LABOR LAW

UST Civil Law

MUST READ CASES (LABOR LAW)

This entry was posted on Thursday, October 29th, 2015 at 3:58 pm and is filed under Uncategorized. Follow any
responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed.

LABOR STANDARDS

Estrellita G. Salazar vs Philippine Duplicators, Inc, G.R. No. 154628 December 6, 2006

The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The
commitment under the fundamental law is that the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer
when the law is clearly on its side.

People of the Philippines vs. Teresita Tessie Laogo. G.R. No. 176264 January 10, 2011

Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and punishable by law. When the illegal recruitment is committed against
three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer
penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic sabotage. But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown
that the accused, without being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the
power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to
be employed. It is important that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing
as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY INC. v. CABILES, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already
declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.

Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Company vs. Carol De Raedt. G.R. No. 161366; June 16, 2009

To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, case law has consistently applied the four-fold
test, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal;
and (d) the employers power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is
accomplished. The so-called control test is the most important indicator of the presence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship.

Manila Water Company, Inc. vs. Jose J. Dalumpines. G.R. No. 175501; October 4, 2010

It should be remembered that the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control, and not
necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not essential that the employer actually supervises the performance of duties
of the employee. It is enough that the former has a right to wield the power.

Macarthur Malicdem and Hermenigildo Flores vs. Marulas Industrial Corporation. G.R. No. 204406; February
26, 2014

The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.

KASAMMA-CCO v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 159828; April 19, 2006

A casual employee is only casual for one year, and it is the passage of time that gives him a regular status.

Jose Y. Sonza vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 138051, June 10, 2004

Television-radio talent is not an employee. Relationship of a big name talent and a television-radio broadcasting
company is one of an independent contracting arrangement. ABS-CBN engaged Sonzas services specifically to co-
host the Mel & Jay programs. ABS-CBN did not assign any other work to Sonza. To perform his work, Sonza only
needed his skills and talent. How Sonza delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were
outside ABS-CBNs control. Sonza did not have to render eight hours of work per day. The Agreement required
Sonza to attend only rehearsals and tapings of the shows, as well as pre- and post-production staff meetings. ABS-
CBN could not dictate the contents of Sonzas script.

Gapayao v Fulo, et al., G.R. No. 193493 (2013)

Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. The Court has consistently held that
seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees. Regular seasonal employees are those called to
work from time to time. The nature of their relationship with the employer is such that during the off season, they are
temporarily laid off; but reemployed during the summer season or when their services may be needed. They are in
regular employment because of the nature of their job, and not because of the length of time they have worked.

This rule, however, is not absolute. Seasonal workers who have worked for one season only may not be considered
regular employees. Also when seasonal employees are free to contract their services with other farm owners, then
the former are not regular employees. For regular employees to be considered as such, the primary standard used
is the reasonable connection between the particular activity they perform and the usual trade or business of the
employer.

FVR Skills and Services Exponents, Inc. (SKILLEX), et al. v. Jovert Seva, et al., G.R. No. 200857, October 22,
2014

For an employee to be validly categorized as a project employee, it is necessary that the specific project or
undertaking had been identified and its period and completion date determined and made known to the employee at
the time of his engagement. This provision ensures that the employee is completely apprised of the terms of his
hiring and the corresponding rights and obligations arising from his undertaking. Notably, the petitioners service
contract with Robinsons was from January 1 to December 31, 2008. The respondents were only asked to sign their
employment contracts for their deployment with Robinsons halfway through 2008, when the petitioners service
contract was about to expire.

Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, contracts where the consent of a party was vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud, are voidable or annullable. The petitioners threat of nonpayment of the
respondents salaries clearly amounted to intimidation. Under this situation, and the suspect timing when these
contracts were executed, we rule that these employment contracts were voidable and were effectively questioned
when the respondents filed their illegal dismissal complaint. Respondents are thus regular employees.

Pasos v Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394 (2013)

Project employee is deemed regularized if services are extended without specifying duration. While for first three
months, petitioner can be considered a project employee of PNCC, his employment thereafter, when his services
were extended without any specification of as to the duration, made him a regular employee of PNCC. And his
status as a regular employee was not affected by the fact that he was assigned to several other projects and there
were intervals in between said projects since he enjoys security of tenure.

Alcatel Phils. vs Relos, G.R. No. 164315. July 3, 2009

However, a project or work pool employee who has been continuously rehired by the same employer for the same
tasks that are necessary to the usual business of the employer must be deemed a regular employee.

Fuji Television Network, Inc. v Arlene S. Espiritu, G.R. No. 204944-45, 03 December 2014

An employee can be a regular employee with a fixed-term contract. The law does not preclude the possibility that a
regular employee may opt to have a fixed-term contract for valid reasons. This was recognized in Brent: For as long
as it was the employee who requested, or bargained, that the contract have a definite date of termination, or that
the fixed-term contract be freely entered into by the employer and the employee, then the validity of the fixed-term
contract will be upheld.

GMA Network, Inc. v Pabriga, et al., G.R. No. 176419 (2013)

Petitioners allegation that respondents were merely substitutes or what they call pinch-hitters (which means that
they were employed to take the place of regular employees of petitioner who were absent or on leave) does not
change the fact that their jobs cannot be considered projects within the purview of the law. Every industry, even
public offices, has to deal with securing substitutes for employees who are absent or on leave. Such tasks, whether
performed by the usual employee or by a substitute, cannot be considered separate and distinct from the other
undertakings of the company. While it is managements prerogative to device a method to deal with this issue, such
prerogative is not absolute and is limited to systems wherein employees are not ingeniously and methodically
deprived of their constitutionally protected right to security of tenure.

Avelino Lambo vs NLRC. G.R. No. 111042 October 26, 1999

There is no dispute that petitioners were employees of private respondents although they were paid not on the basis
of time spent on the job but according to the quantity and the quality of work produced by them. There are two
categories of employees paid by results: (1) those whose time and performance are supervised by the employer.
(Here, there is an element of control and supervision over the manner as to how the work is to be performed. A
piece-rate worker belongs to this category especially if he performs his work in the company premises.); and (2)
those whose time and performance are unsupervised. (Here, the employers control is over the result of the work.
Workers on pakyao and takay basis belong to this group.) Both classes of workers are paid per unit accomplished.
Piece-rate payment is generally practiced in garment factories where work is done in the company premises, while
payment on pakyao and takay basis is commonly observed in the agricultural industry, such as in sugar plantations
where the work is performed in bulk or in volumes difficult to quantify. Petitioners belong to the first category, i.e.,
supervised employees.
PCL Shipping Philippine, Inc. and U-Ming Marine Transport Corporation, vs NLRC. G.R. No.
153031,December 14, 2006

With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in determining whether or not sailors are
entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working
hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours. In the present case, the
Court finds that private respondent is not entitled to overtime pay because he failed to present any evidence to
prove that he rendered service in excess of the regular eight working hours a day.

Bisig Manggawa sa Tryco, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 151309 October 15, 2008

D.O. No. 21 sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in consideration of the benefits that the employees will derive from
the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme, thus:The compressed workweek scheme was originally conceived
for establishments wishing to save on energy costs, promote greater work efficiency and lower the rate of employee
absenteeism, among others. Workers favor the scheme considering that it would mean savings on the increasing
cost of transportation fares for at least one (1) day a week; savings on meal and snack expenses; longer weekends,
or an additional 52 off-days a year, that can be devoted to rest, leisure, family responsibilities, studies and other
personal matters, and that it will spare them for at least another day in a week from certain inconveniences that are
the normal incidents of employment, such as commuting to and from the workplace, travel time spent, exposure to
dust and motor vehicle fumes, dressing up for work, etc. Thus, under this scheme, the generally observed workweek
of six (6) days is shortened to five (5) days but prolonging the working hours from Monday to Friday without the
employer being obliged for pay overtime premium compensation for work performed in excess of eight (8) hours on
weekdays, in exchange for the benefits abovecited that will accrue to the employees. Moreover, the adoption of a
compressed workweek scheme in the company will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused the
petitioners by their transfer to a farther workplace.

Rosario A. Gaa vs CA G.R. No. L-44169 Dec. 3, 1985

The term wages differs from the term salary. Wages apply to compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled,
paid at stated times and measured by the day, week, month or season; while salary denotes a higher grade of
employment or a superior grade of services and implies a position or office. By contrast, the term wages indicates
a considerable pay for a lower and less responsible character of employment, while salary is suggestive of a larger
and more important service

The distinction between salary and wage in Gaa vs CA was only for the purpose of Art. 1708 of the Civil Code which
provides that the laborers wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment except for debts incurred for food,
shelter, clothing, and medical attendance.

Our Haus Realty Development Corporation v. Alexander Parian, et al., G.R. No. 204651, 06 August 2014
The benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an extra remuneration above and over his basic or
ordinary earning or wage is supplement; and when said benefit or privilege is part of the laborers basic wages, it is a
facility. The distinction lies not so much in the kind of benefit or item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but in
the purpose for which it is given. In the case at bench, the items provided were given freely by SLL for the purpose
of maintaining the efficiency and health of its workers while they were working at their respective projects.
Ultimately, the real difference lies not on the kind of the benefit but on the purpose why it was given by the employer.
If it is primarily for the employees gain, then the benefit is a facility; if its provision is mainly for the employers
advantage, then it is a supplement. Again, this is to ensure that employees are protected in circumstances where the
employer designates a benefit as deductible from the wages even though it clearly works to the employers greater
convenience or advantage.

Under the purpose test, substantial consideration must be given to the nature of the employers business in relation
to the character or type of work performed by the employees involved.

Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Company v Glyza Esteban, G.R. No. 192582, 7 April 2014

The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, meanwhile, provides:

SECTION 14. Deduction for loss or damage. Where the employer is engaged in a trade, occupation or business
where the practice of making deductions or requiring deposits is recognized to answer for the reimbursement of loss
or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer to the employee, the employer may make
wage deductions or require the employees to make deposits from which deductions shall be made, subject to the
following conditions:

(a) That the employee concerned is clearly shown to be responsible for the loss or damage;

(b) That the employee is given reasonable opportunity to show cause why deduction should not be made;

(c) That the amount of such deduction is fair and reasonable and shall not exceed the actual loss or damage; and

(d) That the deduction from the wages of the employee does not exceed 20 percent of the employees wages in a
week.

Petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that Esteban was responsible for the negative variance it had in its sales for
the year 2005 to 2006 and that Esteban was given the opportunity to show cause why the deduction from her last
salary should not be made. The Court cannot accept the petitioners statement that it is the practice in the retail
industry to deduct variances from an employees salary, without more.

Lilia P. Labadan vs. Forest Hills Academy. G.R. No. 172295 December 23, 2008
Respecting petitioners claim for holiday pay, Forest Hills contends that petitioner failed to prove that she actually
worked during specific holidays. Article 94 of the Labor Code provides, however, that(a) Every worker shall be paid
his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less
than ten (10) workers; (b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall
be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate.The provision that a worker is entitled to twice his
regular rate if he is required to work on a holiday implies that the provision entitling a worker to his regular rate on
holidays applies even if he does not work.

BPI Employees union-Davao City-FUBU v Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 174912 (2013)

Contracting out of services is not illegal per se. It is an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative.
Absent proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of judgment by an employer. BPIs policy of contracting out cashiering and bookkeeping services was
considered as a valid exercise of management prerogative which is further authorized by the Central Bank in CBP
Circular No. 1388, Series of 199.

Central Azucarera De Tarlac vs. Central Azucarera De Tarlac Labor Union-NLU. G.R. No. 188949, July 26,
2010

Article 100 of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the Non-Diminution Rule, mandates that benefits given to
employees cannot be taken back or reduced unilaterally by the employer because the benefit has become part of
the employment contract, written or unwritten. The rule against diminution of benefits applies if it is shown that the
grant of the benefit is based on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time and that
the practice is consistent and deliberate. Nevertheless, the rule will not apply if the practice is due to error in the
construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law. But even in cases of error, it should be shown
that the correction is done soon after discovery of the error.

Netlink Computer Incorporated v Eric Delmo, G.R. No. 160827, 18 June 2014

With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been observed to constitute a voluntary
employer practice that cannot be unilaterally reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer, we
find that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years. In Davao Fruits
Corporation v. Associated Labor Unions, the company practice lasted for six years. In Davao Integrated Port
Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez, the employer, for three years and nine months, approved the commutation to
cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of its intermittent workers. In Tiangco v. Leogardo,
Jr., the employer carried on the practice of giving a fixed monthly emergency allowance from November 1976 to
February 1980, or three years and four months. In Sevilla Trading Company v. Semana, the employer kept the
practice of including non-basic benefits such as paid leaves for unused sick leave and vacation in the computation of
their 13th-month pay for at least two years.

With the payment of US dollar commissions having ripened into a company practice, there is no way that the
commissions due to Delmo were to be paid in US dollars or their equivalent in Philippine currency determined at the
time of the sales. To rule otherwise would be to cause an unjust diminution of the commissions due and owing to
Delmo.

Bankard Employees Union-Workers Alliance Trade Unions vs NLRC. G.R. No. 140689 February 17, 2004

Even assuming that there is a decrease in the wage gap between the pay of the old employees and the newly hired
employees, to Our mind said gap is not significant as to obliterate or result in severe contraction of the intentional
quantitative differences in the salary rates between the employee group. As already stated, the classification under
the wage structure is based on the rank of an employee, not on seniority. For this reason, ,wage distortion does not
appear to exist.

Rogelio Reyes vs NLRC. G.R. No. 160233, August 8, 2007

Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851, the following compensations are deemed
not part of the basic salary:

5. a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of Instruction No. 174;
b) Profit sharing payments;c) All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated
as part of the regular basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on
December 16, 1975.

Producers Bank v. NLRC. G.R. No. 100701. March 28, 2001

Bonus is not demandable as a matter of right. It is a management prerogative, given in addition to what is ordinarily
received by or strictly due to the recipient.

Philipiine Telegraph vs. Laplana. G.R. No. 76645; July 23, 1991

It is the employers prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees qualifications, aptitudes,
and competence, to move them around in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain where
they will function with maximum benefit to the company. When an employees transfer is not unreasonable, nor
inconvenient or prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of his salaries, benefits
and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.

UE v. PEPANIO, G.R. No. 193897, January 23, 2013

The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of
educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in
possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions.
Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public
as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be
required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 125792; November 9, 1998

In legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists between the principal and the job contractors
employees. The principal is responsible to the job contractors employees only for the proper payment of wages. But
in labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relation is created by law between the principal and the labor-only
contractors employees, such that the former is responsible to such employees, as if he or she had directly
employed them

Vigilla, et al. v Philippine College of Criminology, Inc., G.R. No. 200094 (2013)

In legitimate job contracting, the principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor only
for the payment of the employees wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. On the other hand, in labor-
only contracting, the principal employer becomes solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful
claims of the employees. In this case, the releases, waivers and quitclaims executed by employees in favor of the
labor-only contractor redounded to the benefit of the principal.

San Miguel Corp. vs. MAERC Integrated Systems. G.R. No. 144672; July 10, 2003

The employer is deemed the direct employer and is made liable to the employees of the contractor for a more
comprehensive purpose (wages, monetary claims, and all other benefits in the Labor Code such as
SSS/Medicare/Pag-Ibig). The labor-only contractor is deemed merely an agent. A finding that a contractor is a
labor-only contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an ER-EE relationship between the principal and the
employees of the labor-only contractor.

Cheryll Santos Leus v St. Scholasticas College Westgrove, et al., G.R. No. 187226, 28 January 2015

That an employee was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not absolutely determine whether
her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral. There is still a necessity to determine whether the
petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms
of conduct. To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry
each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of
morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.

Duncan vs. Glaxo Wellcome. G.R. No. 162994; September 17, 2004

Prohibition of marriage or existing or future relationships between employees of competing companies is not
violative of the equal protection clause.

Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. v National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 200575 (2014)

Cabiles contention that his employment with Intel HK is a continuation of his service with Intel Phil alleging that it
was but an assignment by his principal employer, similar to his assignments to Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu is
untenable.

Eugene Arabit, et al. v Jardine Pacific Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 181719, 21 April 2014

It is illogical for Jardine to terminate the petitioners employment and replace them with contractual employees. The
replacement effectively belies Jardines claim that the petitioners positions were abolished due to superfluity.
Redundancy could have been justified if the functions of the petitioners were transferred to other existing employees
of the company.

To dismiss the petitioners and hire new contractual employees as replacements necessarily give rise to the sound
conclusion that the petitioners services have not really become in excess of what Jardines business requires. To
replace the petitioners who were all regular employees with contractual ones would amount to a violation of their
right to security of tenure.

Supreme Steel Pipe Corp. vs. Bardaje, G.R. No. 170811; April 24, 2007

Although fighting within company premises may constitute serious misconduct (possible ground for disciplinary
actions), not every fight with in company premises in which an employee is involved automatically warrant dismissal
from service.

Punzal vs. ETSI Technologies. G.R. No. 170384-85. March 9, 2007

Halloween invitation sent out by employee for office trick-or-treating without clearance from higher management is
considered misbehavior. The circumstances in the case were differentiated from Samson vs. NLRC where the
offensive remarks were verbally made during informal Christmas gathering.

Lores Realty Enterprises, Inc. v. Virginia E. Pacia, March 2011

Petitioner employer ordered the respondent employee to prepare checks for payment of petitioners obligations.
Respondent did not immediately comply with the instruction since petitioner employer had no sufficient funds to
cover the checks. Petitioner employer dismissed respondent employee for willful disobedience. The Court held that
respondent employee was illegally dismissed. Though there is nothing unlawful in the directive of petitioner
employer to prepare checks in payment of petitioners obligations, respondent employees initial reluctance to
prepare the checks, although seemingly disrespectful and defiant, was for honest and well intentioned reasons.
Protecting the petitioner employer from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law was foremost in her mind. It was not
wrongful or willful. Neither can it be considered an obstinate defiance of company authority. The Court took into
consideration that respondent employee, despite her initial reluctance, eventually did prepare the checks on the
same day she was tasked to do it.

Gonzales vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 131653; March 26, 2001

The act constituting the breach must be work-related such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to
continue working for the employer.

Jardine Davies vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 106915; August 31, 1993

For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment there must be a deliberate unjustified
refusal of the employee to resume his employment. This refusal must be clearly shown. Mere absence is not
sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work
anymore.

SME Bank, Inc., et al. v De Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 184517 (2013)

While resignation letters containing words of gratitude may indicate that the employees were not coerced into
resignation, this fact alone is not conclusive proof that they intelligently, freely and voluntarily resigned. To rule that
resignation letters couched in terms of gratitude are, by themselves, conclusive proof that the employees intended to
relinquish their posts would open the floodgates to possible abuse. In order to withstand the test of validity,
resignations must be made voluntarily and with the intention of relinquishing the office, coupled with an act of
relinquishment. Therefore, in order to determine whether the employees truly intended to resign from their
respective posts, we cannot merely rely on the tenor of the resignation letters, but must take into consideration the
totality of circumstances in each particular case.
Sanoh Fulton Phils., Inc., et al. v Bernardo, et al., G.R. No. 187214 (2013)

A lull caused by lack of orders or shortage of materials must be of such nature as would severely affect the
continued business operations of the employer to the detriment of all and sundry if not properly addressed. Sanoh
asserts that cancelled orders of wire condensers led to the phasing out of the Wire Condenser Department, which
triggered retrenchment. Sanoh presented the letters of cancellation given by Matsushita and Sanyo as evidence of
cancelled orders. The evidence presented by Sanoh barely established the connection between the cancelled
orders and the projected business losses that may be incurred by Sanoh.

Hocheng Philippines Corporation v Antonio M. Farrales, G.R. No. 211497, 18 March 2015

Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by substantial evidence, is a
cause analogous to serious misconduct. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must, nevertheless, be in
connection with the employees work to constitute just cause for his separation.

Emeritus Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. v Janrie C. Dailig, G.R. No. 204761, 2 April 2014

A floating status of a security guard for more than six months constitutes constructive dismissal. The temporary
inactivity or floating status of security guards should continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security agency
concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal. The failure of petitioner to give respondent a work assignment
beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it liable for constructive dismissal.

Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation and/or Ma. Teresa Marcelo v Armando D. Serrano, G.R. No.
198538, 29 September 2014

It is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately declare the mere lapse of the six-month period of floating
status as a case of constructive dismissal, without looking into the peculiar circumstances that resulted in the
security guards failure to assume another post. This is especially true in the present case where the security guards
own refusal to accept a non-VIP detail was the reason that he was not given an assignment within the six-month
period. The security agency, Exocet, should not then be held liable for constructive dismissal.

Philippine Sheet Metal Workers Union vs. CIR. G.R. No. L-2028; April 28, 1949

Reduction of the number of workers in a companys factory made necessary by the introduction of machinery in the
manufacture of its products is justified. There can be no question as to the right of the manufacturer to use new
labor-saving devices with a view to effecting more economy and efficiency in its method of production.
Oriental Petroleum & Minerals Corp. vs. Fuentes. G.R. No. 151818. October 14, 2005

Standards to Justify Retrenchment:

1. The losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent;
2. The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent. It be reasonably necessary and likely to
effectively prevent the expected losses;
3. The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses;
4. The alleged losses if already realized, and the expected imminent losses must be proved by sufficient and
convincing evidence.

BPI v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION DAVAO, G.R. No. 164301, October 19, 2011

By upholding the automatic assumption of the non-surviving corporations existing employment contracts by the
surviving corporation in a merger, the Court strengthens judicial protection of the right to security of tenure of
employees affected by a merger and avoids confusion regarding the status of their various benefits which were
among the chief objections of our dissenting colleagues. However, nothing in this Resolution shall impair the right of
an employer to terminate the employment of the absorbed employees for a lawful or authorized cause or the right of
such an employee to resign, retire or otherwise sever his employment, whether before or after the merger, subject to
existing contractual obligations. In this manner, Justice Brions theory of automatic assumption may be reconciled
with the majoritys concerns with the successor employers prerogative to choose its employees and the prohibition
against involuntary servitude.

King of Kings Transport vs. Mamac. G.R. No. 166208. June 29, 2007

In order to intelligently prepare the employees for their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a
detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as the basis for the charge against the employee a
general description of the change will not suffice.

Esguerra vs. Valle Verde Country Club. G.R. No. 173012. June 13, 2012

The law does not require that an intention to terminate ones employment should be included in the first notice. It is
enough that employees are properly apprised of the charges brought against them so they can properly prepare
their defenses; it is only during the second notice that the intention to terminate ones employment should be
explicitly stated

Lavador vs. J Marketing Corporation and Soyao. G.R. No. 157757; June 28, 2005
A hearing or conference should be held during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel, if the
employee so desires, is given the opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence
presented against him.

AGABON v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004

The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar,
we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from
future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or
recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

Jaka Food Processing v. Pacot. G.R. No. 151378.March 28, 2005

If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in
effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee. On the other hand, if the dismissal is based on an authorized
cause under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer
because the dismissal process was initiated by the employers exercise of his management prerogative.

Tangga-an v Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 180636 (2013)

Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employees full backwages shall be inclusive of allowances
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. It is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally
dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other benefits and
bonuses and general increases, to which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed
and had not stopped working.

Reyes, et al. v RP Guardians Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No 193756 (2013)

Backwages and reinstatement are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee in order to
alleviate the economic damage brought about by the employees dismissal. Reinstatement is a restoration to a
state from which one has been removed or separated while the payment of backwages is a form of relief that
restores the income that was lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal. Therefore, the award of one does not bar the
other.

Crisanto F. Castro, Jr. vs Ateneo De Naga University, et al., G.R. No. 175293, 23 July 2014
The Court holds that the order of reinstatement of the petitioner was not rendered moot and academic. He remained
entitled to accrued salaries from notice of the LAs order of reinstatement until reversal thereof. In Islriz Trading v.
Capada, we even clarified that the employee could be barred from claiming accrued salaries only when the failure to
reinstate him was without the fault of the employer.

Considering that the respondents reinstated the petitioner only in November 2002, and that their inability to reinstate
him was without valid ground, they were liable to pay his salaries accruing from the time of the decision of the LA
(i.e., September 3, 2001) until his reinstatement in November 2002. It did not matter that the respondents had yet to
exercise their option to choose between actual or payroll reinstatement at that point because the order of
reinstatement was immediately executory.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Reynaldo V. Paz, G.R. No. 192924, 26 November 2014

The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LA decision
granting him said relief. The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement
pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employers
unjustified act or omission. If the delay is due to the employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required
to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision.

A scrutiny of the circumstances, however, will show that the delay in reinstating the respondent was not due to the
unjustified refusal of PAL to abide by the order but because of the constraints of corporate rehabilitation. The
inopportune event of PALs entering rehabilitation receivership justifies the delay or failure to comply with the
reinstatement order of the LA. In light of the fact that PALs failure to comply with the reinstatement order was
justified by the exigencies of corporation rehabilitation, the respondent may no longer claim salaries which he should
have received during the period that the LA decision ordering his reinstatement is still pending appeal until it was
overturned by the NLRC.

Globe Mackay v. NLRC. G.R. No. 82511; March 3, 1992

When the employer can no longer trust the employee and vice-versa, or there were imputations of bad faith to each
other, reinstatement could not effectively serve as a remedy. This doctrine applies only to positions which require
trust and confidence.

Wenphil Corporation vs. Abing, G.R. No. 207983, 7 April 2014

Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into the mundane realities of human experience, the
refund doctrine easily demonstrates how a favorable decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a
dismissed employee. The employee, to make both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries
received during the pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in case of a final unfavorable
decision. It is mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to a risky cliff of insolvency.

Unilever Philippines v Rivera, G.R. No. 201701 (2013)

As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of
the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation
pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of social justice or on equitable grounds. In both instances, it is
required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the
employee. In this case, the transgressions were serious offenses that warranted employees dismissal from
employment. Hence, employee is not entitled to separation pay.

Agricultural and Industrial Supplies Corp. et al vs. Jueber P. Siazar, G.R. No. 177970 August 25, 2010

In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the amount to be awarded
shall be equivalent to one month salary for every year of service reckoned from the first day of employment until the
finality of the decision. Payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages. And if separation pay is
awarded instead of reinstatement, backwages shall be computed from the time of illegal termination up to the finality
of the decision.

Zenaida Paz v Northern Tobacco Redrying Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 199554, 18 February 2015

The award of financial assistance to an employee who rendered almost three decades of dedicated service to an
employer without a single transgression or malfeasance of any company rule or regulation, coupled with her old age
and infirmity which now weaken her chances of employment is justified and allowed under special circumstances.
These circumstances indubitably merit equitable concessions, via the principle of compassionate justice for the
working class.

Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative Inc. vs NLRC. G.R. No. 163561, July 24, 2007

Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form of
financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity
under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than
twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call for such award of
benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employees
length of service is to be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually
become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse
its ranks of undesirables.
Conrado A. Lim v. HMR Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 201483, 04 August 2014

No essential change is being made (in a final judgment) by a recomputation because such is a necessary
consequence which flows from the nature of the illegality of the dismissal. To reiterate, a recomputation, or an
original computation, if no previous computation was made, as in the present case, is a part of the law that is read
into the decision, namely, Article 279 of the Labor Code and established jurisprudence. Article 279 provides for the
consequences of illegal dismissal, one of which is the payment of full backwages until actual reinstatement, qualified
only by jurisprudence when separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed, where the finality of the illegal
dismissal decision instead becomes the reckoning point.
The nature of an illegal dismissal case requires that backwages continue to add on until full satisfaction. The
computation required to reflect full satisfaction does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision
being implemented as the illegal dismissal ruling stands. Thus, in the present case, a computation of backwages
until actual reinstatement is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.

Zuellig Pharma Corporation v Sibal, et al., G.R. NO. 173587 (2013)

In the present case, the CBA contains specific provisions which effectively bar the availment of retirement benefits
once the employees have chosen separation pay or vice versa. Section 2 of Article XIV explicitly states that any
payment of retirement gratuity shall be chargeable against separation pay. Clearly, respondents cannot have both
retirement gratuity and separation pay, as selecting one will preclude recovery of the other. To illustrate the
mechanics of how Section 2 of Article XIV bars double recovery, if the employees choose to retire, whatever amount
they will receive as retirement gratuity will be charged against the separation pay they would have received had their
separation from employment been for a cause which would entitle them to severance pay. These causes are
enumerated in Section 3, Article XIV of the CBA (i.e., retrenchment, closure of business, merger, redundancy, or
installation of labor-saving device). However, if the cause of the termination of their employment was any of the
causes enumerated in said Section 3, they could no longer claim retirement gratuity as the fund from which the
same would be taken had already been used in paying their separation pay. Put differently, employees who were
separated from the company cannot have both retirement gratuity and separation pay as there is only one fund from
which said benefits would be taken. Inarguably, Section 2 of Article XIV effectively disallows recovery of both
separation pay and retirement gratuity. Consequently, respondents are entitled only to one. Since they have already
chosen and accepted redundancy pay and have executed the corresponding Release and Quitclaim, they are now
barred from claiming retirement gratuity.

Grace Christian High School, represented by its Principal, Dr. James Tan v Filipinas A. Lavandera, G.R. No.
177845, 20 August 2014

RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor Code, providing for the rules
on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment.
The said law states that an employees retirement benefits under any collective bargaining [agreement (CBA)] and
other agreements shall not be less than those provided under the same that is, at least one-half () month salary
for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year and that
[u]nless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half () month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days
plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service
incentive leaves.
The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no CBA or other applicable agreement providing for
retirement benefits to employees, or (b) there is a CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement
benefits but it is below the requirement set by law. Verily, the determining factor in choosing which retirement
scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits provided.

The Court, in the case of Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., has recently affirmed that one-half () month salary
means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5
days for [SIL]. The Court sees no reason to depart from this interpretation. GCHS argument therefore that the 5
days SIL should be likewise pro-rated to their 1/12 equivalent must fail.

Noriel R. Montierro v Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 210634, January 14, 2015

When a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness for work shall be
determined by the company-designated physician. The physician has 120 days, or 240 days, if validly extended, to
make the assessment. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company-
designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer,
whose decision shall be final and binding on them.

Sealanes Marine Services, Inc., et al. v Arnel G. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 214132, 18 February 2015

For the purpose of determining temporary total disability, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment
medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he
is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed
as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctors decision
shall be final and binding on both parties.

LABOR RELATIONS

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. No.
162355, August 14, 2009

Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as any union or association of employees which exists
in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment. Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau
shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to
the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration.

T&H Shopfitters Corporation/Gin Queen Corporation, et al. v T&H Shopfitters Corporation Corporation/Gin
Queen Workers Union, et al., G.R. No. 191714 (2014)

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, is, whether the employer has engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere
with the free exercise of employees rights; and that it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any
employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable
inference that the anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and
collective bargaining.

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. No.
162355, August 14, 2009

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. The fundamental factors in determining
the appropriate collective bargaining unit are:

(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);(2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests
Rule);(3) prior collective bargaining history; and(4) similarity of employment status.

Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc., vs DOLE. G.R. No. 157117,November 20, 2006

Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible for membership in a labor union of
rank-and-file employees. The supervisory employees are allowed to form their own union but they are not allowed to
join the rank-and-file union because of potential conflicts of interest. Further, to avoid a situation where supervisors
would merge with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors labor union would represent conflicting interests, a
local supervisors union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of unions of rank-and-file
employees where that federation actively participates in the union activity within the company. Thus, the limitation is
not confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors
local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions of rank-and-
file employees.

San Miguel Foods, Inc. vs. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union. G.R. No. 146206. August 1,
2011
The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question the process of certification election, since this is
the sole concern of the workers. Law and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in
certification elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous
influence of management. The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article
258 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively.

Holy Child Catholic School v Hon. Sto Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 179146 (2013)

A certification election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the employer itself has to file the petition
pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, but even after such filing its role in the certification process
ceases and becomes merely a bystander. The employer clearly lacks the personality to dispute the election and has
no right to interfere at all therein.

Inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization.

NUWHRAIN MPHC v. SLE. G.R. No. 181531, July 31, 2009

It is wellsettled that under the double majority rule for there to be a valid certification election, majority of the
bargaining unit must have voted and the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.
Following the ruling that all the probationary employees votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the
supervisory Ees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase. Under Art. 256 of
the LC, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole
exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1.

Benguet Consolidated Inc. v. BCI Ees and Workers UnionPAFLU. G.R. No. L24711, April 1968

The Er cannot revoke the validly executed CB contract with their Er by the simple expedient of changing their
bargaining agent. The new agent must respect the contract. It cannot be invoked to support the contention that a
newly certified CB agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings of the former agentlike the no strike
clause in the CBA executed by the latter.

Takata Philippines Corporation vs Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. 196276, 4 June 2014
For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with the election of officers, the minutes of the election of
officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed
officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.

The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting
would not, to our mind, provide a valid reason to cancel respondents certificate of registration. The cancellation of a
unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and
misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud
and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.

Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free workers vs. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 190515. June
6, 2011

A local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent any showing that the same is prohibited
under its constitution or rules. Such disaffiliation, however, does not result in it losing its legal personality. A local
union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary
association owing its creation to the will of its members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of
its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It
only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in representation of the latter. In the present case,
whether the FFW went against the will of its principal (the member-employees) by pursuing the case despite the
signing of the MOA, is not for the Court, nor for respondent employer to determine, but for the Union and FFW to
resolve on their own pursuant to their principal-agent relationship. Moreover, the issue of disaffiliation is an intra-
union dispute which must be resolved in a different forum in an action at the instance of either or both the FFW and
the union or a rival labor organization, but not the employer as in this case.

Legend International Resorts Limited v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda. G.R. No. 169754, February 23,
2011

The pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective bargaining, and that an
order to hold a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the unions
registration because at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform
such act absent an order cancelling its registration. The legitimacy of the legal personality of respondent cannot be
collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election proceeding but only through a separate action instituted
particularly for the purpose of assailing it.

The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal
personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of registration is issued to a
union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent
petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of

Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules.

Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association v Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 170007, 7
April 2014

The duty to bargain does not compel any party to accept a proposal or to make any concession. While the purpose
of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement between the employer and the employees union resulting in
a binding contract between the parties, the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a
reasonable period does not mean lack of good faith. The laws invite and contemplate a collective bargaining
contract but do not compel one. For after all, a CBA, like any contract is a product of mutual consent and not of
compulsion. As such, the duty to bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.

Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form ManufacturingUnited Workers of the Phils v. NLRC. G.R. No. 113856,
Sept. 7, 1998

There is no perfect test of good faith (GF) in bargaining. The GF or BF is an inference to be drawn from the facts
and is largely a matter for the NLRCs expertise. The charge of BF should be raised while the bargaining is in
progress. With the execution of the CBA, BF can no longer be imputed upon any of the parties thereto. All provisions
in the CBA are supposed to have been jointly and voluntarily incorporated therein by the parties. This is not a case
where private respondent exhibited an indifferent attitude towards CB because the negotiations were not the
unilateral activity of petitioner union. The CBA is good enough that private respondent exerted reasonable effort of
GF bargaining.

FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) Vs. Sama-
samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organization
(SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO. G.R. No. 176249, November 27, 2009

While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any
such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the unions exclusive collective
bargaining status. By express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go
beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In
other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five y ears, either as an original provision or by
amendment, the bargaining unions exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged
within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBAs first five years.

Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services Inc., v. Confessor. G.R. No. 111809, May 5, 1997

The signing of the CBA does not determine whether the agreement was entered into within the 6 month period from
the date of expiration of the old CBA. In the present case, there was already a meeting of the minds between the
company and the union prior to the end of the 6 month period after the expiration of the old CBA. Hence, such
meeting of the mind is sufficient to conclude that an agreement has been reached within the 6 month period as
provided under Art. 253A of the LC.
Teodoro S. Miranda, Jr. vs. Asian Terminals, Inc. and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174316, June 23, 2009

A shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a position within the union, and not within the company. A shop
steward is appointed by the union in a shop, department, or plant and serves as representative of the union,
charged with negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the employer. He is the
representative of the union members in a building or other workplace. Blacks Law Dictionary defines a shop
steward as a union official elected to represent members in a plant or particular department. His duties include
collection of dues, recruitment of new members and initial negotiations for the settlement of grievances. A judgment
of reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of union Shop Steward would have no practical legal effect since it
cannot be enforced. Based on the requirements imposed by law and the APCWU-ATI CBA, and in the nature of
things, the subsequent separation of the petitioner from employment with respondent ATI has made his
reinstatement to union Shop Steward incapable of being enforced.

Herminigildo Inguillom, et al. vs. First Philippine Scales, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009

Union security is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends closed shop, union shop, maintenance
of membership or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain
union membership as a condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are
required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is
maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the
agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued
employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. A
closed-shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and
his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the
enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good
standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.

In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the Union Security Clause, the employer needs only to
determine and prove that:

(1) the union security clause is applicable;

(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and

(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the unions decision to expel the employee from the union or company.

Standard Chartered Bank v. Confessor. G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004

Whether or not the union is engaged in bluesky bargaining is determined by the evidence presented by the union
as to its economic demands. Thus, if the union requires exaggerated or unreasonable economic demands, then it is
guilty of ULP. In order to be considered as unfair labor practice, there must be proof that the demands made by the
union were exaggerated or unreasonable. In the minutes of the meeting show that the union based its economic
proposals on data of rank-and-file employees and the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees
from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines and other branches of the bank in the Asian region.
Hence, it cannot be said that the union was guilty of ULP for blue-sky bargaining.
General Santos Coca Cola Plant Free Workers Union-Tupas vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. G.R.
No. 178647. Feb. 13, 2007

Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the
workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are
not unfair labor practices.

Arellano University Employees and Workers Union vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139940, September 19,
2006

To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be gross. Gross violation of the CBA, under Article 261 of the
Labor Code, means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions thereof. Evidently, the
University can not be faulted for ULP as it in good faith merely heeded the above-said request of Union members.

Salunga v. CIR. G.R. No. L22456, Sep. 27, 1967

Labor unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership and a closed shop applicants
provision will not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of an employee whom
the union thus refuses to admit to membership without any reasonable ground thereof.

Phil. Can Co. v. CIR. G.R. No. L3021, July 13, 1950

A coercive measure resorted to by laborers to enforce their demands. The idea behind a strike is that a company
engaged in a profitable business cannot afford to have its production or activities interrupted, much less, paralyzed.

Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc., etc. vs. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National Union of
Workers in the Hotel Restaurant, etc., G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009

The requisites for a valid strike are:

(a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of ULP;(b) a
strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret
ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and

(c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike. The
requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.

Club Filipino, Inc., et al. v Benjamin Bautista, et al., G.R. No. 168406, January 2015
The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states the companys counter-proposal shall be attached to the notice of
strike as far as practicable. In this case, attaching the counter-proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the
union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the union to produce the companys counter-proposal which it did
not have. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the time
the union filed a notice of strike.

NSFW vs. Ovejera. G.R. No. 59743, May 31, 1982

The coolingoff period in Art. 264(c) and the 7day strike ban after the strikevote report prescribed in Art. 264 (f)
were meant to be mandatory. The law provides that the labor union may strike should the dispute remain unsettled
until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the filing of the notice, this clearly implies that the union may not
strike before the lapse of the coolingoff period. The coolingoff period is for the Ministry of Labor and Employment to
exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. The mandatory character of the 7day
strike ban is manifest in the provision that in every case the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the
voting at least 7 days before the intended strike. This period is to give time to verify that a strike vote was actually
held.

In the event the result of the strike/lockout ballot is filed within the coolingoff period, the 7day requirement shall be
counted from the day following the expiration of the coolingoff period.

Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Greenfield v. Ramos. G.R. No. 113907, Feb. 28, 2000

A no strike/lockout clause is legal, but it is applicable only to economic strikes, not ULP strikes. As a provision in the
CBA, it is a valid stipulation although the clause may be invoked by an employer (Er) only when the strike is
economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the Er that are not mandated
to be granted by the law itself. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on ULP.

Interphil Laboratories Ees UnionFFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc. G.R. No. 142824, Dec. 19, 2001

The concept of a slowdown is a strike on the installment plan. It is a willful reduction in the rate of work by
concerted action of workers for the purpose of restricting the output of the employer (Er), in relation to a labor
dispute; as an activity by which workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or their
performance of duties and functions to compel management to grant their demands. Such a slowdown is generally
condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees (Ees) continue to work and remain at
their positions and accept the wages paid to them, they at the same time select what part of their allotted tasks
they care to perform of their own volition or refuse openly or secretly, to the Ers damage, to do other work; in other
words, they work on their own terms.
Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International, et al. vs. Secretary of Department of Labor
and Employment, et al./Triumph International (phils.), Inc. vs. Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng
Triumph International, et al., G.R. No. 167401, July 5, 2010

The assumption of jurisdiction powers granted to the Labor Secretary under Article 263(g) is not limited to the
grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the
incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term assume jurisdiction
connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor

Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or
lockout, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

Sarmiento v. Tuico. G.R. Nos. 7527173, June 27, 1988

Where the return to work order is issued pending the determination of the legality of the strike, it is not correct to say
that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if illegal. Precisely, the purpose of the
return to work order is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made.

Manila Diamond Hotel Ees Union v. SLE, G.R. No. 140518, Dec. 16, 2004

Payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement but there must be showing of special circumstances rendering
actual reinstatement impracticable, or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the law in providing for
assumption of jurisdiction by the SLE in a labor dispute that affects the national interest.

Solid Bank Corp. Ernesto U. Gamier, et al. and Solid Bank Corp., et al. vs. Solid Bank Union and its
Dismissed Officers and Members, et al. G.R. No. 159460 and G.R. No. 159461, November 15, 2010

Under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, a strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the
Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or certification is illegal. So is a declaration of a strike during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike. In the present case, there is no dispute that when
respondents conducted their mass actions on April 3 to 6, 2000, the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were
still pending as both parties filed motions for reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order. Clearly, respondents
knowingly violated the aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration.

Jackbilt Industries, Inc. Vs. Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-Naflu-KMU, G.R. No. 171618-19, March 13,
2009
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing the free ingress to and
egress from the employers premises. Since respondent was found in the July 17, 1998 decision of the NLRC to
have prevented the free entry into and exit of vehicles from petitioners compound, respondents officers and
employees clearly committed illegal acts in the course of the March 9, 1998 strike. The use of unlawful means in the
course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore, pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the
March 9, 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.

Yolito Fadriquelan, et al. vs. Monterey Foods Corporation/Monterey Foods Corporation v. Bukluran ng mga
Manggagawa sa Monterey-ILAW, et al., G.R. No. 178409/G.R. No. 178434, June 8, 2011

A distinction exists between the ordinary workers liability for illegal strike and that of the union officers who
participated in it. The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely participating in the strike. There must be proof
that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. On the other hand, a union officer can be terminated upon mere
proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike. Moreover, the participating union officers have to be properly
identified. In the present case, with respect to those union officers whose identity and participation in the strike
having been properly established, the termination was legal.

Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC. G.R. No. 86000, Sep. 21, 1990

No backwages will be awarded to union members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal strike. As for the
union officers, for knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated
from employment and they are not entitled to any relief.

MSF Tire & Rubber v. CA, G.R. 128632, Aug. 5, 1999

The innocent by stander must show: Compliance with the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, and
That it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its
interests are totally foreign to the context thereof.

Victor Meteoro, et al. v. Creative Creatures, Inc. G.R No. 171275, July 13, 2009

In sum, respondent contested the findings of the labor inspector during and after the inspection and raised issues
the resolution of which necessitated the examination of evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of
inspection. Hence, the Regional Director was divested of jurisdiction and should have endorsed the case to the
appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Considering, however, that an illegal dismissal case had been filed by
petitioners wherein the existence or absence of an employer-employee relationship was also raised, the CA
correctly ruled that such endorsement was no longer necessary.

Honda Cars Philippines, Inc. v. Honda Cars Technical Specialist and Supervisors Union, G.R. No. 204142, 19
November 2014
The Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to settle tax matters. The Voluntary Arbitrator has no competence to rule
on the taxability of the gas allowance and on the propriety of the withholding of tax. These issues are clearly tax
matters, and do not involve labor disputes. To be exact, they involve tax issues within a labor relations setting as
they pertain to questions of law on the application of Section 33 (A) of the NIRC. They do not require the application
of the Labor Code or the interpretation of the MOA and/or company personnel policies.

The University of the Immaculate Conception, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 181146, January 26, 2011
Article 217 of the Labor Code states that unfair labor practices and termination disputes fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. As an exception, under Article 262 the Voluntary Arbitrator, upon
agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks. For the exception to apply, there must be agreement between the parties clearly conferring
jurisdiction to the voluntary arbitrator. Such agreement may be stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement.
However, in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, it is enough that there is evidence on record showing
the parties have agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration.

Samar-Med Distribution v National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162385 (2013)

The non-inclusion in the complaint of the issue of dismissal did not necessarily mean that the validity of the
dismissal could not be an issue. The rules of the NLRC require the submission of verified position papers by the
parties should they fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, and bar the inclusion of any cause of action not
mentioned in the complaint or position paper from the time of their submission by the parties. In view of this,
respondents cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of his complaint alone but also from a
consideration and evaluation of both his complaint and position paper.

Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd., et al. vs. Estanislao Surio, et al. G.R. No. 154213, August 23, 2012

Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not
remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases and
other special cases administrative in character involving such workers. The obvious intent of Republic Act No. 8042
was to have the POEA focus its efforts in resolving all administrative matters affecting and involving such workers.
The NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the POEA in disciplinary cases involving overseas
contract workers.

Peoples Broadcasting Service vs. The Secretary of Labor and Employment. G.R. No. 179652, March 6, 2012

If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a
complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with
the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions
of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still
an existing employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE,
however, may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Rolando L. Cervantes vs. PAL Maritime Corporation and/or Western Shipping Agencies. G.R. No. 175209.
January 16, 2013

There was substantial compliance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure when the respondents PAL Maritime
Corporation and Western Shipping Agencies, Pte., Ltd. filed, albeit belatedly, the Joint Declaration Under Oath,
which is required when an employer appeals from the Labor Arbiters decision granting a monetary award and posts
a surety bond. Under the NLRC rules, the following requisites are required to perfect the employers appeal: (1) it
must be filed within the reglementary period; (2) it must be under oath, with proof of payment of the required appeal
fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond; and (3) it must be accompanied by typewritten or printed copies of the
memorandum of appeal, stating the grounds relied upon, the supporting arguments, the reliefs prayed for, and a
statement of the date of receipt of the appealed decision, with proof of service on the other party of said appeal. If
the employer posts a surety bond, the NLRC rules further require the submission by the employer, his or her
counsel, and the bonding company of a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine
and that it shall be in effect until the final disposition of the case.

In the case at bar, the respondents posted a surety bond equivalent to the monetary award and filed the notice of
appeal and the appeal memorandum within the reglementary period. When the NLRC subsequently directed the
filing of a Joint Declaration Under Oath, the respondents immediately complied with the said order. There was only a
late submission of the Joint Declaration. Considering that there was substantial compliance with the rules, the same
may be liberally construed. The application of technical rules may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demands of
substantial justice.

Mcburnie v Ganzon, et al., G.R. No. 178034 (2013)

While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to
reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the
period to perfect an appeal. The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the
cash bond within the 10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond
securing the full amount within the said 10-day period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for reduction
after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be to reduce the cash or surety bond already
posted by the employer within the 10-day period.

AGG Trucking and/or Alex Ang Gaeid vs. Melanio B. Yuag. G.R. No. 195033, October 12, 2011

On the issue of the propriety of entertaining the Petition for Certiorari despite the prescribed Motion for
Reconsideration with the NLRC, the SC found that the CA committed error when it entertained the petition for
certiorari and explained that when respondent failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRCs 30 November
2006 Resolution within the reglementary period, the Resolution attained finality and could no longer be modified by
the Court of Appeals. Untimeliness in filing motions or petitions is not a mere technical or procedural defect, as
leniency regarding this requirement will impinge on the right of the winning litigant to peace of mind resulting from
the laying to rest of the controversy.

1. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Manila Pavilion Hotel, etc. vs. Henry Delada. G.R. No. 189947, January 25, 2011

In Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Deputy Administrator Magsalin, the Supreme Court ruled that the voluntary arbitrator
had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own
authority subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. It was also held in that case that
the failure of the parties to specifically limit the issues to that which was stated allowed the arbitrator to assume
jurisdiction over the related issue. In Ludo & Luym Corporation v. Saornido, the Supreme Court recognized that
voluntary arbitrators are generally expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission
agreement; that, nevertheless, they can assume that they have the necessary power to make a final settlement on
the related issues, since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled
that even if the specific issue brought before the arbitrators merely mentioned the question of whether an employee
was discharged for just cause, they could reasonably assume that their powers extended beyond the determination
thereof to include the power to reinstate the employee or to grant back wages. In the same vein, if the specific issue
brought before the arbitrators referred to the date of regularization of the employee, law and jurisprudence gave
them enough leeway as well as adequate prerogative to determine the entitlement of the employees to higher
benefits in accordance with the finding of regularization. Indeed, to require the parties to file another action for
payment of those benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional mandate
providing full protection to labor and speedy labor justice.

Philippine Electric Corporation v Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 168612, 10 December 2014

The rule is that a Voluntary Arbitrators award or decision shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10
days from receipt of the award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration
with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a motion for
reconsideration is filed within the period for taking an appeal.

Peoples Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils) v. Secretary of Labor, et al.

GR No. 179652, May 8, 2009

It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to make a
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however,
cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely
preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLEs primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The
determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is the
meaning of the clause in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists in Art. 128(b).

Thus, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or
other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship,
the DOLE exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee
relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE , and it is accompanied
by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code,
which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates
of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If
a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer- employee relationship, the jurisdiction is
purely with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Manolito Barles, et al. v. Hon. Benedicto Bitonio, et al. GR No. 120270, June 16, 1999

The BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both
parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. As already held by the Court in La Tondena Workers Union v.
Secretary of Labor, intra-union conflicts such as examinations of accoutns are under the jurisdiction of the BLR.
However, the Rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration purpose and expressly separated or distinguished
examinations of union accounts from the genus of intra-union conflict and provided a different procedure for the
resolution of the same. Original jurisdiction over complaints for examinations of union accounts is vested on the
Regional Director and appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the former is lodged with the BLR. This is apparent
from Sections 3 and 4 of the Med-Arbitration Rules as already mentioned. Contrast these two sections from Section
2 and Section 56 of the same rules. Section 2 expressly vests upon Med-Arbiters original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide inter alia all other inter-union or internal union disputes. Section 5 states that the decisions of
the Med-Arbiter shall be appealable to the DOLE Secretary. Without a doubt, the rules of Procedure on Mediation-
Arbitration did not amend or supplant substantive law but implemented and filled in details of procedure left vacuous
or ambiguous by the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

Araullo v Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 194169 (2013)

The Writ of Execution in the instant case was procedurally irregular, as it pre-empted the NLRC Rules which require
that where further computation of the award in the decision is necessary during the course of the execution
proceedings, no Writ of Execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the Labor Arbiter
in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the matter. When the writ was issued, there
was as yet no order approving the computation made by the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there
was a pending and unresolved Motion to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. A cursory examination of the motion
reveals that it raised valid issues that required determination in order to arrive at a just resolution, so that none of the
parties would be unjustly enriched.
Virgilio Anabe v. Asian Construction. GR No. 183233, December 23, 2009

To properly construe Article 291 of the Labor Code, it is essential to ascertain the time when the third element of a
cause of action transpired. Stated differently, in the computation of the three-year prescriptive period, a
determination must be made as to the period when the act constituting a violation of the workers right to the benefits
being claimed was committed. For if the cause of action accrued more than three (3) years before the filing of the
money claim, said cause of action has already prescribed in accordance with Article 291.

George A. Arriola v Pilipino Star .Ngayon, Inc. and/or Miguel G. Belmont, G.R. No. 175689, 13 August 2014

This court ruled that Callantas complaint for illegal dismissal had not yet prescribed. Although illegal dismissal is a
violation of the Labor Code, it is not the offense contemplated in Article 290. Article 290 refers to illegal acts
penalized under the Labor Code, including committing any of the prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts,
unfair labor practices, and illegal recruitment activities. The three-year prescriptive period under Article 290,
therefore, does not apply to complaints for illegal dismissal.

Instead, by way of supplement, Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines governs complaints for illegal
dismissal. Under Article 1146, an action based upon an injury to the rights of a plaintiff must be filed within four
years. This court explained:

. . . when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the
legality of ones dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff, as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four [4]
years.

This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for backwages, not the three-year prescriptive period under
Article 291 of the Labor Code. A claim for backwages, according to this court, may be a money claim by reason of
its practical effect. Legally, however, an award of backwages is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally
dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC to render inhis favor as a consequence of the unlawful
act committed by the employer. Though it results in the enrichment of the individual [illegally dismissed], the award
of backwages is not in redress of a private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a command upon the employer to
make public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code.

Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise actions upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. Article
1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, therefore, governs these actions.

SOCIAL LEGISLATION

SSS v. Aguas. G.R. No. 165546; February 27, 2006

A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon the
husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living
together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support,
unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.

Bernardina P. Bartolome v Social Security System, et al., G.R. No. 192531, 12 November 2014

Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming
from Johns death as a dependent parent given Cornelios untimely demise during Johns minority. Since the parent
by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees Compensation Program shall accrue solely
to herein petitioner, Johns sole remaining beneficiary. The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate
parents is contrary to law.

The phrase dependent parents should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether
by nature or by adoption.

Hacienda Cataywa, et al. v Rosario Lorezo, G.R. No. 179640, 18 March 2015)

To be exempted from the coverage of SSS Law on the basis of casual employment, the services must not merely be
irregular, temporary or intermittent, but the same must not also be in connection with the business or occupation of
the employer. The primary standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection
between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer.
The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The
connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the
particular business or trade in its entirety.

GSIS vs. De Leon. G.R. No. 186560; November 17, 2010

Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become
due as provided under the terms of the public employees pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his
pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.

GSIS vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 128524; April 20, 1999
The 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a
police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in
character.

Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. ECC. G.R. No. L-26341. Nov. 27, 1968

When the injury is sustained when the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of the employer,
the injury is compensable.

Enao v. ECC G.R. No. L-46046; April 5, 1985

The company which provides the means of transportation in going to, or coming from the place of work, is liable to
the injury sustained by the employees while on board said means of transportation.