THE SIX DAY WAR:

CAUSES AND THE COLD WARS INFLUENCE

Ms. Emily Dawes

HIS-107

24 April 2017
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The Middle East has, since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, been a volatile region of the

world. The Western partition of the region into artificial nation states with borders that were not

drafted in any logical method other than an equitable division of land for Britain and France. The

result is a region with nations filled with a majority of Sunnis and a minority of Shiites, vice

versa, and the lack of real representation for large swaths of a nation. This type of partitioning

did not go away after the Second World War, when the British Mandate for Palestine was used

by the newly-established United Nations in establishing the state of Israel. The establishment of

a new, Jewish nation, on the land and properties held by Palestinian Arabs for generations was

seen by the people living there as extremely unfair. Israel itself, however, as a political entity,

was a rather socialist body. Israel quickly became a Cold War issue, and the development of the

Israeli nuclear program and the Soviet Unions interference in the establishment of that program

is a direct link to the reasons Nasser invaded the Sinai and why Israel took steps to preemptively

strike the Egyptian military.

Many historians point to a direct correlation between the Soviet Union and Egypt and the

outbreak of the Six Day War. This is largely because of Soviet ambitions in the region during the

1960s, and the intense U.S-Soviet rivalry that, at the time, was largely military in nature. The

Soviet Union extended its foreign policy aims in the Middle East through Egypt by testing Israel

and the United States. Soviet-Egyptian relations had warmed since Gamal Abd Al-Nassers Anti-

Communist policies of the 1950s, and had gotten to such a point that the Soviet Union was

supplying weapons and training for the Egyptian armed forces (including assistance to Egyptian

military forces taking part in the Yemen civil war), and seeking access to bases and support

facilities for Soviet military forces.1 Similarly, and around the same time, Soviet-Syrian

1 Golan, Galia. "The Soviet Union and the outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War." Journal of
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relations were also warming, with Soviet support for the Syrian regime manifesting itself in the

form of propaganda and information campaigns in support for the pro-Soviet regime.2 These

propaganda campaigns focused on Israel, with the first warnings of Israeli troop concentrations

appearing in May, 1966. This propaganda campaign being waged by the Soviet Union was a

direct challenge to the United States, and attempted to push Israel into the Western imperialist

circles that many viewed the United States as being the leader of. Indeed, Moscow often

included in its accusations a deterrent warning that the Soviet Union would not remain

indifferent to aggression so close to its own borders.3 The Soviet Union directly empowered and

assisted both Egypt and Syria in the year before the Six Day War, and sought to undermine both

Israeli and U.S influence in the Middle East through those efforts.

This subversion of Western influence in the Middle East was done for a variety of

reasons. One of the major theories is that the Soviet Union wanted to lure Israel into a

preemptive strike against Arab nations. This serves two purposes: first, it makes Israel look like

the aggressor in any following conflict. Second, it allows the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf

of its Arab allies without looking like an agitator to the conflict. Isabella Ginor, an Israeli

journalist and fellow at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace,

stated that, the 1967 war resulted from a deliberate SovietArab effort to draw Israel into a pre-

emptive strike, which would legitimize Soviet intervention against the aggressor and minimize

the risk of US counteraction.4 The methodology behind this type of interventionism even if it

was only behind the scenes was to promote the pro-Soviet regime in Syria and continue to

Cold War Studies 8, no. 1 (2006): 5.

2
Ibid. Golan states that the Soviet Union, provided its own propaganda contributions from the spring of 1966 to
that of 1967.
3
Ibid.
4
Ginor, Isabella. Too little, too late: the CIA and US counteraction of the Soviet initiative in the Six-Day War,
1967. Intelligence and National Security 3rd ser., 26, no. 2 (2011)
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build friendly relationships with Nasser, allowing more Soviet influence into the Middle East and

countering U.S influence in Israel, Jordan and the UAE.

A major reason for the Soviet Unions attempts at getting Arab states to ready themselves

for war with Israel was Israels secret nuclear project at Dimona. One of the main reasons for

Israels preemptive strike against the Syrian and Egyptian air forces was a perceived threat to

their atomic ambitions at Dimona. It has been confirmed that an Egyptian air strike at Dimona

was one of the two perceived threats that were consistently most feared.5 Israels protection of

its nuclear ambition is not outside the normal attitudes of any nuclear state, as deterrence is their

most potent form of self-defense. Indeed, Shlomo Aronson argues that, A chapter by itself was

the outcry for war now, before Israel went fully nuclear, expressed in public by the alarmed exile

Palestinians who feared that no Arab state would risk war with a nuclear Israel for them.6 It may

be argued that, had Israel not begun to seek an atomic bomb, the 1967 Six Day War may not

have occurred at all. However, this line of thought is not without its own flaws. While the Soviet

Union was propagandizing the nature of Israeli troop movements on the border of Syria and

inflaming the larger situation, it does not negate the fact that these accusations on their own

assisted in bringing the region to open war. Indeed, the Syrian-Egyptian alliance meant that

Syria, Secure in the knowledge that it had Egypts guaranteed support it proceeded to set the

Israeli-Syrian border ablaze.7 This action on the part of the Syrian government would lead

5
Ginor, Isabella. The spymaster, the Communist, and foxbats over Dimona: the USSRs motive for instigating the
Six-Day War. Israel Studies 11, no. 2 (2006)
6
Aronson, Shlomo. Tom segev, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East (2007);
Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, 'Foxbats over Dimona; the Soviets Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War'
(2007)." Israel Studies 13, no. 2 (2008). 177.
7
Gat, Moshe. Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: a premeditated strategy or an inexorable drift to war?
Israel Affairs 11, no. 4 (2005)
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directly to the 7 April airstrikes against Syrian forces. Moshe Gat goes on to describe the Israeli

strikes in Syria:

On 7 April 1967 it launched, in broad daylight, a massive air strike against Syrian targets.
The Israeli air force first attacked and destroyed Syrian artillery batteries and then in the
ensuing, and dramatic, air battle, the first between the two states, it shot down six Syrian
MIGs, two of them over Damascus itself. The Israeli response was without precedent: in
the course of the strike 130 Israeli aircraft had flown over the Syrian capital announcing
their presence with ear-splitting supersonic booms.8

The use of substantial Israeli air power and the preemptive use of their armed forces sent

a strong message both to the Syrian government as well as the Egyptians and Soviets. It was

around this time that Menachem Begin spoke in front of the Knesset about Egyptian troop

movements on the southern Israeli border, stating that Everyone knows that Egypt is at war with

Israel. If that country sends its troops, tanks, planes and canon towards our border, that is an

open and explicit threat of aggression.9 This statement was in response to the Egyptian troop

movements back into the Sinai Peninsula on 14 May 1967, which Israel saw as a direct challenge

to its sovereignty as well as its security. Egypt was reacting to the initial Israeli air strikes on 7

April, and its failure to come to the aid of Syria. Their political standing in the Arab world, and

most importantly as one of its leaders, was at risk as Israel attacked another Arab state while

Egypt even with its guarantee of Syrian defense against Israel did nothing to support it.10

The nuclear project at Dimona had not been forgotten, however. The Soviet Union was

still extremely focused on Israels atomic project, and was hopeful to eliminate it before it

produced an atomic bomb. The Soviet Union attempted to bring about a diplomatic solution to

Israels nuclear ambitions, and the USSR was still attempting, at least in its overt diplomacy, to

8
Gat, Moshe. Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: a premeditated strategy or an inexorable drift to war?
Israel Affairs 11, no. 4 (2005)
9
Eshkol, et al. Political and Security Situation. Address, Sitting 176 of the Sixth Knesset, Jerusalem. 5.
10
Gat, Moshe. Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: a premeditated strategy or an inexorable drift to war?
Israel Affairs 11, no. 4 (2005) 618.
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nudge Israel toward a commitment to non-proliferation by means of relatively conciliatory

proposals.11 These diplomatic talks broke down, however, after a series of publications across

the Arab world regarding Soviet cooperation with a nuclear Israel. A series of articles was

published in the Iraqi press regarding the subject of Soviet cooperation with Israel, and had titles

such as Moscow wants an agreement between the Arabs and Israel and A strange declaration

by the Soviet Ambassador in Israel.12 The ultimate reasoning behind why Soviet support for a

diplomatic solution regarding Israels nuclear ambition remains unknown, but Ginor goes on to

argue that such a decision could only have originated in the Politburo in Moscow.13

The overarching aspect of Moscows agenda in the Middle East with respect to Israel at

the time, however, was luring Israel into a preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria. The CIA

estimated in April of 1967 that Moscow almost certainly views the ArabIsraeli dispute as

promoting its interests, but . . . the Soviets do not want the outbreak of a large-scale conflict.14

Though the CIA estimated that a full-scale conflict would not break out, Ginor goes on to quote

the author of the report in saying that we did not and could not foresee the outbreak of a full-

fledged conflict.15 Even so, Moscows agenda was clear. Unknown to U.S intelligence agencies

and officials, Well before the overt outbreak of the crisis in mid-May 1967, the USSR began to

position nuclear-armed naval forces in the Mediterranean (and later in the Red Sea as well).16 It

is clear, then, that the Soviet Union was ultimately ready for a conflict with Israel through its

allies in the region, and that they had the back-door support of Moscow in their endeavors.

11
Ginor, Isabella. The spymaster, the Communist, and foxbats over Dimona: the USSRs motive for instigating the
Six-Day War. Israel Studies 11, no. 2 (2006) 105.
12
Ibid. 105-106.
13
Ibid. 107.
14
Ginor, Isabella. Too little, too late: the CIA and US counteraction of the Soviet initiative in the Six-Day War,
1967. Intelligence and National Security 3rd ser., 26, no. 2 (2011) 296.
15
Ibid.
16
Ginor, Isabella. The spymaster, the Communist, and foxbats over Dimona: the USSRs motive for instigating the
Six-Day War. Israel Studies 11, no. 2 (2006) 103.
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Ultimately, the Six Day War was a conflict fought over Israels secret nuclear project at

Dimona. The Soviet Union could not afford to allow a U.S-friendly power in the region to

acquire an atomic bomb, and their Arab allies in Syria and Egypt could not afford defensively

to allow a nuclear Israel to exist. With the Soviet propaganda apparatus and its strategic use of

its resources in reassuring Nasser that he had the USSRs support, and with rising tensions on the

Syrian border through guerrilla attacks on Israel, Moscow ultimately achieved its goal: luring

Israel into a preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria. The war was a tactical defeat for Egypt

and Syria, but the effects of the conflict lasted much longer than the six days the war went on.

The real result was a stronger bond between the United States and Israel, a weakened Arab

leadership in Egypt, and a new (and easily ignitable) Cold War flashpoint in the Middle East.
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