Disini, Jr. vs. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The Facts and the Case
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or
computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and
enable him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for
research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public
or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock
exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and
ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of
the current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well
with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use
cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of
the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory
statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-
motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously
accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The
wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography
guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the government has a
legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the
computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the
laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by
sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks,
programs, and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these
tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention
Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013
the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued
on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the
cybercrime law until further orders.
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:
xxxx
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether
natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as
a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.13
But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc,14 it ruled that the
right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of
constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of
Privacy." The Court explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon"15 the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but
also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable
searches16 and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to
privacy of communication and correspondence.17 In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.18
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his
residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if
any, his occupation, and similar data.19 The law punishes those who acquire or use such
identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show
how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and
correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water
since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech.
Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion
of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire anothers
personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists
would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to
secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity theft
that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be
intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made
public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property
pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator.20 As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has
nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required
by this Section.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do not provide
ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading the peoples right to privacy.
The concern is understandable. Indeed, the Court recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc88 that certain
constitutional guarantees work together to create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers
may not intrude, and that there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy. Such right to
be left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all freedoms.89
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the United States Supreme Court classified
privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy
involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions, while informational
privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter rightthe
right to informational privacythat those who oppose government collection or recording of
traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and
the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.91 In determining whether or not a
matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of
privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of
privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.92
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a
particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and
communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population who use
all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation
of privacy is to be measured from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable
expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of
her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from
unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.
HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order
from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA
G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla
Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of private respondents offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any
other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they
are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and
fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is
notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial.
The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is
erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and
not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists,
cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:

W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence
W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed
of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals
Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes
such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City went to the police
station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At
the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim
was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on
tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the
victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified.
Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the
heated discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the
deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of
the accused.
HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications
(Ramirez v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted
sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended
party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and
must immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a
person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The
exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed
that he had no intent to kill the latter.
Ople vs Torres GR No 127685 23 July 1998
Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996.
Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He
contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a
usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizens right to privacy.
Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011
Facts
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of
an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team
and issued a memo directing the team to back up all the files in the computers found in the
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined
by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson
David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave,
to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of
fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For
Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having
proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such
power pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioners answer to the
charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the
prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which
then proceeded ex parte.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658,
November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998,
293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy
in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
and computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized
by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer
reasonable in its inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel
Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520,
November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the
personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence
government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by
the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.
He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence,
this petition.
Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal
search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful
and did not violate his constitutional right.
Ratio Decidendi
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Capt. Garry Alejano, et al. vs. Gen.
Pedro Cabuay, et al., GR No. 160792, August 25, 2005
Facts
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale
apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the
security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The
junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the
resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after
several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive
devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.

In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the
petitioner.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI
agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public
telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure. Because
the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a
personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso,
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major
Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center.
The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers
involvement in the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood
incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and
penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment
Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo
Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.

Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus recognized that
employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.
OConnor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that [i]ndividuals do
not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a
private employer. In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs authorize warrantless
searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a
balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employees
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause
nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into
custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident
except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12
August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURN of the
writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case to
the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings
and decision thereon, after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days
from promulgation of the decision.[3]
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to
make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the
Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return
of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals
during the scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the
appellate court considered the petition submitted for decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition.
Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the
regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in
accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen.
Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees
right to exercise for two hours a day.
RULING
We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated
the detainees right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters handed by
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out
that the letters were not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no
envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the
infringement of a citizens privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not
deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials received
respect.[44] The confidential correspondences could not be censored.[45] The infringement of
such privileged communication was held to be a violation of the inmates First Amendment
rights.[46] A prisoner has a right to consult with his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is
not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the administration of the
institution.[47] Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will conspire in plots that threaten prison
security.[48]
American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by
convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono[49] recognized
that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in
communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees mail addressed to public officials, courts and
counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read
in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or read at all.
In Hudson v. Palmer,[52] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable
expectation of privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners
necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is
also clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights.
These constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. The curtailment of certain rights is
necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives
of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security. Of course, these restrictions or
retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence
and retribution are factors in addition to correction.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a
guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or
imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as
to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention,
pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 78545.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING: The appellate court declared that while the opening and
reading of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this
does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal
restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
LOURDES T. MARQUEZ vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, et al.
G.R. No. 135882
June 27, 2001
En banc
FACTS:
In May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera
relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) Julia Vargas
Branch where petitioner was the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involved
in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v.
Amado Lagdameo, et. al, for violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture
Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. The Order was grounded on
Section 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which provides, among others, the following
powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and
records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure
and with the same penalties provided therein.
Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman in the same footing as the
courts of law in this regard.
The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts was a trail of
managers checks (MCs) purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-0-97-0411,
pending with the office of the Ombudsman. It appeared that Trivinio purchased on May 2 and 3,
1995, 51 MCs for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank (TRB) UN Ave.
Branch. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven 11 MCs in the amount of P70.6M were deposited and
credited to an account maintained at the UBP.
On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met with petitioner Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the
banks main office in Makati City, for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino to
view the checks furnished by TRB. After convincing themselves of the veracity of the checks,
Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner
agreed to an in camera inspection set on June 3, 1998. However, on June 4, 1998, Marquez
wrote the Ombudsman that the accounts in question could not readily be identified since the
checks were issued in cash or bearer, and asked for time to respond to the order. Marquez
surmised that these accounts had long been dormant, hence were not covered by the new
account number generated by the UB system, thus sought to verify from the Interbank records
archives for the whereabouts of these accounts.
The Ombudsman, responding to the request of Marquez for time to comply with the order, stated
that UBP-Julia Vargas, not Interbank, was the depositary bank of the subject TRB MCs as
shown at its dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippine Clearing House. Notwithstanding the
fact that the checks were payable to cash or bearer, the name of the depositor(s) could easily be
identified since the account numbers where said checks were deposited were identified in the
order.
Even assuming that the accounts were already classified as dormant accounts, the bank was
still required to preserve the records pertaining to the accounts within a certain period of time as
required by existing banking rules and regulations.
On June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing Marquez to produce the bank
documents relative to the accounts in issue, stating that her persistent refusal to comply with the
order is unjustified, was merely intended to delay the investigation of the case, constitutes
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by the office and is punishable as Indirect
Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770.
On July 10, 1998, Marquez together with UBP filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition
and injunction with the Makati RTC against the Ombudsman allegedly because the Ombudsman
and other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the
bank documents relative to the accounts in question. Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the
Ombudsman issued another order stating that unless she appeared before the FFIB with the
documents requested, Marquez would be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of
justice.
The lower court denied petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order stating that since
petitioner failed to show prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, no writ of injunction may be issued by
the RTC to delay the investigation pursuant to Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt. On August
31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in
contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the
lower court. Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the
Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders
without her breaking any law, particularly RA 1405.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Marquez may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the
documents requested by the Ombudsman.
2. Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the
questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (RA
1405).
HELD:
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the following
exceptions:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs.
Gancayco
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent
jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that Section 2 of the Law on
Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be absolutely confidential
except:
(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is
specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and
that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular
audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for
the exclusive use of the bank,
(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4) In cases of impeachment,
(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or
(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority.
What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of
the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado
Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which
would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of
the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass
to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.
Ombudsman is ordered to cease and desist from requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T.
Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order dated October 14, 1998, and similar
orders.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. Vs Capulong, 160 SCRA 861, G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988
Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case against private petitioners for the production and filming of
the projected motion picture The Four Day Revolution, which relates to the non-bloody change
of government that took place at EDSA, for its unlawful intrusion upon the formers right to
privacy.
Australian film maker Hal McElroy and his movie production company, Ayer Productions,
envisioned the filming for commercial viewing the peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA
(Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) to oust then President Ferdinand Marcos. They consulted with
General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who played major roles in the events.
While General Ramos signified his approval, Senator Enrile wrote a letter stating that he would
not approve of the use of his name or that of any member of his family in any cinema or
television production for commercial exploitation, and advised petitioners that in the production
or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference (whether written, verbal or visual) should be
made to him or any member of his family. The film producer deleted the name of Senator Enrile
in the script and proceeded to film the motion picture. Senator Enrile then filed a Complaint with
application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, seeking to
enjoin McElroy and Ayer Productions from producing the movie. Senator Enrile alleged that the
production of the film without his consent and over his objection constitutes a violation of his
right of privacy. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, ordering McElroy and Ayer
Productions to desist from filming the movie, and from making any reference to Senator Enrile or
his family or any fictitious character identifiable with them. McElroy and Ayer productions
questioned the trial court decision in a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, claiming
their right of freedom of speech and expression.

Held:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued
by the respondent trial court.

Counter-balancing with right of privacy on case-to-case basis. Our law, constitutional and
statutory, does include a right of privacy. It is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise
scope and content of this right in differing types of particular situations. The right of privacy or
"the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, is not an absolute right.

Privacy of a "public figure" necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizens. A limited
intrusion into a person's privacy is permissible where that person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a
public character. The subject matter of the movie relates to the non-bloody change of
government that took place in February 1986. Such subject matter is one of public interest and
concern as it relates to a highly critical stage in our history. It has passed into the public domain
and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass
media.

At all relevant times that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was
what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a "public figure." A public figure has been
defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. To be included in
this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the
public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors
and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a
personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived
at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. Such public figures were
held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right of privacy because: they had sought
publicity and consented to it, and so could not complain when they receive it; or that their
personalities and their affairs had already become public, and could no longer be regarded as
their own private business; and that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform
the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest.

Private respondent is a "public figure" because of his participation as a principal actor in the
events of the change of government in February 1986. Because his participation was major in
character, a film reenactment that fails to make reference to such would be grossly unhistorical.

Privacy of a "public figure" necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizens; limitations. The
line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom
of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events. There must be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the
participation of private respondent. There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of
the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal
facts. To the extent that the movie limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent
to those events which are reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the
intrusion into his privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal
may be carried out even without a license from private respondent.
Vivares vs. St. Theresas College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29,
2014
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresas College (STC), uploaded
on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara)
wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero.
Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said
pictures to STCs Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and banned them from
marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu
RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still
barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only. They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without
their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and
by subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children
were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the
childrens right to privacy.
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy
tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be
respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such
privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as
Public.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a users posts on his wall
(profile page):
(a) Public the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends only the users Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is Public and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose
any setting other than Public. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject
of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most
of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their
classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it
appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the
pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who
showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely
delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline
their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents
agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal
killing or enforced disappearance; and

2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in
the business of gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)