THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141853. February 7, 2001]

TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN and
ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and HON. PRUDENCIO CASTILLO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 220, Quezon City, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita Idolor which seeks to set aside the decision [1] of
the respondent Court of Appeals which reversed the Order[2]of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City[3]granting Idolors
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[4]
On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, petitioner Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private
respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure
to redeem the mortgage on or before September 20, 1994. The object of said mortgage is a 200-square meter property
with improvements located at 66 Ilocos Sur Street, Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City covered by TCT No.
25659.
On September 21, 1996, private respondent Iluminada de Guzman, wife of Gumersindo de Guzman, filed a
complaint against petitioner Idolor before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon
City, which resulted in a Kasunduang Pag-aayos which agreement is quoted in full[5]:
Kami, ang (mga) may sumbong at (mga) ipinagsusumbong sa usaping binabanggit sa itaas, ay nagkakasundo sa
pamamagitan nito na ayusin ang aming alitan gaya ng sumusunod:
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor of legal age ay nakahiram ng halagang P520,000.00 noong September 20, 1994.
Na ang nasabing halaga ay may nakasanlang titulo ng lupa (TCT No. 25659) under Registry receipt 3420 dated July
15, 1996.
Na ako si Teresita V. Idolor ay humihingi ng 90 days palugit (grace period) to settle the said amount.
Failure to settle the above account on or before December 21, 1996, I agree to execute a deed of sale with the
agreement to repurchase without interest within one year.
Total amount of P1,233,288.23 inclusive of interest earned.
At nangangako kami na tutupad na tunay at matapat sa mga katakdaan ng pag-aayos na inilahad sa itaas.
Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private respondent Gumersindo filed a motion for execution
before the Office of the Barangay captain who subsequently issued a certification to file action.
On March 21, 1997, respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage dated March 21, 1994.
On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent Gumersindo, as the highest
bidder and consequently, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on
June 23, 1997.
On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint for
annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ
of preliminary injunction against private respondents, Deputy Sheriffs Marino Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano and the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City alleging among others alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. In the meantime, a temporary restraining order was issued
by the trial court.
On July 28, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents, the Deputy
Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation
of ownership of the subject property in favor of the De Guzman spouses. The trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the de Guzman spouses.
Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking annulment of the
trial courts order dated July 28, 1998 which granted the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
On September 28, 1999, the respondent court granted the petition and annulled the assailed writ of preliminary
injunction. Teresita Idolor filed her motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated February 4, 2000.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita V. Idolor. The issues raised by petitioner are:
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling (I) that petitioner has no more proprietary right to the
issuance of the writ of injunction, (2) that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos did not ipso facto result in novation of the real
estate mortgage, (3) that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is merely a promissory note of petitioner to private respondent
spouses; and (4) that the questioned writ of preliminary injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The core issue in this petition is whether or not the respondent Court erred in finding that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the private and public respondents from causing the issuance of a final deed of
sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject parcel of land in favor of private respondents.
Petitioner claims that her proprietary right over the subject parcel of land was not yet lost since her right to redeem
the subject land for a period of one year had neither lapsed nor run as the sheriffs certificate of sale was null and void;
that petitioner and the general public have not been validly notified of the auction sale conducted by respondent sheriffs;
that the newspaper utilized in the publication of the notice of sale was not a newspaper of general circulation.
 We do not agree.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. [6] Before an injunction
can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence
of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. [7] Hence
the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect
contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially
protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which
has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. [8]The
controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated
and advisedly adjudicated.[9] It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. [10]
In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no more proprietary right to speak of
over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property
was sold in a public auction to private respondent Gumersindo on May 23, 1997 and the sheriffs certificate of sale was
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. Petitioner had one year from the registration
of the sheriffs sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses
de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. When petitioner filed her
complaint for annulment of sheriffs sale against private respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her
right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. It is always
a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the
ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she shows no equity.[11] The possibility of irreparable damage without proof
of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. [12]
Petitioners allegation regarding the invalidity of the sheriffs sale dwells on the merits of the case; We cannot rule
on the same considering that the matter should be resolved during the trial on the merits.
Petitioner next contends that the execution of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos dated September 21, 1996 between
her and spouses de Guzman before the Office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa showed the express and unequivocal
intention of the parties to novate or modify the real estate mortgage; that a comparison of the real estate mortgage
dated March 21, 1994 and the Kasunduang Pag-aayos dated September 21, 1996 revealed the irreconciliable
incompatibility between them, i.e., that under the first agreement, the amount due was five hundred twenty thousand
(P520,000) pesos only payable by petitioner within six (6) months, after which it shall earn interest at the legal rate per
annum and non-payment of which within the stipulated period, private respondents have the right to extra-judicially
foreclose the real estate mortgage while under the second agreement, the amount due was one million two hundred
thirty three thousand two hundred eighty eight and 23/100 (P1,233,288.23) inclusive of interest, payable within 90 days
and in case of non payment of the same on or before December 21, 1996, petitioner should execute a deed of sale
with right to repurchase within one year without interest; that the second agreement Kasunduang Pag-aayos was a
valid new contract as it was duly executed by the parties and it changed the principal conditions of petitioners original
obligations. Petitioner insists that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos was not a mere promissory note contrary to respondent
courts conclusion since it was entered by the parties before the Lupon Tagapamayapa which has the effect of a final
judgment.[13]
We are not persuaded.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent
one which terminates it, either by changing its objects or principal conditions, or by substituting a new debtor in place
of the old one, or by subrogating a third person to the rights of the creditor. [14] Under the law, novation is never
presumed. The parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new
one.[15] Accordingly, it was held that no novation of a contract had occurred when the new agreement entered into
between the parties was intended to give life to the old one. [16]
A review of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos which is quoted earlier does not support petitioners contention that it
novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate did not appear by express agreement of the parties nor the
old and the new contracts were incompatible in all points. In fact, petitioner expressly recognized in the Kasunduan the
existence and the validity of the old obligation where she acknowledged her long overdue account since September
20, 1994 which was secured by a real estate mortgage and asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her
obligation on or before December 21, 1996 and that upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right
to repurchase without interest within one year in favor of private respondents. Where the parties to the new obligation
expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of the old one, where, in other words, the parties expressly
negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no novation. [17] We find no cogent reason to disagree with the
respondent courts pronouncement as follows:
In the present case, there exists no such express abrogation of the original undertaking. The agreement adverted to
(Annex 2 of Comment, p.75 Rollo) executed by the parties on September 21, 1996 merely gave life to the March 21,
1994 mortgage contract which was then more than two years overdue. Respondent acknowledged therein her total
indebtedness in the sum of P1,233,288.23 including the interests due on the unpaid mortgage loan which amount she
promised to liquidate within ninety (90) days or until December 21, 1996, failing which she also agreed to execute in
favor of the mortgagee a deed of sale of the mortgaged property for the same amount without interest. Evidently, it
was executed to facilitate easy compliance by respondent mortgagor with her mortgage obligation. It (the September
21, 1996 agreement) is not incompatible and can stand together with the mortgage contract of March 21, 1994.
A compromise agreement clarifying the total sum owned by a buyer with the view that he would find it easier to
comply with his obligations under the Contract to Sell does not novate said Contract to Sell (Rillo v. Court of
Appeals, 274 SCRA 461 [1997]).
Respondent correctly argues that the compromise agreement has the force and effect of a final judgment. That
precisely is the reason why petitioner resorted to the foreclosure of the mortgage on March 27, 1997, after her failure
to comply with her obligation which expired on December 21, 1996.
Reliance by private respondent upon Section 417 of the New Local Government Code of 1991, which requires the
lapse of six (6) months before the amicable settlement may be enforced, is misplaced. The instant case deals with
extra judicial foreclosure governed by ACT No. 3135 as amended.
Notably, the provision in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos regarding the execution of a deed of sale with right to
repurchase within one year would have the same effect as the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
wherein petitioner was given one year from the registration of the sheriffs sale in the Registry of property to redeem the
property, i.e., failure to exercise the right of redemption would entitle the purchaser to possession of the property. It is
not proper to consider an obligation novated by unimportant modifications which do not alter its essence.[18] It bears
stress that the period to pay the total amount of petitioners indebtedness inclusive of interest amounted to
P1,233,288.23 expired on December 21, 1996 and petitioner failed to execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase
on the said date up to the time private respondents filed their petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage. The failure of petitioner to comply with her undertaking in the kasunduan to settle her obligation effectively
delayed private respondents right to extra-judicially foreclose the real estate mortgage which right accrued as far back
as 1994. Thus, petitioner has not shown that she is entitled to the equitable relief of injunction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated September 28,
1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134343. January 30, 2001]
MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NENA DE GUZMAN, BEN DE GUZMAN and
CECILIO CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the 14 November 1997 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals nullifying
the 20 June 1996 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 75, San Mateo, Rizal, which directed the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction against private respondents requiring them and all persons claiming
under them to vacate the three (3) parcels of land subject matter of the case, to desist from further entering the property,
and to allow petitioner to take full possession and control of the property as registered owner thereof. Petitioner likewise
seeks the review of the 28 April 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts: On 26 May 1993 petitioner Maximo A. Savellano Jr. filed a complaint [3]for "Recovery of Possession of
Real Property with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and
Mandatory Injunction" against private respondents Nena de Guzman, Ben de Guzman, Cecilio Cruz and John
Doe. Petitioner claimed that he was the registered owner of three (3) parcels of land situated in Sitio Labahan, San
Mateo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 459007, 459008 and 459166 portions of which were
allegedly occupied by the de Guzmans, Cruz and other John Does without his knowledge and consent for at least a
year prior to the institution of his complaint.
In their Answer,[4] private respondents denied the allegations stating that they had been in the peaceful possession
of the property since 1976 or for more than seventeen (17) years prior to the institution of this complaint. In support
thereof Nena de Guzman presented real property tax declarations and tax receipts issued by the Municipal Treasurer
of San Mateo in her favor. Private respondents further claimed that the certificates of title offered in evidence by Maximo
Savellano did not cover the premises being occupied by them.
To resolve this issue, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, issued an order directing the surveyor of the
Bureau of Lands to conduct a survey of the property, with the manifestation from counsel of private respondents that
they would vacate the property if it be shown that they were occupying petitioner's property.
In compliance therewith, Engr. Andres L. Valencia, Chief of the Control Section, Surveys Division, Land
Management Bureau, DENR-Region IV, conducted a ground survey of the property covered by TCT Nos. 459007,
459008, 459166. Thereafter, Engr. Valencia submitted his narrative report with the following findings: "3.4. that there
are three houses within the claim of the plaintiff; 3.5. that lot 11-A (LRC) Psd-88304 was encrouch (sic) by the concrete
fence at its eastern part; and 3.6. that corners 1 and 2 of lot 11-E (LRC) Psd 99304 and corners 5 & 6 of Lot 11-C-1
(LRC) Psd-206834 were not monumented."[5]
Meanwhile, petitioner Maximo Savellano presented evidence in support of his application for the issuance of the
writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Likewise, private respondents presented evidence to refute
the issuance of the writ. Subsequently, they moved that they be given until 20 May 1996 within which to file their Formal
Offer of Evidence, which the trial court granted.
On 23 May 1996 petitioner Maximo Savellano filed an Urgent Motion praying that the right of private respondents
to present documentary evidence be deemed waived. On 7 June 1996 the lower court granted the motion. Private
respondents thereafter moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
After a consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court issued the assailed Order stating in part that
petitioner Savellano had clearly established his right to a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The court
heavily relied on Santos v. Court of Appeals[6] which held that the general rule prohibiting the use of injunction to transfer
possession or control of property from one party to the other does not obtain when (a) the applicant has clearly
established his rights over the disputed property, and (b) the defendant is merely an intruder; or (c) where the action
seeks to prevent a purchaser at an auction sale from molesting the rights of a debtors co-owner whose rights have not
been affected by the sale.
Upon finding that petitioner Maximo Savellano was the registered owner of the property, the trial court ordered
the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction against private respondents.
Forthwith, private respondents moved for reconsideration. They argued against the accuracy and correctness of
Engr. Valencias narrative report inasmuch as: (a) only the monument check was used in the setting of the monuments
and relocation survey in violation of Sec. 363 of the Surveyors' Manual of the Philippines; (b) Engr. Valencia disregarded
the natural boundaries in the survey, such as the Susugin Creek; (c) the report was not approved by the Executive
Director of Region IV of the DENR; and, (d) despite serious objections, Engr. Valencia used only one of the three (3)
relative positions in plotting the plan submitted to the court. [7]
On 18 October 1996 petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release and Enforcement of Writ of Injunction, which
was granted on 22 October 1996. In turn, on 17 February 1997, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying
for the immediate resolution of their motion for reconsideration. In due time, the lower court issued an order denying
their motion.
On a petition for review on certiorari filed after initially issuing a restraining order, the Court of Appeals nullified
the Order of the trial court holding that the resolution to vacate granted in the writ of preliminary injunction was patently
erroneous since it preempted the decision that would have been rendered by the lower court after trial on the merits. The
appellate court further held that the conclusion that private respondents were mere squatters on Maximo Savellanos
property should have been threshed out not in the hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction but after trial on the merits.[8]
Failing to obtain a reconsideration, Savellano filed this petition for review on certiorari raising issues that, in fine,
centered on whether compelling reasons existed to justify the trial court's grant of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction.
We find the petition devoid of merit. The well-settled principle, buttressed by a long line of cases [9] is that
injunctions, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into
that of another whose title has not been clearly established by law. In Angela Estate, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[10] we
held -
Injunctions, like other equitable remedies, will issue only at the instance of a suitor who has sufficient interest or title
in the right or property sought to be protected x x x x It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party
seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought in other words, that he
shows no equity x x x x The complainants right or title, moreover, must be clear and unquestioned, for equity, as a
rule, will not lend its preventive aid by injunction where the complainants title or right is doubtful or disputed.
The rationale for the rule as enunciated in Devesa v. Arbes[11] is -
To hold otherwise would be to render practically of no effect the ordinary actions, and the enforcement of judgment in
such action. If a complainant could secure relief by injunction in every case where the defendant is doing or threatens
or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights and
could enforce the judgment granting the injunction by the summary contempt proceedings x x x x he would seldom
elect to enforce his rights in such cases by the ordinary remedies, involving as they do the difficulty and oftentimes
fruitless labor of enforcing jugments obtained therein by execution.
In the case before us, the preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction issued by the trial court practically
granted the main relief prayed for even before the hearing of the case on the merits and solely on the basis of a narrative
report the accuracy and validity of which are seriously questioned by private respondents. A punctilious perusal of the
records leads us to the conclusion that the accuracy and validity of the report are at best debatable and should be
ventilated during the trial on the merits before a definite determination can be reached. As succinctly put by the
appellate court, "the report cannot be the sole basis of the court to finally rule that the premises occupied by the
petitioners are within the subject property owned by private respondent." [12]
More so, the pronouncement of the lower court in its assailed Order to the effect that private respondents were
"mere intruders or squatters" constitutes a prejudgment of the case and a reversal of the rule on burden of proof, since
it would assume the proposition which petitioner still has the burden of proving. Such conclusion, right or wrong, could
only be made after the parties have completed the presentation of their respective evidence. In short, such a finding
was premature.
It should further be noted that the lower court was not being asked to rule with finality on the issue of whether
private respondents were indeed squatting on petitioners property, but only to determine tentatively if petitioner was
indeed entitled to the issuance of an injunction.
Anent the lower courts reliance on Santos v. Court of Appeals,[13] we find it misplaced. True, we made a
pronouncement that, exceptionally and as an equitable concession, an injunction may be granted to take property out
of the possession or control of one party and place it into that of another; yet, it must be pointed out that in that case
the government's title to the property had been shown to be clear, well-defined and certain and that there was an urgent
need for its issuance in order to prevent social unrest in the community for having been deprived of the use and
enjoyment of waters found in the reservoir located in the subject premises. [14] In contrast, petitioner, to our mind, has
not clearly established his title to the property in question nor has he clearly shown that private respondents were
indeed "mere intruders or squatters thereon." As such, the exception enunciated in Santos v. Court of Appeals does
not apply.
In fine, petitioner has not made out a clear case, free from any taint of doubt or dispute, to warrant the issuance
of a prohibitory mandatory injunction. It is true that he possesses certificates of title in his name covering several parcels
of land located in San Mateo, Rizal. But inasmuch as it relates solely to the issuance of a writ of injunction, the issue is
not one of ownership but, as correctly noted by the appellate court, "whether or not the titles of (petitioner) cover the
premises being occupied by the (private respondents)."
Private respondents vigorously maintain that the property being occupied by them lies outside of the property
covered by petitioners certificates of title. While it may have been desirable for them to produce certificates of title over
the property which they occupy, the absence thereof for purposes of the issuance of the writ does not militate against
them. And if the defense interposed by them is successfully established at the trial, the complaint will have to be
dismissed.
The effect of the preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions issued by the lower court is to dispose of the
main case without trial. Private respondents will have to be hurled off into the streets, their houses built on the premises
demolished and their plantings destroyed without affording them the opportunity to prove their right of possession in
court. In view of the rights to be affected through the issuance of injunctions, courts should at best be reminded that
"(t)here is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound
discretion, or which is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing of an injunction."[15]
 WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision sought to be reviewed, the instant petition is DENIED,
and the 14 November 1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44320 (nullifying the 20 June 1996
Order of the RTC-Br. 75, San Mateo, Rizal, granting the writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction against
private respondents Nena de Guzman, Ben de Guzman and Cecilio Cruz) is AFFIRMED.
Forthwith, let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., no part, signatory to CA decision.
 SECOND DIVISION

FEDERATED REALTY CORPORATION, G.R. No. 127967

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
PHILIPPINES, through the Commanding General of the CALLEJO, SR.,
Armed Forces of the Philippines Visayas Command (AFP- TINGA, and
VISCOM), CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:

December 14, 2005

x------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Eminent domain is one of the fundamental powers inherent to the State as a sovereign. It is the authority and right of
the State to take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just
compensation.[1] Any arm of the State that exercises such power must wield the same with circumspection and utmost
regard for procedural requirements.[2]

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Federated Realty
Corporation (FRC) against the Republic of the Philippines through the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Visayas
Command (AFP-VISCOMM) and several of its men.[3]

The operative facts, together with a historical background of the property involved, follow. Knowing the history of the
property is essential to understanding the case.

Petitioner FRC is the registered owner of a 543-square meter lot in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 119929 of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City. The lot adjoins a military reservation, Camp
Lapu-Lapu, where the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Visayas Command (AFP-
VISCOMM) is situated.

The lot in question used to be a portion of Lot No. 933 containing an area of 37,126 square meters and formed
part of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate. In 1932, Lot No. 933 was registered in the names of Francisco Racaza,
Pantaleon Cabrera and Josefina Martinez per TCT No. RT 2533 (T-13) issued on 30 August 1932.

Sometime in 1938, Lot No. 933 was one of 18 lots subjected to expropriation proceedings by the government
before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu in the case entitled Commonwealth of the Philippines v. Borromeo, et
al. (Commonwealth case), docketed as Civil Case No. 781, for the purpose of establishing a military
reservation.[4] Pursuant to the CFI Order dated 19 October 1938, the Republic deposited P9,500.00 with the Philippine
National Bank as a precondition for entry to the lots sought to be expropriated.

On 14 May 1940, the CFI rendered a Decision[5] condemning Lot No. 933 along with the 17 other adjacent
lots of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate in favor of the Republic. In 1947, the whole military reservation was converted
into a national airport by virtue of a Presidential Proclamation and, by virtue thereof, turned over to the National Airports
Corporation.

The Decision in the Commonwealth case notwithstanding, the legal ownership of the expropriated lands was
mired in controversy. This Court has had two occasions to rule on the question of ownership involving two of the
lots. Valdehueza v. Republic,[6] decided in 1966, concerned Lot Nos. 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate,
while Lot No. 932 was likewise the subject of Republic v. Lim,[7] decided earlier this year. In both cases, the Court found
that by the very admission of the government, there was no record of payment of compensation by the government to
the landowners. Thus, the Court ruled in both cases that there was no transfer of the lots involved in favor of the
government. The decisions, however, did not touch on the state of ownership of Lot No. 933 which was not involved in
the cases.

Beginning in 1940, Lot No. 933 had been subdivided. Part of it was segregated as Lot 933-B under TCT No.
49999 in the name of Francisco Racaza who sold the same to the Cebu Agro Development Corporation (Cebu Agro)
on 11 March 1974.[8] Cebu Agro had Lot 933-B further subdivided into three farm lots to expand its rabbit farm. TCT
No. 108002 was issued for Lot 933-B-1 by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on 05 April 1989 while TCT No. 108001
was issued for Lot 933-B-2. On 08 April 1992, TCT No. 119740 was issued for Lot 3, with an area of 543 square meters,
which is a portion of the consolidation of Lots 933-B-1 and 933-B-2. All three titles were registered in the names of
Arturo Mercader, the President-General Manger of Cebu Agro, and his wife Evangeline Mercader, who religiously paid
the real property taxes for the three lots.[9]

On 27 April 1992, FRC bought Lot 3 from the Mercader spouses and was issued TCT No. 119929 therefor by
the Register of Deeds.[10]

FRC hired workers to fence the said lot in preparation for the construction of a commercial building thereon.
However, the fence construction was halted on 03 June 1992 when Captain Rogelio Molina arrived with a jeepload of
fully-armed men from the AFP-VISCOMM, and ordered FRCs workers to stop building the structure per instructions of
AFP-VISCOMM Commanding General Romeo Zulueta. Intimidated, FRCs men stopped working. When they resumed
work the following day, Captain Molina returned with his armed men and again ordered them to stop the construction.
A similar incident occurred on 08 July 1992, with Captain Molina asserting that the lot in question formed part of the
military reservation. All three incidents were recorded in the blotter of Police Station 2, Mabolo, Cebu City. [11]
On 22 July 1992, FRC filed a Complaint[12] for injunction and damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
against Captain Rogelio Molina and six John Does. The complaint was later amended to implead the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) through the AFP-VISCOMMand its Commanding General Romeo Zulueta. FRC sought the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to order the respondents to cease,
desist and refrain from threatening, intimidating and harassing the workers constructing its fence and to cease, desist
and refrain from committing acts of intrusion into and deprivation of subject land, and to cease, desist and refrain from
harassing, disturbing and interfering with its peaceful and lawful possession and enjoyment thereof. FRC also prayed
that after trial, (i) the injunction be made permanent, (ii) respondents adjudged without any legal right to or interest
whatsoever in the parcel of land in litigation, (iii) respondents ordered to pay compensatory and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
On the same day, the trial court issued the TRO[13] prayed for with a duration of 20 days, and set the hearing
of the application for preliminary injunction.
In their Answer,[14] respondents admitted that Captain Rogelio Molina ordered FRCs workers to desist from
fencing the land in dispute on the ground that said lot is government property. However, they denied that he and his
armed men threatened and/or harassed the said workers.

In an Omnibus Order[15] dated 26 August 1992, the trial court granted FRCs application for preliminary
injunction which writ it later made permanent in an Order[16] dated 12 October 1995 until such time that the issue of
ownership between the parties shall have been resolved by a competent court. [17] The trial court found that the subject
property is in the possession of FRC and its predecessor-in-interest and ruled that FRCs assertion of ownership is
supported by a TCT which must be upheld until nullified by a competent court in a proper proceeding. In all probability,
the Republic would prevent the construction of FRCs fence, if not provisionally prevented by court order, thereby making
injunction a proper relief, the lower court noted.

Aggrieved, the Republic filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) on 24 November 1995 a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with an urgent prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction seeking to set aside the 12 October 1995 Order of the
trial court.[18] It justified its immediate recourse to the appellate court on the basis of urgency and the perceived futility
of filing a motion for reconsideration with the lower court, thereby leaving it with no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law except through the petition. [19]

As per Resolution[20] dated 29 November 1995, the CA gave due course to the petition and temporarily
restrained the implementation of the trial courts questioned order pending full consideration of the Republics petition.

On 12 September 1996, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision[21] granting the Republics petition for
certiorari, setting aside the trial courts 12 October 1995 Order, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
it issued against the implementation of the trial courts decision. It further ordered the trial court to dismiss Civil Case
No. CEB-12290.

The appellate court ratiocinated that FRC does not have a clear and unmistakable right over the subject
property on the ground that the subject lot not only adjoins military structures, but the main entrance thereof carries the
arch of the AFP-VISCOMM identifying beyond peradventure of doubt that one is entering the premises of the AFP, a
government entity.[22] It likewise held that the damage which FRC may suffer in enjoining it from undertaking any
improvements on the subject property pales in comparison with what the [Republic] stands to suffer in the event of a
permanent injunction against it the integrity of its military premises.[23] It concluded that not until FRCs title to the land
is upheld by final judgment may a writ of injunction properly issue to prevent the Republic from disallowing FRC to
fence the lot and introduce any improvement thereon.

FRC then filed a motion for reconsideration[24] but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution[25] dated 31
January 1997. The appellate court found the trial court in grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the fact that
the subject lot had been expropriated by the government a long time ago in the Commonwealth case.

Hence, this petition.

The core issue in this case is whether or not injunction lies in favor of FRC to prevent the Republic from
interfering in the exercise of its rights of ownership over the subject property.

In a long line of cases, this Court has held that injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive
rights and interests.[26] The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a
cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the prevention
of multiplicity of suits.[27] Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction
should be refused.[28]

Thus, to be entitled to injunctive relief, the following must be shown: (1) the invasion of a right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; (2) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. [29]
In reversing the trial court, the CA found FRCs case to be wanting in the second and third requisites.

We disagree.

We first take up the second requisite. Without ruling on the question of ownership over the subject property,
we shall delve into the respective claims of ownership of the parties if only to determine if FRC had sufficiently
established the existence of a right to be protected by a writ of injunction.

Basically, FRC anchors its claim on the indefeasibility of its registered title to the subject lot which cannot be
collaterally attacked by the Republic in an injunction suit. It further alleges, and as found by the trial court, that along
with its predecessors-in-interest it has been in open, peaceful and continuous possession thereof since time
immemorial, tilling the same and paying all the taxes due thereon.

On the other hand, the Republic has not presented any title over the subject lot but instead relies heavily on
the Commonwealth and Valdehueza cases in asserting ownership and possession over the same, arguing that it was
expropriated by the government for military purposes in 1940. It further alleges that its possession of the subject lot is
evidenced by the existence of military structures on the adjoining lots and that of the Camp Lapu-Lapu arch on the
main entrance of the property in question.

Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves
as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.[30] It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land.[31] One who deals with property registered under
the Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go beyond the same. [32]Such principle of indefeasibility has long
been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that
the doctrine finds no application.[33]
In the instant case, it is undisputed that FRC is a holder of a certificate of title over the lot in question. Records
show that each of FRCs predecessors-in-interest was likewise a holder of an indefeasible title. Furthermore, no patent
irregularity can be gleaned on the face of FRCs title. Yet, the Republic challenges the validity of the same by maintaining
that the subject lot had long been expropriated in favor of the government. Although it does not present any title over
the property, the Republic invokes the expropriation proceedings which are
the Commonwealth and Valdehueza cases. However, the Republics reliance on the proceedings does not in any way
bolster its cause.

First, Valdehueza involves Lot Nos. 932 and 939. It does not in any way deal with the subject property nor
were FRC and its predecessors-in-interest made parties thereto. Hence, the ruling therein cannot be applied to the
instant case.
 On the other hand, the property in question was indeed made subject of expropriation proceedings in
the Commonwealth case. However, the CFI in said case made no mention of the award of the land subject thereof in
favor of the government. The CFI merely fixed the valuation of the lots involved for the purpose of payment of just
compensation by the government. Until the government has paid for the value of the lots, ownership shall remain with
the respective landowners.[34] In Republic v. Lim, we reiterated the rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass
from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of just compensation. [35]

We note that the Republic claims possession over the subject lot based first on its alleged deposit of P9,500
pursuant to the CFI Order dated 19 October 1938 in the Commonwealth case, and second, on the existence of military
structures on the adjoining lots of the subject property coupled with the existence of a portion of the runway of the
defunct Lahug airport on Lot No. 933 and the arch of Camp Lapu-Lapu on the subject lot. However, the records are
bereft of evidence on the alleged deposit made by the Republic with the Philippine National Bank. The Republic merely
relies on our ruling in Valdehueza which the Republic claims to have reinforced the Commonwealth case. However,
although Valdehueza and even Lim do mention a disbursement of the said amount, there was no proof presented by
the Republic in both cases as to the receipt of the said deposit by the authorized depositary. [36] Even then, said cases
do not involve Lot No. 933. There is also nothing in theCommonwealth case stating that the Republic had in fact made
the required deposit as precondition to possession of the subject lot.
There is also no evidence presented as to the existence of the camps arch on subject lot. In any case, the
Republic cannot base its right to the subject lot solely on the alleged presence of a government structure therein. The
law provides for a strict procedure for expropriation which the State must follow lest it violates the constitutionally
enshrined principle that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. [37]

Assuming that the Republic had indeed paid the deposit or made full payment of just compensation, in regular
order this should have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on
the certificate of title covering the subject lot. The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republics interest arising
from the exercise of its power of eminent domain is in consonance with Section 88 of Act No. 496 or the Land
Registration Act (now Section 85 of P.D. 1529 also known as the Property Registration Decree), [38] to wit:

SEC. 88. Whenever any land of a registered owner, or any right or interest therein, is taken
by eminent domain, the Government or municipality or corporation or other authority
exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper province a description of the
registered land so taken, giving the name of such owner thereof, referring by number and
place of registration in the registration book to each certificate of title, and stating what
amount or interest in the land is taken, and for what purpose. A memorandum of the right or
interest taken, shall be made on each certificate of title by the register of deeds, and where
the fee simple is taken a new certificate shall be entered to the owner for the land remaining
to him after such taking, and a new certificate shall be entered to the Government,
municipality, corporation, or other authority exercising such right for the land so taken. All
fees on account of any memorandum of registration or entry of new certificate shall be paid
by the authority taking the land.

Furthermore, Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the time of
the Commonwealth case likewise provides for the recording of the judgment of expropriation in the Registry of Deeds.
Said provision reads, to wit:

SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. The record of the final judgment in such
action shall state definitely by metes and bounds and adequate description. the particular
land or interest in land condemned to the public use, and the nature of the public use. A
certified copy of the record of the judgment shall be recorded in the office of the
registrar of deeds for the province in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall
be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the land and estate so
described.[39] (Emphasis supplied)

There is no showing that the Republic complied with the aforestated registration requirement. Without such
compliance, it cannot be said that FRC had notice of the Republics adverse claim sufficient to consider the former in
bad faith, for the law gives the public the right to rely on the face of the Torrens title and to dispense with the need of
further inquiry, except only when one has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably
cautious man to inquire further into its integrity.[40] Such is the very essence of our Torrens system as ruled in Legarda
v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, thus:
 The real purpose of the system is to quiet title of land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the courts, or sitting in the mirador de su
casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land. x x x The certificate, in the absence of fraud,
is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once
registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, except in some
direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be
lost.[41]

In any event, if FRC or any of its predecessors-in-interest had fraudulently acquired title to the subject lot, this
issue should be properly ventilated in a direct proceeding for that purpose, and not in an injunction suit. By law, a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.[42] In Leyson v. Bontuyan,[43] we ruled, to wit:

While Section 47 of Act No. 496 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack, the rule is that an action is an attack on a title if its object is to nullify the
same, and thus challenge the proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack
is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul set aside such proceeding, or
enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an
action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof.

Therefore, FRCs claim as a titleholder is given preference by law to any other claim of right over said land.
Until such title is nullified, the Republic can raise no more than a doubtful claim over the property in question, which
dubious claim militates against the issuance in its favor of a writ of injunction. So, the appellate court erred in stating
the rule in reverse and in granting injunctive relief to the Republic when its claim of ownership as against FRCs is
unclear. It must be stressed that injunction is not proper when its purpose is to take the property out of the possession
or control of one party and transfer the same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception of
the case and whose legal title has not clearly been established, [44] for the reason that before the question of ownership
is determined, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in status quo so that no advantage may be
given to one party to the detriment of the other.[45]

All told, reversing the appellate court we rule that the second requisite for injunctive relief, that FRC holds a
clear and unmistakable right over the subject lot, has been sufficiently established.

Anent the third requisite, the appellate court ruled that in the event of a permanent injunction the Republic
stands to suffer greater injury compared to FRC, as a private commercial building within a camp will pose serious
danger and damage to military operations. Again, we disagree.

In seeking the affirmation of the writ of injunction issued by the CA to enjoin the implementation of the
permanent injunction ordered by the trial court against it, the Republic invokes national security and the integrity of its
military operations. It argues that civilians cannot be allowed to lurk within military premises.

However, we cannot overemphasize that until FRCs title is annulled in a proper proceeding, the Republic has
no enforceable right over the subject property. Neither military operational integrity nor national defense vests title to
property in favor of the government. Hence, the CA was in error in enjoining enforcement of the lower courts order, as
injunction does not protect rights not in esse.[46] The possibility of irreparable damage, without proof of violation of an
actually existing right, is not a ground for injunction.[47]

Furthermore, the only so-called military structure allegedly found on Lot No. 933 is the arch of Camp Lapu-
Lapu. It is not even clear where exactly on Lot No. 933 this arch stands. Neither was it shown when the same was
constructed. Note that the lot in question is not the entire Lot No. 933, but only a portion thereof. We cannot imagine

how fencing a 543-square meter lot can lead to grave and irreparable damage to the Republic. Our ruling in
the Lim case is instructive, to wit:

The Republics assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave danger if we
shall order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an overstatement. First, Lot 932 had
ceased to operate as an airport. What remains in the site is just the National Historical
 Institutes marking stating that Lot 932 is the former location of Lahug
Airport. And second, there are only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight (8) of
which are residence apartments of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are actually
used as training centers. Thus, practically speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent
will only affect a handful of military personnel. It will not result to irreparable damage or
damage beyond pecuniary estimation, as what the Republic vehemently claims.[48]

Lot No. 932 adjoins the subject lot. Although, there existed on Lot No. 932 training centers and housing for
military personnel, we ruled that the reversion of Lot No. 932 to respondent therein, a private party, will not cause
irreparable injury to the Republic that gives rise to a ground for injunctive relief. What more in this case when the only
structures alleged to exist on subject lot are a portion of an unused runway and an arch? Thus, the Republics contention
that it will suffer serious damage if injunction is ordered against it is more imagined than real.

Meanwhile, the exercise by FRC of its rights of ownership over the subject lot is being unduly restrained. At
this point, its possession and ownership of the subject property must be respected.

Since the Republic has failed to prove its indubitable right over the lot in question we have to rule
that FRC possesses a clear and unmistakable right over the subject lot that necessitates the issuance of a writ of
injunction to prevent serious damage to its interests as titleholder thereto. Meanwhile, FRC may institute a separate
proceeding to quiet its title wherein the issue of ownership over the subject property may finally be resolved.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 September
1996 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the Order dated 12 October 1995 of the Regional Trial Court is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

LIMITLESS POTENTIALS, INC., G.R. No. 164459

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISOSTOMO Promulgated:

YALUNG, and ATTY. ROY MANUEL VILLASOR,
Respondents. April 24, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to annul and set aside: (1) The Decision, [1] dated 16 September 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 73463 entitled, Limitless Potentials, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel D. Victorio, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 141, Crisostomo Yalung, and Atty. Roy Manuel Villasor, which dismissed
herein petitioners Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of merit,
and (2) The Resolution,[2] dated 8 July 2004, of the appellate court in the same case which denied petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration because the issues and arguments raised therein had already been passed upon and judiciously
resolved in the Decision dated 16 September 2003.

The controversy of this case stemmed from the following facts:

On 12 October 1995, Digital Networks Communications and Computers, Inc. (Digital) and herein petitioner Limitless
Potentials, Inc. (LPI), a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, entered into a Billboard
Advertisement Contract whereby petitioner was to construct one billboard advertisement for Digitals product for a period
of one year, with an agreed rental of P60,000.00 per month plus Value Added Tax (VAT). It was agreed, among other
things, that Digital will make a three-month deposit in the following manner, to wit: (a) P60,000.00 plus VAT upon the
signing of the contract, and (b) P120,000.00 plus VAT upon completion of the billboard. Digital complied with the
aforesaid agreement.

The billboard, however, was destroyed by unknown persons. In view thereof, the contract between Digital and the
petitioner was considered terminated. Digital demanded for the return of their rental deposit for two months, but the
petitioner refused to do so claiming that the loss of the billboard was due to force majeure and that any cause of action
should be directed against the responsible persons. Thus, on 18 April 1997, Digital commenced a suit against herein
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of MakatiCity, Branch 66, presided over by
then Judge Estela Perlas-Bernabe (Judge Perlas-Bernabe)[3], for the return of Digitals deposit, which was equivalent
to two months rental inclusive of VAT and attorneys fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 55170.

On 18 June 1997, consistent with its defense against Digitals Complaint, petitioner filed a ThirdParty
Complaint[4] against Macgraphics Carranz International Corporation (Macgraphics) and herein private respondents
Bishop Crisostomo Yalung (Bishop Yalung) and Atty. Roy Manuel Villasor (Atty. Villasor) alleging that it had entered
into a contract of lease with Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM), as represented by the private respondents,
over a space inside San Carlos Manor Seminary in Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, where petitioner erected the subject
billboard. Petitioner further averred that despite its full compliance with the terms and conditions of the lease contract,
herein private respondents, together with their cohorts, maliciously dismantled and destroyed the subject billboard and
prevented its men from reconstructing it. Thereafter, petitioner learned that Macgraphics had cajoled and induced
RCAM, through the private respondents, to destroy the subject billboard to enable Macgraphics to erect its own billboard
and advertising signs. Thus, by way of affirmative defenses, petitioner claimed that: (a) the destruction of the subject
billboard was not of its own making and beyond its control, and (b) Digitals cause of action, if any, should be directed
against the private respondents and Macgraphics. Hence, petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor and
to hold private respondents liable for the following: (a) moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; (b) exemplary,
temperate and nominal damages amounting to P300,000.00; (c) P300,000.00 as attorneys fees; (d) P50,000.00 as
litigation expenses; and (e) costs of suit, allegedly suffered or incurred by it because of the willful destruction of the
billboard by the private respondents.

In response, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforesaid Third-Party Complaint based on the
following grounds: (1) litis pendentia; (2) lack of cause of action; (3) forum shopping; and (4) lack of privity of
contract. The MeTC, in an Order dated 25 August 1997,[5] denied the said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner filed an
Amended Third-Party Complaint. Again, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Third-Party
Complaint. However, the MeTC also denied the Motion to Dismiss Amended Third-Party Complaint in an Order
dated 10 October 1997.[6]

On 9 December 1997, private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, assailing the Orders
dated 25 August 1997 and 10 October 1997 of the MeTC of Makati City denying their Motion to Dismiss Third-Party
Complaint and Motion to Dismiss Amended Third-Party Complaint, respectively, in Civil Case No. 55170.

The RTC issued an Order on 6 February 1998,[7] granting private respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, conditioned upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P10,000.00. Thus, the MeTC was
enjoined from hearing the Third-Party Complaint in Civil Case No. 55170. The pertinent portion of the aforesaid Order
reads, as follows:
When the application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was
heard this afternoon, [herein petitioner] who did not file comment on the petition appeared thru
counsel Emmanuel Magnaye. It was brought out to the attention of this Court that respondent judge
is poised on pursuing the hearing of the case before her despite the pendency of this petition.It
appeared that the case was set by respondent judge for hearing ex-parte for the reception of [herein
petitioners] evidence on 23 February 1998. It also appeared that [herein private respondents] were
declared in default despite the fact that they have filed their answer and the motion to lift such order
of default and for admission of the answer was denied by respondent judge.

Upon consideration of the allegations in the petition and the oral manifestations and
admissions of both parties, this Court hereby resolves to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in
order to preserve the status quo as well as not to render the issue herein raised moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the motion for preliminary injunction is granted. Accordingly, upon the filing
by [herein private respondents] of a bond in the amount of P10,000.00, let a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued, enjoining respondent judge, or her successor, from hearing the [T]hird [P]arty
[C]omplaint against [herein private respondents] in Civil Case No. 55170 until further orders from this
Court.[8]

Subsequently, however, the RTC rendered a Decision[9] on 28 April 2000, dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari filed by private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The preliminary injunction
issued by this Court on 6 February 2000[10] (sic) is hereby dissolved.

Costs against [herein private respondents].[11]

Disgruntled, private respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in
its Order[12] dated 26 June 2000.

Petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Against the Bond, and in compliance with the directive of the RTC, the
petitioner filed a pleading[13] specifying its claims, thus: (a) attorneys fees in the sum of P74, 375.00; and (b) moral
damages for the tarnished good will in the sum of P1,000,000.00.
 The RTC, in its Order dated 3 April 2002,[14] denied petitioners Motion for Judgment Against the Bond
declaring that the preliminary injunction was not wrongfully obtained; therefore, the claim for damages on the bond is
untenable.

Aggrieved, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, which was also denied by the
RTC in its Order dated 6 August 2002.[15]

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
before the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of the RTC dated 3 April 2002 and 6 August 2002 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction.

On 6 November 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution [16] dismissing the Petition for failure to show
proof that a certain Quirino B. Baterna has been duly authorized by the petitioner to file the Petition for and in its
behalf. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, which was granted by the appellate court
in its Resolution dated 24 January 2003[17] thereby reinstating the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner.

On 16 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition filed by the petitioner
for utter lack of merit. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration based on the following grounds:

I. The dismissal of the petition and dissolution of the injunction amount to a

determination that the injunction was wrongfully or improvidently obtained.
II. The petitioner suffered damages by reason of the issuance of the injunction.
III. The damages claimed by the petitioner are covered by the injunction bond.

The Court of Appeals through a Resolution dated 8 July 2004, denied the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner pointed out two basic legal issues wherein the appellate court committed serious and reversible
errors, to wit:

I. Is malice or bad faith a condition sine qua non for liability to attach on the
injunction bond?
II. Are attorneys fees, litigation costs, and cost of delay by reason of the injunction
covered by the injunction bond?

Petitioner argues that malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. The dissolution
of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was
wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction immediately accrues to the defendant. The petitioner
maintains that the attorneys fees, litigation costs, and cost of delay by reason of the injunction are proper and valid
items of damages which can be claimed against the injunction bond. Hence, having proven through testimonial and
documentary evidence that it suffered damages because of the issuance of the writ of injunction, and since malice or
lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the injunction bond, petitioner asserts that it can properly collect
such damages on the said bond.

Private respondent Bishop Yalung on the other hand, prays for the outright dismissal of the present Petition
due to the alleged failure of the petitioner to comply with the mandatory rule on proper certification on non-forum
shopping under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. According to him, it is not sufficient for
Mr. Baterna to make the undertaking that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issue in the Supreme Court, etc. inasmuch as such undertaking should have been made by the principal party, namely,
the petitioner. He underscores that the verification/disclaimer of forum shopping executed by Mr. Baterna on behalf of
the petitioner is legally defective for failure to enumerate with particularity the multiple civil and criminal actions, which
were filed by him and the petitioner against the private respondents.

Private respondent Bishop Yalung also avers that the petitioner is not entitled to collect damages on the
injunction bond filed before the court a quo. Primarily, as the appellate court mentioned in its Decision, the preliminary
injunction was directed not against the petitioner but against the MeTC. The petitioner was not restrained from doing
any act. What was restrained was the hearing of the Third-Party Complaint while the Petition for Certiorari was pending,
in order to preserve the status quo and not to render the issue therein moot and academic. [18] Also, the fact that the
decision is favorable to the party against whom the injunction was issued does not automatically entitle the latter to
recover damages on the bond. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that it suffered damages because of the issuance
of the writ of injunction.

Private respondent Atty. Villasor shares the same argument as that of his co-respondent Bishop Yalung that
it was the MeTC which was enjoined and not herein petitioner.Private respondent Atty. Villasor further alleged that in
the Special Civil Action for Certiorari, the action is principally against any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Thus,
private respondents Petition for Certiorari before the RTC principally pertains to the MeTC and not to herein
petitioner. Additionally, private respondent Atty. Villasor argues that it was petitioner who was benefited by such writ of
preliminary injunction, because the injunction left Digital unable to prosecute Civil Case No. 55170 against herein
petitioner. Lastly, private respondent Atty. Villasor claims that petitioner did not oppose their application for a writ of
preliminary injunction at the hearing wherein petitioner was duly represented by counsel.

Simply stated, the threshold issues are:

I. Can petitioner recover damages from the injunction bond?

II. Was petitioner able to substantiate the damages?

Quite apart from the above, there appears to be another question concerning the alleged violation by the
petitioner of the mandatory rule on proper certification on non-forum shopping.

In the case at bar, petitioner repeatedly argues that malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery
on the injunction bond. In answering this issue raised by petitioner, this Court must initially establish the nature of the
preliminary injunction, the purpose of the injunction bond, as well as the manner of recovering damages on the said
bond.

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect
certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. [19]It is an order granted at any stage of an action, prior to
the judgment or final order, requiring a party, court, agency or person to perform or to refrain from performing a particular
act or acts. A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely temporary, subject to the final disposition of
the principal action.[20] It is issued to preserve the status quo ante, which is the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested
status that preceded the actual controversy,[21] in order to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the pendency of the
suit. Otherwise, if no preliminary injunction is issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do the act which the
plaintiff is seeking the court to restrain. This will make ineffectual the final judgment that the court may afterwards render
in granting relief to the plaintiff.[22] The status quo should be existing ante litem motam, or at the time of the filing of the
case. For this reason, a preliminary injunction should not establish new relations between the parties, but merely
maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship between them.[23]

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the
petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites:

(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;

(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.[24]

A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when, among other things, the
applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the court, where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to
the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party
or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court
should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction shall be issued.[25] Thus, the posting of a bond is a condition sine qua non for a writ of preliminary injunction
to be issued.

The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought
not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the
injunction,[26] and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.

The damages sustained as a result of a wrongfully obtained injunction may be recovered upon the injunction
bond which is required to be deposited with court.[27] Rule 57, Section 20, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
which is similarly applicable to preliminary injunction, [28] has outlined the procedure for the filing of a claim for damages
against an injunction bond. The aforesaid provision of law pertinently provides:

SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment. -
An application for damages on account of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed
before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory, with due
notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to
damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and
shall be included in the judgment on the main case.

If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment
was issued, he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an
application in the appellate court, with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued
or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The
appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court.

Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was issued
from recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching
party not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail
to fully satisfy the award.[29]

Now, it can be clearly gleaned that there is nothing from the aforequoted provision of law which requires an enjoined
party, who suffered damages by reason of the issuance of a writ of injunction, to prove malice or lack of good faith in
the issuance thereof before he can recover damages against the injunction bond. This Court was very succinct in the
case of Aquino v. Socorro,[30] citing the case of Pacis v. Commission on Elections,[31] thus:

Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of recovery on the bond. This must be
so, because to require malice as a prerequisite would make the filing of a bond a useless
formality. The dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained in good faith, amounts
to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the injunction
bond immediately accrues. Thus, for the purpose of recovery upon the injunction bond, the
dissolution of the injunction because of petitioners main cause of action provides the actionable
wrong for the purpose of recovery upon the bond.

We, therefore, agree with the petitioner that indeed, malice or lack of good faith is not a condition sine qua
non for liability to attach on the injunction bond.

With respect to the issue raised by the petitioner regarding the coverage of the injunction bond, this Court finds it
necessary to quote once again the provision of Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, to
wit:

Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a
bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect
that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was
not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be
issued.

The aforesaid provision of law clearly provides that the injunction bond is answerable for all damages. The bond insures
with all practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no ultimate loss in the event that the injunction could finally
be dissolved.[32] Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to account to the defendant in the injunction suit
for all damages, or costs and reasonable counsels fees, incurred or sustained by the latter in case it is determined that
the injunction was wrongfully issued.[33]Likewise, the posting of a bond in connection with a preliminary injunction does
not operate to relieve the party obtaining an injunction from any and all responsibility for damages that the writ may
thereby cause. It merely gives additional protection to the party against whom the injunction is directed. It gives the
latter a right of recourse against either the applicant or his surety or against both.[34]

The contention of the petitioner, thus, is tenable. Attorneys fees, litigation costs, and costs of delay can be recovered
from the injunction bond as long as it can be shown that said expenses were sustained by the party seeking recovery
by reason of the writ of preliminary injunction, which was later on determined as not to have been validly issued and
that the party who applied for the said writ was not entitled thereto. The case of Aquino v. Socorro,[35] citing the case
of Pacis v. Commission on Elections,[36] holds that the dissolution of the injunction, even if the injunction was obtained
in good faith, amounts to a determination that the injunction was wrongfully obtained and a right of action on the
injunction bond immediately accrues. It is also erroneous for the appellate court to rule that petitioner is not entitled to
claim damages from the injunction bond simply because the preliminary injunction was directed against the MeTC and
not against the petitioner. The MeTC does not stand to suffer damages from the injunction because it has no interest
or stake in the Petition pending before it. Damage or loss is suffered by the party whose right to pursue its case is
suspended or delayed, which in this case, is the petitioner. Upon issuance of the writ of injunction, it is the petitioner
who will stand to suffer damages for the delay in the principal case because, had it not been for the injunction, the
petitioner would not have incurred additional expenses for attending the separate hearings on the injunction, and
the RTC can already decide the main case and make a prompt determination of the respective rights of the parties
therein. Hence, even if the preliminary injunction was directed against the MeTC and not against the petitioner, it is the
latter which has the right to recover from the injunction bond the damages which it might have suffered by reason of
the said injunction.

As to the second main issue in the present case, although we do recognize that the petitioner had a right to recover
damages from the injunction bond, however, we agree in the findings of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
findings of the RTC, that the petitioner did not sustain any damage by reason of the issuance of the writ of injunction. In
the petitioners Motion for Judgment Against the Bond, [37] petitioner stated therein, thus:
5. There can be no serious debate that the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary injunction, all at the instance of
[herein private respondents], resulted in actual and pecuniary damages on the part of [herein
petitioner] in the amount more than the value of the bond posted by [private respondents]. The
attorneys fees for expenses in litigation alone expended by [petitioner] to defend itself in this
proceedings, not to mention other pecuniary damages, amounts to P10,000.00. [38]

In the case at bar, petitioner is claiming attorneys fees in the sum of P74,375.00 it allegedly paid to defend
itself in the main case for certiorari, which it would not have spent had the private respondents not filed their nuisance
Petition and secured a writ of preliminary injunction. Likewise, by reason of the unfounded suit, the good will of the
petitioner was brought to bad light, hence, damaged.[39] It is noteworthy to mention that the undertaking of the injunction
bond is that it shall answer for all damages which the party to be restrained may sustain by reason of the injunction if
the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. Apparently, as the appellate court pointed out
in its Decision dated 16 September 2003, the damages being claimed by the petitioner were not by reason of the
injunction but the litigation expenses it incurred in defending itself in the main case for certiorari, which is definitely not
within the coverage of the injunction bond. Thus, this Court is not convinced that the attorneys fees in the amount
of P74,375.00 as well as the moral damages for the tarnished good will in the sum of P1,000,000.00 were suffered by
the petitioner because of the issuance of the writ of injunction.
Furthermore, this Court will not delve into the sufficiency of evidence as to the existence and amount of
damages suffered by petitioner for it is already a question of fact. It is settled that the factual findings of the trial court,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. [40] Although this rule is subject
to exceptions,[41] the present case does not fall into any of those exceptions which would have allowed this Court to
make its own determination of facts. This Court upholds the factual findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
that there is insufficient evidence to establish that petitioner actually suffered damages because of the preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC.

Now, on the matter of proper certification on non-forum shopping.

The requirement of a Certification on Non-Forum Shopping is contained in Rule 7, Section 5, of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, which states that:

The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that
he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of
the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint
or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
 summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
Private respondent Bishop Yalung might have overlooked the Secretarys Certificate [42] attached to the petitioners
Petition for Review, which authorized Mr. Baterna, President of herein petitioner LPI, to represent the latter in this
case. According to the Secretarys Certificate, the Board of Directors of petitioner LPI, at a special meeting held on 12
August 2004 at its office at No. 812 J.P. Rizal St., Makati City, during which there was a quorum, the following
resolutions were approved, to wit:

RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the corporation reiterates the authority of its President, Mr.
Quirino B. Baterna, to represent the corporation in all cases by and/or against the corporation vis--
vis the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila/Crisostomo Yalung, Roy Villasor/Digital Netwrok (sic)
Communications and Computers, Inc., and/or MacGraphics Carranz International Corporation, to file
a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 164459 to
assert/protect LPIs rights and interests in connection with C.A.-G.R. No. 73463, entitled Limitless
Potentials, Inc., vs. Hon. Manuel Victorio, et al., Honorable Court of Appeals, Manila.

RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, that any and all acts of our President, concerning the above-referenced
subject matter are hereby affirmed, confirmed and ratified by the corporation for all legal intents and
purposes.[43]

Private respondent Bishop Yalung further argued that Mr. Baterna failed to enumerate in the Certification against Forum
Shopping the multiple cases filed by him and the petitioner against private respondents. This is also erroneous.

Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. [44] It exists where the elements of litis
pendentia[45] are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.[46] It may be
resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek
a favorable opinion in another, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.[47]

As the RTC correctly found, there was no violation of the rule against forum shopping. The cause of action in petitioners
case for consignation and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 95-1559,[48] is different from the cause of action in its
Third-Party Complaint in Civil Case No. 55170. The damages sought in the first case were those suffered by petitioner
by reason of the alleged breach of the contract of lease by the RCAM; whereas the damages sought in the Third-Party
Complaint were those allegedly suffered by petitioner owing to the destruction of its billboard by the private respondents,
thereby terminating the Billboard Advertisement Contract between petitioner and Digital. Digital also sued petitioner for
recovery of the rental deposits it had already paid under the same contract. Consequently, petitioner had to engage
the services of counsel and incurred litigation expenses in order to defend itself in the case filed against it by
Digital. Thus, the two actions are completely different and distinct from each other so much so that a decision in either
case could not be pleaded as res judicata in the other. Hence, there is no forum shopping that would necessitate the
outright dismissal of this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated 16 September 2003 and 8 July 2004, respectively, affirming the Decision of the RTC dated
28 April 2000, denying herein petitioners motion to recover damages against the injunction bond, are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more often than not, in the
matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on pure questions of procedure,
yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy, wherein the law is corrupted to promote
a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law profession, debased into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve
it on the basis not only of the questions raised by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious
ethical implications, on its merits as well.
We turn to the facts.
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land located in
Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from the L & R Corporation, a financing
institution, in various sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the
corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979, and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following his failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six,
according to the petitioner) parcels of land were disposed of at public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was
itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R Corporation, to enjoin
consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. He was represented
by the petitioner. Two years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into a
compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the private respondent another year to redeem the
foreclosed properties subject to payment of P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They
likewise stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the
court 3 approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits a fact the petitioner himself concede 4 for
which reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone the sum of P100,000.00 in
attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for execution insofar as his
fees were concemed. The court granted execution, although it does not appear that the sum was actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with respect to his
liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on the other. The petitioner
contends that the private respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said properties; the private respondent
maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to advance the money," 7 provided that he, the private
respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over the properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of
contention, but as we shall see shortly, we are inclined to agree with the private respondent's version, considering
primarily the petitioner's moral ascendancy over his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of
Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in
question, and secondly, to register the same in his name. The private respondent alleges that he subsequently filed
loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to finance a wet market project upon the subject premises to find,
according to him, and to his dismay, the properties already registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise
contends that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of
Deeds (for Quezon City) had been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer,
assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of the real
properties and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties
foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above
Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679 ... 9
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer,
assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of
redemption and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties
foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above
Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679. . . 10
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the respective certificates
of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner moved for the cancellation of the adverse
claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The court granted both motions. The private respondent countered
with a motion for a temporary restraining order and later, a motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges
that he commenced disbarment proceedings before this Court against the petitioner 11 as well as various criminal
complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On December 1, 1983,
finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance and reformation of document, 13 praying that the certificates of title
issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and that "the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3, 1983 ... be reformed to reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera
and Paterno R. Canlas, of a mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains that the petitioner's "agreement with [him] was
that the latter would lend the money to the former for a year, so that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for
the wet market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner moved for
dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration complained of did not
change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's] rights" 16 "to protect and insure his
interest of P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner himself had
acquired an interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on the compromise agreement approved by
Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to Section 29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had,
consequently, made him a judgment creditor in his own right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all rights
over the same arising from his failure to redeem them from L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally,
that the petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers by
their clients pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after judgment in the injunction case abovesaid had
attained finality. The complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a character of
finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of Judgment 18 in the
respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting execution over the portion of
the compromise agreement obliging the private respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2)
denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining order directed against the execution: and (3) denying the
motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On December 8, 1986, the
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged resolutions, denying the motion to dismiss. On
March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied reconsideration. 20
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure. Specifically, he assigns
the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860
ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD
NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860
ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC G. R. 07860
AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES LONG
BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION
TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE
ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PETITION. 21
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a petition for
certiorari," 22disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces alleged legal
impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two years from the issuance of the assailed orders, and (2) It
was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of judgment were proper, no
judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two orders being in the nature of interlocutory issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we have had
occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is explained in Macabingkil v.
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation : 23
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however, that can serve
as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within
the meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or
real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured so that there is not
 a fair submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of
the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent. 24
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court reveals no cause
of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner Canlas correctly points out, the
judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it. Secondly, there is no showing that
extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the
contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in
fact, had entered timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the former's collection
of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent designs, postponed execution to force
him (Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas) subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was
understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas did not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted
petitioner in order that petitioner would sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of
respondent Atty, Paterno R. Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that
respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge to achieve his plan." 25) Aside
from being plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount to extrinsic fraud as
the term is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an appeal 26and
while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular implementation of the writ. 27 In
the case at bar, there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule, "irregular execution" means the failure of the writ
to conform to the decree of the decision executed. 28 In the instant case, respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that
Judge Castro had erred in denying his motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that
His Honor had acted hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for
issuance of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for irregular
execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the parties'compromise
agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his lands and
constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is uneasy about the judgment on
compromise itself, as well as the subsequent contract between him and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the
Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation, undue influence, or
falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this purpose, gone to the
Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure for the enlightenment solely of the bench and
the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated, we cannot overlook the unseemlier
side of the proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law to score a "technical
knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto parties "in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 31 If procedure were to be an
impediment to such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which
each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing
aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks
that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by the a rapier's
thrust ... 33
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to
extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00
attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a development that should have tempered his demand for
his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to
"conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that
lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a
matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own
client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for
money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a commercial
enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at the expense of another.
Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or
service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from
government interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37Anent
attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to
the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney... A written contract for services shall control the amount
to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not believe that
it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had rendered in Civil Case No. 30679,
and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself
moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research
or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite
handsome prices in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not
likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that vested upon
redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in satisfaction of judgment. In
this case, however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the mortgagor and mortgagee.
It did not give the petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much less the right of redemption, although
provisions for his compensation were purportedly provided. It did not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason
that he was not named one in the amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in
Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer
which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from the L & R Corporation pursuant
to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39Whatever right he had, it was, arguably with respect alone to his
renumeration. It did not extend to the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees and disbursements" 40due
him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise agreement and subsequently,
to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in spite of the issuance of the writ of
execution, it does not appear that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this perplexing given his
passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible explanation
other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the private respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the
properties in his favor. To be sure, he would have us beheve that by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by
in fact parting with his own money he had actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to assume that he
did not get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the properties have been issued
to the new owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic] petition for annulment." 41 To say that he did not
profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared to accept
under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private respondent sign the "Deed
of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-prepared document apparently, that
allowed him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption over the properties and to all intents and purposes,
acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier averred, the private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become
an easy quarry to his counsel's moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the private
respondent who "earnestly implored" 42 him to undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep
his lands that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact that the latter
himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We are of the opinion that in ceding his right
of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to forestall the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee
upon the understanding that his counsel shall acquire the same and keep them therefore within reach, subject to
redemption by his client under easier terms and conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain that he
agreed to make the redemption"in order that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him
in the Compromise Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the properties
in their entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties as a gesture of
magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he cannot dispute is the fact
that he did resell the properties. 44
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the conveyance document
executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as originally drafted, provided for conveyance
of the private respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or redeem" 45 the properties in his favor, whereas the
instrument registered with the Register of Deeds purported to transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties
and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor. He admits having entered the intercalations in question but argues that he did so
"to facilitate the registration of the questioned deed with the Register of Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the
meaning of the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any falsification charges. 48 To start with, the Court
is at a loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of the deed,
why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of
adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party who prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification this is not the proper occasion for it we condemn
him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is subject to the ban on
acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to them, unless the
consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any
government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been
instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner
whatsoever, take part in the sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of the Civil
Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we said that the prohibition does not
apply to contingent contracts, in which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the property can no longer
be said to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or
to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision approving the compromise agreement. It is actually a
new contract not one in pursuance of what had been agreed upon on compromise in which, as we said, the
petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute
ownership thereof). By virtue of such a subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the
object of any litigation." Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from
possession unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no
third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the
issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the private respondent and not the judgment on
compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of execution on the compromise agreement but as we likewise
observed, he did not have the same enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted,
superseded the compromise.) The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code. But like all
voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue influence, 53 which is in turn
subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier detailed. While the
respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his petition for annulment in
the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties have been conveyed to third persons whom we
presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of
actual damages, for such a loss of properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily,
we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his hability for payment of the properties. To
hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must
then set off their obligations against the other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we
hold Francisco Herrera, the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of
P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for
attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum
he earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper adjustments, be indebted to his client in the sum
of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the petition below.
But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases and in the highest interests ofjustice,
to write finis to the controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of general policy, to
leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the outset, we have made clear that
from a technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated, the resolution of the case
rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but if the decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits too.
This is not the first time we would have done so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if
it would establish a barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to
suit and counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as
the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished what convinces us as serious
indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.
1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, the sum of
P326,000.00, as and for damages;
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on him for violation of his
oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be consolidated with AC No. 2625;
3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for execution; and
4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25660 February 23, 1990

LEOPOLDO
VENCILAO, MAURO RENOBLAS, TELESFORO BALONDIA, FELIX ABANDULA, FAUSTOGABAISEN, ISIDORO
ELIVERA, RAYMUNDO BONGATO, MARTIN ROLLON, EUSTAQUIO MEDANA, DOROTEO ELIVERA,
FRANCISCO PAGAURA, MACARIO GEPALAGO, GREGORIO ITAOC, ALEJANDRO RENOBLAS, SIMEON
BARBARONA, GREGORIO RENOBLAS, FRANCISCO ASOY, TEOFILA GUJELING, FABIAN VILLAME,
VICENTE OMUSORA, PEDRO BALORIA, GREGORIO ITAOC, TERESITA ITAOC, FAUSTINO ITAOC,
FORTUNATO ITAOC, FLORENTINA GEMENTIZA, RESTITUTA OMUSORA, ZOILA OMUSORA, FELISA
OMUSORA, ROBERTO HAGANAS, FELISA HAGANAS, FERMIN HAGANAS, VICTORIANO HAGANAS, JULIA
SEVILLA, ROMAN MATELA, MARCELA MATELA, DELFIN MATELA, PELAGIO MATELA, ROBERTA MATELA,
PROCOPIO CABANAS and SERAFINA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
TEODORO VANO, JOSE REYES, ROSARIO REYES, SALUD OGILVE BELTRAN, AMALIA R. OGILVE, FLORA
VDA. DE COROMINAS, JESUSA REYES, LOURDES COROMINAS MUNOZ, JUAN COROMINAS, LOURDES C.
SAMSON CEBALLOS, SOLEDAD C. SAMSON RAMA, DOLORES V. GARCES FALCON, JAIME GARCES,
JOAQUIN REYES, and PEDRO RE R. LUSPO, defendants- appellees.
G.R. No. L-32065 February 23,1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA, MARTIN
ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO
ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA,
TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING,
TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, and MARIANO
OGILVE, et. al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-33677 February 23, 1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA, MARTIN
ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO
ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA,
TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS
REAMBONANSA, MARCOS NAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, The Provincial
Sheriff, Province of Bohol, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents.
Lord Marapao and Lorenzo A. Lopena for petitioners.
Roque R. Luspo for respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of these three cases, considering that they involve the
same parties and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L-25660---this is an appeal from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol (now Regional Trial Court) 1 dated May 12,1964 dismissing the cases of some of the plaintiffs-
appellants and its order dated August 25, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration and the motion to declare the
defendants- appellees in default; (2) G.R. No. L32065---this is a petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of its prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners
guilty of contempt; (3) G.R. No. L-33677--- this is a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition of the order
of the Court of First Instance of Bohol dated June 2, 1971 directing the demolition of the houses of the petitioners.
On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to manifest whether or not they are still interested in
prosecuting these cases, or supervening events have transpired which render these cases moot and academic or
otherwise substantially affect the same. On March 25, 1988, the petitioners filed an ex parte manifestation that they
are still very much interested in the just prosecution of these cases.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
G.R. No. 25660
On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the parcels of land allegedly
inherited by them from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration Case No. 76, L.R.C. Record No. N-4251. On July 26,1951,
administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo filed an amended application for registration. After hearing, the land was
registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400 (pp. 84-85, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo).
On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real properties with damages and preliminary injunction, Civil
Case No. 1533, (pp. 2-19, Record n Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) was filed by plaintiffs-appellants before the Court of First
Instance of Bohol. It was alleged that they are the lawful owners of their respective parcels of land including the
improvements thereon either by purchase or inheritance and have been in possession publicly, continuously,
peacefully and adversely under the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years tacked with the possession of
their predecessors-in-interest. However, those parcels of land were included in the parcels of land applied for
registration by the heirs of Juan Reyes, either by mistake or fraud and with the intention of depriving them of their
rights of ownership and possession without their knowledge, not until the last part of 1960 when the defendants-
appellees, through their agents, attempted to enter those parcels of land claiming that they now belong to the heirs of
Juan Reyes. To the complaint, the defendants-appellees moved to dismiss on two grounds (pp. 19-22, Record on
Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) for lack of cause of action and (2) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
On July 20, 1963, the court a quo issued an order denying defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss (pp. 29-30,
Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on the motion to set aside such order (pp. 31-32, Record on Appeal;
p. 7, Rollo), on May 12, 1964, the same court issued another order reversing itself partially (p. 56, Record on Appeal;
p. 7, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs Alejandro Renoblas, Fausto Cabaisan, Fabian
Villame, Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc, Fortunato Ita-oc, Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas,
Fermin Haganas, Victorians Haganas, Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Roberto Matela, Procopio
Cabaas and Vicente Amosora are hereby dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata with these
plaintiffs paying proportionately eighteenth forty one (18/41) of the costs, but the petition to dismiss
the case of the rest of the plaintiffs is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
On May 28,1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were dismissed filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 57- 58,
Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were not dismissed filed a
motion to declare the defendants-appellees in default for failure to file their answer with the time prescribed by law
(pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On the other hand, defendants-appellees filed their opposition to the
motion for reconsideration praying that the complaint as regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be likewise
dismissed (pp. 75-80, Record on Appeal; p. 7 Rollo).
On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in connection therewith (pp. 82-98, Record on Appeal; p. 7,
Rollo) denying all motions.
The case is now before Us with the following as assignments of errors (p. 3, Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants; p. 9,
Rollo), to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASES OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
WHOSE NAMES ARE ALREADY MENTIONED ABOVE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT
THEIR CASES ARE BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT OF RES ADJUDICATA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
WHOSE CASES ARE NOT DISMISSED TO DECLARE THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES IN
DEFAULT FOR HAVING FAILED TO FILE THEIR ANSWER WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED
BY LAW.
On August 12, 1966, a resolution was issued by this Court dismissing the appeal as regards the second issue
because the order appealed from was merely interlocutory, hence, not appealable (pp. 35-38, Rollo).
On August 17, 1988, petitioners Alex Abandula, Mauro Renoblas, Simeon Barbarona, Fabian Villame, Macario
Gepalago, Eustaquio Medana, Julia Sevilla, Gregorio Itaoc, Francisco Asoy and Martin Rollon filed a motion to
withdraw their appeal on the ground that they are now the absolute owners and possessors of their respective
parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 1533.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
The plaintiffs-appellants claim that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that they (plaintiffs-
appellants) were notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for registration nor were they given
copies of the decision of the trial court. Likewise, they contend that res judicata is not applicable in an action for
reconveyance.
The allegations that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that plaintiffs-appellants were notified of
the date of the trial on the merits of the application for registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the
trial court are new issues. It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question will be entertained
on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below and it is within the issues made by the parties in their
pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532). The other contention that res
judicata is not applicable in an action for reconveyance is not plausible. The principle of res judicata applies to all
cases and proceedings, including land registration and cadastral proceedings (Republic vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-
35376, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 65; Paz vs. Inandan 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303).
It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and their successors in
interest litigating upon the same thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may be. In order, therefore, that
there may be res judicata, the following requisites must be present: (a) The former judgment must be final; (b) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment
on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692, Nov. 26,1986, 146
SCRA 24).
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same
issue more than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them
in law or estate (Sy Kao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61752, Sept. 28,1984,132 SCRA 302). The doctrine of res
judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it
is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a
subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium (Carandang vs. Venturanza, G.R. No.
L41940, Nov. 21,1984,133 SCRA 344). To ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open the door to endless
litigations by continuous determination of issues without end (Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 80294- 95, Sept. 21, 1988, 165 SCRA 515).
Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or when notified he does not want to participate and only
after the property has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding title has been issued files an action for
reconveyance, to give due course to the action is to nullify registration proceedings and defeat the purpose of the law.
In dismissing the cases of some of the petitioners, the court a quo meticulously discussed the presence of all the
elements of res judicata (pp. 36-38; pp. 42-54, Record on Appeal; p. 7; Rollo):
There is no question that in that Registration Proceedings, LRC Record No. N-4251, Land
Registration Case No. N-76, the Court of First Instance of the province of Bohol had jurisdiction of
the subject matter, that said court had rendered a judgment on the merit that was terminated in the
Court of Appeals since December, 1958, and that decision is now final with a decree of registration
over the parcels of land described in the application issued to the applicants.
The subject matter (the parcels of land) now claimed by the plaintiffs in this case at bar are the
same, or at least part of the parcels already adjudicated registration in that registration case to the
persons, some of them are made defendants in this case before us. The cause of action between
the two cases are the same, ownership of these parcels of land, though the forms of action are
different, one is an ordinary Land Registration and the other is reconveyance.
'It is settled that notwithstanding the difference in the form of two actions, the
doctrine of res adjudicata will apply where it appears that the parties in effect
were litigating for the same thing. A party can not, by varying the form of action,
escape the effects of res adjudicata (Aguirre vs. Atienza, L-10665, Aug. 30,
1958; Geronimo vs. Nava No. L-1 21 1 1, Jan. 31, 1959; Labarro vs. Labateria et
al., 28 O.G. 4479).
'Well settled is the rule that a party can not by varying the form of action, or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated
between the same parties or their privies. (Francisco vs. Blas, et al., No. L-5078;
Cayco, et al., vs. Cruz, et al., No. L-1 2663, Aug. 21, 1959).
'Accordingly, a final judgment in an ordinary civil action, determining the
ownership of certain lands is res adjudicata in a registration proceeding where
the parties and property are the same as in the former case (Paz vs. Inandan 75
Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303).'
xxx xxx xxx
But are there identities of parties in this case before us and the former registration proceedings?
Identity of parties means that the parties in the second case must be the same parties in the first
case, or at least, must be successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
former action or proceeding, or when the parties in the subsequent case are heirs (Chua Tan vs.
Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Martinez vs. Franco, 51 Phil. 487-1 Romero vs. Franco, 54 Phil. 744;
Valdez, et a]. vs. Penida No. L- 3467, July 30, 1951).
xxx xxx xxx
Returning our attention to the case at bar, and with in mind the principles of res adjudicata above-
quoted, we noticed that many of the plaintiffs were not oppositors in the former registration case,
but many are children of the former oppositors. In such a case we have to determine the case of
every plaintiff, if the former decision in the land registration case is conclusive and binding upon
him.
xxx xxx xxx
The defendants had proven that the adjoining owners and claimants of the parcels of land object of
registration proceeding had been notified when the land was surveyed. These persons notified
according to the surveyor's certificate, Exhibit "B" were as follows: Cipriano Samoya, Fausto
Baguisin, Silveria Pahado, Enojario Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas, Heirs of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian
Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilon, Gregorio Baguinang, et
al., Nicolas Omosura, Simon Lagrimas, et al., Martin Quinalayo, Gorgonio Baquinang, Demetrio
Asolan, Catalino Orellena, Heirs of Catalina Palves, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano, Victoriano
Balolo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Felomino Ruiz, Apolonio Horbeda, and Mun. of
Calape.
The following persons were notified by the Chief of the Land Registration Office of the initial
hearing (Exhibit "J") of the registration proceedings enjoining them to appear on June 16,1952, at
8:30 a.m., before the Court of First Instance of Bohol to show cause why the prayer of said
application should not be granted: the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the Director of
Public Works and the Director of Forestry, Manila; the Provincial Governor, the Provincial Fiscal
and the District Engineer, Tagbilaran, Bohol; the Municipal Mayor, Gorgonio Baguinang, Demetrio
Azocan, Catalino Orellena, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano, Victoriano Bolalo, Eugenio del
Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Filomeno Ruiz, Apolonio Horboda, the Heirs of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian
Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilom, Gregorio Baguinang,
Nicolas Omosura, Simon Lagrimas and Martin Quinalayo, Calape, Bohol; the heirs of Catalino
Polvos, Fausto Baguisin, Cipriano Samoya, Silveria Pohado, Enojario, Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas
and Leoncio Barbarona, Antequera Bohol.
And after the application had been filed and published in accordance with law the following persons
represented by Atty. Conrado D. Marapao filed opposition to that registration proceeding: Felipe
Cubido, Simon Lagrimas, Simeon Villame, Felix Lacorte, Victor Omosura, Germana Gahil,
Anastacio Orillosa, Enerio Omosura, Valeriano Tuloy, Cipriano Sanoya, Pablo Dumadag, Andres
Reimbuncia, Roman Reimbuncia, Celedonio Cabanas, Moises Cabanas, Calixto Gohiting,
Gervasio Sevilla, Pedro Omosura, Daniel Itaoc, Luis Omosura, Bartolome Omusura, Nicasio
Omosura, Calixto Sevilla, Teodora Omosura, Jose Sabari, Silverio Lacorte, Silverio Tuloy,
Gertrudes Sevilla, Teodora Sevilla, Magno Orillosa, Gervacia Sevilla, Marcos Hagonas, Eleuterio
Pandas, Pablo Omosura, Fabian Villame, Teodoro Omosura, Magdalina Asilom, Mauricio Matela,
Marciano Ordada, Eusebio Omosura, and Gregorio Repelle, (Exhibit "E"), Atty. Juna V. Balmaseda
in representation of the Bureau of Lands, and Asst. Fiscal Norberto M. Gallardo in representation of
the Municipality of Calape.
Plaintiffs Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio Renoblas are children of plaintiff Alejandro Renoblas.
Plaintiff Telesforo Balanda is son-in-law of Alejandro, being the husband of Juliana Renoblas,
daughter of Alejandro. Plaintiff Alejandro Renoblas was not one of the oppositors in the registration
proceedings, but he was notified of the initial healing of that registration case and by the surveyor
that surveyed the land object of registration (Exhibit J-Movant). Therefore, the decision of the land
registration proceeding is binding upon him and his case is dismissed on the ground of res
adjudicata with costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff Fausto Cabaisan was notifed by the surveyor and that notice of the initial hearing. And
though he was not an oppositor, the former land registration proceeding is binding on him.
Therefore, this case is dismissed in so far as Fausto Cabaisan is concerned with costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs Gregorio Ita-oc, Teresita Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc and Fortunate Ita-oc are children of Daniel
Ita-oc, one of the oppositors in the registration proceedings. They claim parcel No. 10 described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint. Gregorio Ita-oc testified that his land was inherited by said plaintiffs'
mother from her father, Pio Sevilla. The evidence on record (Exhibits J-3, J- 4, J-5). However (sic),
shows that the land is declared in the name of Daniel Ita-oc, a former oppositor in the registration
case. Hence, these plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Daniel Ita-oc, and, therefore, are bound
by the decision in that registration case. Their case, therefore, is dismissed, with costs.
 "Plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas and Victoriano Haganas are
children of Marcos Haganas, a former oppositor in the registration case. Marcos testified that his
claim before was only two hectares, while the claim of his children is seven hectares, which come
from his wife, not from him. These plaintiffs claim two parcels, one under Tax Declaration No. R-
4452, and Tax Declaration No. R-8456. It appears that Tax Declaration No. R-4452 (Exhibit M) is in
the name of Marcos Haganas and the land described under Tax Declaration No. R-8456 was
bought by the spouses Marcos Haganas and Tomasa Sevilla from Gertrudis Sevilla in 1956
(Exhibit M-3), who was an oppositor in the registration proceeding. Therefore, plaintiffs Roberto
Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas, and Victoriano Haganas are successors-in-interest to
properties in which the decision in the registration case is conclusive and binding to their
predecessors-in-interest. Hence, their case here is dismissed with costs.
Plaintiff Julia Sevilla is the wife of Marcelo Matela, who was the oppositor in the registration
proceedings. Plaintiffs Roman Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela are their
children. She has no son by the name of Pelagic. Julia testified that the land now claimed by her
children came from her father Pio Sevilla. The land that was claimed by Mauricio Matela as
oppositor was in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5099. This is the same land now claimed by
plaintiffs Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela (Exhibit
0-4). These plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Mauricio Matela, who is bound by the decision in
that land proceeding wherein he was the oppositor. Therefore, the case of these plaintiffs are
dismissed with costs.
Plaintiff Procopia Cabanas was the wife of Andres Reambonancia, oppositor in the land registration
proceedings. She claims parcel No. 20 described in paragraph 2 of the complaint bearing Tax
Declaration No. R-8121. It appears that this land is declared in the name of Andres Reambonancia
(Exhibit N-3) who, as oppositor in the land registration case, is bound by the decision of that case.
Therefore, the case of plaintiff Procopia Cabanas as successor-in-interest to Andres
Reambonancia, is hereby dismissed, with costs.
Plaintiff Vicente Amosora is the son of Enerio Amosora and Florencia Gahil both oppositors in the
former registration case. The land claimed by plaintiff Vicente Amosora is described as parcel No.
24 of paragraph 2 of the complaint under Tax Declaration No. R-6107, under the name of his father
Enerio Amosora. Since Enerio Amosora was an oppositor in the former land registration of which
this land was a part, the decision of that land registration case is conclusive and binding not only to
Enerio Amosora, but also to his successor-in-interest, plaintiff Vicente Amosora, whose case
therefore, is dismissed with costs.
G.R. No. L-32065
Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3561 was issued in the
name of Pedro R. Luspo and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562 was issued in the name of several persons (p. 36,
Rollo).
A writ of possession dated November 6, 1959, a first alias writ of possession dated January 6, 1961, and a second
alias writ of possession dated July 2, 1966 were issued by the trial court against the petitioners. A sample of the
guerilla-like, hide and seek tactics employed by the petitioners was proved by the official report of the deputy sheriff
dated January 21 1960. Another evidence of petitioners' refusal to sign and to vacate was a certification dated July
22, 1966 and the Sheriffs return dated October 25, 1966.
On March 29, 1967, a petition for contempt was filed by Mariano Ogilve, who is one of the registered owners of the
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562, against the petitioners for refusing to vacate the land
occupied by them and for refusing to sign the Sheriffs return.
On May 6, 1969, the court a quo issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 47, Rollo):
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, make it of record that Procopia Reambonansa
voluntarily left the land and dropped out from the case; the charge of contempt against Alejandro
Renoblas (who died) is dismissed and each of the remaining 22 respondents are hereby found
guilty of contempt under Sec. 3-b of Rule 71 and are hereby sentenced each to pay a fine of One
Hundred Pesos, authorizing the Constabulary Detachment at or near Candungao Calape Bohol to
collect the same and to transmit the money to the Clerk of this Court, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency at the rate of one day for every P2.50 or fraction of a day, the said
Constabulary Detachment to effect the commitment if any of them is unable to pay the fine. The
fingerprints of each of these 22 respondents shall also be taken by the constabulary and filed with
the record of this case.
It is so ordered.
On June 4, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforestated resolution whereas Ogilve filed
an opposition thereto.
On February 14, 1970, the motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 18, 1970, another motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioners on the ground of pendency of the action for reconveyance in Civil Case No.
1533 and their appeal in G.R. No. L-25660. On May 14, 1970, the court a quo ordered the proper officers to actually
execute the resolution dated May 6, 1969.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I
THAT THE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT ANY
COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, NOR FOR RECOVERY OF
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION AGAINST THE HEREIN
PETITIONERS.
II
THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS HEREIN, WHO WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE REGISTRATION PROCEEDING AND WHO WERE
NOT DEFEATED OPPOSITORS OF THE SAID APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land registration case,
as their names do not appear in the amended application for registration; that they have occupied the subject parcels
of land for more than thirty (30) years which began long before the filing of the application for registration; and that
after the hearing of the registration case, they continued in possession of the said land.
In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in his name
necessarily carried with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent element of the right of ownership. The
issuance of the writ of possession is, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generally
accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests (Romasanta et. al. vs. Platon, 34 O.G. No. 76;
Abulocion et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et. al., 100 Phil. 554 [1956]). A writ of possession may be issued not only against the
person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the
land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree (Demorar
vs. Ibaez, et al., 97 Phil 72 [1955]).
The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of the said land for more than thirty (30) years which
began long before the filing of the application for registration and continued in possession after the hearing of the
registration case, worked against them. It was a virtual admission of their lack of defense. Thus, the writs of
possession were properly issued against them.
However, We do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that petitioners are guilty of contempt. Under Section 8
(d) of Rule 19, Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of real property, the writ of
execution must require the sheriff or other officer to whom it must be directed to deliver the possession of the
property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing
party from the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession
or ejectment the losing party enters or attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing
acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto, then and only then may the loser be charged with and punished for contempt (Quizon vs. Philippine National
Bank, et. al., 85 Phil. 459). According to this section, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry
out the mandates of the judgment in question, and in fact, it was he himself, and he alone, who was ordered by the
trial judge who rendered that judgment, to place the respondents in possession of the land. The petitioners in this
case had nothing to do with that delivery of possession, and consequently, their refusal to effectuate the writ of
possession, is entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could not hinder, and much less prevent, the delivery
being made, had the sheriff known how to comply with his duty. It was solely due to the latter's fault, and not to the
disobedience of the petitioners' that the judgment was not duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could even
have availed himself of the public force, had it been necessary to resort thereto (see United States v. Ramayrat 22
Phil. 183).
G.R. No. L-33677
On March 22,1971, Mariano Ogilve filed a Motion for a Writ of Demolition which was granted by the trial court on April
5, 1971 (pp. 42-43, Rollo) against those who were adjudged guilty of contempt. On April 29, 1971, the petitioners filed
an urgent motion for reconsideration of said order. On June 2, 1971, the trial court issued another order, the
dispositive portion of which reads (p. 48, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, in the absence of writ of preliminary injunction Deputy Provincial Sheriff Pedro
Aparece must not only take P.C. soldiers with him but also carpenters to effect the demolition, the
carpenters being at the expense of the Luspo.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion and thus excluded the herein petitioners from the use and enjoyment of their right to which they
are entitled when he (respondent judge) issued the order of demolition on April 5, 1971 and again on June 2, 1971 (p.
107, Rollo).
On July 14, 1971, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (p. 51, Rollo).
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The petitioners allege that the respondent-judge cannot issue a writ of demolition pending the resolution of G.R. No.
L-32065.
We rule that the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 was not a bar to the issuance of the writ of demolition. It is significant to
note that the subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 is the order dated May 14, 1970 directing the
execution of the prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt and not the writs of possession
themselves. Thus, the respondent Judge correctly issued the writs of demolition. In Meralco vs. Mencias, 107 Phil
1071, We held:
[I]f the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession
of the land to the successful litigant therein (Demorar vs. Ibanez, 97 Phil. 72; Pasay Estate
Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil. 391; Manlapas vs. Llorente 48 Phil. 298), a writ of
demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of
the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective.
xxx xxx xxx
[The issuance of the writ of demolition] is reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner who is
being deprived of the possession of the lots in question, by reason of the continued refusal of
respondent ...... to remove his house thereon and restore possession of the promises to petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In G.R. No. L-25660, the appeal is DENIED and the orders of the Court of First Instance dated May 12, 1964 and
August 25, 1965 are AFFIRMED; the motion to withdraw the appeal of some of the plaintiffs-appellants is GRANTED;
2) In G.R. No. L-32065, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the Court of First Instance dated May 14, 1970
is SET ASIDE; and
3) In G.R. No. L-33677, the petition is DISMISSED and the order of the Court of First Instance dated June 2, 1971 is
AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

JETRI CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION/ G.R. No. 171687

ANASTACIA CORPUZ RIGOR, President,
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

Respondent. Promulgated:

June 8, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84788, dated 17 November 2005, which dismissed petitioners
appeal for its failure to file its appellants brief within the reglementary period despite notice.

Sometime in 1994, petitioner Jetri Construction Corporation applied for a P20,000,000.00 Omnibus Line
Credit Facility with Far East Bank and Trust Company, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondent Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI). Upon approval of said credit facility, petitioner Jetri Construction Corporation was able to
borrow from the bank a total of P20,000,000.00. As security for the loans, petitioner mortgaged its land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 213950 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila as well as the 4-storey building erected
thereon located at No. 177 M. dela Fuente St., Sampaloc, Manila. A Comprehensive Surety Agreement was also
executed by Anastacia Corpus Rigor, president of Jetri Construction Corporation, wherein she acted as surety of the
corporations loans from Far East Bank and bound herself to pay jointly and severally with Jetri Construction
Corporation all obligations the latter may incur.

When Jetri Construction Corporation defaulted in paying the loan, it entered into a Loan Restructuring
Agreement with the bank wherein it acknowledged that its obligation under the Discounting Line was for the total
amount of P22,621,876.37.

For failure of Jetri Construction Corporation to pay the loan under the Loan Restructuring Agreement upon
maturity, the bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property covered by TCT No. 213950. On 22 November
1999, an auction sale was held wherein the mortgaged property was sold to the bank, it being the lone and highest
bidder. The Certificate of Sale was registered and annotated at the back of TCT No. 213950 on 3 December 1999.

Upon expiration of the redemption period, with petitioner failing to redeem the property, ownership over the
mortgaged property was consolidated in favor of the bank and a new certificate of title was issued in its name,
particularly TCT No. 250654.

On 28 August 2001, BPI filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, Civil Case No. 01-
1336 against herein petitioner for alleged foreclosure deficiency in the amount of P33,270,131.25.

Jetri Construction Corporation, on the other hand, simultaneously filed two complaints against respondent
BPI and its managing officers, respectively. The first is a complaint for (a) annulment of mortgage foreclosure; (b)
cancellation of respondents derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 250654; (c) quieting of petitioners ownership and
restoration of title; and (d) indemnity for damages before the RTC of Manila, Branch 50 and docketed as Civil Case
No. 04-111298. The second is a complaint for Estafa before the City Prosecutors Office of Manila against the managing
officers of BPI for the alleged misappropriation of the Three (3) Million Pesos paid by petitioner as amortization for its
loan.

Despite demands, petitioner refused to vacate the premises of the foreclosed property, thus, on 15 August
2003, herein respondent filed a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession of Real Property [2] before the RTC of
Manila.

On 28 February 2005, the RTC of Manila, Branch IV, issued the assailed Order [3] issuing the writ of
possession prayed for by respondent BPI. According to the court a quo:

As to the Oppositors attack on the validity of the foreclosure sale, the Highest Tribunal has
already ruled in several cases that:

The order for writ of possession issue as a matter of course with no

discretion being left to the court and any question regarding the validity of the sale
should be determined in a subsequent proceeding and cannot be raised as a
justification for opposing the issuance of writ of possession. [De Gracia vs. San
Jose, et al., 94 Phil. 623].

x x x the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing
of the proper motion and approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left
to the court.And any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale (and
the subsequent cancellation of the writ) is to be determined in a subsequent
proceeding as outlined in Sec. 8. Such question is not to be raised as a justification
for opposing the issuance of a writ of possession, since, under the Act, the
proceeding for this is ex parte. [Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA, citing Marcelo Steel Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 54 SCRA 89].

Moreover, in the case of Ong vs. CA, 333 SCRA 189, the High Court fortified the
foregoing obiter dicta by declaring that:

As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its

foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of
possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of
the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of
possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of the said case.

As to the prayer of the petitioner bank for the issuance of writ of possession over the subject
property, the court finds no cogent reason why the same should not be issued, in the case of PDCP
Bank vs. Vestil 264 SCRA 467, the Supreme Court declared among others, that:

In cases in which, an extra-judicial sale is made pursuant to an extra-

judicial foreclosure of mortgage, redemption is governed by secs. 29 to 31 and
sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and sec. 35 provides among others,
that, If no redemption is made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the
purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the
property. The rule therefore is that: after the redemption period has expired, the
purchaser of the property has the right to be placed in possession thereof.

In Navarra vs. CA, 204 SCRA 850, The Highest Tribunal ruled:

The purchaser at an extra-judicial foreclosure sale has the right to the

possession of the property even during the one-year period of redemption provided
he files an indemnity bond. After the lapse of the said period with no redemption
having been made, that right becomes absolute and may be demanded by the
buyer even without the posting of the bond. Possession may then be obtained
under a writ which, may be applied for ex parte pursuant to sec. 7 of Act 3135 as
amended by Act 4118.
 It having been established that the period of redemption of the property described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 213950 (now Transfer Certificate of Title No. 250654) which was sold
at public auction to Far East Bank and Trust Company, (the herein petitioners predecessor-in-
interest) as highest bidder in connection with the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the mortgage has
already expired without said property having been redeemed and a new title, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 250654 issued in the name of Far East Bank and Trust Company (now) Bank of the
Philippine Islands and in conformity with the provisions of Act 3135, as amended, the petition is
hereby GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, let the corresponding writ of possession be issued directing the Sheriff of
this Branch to place the herein petitioner bank in actual physical possession of the foreclosed
property situated in the district of Sampaloc, City of Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 213950, now Transfer Certificate of Title No. 250654, and to eject therefrom mortgagor
JETRI Construction Corporation, its agents and such other persons claiming rights under it.[4]

Aggrieved by the aforequoted Order, petitioner instituted an appeal before the Court of Appeals which was
dismissed by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 17 November 2005, which reads:

For failure of the appellant to file its appellants brief within the reglementary period despite
notice, the appeal is declared ABANDONED and hereby DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 1 (e), Rule
50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[5]

Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the dismissal of its appeal before the
appellate court. In Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, it was averred that counsel for petitioner did not receive any
notice to file its brief from the Court of Appeals as well as a copy of the letter of transmittal of the record from the clerk
of the lower court to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner, thus, argued that this non-compliance by the clerk of the lower
court in violation of Section 10 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court caused the unwarranted confusion which actually
deprived the petitioner of the means to know when the reglementary period to file its brief had commenced.

In a Resolution dated 1 March 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in this wise:

Finding no merit on oppositor-appellants MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,

dated December 5, 2005, considering that the Notice to File Brief, dated July 21, 2005, was sent to
and received by the oppositor-appellant, through counsel, on August 1, 2005, as shown by the
attached Registry Return Receipt (Back of p. 6, Rollo), and taking into consideration the Comment
filed thereto by counsel for petitioner-appellee, We hereby DENY the motion. [6]

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner contends that the dismissal of its appeal by the Court of Appeals amounts to a denial of due
process. Petitioner now explains in its petition before this Court that its counsel failed to receive the Notice to file
appellants brief by honest mistake or unforeseen accident as the same was received and allegedly misplaced by
one AngelineDiguinat, who was just a visiting relative of petitioners counsel seeking financial assistance for the victims
of the calamities in the province of Aurora. Moreover, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, in the interest of
justice, equity and fair play, could have simply directed petitioners counsel to show cause why he should not be cited
for contempt for failure to comply with the order to file appellants brief.

Rule 44, Section 7[7] of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that it shall be the duty of the appellant to file his
brief within 45 days from receipt of notice; and failure to comply with this mandate is a ground for the dismissal of the
appeal as provided under Rule 50, Section 1(e) [8] of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In the instant case, there is no
question that petitioner failed to file its appellants brief despite notice which warranted the dismissal by the appellate
court of its appeal as ordained in the Rules of Court.However, petitioner maintains that such failure must be excused
as it was occasioned by an unforeseen accident or honest mistake that petitioners counsel did not receive the notice
ordering it to file the appellants brief. Thus, petitioner rationalizes, it is erroneous for the Court of Appeals to summarily
dismiss the appeal (thereby depriving petitioner of due process) on the ground of failure to file appellants brief within
the reglementary period which could not have been possibly computed since petitioners counsel did not receive the
notice due to honest mistake or unforeseen accident. Hence, petitioner was deprived of his due process right.

We find petitioners postulations bereft of merit. As stated in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 1
March 2006, the Registry Return Receipt shows that the Notice to File Brief, dated 21 July 2005, was sent to and
received by petitioner, through counsel, on 1 August 2005. However, no appellants brief was filed by petitioner until
the Resolution dated 17 November 2005, dismissing the appeal was issued by the appellate court. Evidently,
petitioners counsel was negligent in failing to file the required appellants brief within 45 days from receipt of said notice
as mandated by the Rules of Court. Petitioners counsel, nevertheless, would like to lay the blame at the door of
one AngelineDiguinat, who allegedly was only visiting to solicit financial aid for victims of the calamities
in Aurora. Petitioners counsel explains that Angeline Diguinat, being unlearned and unaware of the significance of the
letter, unconsciously or accidentally misplaced or misfiled the notice. Still hurting, petitioners counsel explains in the
Reply that he has no regular office assistant or secretary as he is alone in his law office which also serves as his
residence.

Regrettably, such excuse of petitioners counsel is unacceptable. It is the duty of a practicing lawyer to so
arrange matters that official or judicial communications sent by mail reach him promptly. [9] For failure to do so, he and
his clients must suffer the consequences of his negligence. [10] Furthermore, a lawyer can adopt an efficient way of
handling court mail matters even if his residence also serves as his office. [11] Hence, if petitioners counsel was not
informed by his visiting relative of the Notice to File Brief, petitioners counsel cannot hide behind his relatives
negligence to excuse his own failure to adopt an efficient way of managing his court notices. That said, this Court
cannot fault the Court of Appeals for dismissing the appeal which was done in faithful compliance with the rules of
procedure the Court has been mandated to observe.

Nevertheless, in our desire to put an end to the present controversy, we have carefully perused the records
of this case and have reached the conclusion that the order assailed is in perfect harmony with law and jurisprudence.

Petitioner Jetri Construction Corporation raises the validity of the foreclosure sale as a ground to attack the
propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Possession. This is erroneous. This Court, in numerous decisions, has
enunciated that any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for
refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.[12] Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of
the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to
the eventual outcome of the said case.[13] Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the
consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding. [14] In fact, petitioner itself has
already commenced Civil Case No. 04-111298 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 50 for annulment of mortgage
foreclosure. Therefore, the determination of the validity of said foreclosure sale is best left to the discretion of the court
wherein said complaint has been filed.

More succinctly, the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial
act.[15] After the consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right.[16] And its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely
a ministerial function.[17] It is undisputed that herein petitioner failed to redeem the property within the redemption period
and thereafter, ownership was consolidated in favor of herein respondent and a new certificate of title was issued in its
name, particularly TCT No. 250654. Thus, it was purely ministerial for the trial court to issue a writ of possession in
favor of herein respondent upon the latters filing of a petition. The issue of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
was of no moment.[18] Said issue cannot bar the issuance of a writ of possession since, as stated above, any question
regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure is not a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of
possession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84788 dismissing petitioners appeal for failure of appellant to file its appellants brief within
the reglementary period despite notice is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111662. October 23, 1997]
A.G. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE
IGNACIO CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134; NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY; and A. FRANCISCO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. S.P. No. 30227 which upheld the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 134, Makati,
dismissing petitioners complaint on the ground of the lack of jurisdiction.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On November 4, 1981, petitioner A.G. Development (AGDC) and public respondent National Housing Authority
(NHA) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, [1] wherein the former agreed to construct on its lot a dormitory-
apartment-commercial building for the latter at a total cost of Eleven Million Four Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Nine
Hundred Eighty Nine Pesos (P11,452,989.00). Pursuant to the agreement, AGDC executed in favor of NHA a
promissory note[2] and a real estate mortgage[3] over the land as a security for the obligation. Thereafter, NHA made an
initial payment of three million three hundred eight thousand four hundred forty (P3,308,440.00) to AGDC to cover a
portion of the contract price.
On August 30, 1983, however, NHA rescinded the agreement and demanded the immediate return of the initial
amount paid on the ground that AGDC was not able to complete the project on time. The demand was refused, as a
result of which, the real estate mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and the property sold to NHA as the highest
bidder. The one-year period to redeem having expired, a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in favor of
NHA; thereafter, a writ of possession was applied for and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed
as LRC Case No. 3067 (85).
On December 3, 1986, AGDC filed a complaint against NHA before the Makati RTC docketed as Civil Case No.
15495 for breach of contract, declaration of nullity of the promissory note and real estate mortgage, and annulment of
foreclosure sale and reversion of possession and title. NHA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia,
which was denied by the trial court. While the case was pending, private respondent A. Francisco Realty and
Development Corp. (AFRDC) filed a motion to intervene claiming that it is an innocent purchaser for value of the subject
property since it had already bought the foreclosed property from NHA. [4]
Consequently, AFRDC filed a motion to dismiss before the Makati RTC, reasoning that the said court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and annul the writ issued by the Quezon City RTC since both are co-equal or
coordinate jurisdiction. The Makati RTC ruled in favor of AFRDC and dismissed AGDCs complaint. [5] Recourse to the
Court of Appeals proved futile. Hence, this petition.
In resolving the instant petition, the principal issue to be addressed is whether the issuance of a writ of possession
by the Quezon City RTC constitutes res judicata as to bar the complaint filed by AGDC.
It is an oft-repeated rule that for res judicata to apply, the following requisites must concur:
a) the former judgment must be final;
b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
c) the judgment must be on the merits; and
d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. [6]
Although not explicitly stated, a basic requisite for res judicata to apply is that there are two cases which have
been decided on the merits.
In affirming the Makati RTCs dismissal of AGDCs complaint, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issuance of the
writ of possession has the effect of confirming the title of NHA over the property in question. [7] As such, the grant of
said writ constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is final as to the claim of nullity of the promissory note,
real estate mortgage and the resultant extra-judicial foreclosure sale. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that
the action to annul both the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale is barred by res judicata.
The issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits. A writ of possession is generally understood
to be an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property, [8] such
as when a property is extra-judicially foreclosed.[9] In this regard, the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in
an extra-judicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.[10] As such, the Court neither exercises its official discretion
nor judgment.[11] In other words, the issuance of the writ of possession is summary in nature,[12] hence the same cannot
be considered a judgment on the merits which is defined as one rendered after a determination of which party is right,
as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal technical point. [13]
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of administrative powers or to legislative, executive or ministerial determination. [14] Accordingly, cases
disposed of on technical grounds do not fall within the doctrine of res judicata.[15] Hence, the issuance of the writ of
possession by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was not a judgment on the merits but simply an incident in the
transfer of title.
 We also note that LRC Case No. 3067 (85) is not an action as defined by law. An action is an act by which one
sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a
wrong[16] and such is commenced by filing a complaint with the Court.[17] However, in the procedure for the issuance of
a writ of possession, no complaint is necessary, the filing of an ex parte motion being enough.[18] Indeed, the term
action does not include non-judicial proceedings, although they are before a court, as in cases where the court does
not act in a judicial capacity.[19]
There is also another consideration that supports this conclusion since an extra-judicial foreclosure only requires
the posting and publication of the notices to effect the same.[20] It has been held that a proceeding to foreclose a
mortgage by advertisement is not an action.[21]
In the absence of the necessary elements, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No. 15495
is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

URSULA MAGLENTE, CONSOLACION G.R. No. 148182

BERJA, MERCEDITA FERRER,
THELMA ABELLA and ANTONIO NGO,
Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA* and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. PRISCILLA BALTAZAR-
PADILLA, in her capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Manila
Branch 38, VISITACION GABELO,
ERLINDA ABELLA, PETRA PEREZ,
ERLINDA TRAQUENA, BEN CARDINAL,
EDUARDO TRAQUENA, LEOPOLDO
TRAQUENA, MARIFE TUBALAS,
ULYSIS MATEO, JOCELYN FERNANDEZ,
ALFONSO PLACIDO, LEONARDO
TRAQUENA, SUSAN RENDON and
MATEO TRINIDAD,
Respondents. Promulgated:

March 7, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the order[1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, dated April 20, 2001, denying petitioners motion for the issuance of
a writ of possession in their favor.

The antecedent facts follow.

On January 15, 1985, Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), owner of a 687.80-square meter parcel of land at
400 Solana St., Intramuros, Manila, entered into a contract of lease for three years with one of the petitioners,
Ursula Maglente. In the contract, it was stated that, if PRC were to sell the leased property, Maglente would be given
the first priority (right of first refusal) to buy it. Both parties likewise agreed that the lessee was prohibited from
subleasing any portion of the property without the consent of the lessor. However, after the execution of the lease
contract, petitioner Maglente subleased portions of the property to respondents.

On March 9, 1987, when the lease contract was about to expire, PRC sent a written offer to sell the leased
property to Maglente. In response, the latter intimated that she would exercise her right of first refusal to purchase the
property with co-petitioners as her co-buyers. In February 1989, PRC received a letter from respondents expressing
their desire to purchase the same property.

On February 23, 1989, PRC filed a complaint for interpleader[2] in the RTC against both petitioners and
respondents so they could litigate among themselves on who had the right to purchase the property. [3] On March 11,
1991, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and declared them as the rightful parties to purchase PRCs property.
The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring [petitioners] Ursula Maglente, Consolacion Berja, Mercedita Ferrer,

Thelma Abella and Antonio Ngo as the rightful [parties] to purchase the land in controversy; and
 2. Ordering[PRC] to execute the corresponding contract of sale/contract to sell in favor of
[petitioners] aforementioned in accordance with this Decision within 30 days from notice hereof. [4]

Dissatisfied with the above decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.

Undaunted, respondents found their way to this Court, assigning as sole error the ruling of the CA upholding
the right of petitioners. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 111743.

On October 8, 1999, we affirmed the decision of the CA and denied respondents petition for lack of merit. [5] We
declared:

In the case under consideration, the contract of sale was already perfected PRC offered the
subject lot for sale to [petitioners] Maglente and her group Respondent Maglente and her group
accepted such offermanifesting their intention to purchase the property as provided for under the
lease contract. Thus, there was already an offer and acceptance giving rise to a valid contract. As a
matter of fact, [petitioners] have already completed payment of their downpayment of P100,000.
Therefore, as borne by evidence on record, the requisites under Article 1318 of the Civil Code for a
perfected contract have been met.

On April 11, 2000,[6] we ordered entry of judgment.

On motion of petitioners, a writ of execution was later issued by the RTC directing PRC to execute the contract
of sale/contract to sell in favor of petitioners.

As ordered, PRC executed a deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The latter then filed a motion for the issuance
of a writ of possession but respondents (who were occupying the property) objected on the ground that the trial courts
decision on the interpleader case merely resolved petitioners right to purchase the leased property but did not declare
them as the owners entitled to possession. The trial court sustained respondents argument and denied petitioners
motion.[7]

Petitioners are now before us via this special civil action for certiorari raising this sole query: whether or not
they are entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged (in the interpleader case) as the proper parties to buy the
subject property, considering that a deed of sale has already been executed in their favor. [8]

In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioners assail the Manila RTCs denial of their motion for the
issuance of the writ of possession. However, they do not allege that the trial court was without jurisdiction or exceeded
its jurisdiction, or that it committed grave abuse of discretion in denying said motion, as required in all Rule 65 petitions.

The remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any tribunal or board exercising judicial functions without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[9] It must be based on jurisdictional grounds like want of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion; otherwise, any error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error
of judgment which may be questioned only on ordinary appeal. [10]

Considering, however, that a question of law[11] is involved, that is, whether a writ of possession should be
granted to a party with the right of first refusal in an interpleader case, we give due course to this petition.
Indeed, should petitioners be granted the writ of possession they seek? We rule in the negative.

A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2)
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor
has possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales. [12] Here, petitioners seek the writ as a
consequence of the trial courts decision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The
writ does not lie in such a case.

Furthermore, the trial courts decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the CA and the SC) merely
resolved the question of who, between petitioners and respondents, had the right to purchase PRCs property. The
directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary contract in favor of petitioners as the winning parties, nothing else.
The trial courts writ of execution read:

NOW THEREFORE, [PRC] is hereby ordered to execute a contract of sale/contract to

sell in favor of [petitioners] within thirty (30) days from the date of execution hereof. The
 Branch Sheriff shall return this Writ to the Court within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt until
the judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. The returns of periodic reports shall set forth
the whole of the proceedings taken and shall be filed with the Court and copies thereof promptly
furnished the parties[13] (emphasis supplied)

It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the owners of the property. The execution of the deed
of sale in their favor was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the property. [14] Likewise, although we stated
in G.R. No. 111743[15] that the contract of sale between petitioners and PRC had already been perfected, we refrained
from declaring them the owners since, pending the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership
had yet to transfer to them at that time.[16]

Thus, petitioners argument that the trial courts writ of execution [17] in the interpleader case carried with it the
corollary right to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when
the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to
either.[18] The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.

Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment
but must strictly conform to it.[19] It should be in harmony with the judgment that gives it life and not exceed it. [20] We
thus cannot fault the trial court for refusing to issue a writ of possession to petitioners as its issuance would not be in
conformity with the trial courts judgment in the interpleader case.
Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a mere motion. They must file the appropriate
action in court against respondents to recover possession. While this remedy can delay their recovery, this Court cannot
permit an abbreviated method without subverting the rules and processes established for the orderly administration of
justice.

WHEREFORE, the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.