VOL.

266, JANUARY 10, 1997 167

Paat vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.No.111107.January10,1997. *

LEONARDO A.PAAT, in his capacity as OfficerinCharge (OIC), Regional

ExecutiveDirector(RED),Region2andJOVITOLAYUGAN,JR.,inhiscapacityas
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), bothofthe
DepartmentofEnvironment and Natural Resources (DENR),
petitioners,vs.COURTOFAPPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his
capacity as Presiding JudgeofBranch 2, Regional TrialCourtat Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN,
respondents.

AdministrativeLaw;ExhaustionofAdministrativeRemedies;Beforeapartyisallowed
toseektheinterventionofthecourt,itisapreconditionthatheshouldhaveavailedofall
themeansofadministrativeprocessesaffordedhim.ThisCourtinalonglineofcaseshas
consistentlyheldthatbeforeapartyisallowedtoseektheinterventionofthecourt,itisa
precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
affordedhim.Hence,ifaremedywithintheadministrativemachinerycanstillberesorted
tobygivingtheadministrativeofficerconcernedeveryopportunitytodecideonamatter
thatcomeswithinhisjurisdictionthensuchremedyshouldbeexhaustedfirstbeforecourts
judicialpowercanbesought.Theprematureinvocationofcourtsinterventionisfatalto
ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is
susceptibleofdismissalforlackof
_______________

*
SECONDDIVISION.

168

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paat vs. Court of Appeals
causeofaction.Thisdoctrineofexhaustionofadministrativeremedieswasnotwithout
itspracticalandlegalreasons,foronething,availmentofadministrativeremedyentails
lesserexpensesandprovidesforaspeedierdispositionofcontroversies.Itisnolesstrueto
statethatthecourtsofjusticeforreasonsofcomityandconveniencewillshyawayfroma
disputeuntilthesystemofadministrativeredresshasbeencompletedandcompliedwithso
astogivetheadministrativeagencyconcernedeveryopportunitytocorrectitserrorandto
disposeofthecase.

Same;Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exceptions.However, we are not

amisstoreiteratethattheprincipleofexhaustionofadministrativeremediesastestedbya
batteryofcasesisnotanironcladrule.Thisdoctrineisarelativeoneanditsflexibilityis
calleduponbythepeculiarityanduniquenessofthefactualandcircumstantialsettingsof
acase.Hence,itisdisregarded(1)whenthereisaviolationofdueprocess,(2)whenthe
issueinvolvedispurelyalegalquestion,(3)whentheadministrativeactionispatently
illegalamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction,(4)whenthereisestoppelonthepartof
theadministrativeagencyconcerned, (5) whenthereis irreparableinjury, (6) whenthe
respondentisadepartmentsecretarywhoseactsasanalteregoofthePresidentbearsthe
implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings,(10)whentheruledoesnotprovideaplain,speedyandadequateremedy,and
(11)whentherearecircumstancesindicatingtheurgencyofjudicialintervention.

Same;Same;A party cannot, without violating the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies, seekcourts interventionbyfilinganactionfor replevinfor the
grantoftheirreliefduringthependencyofanadministrativeproceedings .Itwaseasyto
perceivethenthattheprivaterespondentslookeduptotheSecretaryforthereviewand
disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an
adequateandplainremedystillavailableandopentothemintheordinarycourseofthe
law.Thus,theycannotnow,withoutviolatingtheprincipleofexhaustionofadministrative
remedies,seekcourtsinterventionbyfilinganactionforreplevinforthegrantoftheir
reliefduringthependencyofanadministrativeproceedings.
169

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 169

Paat vs. Court of Appeals
Same;Same;Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction;Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdictionoverwhichisinitiallylodgedwithanadministrativebodyofspecialcompetence.
Moreover,itisimportanttopointoutthattheenforcementofforestrylaws,rulesand
regulationsandtheprotection,developmentandmanagementofforestlandsfallwithinthe
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by
private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrativeagencysprerogative.Thedoctrineofprimaryjurisdictiondoesnotwarrant
acourttoarrogateuntoitselftheauthoritytoresolveacontroversythejurisdictionover
whichisinitiallylodgedwithanadministrativebodyofspecialcompetence.

Same;Same;Due Process;Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked

where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration .To
sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy
beyondthepaleoftheprincipleofexhaustionofadministrativeremediesandfallwithin
the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances
prevailinginthiscase,wecannotbutruleouttheseassertionsofprivaterespondentstobe
withoutmerit.First,theyarguedthattherewasviolationofdueprocessbecausetheydid
notreceivetheMay23,1989orderofconfiscationofpetiionerLayugan.Thiscontentionhas
nolegtostandon.Dueprocessdoesnotnecessarilymeanorrequireahearing,butsimply
anopportunityorrighttobeheard.Onemaybeheard,notsolelybyverbalpresentation
but also, andperhapsmanytimesmorecreditablyandpracticablethanoral argument,
throughpleadings. Inadministrative proceedings moreover, technical rules ofprocedure
andevidencearenotstrictlyapplied;administrativeprocesscannotbefullyequatedwith
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfullyinvokedwhereapartywasgiventhechancetobeheardonhismotionfor
reconsideration,asintheinstantcase,whenprivaterespondentswereundisputedlygiven
theopportunitytopresenttheirsidewhentheyfiledaletterofreconsiderationdatedJune
28,1989whichwas,
170

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paat vs. Court of Appeals
however,deniedinanorderofJuly12,1989ofExecutiveDirectorBaggayan.

Statutes;StatutoryConstruction;Statutesshouldbeconstruedinthelightoftheobject
tobeachievedandtheevilormischiefto besuppressed,andtheyshouldbegivensuch
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended.TheSecretaryandhisdulyauthorizedrepresentativesaregiventheauthority
toconfiscateandforfeitanyconveyancesutilizedinviolatingtheCodeorotherforestlaws,
rulesandregulations.Thephrasetodisposeofthesameisbroadenoughtocovertheact
offorfeitingconveyancesinfavorofthegovernment.Theonlylimitationisthatitshouldbe
made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies onthe matter. In the
constructionofstatutes,itmustbereadinsuchawayastogiveeffecttothepurpose
projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended.

Same;Same;When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any
extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.With the introduction of
ExecutiveOrderNo.277amendingSection68ofP.D.705,theactofcutting,gathering,
collecting,removing,orpossessingforestproductswithoutauthorityconstitutesadistinct
offenseindependentnowfromthecrimeoftheftunderArticles309and310oftheRevised
PenalCode,butthepenaltytobeimposedisthatprovidedforunderArticle309and310of
theRevisedPenalCode.ThisisclearfromthelanguageofExecutiveOrderNo.277whenit
eliminated the phraseshall be guiltyof qualified theft as defined and punished under
Articles309and310oftheRevisedPenalCodeandinsertedthewordsshallbepunished
withthepenaltiesimposedunderArticle309and310oftheRevisedPenalCode.Whenthe
statuteisclearandexplicit,thereishardlyroomforanyextendedcourtratiocinationor
rationalizationofthelaw.
 Administrative Law;Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;Exhaustion of the
remediesintheadministrativeforum,beingaconditionprecedentpriortoonesrecourseto
thecourtsandmoreimportantly,beinganelementofprivaterespondentsrightofaction,
171

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 171

Paat vs. Court of Appeals
istoosignificanttobewaylaidbythelowercourt.Fromtheforegoingdisquisition,it
isclearthatasuitforreplevincannotbesustainedagainstthepetitionersforthesubject
trucktakenandretainedbythemforadministrativeforfeitureproceedingsinpursuantto
Section68AoftheP.D.705,asamended.Dismissalofthereplevinsuitforlackofcauseof
actioninviewoftheprivaterespondentsfailuretoexhaustadministrativeremediesshould
havebeenthepropercourseofactionbythelowercourtinsteadofassumingjurisdiction
over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
Exhaustionoftheremediesintheadministrativeforum,beingaconditionprecedentprior
to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private
respondentsrightofaction,istoosignificanttobewaylaidbythelowercourt.

Remedial Law;Replevin;Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin

proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the
possessionofproperty,thatthepropertyiswrongfullydetainedbythedefendant,alleging
thecauseofdetention,thatthesamehasnotbeentakenfortaxassessment,orseizedunder
execution,orattachment,orifsoseized,thatitisexemptfromsuchseizure,andtheactual
valueoftheproperty.Itisworthstressingatthispoint,thatasuitforreplevinisfounded
solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be
recovered.Itliestorecoverpossessionofpersonalchattelsthatareunlawfullydetained.
Todetainisdefinedastomeantoholdorkeepincustody,andithasbeenheldthat
thereistortioustakingwheneverthereisanunlawfulmeddlingwiththeproperty,oran
exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this,
without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. Under the Rules of Court, it is
indispensableinreplevinproceedingthattheplaintiffmustshowbyhisownaffidavitthat
heisentitledtothepossessionofproperty,thatthepropertyiswrongfullydetainedbythe
defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax
assessment,orseizedunderexecution,orattachment,orifsoseized,thatitisexemptfrom
suchseizure,andtheactualvalueoftheproperty.Privaterespondentsmiserablyfailedto
convincethisCourtthatawrongfuldetentionofthesubjecttruckobtainsintheinstant
case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was
transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest
contraventionofSection68ofP.D.705as
172

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paat vs. Court of Appeals
amendedbyE.O.277.Section68AofP.D.705,asamended,unquestionablywarrants
theconfiscationaswellasthedispositionbytheSecretaryofDENRorhisdulyauthorized
representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws.
Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for
administrativeforfeiture proceeding is legallypermissible, hence, no wrongful detention
existsinthecaseatbar.

Same;Certiorari;CourtsmaynotreviewthedecisionsoftheSecretaryexceptthrougha
specialcivilactionforcertiorariorprohibition.Moreover,thesuitforreplevinisnever
intendedasaproceduraltooltoquestiontheordersofconfiscationandforfeitureissuedby
theDENRinpursuancetotheauthoritygivenunderP.D.705,asamended.Section8ofthe
saidlawisexplicitthatactionstakenbytheDirectoroftheBureauofForestDevelopment
concerningtheenforcementoftheprovisionsofthesaidlawaresubjecttoreviewbythe
SecretaryofDENRandthatcourtsmaynotreviewthedecisionsoftheSecretaryexcept
throughaspecialcivilactionforcertiorariorprohibition.Itreads:SECTION8.REVIEW
AllactionsanddecisionsoftheDirectoraresubjecttoreview,motupropiooruponappeal
ofanypersonaggrievedthereby,bytheDepartmentHeadwhosedecisionshallbefinaland
executoryafterthelapseofthirty(30)daysfromthereceiptoftheaggrievedpartyofsaid
decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19,
Seriesof1966.TheDecisionoftheDepartmentHeadmaynotbereviewedbythecourts
exceptthroughaspecialcivilactionforcertiorariorprohibition.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
PedroR.Perez,Jr.forprivaterespondents.

TORRES,JR.,J.:

Without violating the principleofexhaustionofadministrative remedies, may an

action forreplevinprosper to recover a movable property which is the subject
matterofan administrative forfeiture proceeding in the
DepartmentofEnvironment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68
AofP.D.
173
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 173
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
705,asamended,entitledTheRevisedForestryCodeofthePhilippines?
AretheSecretaryofDENRandhisrepresentativesempoweredtoconfiscateand
forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favorofthe
government?
Thesearetwofundamentalquestionspresentedbeforeusforourresolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the
truckofprivaterespondentVictoriadeGuzmanwhileonitswaytoBulacanfrom
San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the DepartmentofEnvironment and
NaturalResources(DENR,forbrevity)personnelinAritao,NuevaVizcayabecause
thedrivercouldnotproducetherequireddocumentsfortheforestproductsfound
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23,
1989anorderofconfiscationofthetruckandgavetheownerthereoffifteen(15)
dayswithinwhichtosubmitanexplanationwhythetruckshouldnotbeforfeited.
Privaterespondents,however,failedtosubmittherequiredexplanation.OnJune
22, 1989, the Regional Executive Director Rogelio BaggayanofDENR sustained
1

petitionerofLayugans actionofconfiscation and ordered the forfeitureofthe

truck invoking Section 68AofPresidential Decree No. 705 as amended by
ExecutiveOrderNo.277.Privaterespondentsfiledaletterofreconsiderationdated
June28,1989oftheJune22,1989orderofExecutiveDirectorBaggayan,which
was,however,deniedinasubsequentorderofJuly12,1989. Subsequently,thecase
2

was brought by the petitioners to the SecretaryofDENR pursuant to private

respondentsstatementintheirletterdatedJune28,1989thatincasetheirletter
forreconsiderationwouldbedeniedthenthislettershouldbeconsideredasan
appealtothe
_______________

Rollo,p.235.
1

Rollo,pp.241242.
2

174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
Secretary. Pendingresolutionhoweveroftheappeal,asuitforreplevin,docketed
3

asCivilCase4031,wasfiledbytheprivaterespondentsagainstpetitionerLayugan
and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional TrialCourt, Branch
4

2ofCagayan, which issued a writ ordering the returnofthe truck to private

5

respondents. PetitionerLayuganandExecutiveDirectorBaggayanfiledamotionto
6

dismisswiththetrialcourtcontending,interalia,thatprivaterespondentshadno
causeofaction for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
trialcourtdenied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28,
1989. Theirmotionforreconsiderationhavingbeenlikewisedenied,apetitionfor
7

certiorariwasfiledbythepetitionerswiththerespondentCourtofAppealswhich
sustainedthetrialcourtsorderrulingthatthequestioninvolvedispurelyalegal
question. Hence,thispresentpetition, withprayerfortemporaryrestrainingorder
8 9

and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decisionofthe

respondentCourtofAppealswasfiledbythepetitionersonSeptember9,1993.
By virtueofthe Resolution dated September 27, 1993, the prayer for the
10

issuanceoftemporaryrestrainingorderofpetitionerswasgrantedbythisCourt.
 Invokingthedoctrineofexhaustionofadministrativeremedies,petitionersaver
that the trialcourtcould not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the
truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68
AofP.D.705,asamendedbyE.O.277.Privaterespon
_______________

Rollo,p.239.
3

Baggayandiedduringthependency ofCivilCase 4031,he wassucceededin office by Petitioner

4

LeonardoPaat.
PresidedbyJudgeRicardoA.Baculi.
5

Rollo,pp.251252.
6

Rollo,pp.274275.
7

Rollo,pp.3646pennedbyJusticeSerafinV.C.Guingona,concurredbyJusticesLuisA.Javellana
8

andJorgeS.Imperial.
Rollo,pp.1435.
9

Rollo,pp.117119.
10

175
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 175
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
dents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operationofthis principle
assertingthattheinstantcasefallswithintheexceptionofthedoctrineuponthe
justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the
chancetobeheard,and(2)theseizureandforfeiturewasunlawfulonthegrounds:
(a) that the SecretaryofDENR and his representatives have no authority to
confiscateandforfeitconveyancesutilizedintransportingillegalforestproducts,
and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the
commissionofthecrime.
Uponathoroughanddelicatescrutinyoftherecordsandrelevantjurisprudence
onthematter,weareoftheopinionthatthepleaofpetitionersforreversalisin
order.
ThisCourtinalonglineofcaseshasconsistentlyheldthatbeforeapartyis
allowedtoseektheinterventionofthecourt,itisapreconditionthatheshould
haveavailedofallthemeansofadministrativeprocessesaffordedhim.Hence,ifa
remedywithintheadministrativemachinerycanstillberesortedtobygivingthe
administrativeofficerconcernedeveryopportunitytodecideonamatterthatcomes
withinhisjurisdictionthensuchremedyshouldbeexhaustedfirstbeforecourts
judicialpowercanbesought.Theprematureinvocationofcourtsinterventionis
fataltoonescauseofaction. Accordingly,absentanyfindingofwaiverorestoppel
11

the case is susceptibleofdismissal for lackofcauseofaction. This 12

doctrineofexhaustionofadministrativeremedieswasnotwithoutitspracticaland
legal reasons, for one thing, availmentofadministrative remedy entails lesser
expenses
_______________
 National Development Company v. Hervilla,L65718, June 30, 1987;Atlas Consolidated Mining
11

Companyvs.Mendoza,G.R.No.L15809,August30,1961;Aboitizv.CollectorofCustoms,G.R.No.L
29466,May18,1978;Pestenasv.Dyogi,G.R.No.L25786,February27,1978.
Sotov.Jareno,G.R.No.38962,September15,1986;Hodgesv.Mun.Board,L18276,January12,
12

1967;AbeAbev.Manta,L4827,May31,1979;Gonev.DistrictEngineer,L22782,August29,1975.

176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
andprovidesforaspeedierdispositionofcontroversies.Itisnolesstruetostate
thatthecourtsofjusticeforreasonsofcomityandconveniencewillshyawayfrom
a dispute until the systemofadministrative redress has been completed and
compliedwithsoastogivetheadministrativeagencyconcernedeveryopportunity
to correct its error and to disposeofthe case. However, we are not amiss to
reiteratethattheprincipleofexhaustionofadministrativeremediesastestedbya
batteryofcases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniquenessofthe factual and
circumstantial settingsofa case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a
violationofdueprocess, (2)whentheissueinvolvedispurelyalegalquestion, (3)
13 14

when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or

excessofjurisdiction, (4)whenthereisestoppelonthepartoftheadministrative
15

agencyconcerned, (5)whenthereisirreparableinjury, (6)whentherespondentis

16 17

a department secretary whose acts as analter egoofthe President bears the

implied and assumed approvalofthe latter, (7) when to require
18

exhaustionofadministrativeremedieswouldbeunreasonable, (8)whenitwould 19

amounttoanullificationofaclaim, (9)whenthesubjectmatterisaprivateland
20

inlandcaseproceedings, (10)whentheruledoesnotprovideaplain,speedyand
21

_______________

Quisumbingv.JudgeGumban,G.R.No.85156,February5,1991.
13

EasternShippingLinesv.POEA,L76633,October18,1988.
14

IndustrialPowerSales,Inc.v.Sinsuat,L29171,April15,1988.
15

Vda.DeTanv.VeteransBackpayCommission,L12944,March30,1959.
16

DeLarav.Cloribel,G.R.No.L21653,May31,1965.
17

Demaisipv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.13000,September25,1959;Bartulatav.Peralta,G.R.No.
18

23155,September9,1974.
Ciprianov.Marcelino,G.R.No.L27793,February28,1972.
19

Alzatev.Aldana,G.R.No.14407,February29,1960.
20

Sotov.Jareno,supra.
21

177
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 177
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the
urgencyofjudicialintervention. Inthecaseatbar,thereisnoquestionthatthe
22
controversywaspendingbeforetheSecretaryofDENRwhenitwasforwardedto
him following the denial by the petitionersofthe motion for
reconsiderationofprivaterespondentsthroughtheorderofJuly12,1989.Intheir
letterofreconsiderationdatedJune28,1989, privaterespondentsclearlyrecognize
23

thepresenceofanadministrativeforumtowhichtheyseektoavail,astheydid
avail,intheresolutionoftheircase.Theletter,reads,thus:
xxx
Ifthismotionforreconsiderationdoesnotmerityourfavorableaction,thenthisletter
shouldbeconsideredasanappealtotheSecretary. 24

ItwaseasytoperceivethenthattheprivaterespondentslookeduptotheSecretary
forthereviewanddispositionoftheircase.Byappealingtohim,theyacknowledged
theexistenceofanadequateandplainremedystillavailableandopentothemin
the ordinary courseofthe law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the
principleofexhaustionofadministrativeremedies,seekthecourtsinterventionby
filinganactionforreplevinforthegrantoftheirreliefduringthependencyofan
administrativeproceedings.
Moreover,itisimportanttopointoutthattheenforcementofforestrylaws,rules
andregulationsandtheprotection,developmentandmanagementofforestlands
fall within the primary and special responsibilitiesofthe
DepartmentofEnvironment and Natural Resources. By the very natureofits
function,theDENRshouldbegivenafreehandunperturbedbyjudicialintrusion
todetermineacontroversywhich
_______________

22
Quisumbingv.JudgeGumban,supra.
23
Rollo,pp.236240.
24
Rollo,p.239.

178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
iswellwithinitsjurisdiction.Theassumptionbythetrialcourt,therefore,ofthe
replevinsuitfiledbyprivaterespondentsconstitutesanunjustifiedencroachment
intothedomainoftheadministrativeagencysprerogative.Thedoctrineofprimary
jurisdictiondoesnotwarrantacourttoarrogateuntoitselftheauthoritytoresolve
acontroversythejurisdictionoverwhichisinitiallylodgedwithanadministrative
bodyofspecial competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co.vs. Deputy Executive
25

Secretary, which was reiterated in the recent caseofConcerned

26

OfficialsofMWSSvs.Vasquez, thisCourtheld:
27

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems
causedbyunbriddledexploitationoftheseresources,thejudiciarywillstandclear.Along
lineofcasesestablishthebasicrulethatthecourtswillnotinterfereinmatterswhichare
addressed to the sound discretionofgovernment agencies entrusted with the
regulationofactivitiescomingunderthespecialtechnicalknowledgeandtrainingofsuch
agencies.

To sustain the claimofprivate respondents would in effect bring the instant

controversy beyond the paleofthe principleofexhaustionofadministrative
remediesandfallwithintheambitofexceptedcasesheretoforestated.However,
consideringthecircumstancesprevailinginthiscase,wecannotbutruleoutthese
assertionsofprivaterespondentstobewithoutmerit.First,theyarguedthatthere
was violationofdue process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989
orderofconfiscationofpetitionerLayugan.Thiscontentionhasnolegtostandon.
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
28

presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable
than
_______________

Vidadv.RTC,G.R.No.98084,October18,1993.
25

G.R.No.79538,October18,1990.
26

G.R.No.109113,January25,1995.
27

PepsiColaDistributorsofthePhil.v.NLRC,G.R.No.100686,August15,1995.
28

179
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 179
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
29

technical rulesofprocedureandevidencearenotstrictlyapplied;administrative
processcannotbefullyequatedwithdueprocessinitsstrictjudicialsense. Indeed, 30

deprivationofdueprocesscannotbesuccessfullyinvokedwhereapartywasgiven
thechancetobeheardonhismotionforreconsideration, asintheinstantcase,
31

whenprivaterespondentswereundisputedlygiventheopportunitytopresenttheir
side when they filed a letterofreconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was,
however,deniedinanorderofJuly12,1989ofExecutiveDirectorBaggayan.In
NavarroIIIvs.Damasco, weruledthat:
32

The essenceofdue process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrativeproceedings,anopportunitytoexplainonessideoranopportunitytoseeka
reconsiderationoftheactionorrulingcomplainedof.Aformalortrialtypehearingisnotat
alltimesandinallinstancesessential.Therequirementsaresatisfiedwhenthepartiesare
affordedfairandreasonableopportunitytoexplaintheirsideofthecontroversyathand.
Whatisfrowneduponistheabsolutelackofnoticeorhearing.

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegalityofseizure and

forfeitureofthe truck because the administrative officersofthe DENR allegedly
have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only
thecourtisauthorizedtoconfiscateandforfeitconveyancesusedintransporting
illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraphofSection
68ofP.D.705,asamendedbyE.O.277.Thepertinentprovisionreadsasfollows:
_______________

29
ConcernedOfficialsofMWSSvs.Vasquez,supra.
30
Ibid.
31
Rodriguezv.Project6MarketServiceCooperative,G.R.No.79968,August23,1995.
32
G.R.No.101875,July14,1995.

180
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
SECTION68.xxx
xxx
Thecourtshallfurtherordertheconfiscationinfavorofthegovernmentofthetimber
or any forest productscut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as
themachinery,equipments,implementsandtoolsillegaly[sic]usedintheareawherethe
timberorforestproductsarefound.(Italicsours)

A reading, however,ofthe law persuades us not to go along with private

respondentsthinkingnotonlybecausetheaforequotedprovisionapparentlydoes
notmentionnorincludeconveyancesthatcanbethesubjectofconfiscationbythe
courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents
interpretationofthe subject provision unduly restricts the clear intentionofthe
law and inevitably reduces the other provisionofSection 68A, which is quoted
hereinbelow:
SECTION 68A. Administrative Authorityofthe Department or His Duly Authorized
RepresentativeToOrderConfiscation.InallcasesofviolationofthisCodeorotherforest
laws, rules and regulations, theDepartment Head or his duly authorized representative,
mayorder the confiscationofany forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, andall conveyances used either by land, water or airin the
commissionofthe offense andto disposeofthe same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulationsandpoliciesonthematter.(Italicsours)

It is thus clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly
authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any
conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations. The phrase to disposeofthe same is broad enough to cover the
actofforfeitingconveyancesinfavorofthegovernment.Theonlylimitationisthat
itshouldbemadeinaccordancewithpertinentlaws,regulationsorpoliciesonthe
matter.Intheconstructionofstatutes,itmustbereadinsuchawayas
 181
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 181
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
togiveeffecttothepurposeprojectedinthestatute. Statutesshouldbeconstrued
33

inthelightoftheobjecttobeachievedandtheevilormischieftobesuppressed,
andtheyshouldbegivensuchconstructionaswilladvancetheobject,suppressthe
mischief, and secure the benefits intended. In this wise, the observationofthe
34

SolicitorGeneralissignificant,thus:
But precisely becauseofthe need to make forestry laws more responsive to present
situations and realities and in viewofthe urgency to conserve the remaining
resourcesofthecountry,thatthegovernmentoptedtoaddSection68A.Thisamendatory
provision is anadministrative remedytotally separate and distinct from criminal
proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that
characterize enforcementofforestry laws through criminal actions. The preambleofEO
277thelawthataddedSection68AtoPD705ismostrevealing:
WHEREAS,thereisanurgencytoconservetheremainingforestresourcesofthecountryforthe
benefitandwelfareofthepresentandfuturegenerationsofFilipinos;
WHEREAS,ourforestresourcesmaybeeffectivelyconservedandprotectedthroughthevigilant
enforcementandimplementationofourforestrylaws,rulesandregulations;
WHEREAS, the implementationofour forestry lawssuffers from technical difficulties, due to
certaininadequaciesinthepenalprovisionsoftheRevisedForestryCodeofthePhilippines;and
WHEREAS,toovercomethisdifficulties,thereisaneedtopenalizecertainactsmoreresponsive
topresentsituationsandrealities;

ItisinterestingtonotethatSection68AisanewprovisionauthorizingtheDENRto
confiscate, not only conveyances, but forest products as well. On the other
hand,confiscationofforest products by the court in a criminal action has long been
providedforinSection68.Ifasprivaterespondentsinsist,thepowerofconfisca
_______________

33
Lopez,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.104158,November6,1992.
34
DeGuiav.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.104712,May6,1992.

182
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
tioncannotbeexercisedexceptonlythroughthecourtunderSection68,thenSection68A
would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68A would not have provided any
solutiontotheproblemperceivedinEO277,supra. 35

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the
petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive
Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the
commissionofthecrime.Thisorder,acopyofwhichwasgiventoandreceivedby
thecounselofprivaterespondents,readsinpart,viz.:
xxxwhileitistruethatthetruckofyourclientwasnotusedbyherinthecommissionof
thecrime,weupholdyourclaimthatthetruckownerisnotliableforthecrimeandinno
casecouldacriminalcasebefiledagainstherasprovidedunderArticle309and310ofthe
RevisedPenalCode.xxx 36

Weobservedthatprivaterespondentsmisreadthecontentoftheaforestatedorder
andobviouslymisinterpretedtheintentionofpetitioners.Whatiscontemplatedby
thepetitionerswhentheystatedthatthetruckwasnotusedinthecommissionof
thecrimeisthatitwasnotusedinthecommissionofthecrimeoftheft,hence,in
no case can a criminal action befiled against the owner thereof for violation of
Article309and310oftheRevisedPenalCode.Petitionersdidnoteliminatethe
possibilitythatthetruckwasbeingusedinthecommissionofanothercrime,that
is,thebreachofSection68ofP.D.705asamendedbyE.O277.Inthesameorderof
July12,1989,petitionerspointedout:
x x x However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further amended by
ExecutiveOrderNo.277specificallyprovidesfortheconfiscationoftheconveyanceusedin
thetransportofforestproductsnotcoveredbytherequiredlegaldocuments.Shemaynot
_______________

Rollo,pp.170171;Memorandumpp.1213.
35

Rollo,p.242.
36

183
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 183
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
havebeeninvolvedinthecuttingandgatheringoftheproductinquestionbutthefactthat
sheacceptedthegoodsforafeeorfarethesameisthereforliable.xxx 37

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and

punishable underSection68 otherthanqualifiedtheft,so that,whenpetitioner
admittedintheJuly12,1989orderthatprivaterespondentscouldnotbecharged
fortheftasprovidedforunderArticles309and310oftheRevisedPenalCode,then
necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a
crimeunderSection68.Wedisagree.Forclarity,theprovisionofSection68ofP.D.
705beforeitsamendmentbyE.O.277andtheprovisionofSection1ofE.O.No.277
amendingtheaforementionedSection68arereproducedherein,thus:
SECTION 68.Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without
license.Anypersonwhoshallcut,gather,collect,orremovetimberorotherforestproducts
fromanyforestland,ortimberfromalienableanddisposablepubliclands,orfromprivate
lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall
beguilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
RevisedPenalCodexxx.(Italicsours;Section68,P.D.705beforeitsamendmentbyE.O.
277)
SECTION1.Section68ofPresidentialDecreeNo.705,asamended,isherebyamended
toreadasfollows:
Section68.Cutting,gatheringand/orcollectingtimberorotherforestproductswithoutlicense.Any
personwhoshallcut,gather,collect,removetimberorotherforestproductsfromanyforestland,or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority,or
possesstimberorotherforestproductswithoutthelegaldocumentsasrequiredunderexistingforest
lawsandregulations,shallbepunishedwiththepenaltiesimposedunderArticles309and310ofthe
RevisedPenalCodexxx(Italicsours;Section1,E.O.No.277amendingSection68,P.D.705as
amended)

_______________

37
Ibid.

184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
WiththeintroductionofExecutiveOrderNo.277amendingSection68ofP.D.705,
the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products
withoutauthorityconstitutesadistinctoffenseindependentnowfromthecrimeof
theftunderArticles309and310oftheRevisedPenalCode,butthepenaltytobe
imposedisthatprovidedforunderArticle309and310oftheRevisedPenalCode.
ThisisclearfromthelanguageofExecutiveOrderNo.277wheniteliminatedthe
phraseshallbeguiltyofqualifiedtheftasdefinedandpunishedunderArticles309
and310oftheRevisedPenalCodeandinsertedthewordsshallbepunishedwith
thepenaltiesimposedunderArticle309and310oftheRevisedPenalCode.When
the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocinationorrationalizationofthelaw. 38

Fromtheforegoingdisquisition,itisclearthatasuitforreplevincannotbe
sustainedagainstthepetitionersforthesubjecttrucktakenandretainedbythem
foradministrativeforfeitureproceedingsinpursuanttoSection68AoftheP.D.
705,asamended.Dismissalofthereplevinsuitforlackofcauseofactioninviewof
the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have
beenthepropercourseofactionbythelowercourtinsteadofassumingjurisdiction
overthecaseandconsequentlyissuingthewritorderingthereturnofthetruck.
Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition
precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an
elementofprivaterespondentsrightofaction,istoosignificanttobewaylaidby
thelowercourt.
Itisworthstressingatthispoint,thatasuitforreplevinisfoundedsolelyonthe
claimthatthedefendantwrongfullywithholdsthepropertysoughttoberecovered.
Itliestorecoverpossessionofpersonalchattelsthatareunlawfully
_______________

38
Libananv.Sandiganbayan,G.R.No.112386,June14,1994.

185
 VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 185
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
detained. Todetainisdefinedastomeantoholdorkeepincustody, andithas
39 40

beenheldthatthereistortioustakingwheneverthereisanunlawfulmeddlingwith
theproperty,oranexerciseorclaimofdominionoverit,withoutanypretenseof
authorityorright;this,withoutmanualseizingofthepropertyissufficient. Under 41

theRulesofCourt,itisindispensableinreplevinproceedingthattheplaintiffmust
showbyhisownaffidavitthatheisentitledtothepossessionofproperty,thatthe
propertyiswrongfullydetainedbythedefendant,allegingthecauseofdetention,
thatthesamehasnotbeentakenfortaxassessment,orseizedunderexecution,or
attachment,orifsoseized,thatitisexemptfromsuchseizure,andtheactualvalue
oftheproperty. PrivaterespondentsmiserablyfailedtoconvincethisCourtthata
42

wrongful detentionofthesubjecttruckobtainsintheinstantcase.Itshouldbe
notedthatthetruckwasseizedbythepetitionersbecauseitwastransportingforest
products without therequired permit oftheDENR in manifest contravention of
Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68A of P.D. 705, as
amended,unquestionablywarrantstheconfiscationaswellasthedispositionbythe
SecretaryofDENRorhisdulyauthorizedrepresentativesoftheconveyancesused
inviolatingtheprovisionofforestrylaws.Evidently,thecontinuedpossessionor
detentionofthetruckbythepetitionersforadministrativeforfeitureproceedingis
legallypermissible,hence,nowrongfuldetentionexistsinthecaseatbar.
Moreover,thesuitforreplevinisneverintendedasaproceduraltooltoquestion
theordersofconfiscationandforfeitureissuedbytheDENRinpursuancetothe
authoritygiven
_______________

AmericanJurisprudence,SecondEdition,Volume66,p.850,footnote57;I.TanenbaumSonand
39

Companyvs.C.LudwigBaumannandCompany,261NY85,184NE503,86ALR102.
Ibid.,footnote59;Andersonvs.Hapler,34Ill436;Wailsvs.Farrington,27Okla754,116P428.
40

Id.,footnote60;Haythornvs.Rushforth,19NJL160.
41

Section2,Rule60oftheRulesofCourt.
42

186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Paat vs. Court of Appeals
underP.D.705,asamended.Section8ofthesaidlawisexplicitthatactionstaken
bytheDirectoroftheBureauofForestDevelopmentconcerningtheenforcementof
theprovisionsofthesaidlawaresubjecttoreviewbytheSecretaryofDENRand
thatcourtsmaynotreviewthedecisionsoftheSecretaryexceptthroughaspecial
civilactionforcertiorariorprohibition.Itreads:
SECTION 8. REVIEWAll actions and decisions of the Director are subject to
review,motupropiooruponappealofanypersonaggrievedthereby,bytheDepartment
Headwhosedecisionshallbefinalandexecutoryafterthelapseofthirty(30)daysfromthe
receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in
accordancewithExecutiveOrderNo.19,Seriesof1966.TheDecisionoftheDepartment
Headmaynotbereviewedbythecourtsexceptthroughaspecialcivilactionforcertiorari
orprohibition.

WHEREFORE,thePetitionisGRANTED;theDecisionoftherespondentCourtof
AppealsdatedOctober16,1991anditsResolutiondatedJuly14,1992arehereby
SETASIDEANDREVERSED;theRestrainingOrderpromulgatedonSeptember
27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to
resolvethecontroversywithutmostdispatch.
SOORDERED.
Regalado(Chairman),Romero,PunoandMendoza,JJ.,concur.

Petitiongranted.
Note.Whenthelanguageofthestatuteisclearitshouldbegivenitsnatural
meaning. (Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice,238 SCRA
5[1994])

o0o

187