rates of Roundup, a herbicide developed by ~vestrx:~t o:er ~any children.~ Also, as a country gains wealth through
mdustnahzanon, 1t can more easily afford social security, pensions. health
Monsanto, without the crop itself falling susceptible to the chemical.
car~, an_d other sac~ benefits, reducing the tendency for parents to see
(Monsanto, of course, makes moneytvvo ways with this new variety: soybean
therr children as the1r future caregivers in old age.
sales and increased pesticide sales.) . Notestein called this Sequence the demographic transition, a theory that
Critics worry about the environmental and moral consequences of
~s clos~ly r~l~ted t_o_modernization ~eory. Demographic transition theory
bioengineering and other new agronomic techniques, as well as the likely lS an 1mphc1t crmque of Malthus1anism. It suggests that, rather than
continuance of patterns of social inequality. Even some bioengineers and expanding until environmental constraints cause it to collapse, population
financial analysts remain skeptical that technology can produce a "new green growth eventually levels off of its own accord. The same factors that lead
revolution:'76 Maybe it will. But we face the risk that it won t. And even if to -population growth-scientific advances, industrialism, and
it does, will we be able to handle the social and environmental consequences? modernization.-are also those that eventually lead to a return to
population stability, once societies adjust to their new-found social and
technological circumstances.
-t
l
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 133
1 3Z AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY

Exhibit 4.4 The demographic transition: In stage J, a stable birth ra~~:nd First, the rate of population growth currently experienced in most less-

dd~~abr~ [":f~ie ';",'h~ d:~;h J:'o~:;~ik ~~irthh


0 developed countries is considerably higher than the growth rate in
a flu'f'"atng o:;:; nineteenth-ccntury Europe. Since contemporary less-developed countries
remams ~w a_n. . h. h and oj,ulation rises rapidly. In stage 3, t e have been able to import already established medical technologies, mortality
rate remams t7'!ttr.ally ~g' #zr matches the death rate, once again
birt~ rate
decltnes un u!:J~~-but at a much higher level. Scholars
leadt~g to a stabile pobf?l.ty .; this model o' population change to lower
rates have dec!ined much faster. At the same time, birth rates are far higher.
Many-European cultures of the nincteenth century practiced late marriage
questron the ap_p tea t t o; 'l . and frequent nonmarriage, as opposed to the practice of carly and nearly
income countrtes. universal marriage in most contemporary less-developed countries. High
Stage3 fertility and low mortality has in tum led to a young age structure throughout
Stage 2
the less-developed world, leading to population momentum as younger

_ ....
.
Stage l

'-~"' ,,
'
~...,.c..:.-::''-:--:.:':.'---'>~'r-B:::irth:::"
~~ra,te
--
_,''
:
l
_______ _ generations reach their reproductive years. 80
Second, the poverty that leads children to be regarded as a labor supply
1'\
1 '\ /
.",... '
:
may be intractable in the face of contemporary forces of global ine quality.
'\ '\ ': Economic structures that channel wealth toward core countries may limit
//
: \ / ! the extent to which less-developed countries will ever in fact develop, or at
': \
\ /
/ ',
' least may very much retard the spread of development's benefits.
[l ~ l
X ...
: :
Third, an increasing chorus of critics doubt the very desirability of some
ofthose benefits. The principa! doubt centers on thehomogenizing tcndcncy
:.ir : l ...... '
l l ... , l of development and the charge that development procecds from a West-
:: l l ......... ....... ________ l ----
_______ _,.
Population :/ Death rate
knows-best pOint of view. Critics see development not only as economic
imperialism but as cultural imperialism as wcll. ln the words of Wolfgang
Sachs, "From the start, development's hidden agenda was nothing else than
Tlll\e-
the Wcsternization of the world."81 Hidden in the idea of development" is
Source: Sarre (1991). the prcsumption that those who arc "underdeveloped" or<(lcss developed"
or developing" are missing something-that there is something inadequate
about them. Western education and Western values do not liberate
A Ne:w Demographic Transition?
traditional peoples, argucs Helena Norberg-Hodge, another critic ofWest-
. th E """"riencc But scholars and knows-best Clevelopmcnt.82 Rather, they deny traditional peoples the
Notestcin based his model on e uropean --r- . d cl d
. d n the idea that the less- ev ope cultural tools:to function in anything but a Western economy, trapping them
dcvelo~rocn.t or~nx.zatlo:~ex~: ~ough a demographic transition. If
counchtnes mxgi;t .soc~~C:ct.
su an exten~xon lS .
th:
solution to population problems wo~d bc
the ath of modern development.
instead. Given that unequal relationships of econontic exchange may
prevent poor countries from becoming developed, or may delay
for poor natxonths to ~onthtmulesseddo:'elopelcountriesvvillgrowoutofrapid
development for generations, the trap is particularly tight.
E tually they eonze, e - " f Fourth, there is the environmental critique. Levels and inefficicncies of
:ven h 'd th lannmg difficulties it causes. As a slogan that came out o consumption associated with the European dcmographic transition may
growt an e p . "Devcl t
the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest put lt, opme:n simply be unsustainable, and may as well compromise environmental justice
"78
and nature's rights and beauty. Even though only the wealthy few currently
is ~:~~~:;:~a~:.:;aphic transition fits European history .reason~blh enjoy them, such consumption levels already seem to be compromising the
well (although there are plenty of exceptions, such as the dralop Idn ~e b~r)t,' environment-the situation may become far worse when the whole world
. ed . e ons of France before mort rty e me
~~e t~;'reen:;~ su:tx:::r r~asons to doubt the ap~licability ~f th~
tries to keep up with the Joneses. Although wc must avoid the simplicityof
crude Malthusianism, wc must also avoid crude :mti-Malthusianism. If the
demo ra hic transition to the less-developed countncs. A num cr o rest of theworld is to attain development, then the meaning and the
impo;ta~t conditions seem to set the contemporary less-dev7loped "''
techniques of development must change.
. apa rt from ninetcenth-century Europe:
countnes .
134 AN INVITATION TO .E:NVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 135

In light of these critiques, there is increasing agreement among Population women collect the bulk of fuel wood essential for cooking food-another
specialists that if the poor countries of the world are to achieve a actlVlty dommated by women. Development policies stressing exports
demographic transition, they will have to do so by different paths than encoura.ged po?r c?untries to convert forest lands to timber and crop
European countries took.83 productl.On, taking little notice oftheir importance as a source of fuel wood.
Women soon found th~mselves w<illdng miles and miles each day to gather
Women and Development fuel: In general, t~e kinds of economic activity stn:ssed by development
prOJects .emphas1zed men's work, underestimated the agricultural
One vision of those different paths sees women having a key. role in contributions of women, and almost completely ignored domestic work
development. Scholars and development organizations now see improving seeing it as outside the money economy and therefore not really an economi~
the status of women both as an end in itself and also as one of the most activity at all.
significant means of reducing rapid population grovrth and improving the The status ofwomen in households and commnnities, as well as in politics
life chances of poor children. and the: economy, was not seen as a development issue at the time Boserup
The first two decades of development efforts, 1950 to 1970, gave scarcely wrot.e. ln the years afterward, hoWever, issues of women's status and gender
any consideration to gender issues. Women were largely invisible, both as relat10ns came closer to the cent~::r of the development debate. Scholars
actors in and potential beneficiaries (or victims) ofthe development process. came to recognize that women were disproportionately represented in the
Ester Boserup's pathbreaking 1970 book. Women's Role in Economic :anks of the poor. Moreover, while women tendt:d to live longer than men
Development, was the first work on development to highlight women, and m the developed world, their longevity lagged considerably behind men's
it came as something of an academic bolt oflightening. Boserup pointed m the less-developed countries. The United Nations prodaimed 1976 to
out that women in less-developed countries make vital contributions not 1~85 the Decade f~r .Wome~, and now few development projects go ahead
only in the domestic sphere of reproduction but a_lso in economic Without some expliclt attentlon to women, al beit often cursory.
production. . . One reason why "women in development" (orWID, as it is often called
In retrospect, Boserup's finding seems obvious, but at the tune the offiaal . by dev~?pment s~ecialists) has captured so much interest is the increasing
economic statistics of countries around the world consistently reco~non ofthe unportance ofwomen in population issues. Demographic
underestimated women's nondomestic work. For example, Egypt's national studies ~~ th~t ~e status of women, measured through their education
statistics for 1970 listed only 3.6 percent of the agricultural workforce as and pamapation m the paid economy, is the most consistent factor in
female. ln-depth studies revealed quite a different picture. Half of women fertili:r re~uctionY Women frequently want to reduce fertility rates,
participated in plowing and leveling land, and three-quarters participated sometimes m contrast to their male sexual partners. lill When men come to
in dairy and poultry production. 114 A 1972 census in Peru registered only see women as economic equals, they tend to see them nlore as social equals
2.6 percent of the agricultural workforce as female, whereas an interview as':":n, and wo~en gain more say in family planning and other family
study found 86 percent of women ~articipating in field work. 85 deas10~s: .~ducano~ gives ":'omen, as well as men, a broader nnderstanding
Boserup's survey found that, although there are substantial variations by of poss1bilrnes, e~ oding fa~alism and building a sense of empowerment. The
region and by level of agricultural intensity, women do as much work in greater ~cononuc standing of women in paid work in an increasingly
agriculture as men, if not more.86 The kinds of agricultural work women monetarized world also means that childbirth and child care can become
and men perform do differ, however. Men tend to be more involved in the more of an economic burden than an economic opportunity for families.
mechanized and animal-assisted aspects of production, such as plov.ring. As opposed :o g~neral ~con o mic ~evelopment of the structural adjustment
and women tend to be more involved "With hand operations, such as sowing an~ n:oderm.zat10n vanc::ty, improving women's standing may be one of the
seed and boeing weeds. Contrary to stereotypes about the greater physical pnnapal pa~. to a .~mographic transition for less-developed countries.
capabilities of men, women in fact do the bulk of the world's physical work. ~ome femmlSt .'nt:cs are ~uspicious of this approach to devdopment,
Development efforts, however, were ignoring the implications of wh1ch st:ems to VIew rmproVlng womeds status as a means to the end of
development policies for the kind of work women do and for women's status. pop~atio.n stab~ation, not as a moral end in itself. The emphasis should
In many rural regions in less-developed countries, particularly in Afri.ca, be on end~gpatr1ar::y, n~t on fu_rtheringwomen's economic devdopment,
argues Sylvia Walby. Patnarchy IS a system of social organization in which
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 137
AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY
136
The pro motion ofbirth control has some serious black marks on its record.
women consistently receive lower status and less social power then men- One of the worst instances was In dias National Population Policy of 1976,
a system which, most scholars agree, still characterizes virtually all hu~an
initiated during the eighteenth-month period between )une 1975 and
socxetxcs. Emphasizing women's economic development may be puttmg
January 1977, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ruled as a dicta tor. Prime
the cart before the horse. Minister Gandhi had been found guilty of election fraud, and in order to
Part of the reason for this doubt about women's economic development
hold on to power she declared a national state of emergency. The press was
is the tendency to relegate women to lower-~aid work. As less-developed
censorcd, dissidents jailed, civilliberties curtailed. In this climate of extreme
countries have tried to build their exports m order to reduce debt and
state control, the government put forth the National Population Policyunder
comply with structural adjustment plans, they have promotcd ch cap facto:r
the direction of Mrs. Gandhi's son, Sanjay Gandhi. The policy emphasized
work generally-performed by women. As Valentine Moghadam has put Jt,
, arc the "new proletanat . world"d"" sterilization-as well as health care, nutrition, and education for girls.
women WI e. . Sterilization plans went quickly ahcad, but the other aspects of the policy
There is considerable controversy among feminist scholars. about thxs
were more long:-term and were basically ignorcd.
phenomenon, often termed the feminiz~tion. of labor. Does ~t represent
91
Most Indian. states set bureauci-atic quotas to monitor the "performance;'
the continued subordination of women m a new form, or does xt represent
ity for poor women to gain a better life for themselves and as it was called, of the policy. Although people were paid for being sterilized.
an opp Ortun . l h ' I ., there was much coercive abuse as government officials in this strikingly
their families through one of the few means avrulab e to t em. s 1
un democratic period in India's historystruggled to meet their quotas. Near
empowermcnt or continued disempowerment? .
1 strongly suspect the answer is both. As other VIII'lte~s have _a_rgu:d, the capital, Delhi, the government set up vasectomy booths. People were
improving women's status is not simply a means to populat1on stabilxzauon harassed, threatened, and bribed. In about six months, some 8 million
and increased exports.n However it may be seen ?Y the governments and sterilizations were performed, maii:Uy on the poor, who were vulnerable to
development agencies involved, improved ~tatus tS good for both wome? the fees, harassment, and threats; they were probably more often targcted
and their fa:milies. If nothing else, reproductlon should be seen as a women s by the program as well. Hundreds died in the riots that broke out in protest,
health issue. Half a million women die each year from_rregnancy-related as well as through infectious caused by the sterilization procedures. YVhen
causes-some 200,000 through unsafe and illegal aboruons and the others Mrs. Gandhi finally lifted the national state of emergency, the program was
through childbirth, postbirth infections, and other illn.esses; 90 p~rcent of quickly dropped.''
93
these deaths occur in less-developed countries. Better .women s health Instances such as this, or such as the stcrilization of Native Americans that
was carried out on some U.S. reservations, are intolerable. They can also lead
also means better health for their children.
The persistence of patriarchy, despite improvemen~ ~ ~men's _health people, in anger and suspicion~ to associate all advocacyforpopulation control
and economic and social status, seems undeniable. Elirmnatmg patnarchal "With oppression. A number of critics h.ave seen the concern about population
social relations is ultimatclythe onlywayto achieve equal s~tus for women. as part of, to quote one author, a ((racist eugcnic and patriarchal tradition"-
But the fact that attention is finally being given to women 1~ development the fears of the rich and white about arising darker-skinned horde, as well as
(although perhaps notyctwith sufficient sensitivity :"d cormmtment) should an effort to control women's bodies.95 Critics have had particular concern
not be seen merely as a patriarchal ploy. Rather, 1t may bc a sxgn that th_e about thesingle-minded attention that some Malthusians have given to birth
world is beginning to acknowledge that improving the status of women IS control as a means for reducing _population growth, given that most
good not only for women: lt is good for everyone. contemporary population grovvth is outside the West.
Paul and Anne Ehrlich's 1990 book, The Population Explosion, may be a
case in point. They predicted that, ((the population explosion will come to
Family Planning and Birth Control an end before very long. The only remaining question is whether it v.-rill be
Another controversial aspect of population is the use ofbirth control in family halted through the human method of birth control, or by nature wiping
"'"'-e controversy stems partly from the coemve way that b1rth out the surplus:'96 -
l
pannmg. "' al. d .There is nothing explicitly, and pcrhaps not even impJicitly, racist about
control has been applied in some instances, partly from mo: JU gments
concerning some forms ofbi.rth con tro~, a~d partl~from q:U.esttons about the such a statement. Nevertheless, critics have argucd that placing all the
significance of bi~ control technoloycs m reducmg fertility. emphasis on birth control as a solution to population growth leaves intact
138 AN INVITATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 139

the soCial inequality that is the primary cause of growth.97 Whatever the birth control technologies. Practices such as late marriage, extended nursing,
intent of the Ehrlichs' position (and I believe the Erhlichs are in fact strongly abstinence, rhythm, withdrawal, and polyandry, among others, can be and
committed to social equality), critics suggest that the effect would be the have been effective forms of family planning.
continuance of social inequality of race, class, and gender. But no doubt modem methods can be even more effective, which is one
But just because racism, classism, and sexism have been a dimension of of the main reasons why so many couples across the world choose them,
some birth control policies, and possibly some theories, this does not mean when .they are available. The commitment to plan births is absolutely
that birth control is necessarily racist, classist, or sex.ist. Indeed, preventing essential to the success of any family planning practice, however. If social
people from controlling births can be just as racist, classist, and sexist as any conditions are such that people are unable or unwilling to make such a
ill-conceived birth control policy. Reproduction, I believe most people would commitment, no technique can be effective. In other words, birth control
agree, is a basic hwnan right. But so too is the right not to reproduce. Most and greater spcial equality can be complementary. rather than contradictory.
couples around the world voluntarily seek to control and regulate-to plan- social policies. .
their reproduction. Limiting their ability to do so can be coercive too.
One example of a policy of coerced reproduction took pla!=e in the late
"i::
1960s in Romania under the regime of Nicolae Ceaucescu, one of the
most iron-fisted dictators of the tvventieth century. In 1966, Ceaucescu THE ENVIRONMENT AS A SOCIAL ACTOR
suddenly declared any form of birth control. as well as abortion, illegal. Ma~thus went too far. It is clearly incorrect to adopt a position of
Women had to unde.rgo gynecological exams every three mori.ths to env:ronmental determinism-the view that the environment controls our
determine if they were complying with the new law. As a result, birth lives ~nd :hat there is little we can do about it. The human population has
rates doubled, at least initially. cert~mly mcreased to unprecedented levds, despite environmental limits,
Matemal mortality doubled too, with about 85 percent of these deaths and m many wealthy countries population levels have returned to stability
due to botchedabortions, illegallyperfonned. Women across Romania also for reasons other than environmental scarcity. Technological and social
began avoiding gynecologists as much as possible, skipping appointments change have allowed societies across the world to increase the production
and failing to sign up for them, even for routine gynecological checkups. offo_od and ~ther resources. Although the numbers of the poor are growing,
The result is that Romania now suffers from Europe's highest rate of death particularly m areas v..rith rapid population growth, their poverty cannot be
. :. ! due to cervical cancer. Infant mortality also went up considerably (by one understood apart from the dynamics of the world economy.
third) as parents neglected, abused. and even abandoned unwanted babies.99 But Malthus was not entirely wrong. Access to food depends not only on
Granting a right to control and plan births is not the same as approving systems of entitlement; it also depends upon the environmental availability
of all forms ofbirth control and all national birth control policies. There is o~ food. S~me resources seem hard to substitute with something else, even
certainly extensive disagreement on the morality of some forms of birth With the htghest of technologies. And too often the risk inherent in some
control, particularlyabortion. But one can disapprove of abortion and still technologies puts the poor and marginal most in. danger. Rapid population
support other means of controlling births. growth is also a ~r~blem ~ itsel.f, apart from any envirorunental implications,
The question remains, though, whether modern birth control both for organtzmg soc1al benefits such as schools and a coordinated
technologies are effective means of reducing population growth. In detailed economy and for safeguarding the health of women and children. In other
historical studies, scholars have noted that, at least in the European words, rapid growth can cause poverty, just as it is itself a product of poverty.
demographic transition, fertility decline generally began before modern Moreover, because of the compounding effects of population with
birth control technologies were v..ridely available. Indeed, in some places ~onsumption and production, the question of growth and development
fertilit)i declined even before industrialization began. lS not_ merely one of finding enough food to feed everyone. It is also a

The point is, there is nothing new about family planning. People have question of whether we will ultimately be able to sustain everyone-
been using, and continue touse, many family planning techniques other humans. and other creatures alike-if the competitive consumption and
than the Pili, the d.iaphragm, the con dom, the sponge, and other modern p reduction levels of the world's rich become the ever-escalating norm.
140 AN INVITATI'ON TO ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION AND DE:VELOPMENT

Accepting a degree of environmental agency, accepting the environment's well-being. Maybe. We' re certainly not doing a great job. of it now. But in
causa! role in social life, is not the same as accepting environmental order to do a better job, wc need a dialogical understanding of the situation-
determinism. The role that the environment plays in our lives depends an understanding that recognizes the complexity and interactivencss of
upon our interactions v.rith it. The environment is not a given; wc shape the social and ecologic life. For the problem of population is not just one of
significancc it has. The environment is, in effect, a different place depending <<too many people." Rather, it is also a problem of too many people with too
upon how we wish to use it and how we envision what it is. An environmental much and too many people with not enough.
resource is only a resource if, because of our technical ~n d social relations,
we find it to be a resource. It is we who make resources as much as it is the
environment that.providcs them to us. It is we who make the environment
as much as it is the environment