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First published Thu Dec 27, 2007; substantive revision Thu May 30, 2013
In its broadest definition, civic education means all the processes that affect people's
beliefs, commitments, capabilities, and actions as members or prospective members of
communities. Civic education need not be intentional or deliberate; institutions and
communities transmit values and norms without meaning to. It may not be beneficial:
sometimes people are civically educated in ways that disempower them or impart
harmful values and goals. It is certainly not limited to schooling and the education of
children and youth. Families, governments, religions, and mass media are just some of
the institutions involved in civic education, understood as a lifelong process. A[1]
rightly famous example is Tocqueville's often quoted observation that local political
engagement is a form of civic education: Town meetings are to liberty what primary
schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to
use and how to enjoy it.
Nevertheless, most scholarship that uses the phrase civic education investigates
deliberate programs of instruction within schools or colleges, in contrast
to paideia (see below) and other forms of citizen preparation that involve a whole
culture and last a lifetime. There are several good reasons for the emphasis on schools.
First, empirical evidence shows that civic habits and values are relatively easily to
influence and change while people are still young, so schooling can be effective when
other efforts to educate citizens would fail (Sherrod, Flanagan, and Youniss, 2002).
Another reason is that schools in many countries have an explicit mission to educate
students for citizenship. As Amy Gutmann points out, school-based education is our
most deliberate form of human instruction (1987, 15). Defining the purposes and
methods of civic education in schools is a worthy topic of public debate. Nevertheless,
it is important not to lose sight of the fact that civic education takes place at all stages
of life and in many venues other than schools.
Whether defined narrowly or broadly, civic education raises empirical questions: What
causes people to develop durable habits, values, knowledge, and skills relevant to their
membership in communities? Are people affected differently if they vary by age,
social or cultural background, and starting assumptions? For example, does a high
school civics course have lasting effects on various kinds of students, and what would
make it more effective?
From the 1960s until the 1980s, empirical questions concerning civic education were
relatively neglected, mainly because of a prevailing assumption that intentional
programs would not have significant and durable effects, given the more powerful
influences of social class and ideology (Cook, 1985). Since then, many research
studies and program evaluations have found substantial effects, and most social
scientists who study the topic now believe that educational practices, such as
discussion of controversial issues, hands-on action, and reflection, can influence
students (Sherrod, Torney-Purta & Flanagan, 2010).
The philosophical questions have been less explored, but they are essential. For
example:
Who has the full rights and obligations of a citizen? This question is especially
contested with regard to children, immigrant aliens, and individuals who have
been convicted of felonies.
In what communities ought we see ourselves as citizens? The nation-state is not
the only candidate; some people see themselves as citizens of local
geographical communities, organizations, movements, loosely-defined groups,
or even the world as a whole.
What responsibilities does a citizen of each kind of community have? Do all
members of each community have the same responsibilities, or ought there be
significant differences, for example, between elders and children, or between
leaders and other members?
What is the relationship between a good regime and good citizenship? Aristotle
held that there were several acceptable types of regimes, and each needed
different kinds of citizens. That makes the question of good citizenship relative
to the regime-type. But other theorists have argued for particular combinations
of regime and citizen competence. For example, classical liberals endorsed
regimes that would make relatively modest demands on citizens, both because
they were skeptical that people could rise to higher demands and because they
wanted to safeguard individual liberty against the state. Civic republicans have
seen a certain kind of citizenship--highly active and deliberative--as
constitutive of a good life, and therefore recommend a republican regime
because it permits good citizenship.
Who may decide what constitutes good citizenship? If we consider, for
example, students enrolled in public schools in the United States, should the
decision about what values, habits, and capabilities they should learn belong to
their parents, their teachers, the children themselves, the local community, the
local or state government, or the nation-state? We may reach different
conclusions when thinking about 5-year-olds and adult college students. As
Sheldon Wolin warned: [T]he inherent dangeris that the identity given to
the collectivity by those who exercise power will reflect the needs of power
rather than the political possibilities of a complex collectivity (1989, 13). For
some regimesfascist or communist, for examplethis is not perceived as a
danger at all but, instead, the very purpose of their forms of civic education. In
democracies, the question is more complex because public institutions may
have to teach people to be good democratic citizens, but they can decide to do
so in ways that reinforce the power of the state and reduce freedom.
What means of civic education are ethically appropriate? It might, for example,
be effective to punish students who fail to memorize patriotic statements, or to
pay students for community service, but the ethics of those approaches would
be controversial. An educator might engage students in open discussions of
current events because of a commitment to treating them as autonomous
agents, regardless of the consequences. As with other topics, the proper
relationship between means and ends is contested.
These questions are rarely treated together as part of comprehensive theories of civic
education; instead, they arise in passing in works about politics or education. Some of
these questions have never been much explored by professional philosophers, but they
arise frequently in public debates about citizenship.
5. Cosmopolitan Education
Bibliography
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As noted above the founders of the United States tried to reduce the burdens on
citizens, because they observed that republics had generally collapsed for lack of civic
virtue. However, they also created a structure that would demand more of citizens, and
grant citizens more rights, than the empire from which they had declared
independence. So virtually all of the founders advocated greater attention to civic
education. When Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 23 that the federal
government ought to be granted an unconfined authority in respect to all those
objects which are entrusted to its management (1987, p. 187), he underscored the
need of the newly organized central government for, in Sheldon Wolin's words, a new
type of citizenone who would accept the attenuated relationship with power implied
if voting and elections were to serve as the main link between citizens and those in
power. Schools would be entrusted to develop this new type of citizen.
[5]
would do in their schools, divisions of race, class, and ethnicity would be worn down
and transcended. Dewey thought that the actual interests and experiences of students
should be the basis of their education. I recur to a consideration of Dewey and civic
education below.
among our future citizens to sacrifice their self-interests for the sake of the common
good. Participation on this view is important both to stabilize society and to enhance
each individual's human flourishing through the promotion of our collective welfare.
The second group does not see democratic participation as the center, but instead sees
democratic participation as one aspect of overall character education. Central to the
mission of our public schools, on this view, is the establishing of character traits
important both to individual conduct (being a good person) and to a thriving
democracy (being a good citizen). The unannounced leader of the second group is
educational practitioner Thomas Lickona, and it includes such others as William
Bennett and Patricia White.
Neither group describes in actual terms what might be called democratic character.
Though their work intimates such character, they talk more about character traits
important to human growth and well-being, which also happen to be related to
democratic participation. What traits do these pundits discuss, and what do they mean
by character?
It is difficult, comments British philosopher R. S. Peters, to decide what in general
we mean when we speak of a person's character as distinct from his nature, his
temperament, and his personality (1966, p. 40). Many advocates of character
education are vague on just this distinction, and it might be helpful to propose that
character consists of traits that are learned, while personality and temperament consist
of traits that are innate.
[8]
What advocates are clear on, however, is that character is the essence of what we are.
The term comes from the world of engraving, from the Greek term kharakter, an
instrument used for making distinctive marks. Thus character is what marks a person
or persons as distinctive.
Character is not just one attribute or trait. It signifies the sum total of particular traits,
the sum of mental and moral qualities (O.E.D., p. 163). The addition of moral
qualities to the definition may be insignificant, for character carries with it a
connotation of good traits. Thus character traits are associated, if not synonymous,
with virtues. So a good person and, in the context of liberal democracy, a good citizen
will have these virtues.
To Thomas Lickona a virtue is a reliable inner disposition to respond to situations in
a morally good way (p. 51); good character, he continues, consists of knowing the
good, desiring the good, and doing the good (Idem). Who determines what the good
is? In general, inculcated traits or virtues or dispositions are used in following rules
of conduct. These are the rules that reinforce social conventions and social order
(Peters, p. 40). So in this view social convention determines what good means.
This might be problematic. What occurs when the set of virtues of the good person
clashes with the set of virtues of the good citizen? What is thought to be good in one
context, even when approved by society, is not necessarily what is thought to be good
in another. Should the only child of a deceased farmer stay at home to care for his
ailing mother, or should he, like a good citizen, join the resistance to fight an
occupying army?
What do we do when the requirements of civic education call into question the values
or beliefs of what one takes to be the values of being a good person? In Mozert v.
Hawkins County Board of Education just such a case occurred. Should the Mozerts
and other fundamentalist Christian parents have the right to opt their children out of
those classes that required their children to read selections that went against or
undermined their faith? On the one hand, if they are permitted to opt out, then without
those children present the class is denied the diversity of opinion on the reading
selections that would be educative and a hallmark of democracy. On the other hand, if
the children cannot opt out, then they are denied the right to follow their faith as they
think necessary.[9]
character types speak to all of our students and to the variegated contexts in which
they will find themselves?
Should our teachers teach a prescribed morality, often closely linked to certain
religious ideas and ideals? Should they teach a content only of secular values related
to democratic character? Or should they teach a form of values clarification in which
children's moral positions are identified but not criticized?
These two approachesa prescribed moral content or values clarificationappear to
form the two ends of a character education spectrum. At one end is the method of
indoctrination of prescribed values and virtues, regardless of sacred or secular
orientation. But here some citizens will express concern about just whose values are to
be taught or, to some, imposed. At the same time, some will see the inculcation of
[11]
specified values and virtues as little more than teaching a morality of compliance
(Nord, 2001, 144).
At the other end of the spectrum is values clarification, but this seems to be a kind of
[12]
moral relativism where everything goes because nothing can be ruled out. In values
clarification there is no right or wrong value to hold. Indeed, teachers are supposed to
be value neutral so as to avoid imposing values on their students and to avoid
damaging students' self-esteem. William Damon calls this approach anything-goes
constructivism (1996), for such a position may leave the door open for students to
approve racism, violence, and might makes right.
Is there a middle of the spectrum that would not impose values or simply clarify
values? There is no middle path that can cut a swath through imposition on one side
and clarification on the other. Perhaps the closest we can get is to offer something like
Gutmann's or Galston's teaching of critical thinking. Here students can think about and
think through what different moral situations require of persons. With fascists looking
for hiding Jews, I lie; about my wife's new dress, I tell the truth (well, usually). Even
critical thinking, however, requires students to be critical about something. That is, we
must presuppose the existence, if not prior inculcation, of some values about which to
be critical.
What we have, then, is not a spectrum but a sequence, a developmental sequence.
Character education, from this perspective, begins with the inculcation in students of
specific values. But at a later date character education switches to teaching and using
the skills of critical thinking on the very values that have been inculcated.
This approach is in keeping with what William Damon, an expert on innovative
education and on intellectual and moral development, has observed: The capacity for
constructive criticism is an essential requirement for civic engagement in a democratic
society; but in the course of intellectual development, this capacity must build upon a
prior sympathetic understanding of that which is being criticized (2001, 135).
The process, therefore, would consist of two phases, two developmental phases. Phase
One is the indoctrination phase. Yet which values do we inculcate? Perhaps the easiest
way to begin is to focus first on those behaviors that all students must possess. In fact,
without first insisting that students behave, it seems problematic whether students
could ever learn to think critically. Every school, in order to conduct the business of
education, reinforces certain values and behaviors. Teachers demand that students sit
in their seats; raise their hands before speaking; hand assignments in on time; display
sportsmanship on the athletic field; be punctual when coming to class; do not cheat on
their tests or homework; refrain from attacking one another on the playground, in the
hallways, or in the classroom; be respectful of and polite to their elders (e.g., teachers,
staff, administrators, parents, visitors, police); and the like. The teachers' commands,
demands, manner of interacting with the students, and own conformity to the
regulations of the classroom and school establish an ethos of behaviora way of
conducting oneself within that institution. From the ethos come the requisite virtues
honesty, cooperation, civility, respect, and so on.[13]
Another set of values to inculcate at this early stage is that associated with democracy.
Here the lessons are more didactic than behavioral. One point of civic education in a
democracy is to raise free and equal citizens who appreciate that they have both rights
and responsibilities. Students need to learn that they have freedoms, such as those
found in Bill of Rights (press, assembly, worship, and the like) in the U. S.
Constitution. But they also need to learn that they have responsibilities to their fellow
citizens and to their country. This requires teaching students to obey the law; not to
interfere with the rights of others; and to honor their country, its principles, and its
values. Schools must teach those traits or virtues that conduce to democratic character:
cooperation, honesty, toleration, and respect.
So we inculcate in our students the values and virtues that our society honors as those
that constitute good citizenship and good character. But if we inculcate a love of
justice, say, is it the justice found in our laws or an ideal justice that underlies all
laws? Obviously, this question will not arise in the minds of most, if any, first graders.
As students mature and develop cognitively, however, such questions will arise. So a
high-school student studying American History might well ask whether the Jim Crow
laws found in the South were just laws simply because they were the law. Or were
they only just laws until they were discovered through argument to be unjust? Or were
they always unjust because they did not live up to some ideal conception of justice?
Then we could introduce Phase Two of character education: education in judgment.
Judgment is based on weighing and considering reasons and evidence for and against
propositions. Judgment is a virtue that relies upon practical wisdom; it is established
as a habit through practice. Judgment, or thoughtfulness, was the master virtue for
Aristotle from whose exercise comes an appreciation for those other virtues: honesty,
cooperation, toleration, and respect.
Because young children have difficulty taking up multiple perspectives, as
developmental psychologists tell us, thinking and deliberating that require the
consideration of multiple perspectives would seem unsuitable for elementary-school
children. Additionally, young children are far more reliant on the teacher's
involvement in presenting problem situations in which the children's knowledge and
skills can be applied and developed. R. S. Peters offers an important consideration in
this regard:
The cardinal function of the teacher, in the early stages, is to get the pupil on the
inside of the form of thought or awareness with which he is concerned. At a later
stage, when the pupil has built into his mind both the concepts and the mode of
exploration involved, the difference between teacher and taught is obviously only one
of degree. For both are participating in the shared experience of exploring a common
world (1966, 53).
The distinction between those moving into the inside of reflective thinking and
those already there may seem so vast as to be a difference of kind, not degree. But the
difference is always one of degree. Elementary-school students have yet to develop
the skills and knowledge, or have yet to gain the experience, to participate in phase-
two procedures that require perspectivism.
In this two-phased civic education teachers inculcate specific virtues such as
patriotism. But at a later stage this orientation toward solidifying a conventional
perspective gives way to one of critical thinking. The virtue of patriotism shifts from
an indoctrinated feeling of exaltation for the nation, whatever its actions and motives,
to a need to examine the nation's principles and practices to see whether those
practices are in harmony with those principles. The first requires loyalty; the second,
judgment. We teach the first through pledges, salutes, and oaths; we teach the second
through critical inquiry.
Have we introduced a significant problem when we teach students to judge values,
standards, and beliefs critically? Could this approach lead to students' contempt for
authority and tradition? Students need to see and hear that disagreement does not
necessarily entail disrespect. Thoughtful, decent people can disagree. To teach
students that those who disagree with us in a complicated situation like abortion or
affirmative action are wrong or irresponsible or weak is to treat them unfairly. It also
conveys the message that we think that we are infallible and have nothing to learn
from what others have to say. Such positions undercut democracy.
Would all parents approve of such a two-phased civic education? Would they abide
their children's possible questioning of their families' values and religious views? Yet
the response to such parental concerns must be the same as that to any authority
figure: Why do you think that you are always right? Aren't there times when parents
can see that it is better to lie, maybe even to their children, than to tell the truth? This,
however, presupposes that parents, or authority figures, are themselves willing to
exercise critical judgment on their own positions, values, and behaviors. This point
underscores the need to involve other social institutions and persons in character
education.
Empirical evidence suggests that experiential education may be most effective for
civic learning. The reason, again, is that students respond to experiences that touch
their emotions and senses of self in a firsthand way (Damon, 2001, 141). Also, as
Conover and Searing point out, while most students identify themselves as citizens,
their grasp of what it means to act as citizens is rudimentary and dominated by a focus
on rights, thus creating a privately oriented, passive understanding (2000, 108). To
bring them out of this private and passive understanding, nothing is better, as
Tocqueville noted, than political participation. The kind of participation here is
political action, not simply voting or giving money. William Damon concludes that the
most effective moral education programs are those that engage students directly in
action, with subsequent opportunities for reflection (2001, 144).
Another influence on service-learning is the theory of social capital, described above.
If a democracy depends on people serving one another and developing habits and
networks of reciprocal concern--and if that kind of interaction is declining in a country
like the United States--then it is natural to encourage or require students to serve as
part of their learning.
the best means of perpetuating and recovering their political power. But the
maintenance of a particular national sovereignty required subordination of individuals
to the superior interests of the state both in military defense and in struggles for
international supremacy in commerceTo form the citizen, not the man, became the
aim of education (1916, 90).
In a democracy, however, because of its combination of numerous and more varied
points of shared common interest and its requirement of continuous readjustment
through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse, which Dewey
called progress, education could address personal development and full and free
interplay among social groups (Ibid, 83, 79). In other words, it is in democratic states
that we want to look for the preparation of good persons as well as good citizens; that
is, for democratic education, which in this context, to repeat for emphasis, is what is
meant by civic education.
Nowhere is there a better site for political or democratic action than the school itself,
the students' own community. This is Dewey's insight (1916). Creating a democratic
culture within the schools not only facilitates preparing students for democratic
participation in the political system, but it also fosters a democratic environment that
shapes the relationships with adults and among peers that the students already engage
in. Students learn much more from the way a school is run, comments Theodore
Sizer, and the best way to teach values is when the school is a living example of the
values to be taught (1984, 120, 122).
Real problems, and not hypotheticals or academic exercises, are, Dewey argued,
always of real concern to students. So in addition to activities of writing and
classroom discussion, typical of today's public schools, students should engage in
active inquiry and careful deliberation in the significant and vital problems that
confront their communities, however defined but especially their schools (1910, 55).
Book lessons and classroom discussions rarely connect with decision-making on
issues that affect that community. In fact, Dewey comments that traditional methods
of instruction are often foreign to the existing capacities of the youngbeyond the
reach of [their] experience[T]he very situation forbids much active participation by
pupils (1938, 19).
As a core of learning Dewey wanted an experiential continuum (1938, 28, 33). The
experiences that he wanted to promote were those that underscored healthy growth;
those, in other words, that generated a greater desire to learn and to keep on learning
and that built upon prior experiences. [D]emocratic social experiences were superior
in providing a better quality of human experience than any other form of social or
political organization (Ibid, 34).
One logical, and practical, possibility was to make the operations of the school part of
the curriculum. Let the students use their in-school experiences to make, or help make,
decisions that directly affect some of the day-to-day operations of the schoolstudent
discipline, maintenance of the grounds and buildings, problems with cliques, issues of
sexism and racism, incidents of ostracism, and the likeas well as topics and issues
inside the classrooms.
Dewey thought of schools as embryo communities (1915, 174), institution[s] in
which the child is, for the timeto be a member of a community life in which he feels
that he participates, and to which he contributes (1916, 88). We need not become
sidetracked in questioning just what Dewey means by, or what we should mean by,
community to grasp the sense that he is after. It is not surprising that Dewey wanted
to give students experience in making decisions that affect their lives in schools. What
is surprising is that so little democracy takes place in schools and that those who
spend the most time in schools have the least opportunity to experience it.
The significance of democratic decision-making within the schools and about the
wider communitythe making of actual decisions through democratic means
cannot be overstated. As a propaedeutic to democratic participation, political action of
this sort is invaluable. Melissa S. Williams comments: [L]earning cooperation as
a practice is the only way to develop individuals' sense of agency to reshape the world
they share with others. It teaches moderation in promoting one's own vision, and the
capacity of individuals to see themselves as part of a project of collective self-rule
(2005, 238; emphasis in original).
Of course, not everything in school should be decided democratically. There are some
areas in which decisions require expertisea combination of experience and
knowledgethat rules out students as decision-makers. Chief among such areas is
pedagogy. Because the teachers and administrators know more about the processes of
education and about their subjects, because they have firsthand and often intimate
knowledge of the range and nature of abilities and problems of their studentsa point
emphasized by Dewey (1938, 56)as well as the particular circumstances in which
the learning takes place, they and not the students should make pedagogical decisions.
At the same time, because many students are still children, the decisions that they are
to make should be age-appropriate. Not all democratic procedures or school issues are
suitable for all ages. Differences in cognitive, social, and emotional development,
especially at the elementary-school level, complicate democratic action. While all
students may have the same capacity as potentiality, activating those capacities
requires development, as noted in the discussion of a two-phased form of civic
education.
Deweyan ideas about the school as a community live on in several kinds of practice.
First, in some experimental schools, students, teachers, and parents actually govern
democratically. In a Sudbury School (of which the first was founded in Sudbury,
Massachusetts in 1968), the whole community governs the institution through weekly
town meetings.
Much more common is to give students some degree of voice in the governance of a
school through an elected student government, student-run media, and policies that
encourage students to express their opinions.
Another very prevalent approach is to support and encourage students to manage their
own voluntary associations within a school: clubs, teams, etc. Thomas & McFarland
(2010) and others have found positive affects of extracurricular participation on
voting, and a plausible explanation is that adolescents become active citizens by
managing their own mini-communities.
5. Cosmopolitan Education
Cosmopolitanism is an emerging and, because of globalization, an increasingly
important topic for civic educators. In an earlier iteration, cosmopolitan education was
multicultural education. According to both, good persons need to be aware of the
perspectives of others and the effects their decisions have on others. While
multicultural good citizens needed to think about the perspectives and plight of those
living on the margins of their societies and about those whose good lives deviated
from their own, good citizens in cosmopolitanism need to think, or begin to think, of
themselves as global citizens with obligations that extend across national
boundaries. Should and must civic education incorporate a global awareness and
foster a cosmopolitan sensibility?
Martha Nussbaum, for one, thinks so. Nussbaum argues that our first obligation must
be to all persons, regardless of race, creed, class, or border. She does not mean that we
ought to forsake our commitments to our family, friends, neighbors, and fellow
citizens. She means that we ought to do nothing in our other communities or in our
lives that we know to be immoral from the perspective of Kant's community of all
humanity (1996, 7). We should work to make all human beings part of our
community of dialogue and concern (Ibid, 9). Civic education should reflect that
(Ibid, 11).
Philosopher Eamonn Callan, however, thinks otherwise. Callan wants to avoid a civic
education, and the pursuit of justice that underlies it, that gives pride of place to a
cosmopolitan sensibility at the cost of particularistic affiliations (1999, p. 197). In
Callan's view our civic education should be constructed ideally around the concept of
liberal patriotism. Although liberal patriotism is an identification with a particular,
historically located project of political self-rulethat is, American liberal democracy
it nevertheless also entails a sense of responsibility to outsiders and insiders
alike. (Ibid, 198).
Of course, the danger here is that a liberal patriot may well feel a sense of obligation
or responsibility only when her country is committing the injustice. Callan points out
that it is precisely the thought that we Americans have done these terrible things
that gave impetus [during the Vietnam war] to their horror and rage (Idem). This
thought is to be contrasted with our feelings and sense of responsibility when, as
Callan suggests, Soviet tanks rolled through Prague. Because, according to Callan, our
politico-moral identity was not implicated in the Soviet action, we somehow do not
have to have a similar sense of horror and rage. Perhaps we do not have to, but should
we? Nussbaum's point is that we certainly should.
What, therefore, should civic education look like? Callan provides two examples:
Should we cultivate a civic identity in which patriotic affinities are muted or
disappear altogether and a cosmopolitan ideal of world citizenship is brought to the
forefront? Or should we cultivate a kind of patriotism in which identification with a
particular project of democratic self-rule is yet attuned to the claims of justice that
both civic outsiders and insiders will make (1999, 198). It appears that Nussbaum
would favor the first, while Callan favors the second.
Perhaps these two are not the only options. In her metaphor of concentric identity
circles Nussbaum argues that we ought to try to bring the outer circles of our
relationships, the circle of all humanity, closer to the center, to our selves and to our
loved ones (1996, 9). By doing so, we do not push out of our identities those particular
relationships of significance to us. Instead, we need to take into consideration the
effects that our moral and political decisions have on all of humanity. If our civic
education helps us extend our sympathies, as Hume proposed, and if we could do so
without paying the price of muting or eliminating our local and national affinities,
then would Nussbaum and Callan agree on such a civic education?
Additionally, we need to consider that patriotism itself seems to have its own version
of concentric circles. For example, Theodore Roosevelt warned against that
overexaltation of the little community at the expense of the great nation. Here is a
nod toward Roosevelt's New Nationalism as opposed to what he called the
patriotism of the village. If we move from the village to the nation, then can't we
[16]
move from the nation to the world? As Alexander Pope wrote in An Essay on Man:
God loves from Whole to Parts; but human soul/Must rise from Individual to the
Whole/Friend, parent, neighbor first it will embrace/His country next, and next all
human race.
Is it ever too early to begin educating children about the cultures, customs, values,
ideas, and beliefs of people from around the world? Will this undercut our
commitment and even devotion to our own family, neighborhood, region, and nation?
No civic education must consist exclusively either of love of one's community and a
patriotic affiliation with one's country or of preparation for world citizenshipa term
that implies, at the least, a world state. There ought to be a composite that will work
here.
If the purpose of civic education is to generate in the young those values that
underscore successful participation in our liberal democracies, then the task facing
educators, whether in elementary school, secondary school, or post-secondary school,
might be far easier than we imagine. There seems to be a direct correlation between
years in school and an increase in tolerance of difference (Nie et al., 1996). An
increase of tolerance can lead to an increase of respect for those holding divergent
views. Such increases could certainly help engender a cosmopolitan sensibility. But
does the number of years in school correlate with a willingness to participate in the
first place? For example, the number of Americans going to college has increased
dramatically over the past 50 years, yet voting in elections and political participation
in general are still woefully low.
Perhaps public schools should not teach any virtue that is unrelated to the attainment
of academic skills, which to some is the paramount, if not the sole, purpose of
schooling. But shouldn't all students learn not just the skills but also the
predispositions required to participate in the conscious social reproduction of our
democracies, as Gutmann argues? If our democracies are important and robust, then
do our citizens need such predispositions to see the value of participation? And if we
say that our democracies are not robust enough, then shouldn't our students be striving
to reinvigorate, or invigorate, our democratic systems? Will they need infusions of
patriotism to do that? If tolerance and respect are democratic virtues, then do we fail
our students when we do not tolerate or respect their desires as good persons to
eschew civic participation even though this violates what we think of as the duties of
good citizens?
As stated earlier, civic education in a democracy must prepare citizens to participate in
and thereby perpetuate the system; at the same time, it must prepare them to challenge
what they see as inequities and injustices within that system. Yet a civic education that
encourages students to challenge the nature and scope of our democracies runs the risk
of turning off our students and turning them away from participation. But if that civic
education has offered more than simply critique, if its basis is critical thinking, which
involves developing a tolerance of, if not an appreciation for, difference and
divergence, as well as a willingness and even eagerness for political action, then
galvanized citizens can make our systems more robust. Greater demands on our
citizens, like higher expectations of our students, often lead to stronger performances.
As Mill reminds us, if circumstances allow the amount of public duty assigned him
to be considerable, it makes him an educated man (Ibid, 233).
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character, moral | citizenship | cosmopolitanism | democracy | Dewey, John | ethics:
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Copyright 2013 by
Jack Crittenden
Peter Levine <Peter.Levine@tufts.edu>