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RCBC vs. METROCAN G.R. No. 127913 13 decision became final and executory.

By reason
September 2001 thereof, METROCAN and LEYCON separately filed
motions to dismiss the interpleader case. However,
FACTS: said motions were dismissed for lack of merit.
In 1990, Ley Construction Corporation contracted a METROCAN went to the Court of Appeals seeking relief
loan from Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation in the via a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
amount of P30 million with a real estate mortgage over for issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction. In
property in Valenzuela secured. LEYCON failed to settle 1996, CA ruled in favor of METROCAN and ordered the
its obligation to pay back the loan thereby prompting dismissal of the interpleader case.
RCBC to foreclose the mortgage with the latter being ISSUE:
the highest bidder in 1992. LEYCON promptly filed an
action for Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale May METROCAN unilaterally have the interpleader
and Damages against RCBC. The case was raffled to case dismissed?
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Branch
172. Meanwhile, RCBC consolidated its ownership over RULING:
the property due to LEYCONs failure to redeem it Yes. An action for interpleader is afforded to protect a
within the 12-month redemption period and a new TCT person not against double liability but against double
was issued if favor of the bank. By virtue thereof, RCBC vexation in respect of one liability. It requires that
demanded rental payments from Metro Container conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or
Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who
property from LEYCON. In 1994, LEYCON filed an action claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an
for Unlawful Detainer against RCBC before MeTC interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the
Valenzuela Branch 82. METROCAN filed later a claimants. When the decision in the Unlawful Detainer
complaint for Interpleader before RTC Valenzuela case became final and executory, METROCAN had no
Branch 75 against LEYCON and RCBC to compel them other alternative left but to pay rentals to LEYCON.
to interplead their claims between themselves and to Precisely because there was a judicial fiat to
determine which of them shall rightfully receive the METROCAN, there was no more reason to continue
payment rentals on the subject property. In 1995, with the interpleader case. Thus, METROCAN moved
judgment was rendered in the Unlawful Detainer case, for the dismissal of the interpleader action not
which ordered METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever because it was no longer interested but because there
rentals were due on the subject land. Said MeTC was no more need to pursue the action. The Unlawful
Detainer case resolved the conflicting claims insofar as that both defendants threatened to take punitive
payment of rentals was concerned. RCBC correctly measures against CDC should it take any step that
contended that it was not bound by the decision in the shall prejudice their interests; that plaintiff was not
Unlawful Detainer case as it was not a party thereto. sufficiently informed of the rights of the respective
However, it could not compel METROCAN to pursue the claimants and therefore not in a sufficient position to
Interpleader case. RCBC has other avenues to prove its adjudicate their claims; that CDC has no interest of
claim. any kind of stock and was willing to issue certificates
of stock to the claimants; and prayed that defendants
be directed to interplead between themselves their
respective claims over the said shares of stock and
determine which truly belong to them. CFI Manila
LIM vs. COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT Branch XXVI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause
CORPORATION of action invoking Sec. 35 of Act No. 1459 (Corporation
Law). Lim and CDC filed their respective motions for
G.R. No. L-41818; G.R. No. L-41831 18 February reconsideration of the order to which Tan filed his
1976 rejoinder. Said motions were denied in 1974.
FACTS: RULING:
In 1973, Continental Development Corporation filed a The interpleader must be granted. It is patent from the
complaint for interpleader against Benito Gervasio Tan pleadings in the lower court that both Tan and Lim
and Zoila Co Lim alleging that: in plaintiffs books, assert conflicting rights to the questioned shares of
Tans name appears as one of its stockholders in 1957 stock. Precisely in his motion to dismiss the complaint
with 50 common shares, and subsequently credited for interpleader, Tan states that petitioner corporation,
with 75 shares by way of dividends, or an outstanding through its Vice-President, notified him on July 23,
total of 125 shares of par value of P250 each; that Tan 1973 "that the shares of stock are in the possession of
had since December 1972 been demanding CDC to its treasurer Mr. Ty Lim, and urged defendant to
release the certificates of stock but which plaintiff had directly obtain them from the former, who allegedly
not done so far and was prevented from doing so was on vacation at the time. Mr. Ty Lim, on August 30,
because of Lims adverse claims; that Lim laid claim on 1973, through counsel, replied to Tan that said
the very same shares of stock being demanded by Tan, certificates were not in his possession but surmised,
alleging that the same belonged to her late mother; without reference to any record, that the same might
have been delivered to the deceased So Bi. the claimants, he may bring an action against the
Continental Development Corporation expressly stated conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and
in the complaint that both defendants, through their litigate their several claims among themselves." This
respective lawyers, threatened to take punitive provision only requires as an indispensable requisite:
measures against it should it adopt any steps that may "that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
prejudice their respective interests in the shares of are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-
stock in question; and that it is not sufficiently interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the
informed of the rights of the respective claimants and subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part
therefore not in a position to determine justly and is not disputed by the claimants." Indeed, CDC is
correctly their conflicting claims. And in its placed in the same situation as a lessee who does not
opposition to the motion to dismiss its complaint, know the person to whom he will pay the rentals due
petitioner Continental Development Corporation to the conflicting claims over tine property leased, or a
stressed that it might be liable to one defendant sheriff who finds himself puzzled by conflicting claims
should it comply with the demands of the other with to a property seized by him. In these examples, the
respect to the transfer or entry of the shares of stock lessee (Pangkalinawan v. Rodas, 80 Phil. 28) and the
in the books of the corporation. Since there is an sheriff (Sy-Quia v. Sheriff, 46 Phil. 400) were each
active conflict of interests between the two allowed to file a complaint in interpleader to determine
defendants, now herein respondent Benito Gervasio the respective rights of the claimants.
Tan and petitioner Zoila Co Lim, over the disputed
shares of stock, the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing the complaint for interpleader, GREGORIO SYQUIA vs. SHERIFF OF ILOCOS SUR
which practically decided ownership of the shares of
stock in favor of defendant Benito Gervasio Tan. The G.R. No. L-22807 10 October 1924
two defendants should be given full opportunity to
litigate their respective claims. Rule 63, Section 1 of FACTS:
the New Rules of Court tells us when a cause of action
In 1915, Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano
exists to support a complaint in interpleader:
Reyes Cheng-Kiangco executed a chattel mortgage in
"Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject
favor of Gregorio Syquia on their mercantile
matter are or may be made against a person, who
establishment as a security for a debt of P6,000. The
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or
chattel mortgage was duly registered and due date fell
an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by
two years later. From its terms, it was the parties
intention that the mortgagors were to be permitted to hold him harmless in such an event. In these
sell their merchandise replenishing their stock from circumstances, his action in suspending the sale
time to time and that the new stock shall also be pending the determination of the action of interpleader
subject to the mortgage. In 1924, Cheng-Laco seems justified. We may say further that in cases such
executed another chattel mortgage over the same as the present, the petition for mandamus should be
establishment in favor of Filadelfo de Leon. After the addressed to the Courts of First Instance rather than to
second mortgage was registered, Syquia requested the this court.
sheriff to take possession of the mortgaged property to
sell it at public auction under the Chattel Mortgage ALFONSO PAGKALINAWAN vs. SOTERO RODAS
Law. The sheriff then seized the property in question G.R. No. L- 1806
but de Leon presented an adverse claim to the 25 February 1948
property stating that by virtue of the second chattel
mortgage, Syquias was no longer effective. In doubt FACTS:
as to the priority of the claims, the sheriff suspended
the proceedings and brought an action for In an ejectment suit between Manuel Tambunting and
interpleader. Thereupon, the present proceeding in Alfonso and Manuel Pagkalinawan, the latter appealed
mandamus was instituted, the petitioner alleging that from the lower court to CFI Manila. The appellate court
the duty of the sheriff to proceed with the sale was a then rendered a decision sentencing the
ministerial one and praying that the sheriff be Pagkalinawans to vacate the house in question and
commanded to proceed. pay rentals due to Tambunting from November 1946 at
P45 per month plus costs. Acting upon a motion for
RULING: reconsideration filed by the Pagkalinawans, CFI
granted the motion and absolved them from the
Though it perhaps, would have been better practice for complaint. On motion from Tambunting, the same
the sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds of court reversed the Pagkalinawans motion and ordered
the sale subject to the outcome of the action of the latter to pay the rent for the property in question.
interpleader, we, nevertheless, are of the opinion that Defendants, however, moved to stay execution of the
the facts shown do not justify our interference by new judgment on the ground that they had filed with
mandamus. The sheriff might lay himself open to an the same court an interpleader suit against plaintiff
action for damages if he sold the goods without the and Angel de Leon Ong, praying that the latter two be
consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does ordered to litigate their conflicting claims over rentals
not appear that the petitioner offered to give bond to due from the defendants. CFI acceded to the motion
but did not stop the execution of its judgment. Failing Tambunting from the property located at Nos. 329 to
to obtain a reconsideration of the latter order, the 339 Tanduay Street, Manila, which includes the
defendants instituted the present petition for certiorari premises held by the petitioners. Under the law, the
and prohibition, seeking from us an order directing latter have a right to file the interpleader suit in view
Hon. Sotero Rodas, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the claim for rentals of Angel de Leon Ong; and if
of Manila, and Joaquin Garcia, sheriff, to desist from the respondent Tambunting believes that he is legally
carrying out the writ of execution. entitled to said rentals, he is free to move for the
withdrawal of the deposits made by the petitioners.

RULING:

Petition has merit. It is true that the decision ordering


the payment of rentals to Tambunting is now final and
executory. However, in connection with the suit for
interpleader filed by petitioners, said rentals were UCPB vs. IAC and MAKATI BEL-AIR
deposited with the Clerk of Court, of which fact the CONDOMINIUM
respondent judge was informed by petitioners. Such G. R. Nos. 72664-5 20 March 1990
deposits, in our opinion, constitute a bona fide
compliance with the decision of the respondent judge, FACTS:
since it is undeniable that the petitioners were warned
by Angel de Leon Ong not to pay rentals to the In 1979, United Coconut Planters Bank filed in the
respondent Manuel Tambunting. That there is really a lower court a complaint-in-interpleader against Makati
conflicting claim between Angel de Leon Ong and Bel-Air Condominium Developers and against Altiura
respondent Manuel Tambunting is evidenced by the Investors. The subject matter of the complaint was a
fact that there are pending in the Court of First managers check in the amount of P494,000 issued by
Instance of Manila civil case No. 815, between Manuel UCPB payable to Makati Bel-Air, having been
Tambunting, plaintiff, and Angel de Leon Ong and Ong purchased by Altiura. Altiura delivered the check to
Hoa, defendants, for the annulment of a contract of Makati Bel-Air as part payment on an office
sale involving the premises in question, and civil case condominium unit in the Cacho-Gonzales Building.
No. 2690, between Angel de Leon Ong, plaintiff, and UCPB received instructions from Altiura to hold
Manuel Tambunting, defendant, for the ejectment of payment of the check, in view of a material
discrepancy in the area of the office unit purchased by
Altiura which unit actually measured 124.58 square cross-claim against Altiura. In turn, Altiura filed an
meters, instead of 165 square meters as stipulated in answer to the complaint-in-interpleader, with motion
the contract of sale. Petitioner Bank immediately to dismiss the cross-claim of Makati Bel-Air. Meantime,
requested private respondent Makati Bel-Air to advise on 23 July 1979, Altiura had filed a complaint for
the Bank why it should not issue the stop payment rescission of the contract of sale of the condominium
order requested by Altiura. The next day, UCPB unit, with damages, against Makati Bel-Air docketed as
received a reply from Makati Bel-Air explaining the Civil Case No. 33967, which case was eventually
latter's side of the controversy and at the same consolidated with the interpleader case. UCPB filed a
proposing a possible reduction of the office unit's "motion to withdraw complaint and motion to dismiss
purchase price. UCPB received a letter from Altiura counter-claim", stating that there was no longer any
requesting the Bank to hold payment of its manager's conflict between Makati Bel-Air and Altiura as to who
check while Altiura was discussing Makati Bel-Air's was entitled to the funds covered by the manager's
proposal for reduction of the purchase price and check, since Makati Bel-Air in its answer had alleged
requesting the Bank to give both parties fifteen (15) that it had cancelled and rescinded the sale of the
days within which to settle their differences. UCPB condominium unit and had relinquished any claim it
requested Makati Bel-Air to hold in abeyance for a had over the funds covered by the manager's check.
period not exceeding fifteen (15) days the presentation Makati Bel-Air delivered to petitioner Bank the original
of the manager's check, so that both parties could of the manager's check. The trial court in Civil Case
settle their differences amicably, but UCPB did not No. 33961 issued an order directing the release of the
agree to such arrangement. Thereupon, UCPB filed a funds covered by the manager's check to Altiura. On
complaint-in-interpleader against Altiura and Makati 28 April 1983, the trial court issued an order resolving
Bel-Air to require the latter to litigate with each other petitioner Bank's motion to withdraw complaint-in-
their respective claims over the funds represented by interpleader and to dismiss counter-claim, declaring
the manager's check involved, and at the same time that motion to withdraw the complaint-in-interpleader
asking the court for authority to deposit the funds in a had been rendered moot and academic by the court's
special account until the conflicting claims shall have earlier order of 18 February 1980 directing petitioner
been adjudicated. The trial court ordered the deposit Bank to release to Altiura the P494,000.00 covered by
of the funds into a special account with any reputable the manager's check, which Makati Bel-Air had not
banking institution subject to further orders of the opposed nor appealed from. In the same order, the
court. Makati Bel-Air filed its answer and incorporated trial court granted Makati Bel-Air's motion to
therein a counter-claim against petitioner Bank and a consolidate Civil Case No. 33961 (the interpleader
case) and Civil Case No. 33967 (the rescission plus for payment, petitioner Bank felt compelled to resort
damages case). Makati Bel-Air moved for to the remedy of interpleader. It will be seen that
reconsideration of the 12 July 1983 clarificatory order Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim arose out of or was
of the trial court, without success. Makati Bel-Air then necessarily connected with the recourse of petitioner
went to the respondent appellate court on petition for to this remedy of interpleader. Makati Bel-Air was in
certiorari. In its decision dated 27 June 1985, the effect claiming that petitioner Bank had in bad faith
appellate court granted certiorari and nullified the trial refused to honor its undertaking to pay represented by
court's orders of 12 July and 30 August 1983 to the the manager's check it had issued. When the trial
extent that these had dismissed Makati Bel-Air's court granted petitioner's motion for withdrawal of its
counter-claim. The appellate court held that the complaint-in-interpleader, as having become moot and
withdrawal of the complaint-in-interpleader and its academic by reason of Makati Bel-Air's having
dismissal as moot and academic did not operate ipso cancelled the sale of the office unit to Altiura and
facto to dismiss Makati Bel-Air's counter-claim for the having returned the manager's check to the Bank and
reason that said counter-claim was based on "an acquiesced in the release of the funds to Altiura, the
entirely different cause of action from that in the trial court in effect held that petitioner Bank's recourse
complaint-[in]-interpleader." to interpleader was proper and not a frivolous or
malicious maneuver to evade its obligation to pay to
RULING: the party lawfully entitled the funds represented by
Interpleader is a proper remedy where a bank which the manager's check. Having done so, the trial court
had issued a manager's check is subjected to opposing could not have logically allowed Makati Bel-Air to
claims by persons who respectively claim a right to the recover on its counterclaim for damages against
funds covered by the manager's check. The Bank is petitioner Bank. There are other considerations
entitled to take necessary precautions so that, as far supporting the conclusion reached by this Court that
possible, it does not make a mistake as to who is respondent appellate court had committed reversible
entitled to payment; the necessary precautions error. Makati Bel-Air was a party to the contract of sale
include, precisely, recourse to an interpleader suit. In of an office condominium unit to Altiura, for the
the instant case, petitioner Bank having been informed payment of which the manager's check was issued.
by both Altiura and Makati Bel-Air of their respective Accordingly, Makati Bel-Air was fully aware, at the time
positions in their controversy, and Makati Bel-Air it had received the manager's check, that there was,
having refused the Bank's suggestion voluntarily to or had arisen, at least partial failure of consideration
refrain for fifteen (15) days from presenting the check since it was unable to comply with its obligation to
deliver office space amounting to 165 square meters amortization, but no monthly installments were made
to Altiura. Makati Bel-Air was also aware that petitioner thereafter. Threatened with the cancellation of the
Bank had been informed by Altiura of the claimed conditional sale, the Suico and Flores spouses sold
defect in Makati Bel-Air's title to the manager's check their rights over the said properties to herein
or its right to the proceeds thereof. Vis a vis both respondents Restituto and Mima Sabordo, subject to
Altiura and petitioner Bank, Makati Bel-Air was not a the condition that the latter shall pay the balance of
holder in due course 3 of the manager's check. the sale price. On September 3, 1974, respondents
and the Suico and Flores spouses executed a
ELIZABETH DEL CARMEN vs. SPOUSES supplemental agreement whereby they affirmed that
RESTITUTO AND MIMA SABORDO G.R. No. what was actually sold to respondents were Lots 512
181723 11 August 2014 and 513, while Lots 506 and 514 were given to them
FACTS: as usufructuaries. DBP approved the sale of rights of
the Suico and Flores spouses in favor of herein
Spouses Toribio and Eufrocina Suico entered into a respondents. Subsequently, respondents were able to
business venture by establishing a rice and corn mill in repurchase the foreclosed properties of the Suico and
Mandaue, Cebu. As part of their capital, they obtained Flores spouses. On September 13, 1976, respondent
a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines Restituto Sabordo filed with the then Court of First
and had mortgaged 4 parcels of land of theirs (Lots Instance of Negros Occidental an original action for
506, 512, 513 and 514) as well as a lot belonging to declaratory relief with damages and prayer for a writ
one of their partners, Juliana del Rosario. of preliminary injunction raising the issue of whether
Subsequently, the Suico spouses and their business or not the Suico spouses have the right to recover from
partners failed to pay their loan obligations forcing respondents Lots 506 and 514. In its Decision dated
DBP to foreclose the mortgage. After the Suico spouses December 17, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of San
and their partners failed to redeem the foreclosed Carlos City, Negros Occidental, ruled in favor of the
properties, DBP consolidated its ownership over the Suico spouses directing that the latter have until
same. Nonetheless, DBP later allowed the Suico August 31, 1987 within which to redeem or buy back
spouses and spouses Reginald and Beatriz Flores, as from respondents Lots 506 and 514. On appeal, the
substitutes for Juliana Del Rosario, to repurchase the Court of Appeals modified the decision and gave the
subject lots by way of a conditional sale for the sum of Suicos until 31 October 1990 to redeem the lot from
P240,571.00. The Suico and Flores spouses were able respondents by paying P127,500. The Suicos were
to pay the downpayment and the first monthly given an additional 90 days from notice to redeem the
property. In the meantime, Toribio Suico (Toribio) died Complaint on the ground that petitioner and her co-
leaving his widow, Eufrocina, and several others, heirs had no valid cause of action and that they have
including herein petitioner, as legal heirs. Later, they no primary legal right which is enforceable and binding
discovered that respondents mortgaged Lots 506 and against RPB. On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered
514 with Republic Planters Bank (RPB) as security for a judgment, dismissing the Complaint of petitioner and
loan which, subsequently, became delinquent. her co-heirs for lack of merit. Respondents'
Thereafter, claiming that they are ready with the Counterclaim was likewise dismissed. Petitioner and
payment of P127,500.00, but alleging that they cannot her co-heirs filed an appeal with the CA contending
determine as to whom such payment shall be made, that the judicial deposit or consignation of the amount
petitioner and her co-heirs filed a Complaint with the of P127,500.00 was valid and binding and produced
RTC of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental seeking to the effect of payment of the purchase price of the
compel herein respondents and RPB to interplead and subject lots. In its assailed Decision, the CA denied the
litigate between themselves their respective interests above appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the
on the abovementioned sum of money. The Complaint disputed RTC Decision.
also prayed that respondents be directed to substitute
Lots 506 and 514 with other real estate properties as RULING:
collateral for their outstanding obligation with RPB and Petition lacks merit. This court quotes the CAs prior
that the latter be ordered to accept the substitute decision to wit on consignation: consignation [is]
collateral and release the mortgage on Lots 506 and the act of depositing the thing due with the court or
514. Upon filing of their complaint, the heirs of Toribio judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot
deposited the amount of P127,500.00 with the RTC of accept or refuses to accept payment, and it generally
San Carlos City, Branch 59. Respondents filed their requires a prior tender of payment. It should be
Answer with Counterclaim praying for the dismissal of distinguished from tender of payment which is the
the above Complaint on the grounds that (1) the action manifestation by the debtor to the creditor of his
for interpleader was improper since RPB is not laying desire to comply with his obligation, with the offer of
any claim on the sum of P127,500.00; (2) that the immediate performance. Tender is the antecedent of
period within which the complainants are allowed to consignation, that is, an act preparatory to the
purchase Lots 506 and 514 had already expired; (3) consignation, which is the principal, and from which
that there was no valid consignation, and (4) that the are derived the immediate consequences which the
case is barred by litis pendencia or res judicata. On the debtor desires or seeks to obtain. Tender of payment
other hand, RPB filed a Motion to Dismiss the subject may be extrajudicial, while consignation is necessarily
judicial, and the priority of the first is the attempt to reason to depart from the findings of the CA and the
make a private settlement before proceeding to the RTC that petitioner and her co-heirs failed to make a
solemnities of consignation. Tender and consignation, prior valid tender of payment to respondents.
where validly made, produces the effect of payment
and extinguishes the obligation. This Court held that It is settled that compliance with the requisites of a
while [t]he deposit, by itself alone, may not have valid consignation is mandatory. Failure to comply
been sufficient, but with the express terms of the strictly with any of the requisites will render the
petition, there was full and complete offer of payment consignation void. One of these requisites is a valid
made directly to defendants-appellants (Arzaga vs. prior tender of payment. Under Article 1256, prior
Rumbaoa).In the instant case, however, petitioner tender of payment is excused: (1) when the creditor is
and her co-heirs, upon making the deposit with the absent or unknown, or does not appear at the place of
RTC, did not ask the trial court that respondents be payment; (2) when the creditor is incapacitated to
notified to receive the amount that they have receive the payment at the time it is due; (3) when,
deposited. In fact, there was no tender of payment. without just cause, the creditor refuses to give a
Instead, what petitioner and her co-heirs prayed for is receipt; (4) when two or more persons claim the same
that respondents and RPB be directed to interplead right to collect; and (5) when the title of the obligation
with one another to determine their alleged respective has been lost. None of these instances are present in
rights over the consigned amount; that respondents be the instant case. Hence, the fact that the subject lots
likewise directed to substitute the subject lots with are in danger of being foreclosed does not excuse
other real properties as collateral for their loan with petitioner and her co-heirs from tendering payment to
RPB and that RPB be also directed to accept the respondents, as directed by the court.
substitute real properties as collateral for the said SUBASH PASRICHA vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY
loan. Nonetheless, the trial court correctly ruled that
interpleader is not the proper remedy because RPB did G.R. No. 136409 14 March 2008
not make any claim whatsoever over the amount
consigned by petitioner and her co-heirs with the FACTS:
court. tender of payment involves a positive and
Don Luis Dison Realty and the Pasrichas (Subash and
unconditional act by the obligor of offering legal tender
Josephine) executed two lease contracts whereby the
currency as payment to the obligee for the formers
former agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32,
obligation and demanding that the latter accept the
33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building,
same. In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent
located at 1006 M.Y. Orosa cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets,
Ermita, Manila. Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay of rents starting January 1993 because of respondent's
monthly rentals as well as utilities expenses therefor. refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38. To show
While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners
with Francis Pacheco, then General Manager of private alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for
respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January
Roswinda Bautista. Petitioners religiously paid the 1994. Petitioners further averred in their Amended
monthly rentals until May 1992. After that, however, Answer that the complaint for ejectment was
despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously prematurely filed, as the controversy was not referred
refused to pay the stipulated rent. Consequently, to the barangay for conciliation. On November 24,
respondent was constrained to refer the matter to its 1994, the MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand on complaint for ejectment. It considered petitioners' non-
petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals payment of rentals as unjustified. The court held that
amounting to P916,585.58. Because petitioners still mere willingness to pay the rent did not amount to
refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed payment of the obligation; petitioners should have
by private respondent through its representative, Ms. deposited their payment in the name of respondent
Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of company. On the matter of possession of the subject
Manila. The case was raffled to Branch XIX. Petitioners premises, the court did not give credence to
admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the petitioners' claim that private respondent failed to turn
leased premises starting July until November 1992, but over possession of the premises. The court, however,
claimed that such refusal was justified because of the dismissed the complaint because of Ms. Bautista's
internal squabble in respondent company as to the alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the
person authorized to receive payment. To further corporation. Deciding the case on appeal, the Regional
justify their non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
that they were prevented from using the units subject 94-72515, reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision.
matter of the lease contract, except Room 35. Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the
Petitioners eventually paid their monthly rent for Court of Appeals in a petition for review on certiorari.
December 1992 in the amount of P30,000.00, and On March 18, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus
claimed that respondent waived its right to collect the Motion to cite Ms. Bautista for contempt; to strike
rents for the months of July to November 1992 since down the MeTC and RTC Decisions as legal nullities;
petitioners were prevented from using Rooms 22, 24, and to conduct hearings and ocular inspections or
32, 33, and 34. However, they again withheld payment delegate the reception of evidence. Without resolving
the aforesaid motion, on May 26, 1998, the CA reference to specific rooms and the monthly rental for
affirmed the RTC Decision. each - easily raise the inference that the parties
intended the lease of each room separate from that of
RULING: the others. There is nothing in the contract which
Petition lacks merit. It is undisputed that petitioners would lead to the conclusion that the lease of one or
and respondents entered into 2 separate contracts of more rooms was to be made dependent upon the lease
lease involving 9 rooms. Records likewise show that of all the nine (9) rooms. Accordingly, the use of each
respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners room by the lessee gave rise to the corresponding
vacate the premises, but the latter refused to heed the obligation to pay the monthly rental for the same.
demand; thus, they remained in possession of the Notably, respondent demanded payment of rentals
premises. What was clearly established by the only for the rooms actually delivered to, and used by,
evidence was petitioners' non-payment of rentals petitioners. It may also be mentioned that the contract
because ostensibly, they did not know to whom specifically provides that the lease of Rooms 36, 37
payment should be made. However, this did not justify and 38 was to take effect only when the tenants
their failure to pay, because if such were the case, thereof would vacate the premises. Absent a clear
they were not without any remedy. They should have showing that the previous tenants had vacated the
availed of the provisions of the Civil Code on premises, respondent had no obligation to deliver
consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on possession of the subject rooms to petitioners. Thus,
interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when petitioners cannot use the non-delivery of Rooms 36,
the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals 37 and 38 as an excuse for their failure to pay the
should be made due to conflicting claims on the rentals due on the other rooms they occupied. In light
property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is of the foregoing disquisition, respondent has every
afforded not to protect a person against double liability right to exercise his right to eject the erring lessees.
but to protect him against double vexation in respect The parties' contracts of lease contain identical
of one liability. Notably, instead of availing of the provisions, to wit: In case of default by the LESSEE in
above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from the payment of rental on the fifth (5th) day of each
making payments. Neither can petitioners validly month, the amount owing shall as penalty bear
invoke the non-delivery of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as a interest at the rate of FOUR percent (4%) per month,
justification for non-payment of rentals. Although the to be paid, without prejudice to the right of the
two contracts embraced the lease of nine (9) rooms, LESSOR to terminate his contract, enter the premises,
the terms of the contracts - with their particular and/or eject the LESSEE as hereinafter set forth;
Moreover, Article 1673 of the Civil Code gives the case as well as lack of cause of action. Said motion
lessor the right to judicially eject the lessees in case of and a subsequent motion for reconsideration were
non-payment of the monthly rentals. A contract of dismissed by the RTC. Arreza filed a petition for
lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging that the
commutative contract by which the owner temporarily Orders dated February 4 and March 20, 1997, were
grants the use of his property to another, who issued against clear provisions of pertinent laws, the
undertakes to pay the rent therefor.[64] For failure to Rules of Court, and established jurisprudence such that
pay the rent, petitioners have no right to remain in the respondent court acted without or in excess of
leased premises. jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition was
EDGAR ARREZA vs. MONTANO DIAZ, JR. dismissed for lack of merit. The CA held that res
G.R. No. 133113 30 August 2001 judicata does not apply because the interpleader case
only settled the issue on who had a better right. It did
FACTS: not determine the partiesrespective rights and
obligations. The action filed by Diaz seeks principally
Bliss Development owned a housing unit located at Lot the collection of damages in the form of the payments
27, Block 30, New Capitol Estates, Quezon City. It filed Diaz made to Bliss and the value of the improvements
before RTC Makati Branch 146 a complaint for he introduced on the property matters that were not
interpleader in the midst of a conflict of ownership adjudicated upon in the previous case for interpleader.
between Edgar Arreza and Montano Diaz, Jr. The trial
court ruled on the interpleader in favor of Arreza, and ISSUE:
Bliss, in view of that decision, made a contract to sell
the property to Arreza and Diaz was ordered to Whether or not Diazs claims for reimbursement
transfer possession and fruits of the property to against Arreza are barred by res adjudicata.
Arreza. Thereafter, Diaz sued Arreza, Domingo Tapay
and Bliss before RTC Makati Branch 59. He sought to RULING:
hold Bliss and Arreza liable for the reimbursement to
him of P1,706,915.58 representing the cost of The court in a complaint for interpleader shall
acquisition and improvements on the property with 8% determine the rights and obligations of the parties and
interest per annum. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights,
the case, citing as grounds res adjudicata or obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put
conclusiveness of the judgment in the interpleader forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his
rights. That party in this case referred to respondent compulsory counterclaim, which is now barred. There
Diaz. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of being a former final judgment on the merits in the
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the prior case, rendered in Civil Case No. 94-2086 by
parties in an interpleader action may file Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which
counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and acquired jurisdiction over the same parties, the same
responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these subject property, and the same cause of action, the
Rules. The second paragraph was added to Section 5 present complaint of respondent herein (Diaz) against
to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and petitioner Arreza docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1372
claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a before the Regional Trial of Makati, Branch 59 should
complete adjudication of the controversy and its be dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata.
incidents. Pursuant to said Rules, respondent should
have filed his claims against petitioner Arreza in the LEONCIA BACLAYON, et. al. vs. COURT OF
interpleader action. Having asserted his rights as a APPEALS, et. al.
buyer in good faith in his answer, and praying relief G.R. No. 89132 26 February 1990
therefor, respondent Diaz should have crystallized his
demand into specific claims for reimbursement by FACTS:
petitioner Arreza. This he failed to do. Having failed to
set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of Leoncia, Martin, Policarpio, Hilarion, Ireneo, Juliana and
respondent Diaz being in the nature of a compulsory Tomas, all surnamed Baclayon; Rosendo, Felicidad and
counterclaim is now barred. Elements of res judicata: Silvestra, all surnamed Abanes; and Tomasa, Leoncia,
(1) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court Anacleto, Monica, Guillerma and Gertrudes all
which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the surnamed Abellare filed with the then CFI-Cebu,
parties and the subject matter; (c) it must be a Branch 2, in Civil Case No. R-11185, a complaint for
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be recovery of ownership and possession, and damages,
between the first and second causes of action identity against spouses Marciano Bacalso and Gregoria
of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. In the Sabandeja of Lot No. 5528 of the Cebu Cadastre. The
present case, we find there is an identity of causes of trial court ruled in favor of spouses Bacalso, declaring
action between Civil Case No. 94-2086 and Civil Case them owners of the subject lot, which decision was
No. 96-1372. Respondent Diaz's cause of action in the appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the trial
prior case, now the crux of his present complaint courts decision holding that the heirs of the late
against petitioner, was in the nature of an unpleaded Matias Baclayaon owned the land at bar. The decision
in favor of the petitioners having become final and
executory, they filed a motion for execution of judgment. Sad to say, we have to cut this straw. We
judgment and possession which was opposed by the disagree with the respondent court that any
private respondents. The private respondents argued counterclaim for reimbursement of the value of the
that since they were builders in good faith, they were improvements thereon by reason of private
entitled to the reimbursement of the necessary and respondents' being builders in good faith, which
useful expenses incurred from the owner of the land. presupposes that they are not the owners of the land,
The presiding judge of RTC Cebu Branch 15, Hon. would run counter to the defense of ownership and
German Lee, granted the motion for execution and therefore could not have been set up before the trial
ordered the judgment to be executed. Private court. It should be emphasized that Rule 8, Section 2
respondents appealed the said order but it was of the Rules of Court allows a party to set forth two or
dismissed by Lee. Later, private respondents filed a more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense
CA concerning the orders of the RTC Cebu which was or in separate causes of action or defenses. A
granted by respondent court, thereby setting aside the corollary question that We might as well resolve now
trial courts orders and ordering the same court to hear (although not raised as an issue in the present
respondents evidence that they were builders in good petition, but conformably with Gayos, et al. v. Gayos,
faith. et al., G.R. No. L-27812, September 26, 1975, 67 SCRA
146, that it is a cherished rule of procedure that a
RULING: court should always strive to settle the entire
The rule is well established that once a decision has controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
become final and executory the only jurisdiction left branch to bear the seeds of future litigation) is
with the trial court is to order its execution. To require whether or not the private respondents can still file a
now the trial court in a hearing supplementary to separate complaint against the petitioners on the
execution, to receive private respondents' evidence to ground that they are builders in good faith and
prove that they are builders in good faith of the consequently, recover the value of the improvements
improvements and the value of said improvements, is introduced by them on the subject lot. The case of
to disturb a final executory decision; which may even Heirs of Laureano Marquez v. Valencia, 99 Phil. 740,
cause its substantial amendment. It appears that the provides the answer: "If, aside from relying solely on
private respondent's opposition to the motion for the the deed of sale with a right to repurchase and failure
execution of the judgment, possession and demolition on the part of the vendors to purchase it within the
is their last straw to prevent the satisfaction of the period stipulated therein, the defendant had set up an
alternative though inconsistent defense that he had residents of Project 4 in Quezon City, praying that the
inherited the parcel of land from his late maternal Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation and
grandfather and presented evidence in support of both Government Service Insurance System be compelled
defenses, the overruling of the first would not bar the to litigate between themselves their conflicting claims
determination by the court of the second. The over Project 4. PHHC leased out housing units to
defendant having failed to set up such alternative plaintiffs in 1953. The lessees, paying monthly rentals
defenses and chosen or elected to rely on one only, therefor, were assured by competent authority that
the overruling thereof was a complete determination after 5 years of continuous occupancy, they would be
of the controversy between the parties which bars a entitled to purchase these units. In 1961, the PHHC
subsequent action based upon an unpleaded defense, announced that the management, administration and
or any other cause of action, except that of failure of ownership of Project 4 would be transferred to GSIS in
the complaint to state a cause of action and of lack of payment of PHHS debts to GSIS. PHHC also asked the
jurisdiction of the Court. The determination of the tenants to signify their conformity to buy the housing
issue joined by the parties constitutes res judicata." units at the selling price indicated on the back thereof,
agreeing to credit the tenants, as down payment on
the selling price, 30% of what had been paid by them
as rentals. The tenants accepted the PHHC offer, and
on March 27, 1961, the PHHC announced in another
circular that all payments made by the tenants after
March 31, 1961 would be considered as amortizations
or installment payments. By the end of 1960,
administration and ownership of Project 4 was turned
over to GSIS. PHHC, however, through its new
JOSE BELTRAN vs. PEOPLES HOMESITE & Chairman-General Manager, Esmeraldo Eco,
HOUSING CORPORATION refused to recognize agreements previously entered
into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its legal rights to
G.R. No. L-25138 28 August 1969 enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its
contention by both the Government Corporate
FACTS:
Counsel and the Secretary of Justice. Plaintiffs thus
In 1962, an interpleader suit was commenced by Jose claimed that these conflicting claims between
Beltran, et. al. in their own behalf and in behalf of the PHHC and GSIS caused them great inconvenience and
incalculable moral and material damage, as they did not by a motion to dismiss heard by mere oral
not know to whom they should pay the monthly manifestations in open court," and that they "do not
amortizations or payments. know who, as between the GSIS and the PHHC, is
the right and lawful party to receive their
TC: Designated the People's First Savings Bank, QC "to monthly amortizations as would eventually entitle
receive in trust the payments from the plaintiffs on them to a clear title to their dwelling units."
their monthly amortizations on PHHC lots and to be
released only upon proper authority of the Court." ISSUE:

PHHC and GSIS filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint Whether the dismissal of the complaint for
of Beltran, et al. for failure to state a cause of action as interpleader was proper?
well as to lift the Court's order designating the People's
First Savings Bank as trustee to receive the tenants' RULING:
payments on the PHHC lots. TC granted the Motion, Yes. Plaintiffs entirely missed the vital element of an
ruling that the counsel for GSIS ratified the allegations action of interpleader. Rule 62, section 1 of the Revised
in his motion and made of record that GSIS has no Rules of Court requires as an indispensable element
objection that payments on the monthly amortizations that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter
be made directly to PHHC. There was thus no dispute are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-
as to whom the residents pay and therefore no cause interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the
of action for interpleading. Counsel for defendants subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part
went further to say that whatever dispute, if any, is not disputed by the claimants."
may exist between the two corporations over
the lots and buildings in Project 4, payments While PHHC and GSIS may have conflicting claims
made to the PHHC will not and cannot in any between themselves with regard to the management,
way affect or prejudice the rights of the administration and ownership of Project 4, such
residents thereof as they will be credited by either of conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do
the two defendants. they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is
made in their complaint that any corporation other
On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their
dismissing their suit, contending the allegations in lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any
their complaint "raise questions of fact that can be claim or demand for payment of the rentals or
established only by answer and trial on the merits and amortization payments. The questions of fact raised in
their complaint concerning the enforceability, and Culbertson and Fritz, the original owner of MFC 201.
recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition For its second cause of action, the Corporation alleged
of the turnover agreement of December 27, 1961 that MFC 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy
between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant clerk of court in behalf of the Corporation is null and
to their action of interpleader, for these conflicting void because it was issued in violation of the
claims, loosely so-called, are between the two Corporations by-laws, which require the surrender and
corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant cancellation of the outstanding MFC 201 before
corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as issuance may be made to the transferee of a new
pointed out by the trial court that the monthly certificate duly signed by its president and secretary,
payments and amortizations should be made directly aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of
to the PHHC alone. Manila in civil case 26044 is not binding upon
defendant Tan. The Corporation prayed for the
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB vs. LEE issuance of an order requiring Lee and Tan to
WON interplead and litigate their conflicting claims,
G.R. No. L-23851 26 March 1976 declaring who the lawful owner of MFC 201 is, and
ordering the surrender and cancellation of MFC 201-
FACTS: serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee. The trial
court dismissed the complaint upon motion of the
Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, a non-stock, civic and defendants on the grounds of res judicata, failure of
athletic corporation organized under the laws of the the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by
Philippines, filed a complaint of interpleader. It prescription.
alleged, for its first cause of action, that defendants
Lee Won and Bienvenido Tan were both claiming ISSUE:
ownership over the Corporations membership fee
certificate (MFC) 201: Won, by virtue of the decision Whether or not the action of interpleader was proper
of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 and by MFC and timely filed.
201-serial no. 1478 issued on Oct. 17, 1963 by the HELD:
deputy clerk of court for and in behalf of the president
and secretary of the corporation and of the Peoples No. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the
Bank & Trust Company; Tan, on the other hand, by complaint. The action of interpleader, under 120 of
virtue of MFC 201-serial no. 1199 issued on July 24, the Code of Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a
1950 pursuant to an assignment in his favor by Swan, person who has personal property in his possession, or
an obligation to render wholly or partially, without situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot
claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks prosper because it was filed much too late. A
that the persons who claim the said personal property successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his
or who consider themselves entitled to demand defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and
compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate compelled to prove his claim anew against other
among themselves in order to determine finally who is adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a
entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy is collateral attack upon the judgment. In fine, the
afforded to protect a person not against double liability interpleader suit cannot prosper because the
but against double vexation in respect of one liability. Corporation had already been made independently
A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its application
the contending claimants to court. He need not await for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack
actual institution of independent suits against him upon the final judgment in the said civil case; Lee had
before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an already established his rights to MFC 201 in the civil
action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would
dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby
either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of
may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the
acts with reasonable diligence in view of the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the
environmental circumstances, the remedy is not said civil case might eventually be taken away from
barred. If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to
the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed be sued to final judgment in the said case, its
to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for
that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable
suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil delay.
case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it
offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to
implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual

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