SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. v.

PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND PEDRO BALUBAL

519 SCRA 432 (2007), SECOND DIVISION

Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (Superlines) is engaged in the business of providing public
transportation. One of its buses, while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit
lane, crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC). PNCCs
Sofronio Salvanera, and Pedro Balubal, then head of traffic control and security department of the South Luzon
tollway, investigated the incident. The bus was turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for its own
investigation. Because of lack of adequate space, traffic investigator Pat. CesarLopera requested that the bus be
towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound. Superlines made several requests for the release of the bus but
Balubal refused. Instead, Balubal demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or a collateral with the same value for the
reconstruction of the damaged radio room.

Superlines filed a replevin suit with damages against PNCC and Balubal before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Superlines to pay PNCC an amount of P40, 320.00,
representing actual damages to the radio room. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision and
concluded that the case should have been brought against the police authorities.

ISSUE: Whether or not a suit for replevin is proper

HELD: Contrary to PNCCs contention, the petition raises questions of law foremost of which is whether the
owner of a personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and recover damages for
illegal distraint. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or
clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual
or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.

In the case at bar, Superlines ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC, consideration of whether
PNCC has been wrongfully detaining it is in order. The bus was towed by the PNCC on the request of Lopera
in violation of constitutional right against unreasonable seizures. The seizure and impounding of Superliness
bus, on Loperas request, were unquestionably violative of the right to be let alone by the authorities as
guaranteed by the Constitution.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it cannot pass upon the same without impleading Lopera and
any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The police authorities,
through Lopera, having turned over the bus to PNCC for safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected
between them and PNCC. Superlines or the trial court motu proprio may implead as defendants the
indispensable parties Lopera and any other responsible police officers.

Padilla v Magdua Case Digest (OBLIGATIONS & CONTRACTS)

PRESCRIPTION

FACTS:

(1) Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name without
the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Juanita, the mother of the heirs had allegedly executed a notarized
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole
owner of the land.
(2) The land was subsequently sold by Ricardo's daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to
respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador).

RTC: The case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit was executed in 1966. The
RTC explained that while the right of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs
appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC
added that since prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem
logical that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardo's daughters in favor of
Dominador.
 ISSUE: The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by prescription.

APPLICABLE LAW/S: Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years,
shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Section 1, Rule 9 of the rules of Court. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the case.

HELD: No, it has not prescribed.

Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners,
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. In the present case, all three requisites have
been met.

After Juanita's death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their mother's land. The heirs, including
Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his
co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardo's interest in the land had now
become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In
Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it
must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim
of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to run.

However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners
received notice of Ricardo's repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an action for
recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere
three years had lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription
period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot
invoke acquisitive prescription.

In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on the
ground of prescription, insufficiently established Dominador's rightful claim of ownership to the land. Thus,
we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to determine who among the parties are legally entitled to the
land.

Ining v Vega

ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-

FRANCISCO, CAMILO
FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS
*
FRANCISCO, CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES,
ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA,
JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA- FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ,
EUGENIO RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS
RIMON, CESARIA RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR., Petitioners, v.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M.
VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land
(subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings
Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent
Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and
children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted
respondents.
Sibling # 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except
for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregorias grandchildren or spouses
thereof (Gregorias heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romanas surviving heir,
Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition,
recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregorias heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregorias heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had no
cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr.
who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same
from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.

ISSUES BEFORE LOWER COURTS:

1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leons estate;

2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
3. Whether Leonardos claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC
1. No. Declared lot to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining
2. Concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to
Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leons estate at the time of his death in 1962.
3. Dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription (30 years adverse possession).
(2) CA:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan;
Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan
Ining;
2. Trial courts declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of
Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners failure to appeal the same.
3. There was no prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leons death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s
execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership
of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides
that [n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,

ISSUES:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED
THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.

RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct based on the following reasons:
1. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become final for
failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leons estate.
2. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
3. Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no prescription shall run in favor of
one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
4. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA held that prescription began
to run against Leonardo only in 1979 or even in 1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that
Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus
concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly
within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-
in-law, being married to Antipolos daughter Teodora.
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-
owner of the decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the
estate that was formed among the decedents heirs.

OTHER NOTES:
1. Possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other co- owners but will be held to
benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co- heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the
obligation to deliver the same to his co- owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
2. Principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is controlled by
equitable considerations and it cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to
deprive the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
3. A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of
the co- ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
4. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by
affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(2) Between parents and children;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could
seek partition of the property at any time.

Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. vs. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla

Facts:

The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion who died intestate in 1958. Petitioner Carolina is the
surviving spouse. Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which
were acquired by Leandro during his lifetime. Both lands were registered in the name of Leandro Figuracion
married to Carolina Adviento.

Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the two real properties in favor of his six (6) children on August
23, 1955. Their shares, however, were not delineated with particularity because spouses Leandro and Carolina
reserved the lots and its fruits for their expenses. Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the
Cadastral
Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan which was originally owned by EulalioAdviento (Eulalio).

On November 28, 1961, a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 was executed in favor of
Emilia. Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased
parents, Eulalio and Faustina. On the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed ofAbsolute Sale over Lot No.
707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa.

In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the Philippines only in 1981. Upon
her return and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707. The legal
debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house of
Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705.

Issues:
1. W/N the respondent can compel the partition of Lot No. 707
2.W/N the respondents right to demand for partition is not barred by acquisitive prescription or laches
 Held:
1. The respondent can compel the partition of Lot No. 707

In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what respondent Emilia was able to successfully
establish, as correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of
Agripina and Carolina. As co-owners, each of them had full ownership of her part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right to alienate the lot but only in so far as the extent of her
portion was affected.

Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria and Felipa was a valid conveyance but
only insofar as the share of Carolina in the co-ownership is concerned. As Carolinas successors-in-interest to
the property, Hilaria and Felipa could not acquire any superior right in the property than what Carolina is
entitled to or could transfer or alienate after partition.

In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same
rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner.
Hilaria and Felipa did not acquire the undivided portion pertaining to Agripina, which has already been
effectively bequeathed to respondent Emilia as early as November 28, 1961 thru the Deed of Quitclaim. In
turn, being the successor-in-interest of Agripinas share in Lot No. 707, respondent Emilia took the formers
place in the co-ownership and as such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at any time

2. The respondents right to demand for partition is not barred by acquisitive prescription or laches

Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership. The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership,
is subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and
(4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for
the period required by law. The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions.

Further, records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the manner of occupation and possession
exercised by Hilaria and Felipa over the lot from the time it was registered in their names. The only evidence
of possession extant in the records dates back only to 1985 when Hilaria and Felipa declared the lot in their
names for taxation purposes.

Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of ownership, or in this case, possession, do not evince
any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. Hence, prescription among co-owners cannot
take place when acts of ownership exercised are vague.

Decision:
The petition is denied.