9/8/2016 G.R.No.

L31685

TodayisThursday,September08,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L31685July31,1975

RAMONA.GONZALES,petitioner,
vs.
IMELDAR.MARCOS,asChairmanoftheCulturalCenterofthePhilippines,FatherHORACIODELA
COSTA,I.P.SOLIONGCO,ERNESTORUFINO,ANTONIOMADRIGAL,andANDRESSORIANO,asMembers
thereof,respondents.

RamonA.Gonzalesinhisownbehalf.

ActingSolicitorGeneralHugoE.GutierrezJr.andAssistantSolicitorGeneralReynatoS.Punoforrespondent
ImeldaR.Marcos.

SiguionReyna,Montecillo,BetoandOngsiakoforrespondents.

FERNANDO,J.:

It was the novelty of the constitutional question raised, there being an imputation by petitioner Ramon A.
GonzalesofanimpermissibleencroachmentbythePresidentofthePhilippinesonthelegislativeprerogative,that
led this Tribunal to give due course to an appeal by certiorari from an order of dismissal by the Court of First
InstanceofManila.1 More specifically, the issue centered on the validity of the creation in Executive Order No. 30 of a
trustforthebenefitoftheFilipinopeopleunderthenameandstyleoftheCulturalCenterofthePhilippinesentrustedwith
the task to construct a national theatre, a national music hall, an arts building and facilities, to awaken our people's
consciousnessinthenation'sculturalheritageandtoencourageitsassistanceinthepreservation,promotion,enhancement
anddevelopmentthereof,withtheBoardofTrusteestobeappointedbythePresident,theCenterhavingasitsestatethe
real and personal property vested in it as well as donations received, financial commitments that could thereafter be
collected, and gifts that may be forthcoming in the future. 2 It was likewise alleged that the Board of Trustees did accept
donationsfromtheprivatesectoranddidsecurefromtheChemicalBankofNewYorkaloanof$5millionguaranteedbythe
National Investment & Development Corporation as well as $3.5 million received from President Johnson of the United
Statesintheconceptofwardamagefunds,allintendedfortheconstructionoftheCulturalCenterbuildingestimatedtocost
P48 million. The Board of Trustees has as its Chairman the First Lady, Imelda Romualdez Marcos, who is named as the
principalrespondent.3InanorderofdismissalbythethenJudge,nowJusticeoftheCourtofAppeals,JoseG.Bautistaof
asuitforprohibitionfiledintheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila,stresswaslaidonthefundsadministeredbytheCenteras
comingfromdonationsandcontributions,withnotasinglecentavoraisedbytaxation,andtheabsenceofanypecuniaryor
monetary interest of petitioner that could in any wise be prejudiced distinct from those of the general public. Moreover,
reference was made to the admission by petitioner of the desirability of the objective of Executive Order No. 30, his
objectionarisingfromtheallegedillegalityofitsissuance.4

Therewasamotionofrespondentstofileamotiontodismissthisappealbycertiorari, and it was granted in a

resolution of March 5, 1970. Such a pleading was submitted to this Court twelve days later, where it was
contended that Executive Order No. 30 represented the legitimate exercise of executive power, there being no
invasion of the legislative domain and that it was supplementary to rather than a disregard of Republic Act No.
4165 creating the National Commission on Culture. In this exhaustive motion to dismiss, the point was likewise
raisedthatpetitionerdidnothavetherequisitepersonalitytocontestasataxpayerthevalidityoftheexecutive
order in question, as the funds held by the Cultural Center came from donations and contributions, not one
centavobeingraisedbytaxation.5 Thereafter, a manifestation was filed by the then Solicitor General, now Associate
Justice,FelixQ.Antonio,adopting"theMotiontoDismissthePetitiondatedFebruary25,1970,filedbyrespondentswith
thisHonorableCourt."6Therewasanoppositiontosuchmotiontodismissonthepartofpetitioner.7That was the status
ofthecase,therebeingnofurtherpleadingsfiledexcepttwomotionsforextensionoftimetofileanswersubmittedbythe
Solicitor General and granted by this Court, when on July 22, 1975, there was a second motion to dismiss on the part of
respondentsthroughtheActingSolicitorGeneralHugoE.GutierrezJr.andAssistantSolicitorGeneralReynatoS.Puno.It
is therein set forth: "(1) As stated in the petition itself its undeniable quintessence is [the allegation of] "an executive
usurpation of legislative powers, hence, respondents in enforcing the same, are acting without jurisdiction, hence, are
restrainablebyprohibition."...(2)OnOctober5,1972,PresidentialDecreeNo.15...waspromulgatedcreatingtheCultural
CenterofthePhilippines,definingitsobjectives,powersandfunctionsandotherpurposes.Section4,thereofwasamended
by Presidential Decree No. 179 ... enacted on April 26, 1973. It is submitted that it is now moot and academic to discuss
theconstitutionalityofExecutiveOrderNo.30consideringthepromulgationofPDNos.15and179,donebythePresident
in the exercise of legislative powers under martial law. Executive Order No. 30 has ceased to exist while PD Nos. 15 and
179meetalltheconstitutionalargumentsraisedinthepetitionatbar."8

It would thus appear that the petition cannot succeed. There is no justification for setting aside the order of
dismissal.Notwithstandingtheexhaustiveandscholarlypleadingssubmittedbypetitioneronhisownbehalf,the
burdenofpersuasiontowarrantareversaloftheactionofthelowercourtwasnotmet.Bothonproceduraland
substantivegrounds,acaseforprohibitionwasnotmadeout,notwithstandingthevalianteffortsofpetitioner.With
thislatestmanifestation,thatExecutiveOrderNo.30hadbeensupersededbyPresidentialDecreeNos.15and
179,themootandacademiccharacterofthisappealbycertioraribecameratherobvious.Torepeat,thepetition
mustfail.

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1. It may not be amiss though to consider briefly both the procedural and substantive grounds that led to the
lowercourt'sorderofdismissal.Itwasthereinpointedoutas"onemorevalidreason"whysuchanoutcomewas
unavoidable that "the funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations [and]
contributions [not] by taxation." Accordingly, there was that absence of the "requisite pecuniary or monetary
interest."9Thestandofthelowercourtfindssupportinjudicialprecedents. 10Thisisnottoretreatfromtheliberalapproachfollowedin
Pascualv.SecretaryofPublicWorks,11foreshadowedbyPeoplev.Vera,12wherethedoctrineofstandingwasfirstfully
discussed.Itisonlytomakeclearthatpetitioner,judgedbyorthodoxlegallearning,hasnotsatisfiedtheelementalrequisite
for a taxpayer's suit. Moreover, even on the assumption that public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does not
necessarilyfollowthatsuchkindofanactiontoassailthevalidityofalegislativeorexecutiveacthastobepassedupon.
ThisCourt,asheldintherecentcaseofTanv.Macapagal,13"isnotdevoidofdiscretionastowhetherornotitshouldbe
entertained."14Thelowercourtthusdidnoterrinsoviewingthesituation.

2. Nor was the lower court any more impressed by the contention that there was an encroachment on the
legislativeprerogativediscernibleintheissuanceofExecutiveOrderNo.30.Itfirsttooknoteoftheexchangeof
diplomatic notes between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States as to the use of a special fund
comingfromthelatterforaPhilippineculturaldevelopmentproject.Then,assetforthintheorderofdismissal,it
explainedwhynoconstitutionalobjectioncouldbevalidlyinterposed.Thus:"WhenthePresident,therefore,acted
by disposing of a matter of general concern (Section 63, Rev. Adm. Code) in accord with the constitutional
injunctiontopromoteartsandletters(Section4,ArticleXIV,ConstitutionofthePhilippines)andissuedExecutive
OrderNo.30,hesimplycarriedoutthepurposeofthetrustinestablishingtheCulturalCenterofthePhilippines
astheinstrumentalitythroughwhichthisagreementbetweenthetwogovernmentswouldberealized.Needlessto
state,thePresidentalonecannotandneednotpersonallyhandlethedutiesofatrusteeforandinbehalfofthe
Filipinopeopleinrelationwiththistrust.Hecandothisbymeansofanexecutiveorderbycreatingashedid,a
groupofpersons,whowouldreceiveandadministerthetrustestate,responsibletothePresident.Asheadofthe
State,aschiefexecutive,asspokesmanindomesticandforeignaffairs,inbehalfoftheestateasparenspatriae,
it cannot be successfully questioned that the President has authority to implement for the benefit of the Filipino
people by creating the Cultural Center consisting of private citizens to administer the private contributions and
donationsgivennotonlybytheUnitedStatesgovernmentbutalsobyprivatepersons."15

Thereisimpressivejuridicalsupportforthestandtakenbythelowercourt.JusticeMalcolminGovernmentofthe
PhilippineIslandsv.Springer16tookpainstoemphasize:"Justassurelyasthedutyofcaringforgovernmentalproperty
isneitherjudicialnorlegislativeincharacterisitassurelyexecutive." 17ItWouldbeanundulynarroworrestrictiveviewof
suchaprincipleifthepublicfundsthataccruedbywayofdonationfromtheUnitedStatesandfinancialcontributionsforthe
CulturalCenterprojectcouldnotbelegallyconsideredas"governmentalproperty."Theymaybeacquiredundertheconcept
ofdominium,thestateasapersonainlawnotbeingdeprivedofsuchanattribute,thereaftertobeadministeredbyvirtueof
itsprerogativeofimperium.18Whatisamoreappropriateagencyforassuringthattheybenotwastedorfritteredawaythan
theExecutive,thedepartmentpreciselyentrustedwithmanagementfunctions?ItwouldthusappearthatforthePresident
torefrainfromtakingpositivestepsandawaittheactionofthethenCongresscouldbetantamounttoderelictionofduty.He
had to act time was of the essence. Delay was far from conducive to public interest. It was as simple as that. Certainly
then,itcouldbeonlyunderthemoststrainedconstructionofexecutivepowertoconcludethatintakingthestephetook,he
transgressedonterrainconstitutionallyreservedforCongress.

Thisisnottoprecludelegislativeactioninthepremises.WhiletothePresidencyunderthe1935Constitutionwas
entrustedtheresponsibilityforadministeringpublicproperty,thethenCongresscouldprovideguidelinesforsuch
atask.RelevantinthisconnectionistheexcerptfromanopinionofJusticeJacksoninYoungstownSheet&Tube
Co.v.Sawyer:19"When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only
rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may
sometimes,atleastasapracticalmatter,enable,ifnotinvite,measuresonindependentpresidentialresponsibility.Inthis
area,anyactualtestofpowerislikelytodependontheimperativeofeventsandcontemporaryimponderablesratherthan
onabstracttheoriesoflaw." 20Tovarythephraseology,torecallThomasReedPowell,ifCongresswouldcontinuetokeep
its peace notwithstanding the action taken by the executive department, it may be considered as silently vocal. In plainer
language,itcouldbeaninstanceofsilencemeaningconsent.TheExecutiveOrderassailedwasissuedonJune25,1966.
Congress until the time of the filing of the petition on August 26, 1969 remained quiescent. Parenthetically, it may be
observedthatpetitionerwaiteduntilalmostthedayofinauguratingtheCulturalCenteronSeptember11,1969beforefiling
his petition in the lower court. However worthy of commendation was his resolute determination to keep the Presidency
withintheboundsofitscompetence,itcannotbedeniedthattheremedy,ifany,couldbesuppliedbyCongressasserting
itselfinthepremises.Instead,therewasapparentconformityonitsparttothewaythePresidentsawfittoadministersuch
governmentalproperty.

3.ThefutilityofthisappealbycertioraribecomesevenmoreapparentwiththeissuanceofPresidentialDecree
No.15onOctober5,1972.AscontendedbytheSolicitorGeneral,thematter,asofthatdate,becamemootand
academic. Executive Order No. 30 was thus superseded. The institution known as the Cultural Center is other
than that assailed in this suit. In that sense a coup de grace was administered to this proceeding. The labored
attemptofpetitionercouldthusbesetatrest.Thisparticularlitigationisatanend.Thereis,too,relevanceinthe
observationthattheaforesaiddecreeispartofthelawoftheland.SotheConstitutionprovides.21

4.Itonlyremainstobeaddedthatrespondentsastrusteeslivedupfullytotheweightyresponsibilityentrustedto
them. The task imposed on them was performed with competence, fidelity, and dedication. That was to be
expected.FromtheinceptionoftheMarcosAdministration,theFirstLadyhasgivenunsparinglyofherselfinthe
encouragement and support of literary, musical, and artistic endeavors and in the appreciation of our rich and
diverseculturalheritage.TherestofthethenBoardofTrustees,namedastheotherrespondents,wereequally
deservingoftheirbeingchosenforthisworthyproject.Oneofthem,thelateI.PSoliongco,wasinhislifetimeone
of the most gifted men of letters. Father Horacio de la Costa is a historian and scholar of international repute.
Respondents Ernesto Rufino, Antonio Madrigal and Andres Soriano, all men of substance, have contributed in
timeandmoneytocivicefforts.ItisnotsurprisingthenthattheCulturalCenterbecameareality,themassiveand
imposing structure constructed at a shorter period and at a lower cost than at first thought possible. What is of
evengreatersignificance,withaportionthereofbeingaccessibleatmodestadmissionprices,musicalandartistic
performancesofallkindsarewithinreachofthelowerincomegroups.Onlythusmaymeaningbeimpartedtothe
Constitutional provision that arts and letters shall be under State patronage. 22 For equally important as the
encouragementandsupportfortalentedFilipinoswithacreativesparkisthediffusionoftheopportunityfortherestoftheir
countrymentosavourthefinerthingsinlife.Whoknows,ifstateeffortsalongtheselinesarediligentlypursued,thatwhat
wassaidbyJusticeHolmesaboutFrancecouldapplytothePhilippines.Thus:"Wehavenotthatrespectforartthatisone
of the glories of France." 23 In justice to petitioner Gonzales, it may be noted that he did not question the wisdom or
soundness of the goal of having a Cultural Center or the disbursement of the funds by respondents. It is the absence of

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statutoryauthoritythatbotheredhim.Thelowercourtdidnotseethingsinthesamelight.Itiseasilyunderstandablewhy,
astheprecedingdiscussionhasmadeclear,itcannotbesaidthatsuchaconclusionsufferedfromlegalinfirmity.Whatis
more,withtheissuanceofPresidentialDecreeNo.15,thesuit,torepeat,hasassumedamootandacademiccharacter.

WHEREFORE,thisappealbycertioraritoreviewthelowercourt'sorderofdismissaldatedDecember4,1969is
dismissed.

Nocosts.

Makalintal,C.J.,Barredo,Esguerra,MuozPalma,Aquino,ConcepcionJr.andMartinJJ.,concur.

CastroandMakasiar,JJ.,tooknopart.

TeehankeeandAntonio,JJ.,areonleave.

Footnotes

1ResolutionofFebruary27,1970.

2Petition,par.1.

3TheotherrespondentsareFatherHoraciodelaCosta,1.P.Soliongco,whodiedduringthe
pendencyofthesuit,ErnestoRufino,AntonioMadrigalandAndresSoriano.

4Petition,AnnexF.Norwastheotherobjectionthattherewasarepugnancybetweensuchorder
andastatutecreatingaNationalCommissiononCulturesustained.RepublicActNo.4165(1964).

5MotiontoDismissdatedMarch17,1970,submittedbythelawfirmofSiguionReyna,Montecillo,
Belo&OngsiakoandsignedbyAttorneyEdgardoAngara.Insupportofthelastpoint,referencewas
madetothefollowingstatecases:Barberv.HousingAuthority,5SE2d425(1939)Pricev.Mattoon,
4NE2d850(1936)Mathaeiv.HousingAuthority,9A2d835(1939)Hanrahanv.Corron,12NYS
2d536(1938)Warmv.Cincinnati,11NE2d281(1937)McKinneyv.Watson,145P.266(1915)
Hazelwoodv.Cooper,87SW2d776(1935)Jenkinsv.Cooper,87SW2d778(1935)Youngv.
Taylor,92SW2d1075(1935)Powellv.Baird,132SW2d464(1939).

6ManifestationofMarch18,1970.ThethenAssistantSolicitorGeneral,nowJudge,RicardoL.
Pronove,Jr.aswellasSolicitorVicenteA.Torres,Jr.filedsuchmanifestation.

7OppositiontoRespondent'sMotiontoDismissdatedMarch23,1970..

8SecondMotiontoDismissdatedJuly22,1975.

9Petition,AnnexF,7.

10Cf.McKinneyv.Watson,145P266,267(1915)Hazelwoodv.CityofCooper,87SW(2d)776
(1935)Jenkinsv.Cooper,87SW(2d)778(1935)Pricev.CityofMattoon,4NE(2d)850(1936)
Youngv.Taylor,92SW(2d)1075(1936)Warmv.Cincinnati,11NE(2d)281(1937)Barberv.
HousingAuthority,5SE(2d)425(1939)andPowellv.CityofBaird,132SW(2d)464(1939).

11110Phil.331(1960)..

1265Phil.56(1937).

13L34161,February29,1972,43SCRA677.

14Ibid,680.

15Petition,AnnexF,3.

1650Phil.259(1927).

17Ibid,290.

18Cf.LeeHongHockv.David,L30389,December27,1972,48SCRA372.

19343US579(1952).

20Ibid,637.

21AccordingtoArticleXVII,Section3,par.(2)oftheConstitution:"Allproclamations,orders,
decrees,instructions,andactspromulgated,issued,ordonebytheincumbentPresidentshallbe
partofthelawoftheland,andshallremainvalid,legal,binding,andeffectiveevenafterliftingof
martiallawortheratificationofthisConstitution,unlessmodified,revoked,orsupersededby
subsequentproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,or
unlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodifiedorrepealedbytheregularNationalAssembly."

22AccordingtoArticleXIV,Section4ofthe1935Constitution:"Artsandlettersshallbeunder[the
State's]patronage."SuchaprovisionisnowfoundinArticleXV,Section9,par.(2)ofthepresent
Charterandreads:"Filipinocultureshallbepreservedanddevelopedfornationalidentity.Artsand
lettersshallbeunderthepatronageoftheState."

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