G.R. Nos.

99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor;
SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.
Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.
RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:
Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is petitioner's so-
called "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending
Incident for Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the issue to us, as will
hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of an early resolution
hereof.
The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear
understanding and perspective of our disposition of this matter, thus:
1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was
filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at
P15,000.00. 1
3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in
Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," 2 which pertinently states in part:
xxx xxx xxx
3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which
required surgical intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically in the jaw or gum
area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain. Further, she
cannot for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain. . . . .
4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this
Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings and further
seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended bail bond of P15,000.00 that
she is posting in cash be accepted.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she is
posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion, she be
considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court and
dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have
recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.
Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her arrest
be immediately recalled.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash
bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest,
unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court. On May
15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other legal fees. 4
5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of the
Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon
of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor
and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying for about fifteen
minutes. 5
6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991, setting the
arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and setting aside the court's resolution of May 14, 1991
which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division of said court on or before June
5, 1991. 6
7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be
allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining under
bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an intention she would like to prove
as baseless. 7
8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and
the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of
Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-94897
(for libel), respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24,
1991, enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding
with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order, took into consideration the
fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably
advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail
herself of any remedial right to meet said contingency.
9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until
further advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel
her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel. 8
10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting
and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992.
11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order
against petitioner which reads as follows:
Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to leave
the country soon for an extended stay abroad for study purposes, considering the recent
decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on January 13, 1992,
although the same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration from the accused,
considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that she has not (sic) even
posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier claim of being seriously
indisposed, all of which were overtaken by a restraining order issued by the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May 24, 1991, the accused is ordered not
to leave the country and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation is ordered not
to allow the departure of the accused unless authorized from (sic) this Court. 10
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States to
accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities in the United
States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and corruption.
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that:
1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and due
deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold departure order despite the
pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this Honorable Court.
3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of speech
are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in the Constitution but also in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only under stringent
criteria which do not obtain in the instant case.
4. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing
circumstances which suggest political harassment and persecution.
 5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar and her
characteristic transparency and candor, there is no reasonable ground to fear that
petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial processes. 11
I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person
considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact
that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court. We reject her
thesis for being factually and legally untenable.
It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or
was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 12 The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished
either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the
exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On
the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the
same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either
by his arrest or voluntary surrender. 13
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail
bond.
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be
considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the
amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed
herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her
own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated
pleadings she filed therein.
It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release
as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even attached as Annex
C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is further buttressed by the fact that petitioner
thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the court to allow her
provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With the filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner
should accordingly and necessarily admit her acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of
the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction for candor and
sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before respondent
court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it
was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who requested respondent
court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently from her
vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around and fault respondent court for
taking a compassionate stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for acceptance of the
cash bond posted in her absence.
II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold
departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court which
dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of judicial comity applies to prevent a court from
interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a coordinate court, with more reason should it operate to
prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from interfering with the instant case where a
motion for reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She contends further that the hold
departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order previously issued by this court enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case pending before it.
It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18, 1992
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining
order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the filing of her motion for reconsideration
stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent court continued to be enjoined
from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. We
likewise reject this contention which is bereft of merit.
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment
in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the
pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an
appeal, 14 and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations should not apply to a temporary
restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment
dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule
applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. 15
It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even
though it is not final. 16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or
temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary
injunction 17 and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution. 18 Consequently, a
special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. 19 There must be a new
exercise of .judicial power. 20
The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained, to wit:
. . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted, held that an
appeal from an order dissolving an injunction continued the injunction in force. The evils
which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by Judge Mitchell in a
dissenting opinion. He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers are so insufficient on their face
or so false in their allegations that if he should apply on notice for an injunction, any court
would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one, yet, if he can find anywhere in the
State a judge or court commissioner who will improvidently grant one ex parte, which the
court on the first and only hearing ever had dissolves, he can, by appealing and filing a
bond, make the ex parte injunction impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal
is determined in this court." . . . Such a result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with
all known rules of equity practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless
absolutely shut up to it by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute. . . . . 21
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely in point and
of more recent vintage:
The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of
UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature, despite the petitioners
then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ of preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the SEC's en banc resolution in SEC
EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of Appeals to resolve the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It shall not be stayed after its rendition
and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. . . . . 22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari and the lifting of the restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting
on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier
mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution
dated September 10, 1992.
Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action for certiorari divested the
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein. Whether generated by misconception or design,
we shall address this proposition which, in the first place, had no reason for being and should not
hereafter be advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios.
The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for
the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the
inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. It is elementary that the
mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a
lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining
it. 23 The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in
the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court
from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if such injunctive
writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal
action.
III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right
to travel and freedom of speech.
First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Much is made by
petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by
the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero motu by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in
error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of
jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. 24 These inherent powers are such powers
as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; 25 or essential to the existence,
dignity and functions of the courts, 26 as well as to the due administration of justice; 27 or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; 28 and include the power to
maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 29
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and
usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional
provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions
ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may
be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which,
as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its
jurisdiction. 30 Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive
measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the
result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends
upon the particular circumstances. 31
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public
statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad.
We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of
petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in justified
consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of
respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the
case and the person of the accused.
Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies,
there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and that under
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only when so required in
the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete
despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and
grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano.
Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable
at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the
country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 32 to the effect that:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear before any
court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping
him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power
of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance
 of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of
him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we
have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935):
. . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the
accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower
court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they
issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have
no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he
may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to
travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or
public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in
the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p.
263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on
international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an
interested party (See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25
April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
Section 6, Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any
criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an
accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes. 33
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner,
and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite
the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
jurisdiction, or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only
because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling
for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of petitions
or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein
should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are
in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor
since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof. Where,
as in the present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex parte or motu propio by said court, the
party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration
or other proper submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where all
the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over
said tribunals be invoked through the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid
grounds their actuations therein.
WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of
April 26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by
petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal by certiorari through a petition
which raises issues centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be admitted to
bail.

On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended

information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case
No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the
killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of
which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on
October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, 1 had initially
indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And
Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the
spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one
of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually
convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at large
up to the present. 2

In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the
crime. In an amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a
co-accused therein. As herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew
him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case.
Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in a
signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he later retracted on June 20,
1990, implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of
the Bucag family. 3

Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the
case per his resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance
of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated
September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said
criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner
assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in G.R.
No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon.
Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B.
Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained
the filing of the second amended information against him. 4

Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of
an arrest warrant for petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on
him, petitioner through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission
to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992.
Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor,
Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear
the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only
Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office
appeared for the prosecution. 5

As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital
due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting
custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the
integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on
the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the
chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution
was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were
submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. 6

Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he
was waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a
resolution dated November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in
the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner,
apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally
 appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount
thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also
personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. 7

The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later
on November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the
petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in
its omnibus order dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6)
months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals
through a special civil action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the
trial court granting bail to petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now
under review, on the ground that they were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 8

Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's

application for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently
because he filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually arrested
or had voluntarily surrendered. It further noted that apart from the circumstance
that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the
evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail was
recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of bail
was doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court,
was not afforded an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail contrary
to the requirements of due process. Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs.
Vasquez etc., et al., 9 his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial
court effectively conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for
all intents and purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In petitioner's words,
the "invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in
court is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the person of the accused
and bring him within the custody of the law."

Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence
of such strong evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail.
Furthermore, the prosecution, by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of
any further presentation of evidence to oppose the application for bail and whose
representation in court in behalf of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot
legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due process. Finally, petitioner
points out that the special civil action for certiorari was filed in respondent court
after an unjustifiable length of time.

On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved
in this case, the Court finds for petitioner.

1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under the conditions
specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the
rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the
trial. 10 As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same
cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial
authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. 11 As this Court has
put it in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." 12

The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the
former pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his
stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 13
Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., 14 where the petitioner who had been
charged with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering
himself, and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of
the bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically
pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.

As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been
arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have
occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The person
seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for
a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available to "all
persons" 15 where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the
condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law. 16

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a)
when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in
relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b)
when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities. 17 in this light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., 18 should be explained.

In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what
purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond."
Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious
physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently,
she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself
under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial
and other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner
to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal
appearance in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane
consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she
question the jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this
Court, on the ground that "she neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she
never personally appeared before said court" In rejecting her arguments, the
Court held that she was clearly estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the urgent ex parte motion for
bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually posting
a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to its
jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took
pains to reiterate that the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.

In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under
arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the
likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application
with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to
have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily,
to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In
fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode
may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military
offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.

It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically

made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail
that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby
Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could
not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the
trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of
petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him.
Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the
physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under
medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his
confinement or placing him under guard.

The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of
the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point
since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his
lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person,
firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing
true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by
unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
 came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner
never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or
concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in
court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing
thereof.

At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital
on account of an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they
were easily verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his good faith and of his actual
recognition of the authority of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed the
court that they were surrendering custody of petitioner to the president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis Oriental Chapter. 20 In other words, the
motion for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in the manner of the
former practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority
and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here
no intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to
avoid arrest should the application therefore be denied.

2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4
of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before
conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail,
which may be waived considering its personal nature 21 and which, to repeat, arises from
the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of
innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at
the outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
established beyond reasonable doubt. 22

Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal
offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present
exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment 23 and the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for
admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of
course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the
conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the
other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the
court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should
be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, 24 is required with the
participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution,
this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional
liberty of the applicant. 25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show
that the evidence meets the required quantum. 26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be
give an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
want to introduce before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled
as the accused to due process. 27 If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there
would be a denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court's
order in respect of the motion or petition is void. 28 At the hearing, the petitioner can
rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal. 29 When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting
or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong. 30 The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if
timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are insufficient
to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires. 31

In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural

due process when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of
State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government
prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and who received his copy of the
motion only on the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly, the
prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to waive the
presentation of any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail and to
submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that
the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable time" to oppose that application for bail.

We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor
acted as the collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal
Case No. 86-39 on the basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando
de Leon which was sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by
the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which
was to be continuing until and unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed
and then withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of
Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to
enter their appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case. 32
It was in fact by virtue of this arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and
Prosecutor Perseverando Arana entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutor
in the previous hearing in said case. 33 Hence, on the strength of said authority and of its
receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office,
through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on
November 5, 1992.

Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not
familiar with the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position
of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado,
whose office received its copy of the motion on the very day when it was sent,
that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the
court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for
bail and that they were submitting the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously,
what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case,
was waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a
quo sought to ascertain whether or not that was the real import of the submission
by Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered in the affirmative.

The following exchanges bear this out:

PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:

I was informed to appear in this case just now Your Honor.

COURT:

Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a copy of the motion
as early as October 28. There is an element of urgency here.

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only informed just now. The
one assigned here is State Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick son. I do not know
about this but before I came I received an instruction from our Chief to
relay to this court the stand of the office regarding the motion to admit
bail. That office is neither supporting nor opposing it and we are
submitting to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal Abejo, would
you like to formally enter your appearance in this matter?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.

COURT:

By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand that in effect,

at least, the prosecution is dispensing with the presentation of evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . .

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.

COURT:
 Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the incident covered by
this particular motion for resolution by this court?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Without presenting any further evidence?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor. 34

It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of
Regional State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the
motion for bail and this should be so notwithstanding the statement that they
were "neither supporting nor opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the
manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to the sound
discretion of the Honorable Court." By that, it could not be any clearer. The
prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of evidence en contra and this it
did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the
mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that
such was the position of the prosecution.

3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 35 it was stressed that where the
trial court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing
the application for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross
error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire
from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to determine
whether or not it is strong. And, in the very recent administrative matter Re: First
Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan
City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36 the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas, etc., 37
held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the
accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and
from there diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not
contesting the bail application.

No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be

attributed to the trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A
review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of
November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals
scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in its aforementioned
order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of
the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus
order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution
 and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that
petitioner could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no
showing that, since then and up to the present, petitioner has ever committed
any violation of the conditions of his bail.

As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present
its evidence within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records
indicate that the Regional State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the
application for bail on the very same day that the it was filed with the trial court on
October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the day of the hearing on
November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more than one (1) week to muster such
evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the
motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than
reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the
application only on November 6, 1992 is beside the point for, as already
established, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was authorized to
appear for the People.

4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably
unreasonable period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the
respondent court the resolution and the omnibus order of the trial court through a
special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of
more than six (6) months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was
reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which characterized the prosecution
of the criminal case against petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was
initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case had
ensued in the court below with the active participation of prosecution lawyers,
including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now in that the
special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the
three months, 38 the same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of
time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained to annul the
same. 39

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

32233, promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5,
1992 and the omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City, as well as said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994
denying the motion for reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail Court
granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines v. sandiganbayan 529 SCRA 764 PLEASE CHECK

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5379. May 9, 2003]

WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs. CEASAR G. BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO

NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q. SUSA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for
disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q.
Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyers oath. 1[1]

Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled
People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr., pending before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 27. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel
for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the accused has
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention.2[2] Upon
personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana
allegedly surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as
shown by the Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the
Security Management Division of the NBI.

Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the
motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects,
namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day notice
rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which was referred to in the Motion as
Annex 1.

Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon
learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation with
Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and
brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at
the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused
surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither unethical conduct nor
falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at
the NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private
prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City
prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a
motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court.3[3]

For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court when his co-
respondents filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Pea, Clerk III,
received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and the
Certificate of Detention was not attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to receive
the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention before the hearing. Thus,
the inclusion of the Motion in the courts calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the
presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful performance of his ministerial
duty.

In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,4[4] the instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.

On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted

her report and recommendation as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that Atty.

Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of
their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6) months from receipt
hereof. The complaint against Atty. Franklin Q. Susa, upon the other hand, is hereby
recommended dismissed for lack of merit.5[5]

The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and in view of
respondents commission of deliberate falsehood, Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The complaint against Atty. Susa is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.6[6]

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner.

Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.7[7] He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do
no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to his clients.8[8] He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusion.9[9] The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.10[10] While a lawyer has the
solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of
his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.11[11]

The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.12[12]
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as
members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it
found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth
by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under
detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby
contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to
deception.

Respondents contend that their allegation of the accuseds detention was merely a statement of
an ultimate fact which still had to be proved by evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That they
were able to show that their client was already under the custody of the NBI at the hearing held
on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them. The fact remains that the allegation that the
accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.

In Comia vs. Antona, we held:

It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same
date tentatively scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such
supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from
administrative liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the
application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to
ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.13[13] In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a
matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation.14[14]

In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two
days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents
failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily,
as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.15[15]

Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court
should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial
court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that
his administrative functions, although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are
vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice.16[16] Thus, he should not hesitate to
inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to
the established rules of procedure.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito

Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they
are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas
and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

tolentino v. camino 322 SCRA 559---PLZ CHECK

barbero v. judge dumlao 558 SCRA 193PLZ CHECK
Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan588 SCRA 64
cojuangco v. sandiganbayan 300 SCRA 345
people v. meris 3/8/2000
padilla v. ca JULY 31 1996

SHIRLEY C. RUIZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROLINDO D. BELDIA, JR., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 57, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, [Assisting Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 272, Marikina City,] respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In an Affidavit-Complaint[1] filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),

complainant Shirley C. Ruiz charged respondent Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of Branch 57,
Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, with gross ignorance of the law and
grave abuse of authority in connection with the grant of bail and issuance of a release order in
favor of one Lourdes Estrella Santos.
Ruiz is the private complainant in I.S. No. 2000-1031 for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law[2]
pending before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Santos, who was arrested during entrapment
operations relative to the carnapping of Ruizs vehicle, was one of the respondents therein.

After her arrest on May 24, 2000, Santos was detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City, pending
the filing of formal charges in court. Upon inquest, she executed a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125[3] of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Rule 112, Section 7[4] of the then
applicable 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Inquest Prosecutor thus set the hearing of the
preliminary investigation on May 31, 2000 at 2:00 PM.[5]

However, on May 30, 2000, Santos obtained an Order of Release[6] signed by respondent Judge
Beldia who was then detailed as assisting judge of Branch 272, Regional Trial Court of Marikina
City (RTC-Marikina City). Respondent Judge Beldia apparently granted bail to Santos and
approved the corresponding bail bond without serving notice to the prosecutor.

Consequently, Ruiz filed the instant administrative complaint contending that respondent Judge
Beldia had no authority to grant bail to Santos since the Investigating Prosecutor has yet to
conclude the preliminary investigation. She claimed that for as long as the information has not
yet been filed in court, a court has no power to grant bail to a detained person since it has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

In his Comment[7] dated August 14, 2000, respondent Judge Beldia maintained that Section 1 (c),
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows any person in custody, even if not formally charged in
court, to apply for bail.

Meanwhile, the OCA directed the Clerk of Court, Branch 272, RTC-Marikina City, Atty. Elvira
Badillo-Adarlo, to confirm whether a formal petition for admission to bail was filed by Santos or
her counsel and, whether Executive Judge Reuben P. de la Cruz and Presiding Judge Olga P.
Enriquez were absent or unavailable on May 30, 2000 when the release order was issued.[8]

On June 18, 2002, Atty. Badillo-Adarlo informed the OCA that the records of release orders and
bailbonds in her custody did not include the subject release order issued by respondent Judge
Beldia. As such, she could not tell whether a formal petition for admission to bail was filed by
Santos. She likewise confirmed that Executive Judge De la Cruz and Presiding Judge Enriquez
were present and available on the day that Judge Beldia issued the release order.[9]

On November 20, 2002, the complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter. At
the same time, the parties were required to manifest whether they are willing to submit the case
for resolution based on the pleadings filed.[10] The parties failed to file their manifestations,
hence the filing thereof was deemed waived.

In its report[11] dated July 31, 2002, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge Beldia be held
liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined in the amount of P5,000.00. It opined that
although a person in custody and who is not formally charged in court could apply for bail
pursuant to Section 17 (c), Rule 114, the grant thereof by Judge Beldia was nonetheless
irregular. It noted that no formal petition or application for bail was filed by Santos, and even if
one was filed, the Marikina courts could not have properly taken cognizance of the same since
Santos was detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. There was also no showing that the regular
judge of Branch 272, RTC-Marikina City, was unavailable to act on the application for bail.

We agree with the recommendation of the OCA.

Record shows that Executive Judge De la Cruz and Presiding Judge Enriquez were present on
May 30, 2000 to act on the bail application of Santos. When respondent Judge Beldia acted on
the bail application of Santos on May 30, 2000, his designation was merely an assisting judge
in the RTC-Marikina City, his permanent station being in Branch 57, RTC-San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental. As such, his authority in the Marikina court is limited and he could only act
on an application for bail filed therewith in the absence or unavailability of the regular judge.

Concededly, a person lawfully arrested and detained but who has not yet been formally charged
in court, can seek his provisional release through the filing of an application for bail. He need
not wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed since bail is available to all persons
where the offense is bailable.[12] Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a judge could grant bail to a person lawfully arrested but without a warrant, upon
waiver of his right under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as Santos had done upon her
inquest.

Undeniably too, Santos was entitled to bail as a matter of right since the offense with which she
was charged does not carry the penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua or death.[13]
Notwithstanding, it was incumbent upon respondent Judge Beldia to grant bail to Santos in
accordance with established rules and procedure. Respondent Judge Beldia failed in this respect
and must thus be held administratively liable.

Section 17, par. (c) of Rule 114 distinctly states:

SEC. 17. Bail, where filed.

(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court
in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. (Emphasis supplied)

The Certificate of Detention[14] issued by the PNP-TMG-SOD shows that Santos was detained at
Camp Crame in Quezon City. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the OCA, the application for bail
should have been filed before the proper Quezon City court and not in Marikina City.

In addition, it appears that no formal application or petition for the grant of bail was filed before
the RTC-Marikina City. There were no records of the application or the release order issued by
respondent Judge Beldia. Neither was there a hearing conducted thereon nor the prosecutor
notified of the bail application.

Under the present rules, a hearing on an application for bail is mandatory.[15] In Cortes v. Judge
Catral,[16] we ruled that in all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable
notice of hearing must be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation on the matter
must be sought. The rationale for this was explained in this wise:

Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The amount fixed should be
sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with
the constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter
of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or
fiscal or at least he must be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail,
the judge is required to take into account a number of factors such as the applicants character
and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice.[17]

Judge Beldia disregarded basic procedural rules when he granted bail to Santos sans hearing and
notice and without the latter having filed a formal petition for bail. Accordingly, the prosecution
was deprived of procedural due process for which respondent Judge Beldia must be held
accountable.[18]

There is no dearth of jurisprudence on the rules to be applied in the grant of bail.[19] These same
rules have been incorporated in the Rules of Court, of which a judge must have more than just a
superficial understanding, if he were to discharge his functions properly and competently.
Indeed, everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. When, as in this case, the
law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[20]

The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be
aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by
his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the rule of law.[21]

Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the
Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the
law is classified as a serious charge punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension or a
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. In this case, considering that the
incident took place on May 30, 2000 which is before the effectivity of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
and malice or bad faith on the part of respondent Judge Beldia not having been established, and
further, this being his first administrative offense, we deem it just and reasonable to impose upon
him a fine of P5,000.00.[22]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of Branch 57,
Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental is found GUILTY of gross ignorance
of the law, and is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00. He is further WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-4.

[2] Presidential Decree No. 1612, March 2, 1979.

[3]Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. The
penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person
to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel.

[4]SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask
for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign
a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
assistance of a lawyer, and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding
rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the
information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.

Defensor-Santiago Vs. Vasquez

217 SCRA 633
G.R. Nos. 99289-90
January 27, 1993

Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation
of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for
release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On
the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post
cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set,
but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed
provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The
Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the
announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a
Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to
travel is impaired.

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired.

Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public
statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies
abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial
notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte
the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent courts inherent power to
preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of
the accused.

Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)
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