Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 103956, 207 SCRA 712 , March EMILIO M. R.
EMILIO M. R. OSMEA and PABLO P. GARCIA, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
31, 1992
Case Nature: PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Elections.
Division: EN BANC
Counsel: Romulo R. Macalintal
Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., CRUZ
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section
15(a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that decals and stickers
may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section
21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
Syllabi Class: Constitutional Law|Commission on Elections|Freedom of Speech
Syllabi:1. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The COMELECs
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except
in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds.-
The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public
or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds.2. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The
qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom.-
This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
[1937]; Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions
of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak
and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.3. Constitutional Law; Commission on
Elections; Freedom of Speech; Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should
be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property which in this case
is a privately-owned vehicle.-
The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-
1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places
whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as
to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the
citizens private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this
prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1,
Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law.4. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except
in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.-
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.
ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 132231. March 31, 1998]
This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646,
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of
charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the
Commission on Elections.[1] Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming
elections. Petitioner Emilio M. R. Osmea is candidate for President of the Philippines, while
petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking reelection. They contend that
events after the ruling in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections[2] have called into
question the validity of the very premises of that [decision].
NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it abridged
freedom of speech and of the press.[4] In urging a reexamination of that ruling, petitioners claim
that experience in the last five years since the decision in that case has shown the undesirable
effects of the law because the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing
field, [but] actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidate[s][5] by depriving
them of a medium which they can afford to pay for while their more affluent rivals can always
resort to other means of reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills.
No empirical data have been presented by petitioners to back up their claim, however.
Argumentation is made at the theoretical and not the practical level. Unable to show the
experience and subsequent events which they claim invalidate the major premise of our prior
decision, petitioners now say there is no need for empirical data to determine whether the
political ad ban offends the Constitution or not.[6] Instead they make arguments from which it is
clear that their disagreement is with the opinion of the Court on the constitutionality of 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646 and that what they seek is a reargument on the same issue already decided in
that case. What is more, some of the arguments were already considered and rejected in the
NPC case.[7]
Indeed, petitioners do not complain of any harm suffered as a result of the operation of the law.
They do not complain that they have in any way been disadvantaged as a result of the ban on
media advertising. Their contention that, contrary to the holding in NPC, 11(b) works to the
disadvantage of candidates who do not have enough resources to wage a campaign outside of
mass media can hardly apply to them. Their financial ability to sustain a long drawn-out
campaign, using means other than the mass media to communicate with voters, cannot be
doubted. If at all, it is candidates like intervenor Roger Panotes, who is running for mayor of
Daet, Camarines Norte, who can complain against 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. But Panotes is for the
law which, he says, has to some extent, reduced the advantages of moneyed politicians and
parties over their rivals who are similarly situated as ROGER PANOTES. He claims that the
elimination of this substantial advantage is one reason why ROGER PANOTES and others
similarly situated have dared to seek an elective position this coming elections.[8]
What petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case but simply the holding of an academic
exercise. And since a majority of the present Court is unpersuaded that its decision in NPC is
founded in error, it will suffice for present purposes simply to reaffirm the ruling in that case.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. This is what makes the present case different from the
overruling decisions[9] invoked by petitioners.
Nevertheless, we have undertaken to revisit the decision in NPC v. COMELEC in order to clarify
our own understanding of its reach and set forth a theory of freedom of speech.
Test for Content-Neutral Restrictions[33]
In Adiong v. COMELEC[34] this Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in a case sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the posting
of campaign signs on public property:

A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466
US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118[1984])[35]
This test was actually formulated in United States v. OBrien.[36] It is an appropriate test for
restrictions on speech which, like 11(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based restrictions,
they are not imposed because of the content of the speech. For this reason, content-neutral
restrictions are tests demanding standards. For example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad
v. COMELEC,[37] prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning
either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling reason to support it, or it will
not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and
therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be
tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.
It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to content-neutral regulations which, like
11(b), are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need only a
substantial governmental interest to support them.[38] A deferential standard of review will
suffice to test their validity.
Justice Panganibans dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test and argues that media
ads do not partake of the real substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent and that
justifies the curtailment of the peoples cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of
access to information. The clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy
for all free speech problems. As has been pointed out by a thoughtful student of constitutional
law, it was originally formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech
cases. For the criminal law is necessarily concerned with the line at which innocent preparation
ends and a guilty conspiracy or attempt begins.[39] Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test for
determining the constitutional validity of laws which, like 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, are not
concerned with the content of political ads but only with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-
present-danger test to such regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a
nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.
The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that
content-based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually
imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons
underlie content-neutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner of holding public
assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Applying the OBrien test in
this case, we find that 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to
regulate media of communication or information for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity,
time and space for political campaigns; that the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of
speech; that any restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no more than is
necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality.
The petition is DISMISSED.
Chavez vs. Gonzales (2008) (Political Law)
Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008
Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc
audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria
Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales
warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its
contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by
anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations found to
have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape. Meanwhile,
respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and
the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press
statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear
and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast
media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of
speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no
option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the
feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a
form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that
the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal
orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in
the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf
of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of
an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC
FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6)
by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as
either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act
No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it form
Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
ISSUE: Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject

matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has
used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only when the challenged act
has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of
the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for
the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private
property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-

Terrorism Council, 632 SCRA 146

Disini, Jr. vs. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
ISSUE: Whether or not the following provisions are valid and constitutional.
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
HELD: b. Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(3) provides:
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration
of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby
invading the area of protected freedoms.But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,the act of willfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and private
documents.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under
no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.Petitioner has failed to discharge this
burden.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Landmark Case: RH BILL CASE -- Imbong vs Ochoa et.al. G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
FACTS:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth
control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views
on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political activists to mass
gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in
every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its
decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen
petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality
of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right
to health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal
protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer
patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
religious beliefs and convictions.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in
schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they
argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling
state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to
free speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the
management perogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in
accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy
and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner
ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very
essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the
State is mandated to protect and promote.
POLITICAL LAW: freedom of religion and the right to free speech
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of
people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us
that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social
and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is
tolerant towards all -the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed
fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to
whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the
preamble of the present Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality innate in
our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this
is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of
religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. Moreover, in
recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of
church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not
encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.
The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 ofthe
1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the
State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and
dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the
other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the
citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they
are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which
refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations
collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect
the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following
mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring
any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition ofa religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from
unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes.
They have a single goal to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In
simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs
with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In
other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either
the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of
religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on
one's belief. The first part is absolute.
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be
enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief
is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
REMEDIAL LAW: facial challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
measure.
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance
of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

REMEDIAL LAW: locus standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and
their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge
the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits
one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.

HECKLER'S VETO
A heckler's veto occurs when an acting party's right to freedom of speech is curtailed
or restricted by the government in order to prevent a reacting party's behavior. The
common example is that of demonstrators (reacting party) causing a speech (given
by the acting party) to be terminated in order to preserve the peace.