1. Enrico vs.

Heirs
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007
FACTS:
The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married in June 1962 and begot seven children, herein respondents. On May 1,
2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor
of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months
later. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who
have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the
marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004,
which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was
performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As
an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUES:
Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio
and Lolita
RULING:
No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, covers marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio
was celebrated on August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the order. The order declares
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without
any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages, LegalSeparation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity,
but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.
______________________________________________________________________________
ENRICO vs HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO & TRINIDAD MEDINACELI G.R. No. 173614
FACT:
It is petition assailing the RTCs reinstatement order on the formerly dismissed filed action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between the petitioner and respondents father. Eulogio
Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, were married on June 14, 1962, begotten seven
children. Trinidad died on May 1, 2004; Eulogio married another woman named Lolita Enrico on
August 26, 2004. Six months later, Eulogio passed away.
Respondents filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage between Petitioner and the
respondents late father on two grounds: 1. that the marriage lacks the requisite of marriage license,
and; 2. the lack of marriage ceremony due to respondents father serious illness that made its
performance impossible.
Loleta, defend her stand by citing Article 34 of the family code arguing her exemption from getting
marriage license. She sought then the dismissal of the respondents filed action by citing the AM-
02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, par. (a) Rule of the family code.
Pursuant to AM-02-11-10-SC embodied the rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages RTC dismissed the respondents filed action.
Respondents filed motion for reconsideration invoking the ruling in the case of Nial v. Bayadog,
holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a voidable marriage even
after death of one of the spouses. RTC granted the motion and issued an order for reinstatement
of the case. Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration but denied, thereby petitioner assailed a
petition directly to Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death of
Eulogio.
2.) Whether which of the two rule AM 02-11-10-SC or Nial v. Bayadog shall govern the
instant case
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Respondent/heirs have NO legal standing to assail the validity of
the second marriage after the death of their father; because the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC shall
govern the said petition, under the Family Code of the Philippines. Particularly Sec 2, par. (a)
Provides that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.
Question: Why the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC should govern this case not the held decision on Nial
v. Bayadog case whereas the two cases expressed a common cause of issue?

Here the court resolved that; in Nial v. Bayadog case the heirs were allowed to file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of their fathers second marriage even after their fathers death because
the impugned marriage there was solemnized prior to the affectivity of the Family Code. Unlike
in this case Enrico v Heirs of Medinaceli where same holding cannot be applied because the
marriage here was celebrated in 2004 where the Family Code is already effective and under family
code is embodied the rule on AM 02-11-10-SC where this rule shall govern petitions for the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages.

Nonetheless, as the heirs major concern here, the court supplied; that the heirs have still remedy
to protect their successional rights not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.

2.
IGNACIO J. SALMINGO v. ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA
527 SCRA 1(2007)
In view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary proceeding, observance of due process,
as in other judicial determinations, is imperative along with a presumption of innocence in favor
of the lawyer.
Ignacio J. Salmingo (Salmingo), City Administrator of Silay, filed a disbarment complaint against
Atty. Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica) and a petition for setting aside of the decision holding Liza
Janes (Jane) marriage as annulled. Salmingo alleged that in prosecuting an annulment case, Atty.
Rubica deliberately concealed Liza Janes address so that she could not be served with summons,
thus enabling him to present evidence ex parte, and that Atty. Rubica also caused the publication
of summons only in a newspaper of local circulation. Salmingo also contends that Atty Rubica did
not serve a copy of his petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor; and that he did not cause the registration of the decree of nullity in the Civil
Registry. Salmingo contends that the conduct of Atty. Rubica did not comply with the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) investigating commissioner recommended that Atty.
Rubica be suspended for three months for gross misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors resolved
to dismiss the case for lack of sufficient evidence. Salmingo, meanwhile, re-appealed the decision
to the Supreme Court through a letter he sent to the Chief Justice. He avers that in prosecuting
theannulment case, Atty. Rubica deliberately concealed Liza Janes address so that she could not
be served with summons, thus enabling him to present evidence ex parte.
ISSUES :
Whether or not Atty Rubicas alleged non-compliance with the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is tantamount to gross
misconduct which warrants his disbarment
HELD:
The Court upholds the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
It is settled that in view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary proceeding, observance
of due process, as in other JUDICIAL determinations, is imperative along with a presumption of
innocence in favor of the lawyer. Consequently, the burden of proof is on the complainant to
overcome such presumption and establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence.
To prove that Atty. Rubica knew Liza Janes true whereabouts all along, complainant alleged that
Atty. Rubica had been sending allowances to Liza Jane and their children at her residence. Atty.
Rubica countered, however, that he had been sending allowances by depositing the same in a bank
in Bacolod City through an automated teller machine (ATM) account, which deposit could be
withdrawn at any ATM machine within the Philippines. This complainant failed to controvert.
On Atty. Rubicas alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which took effect on
March 15, 2003 xxx that the petitioner should serve copies of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and that of the Public Prosecutor; that service of summons by publication on a
respondent whose whereabouts are unknown be in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; and that the prevailing party cause the registration and publication of the decree took
effect only May 15, 2003, after respondent filed the declaration of nullity case on January 9, 2003.
At the time respondent filed his petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage, what applied was
the Rules of Court under which he was not required to file his petition in six copies and to serve
copies on the Office of the Solicitor General and that of the City or Provincial Prosecutor. Neither
was he required to cause the registration and publication of the decree of nullity.
Atty. Rubica did comply with the procedure in the Rules of Court on service by publication on a
respondent whose whereabouts are unknown, which procedure requires only publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order, as
opposed to a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the court
may order required by the above-quoted Section 6 (1) of the Rule On Declaration Of Absolute
Nullity Of Void Marriages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages.
The requirement that the trial court order the prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists in
case the defendant in the declaration of nullity case files no answer is addressed to the said court,
not to the parties to the case nor to their counsel, absent any showing of respondents involvement
in the lapse in the prescribed procedure, he cannot be faulted therefor.
___________________________________________________________
SALMINGO VS. RUBICA
FACTS:
On Jan. 9, 2003 Atty. Rubica filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Liza Jane
Estao.
Liza Jane's given address was at Blk. 25, Lot 36 Josefina St., Eroreco Subd., Bacolod City. But,
the summons delivered to her was returned unserved because noone was allegedly found in the
address. The court granted the respondent's Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Service by
Publication and he was able to publish his summons in the Visayan Post, a weekly newspaper os
general circulation in Negros Occidental.

When nothing was heard from Liza Jane, Atty. Rubica presented his evidence ex parte at Branch
40 of Silay RTC without the City Prosecutor's participation. On May 23, 2003, the trial court
declared the respondent's and Liza Jane's marriage as null and void because it was shown
through the presented evidence that Liza Jane had a previous valid and existing marriage with
another man named Rene T. Mojica. The judgment was rendered final on July 17, 2003.
Ignacio Salmingo complained that Atty. Rubica intentionally hid Liza Jane's address so she
could not receive the summons and that this enabled him to present evidence ex parte. He also
alleged that the respondent only published the summons in a newspaper of local circulation and
that he also did not serve a copy of his petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and Office
of the City Prosecutor; hence, the petition for Atty. Rubica's disbarment.

ISSUE: Whether Salmingo's complaint of non-service of summons could have merit in Atty.
Rubica's disbarment.

RULING: No. As with other judicial determinations, the Court upheld the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors, where it was presumed that the lawyer being complained about is innocent
until the complainant's proof overcomes the presumption and that the latter's clear evidence
could establish his charges ( Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1, 15).

To prove that Atty. Rubica knew Liza Jane's address, Salmingo argued that he was sending
allowances to his ex-wife and children at her residence. The respondent countered that he sent
his allowances through ATM, which could enable Liza Jane to withdraw the money from
anywhere in the country.

The complainant also alleged that Atty. Rubica did not follow the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages in terms of
submitting six copies to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor and that he did not publish his summons in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines.
The Court held that the first complaint did not apply to Atty. Rubica at the time of his filling for
the declaration of his marriage as null and void. So, he was not obliged to submit six copies of
his petition. He was also found to comply with the rules on publishing summons as provided for
in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, wherein he was able to post the summons in publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order.

Because of insufficient evidence, weak argument, and absence of direct claim to the situation
being complained about, the Court denied Salmingo's petition for Atty. Rubica's disbarment.

______________________________________________________________________________

3.

Valdes vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Valdes vs. RTC

Art. 52. The judgement of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons.
COMMENT:
Who are not affected?
Under the Rule provided for under Article 52, third parties shall NOT be affected.
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
*Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage , shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.( As
amended by E.O. No.227, dated July 17, 1987)
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
*prima facie- based on the first impression; accepted as correct until proved otherwise

Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In
1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null
and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code
contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
without marriage.

In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that
Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during
their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through
the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant
will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the
liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that:
(1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses;
(3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground
of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
Issues:

Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar.

Held:

Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during
the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the
case may be, of the Family Code.

Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other,
so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did
not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing
under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his
or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental
and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation
of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of
Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. (Valdes
vs Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996).
______________________________________________________________________________

4.

G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993

Domingo vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia,
for support and subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of some
of her properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and
separation of property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.

Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of
their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however,
one is required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
Marriage is an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family; as such, it shall be
protected by the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
void and a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void

______________________________________________________________________________

Domingo vs CA
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter
filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-
month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because
their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and
superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the
purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties
acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.

HELD:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it
is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or
her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being
charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply
be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence,
the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime
of property relations governing them.

______________________________________________________________________________

5.
337 SCRA 122 (391 Phil. 809) Civil Law Family Code Void Marriages Need for
Judicial Declaration of Nullity Before Remarriage
Criminal Law Bigamy Elements
In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991, Mercado
married a second time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan.
In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.
In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity).
In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy against Mercado.
In May 1993, Mercados marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio. Mercado now sought
the dismissal of the bigamy case filed against him. He contended that since his first marriage
was declared void ab initio, there was no first marriage to speak of, hence, his second
marriage with Tan was actually his first marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is correct.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
All the elements are present when Mercado married Tan. When he married Tan, his first
marriage was still subsisting and was not declared void. In fact, Mercado only filed an action
to declare his first marriage void after Tan filed the bigamy case. By then, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous
marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. Absent that
declaration a person who marries a second time shall be guilty of bigamy.

______________________________________________________________________________

Mercado vs Tan
Mercado vs. Tan
337 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the
former marriage.

HELD:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after
Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted
second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

______________________________________________________________________________

6.Republic vs CA and Molina

Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married
in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband
and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on
his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In
1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit
her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at
the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this
case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be
respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state.

______________________________________________________________________________

REPUBLIC v. MOLINA
268 SCRA 198

FACTS:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 in Manila and bore a son. A year after the
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility. In October 1986, the couple had a
very intense fight which estranged their relationship. On August 16, 1990, Roridel filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo contending that the latter is psychologically incapable
of complying with essential marital obligations. Petitioner argues that opposing and conflicting
personalities is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.

ISSUE;
Does opposing or conflicting personalities constitute to or is equivalent to psychological incapacity as
defined in Article 36 of the Family Code?
HELD:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The
evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with
each other. There was no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The court further laid down the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:

1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff;

2) The root cause psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint and proven by experts;
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration;
4) The incapacity must be incurable or permanent;
5) Such illness must be grave enough;
6) The essential marital obligations are those embraced by Articles 68-71 and Articles 220, 221, and
225 of the Family Code;
7) The interpretations given by the National Appellate of Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines should be given great respect by our courts; and
8) The court must order the fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State and the
Solicitor General must issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition

On these grounds, the decision of RTC and CA declaring the marriage null and void ab initio is reversed
and set aside.

______________________________________________________________________________

7.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they
proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during
their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their
honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there
was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping
on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the
same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of
the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even
the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to
maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming
Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other
hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has
no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still
young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another
physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of
erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

______________________________________________________________________________

CHI MING TSOI V. CA

FACTS

Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married on May 22, 1988. According to Gina, since the time of their
marriage, they never had a sexual intercourse. They underwent medical examinations. She was found
healthy & normal. Chi Ming underwent medication which was confidential.
She claims that her husbands a homosexual who married her to maintain his residency status and to
prove that he is really a man. Chi Ming claims that it is Gina who refuses to have sexual intercourse. Gina
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Chi Mings psychological
incapacity. New medical examination proved that Chi Ming is capable of having sexual intercourse.
Lower court & CA declared Alfonso as psychologically incapacitated to discharge essential marital
obligations due to his reluctance or unwillingness to consummate marriage.

ISSUE

WON Chi Ming is psychologically incapable?

HELD

Yes. Granted. Marriage void.

RATIO:
No intercourse since marriage. Chi Ming should have discussed the problem with his wife if she indeed
refused to have sexual intercourse with him. Or he could have resorted to the court if she still resisted.

1. Senseless & protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

2. Procreation is one of the essential marital obligations and constant non-fulfillment of such will
destroy marriage.
3. Filipinas are modest, Leni would have not subjected herself to such public scrutiny if she was just
making this up.

Chi Mings reluctance & unwillingness to perform sexual acts with a wife he claims he loves dearly,
proves that this is a hopeless situation & of his serious personality disorder. Grave enough

______________________________________________________________________________

8.
Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000
FACTS: Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. They later on became sweethearts and got married and had 5 children. After the
EDSA revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. He engaged to different
business ventures but failed. She always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him,
instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even
force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their
children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times
during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. She
did not want him to stay in their house anymore so when she saw him in their house, she was so angry
that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother
who came to her aid. She sought for nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Brenda submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation.
The court a quo found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda
and their children. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: W/N there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove psychological
incapacity? Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity

HELD: Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a

declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does
not show such incapacity. Although SC is convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of these acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

______________________________________________________________________________

MARCOS V. MARCOS

Facts

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the
husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC
declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.

Issues

Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a

requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

Held

Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the
totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is
sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent
can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of
more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was
traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.

______________________________________________________________________________

9.

REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

FACTS:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at
the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino
begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started
leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few
months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in
drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned
that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-
date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was
served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for
presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her
sister-in-law as her only witness.

The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in
writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file
said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor
conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the
investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino
void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground
that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest
whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the
evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General
appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is
psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a
married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.

ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the
ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?

HELD:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is
on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-
mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires
that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since
no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the
crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not
given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely
rendered.

______________________________________________________________________________

Case Digest: G.R. No. 109975. February 9, 2001

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, respondent.

_______________________________________________________________________

Facts: Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag and begot two children. Avelino would
disappear for months without explanation and attend to drinking sprees with friends and return
home drunk when with the family; forced his wife to have sexual intercourse and if she resisted,
would inflict injure to the latter. He left his family again and never heard of him. Erlinda was
constrained to look for a job to fend for themselves. Erlinda then learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail who remains at-large at date.Erlinda
filed for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void
under Artcile 36 of the Family Code. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals
raising that the lower court erred in declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino Dagdag null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code, the psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated by the law not having been proven
to exist. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court

Issue: Whether or not immaturity and irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice
constitutes psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code to declare the marriage
null and void.

Ruling: No. The ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina case is reiterated herein in
which the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.

______________________________________________________________________________

10.

BARCELONA V CA 412 SCRA 41 SEPTEMBER 24, 2003

FACTS: Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision as well as the 7 August 1997
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order
dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-
24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of
Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
March 29, 1995 Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment against Diana Barcelona
(petitioner). On May 9, 1995, Tadeo filed a motion to withdraw petition which the RTC granted
on June 7, 1995
July 21, 1995 Tadeo filed annulment again but petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on two
grounds: no cause of action and violates SC administrative circular 04-94 on forum shopping
Ground for dismissal of the petition for reconsideration filed by petitioner (against deferring
resolution) was the complainants failure to state a cause of action but according to Judge Pison,
petitioner was shown to have violated the complainants right so there is cause of action.
RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that
"[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert." After
her Motion for Reconsideration11 was denied in the March 22, 1999 Order, petitioner elevated
the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari,13 docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.

ISSUE: Whether evidences presented are sufficient to invoke psychological incapacity in annulling said
marriage

HELD: A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action
at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether
true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue." The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a
demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to
sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

The evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of
psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get
along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or
incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify
and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show
that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that
it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
Medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as
the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here, however, the
totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
PETITION GRANTED. ANNULMENT CASE WAS DISMISSED

______________________________________________________________________________

11.

Art 46 compared with PI

In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. Theyve had four children since then. David
then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the
marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one
Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim.
David averred that Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the findings
of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan
declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with
petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated
acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.
HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to
the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one be incapable of performing
the essential marital obligations. Sharons sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it
constitute the other forms of psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those
contemplated in law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or
established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the dissolution of marriage.

______________________________________________________________________________

12.
CO- OWNERSHIP
Buenaventura VS. CA
G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449
March 31, 2005

Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and
violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondents motion
issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general
rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA,
to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No
fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said
distribution.

______________________________________________________________________________
13.

Paras vs Paras

Facts:

On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel.
Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36 of
the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived
with a concubine and sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and (d)
he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She
was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently spending time at her
"Botica." Eventually, in1964 convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was
considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy
Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son
Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her
earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope
with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. However, after three
months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was
shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent a
conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from
their gas station free of charge. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the
last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in
1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose,
obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.

He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose
of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before
the banks authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United States. For his part, he was
granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the
Philippines. He spent for his childrens education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was
just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for
their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed to give them financial support because
of his lack of income. What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him
during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she
retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This
was further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not
his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle
Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.

After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It
found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted
guards at the gates of their house; (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs,
thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; and (c) the charge of infidelity is
unsubstantiated. The RTC observed that the relationship between the parties started well, negating the
existence of psychological

incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage. And lastly, it ruled that there
appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage.

On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas signature in
bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice of
law, thus: the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of
falsifying his wifes signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1)
YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the
penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondents record as an
attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. On December 8, 2000, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa)
falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged
defects or idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Courts
factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant
complaint sometime in May, 1993

Issues:

1) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case;

2) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of
Justos alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and

3) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo

Held:

1) A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact,
the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient
to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged infidelity, failure
to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best
indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these
grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These
grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly in cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the
"gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show incurability, such that
while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an
irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic
obligations of marriage in the future.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must

convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologist

\3) ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability

______________________________________________________________________________

14.

REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO

FACTS
Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique a petition for the declarationof the
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The Republic
of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor General in the case. During trial, Nolasco testified that he was seaman
and that he had first met Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ships port calls.
From that chance meeting onwards, Parker lived with Nolasco on his ship for six months until they
returned to Nolascos hometown of San Jose, Antique in 1980 after his seamans contract expired. On
January 1982, NOlasco married Parker in San Jose, Antique. After the marriage celebration, Nolasco
obtained another employment as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in Antique. Sometime in
1983, while working overseas, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that Parker had
left Antique. Nolasco claimed he asked permission to leave the ship and return home to look for his
wife. He testified that his efforts to look for her whenever their ship docked in England were fruitless,
that the letters he sent to Parkers address in England were all returned to him, and that their friends
received no news from Parker. He testified that he had no knowledge of her family background even
after the marriage and did not report the disappearance to the authorities. The petition was granted by
lower court and was also affirmed by the appellate court. As such, the republic appealed to the SC.

Issue

Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Held

The respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent
wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead. In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by
respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the
basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose,
Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of
the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many
millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica
declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent
17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the
alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him.
Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

______________________________________________________________________________

G.R. NO. 94053 March 17, 1993

Republic of the Philippines vs. Nolasco

FACTS:

Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived with
him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his
hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married in January 1982.

After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the province. In
January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to
their son, she left. He cut short his contract to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983.

He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He wrote several
letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he
inquired from his friends but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before
the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.

RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to the CA,
contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco had
failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the trial
court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the Article 41
of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years;
however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive
death of one spouse. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before
a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's
whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead.

Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities or of
the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any
information about her was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did not
explain why he took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his
captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked
Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London,
he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.

The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.

______________________________________________________________________________

15.

[No. 5986. March 18, 1941]

JOSE RUIZ, plaintiff and appellant,
vs. PELAGIA ATIENZA, defendant and appellee.

ENGZON, J.:

DOCTRINE: The provision of the Marriage Law (Sec. 30, Act No. 3613) referring to "force" or "violence" as
ground of annulment of marriage, does not seem to include mere intimidation, at least where it does not
in legal effect amount to force or violence.

FACTS:
1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Manila Court of First Instance denying plaintiff's demand for
the annulment of his marriage with defendant contracted on November 14, 1938, with all the outward
legal formalities.
2. Previous to February, 1938, Jose Ruiz and Pelagia Atienza, both single, were sweethearts.
3. Loving perhaps too well, she allowed him, in a moment of weakness, to have his way, with the result
that nine months later she became an unmarried mother.
4. After the baby's birth, i. e., on November 14, 1938, Pelagia's father Jose Atienza, Atty. Villavicencio
(her cousin-in-law), and three other persons visited Jose Ruiz at the boarding house where he lived,
in Oregon street.
5. They requested, and after some discussion, convinced him to marry Pelagia.
6. With his cousin Alfredo Asuncion, he went with Jose Atienza and companions to Tanduay street,
where Pelagia was living;
7. from there the party, joined by Pelagia and others, went to the Aglipayan church at Maria Clara street,
Manila, then proceeded to secure a marriage license, and later returned to the same Aglipayan
church where the marriage was celebrated in the evening.
8. Four days later, alleging that he had been forced into wedlock, Jose Ruiz brought this suit to secure
its avoidance.
9. His counsel has 'dramatized the visit of Jose Atienza and companions, and the "plans" drawn to force
Jose Ruiz into the marriage, Jose's passive and downcast attitude, all in an effort to maintain the
proposition that Jose Ruiz went with them that afternoon "convinced" by the following "arguments":
a. the threats of the father supported by his "balisong";
b. the unveiled intimidation by Atty.Villavicencio that if he would not marry Pelagia Atienza, he
would have difficulty when he would take the bar examinations because, as he said, many
have been rejected admission to the bar on the ground of immorality; and
c. the promise of Atty. Villavicencio that Ruiz would be physically "safe" if he would go with
them.
ISSUE:
W/N Jose Ruiz was intimidated into marrying Pelagia Atienza?

HELD: No!
1. As to the first, it appears that in the course of the conversation during the visit, Ruiz made the
statement that he could not marry Pelagia because he was already a married man.
2. This so aroused Jose Atienza that he grabbed Ruiz' necktie, exclaiming: "So you mean to fool my
daughter!"
3. Those present intervened quickly, and the dispute stopped.
4. The flare of anger is easily understandable.
5. But it is not sufficiently established that Jose Atienza displayed any "balisong", or made any threat
against the life of Ruiz.
6. In fact, only a one-and-a-half-inch knife was found in his possession by the policeman whom the
companions of Ruiz called upon seeing what they believed to be the beginning of trouble.
7. As to the threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar, by filing charges against him for immorality,
the authorities are unanimous that it is not such a duress as to constitute a reason for annuling the
marriage.
8. * * * and where a man marries under the threat of, or constraint from, a lawful prosecution for
seduction or bastardy, he cannot avoid the marriage on the ground of duress; * * *.
9. As to the promise by Atty. Villavicencio, it is apparent that when defendant was invited to go with
them and marry Pelagia, he had some fears that he might be subjected to bodily harm in retaliation
for the dishonor inflicted upon her family.
10. For this reason, he had to be assured by Villavicencio that he would be safe if he went with them.
11. From this statement, we cannot infer what appellants attorney would cleverly infer, i.e., that Ruiz
would not be safe if he did not follow them.
12. Appellant would make it appear that that afternoon Ruiz was practically kidnapped by Pelagia's
relatives until after the marriage ceremony.
a. That cannot be true.
b. He had many occasions to escape, as pointed out in appellee's brief.
c. He had companions in the house whom he could have asked for help.
d. There was even the policeman.
13. Now, considering that the law presumes strongly the validity of marriage once the formal ceremonies
have been completed, we are led to the conclusion that although plaintiff may not have looked upon
the ceremony as the happy culmination of youthful romance, still the evidence does not warrant a
pronouncement that his consent to it was obtained through force or intimidation.
14. Indeed, we may advert to the provision of the Marriage Law which, referring to "force" or "violence",
does not seem to include mere intimidation, at least where it does not in legal effect amount to force
or violence.
15. At any rate, it is unnecessary to pass on the effect of this legal distinction.
16. For even though appellant has presented his case in the best possible light, yet appellee's attorney
has successfully met the issues, upholding the judge's conclusion of fact that neither violence nor
duress attended the marriage celebration.

Judgment affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered

______________________________________________________________________________

16.
424 SCRA 42 Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Disbarment Case is Sui Generis Immoral
and Deceitful Conduct
In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began his career as a
lawyer. However in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage with Esparza
was subsisting. In June 2000, Teves filed a complaint for disbarment against Macarrubo.
Teves alleged that Macarrubo made her believe that his marriage with Esparza was void; that
Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but later on left her and then Macarrubo
subsequently married another woman named Josephine Constantino whom he subsequently
abandoned. Teves presented as evidence documents proving Macarubbos marriages as
well as photos of him and his wife as a family. Macarrubo was initially declared in default for
failing to appear multiple times but was subsequently given the opportunity to defend himself.
In his defense, Macarrubo avers that he was only coerced to marry Teves in order to save
her face because at that time she was already pregnant; that Teves sent some strangers to
pick Macarrubo up wherever he goes. He presented a judicial declaration of the nullity of his
marriage with Teves; that the marriage was void for being a sham. He also averred that the
ruling in the said case serves as res judicata on the disbarment case because Teves failed
to appear in the annulment case. He also avers that his third marriage, with Constantino, is
currently being annulled due to similar circumstances.
The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was never remiss in
supporting Teves and the two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with her is void,
recommended a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law for grave
misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first one is
subsisting shall be a ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is subsequently
declared void.
HELD: Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared void, it is
still undeniable that he contracted it while his first one is subsisting. Further, since the second
marriage is void, he is then liable for concubinage for living with another woman while his first
marriage is subsisting. The Supreme Court cannot give credit to his defense that both second
and third marriages are shot gun marriages. He is a lawyer and is unlikely to be coerced. One
incident of a shotgun marriage is believable, but two such in succession would tax ones
credulity. Macarrubos actions show a blatant disregard to the institution of marriage and
family. His acts import moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic social institution
of marriage.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of
a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community. Macarrubo violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui generis
cases. A disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in
a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit
of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course. In this case, the annulment of
Macarrubos second marriage will not work to remove such second marriage as a ground for
disbarment.

______________________________________________________________________________

17.
Sarao vs. Guevarra

( 1940)G.R. No. 47063; 40 OG 263

FACTS:

-Felix Sarao (plaintiff) and Pilar Guevarra (defendant) were married in Manila on June 3, 1936.

-In the afternoon of the same day, Sarao tried to have carnal knowledge of Guevarra, but the latter
showed reluctance and begged him to wait untilevening.

-When night came, the plaintiff again approached the defendant and tried to have carnal act with her,
but she complained of pains in her privateparts and he noticed some purulent matter offensive to the
smell coming out from her genital.
-Every attempt on plaintiffs part to have carnal act with his wife failed because she would complain of
pains in her genital organs, and he did notwant her to suffer.

-Upon the advice of a physician, defendant submitted to an operation on Aug. 7, 1936, and as her uterus
and ovaries were affected with the tumor,these organs were removed with the consent of the plaintiff.

-The removal of said organs rendered defendant incapable of procreation, but not of copulation.

-Plaintiff, however, declared that from the time he witnessed the operation he lost all desire to have
carnal act with her, and has tried not to do itsince then.

ISSUE(S):

-W/N incapacity to procreate can be construed as physically incapable of entering into the married
state, and is a valid ground for annulment.

HELD/RATIO:

-No. Under the marriage law at that time, and as consistently applied in the provision in Art. 45 (5) of
the Family Code, marriage may be annulled if either party was, at the time of marriage, physically
incapable of entering into the married state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be
incurable. It is held that the test of impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate.
In this case, the defendant was notimpotent at the time the marriage was celebrated, as supported by
the opinion of the doctor that the existence of fibrous tumor in the ovaries didnot necessarily render her
incapable of copulation or even procreation. The removal of her uterus and ovaries rendered her sterile
but did not make her unfit for sexual intercourse. Thus, the defendants sterility cannot be a ground for
annulment since what the law provides as a ground forannulment is the incapacity to copulate, and not
to procreate

______________________________________________________________________________

18.
Impotency
Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that
Remedios is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was
already existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the
complaint of Joel but she refused to do so. It was found that there was no collusion between
the parties notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in the case. Remedios was
ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals are indeed too
small for copulation. Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely on
Joels complaint. The marriage was later annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Remedios impotency has been established.
HELD: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the
sole testimony of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent cannot
be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although
her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from
such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or
be inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not
submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency.
The lone testimony of Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

______________________________________________________________________________

19. Buccat v Buccat (1941)

Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
April 25, 1941
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.

Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in
September, and got married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a
son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed
to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida
concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which
the State is interested and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting
fraud as a ground forannulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not
suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.

Decision:
SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant

___________________________________________________________________________
Buccat v Buccat de Mangonon GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941

FACTS:

1.It was established before the trial court:a. The Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938b.After
several interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that yearc.On November 26 the same
year, the plaintiff married the defendant in aCatholic Cathedral in Baguiod.They, then, cohabited for
about eighty-nine dayse.Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on February 23,
1939f.Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated.

2.On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment of marriage before theCFI of Baguio
City. The plaintiff claimed that he consented to the marriage becausethe defendant assured him
that she was virgin.

3.The trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.BASICALLY: Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff)
and Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got married onNovember 26, 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and
on March 20, 1939 Godofredo filedfor annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was led to
believe by Luida that shewas a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent of Plaintiff to the marriage?

DECISION: There is no fraud because: The Supreme Court states that: We see no reason to overturn
the ruling appealed. It isunlikely that the plaintiff, Godofredo, had not suspected that the
defendant, Luida, waspregnant. (As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she must
havelooked very pregnant even before they were married.) Since Godofredo must have knownthat she
was not a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled. The Sacred Marriage is an institution: it is the
foundation on which society rests. To cancel it,reliable evidence is necessary.*Consent freely given:
ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC

______________________________________________________________________________

20.

Aquino vs Delizo
Aquino vs. Delizo
109 Phil 21
FACTS:

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita
Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she
was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage,
gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the
proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence
presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any
evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA
thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such
fraud as would annul a marriage.

HELD:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was
allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is
hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally plump or
fat. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans abdomen reaches a
height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.

In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is
set aside.

______________________________________________________________________________

21. Anaya vs Palaroan

Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment
of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting
Auroras counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged
to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative
of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in
obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those
enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for
an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would
not warrant an annulment of marriage.

______________________________________________________________________________

Anaya vs Palaroan
G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970
FACTS:

Aurora Anaya filed a complaint for annulment of marriage against Fernando Palaroan
wherein she alleged the following: she and Fernando were married in 1953; after one
month of their marriage, Fernando filed an action for annulment against her; the trial
court dismissed the complaint, upholding the validity of their marriage and granting her
counterclaim; while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando
divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with
a close relative of his; and the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital
secret constituted fraud that would have precluded her from going through the marriage.
Aurora prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages. Fernando
denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and having committed
any fraud against Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its
dismissal with respect to moral damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding
that Auroras allegation of fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. Aurora
appealed.

ISSUE:

Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another

woman a ground for annulment of marriage?

HELD:

No. Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one
of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment (Art. 85,
Civil Code; Art. 45, Family Code); and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the
article (Art. 86, Civil Code; Art. 46, Family Code), providing that no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel
having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the
law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage
she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The
lawmakers intent being plain, the Courts duty is to give effect to the same, whether it
agrees with the rule or not. (Anaya vs Palaroan, G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970)

______________________________________________________________________________

22.

Article 45
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November
1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced
him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that
Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly
also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her
but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other
hand denied Orlys allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the
marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlys affection and care towards her.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face,
it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending
appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of the case,
Orlys allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not able to prove that there
was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged
intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well
abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient
enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well.
His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and
is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage.
It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly
freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

______________________________________________________________________________

23.

ONE ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, vs LUCITA ONG,

FACTS

William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union wasblessed with 3 children. On March
21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legalseparation under Art 55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical
violence, threats,intimidation and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted prayer for
legalseparation. CA upheld RTCs decision when herein petitioner filed a Motion forReconsideration
(MR). The climax of the couples drama was on December 14, 1995when the respondent asked
petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back fromBacolod which turned into a violent quarrel with
the petitioner hitting therespondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately
pointing agun at respondents head asking her to leave the conjugal house.

ISSUES:

Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTCs decision granting legalseparation to Lucita when she
herself has given ground for legal separation whenabandoned her family.

HELD:

No.

RATIO:

It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted whenboth parties have given ground
for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, theabandonment referred to in the Familu Code
is abandonment without justifiablecause for more than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left
William due tohis abusive conduct which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated inthe said
provision.

DISPOSITION:

Petition denied for lack of merit

24. G.R. No. 164915 March 10, 2006ERIC JONATHAN YU vs. CAROLINE T. YUFACTS:

Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CAalleging that his estranged wife Caroline Yu
unlawfully withheld from himthe custody of their minor child Bianca. Subsequently, respondent filed
apetition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of theabsolute community of property. The
petition included a prayer for theaward to her of the sole custody of Bianca and for the fixing of scheduleof
petitioners visiting rights "subject only to the final and executory judgment of the CA.

ISSUE: Is WHC available to determine the custodial rights of parents overtheir children?

HELD: No. Articles 49 and 50 of the Family Code provides that the issue on the custody of the spouses
common children is deemed pleaded in the declaration of nullity case. Hence, the writ of habeas corpus
cannot beavailed of by either spouse. Pursuant to the aforementioned provisions, itis the court who shall
determine the custody of the common children inthe case for declaration of nullity
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action [for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] and in the
absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for
the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. x x x It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[17]

Art. 50. x x x x

The final judgment in such cases [for the annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] shall provide
for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such other matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. (Emphasis and underscoring added)

By petitioners filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he automatically
submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently
dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for petitioner to replead his prayer for custody for,
as above-quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case
is deemed pleaded. That that is so gains light from Section 21 of the Rule on Declaration Of Absolute
Nullity Of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages[18]which provides:

Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes.Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon
receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion
of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage to resolve the custody of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could
only mean that the filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to consider the issue of custody of
a minor.[19]

The only explicit exception to the earlier-quoted second paragraph of Art. 50 of the Family Code is when
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings, which is not the case here.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

25. Republic v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan case brief summary

Republic v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan case brief summary

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981, registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up developed secondary male characteristics and eventually
diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

Respondent alleges that she had clitoral hypertrophy in her early years, at age six, after an ultrasound, it
was discovered that she had small ovaries but at 13 years old, tests revealed that her ovarian structures
had diminished, stopped growing and had no breast or menses. For al intents and purposes, as well as in
disposition, considered herself male. To prove her claim, respondent presented Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH, who issued a medical certificate stating that respondent is
genetically female but her body secretes male hormones, has two organs of which the female part is
undeveloped.

RTC granted respondents petition.

ISSUE: Can a genetically female but predominantly male person request for change of name and gender?
RULING: The Court ruled that the governing law with respect to change of name and gender is RA 9048.
Respondent, indisputably, has CAH, as such, is characterized by inappropriate manifestations of male
characteristics, although are genetically female. CAH people also have ambiguous private parts, appearing
more male than female but have internal female reproductive organs which may become undeveloped.
These individuals are commonly referred to as inters ex, and respondent, having reached the age of
majority, and having decided to be male, considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
is a preponderant biological support for considering him male.

Republics petition is denied. RTC Branch 33 decision is affirmed.

XXX

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case,
respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

26. republic vs silverio

Civil Law Equity Change of Name Change of Sex Marriage
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. Hes a biological male who feels
trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand.
The procedure was successful he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he
filed a petition for the change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to
female) in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make
these changes, among others, so that he can marry his American fianc.
The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity;
that Silverios misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not
be in any way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG
did not make any basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fianc and
the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may
be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in
existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was
passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in
petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of
Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the
petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is
based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under the law, a
change of name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;
or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-
assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for
the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with
the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it
was just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by
Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws
which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment
of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected
if Silverios petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone
sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned
sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of
that privilege.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

27 Barco vs CA
Date: January 20, 2004
Petitioner: Milagros Barco as natural guardian of Mary Joy Ann Gustilo
Respondents: CA, RTC, NCJR, Local Civil Registrar of Makati and Nadina Maravilla

Ponente: Tinga

Facts: In 1970, Nadina Maravilla married Francisco Maravilla. In 1977, the spouses lived separately and in 1978
they obtained an ecclesiastical annulment of. On 9 June 1978, Nadina gave birth to a daughter named June
Salvacion in Makati. Junes birth certificate listed Francisco as the father, and Maravilla as the childs surname.
However, Nadina subsequently claimed that all along, the real father of her child was Armando Gustilo, a
former Congressman with whom she maintained a relationship. Gustilo was married to Consuelo Caraycong, who
would later perish in the MV Don Juan naval accident. In1982, Nadina and Gustilo were married in the US. On 12
March 1985, Nadina apparently was able to obtain a judicial declaration annulling her marriage to Francisco.
In 1983, Nadina filed in her own name a Petition for Correction of Entries in the Birth Certificate of June
with the RTC of Makati. She claimed that Gustilo was the real father of June. Notably, Francisco affixed his
signature to the Petition signifying his conformity thereto. Gustilo filed a "Constancia," wherein he acknowledged
June as his daughter with Nadina, and that he was posing no objection to Nadinas petition.
The RTC issued an order setting thecase for hearing and directing the publication of the order. Nadina
filed an Amended Petition, this time impleading Francisco and Gustilo as respondents. The OSG filed an MTD on
the ground that the RTC "had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and/or the nature of th[e] suit. They claimed
that the changes "are substantial and controversial in character which directly affect the filiation and legitimacy of
petitioners daughter." The RTC denied the MTD. In 1985, the RTC granted the petition and ordered the
corrections to be effected. The RTC considered the claim of Nadina that she had relied completely on her uncle
William R. Veto16 to facilitate the preparation of Junes birth certificate, that it was through his inadvertence that
the mistaken entries were made, and that she was in intense physical discomfort when she had affixed her
signature to the birth certificate containing the incorrect entries.
Gustilo died in 1986. Two estate proceedings arose from his death, one lodged in Makati, the other in
Texas. Among the participants in both estate proceedings was Jose Vicente Gustilo, allegedly a biological child of
Gustilo. He filed with the CA a petition seeking the annulment of the RTC Order which had effected changes in the
civil status of June. Jose Vicente impleaded Nadina as an indispensable party. In her Comment, Nadina countered
that Jose Vicente had not sufficiently proven that he was a child of Armando, and there was neither extrinsic fraud
or lack of jurisdiction that would justify the annulment of the RTC Order. Nadina also pointed out that the Makati
court had approved a compromise agreement wherein the parties had agreed that the only heirs of the decedent
are "the surviving spouse, Nadina G. Gustilo, the daughter, June Salvacion G. Gustilo, the son, Jose Vicente Gustilo
III, and another daughter, Mary Joy Ann Gustilo." However, this compromise agreement was subsequently voided
on petition by Jose Vicente to the CA, on the ground that the Civil Code prohibited compromise as to the civil
status of persons.
Milagros Barco, in 1994, , a Motion for Intervention with a Complaint-in-Intervention attached thereto.
Barco alleged that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the RTC Order as she was likewise fathered by
Gustilo. In her Complaint-in-Intervention, Barco claimed that she and Gustilo had maintained a relationship since
1967, and to them was born Mary Joy in 1977. Barco also alleged that she actually moved in with Gustilo after the
death of the latters wife in 1980, and maintained her affair with Gustilo until 1983, when she was purportedly
supplanted by Nadina as Gustilos common-law companion after Gustilo had become gravely ill.
The CA dismissed both the petition and complaint in intervention. It held that neither Jose Vicente nor
Barco were able to establish the existence of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, the two grounds that would
justify the annulment of a final judgment. It ruled that while Jose Vicente and Barco had not been made parties in
the Petition for Correction. The publication of the Order conferred upon the RTC the jurisdiction to try and decide
the case. It also found no merit in Jose Vicentes claim that he learned of the RTC Order only in November of 1992,
pointing out that as early as 1987, he filed a pleading with the intestate court alleging that Junes birth certificate
had been amended to record the name of her true father.

Action to Annul Judgment: The recourse is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases, as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy. Annulment of judgments is a remedy long authorized and
sanctioned in our jurisdiction. As far back as 1918, this Court in Banco Espaol-Filipino v. Palanca recognized the
availability of a direct attack of a final judgment on the ground that it is void for want of jurisdiction. In Reyes v.
Datu we held that the validity of a final judgment or order of the court may be attacked only by a direct action or
proceeding or by motion in another case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Yet, it was only in the 1997 Rules that the procedure for the annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil cases of RTCs, through a petition before the CA, was formally provided. Rule 47 under which the
procedure was integrated incorporates settled jurisprudence on annulment of judgment. Statutory basis for the
remedy was laid way back in 1980, with the enactment of BP 129. Section 9 thereof vests in the CA exclusive
original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of the lower courts.
Section 2, Rule 47 explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, namely: extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. This express limitation is significant since previous jurisprudence recognized other grounds
as well. The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of
finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the issue or cause involved therein
should be laid to rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public
policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-
judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law. Even if the rule on annulment of judgment
is grounded on equity, the relief is of an extraordinary character, and not as readily available as the remedies
obtaining to a judgment that is not yet final.

Issue: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the parties

Held: Yes

Ratio: The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil registry is that the true
facts be established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding. Section 3, Rule 108 (the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.)
The CA held that jurisdiction over the parties was properly acquired through the notice by publication
effected in conformity with Section 4 of Rule 108. Barco assails this holding and claims that the failure to implead
her as a party to the petition for correction deprived the RTC of jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by
the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her
wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at
the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under
Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example,
a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or
paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort on
her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the CA correctly pointed out that the defect
was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication. The purpose precisely of
Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were
inadvertently left out.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person.46
The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

Issue: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Nadinas cause of action

Held: Yes

Ratio: It should be emphasized that jurisdiction over the nature of the action or the subject matter is conferred by
law. The question of whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter can be answered simply by
determining if on the basis of the complaint or petition the court has, under the law, the power to hear and decide
the case. Barcos remaining arguments are to be tested against this standard.
One of Barcos striking assertions is that the general rule still is that the jurisdiction of the court in the
correction of entries in the civil register is limited to innocuous or clerical mistakes, as what she insinuates as the
apparent contrary holding in Republic v. Valencia applies only to citizenship cases. Since the promulgation of the
Valencia ruling in 1986 the Court has repeatedly ruled that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding. Barco, by seeking to limit the application of
the Valencia doctrine to citizenship cases, is flogging a dead horse.
The erroneous doctrine was traced back to the 1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic. The flaw in Ty Kong
Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows: "No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without a judicial order." It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed
except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned
therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and "changed." In its
ordinary sense, to correct means "to make or set right;" "to remove the faults or errors from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute".
The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the
basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the
civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need
not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status
but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters
that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of isolating
Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule
of statutory construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to
be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated.59
Lee also points out that RA 9048, enacted in 2001, has effectively changed the nature of a proceeding
under Rule 108. Under this new law, "clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname" may
now be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal registrar or consul general, without need of any
judicial order. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors
in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes
and corrections in entries of the civil register.
RA 9048 may not find application in this case, yet it is clearly another indicium of how entrenched the
Valencia ruling is today. With the enactment of the law, the legislature acknowledged the potency of the ruling. To
repeat, substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through
the filing of a petition under Rule 108. Any further attempt to limit the scope of application of Rule 108 runs
against the wall of judicial precedent cemented by legislative affirmation.

Issue: WON the petition for correction has prescribed

Held: No

Ratio: Next, Barco argues that the petition for correction had prescribed under the Civil Code; and that the
petition for correction should be treated as a petition for change of name which can only be filed by the person
whose name is sought to be changed. These arguments can be decided jointly. They both are not well taken as
they cannot allude to a lack of jurisdiction that would render the RTC Order subject to annulment.
Assuming arguendo that Nadinas petition for correction had prescribed and/or that the action seeking
the change of name can only be filed by the party whose name is sought to be changed, this does not alter the
reality that under the law the Makati RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition for correction. BP
129 clearly conferred on the Makati RTC exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. In complementation of grant of jurisdiction, Section 1 of Rule 108
provides that the verified petition to the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto should be filed
with the CRI of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Prescription and lack of capacity to bring action cannot be ignored by a court of law in properly resolving
an action, to the extent that a finding that any of these grounds exist will be sufficient to cause the dismissal of the
action. Yet, the existence of these grounds does not oust the court from its power to decide the case. Jurisdiction
cannot be acquired through, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties. Contrariwise,
lack of capacity to sue and prescriptions as grounds for dismissal of an action may generally be rendered
unavailing, if not raised within the proper period.
It thus follows that assuming that the petition for correction had prescribed, or that Nadina lacked the
capacity to file the action which led to the change of her daughters name, the fact that the RTC granted the Order
despite the existence of these two grounds only characterizes the decision as erroneous. An erroneous judgment is
one though rendered according to the course and practice of the court is contrary to law. It is not a void judgment.

Issue: WON the RTC Order is an erroneous judgment

Held: No

Ratio: Barco correctly notes that the RTC erred in directing that the name of Nadinas daughter be changed from
"June Salvacion Maravilla" to "June Salvacion Gustilo." Following the trial courts determination that Gustilo was
the father of June, but prescinding from the conclusive presumption of legitimacy for the nonce assuming it could
be done, the child would obviously be illegitimate. The applicable laws mandate that June, as an illegitimate child,
should bear the surname of her mother, and not the father.68 From another perspective, the RTCs error in
ordering the change of name is merely an error in the exercise of jurisdiction which neither affects the courts
jurisdiction over Nadinas petition nor constitutes a ground for the annulment of a final judgment. As the seminal
case of Herrera v. Barretto explains: xxx Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter xxx the decision of all other questions
arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.
In the same vein, it is of no moment that the RTC Order contravenes the legal presumption accorded June
of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Nadina. A review of the records does indicate the insufficiency of the
evidence offered to defeat the presumption, against which the only evidence admissible is the physical
impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child. It seems that the RTC relied primarily on the testimony of Nadina in
adjudging that Gustilo, and not Francisco, was the father of June. Yet, Article 256 CC renders ineffectual any
pronouncement against legitimacy made by the mother. The testimony proffered by the mother has no probative
value as regards Junes paternity. The RTCs cognizance of Gustilos Constancia might likewise be subject to critical
scrutiny. But the Court is now precluded from reviewing the RTCs appreciation of the evidence, however
erroneous it may be, because the Order is already final. The RTCs possible misappreciation of evidence is again at
most, an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, which is different from lack of jurisdiction. These purported errors do
not extend to the competence of the RTC to decide the matter and as such does not constitute a valid ground to
annul the final order.
The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final, are ultimately void.
Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to
reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden
of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with. The inevitable conclusion is that the RTC
Order, despite its apparent flaws, is not null and void, and thus cannot be annulled. Consequently, the CA
committed no reversible error in issuing the assailed decision.

______________________________________________________________________________

28. In Re: Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lim Carulasan Wang GR No 159966 30

March 2005

Facts: A petition was filed by Anna Lisa Wang for the change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of her son, a minor, Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang before the RTC of Cebu City.
Julian was the son of Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang. They were not yet married to each
other when Julian was born. Subsequently, when Julians parents got married, the latter executed
a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Reason: Since the family plans to stay in Singapore and, since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipated that Julian will
be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name.
Also, the spouses daughter and Julian might get confused if they are really brothers and sisters
because they have different surnames. Lastly, Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin
language since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for
these reasons why the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian
Lin Wang.
RTC: denied the petition. It found that the reasons abovementioned does not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. It further ruled that the real reason behind is only convenience.
MR: Denied. The Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the
dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The
dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of
the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling.
Hence, this Appeal. SC required the OGS to comment on the petition.

OSG: Trial Court is correct. legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of both their
mother and father, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same
(Family Code). Mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of name
and/or cancellation of entry.
Issue: Whether the name mothers surname should be dropped in the instant case because it is a
common practice in Singapore to omit said surname?
Decision: No. Petition is denied.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that A CHANGE OF NAME IS A PRIVILEGE AND NOT A RIGHT, so that
before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth
or civil registry, he must show PROPER AND REASONABLE CAUSE, or ANY
COMPELLING REASON which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be
denied.

VALID GROUNDS FOR CHANGE OF NAME:

1. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2. When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
3. When the change will avoid confusion;
4. When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and
was unaware of alien parentage;
5. A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and
6. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
IN GRANTING/DENYING:
The question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available.

What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
JUDICIOUS evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative
for making such determination being lodged in the courts.

DROPPING OF THE MIDDLE NAME FROM HIS REGISTERED NAME? No law supports
such.
MIDDLE NAME PURPOSE
1. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
IN THE CASE AT BAR
1. The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping of his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop
it from his registered name.
2. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to
his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he
may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of
the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

______________________________________________________________________________

30. TEOFISTA BABIERA V. PRESENTACION CATOTAL

G.R. No. 138493

June 15, 2000

Facts:

-Presentacion (petitioner) filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of Birth of Teofista
(respondent) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. Presentacion asserted that she was the only surviving
child of the late Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa.

-Months after the spouses' death, a baby girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the spouses' house and the
baby's mother, Flora Guinto, and the housemaid simulated that the baby girl was the spouses' child.

-Petitioner personally witnessed Flora give birth to Teosita as contested that the birth certificate of
Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it
contained false entries, and it was medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child
because, 1.) Hermogena was already 54 years old; 2.) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941,
the year petitioner was born.

-Teofista contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 1718 of the Family Code
states that the child's filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs.
She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack. She averred that she was
always known as Teifusta Babiera, and she and petitioner are full-blood sisters. Certificate of Birth,
Certificate of Baptism and Student's Report Card are shown with Hermogena's signature are Teofista's
proof. She also pointed out that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article
170 of the Family Code.

-CA deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated that only the father
could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that
said provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the
wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate for being
void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the mother.

Issues:

1. Does Presentacion have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal?

2. Is the special proceeding on appeal improper and is barred by the statute of limitation (prescription)?

3. Has CA failed to hold that the ancient public record of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving
oral testimony of respondent?

Ruling:
1. This argument is incorrect. Presentacion has the requisite standing to initiate the present action.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The
interest of Presentacion in the civil status of Teofista stems from an action for partition which the latter
filed against the former. The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.

2. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her
legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply.
Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab
initio.

3. While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption
of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence
presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption.

First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local
civil registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was
different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.

Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's
real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical records and
doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest
to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.

Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were
possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own
home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.

The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states
that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio's.

______________________________________________________________________________
31. republic vs capote

Facts: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for change of
name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The petition alleged
that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he
was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother made him
use the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; from the time
Giovanni was born and up to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him]
on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of
how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers
surname; Giovannis mother might eventually petition him to join her in the United States and his
continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate his
status as natural child; and the change of name will be for the benefit of the minor.
Having found respondents petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course
to the petition. Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the petition,
respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed
commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower
court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision
ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of
error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. Ruling that the
proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision
ordering the change of name.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts
decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable
parties. The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the childs
change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.
2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?
3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?
4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?
Held:
1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with
all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he
was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A
change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his
best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.

2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial
proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103
cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall
under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or
typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil
registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in
the entry is also required to reflect the change in name.

3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper
of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG
a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG.
The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected
to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely
accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition
nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now
complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough.

4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the petition
through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties were deemed notified
and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave
due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a
proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as
represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition (Republic of the
Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007).
______________________________________________________________________________
32.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLITO I. KHO et al.

526 SCRA 177 (2007), SECOND DIVISION

Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth
certificate. Kho petitioned for (1) change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to
Filipino; (2) delete John from his name; and (3) delete the word married opposite the date
of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth
certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.

The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on Republic Act No. 9048,
which allows first name and nickname in birth certificates without judicial order. The Municipal
officer approved of the change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground that
the correction not merely clerical but requires an adversarial proceeding. The Court of Appeals
found in favor of Kho.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Khos request for change in the details of their birth certificate requires an
adversarial proceeding

HELD:

It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlitos
mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the married status of Carlitos parents in
his and his siblings respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage
of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.

For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a
grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only
of the parents, but also of the offspring.

Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were married alters their
filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, with significant implications on their successional and
other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding.

The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as An Act Authorizing
the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical or Typographical
Error In An Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need
of Judicial Order, has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence
that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be
effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.

When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary
proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.