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Danika Li
U0888022
Introduction
protests and demonstrations by students that became more widely known as the 89
Democracy Movement. Students began gathering again in April when reformist General
Secretary Hu Yaobang died, and students called for the continuation of his democratizing
legacy. Throughout April, there were multiple clashes between students and police forces,
and following Hus funeral on April 22, serious rioting began to break out to the alarm of
From the very beginning of the movement, the party experienced deep divisions
between its elite leaders. This division could be seen most clearly between General
Secretary Zhao Ziyang and Premier Li Peng. Zhao was in favor of conciliatory tactics to
handle the student protestors, whereas Li advocated hardline tactics to suppress the
movement. When Zhao left for North Korea on April 23, Li and party official Deng Xiaoping
took initiative and released the April 26 Editorial, branding the student movement as an
anti-government revolution (Zhang, 2001, p. 10-12). This was the beginning of the
The divisions between Li and Zhao culminated in many unproductive meetings, and
declarations and conciliatory meetings with student leaders. Zhaos speeches on May 3-4
condoned the student movement as legitimate and patriotic, essentially negating the
official message of the April 26 Editorial and revealing party divisions to the public.
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The lack of cohesive decisive action by the party gave time for the movement to gain
momentum, and on May 13, about 300,000 students gathered in Tiananmen Square and
staged a hunger strike as similar strikes broke out across the country (Zhang, 2001, p. 4).
This hunger strike came two days before Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was scheduled to
visita meeting critical to party leaders as it signaled the revival of Sino-Soviet relations.
a humiliation to the party, and on May 19, it was decided that martial law would be
soldiers, from the countrys military regions were mobilized, but protestors blocked the
army troops, appealing them to join the protests (Wu, 2009). With the advancement of the
As the protests showed no sign of dissipating, the decision was made on June 3 to
remobilize the army and strictly enforce the military crackdown. That night, citizens were
instructed to stay inside, but many poured out to block the advancement as they had during
the initial troop mobilization. However, violent engagements occurred throughout the
night and into the next day, and the increasing death toll culminated in what is now known
as the Tiananmen Square Massacre, or the June Fourth Incident. The early hours and day of
June 4 resulted in the death of anywhere between a few hundred to a few thousand
Looking back on 1989, the escalation of events and their handling by the Communist
Party depicts a party and nation in turmoil. Traditional strategic logic argues that attacking
ones own civilian base undermines long-term stability, and that political violence is the
result of irrational decisions driven by fear. However, Kalyvas (2004) argues that although
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violence against civilians may seem irrational, the rational motivator of violence is to
cement power and deter defection. The motivators behind the Communist Partys decision
to remobilize the troops onto Tiananmen Square are found in the partys organizational
culture, inflexibility, and desire to control the narrative received by domestic and
June 3rd mobilization was incredibly successful, and galvanized a decade of Communist
Party crackdown and power consolidation. By looking at the motivators, methods, and
implications of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, one can gain a deeper understanding of
Motivators
The key motivator of the Communist Party to re-mobilize PLA troops and attack
civilians, despite international norms, can be traced back to the organizational structure
and culture of the party. In this case, I also argue that not only are decisions affected by
structured in a highly hierarchical way, and its strength is based on unwavering deference
to party leadership. Therefore, the key organizational component of the party is that it
attributed to its monopoly on expertise, the complexity of the issue, as well as the time
frame of the issue. However, the concept of the sacred and non-negotiable beliefs (Francis,
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2015) may create a deeper understanding or organizational culture. While Legro asserts
that the impact of culture is decided by three factors, I believe that the complexity of the
issue is much less applicable to the decision of party elites to attack their civilians. The
crux of the issue was simply that demonstrators broke the hold the Communist Party had
on society, undermining its authority and therefore the logical reaction was to engage or
attack.
on power (the ability to act on this expertise), military action is driven entirely on the
decisions of elites. Within this structure, theres no room for political opposition. To the
party, its most sacred and strict goal is to maintain political homogeneity, with full support
and dedication from all citizens expected at all times. From the beginning of the protests,
party elites viewed the protests as an attempt to undermine the power of the party, and
therefore their core belief was violated. This is evidenced in statements made by top party
officials such as Deng Xiaoping, who stated, We must not give an inch on the basic
principle of upholding Communist Party rule and rejecting a Western multiparty system,
The more impervious the party is to external influences, the more internal organizational
organization holds, the more organizational culture has an impact on decisions (Legro,
1997). Essentially, the actions of the party are dictated by expertise that comes from within
the party, as no other organizations in society are capable of gathering information and
experts.
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Another aspect of the issue that contributed to the decision to mobilize was the time
frame. Legro asserts that the shorter the time frame on events, the more impact
Democracy Movement, the main escalations and major events were taking place in the span
of days and weeks between April to June. To the party, immediate and decisive action by
the party to dissolve the demonstrations was necessary to prevent the movement from
Because the partys sacred belief was the maintenance of its organizational
component (monopoly on power), it had stronger initial motivators to keep a hold on this
the shortened time frame of the 89 Democracy Movement had a stronger effect due to the
partys organizational monopoly on power. This in turn served to only reinforce the effect
While organization culture, components, and sacred beliefs had significant impacts
to be remembered that this was a weak and inflexible state. States that are weak either by
order to assure their own political survival (Mason and Krane, 1989). Mason and Krane
argue that for a cornered organization, its do or die, because reform spells certain death
for the already weakened state. Attempts at compromise emphasize that the organization
is unable to assert its strength and erodes its power base even further. In Mason and Krane,
its argued that the interests of economic elites are what drive the decision to strike out at
civilians. A crucial distinction must be made at this point, which is that the Communist
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Party was weak not for lack of military capabilities, but because it was inflexible in its
beliefs.
In the case of the Communist Party, rather than the survival interests of economic
elites, it was the fear of party elites that they might lose power if they instated reforms.
Therefore, its important to understand why the Communist Party felt that it couldnt
reform without losing power. This requires a look back into history, at events such as the
Prague Spring of 1968. This was a period of time in USSR-dominated Czechoslovakia where
political liberalization began to take hold. The loosening of political freedoms was ill
received by the Soviets, and the movement took eight months to fully repress because it
gained too much momentum (CIA, 2013). Additionally, there was the Polish Solidarity
Movement, a broad anti-communist movement in the 1980s that lead to the eventual
dismantlement of the communist system in Poland. This set an example to the rest of the
Eastern Bloc, and significant weakening of the communist government followed. This initial
(Britannica, 2016).
In light of these events, its not a far stretch to understand why the party leaders in
potentially galvanize the protestors and lead to the erosion of party power. The Communist
Party was weak because it felt it could not stand up to this reformist pressure if it gave any
ground, and therefore the decision was made to attack and maintain power instead of
The actions chosen because of these motivators may be best understood as a costly
form of signaling specifically the intimidation logic of Kydd and Walter (2006). Kydd and
able to signal the costs of continuing a certain policy, as well as asserting the strength of the
organization over its opponents. The goal of suppressing the movement was ultimately to
assert the strength of the party over that of the demonstrators. However, it wasnt just a
the costs of defecting from the goals of the party. This is attributed to organizational
culture and non-negotiable/sacred beliefs the Communist Party had even more incentive
to intimidate the protestors because a central goal of the party was to portray and maintain
undermining their liability, but also with how to handle the reactions of the domestic and
international audience. The third and final motivator behind the Tiananmen Square
Massacre was a desire to control the narrative of events. Throughout the course of events
leading up to the massacre, the party made multiple attempts to portray the demonstrators
as the April 26 Editorial. However, after the numerous weaknesses within the party, there
was an additional incentive to portray to the international and domestic audiences that the
decision to strike wasnt a desperate attempt to maintain power, but to suppress an enemy
A tiny minority is exploiting the students; they want to confuse the people and throw
the country into chaos. This is a well-planned plot whose real aim is to reject the
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Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system at the most fundamental level. We
must explain to the whole Party and nation that we are facing a most serious political
The overall narrative was that the partys actions were justified as being for the sake
of the people. According to Lyall et al (2013), the ability to effectively spin the narrative
gives organizations the capability to make attacks that would otherwise create civilian
backlash. By re-writing civilian aggression as either the result of the opponents actions or
as aggression necessary to defeat the opponent, an organization gains more social capital to
commit strategically illogical actions. This extended to the decision to remobilize because
by completely suppressing the movement, the party gains a monopoly on presenting the
narrative to the domestic audience. The effectiveness of this can also be heavily attributed
to the structure of the party and the way it governed its citizens through heavy
propaganda. By controlling the spin on events, the government is able to portray to the
people that its still in power and also gives it space to mobilize the troops into Tiananmen
Square, which would normally eat away at their long-term civilian support base.
On the other side of this was also the desire of the party to control the narrative of
domestic events to its international audience. The impact of Gorbachevs botched visit had
a deep effect on party elites in front of a major Communist leader, the Chinese
government had shown that it was incapable of controlling its own citizens. By aggressively
and decisively shutting down the immediate demonstrations within a day or so, China was
showing the rest of the world (the other Communist regimes in particular) that it was still
in control. This would also help it to regain some of the reputation that had been tarnished
Effectiveness
Up until now, I have simply stated that the June 3 remobilization was extremely
effective as an assumption, and have analyzed three strong motivators for why it
happened: organizational culture/sacred belief, a weak and inflexible state, and a desire to
control narrative. However, what made the Tiananmen Square Massacre so much more
decisive and effective over the prior attempt at clearing the square on May 20 is another
important dimension of the case to analyze. The primary difference observed between the
May 20 and June 3 mobilizations can be understood through the lens of the principal-agent
framework.
It may seem odd that given the partys emphasis on maintaining a monopoly of
power, it took so long for the party to take decisive action, which allowed the movement to
gain momentum. This can be attributed to the divisions within party elites, which crippled
the party from taking decisive actions. Had the party made the decision to fully suppress
the movement or fully engage and attempt to come to an agreement with the protestors,
the movement might not have ever snowballed. However, the party had an elite leader in
General Secretary Zhao who was openly opposing the messages being broadcasted by the
other party members such as Premier Li. With debates raging between the two sides of the
leadership, the movement eventually escalated to a point where the party felt that it had to
take action and signal to domestic and international audiences that it was still in power.
occurs when a principal is unable to control the actions of its agents, either through a
this case, the Communist Party was the principal, and the various factions of the army it
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called to the square its agents. During the initial attacks, there were instances of the
principal-agent problem occurring with specific military officers. One such instance
occurred in General Xu Qinxian, who refused to enforce martial law until General Secretary
Zhao had approved it as well (Wu, 2011). More importantly, however, was the principal-
agent problem as exacerbated by the incompetence of the deployed troops. Many of the
troops that were deployed were from peasant villages around the country, who had very
sparse understanding of the politically tumultuous situation they were about to enter, and
who were more excited for their first trip to Beijing than prepared for the coming
Once inside the city, interactions between troops and demonstrators were largely
peaceful, with students offering care and resources to soldiers and attempting to reason
with them and protecting them from attacks by other demonstrators. For soldiers who
already had a poor understanding of the politics of the situation, and who only had
exposure to their small villages, these acts of kindness created a confusing relationship
between the two, contrary to the strict in-group out-group classification presented by the
party. Throughout the course of the initial mobilization, troops developed ties with the
demonstrators, which took them out of alignment with their desired allegiance with the
Communist Party. Many troops found themselves unable and unwilling to shoot the
civilians who they either had previous local ties to, or whom they had connected with
throughout the initial four-day mobilization. After four days of being unable to gain any
During the interim between the failed mobilization and the June 3 mobilization,
even more PLA troops were pulled in. Even more critically, the troops from the initial
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deployment were taken and put through re-education programs that drilled into their
heads the belief that there was an enemy to the party and the people causing significant
turmoil to the country, and that these enemies needed to be removed at all costs (Zhang,
2001, p. 37). By essentially re-programming the ideals and beliefs of the party elite into
their soldiers, and by taking precautions to pull in more disciplined troops, the party
regained their hold on the agents. The more the agents goals can be pulled into alignment
with that of the principal, the less likely it is that agents will act on goals contrary to that of
the principal. Additionally, the party removed the insubordinate officers from the first
mobilization, signaling what would happen to other officers if they were to defect from the
cause.
By the time the second mobilization rolled around, the troops had largely been re-
educated, and although there were still a few individual instances of insubordination,
control by the party had been regained. With more decisive action by the leadership and an
emphasis on intolerance for failure, the party authorized troops to begin moving in on the
night of June 3. The principal-agent problem was therefore resolved in a few ways. First,
the wayward agents of the first mobilization had been re-educated and their goals
brought into strict alignment with the party. Second, the insubordinate officers who were
critical to maintaining principal control on the unit by unity level were removed and
replaced, thereby improving the partys capability of monitoring and ability to control the
actions of its agents through these intermediary agents. Third, the principal broadcasted
its message more aggressively and clearly, narrowing the margin for agents to interpret the
mechanisms, the party was able to effectively control its military agents throughout the
EVALUATING AND UNDERSTANDING TIANANMEN SQUARE 13
second deployment. The stark contrast between the two is evident during the May 20
mobilization, troops were stalled and pulled out after four days. In the case of the June 3
mobilization, the Square was cleared within a day or two, and protests around the country
Theoretical Implications
obviously has a profound impact on the understanding that theorists hold on Chinese
domestic policy, the real value comes from its predictive capabilities. Kalyvas (1999)
argues that through rational, targeted violence, governments can succeed in achieving
strategic goals through political violence. Tiananmen Square illustrates this concept, as the
Chinese government enjoyed increased stability and control following the events of June 4.
It is therefore vital to look at these rational motivators, and through analysis of these
choose to violate international norms and conventional strategic logic by attacking their
own civilians. The reason a government might choose to attack its own civilians, as
norms, how strong the regime is internally, and how capable it is of controlling the
Firstly, authoritarian regimes, from a structural and cultural point of view, are less
accountable to their citizens than democratic regimes (Morrow, 2007). This gives them
more freedom to violate international norms and still maintain control over their
to its constituents, and party decisions mostly centered on maintaining political survival.
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Additionally, the international audience that China was focused on wasnt the Western
world that championed these civilian rights norms, but the other authoritarian Communist
norms, China was able to easily make the decision to clear the square with force when the
Secondly, weak states that are unable to change either through capability or
inflexibility factors will strike out against opposition forces to maintain political survival
(Mason and Krane, 1989). The Chinese government was weak due to its inflexibility and
belief that it could not reform without losing power. Similarly, other governments that
believe their only choice is to either take out the opposition or lose power will make the
logical decision to try and maximize their chances of staying in power by lashing out. If this
pans out in favor of the state, then it consolidates its power base while also signaling to
potential defectors and dissenters what the costs of their actions will be.
Lastly, if a state believes that by striking out against dissenting or defecting civilians,
it can gain a monopoly on narrative control, it may be incentivized to strike out. In the case
of Tiananmen Square, the Chinese government already had all the parts in place to control
the narrative through their extensive propaganda machine. However, this was one of the
most major disruptions of Chinese social structure in modern history and therefore
required more effort than just propaganda to deter the students. Because reconciling was
not an option the party viewed as viable, the next best choice was to crush the
demonstrations in order to regain control over the narratives being portrayed to domestic
and international audiences. This narrative control in return consolidates the regimes
Conclusion
In sum, the decision of the Chinese government to remobilize troops and violently
clear our Tiananmen Square was a function of its authoritarian organizational culture and
emphasis on party unity/stability as a sacred belief, weaknesses both within the leadership
and inflexibility towards reforms, as well as its desire to control the narrative and flow of
was able to achieve its core strategic goals and solidify its power base for the coming
decades. By analyzing these factors within a shifting international and domestic context,
one can also begin to predict variations in decision-making by the similar governments, as
well as look to the future for what to expect from Chinese policy and responses to dissent.
EVALUATING AND UNDERSTANDING TIANANMEN SQUARE 16
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