Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 1 of 43

A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944 agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
vs. adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent. public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities
as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and
effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant. well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
Francisco Claravall for respondent. forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

OZAETA, J.: In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of
law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this
published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and
follows: insistent.

Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or
publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties.
Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the
Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is,
reprimanded.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said
advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its
publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to
repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict
ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said
advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case
at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the

respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid

1

A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July
5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee
of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half
after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 2 of 43
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising
and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our
views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public
is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the
ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition
should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges
against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services
offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is
dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the
warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP
Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was
denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or
not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not
submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other
hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
2

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in
which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering
the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and
after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy
& Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to
be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are
a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 3 of 43
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed,
in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months
from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If
it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and
to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the
office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards
is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data
is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof,
in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot
be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which
is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law
list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
3
 Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 4 of 43

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found

GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

B. WHY DO YOU WANT TO BECOME A LAWYER?

C. HOW TO BE A LAWYER BY DEAN FORTUNATO GUPIT

4

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR
OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice
failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the
NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three
times and flunked it as many times.1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner
rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to
academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private
respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the
outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely
challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the
above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 5 of 43
After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held
that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through
an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a
measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have
initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether
there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing
the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine
in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method
of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to
regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for
admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we
have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of
access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted
earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those
admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading
is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the
difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools
in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of
our social and economic development, are widely known.
5

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission
test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and
of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given
the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance,
medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far
more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into
account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to
prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably
related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection
of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not
applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test
and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."
We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at
bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This
may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability,
by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in
the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that
the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of
the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not
qualified to be doctors.
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 6 of 43
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional
right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is
involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has
the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not
dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a
sense of satisfaction.
A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one
who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and
adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he
may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has
demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing,
however appropriate this career may be for others.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.6
The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better
prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our
already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like
him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-
taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students
and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The
medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers
which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for
example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same
delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are
admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what
the equal protection requires is equality among equals.
6
 Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 7 of 43

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his
preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five
times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced,
like a hopeless love.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a

person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any
work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the
medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to
succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled
to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his
latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never
have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who
could be better as merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of
education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as
determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with
mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence
but because we are a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated
January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so
ordered.

7

Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful
Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and
concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953."
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully,
he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless,
considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and
the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this
court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of
only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in
1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and
passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See
Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of
a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and
secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request,
seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the
veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions
of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 8 of 43
on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without
his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full
as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS
FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND
INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule
numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate
who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations
after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen
hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or
more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next
whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in
any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such
grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may
take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision
of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid
8
 Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 9 of 43

injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
1953 2,555 968 284
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be
admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid,
should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A
complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a
more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the
following statistical data are set forth:
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or
Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows: mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2

1946 (August) 206 121 18 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different
examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating,
however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their
latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by
1946 (November) 477 228 43 Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore
1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in
1947 749 340 0 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were
denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented
similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by
Republic Act No. 972, although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no
1948 899 409 11 sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

1949 1,218 532 164 Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the
legal profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been
expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for
admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
1950 1,316 893 26
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects
in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire
1951 2,068 879 196 Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of
the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General,
Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios,
Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta
1952 2,738 1,033 426 against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners
9

Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The
legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American
jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation
for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the
majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as
possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar,
those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author
Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the
Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed.
And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total
1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094
law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the
profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The
public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of
those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate
mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant
materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available
to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in
monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published
continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction
since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been
printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be
published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new
volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 10 of 43
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical
case of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is
there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly
derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the
United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of
those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had
been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In
re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37),
aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill
and which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not
within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has
been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81),
where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of
that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the
provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated
on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes
for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals,
given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise
any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of
twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite
qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in
all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them
had previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing
power which they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with
the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions
which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The
prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and
10

the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this
particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with
the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in
the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this
subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the
use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave,
and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and
of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act.
(p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it
provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College
conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that
the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not
however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible
private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New
York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College
being an institution of established reputation, and having a law department
under the charge of able professors, the students in which department were
not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the
institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly,
considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by
the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no
definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the
applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law
committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no other
object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We
cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the
plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains
nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college
should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a
diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 11 of 43
intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates
as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection
with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the
present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question
of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in
certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar
may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who
failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from
the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it
does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely
different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and
their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of
this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power
have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes
the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our
Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding
the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a
legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function
requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past
or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts
are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest
degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous
judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be
revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
11

profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this
matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in
which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to
practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the
following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the
history of the English speaking people so far as we have been able to
ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of
the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has
been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always
been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion
of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and
Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for
admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within
its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications.
(p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its
judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power
of the court to impose other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed
or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch
enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department.
Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge
of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people
setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings,
10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p.
445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which
the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is
exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial
department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was
supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any
other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir
the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial
department are exercised. (p. 445)
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 12 of 43
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The
bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts
depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may
easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the
courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over
their bars, at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries
prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly
subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right
of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was
said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235,
"constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to
practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate
that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent
power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by
the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not
only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the
power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at
law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent
that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be
subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of
our constitution was to make the three great departments of government
separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might
embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for
attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the
judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should
not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the
legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is
incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public
interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of
attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class
from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do
not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in
fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel
courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the
prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
12

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It
is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment
when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are
well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is
a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J.
Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the
court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed.
565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall.
53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A.
519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030,
20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually
exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the
court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an
attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one
being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the
power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a
consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the
laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning
and sound moral character. This arises from the need of enlightened
assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It
is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said
by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471,
162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden
with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private
gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the
court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld."
Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of
attorneys under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission
to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a
judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings
invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open
and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority
necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 13 of 43
government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in
its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the
unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the
rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court
to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and
counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to
practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court
said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding
the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the
attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by
its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair
private character. It has always been the general practice in this country to
obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of
the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they,
respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as
sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the
statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their
private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as
attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are
responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been
afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of
a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so
held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in
the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court,
but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial
nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the
court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as
engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere
to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened
13

with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the
exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash.
472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an
inherent power of the court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California,
281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission
to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial
and legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial
departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that
shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to
the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the
exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the
other departments of the government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by
requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very
plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling
them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what
particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952,
a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can
revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only
this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the
practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 14 of 43
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as
statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal
equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary
power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this
Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter,
it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may
repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power
to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress
substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the
matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend,
disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the
practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on
the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal
profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to
admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the
legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce
rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter
and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to
the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without
diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature
may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture,
training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or
supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which
has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the
supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the
minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these
reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are
powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but
14

rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took
examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently
enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be
admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guaria and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This
tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this
case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination,
on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of
Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and
ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and
Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as
follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the
Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good
and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the
passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court,
judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of
Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney
General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in
the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila,
city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal,
attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province,
may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without
an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such
fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant
took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the
examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average
of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he
was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75.
We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 15 of 43
bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant
in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him
license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying
ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he
now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the
applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the
prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of
provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the
object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-
cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally
and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that
section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of
certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this mandatory
construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent
intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States,
articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court
continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission
and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and
in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the
word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under
the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have
accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory
evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had
reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the
date of their appointment.
15

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the
applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other
jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it
further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications
at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do
not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself
satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in
the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only
four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice;
and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible
office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave
evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office
that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine
Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing
him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the
above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary
examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory
evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by
a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his
right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary
examinations prescribed by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to
suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to
make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court,
until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students
who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and
presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law
office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if
they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court
declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The
Court said:
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 16 of 43
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by
virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the
general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is
entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law
in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force
July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause,
consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every application
for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to
admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of
law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a
license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules".
In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that
up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the
bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly
organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is
two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in
each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior
to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral
character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied
law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part
in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to
November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the
examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the
right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed,
confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and
establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special
legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature
had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the
administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which
should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and
ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law,
persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law
is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the
court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes,
and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury
services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring
such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the
law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the
end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable
basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation.
16

Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155
Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by
experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill.
48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and practiced
his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination,
making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18
Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of
fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have
some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice.
The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law
prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes First,
those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two
years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office,
who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the
present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be
no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different
conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the
law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its
managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with
relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon
the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification.
Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify
themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd.
The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while
those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on
the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while
as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is
utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or
bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The
proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the
legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also
held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature
has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which
courts must admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 17 of 43
can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal
opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in
the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L.
Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States
to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject
only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing
feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every
one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some
requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution.
The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them
that is, the right to continue their prosecution is often of great value to the
possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real
or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall
enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application
of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been
challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from
such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment
of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon
this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see,
also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345;
State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to
practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of
legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once established his
right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and
other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the
power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an
individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the
Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had
served in the military or naval forces of the United States during the World War
and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein
or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924,
known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least
ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was
held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses
of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178
Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
17

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am.
Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the
person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based
upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences,
as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is
made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some
substantial difference between the situation of that class and other individuals
to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be
defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the
situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation
and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects
of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the
difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and
privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause
unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class
only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in
1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5
per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules
require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed
since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the
general average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the
unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954,
1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same
conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946
does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an
equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its
retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What
does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which
the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the
general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 18 of 43
1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per
cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by
the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is
desired to undo what had been done cancel the license that was issued to those
who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly
does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this
Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent
obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to
practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being
cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is
being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general
average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar.
This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to
amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court,
by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have
done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the
power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in
force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in
what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to
apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been
confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite
intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the
laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different,
seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law
prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for
this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is
not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of
article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to
Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2
completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity
affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within
the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers;
second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers
from these fatal defects.
18

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following
reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar
examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to
practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the
admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It
obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary
manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the
petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said
resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise
and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are,
as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and
should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider
these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists
immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the
Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may
continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law
makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the
admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the
entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the
examinations in those years, shall continue in force.
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 19 of 43
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent
and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening
and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the
judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have
announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court
who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the
Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations
of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore,
void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to
the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955
inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article
VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without
having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become
final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ADDENDUM (NOT IN THE FULL TEXT BUT INCLUDED IN THE CASE)
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution.
Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of
1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general
average in the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947;
70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since
1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This
caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which
was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
19

concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The
amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and
16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to
have passed the examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In
determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following
relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5
per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law,
10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent;
Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take
another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70
per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining
their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however,
That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third
examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects
and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any applicant who
has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling
below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or
who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding
oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us
being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should
be compelled to repeat even those subjects which they have previously
passed. This is not the case in any other government examination. The Rules
of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate
due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75
per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President
requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was
signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no
part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment
provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject,
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 20 of 43
although failing to pass the examination, he need not be examined in said
subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination
on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with
this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient
for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only
one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has
passed the last required subjects, which may be several years away from the
time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the
principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those
of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly
possible because there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to
continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The only
condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination
in no more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or
number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would
defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting
persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be
presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency
in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations,
so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately
render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold
true of the candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five
subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year later, and the last
two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring
a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject
below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all
around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to
the practice of law.
xxx xxx xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This
amendment provides that any application who has obtained a general average
of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in
any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates
who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to
the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general
average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not
only prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment
that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from
75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to the validity of
20

making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should
not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court
passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who
have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present
amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the
Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who
may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the
general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted
into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court
remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or
promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a
certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of
said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of
the bar are officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar
candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as
a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it
refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since
1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that
required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and
impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent
and qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to
the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to all these acts and
resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer
because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and
in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its
officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be
carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the
standard of the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not
achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a special class who have
failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I
find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of
70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in
any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 21 of 43
and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes
class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons,
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950
bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the
Supreme Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be
noted that after every bar examination the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have
obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under
consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to
obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a bad
precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other
professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public
accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not
repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the
Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM
1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines
in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per
cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar
examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the
1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent
in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per
cent passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding
examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact
one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part
of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject
in any bar examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in
21

such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford
another opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the
Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would otherwise have
passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering
its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been
altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the
apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties
concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages
for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar
examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar
examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955
bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored
with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of
below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing
grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956
the preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will
be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the
last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court
assumed the supervision as well as the administration of the study of law
which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that
the bill would admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar
examination". He considered the bill a class legislation. This contention,
however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely
supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as
precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who
took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill
should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar
examination on the strength of the established precedent of our Supreme
Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps
which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 22 of 43
or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without
giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar
candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered,
or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles
of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or
corrective statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of
a "valid classification" as against class legislation, is very expressed in the
following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who
possess a common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a
"natural" and substantial differentiation between those included in the class
and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as
"natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered factions of the
original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain
Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new
conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new
conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must
apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the
correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not
prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are
special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special
public purpose will sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last
analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded
to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the
court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L.
Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to
the extent of the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the
Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
22

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed.
The President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary,
Manila, with the information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the
members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on Senate
Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first
indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without
vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI,
Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the
President and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however,
they lost in the polls.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 23 of 43
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL
TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR.,
Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon
Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during
the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-
correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question,
Oscar Landicho who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a
grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court
to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar
candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released
this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him,
by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons
to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also
underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to the release of the results. Note
that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar
candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without
formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request
answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might
not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were
not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford
sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power
to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I,
rec.).
23

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971
Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public
International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.
Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is
one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964,
1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%,
56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade
of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their
sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having
brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang,
back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-
evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the
representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the
same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was
on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation,
the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo
"to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned
were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70,
rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs
on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38,
rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 24 of 43
on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the
Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163,
pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo
Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No.
954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination
notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for
submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo
Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon.
Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another
paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or
re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation
resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in
the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This
notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the
name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were
summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that
one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law
of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de
Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the
hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared
that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make
mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was
terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit
their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in
Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned
to testify.
24

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier
submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-
examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct
testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners
recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is
the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a
review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate
obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in
another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation
and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me
an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him
the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to
75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered
the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-
evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were
based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others;
thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No.
5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis
supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11,
1972 affidavit with following additional statements:
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 25 of 43
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is
no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same
evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6
and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did
not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I
am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo,
based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that
with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I
have always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the
rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same;
that I have no alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to
me as reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not
bother any more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of
the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear
that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such
recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet
in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original
correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political
Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to
obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code
numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972,
25

he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the
Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him
an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine
the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57,
whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly,
in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee
the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I
was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or
that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar
Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing
code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have
been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in
the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the
answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used
throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee
deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant
my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code
number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade
card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the
itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading
sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the
other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the
grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation",
respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts
stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international
law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came
to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now
knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I
have never met him even up to the present;
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 26 of 43
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make
such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was
authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as
the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity
revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so
appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and
guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my
official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as
possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be
identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in
the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority
with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the
official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied
by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to
me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see
me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition
as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook
code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the
correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it
entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial
law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the
Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and
that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the
examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was
increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee
did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to
make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had
passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed
the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody
26

objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did
not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and
did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him
before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April
12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination
books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law
saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75%then he would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise
of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised
also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the
word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the
identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14,
1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 27 of 43
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972,
Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my
house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and
submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words
"we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said
notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He
explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but
that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in
Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo
remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr.
Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr.
Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades
I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant
to address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I,
in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each
and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of
the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in
other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I
recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had
given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still
short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the
contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the
total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to
74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could
be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of
Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein
respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not
having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
27

particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every
right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar
Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook.
Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it
was only in that particular subject that the said examine failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher
grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should
also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from
9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April
17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the
Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all
other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-
evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook
(No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the
grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his
sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 28 of 43
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-
evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made
during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-
evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I
have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.
Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum
circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the
results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them
would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now,
we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to
be denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and
irrevocable.
28

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to
bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his
hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he
does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he
remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting
a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average
but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to
remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who
thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he
remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-
de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such
serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all
good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed
another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into
believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the
fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so
merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as
Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which
was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in
question:
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 29 of 43
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of
February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch,
I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point
that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object
and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the
ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954"
boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the
MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P.
Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino
street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of
the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is
attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number
"954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look
for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket,
which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This
number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six
digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to
me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or connect it
with said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code
numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took
charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started
with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master
List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at
the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh.
6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-
Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at
the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List
as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-
a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these
incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I
was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke
out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp
was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941
as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility
of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get
out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947,
I got married and since then we begot children the youngest of whom was
born on February 27, 1957.
29

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket,
I resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks.
While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the office code
number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed
by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent soundness of the
answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-
Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took
them back to the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them
the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their
discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to
either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during
the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective
examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and
the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with
the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-
Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of
73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I
could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It
turned out that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the
Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No.
661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as
Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is
precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph,
only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only
Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the
latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee
and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the
notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 30 of 43
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review
or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the
Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade
after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome
since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that
Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led
to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was
impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over
those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the
record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on
a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent
Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required
by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the
bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now
reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent
and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in
the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests
a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution
dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having
redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First,
was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar
30

Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are
supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was
done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers
were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be
unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant
Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence
per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo
to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect
because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result
of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences
are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only
goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or
consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this
Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation
is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the
performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the
consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo
systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation
and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and
individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to
the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for
and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just
before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian
while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and
there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 31 of 43
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an
extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring
back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline
of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said
examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent
Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said
subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with
Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the
identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian,
2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-
4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects
including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and
could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at
1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law,
which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo
then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to
reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the
that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent
Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing.
Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if
the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving
of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention
of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself
clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of
respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as
follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge
of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems
rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial
31

weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo,
believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such
request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate
the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the
examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the
notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39,
74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the
passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent
Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new
batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be
corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66,
rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public
International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be
increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After
satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible the respondent Bar Confidant
informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing
in just one subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar
Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated
the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased
to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the
corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges
made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still
below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with
the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in
Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the
examination notebooks in his assigned subject Criminal Law that the examinee
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 32 of 43
who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then
the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent
Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one
causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64%
to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the
general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is
746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71;
Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent
Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he
remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the
passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court,
leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He
recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was
received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a
passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile
Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent
Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law
tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the
rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo
was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except
Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the
order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made
known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent
Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's
Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the
whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for
consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-
71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
32

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the
particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not
have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33,
rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the
grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number
1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence
of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of
the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent
Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of
the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an
examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after
the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible,
the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns
that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which
is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to
reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine
concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has
number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs.
1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E.
GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the
five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from
66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points,
more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution
of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any
grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath.
It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee
to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of
other examinees.
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 33 of 43
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent
Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing,
Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted
paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases
Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the
members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith
and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not
his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order
was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential
memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial
correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to
the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII,
p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive
to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and
Pamatian whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and
deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as
corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm.
Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the
1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo
too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the
Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence
that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating
the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of
his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine
Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's
well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each
of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and
in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in
33
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one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to
was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the
passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang,
with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But
unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows: only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and
Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
BAI
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the
1. Political Law Public re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts. passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After
or 30 weighted points the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to
tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter
compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data
BAI showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be
submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
Labor Laws and Social determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no
Legislations 67% 67% = no re- business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of
evaluation made. passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the
or 33 weighted points. Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative,
exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the
image of the Court.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any
intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts. Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled
or 30 weighted points. out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90)
examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as
22 weighted points. borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good
faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For
certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as
claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of
Legal Ethics and Practical the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the
Exercises 81% 81% = no re- unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or
evaluation made. even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation
and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of
good faith.
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give
in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over

34

ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away.
Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz
violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-
evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela
Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves
scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in
the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first
time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his
answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.),
showing that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN
MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER
MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN
POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION,
RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO
66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid
notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and
Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela
Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent
Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination
Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to
refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case
of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp.
33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two
cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting
of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of
every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28,
rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the
dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as,
according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when
he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It
appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 35 of 43
Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh.
X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one
notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated
by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this
notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47%
in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner
Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number
110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed
out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-
Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but
Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of
an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects
except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16,
rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was
on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was
taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number
1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee
agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which
the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo
handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook
with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile
Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to
the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an
examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-
evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation
made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the
members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and
passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-
evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9,
35
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Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. BA
1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) Civil Law 89% 89% = "
subjects, as follows: Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
Labor Laws 3% weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Taxation 69% Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Mercantile Law 68%
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade
in Political Law are as follows: (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

BA The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela
Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27 February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent
weighted points Lanuevo.
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = " It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to
Taxation 69% 69% = " Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = " Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the
Criminal Law 78% 78% = " unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing
Remedial Law 85% 85% = " grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = " was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner
Montecillo was 71%.
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.) trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of
the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to disbarred.
Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had
two (2) other failing grades. These are: As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their
names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to
Political Law 70% show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.
Taxation 72%
III
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as
follows:

36

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
respondent.
A others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized
re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal
profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous
established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar --
94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the
required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice
Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee,
composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of
the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to
each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on
one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar
Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of
the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of
examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules
of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect
to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation
indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are
defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of
respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by
Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust
and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-
evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to
be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any
discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not
clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-
evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is
correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy
thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led
to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 37 of 43
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among
that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old
Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules,
every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal
case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or
determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before
or informing the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally indicted,
acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the
Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal
cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all
other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the
application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in
1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any.
But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of
good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any
criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal
records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral
character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal
case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or
conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963
and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time,
respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already
required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted
for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and
that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took
the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for
use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether
involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required
under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal,
Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him"
(Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally
withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which
was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly
omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in
1967, 1969 and 1971.
37

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical
injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and
1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending
criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case
pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar
examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of
the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS
741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to
whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom
he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate
of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of
Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to
surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken
from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and
his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of
indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his
motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such
explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as
tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case
despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of
the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it
when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 38 of 43
his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up
to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and
good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble
profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court
requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys,
respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to
the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such
omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in
which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his
attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as
WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be
a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an
officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to
permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American
cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this
present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several
occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the
membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or
false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel
vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico
from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators
contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7
SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and
(c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis
Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe,
54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the
grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of
falsification of public documents.
IV
38

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now
CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz
and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or
re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent
BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee
who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or
expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion
and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or
re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of
members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should
have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before
acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked
the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter
to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average
of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their
respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could
have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared
under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the
increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of
Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and
Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective
subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in
the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that
this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60
something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points
higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to
be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4,
Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent
Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her
subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and
increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations
so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used
to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily
acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and
he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 39 of 43
could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be
more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the
grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading
sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their
declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee
concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception
committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the
paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence
of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V,
p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17,
1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973,
Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to
me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according
to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider
his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper
and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I
am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio
Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
39

Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook.
Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it
was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent
became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected
that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I
recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to
induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among
them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from
any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence
notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades
given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case
No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-
examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the
re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve
the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their
participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so are
required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of
their duties relative thereto.
V
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 40 of 43
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973,
claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or
lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due
to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a
participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar
Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9,
Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the
late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore
cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this
out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice
Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian
and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until
this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being
intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent
or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of
the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that
he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in
their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law
examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar
Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho
that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of
the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by
respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit
restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His
unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair
public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of
respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was
committed for valuable consideration.
A
40

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the
official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of
proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF
Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for
the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was
notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo
and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of
BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80,
Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April
20, 1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument
April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.].
Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00,
which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of
P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was
his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in
the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971
in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from
his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in
the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under
Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the
P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the
amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable
listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the
transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married
sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000
(P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on
January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his
sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent
during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no
mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the
address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the
records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 41 of 43
her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give
to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was
either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing
circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF
Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No.
4992: August 14, 1972 date of instrument; August 23, 1972 date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was
subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently,
or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled
on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage
in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot.
According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS
mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to
pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed
in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972),
the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90.
Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the
GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is
a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact
that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities
of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed
total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00,
while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total
assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956
VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends
to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed
by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination
papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the
acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent
Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar
Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April
41

12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent
Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in
view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause
on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16,
1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount
of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a
down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he
bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a
& e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation
or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public
officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion
to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act
3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements
of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but
they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational
Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 42 of 43
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent
Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the
latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational
program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days 1951 to 1955
up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University)
1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected
with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the
affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior
Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and
Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that
period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and
beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved
on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also
the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time
attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was
already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to
1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he
was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80,
86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private
secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that
a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the
MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from
Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the
school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E.
Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the
Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not
even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries
of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine
Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But
respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila,
although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings
(Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside
the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board,
benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the
course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon
42
 Legal Writing #1: August 13, 2017 Page 43 of 43

E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon
E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry
operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol.
VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY
LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working

with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father
belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar
only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of
the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only
and does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was
employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and
was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes
on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27,
1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla
Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted
as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His
unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div.,
US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division,
US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies,
from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected
notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose
whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses
herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative
Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.

LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM
43