Adaptive Protection Scheme for Smart Grids
S Voima*, H Laaksonen, K Kauhaniemi*
*University of Vaasa, P.O. Box 700 FI-65101 Vaasa, Finland, e-mail: sampo.voima@uva.fi; kimmo.kauhaniemi@uva.fi
ABB Oy Medium Voltage Products, P.O. Box 699 FI-65101 Vaasa, Finland, e-mail: hannu.laaksonen@fi.abb.com
Keywords: Distance protection, microgrid, Smart Grid,
adaptive protection.
Abstract
The amount of distributed generation (DG) connected to
distribution networks is increasing. This can cause challenges
for traditional protection of distribution networks due to bi-
directional power flows, fault current contribution of DG
units and grid code fault-ride-through (FRT) requirements.
During the normal, parallel with utility grid, operation, the
protection coordination may be compromised and nuisance or
delayed tripping may be experienced. After possible transition
to intended island operation the situation becomes even more
demanding from protection point of view due to low short-
circuit currents fed by DG units and sensitive dynamics.
Therefore, protection adaptation to different topology changes
will be more and more often required in the future distribution
networks. This paper evaluates the performance of different
protection methods in grid connected and in controlled island
operation modes of a part of medium voltage network. The
evaluation is done with PSCAD simulation software for an
example network. Finally, an adaptive protection scheme for
smart grids is proposed.
1 Introduction
Todays medium voltage (MV) distribution networks are in
transition towards future Smart Grids. The amount of
distributed generation (DG) connected to MV networks is
expected to increase steadily. The addition of active
distributed energy resources (DER), which include not only
DG but also energy storages and demand response, brings up
new requirements for protection that needs to adapt to
changes in the network topology and configuration. As a
result of changes in the direction of power flow and short
circuit levels due to the increasing number of DG units in MV
networks, the requirements for protection of distribution
networks and DG are getting more complicated. The
traditional, non-directional overcurrent based, protection
system is not anymore adequate. During intentional island
operation due to lack of short-circuit current and inertia, the
situation from protection sensitivity, selectivity and operation
speed perspective will become even more challenging.
Therefore, new adaptive protection solutions are needed.
In this paper different protection methods and situations are
analysed with a scheme that is based on a limited set of
different types of protection zones. The main features of the
1
zones are the number of connections to other zones as well as
the inclusion of the DG within the zone. A simulation study
on a sample network is carried out using PSCAD to compare
the performance of some of the chosen protection methods.
The focus is on the distribution systems and especially in the
MV level where relay protection is applied. In addition, the
protection is also analysed in controlled island operation
(microgrid) with PSCAD simulations.
As a result of the analysis a novel adaptive protection scheme
is proposed, which defines the protection system
configuration and settings based on information from the
system state.
2 Adaptive protection
The adaptive protection was developed in the 1980s. The
development was enabled by the increase of computer based
relaying which allowed the possibility to change relay
characteristics [1]. The evolving networks create the need for
adaptive protection as existing relay settings and protection
methods may become inappropriate. This requires adaptive
characteristics in protection and creates the need for relays
whose settings can be controlled in response to external
conditions [1].
Moving towards Smart Grids means active management of
the power system in all levels. This is accomplished by
controlling various active elements. Since the configuration
of the network and the state of the active elements is
constantly changing an adaptive protection concept will be
needed for Smart Grids. In addition, one more characteristic
of future Smart Grids is the controlled island operation for
part of the distribution network, which can also be viewed as
self-healing feature for Smart Grids as introduced in [2].
Having the possibility to transit into island operation can
potentially improve stability and reliability of the network. In
microgrids to achieve controlled island operation, power
balance within the system must be achieved and maintained
through local generation [3]. In addition, the protection
system needs to be quickly adapted to the new operating state
after the islanding. Normally microgrids are used in low
voltage network, but they could also be used for part of the
MV system as an ad hoc island in a fault situation. By
monitoring the system state, both loads and generation,
suitable MV feeder sections can be defined in advance.
Depending on the load/generation balances the size of
suitable islands to be used in fault cases may be different at
different times [3].
The protection system must be able to protect the network in
both possible connection states. In normal operation the
network sections capable to operate in an island mode will be
operated in parallel with the utility grid, and transition to
island operation is made when necessary. Nevertheless, island
operation produces challenges for protection as also indicated
in [4].
Many of the DG technologies are based on a DC/AC
converter at the grid interface [3]. During network faults the
short circuit current producing capability of these converters
is usually limited to only 2-3 times their rated current [5], [6]
or even less than that. Traditional overcurrent protection
scheme becomes infeasible with lack of short circuit current.
The main problems related to the DG protection are
identified, for example, in [7]. Very much the same issues are
valid for the Smart Grid protection [3].
3 Adaptive network protection schemes
Adaptive protection schemes have various requirements,
proposed solutions and methods. Buigues et al. [8] have
extensively gone through publications of microgrid protection
methods. They have made several conclusions based on their
review [8]:
x Whatever the microgrid protection methods, it is
likely that some kind of communication will be
necessary.
x Combined action of different protection techniques
might be necessary in order to get an optimal
protection system for microgrids.
x It might be necessary to use different settings and
even different methodologies for each fault
direction.
x Many solutions are based on dividing the network
into smaller zones.
This paper does a comparative study on selected protection
methods, with a scheme that is based on a limited set of
different types of protection zones. The scheme is analysed in
grid connected and in island modes of operation. In grid
connected mode the protection methods are compared with
and without DG connection. The number of connection of
each zone as well as the number of DG units within a zone is
analysed. The effects of different grid code requirements are
also examined.
Based on the analysis a protection method is proposed, and
the benefits of the proposed adaptive protection scheme are
illustrated. Novel adaptive protection scheme can in practice
be achieved by applying either centralized or de-centralized
intelligent protection management system relying on
extensive communication network, which assigns new
protection settings to Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED).
Not all protection methods are suitable for every situation or
network topology encountered. Unnecessary tripping of DER
units or feeders can occur due to faults in adjacent feeders and
fault current contribution from DER. Enabling the use of
different protection methods for different network
configurations and even the use of different methods in
different parts of the network may be necessary in order to
have acceptable protection speed and selectivity. This could
be done by changing the active protection function in each
2
IED or the settings of protection functions according to the
changes in the primary system.
In the simulations done in the following chapter only three
phase faults are examined. Fault locations are the same for
islanded and grid connected modes, with the addition of one
HV/MV substation busbar fault in grid connected mode.
The analysed and simulated protection methods are
directional overcurrent and distance protection.
3.1 Directional overcurrent protection
Directional overcurrent relays can be used when fault current
can flow in both directions through the relay location. In
order to have the ability to distinguish current direction,
voltage measurement is required in addition to the current
measurement.
The changes in short circuit current levels in microgrid pose
challenges for current based protection. The short circuit
current might be too low to differentiate between maximum
load current and the lowest short circuit currents. As with
non-directional overcurrent protection the selectivity is in
some cases achieved by time grading.
3.2 Distance protection
Distance protection is virtually independent on variations in
source impedance making it an interesting option when
researching the protection of microgrids, where the short
circuit current fed from the supporting network is lost. This
can be viewed as a key advantage of distance protection [9].
However, in [10] it is observed that load flow changes could
adversely affect the performance of the distance protection by
altering the measured impedance from actual positive
sequence impedance. DG unit between the distance relays
measurement point and the fault location could have negative
impact on the protection. As a result a DG unit appears as
intermediate in-feed to some protection relays. The same
problems arise in grid connected mode as well [11].
Impedance of a line is proportional to its length and by
measuring the impedance an indication of possible fault
situations is given. Distance protection uses current and
voltage to calculate fault impedance as is shown in equation
(1).
U
Z (1)
I
where Z is impedance, U is measured voltage and I is
measured current [11]. Measured impedance is compared
with predefined relay characteristics, and if the measured
impedance falls within these characteristics the situation is
detected as an internal fault. The impedance setting in the
relay determines the reach of the protection.
3.3 Grid codes and FRT requirements
Fault ride-through (FRT) or Low Voltage Ride-through
(LVRT) requirements for DG have been developed in order
to secure power system stability during fault conditions. This
obliges the DG units to support the grid during fault and
abnormal network conditions and to prevent unnecessary
disconnection of DG units due to faults. Therefore, to prevent
unnecessary tripping, faulty lines should be disconnected first
by the protection system and only after that the DG units are
disconnect according to their FRT/LVRT profile. Fast
operation of protection is required, and emphasised if there
are several protection zones. To achieve this communication
based protection methods and schemes are often required to
ensure selective operation.
3.4 Communication requirements
Communication requirements are different depending on
whether the communication is used directly for protection
(such as differential protection) or only used for transferring
network state information. In the proposed adaptive scheme
The system comprises of one 20 kV overhead line feeder with
a total length of 40 km. The 40 km segment is also separated
as a microgrid. The feeder is divided into three protection
zones with respective lengths of 10 km, 15 km and 15 km.
Circuit breakers have been connected between the zones.
Voltage and current are measured from those locations and
those measurements are used in the directional overcurrent
and distance protection. IEDs are connected to the network
and referred to by numbers as shown in figure 1. There are
five possible fault locations which are marked from as F1 to
F5 in figure 1. A fault marked as F1 is in the low voltage
network connected via 20/0.4 kV Dy-connected transformer.
Faults from F2 through F4 are in the MV network, as well as
the fault F5 which is in the MV busbar outside the islanded
part and thus not considered in island mode.
110 kV

the relays communicate with each other to get crucial

information on changes in network conditions. In this way the 110 / 20 kV
information needed to adjust protection settings for example
when transition to island operation has occurred is available.
Communication is also needed for managing the adaptive MV bus
F5

protection system [3]. 20 kV

Outgoing
MV feeders IED 1

4 Simulations
Pigeon Pigeon
10 km 10 km
In this chapter the simulations with an example network are F1&F2
carried out with PSCAD transient simulation software. In the
simulations a three phase fault is simulated in different
F4
locations. The simulation model is depicted in the following IED 2
chapter, followed by the different simulations done, and G
IED 3
finally the results of the simulations. DG unit 1
Pigeon
15 km
(converter based,
1.5 MVA)
4.1 Simulation model
F3
Pigeon
The example network is presented in figure 1. The examined 15 km
IED 4 IED 5
system consists of two generators and a network with
overhead line. A part of the network is possible to be used as DG unit 2
(converter based,
a microgrid. The coloured area in figure 1 shows the part that G 1.5 MVA)

can be disconnected as a microgrid.

The two generators connected are identical in their rated
power (1.5 MVA), and their maximum current output has
been limited to 1.2 p.u. They represent typical converter
interfaced DG units. They are modelled as controlled voltage
sources. In grid connected mode both operate in current
control mode to output a desired power (constant P and Q). In
island operation one is set as a master unit operating with
constant frequency and keeping the voltage the nominal
value, while the other unit continues to operate in PQ control
mode. The DG units are connected to the network in locations
shown in figure 1, one 10 km from the start of the feeder and
the other 15 km further.
Load consists of mainly constant impedance based passive
loads connected evenly throughout the network, small part of
the load is constant power load connected to a single phase.
Also few diode loads have been included. A total load of 0.82
MW and 0.22 MVAr has been connected to the microgrid
part of the network. The system earthing method is chosen to
be isolated, and thus the disconnection of the microgrid from
the secondary side does not affect the earthing method.
Figure 1: Simulated network.
4.2 Simulations
Simulation runs are done for the above mentioned network in
both grid connected and in island modes. In each run the
faults are applied in the defined locations with a predefined
sequence so that the results for all fault locations are obtained
with one simulation run. The network is first simulated in grid
connected mode for the five fault situations followed by
simulations where the feeder is disconnected from the
supporting network and simulated as a microgrid in four fault
situations.
Table 1 below depicts fault starting times and fault locations
for both grid connected and islanded simulations. In all fault
cases the fault duration is 100 ms. In microgrid case the fault
F5 is not simulated and simulation ends at 3.0 s time.

3
 Time (s) Event 800
1.0 Fault F1 in LV network IED2 Island

1.5 Fault F2 in MV network 600 IED2 NODG

Current / A
2.0 Fault F3 in MV network IED2 DG
400
2.5 Fault F4 in MV network
3.0 Fault F5 in MV busbar 200
3.5 End of simulation
Table 1: Simulation sequence. 0
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Time / s
4.3 Simulation results Figure 3: Fault current magnitudes in both operating modes as
measured from IED 2.
In this chapter the most interesting simulation results are
shown and discussed. The results from directional overcurrent The figure 4 represents impedance measured from IED 2
protection simulations are presented first, followed by results during fault F2 in island operation. The distance relay
from distance protection simulations. characteristics have been drawn to equal 85 % of the line
The following figure (figure 2) shows current measurement of length (green line). It can be observed that fault F2 is within
three relays (IED 2, IED 3 and IED 4) for faults in microgrid. the reach settings and the relay detects the fault accurately.
The fault starting times and their type can be seen from table The fault in the LV network, F1 was also simulated and not
1, and fault locations from the figure 1. For fault F1, in the detected by the IED 2. The measured resistance varied from
LV network, all the relays measure very similar currents and
60: to 86:, and reactance varied from 105: to 135:,
distinguishing where the fault is becomes a challenging task.
therefore the measured impedance is clearly outside the relay
During fault F2, IED 2 measures slightly bigger current than
characteristics. Faults F1 and F2 are both located 4km from
for fault F1, but in practice the difference is far too low for
DG1 and IED 2.
current based grading. For IEDs 2 and 3 the current
magnitude measurement is similar for three phase faults in 3

MV network than it is for three phase faults in LV network. 2

Reactance / :

Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish whether the fault is

in LV or in MV network. For fault F1 the directional ability 1

does not give value for IED 4 as it sees the fault in the same 0
direction as IED 2. Directional ability is, nonetheless, needed Impedance
for IED 3 to be able to not to operate for faults F1 and F2. -1
Relay characteristics
Furthermore, fuse to relay coordination between MV feeder 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
protection and LV system protection becomes even more Resistance / :
important, which possibly increases the operation time of the Figure 4: Impedance characteristics of IED 2 and F2.
MV network protection.
120 Figure 5 has impedance measurement from IED 3 during fault
IED2 Current
100 IED3 Current
F3 in both grid connected mode with DG units and in
80
IED4 Current microgrid. As can be seen from the figure 5, both impedance
measurements are outside of the drawn relay characteristics,
Current / A

60
85 % of line length, and are accurately measured because the
40 fault is located at the end of the feeder. IED 4 trips to this
20 fault in the 1st time grading zone while IED 3 trips in the 2 nd
time grading zone, and therefore fault clearing for faults near
0
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 the end of the feeders is time delayed. This clearly illustrates
Time / s
how the distance protection is immune to the source
Figure 2: Fault current magnitudes in island mode.
impedance size and type.
In the figure 3 it can be seen that the fault currents are very 6
similar in grid connected mode, regardless of DG connection.
Reactance / :

Overcurrent based protection can be used in grid connected 4

mode. The current magnitudes during island operation,

2
however, are much smaller. As seen from the figure 3 the
Impedance microgrid
fault current measured for fault F2 during island operation is 0 Impedance grid connected
only marginally greater than the current flowing through the Relay characteristics
feeder during normal operation in grid connected mode with 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
DG units connected. As a result fault detection with current Resistance / :
based protection in islanded mode is not possible without a Figure 5: Impedance characteristics of IED 3 and F3.
complete change in protection settings.
Similar results were observed from the simulation for other
fault situations and other IEDs also. Table 2 shows the results

4
of the measured current magnitudes from every IED during
fault situations in grid connected mode with DG units
connected and in island mode. The results are given in
amperes. The results show that for grid connected mode the
directional overcurrent protection can be viable, but in island
operation it becomes inadequate. Simulation results also
showed that during island mode it might be possible to use
overcurrent based protection in some situations, but when the
maximum load current is very close to the lowest short circuit
currents discrimination between fault and heavy load
situations becomes challenging. Furthermore, faults in LV
network will be erroneously detected. Distance protection
performed much better in island mode and was able to detect
all simulated faults. Additionally, distance protection did not
detect fault F2 in the LV network.
F1 F2 F3 F4
Grid Island Grid Island Grid Island Grid Island Grid
IED 1 95 - 1632 - 732 - 496
IED 2 69 70 99 95 732 0 496
IED 3 25 55 50 55 733 52 507
IED 4 32 55 50 55 49 53 506
IED 5 13 15 0 0 0 0 513
Table 2: Current magnitudes during faults in amperes [A].
The use of distance protection, however, has its limitations. It
is usable in situations where the connection is of the above
type, that is, the measurements are taken from both sides of a
DG. Distance protection requires a source of fault current
flowing through the measurement points. The simulations
above studied situations where measurements are taken from
both directions of a DG. Overcurrent based protection can be
more versatile in comparison to distance protection when it
comes to circuit breaker topology. Therefore, it is not always
easy to say which protection method is the best for any
situation.
5 Proposed Scheme
As illustrated in the simulations above it is clear that an
adaptive protection scheme is needed for Smart Grids. Basing
on the information about the system configuration and the
statuses of the DG units the protection system needs to be
adapted. Assuming that we have a fixed set of IEDs in the
network the adapting means primarily two things:
x enabling or disabling different protection functions,
x adjusting the settings of the applied protection
functions.
For proper operation an adaptive scheme we need to collect
information from the system and then make decision about
the adjustments needed for the protection system. This can be
accomplished with a suitable protection management system
consisting various intelligent devices and suitable
communication means.
The decision making could be based on either centralised or
de-centralised intelligence. In centralised decision making
one central controller receives information from the network
and according to the input it receives it either selects or
calculates new protection settings for the whole network, and
transmits the new protection settings forward to protection
devices. In de-centralised decision making for example all
protection zones are responsible of protecting their own zone
and independently gather necessary information to make
decision on how to change protection settings related to that
specific zone.
This kind of adaptive scheme has basically relatively low
requirements for the needed communication system. This
considers both the speed of the communication links and their
availability. The situation would be different if the
communication is used also for protection (for example with
line differential protection). However, in any case the
protection system should be designed so that there is valid
backup protection operating in case the communication
system fails. A challenge for the adaptive protection system is
F5 also the validity of the system data collected. There could be
some missing or erroneous data and it should be taken care
- 101
that any resulting hazards are avoided. Also the cyber security
issues are vital in this respect.
0 101
The figure 6 represents an example case where an adaptive
52 47 scheme can be used to determine the protection method and
52 47 precalculated settings groups for IEDs. A particular setting
103 1 group is selected based on, for example, the number of DG
connections in the zone. Telecommunication is used to
transfer the status information of the network topology to
IEDs. There are different types of protection zones, which are
separated by the number connection to other zones and by the
number of DG connection. Their behaviour is different
whether or not there is DG present in the zone. Moreover, the
type of a zone can change when changing the connection
status of a DG unit, or by changing the status of circuit
breakers. If a bi-directional power flow is possible in the
zone, the protection needs to be able to differentiate the fault
direction, such as the directional overcurrent or distance
protection.
When changing to island mode the protection must be
adjusted by either changing the protection method, for
example from overcurrent to distance protection, or by
changing the relay settings or settings groups. The settings of
IEDs may depend on the size of the formed island. IEDs
included in the island may have to change to which IEDs they
send interlocking signals to according to the size of the island.
Like the simulations showed (figure 2) overcurrent based
protection cannot selectively distinguish between MV and LV
faults. The simulations furthermore showed that distance
protection is able to selectively distinguish between faults in
the MV and LV networks. In the figure 6 also LV loads are
considered, and protection method should be chosen also
considering LV faults. Further, based on the simulations and
the analysis, it is safe to say that overcurrent protection
cannot be used if fault current levels within the island are
close to the maximum load current. Therefore, distance
protection may be suitable to be used in island operation.
Depending on the connections between the protection zones
and applied protection methods it is also necessary to make
sure the selective operation of the protection of different
zones. In practice this may be achieved by applying suitable
time grading or by a telecommunication based interlockings.
The former in some cases may lead quite long time delays
5
which may not be acceptable, and therefore a fast and secure
communication links are needed for interlockings. Referring
to the figure 6 below, for example, the faults in the branch
(upward direction, protected by directional overcurrent relay)
can be detected from the main feeder, depending on reach of
the distance relays, leading to danger of both the distance and
directional overcurrent protection operating in the faults at the
branched zone. This problem can be solved so that when
detecting a fault in the branched zone, the directional
overcurrent relay at the branch sends an interlocking message
to the distance relays at the neighbouring zone. Another
option would be the use of longer time delay for the first zone
of the distance relays, but that might not be possible if there is
DG within the zone as in the figure below. Furthermore, in
grid connected mode fast detection and separation of faults is
necessary to prevent nuisance tripping, as the protection of
DG units disconnect the generation according to their
FRT/LVRT profile.
The target is to select the most suitable protection method and
settings according to the current topology, and apply them
every time a change in the network topology happens. For
zones with only one connection to other zones the settings can
be extended to reach to the end of the zone. Zones with two or
more zone connections should use time grading depending on
the DG connections. Reach settings can be selected according
to DG connections and reach that must be covered. When fast
communication is used the interlocking commands can be
used to block unnecessary tripping instead of time grading.
Also with communication the fastest reach settings for
distance relays can be set to reach over the adjacent zone
border and fault direction information is sent to both
directions by all IEDs enabling the faulted zone to be detected
in that way and used to selectively operate the correct IED.
Figure 6: Example network.
6 Conclusions
An adaptive protection scheme for Smart Grids has been
demonstrated in this paper. Comparison between directional
overcurrent and distance protection has been simulated. The
results showed that distance protection can with little to no
changes to settings perform well in island operation. The
simulations also suggested that adaptation of distance
protection would be rather easy. When the scope is expanded
to cover also two phase and earth faults the viability of
distance protection must be further studied. Directional
overcurrent may fail to operate selectively in island operation.
Directional overcurrent protection requires a clear margin
with maximum load current and fault currents to have any
consideration. Benefits of the proposed scheme are
maintaining selective operation after topology changes. The
method explained in figure 6 is intended to go under more
specific studies in future work and papers. The proposed
adaptive protection scheme was applied for studying the
suitability of different protection methods to different kinds of
protection zones. It enables full integration of the DG to the
grid and provides means to utilize the DG also in the
controlled island operation of a small part of the network.
Acknowledgements
This work was carried out in the Smart Grids and Energy
Markets (SGEM) research program coordinated by CLEEN
Ltd. with funding from the Finnish Funding Agency for
Technology and Innovation, Tekes.
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