BugarinvEspanol
Courtwhichdirectedyourofficetoregisterlispendensofthecomplaintin
BeforeusisapetitionforreviewoncertiorarioftheDecisiondatedMarch6,
1998oftheCourtofAppeals[1]affirmingthedecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtof
Cavite,Branch90,Imus,Cavite,declaringpetitionerRexieEfrenA.Bugaringguilty
indirectcontemptofcourt.
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on
December5,1996ofCivilCaseNo.126696entitledRoyalBecthel[2]Builders,Inc.
vs.SpousesLuisAlvaranandBeatrizAlvaran,etal.,forAnnulmentofSaleand
CertificatesofTitle,SpecificPerformanceandDamageswithPrayerforPreliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Orderin the sala of respondent judge
DoloresS.EspaoloftheRegionalTrialCourtofCavite,Branch90,Imus,Cavite.
PursuanttoamotionfiledbythepreviouscounselofRoyalBechtelBuilders,
Inc.,thetrialcourtissuedanorderonFebruary27,1996directingtheRegisterof
DeedsoftheProvinceofCavitetoannotateatthebackofcertaincertificatesoftitle
anoticeoflispendens.BeforetheRegisterofDeedsoftheProvinceofCavitecould
complywithsaidorder,thedefendantSpousesAlvaranonApril15,1996,fileda
motion to cancellis pendens.On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed
counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to
cancellis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancellis pendenswas
granted by the court.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
opposedbythedefendants.OnNovember5,1996,petitionerfiledanUrgentMotion
toResolve,andonNovember6,1996,filedaRejoindertoOppositionandaMotion
forContemptofCourt.[3]
DuringthehearingofthemotionforcontemptofcourtheldonDecember5,
1996,thefollowingincidenttranspired:
ATTY.BUGARING:Fortheplaintiff,yourHonor,weareready.
ATTYCORDERO:Sameappearanceforthedefendant,yourHonor.
ATTY. BUGARING:Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the
prosecutionofourmotionforcontempt,yourHonor.Mayweknowfrom
therecordiftheRegisterofDeedsisproperlynotifiedfortodayshearing.
COURT:WillyoucallontheRegisterofDeeds.
INTERPRETER:Atty.DiosdadoConcepcion,Heishere,yourHonor.
ATTY.BUGARING:Weareready,yourHonor.
COURT:Thereisamotionforcontemptinconnectionwiththeorderofthis
connectionwiththiscaseofRoyalBecthelBuilder,Inc.versusspouses
LuisAlvaranandBeatrizAlvaran,etal.
ATTY.CONCEPCION:YourHonor,Ijustreceivedthismorningattenoclock
[inthemorning]thesubpoena.
ATTY.BUGARING:MayweputitonrecordthatasearlyasNovember6,
1996,theOfficeoftheRegisterofDeedswasfurnishedwithacopyofour
motion,yourHonorplease,andtherecordwillbearitout.Untilnowthey
did not file any answer, opposition or pleadingswith respect to this
motion.
ATTY.CONCEPCION:WellIwasnotinformedbecauseIamnottheRegister
ofDeeds.IamonlytheDeputyRegisterofDeedsandIwasnotinformed
bythereceivingclerkofourofficeregardingthiscase.Asamatteroffact
IwassurprisedwhenIreceivedthismorningthesubpoena,yourHonor.
ATTY.BUGARING:YourHonorplease,mayweputthatonrecordthatthe
manifestationoftherespondentthathewasnotinformed.
COURT:Thatisrecorded.ThisisaCourtofrecordandeverythingthatyousay
hereisrecorded.
ATTY.BUGARING:YesyourHonorplease,weknowthatbutwewanttobe
specificbecausewewillbe[filing]acaseagainstthisreceivingclerkwho
didnot[inform]himyourHonorplease,withthismanifestationofthe
DeputyoftheRegisterofDeedsthatisirregularityintheperformanceof
theofficialdutyoftheclerknottoinformthepartiesconcerned.
COURT:Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is
taking the video recording at this proceedings.There is no permission
fromthisCourtthatsuchproceedingsshouldbetaken.
ATTY.BUGARING:YourHonor,myAssistant.Ididnotadvisehimtotakea
videohejustaccompaniedmethismorning.
COURT:Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should
securethepermissionofthisCourt.
ATTY.BUGARING:Actually,Ididnotinstructhimtotakesomevideotape.
COURT:Why would he be bringing camera if you did notgive him the go
signalthatshotsshouldbedone.
ATTY.BUGARING:ThisCourtshouldnotpresumethat,yourHonorplease,
wejustcamefromanoccasionlastnightandIamnotyetcomehome,
yourHonorplease.IcouldproveyourHonorplease,thatthecontentsof
thattapeisothermattersyourHonorplease.Iwasjustsurprisedwhyhe
tookvideotapeyourHonorplease,thatweasktheapologyofthisCourtif
thatoffendthisCourtyourHonorplease.
COURT:It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the
necessaryauthorityorpermissionshouldbesecured.
ATTY.BUGARING:InfactIinstructedhimtogoout,yourHonor.
COURT:Afterthecourthavenoticedthatheistakingavideotape.
ATTY.BUGARING:Yes,yourHonor,infactthatisnotmypersonalproblem
yourHonorplease,thatispersonaltothatguyyourHonorpleaseifthis
representationisbeing.
ATTY.CONCEPCION:AsamatteroffactIhavealawyerhere,Atty.Barzaga
ifheiswilling
ATTY.BARZAGA[4]:Yes,yourHonor,Iwilljustreviewtherecords.
ATTY. BUGARING:Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my
witnessbutIwilljustmarkourdocumentaryexhibitswhicharepartof
therecordofthecaseandthereafteryourHonorplease.
COURT:Youwaitforaminutecounselbecausethereisapreparationbeing
done by newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is
consideredastheprivatelyhiredcounseloftheregisterofdeedsandthe
respondentofthiscontemptproceedings.Howmuchtimedoyouneedto
goovertherecordofthiscasesothatwecancalltheothercaseinthe
meanwhile.
ATTY.BARZAGA:Secondcall,yourHonor.

COURT:Thatisveryshallow,dontgivethatalibi.

ATTY.BUGARING:Atanyrate,yourHonorplease,wearegoingtomarkour
documentaryevidenceaspartofourmotionforcontempt,yourHonor COURT:AreyoureadyAtty.Barzaga?
please.

COURT:WhathastheRegisterofDeedsgottosaywiththismatter?

ATTY.CONCEPCION:WellasIhavesaidbefore,Ihavenotreceivedany
motion regarding this contempt you are talking.I am willing now to
testify.

ATTY.BUGARING:YourHonorIamstilloftheprosecutionstage,itisnotyet
the defense.This is a criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a
criminal.

ATTY.CONCEPCION:YourHonorplease,mayIaskfortheassistancefrom
theFiscal.

COURT:If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscalor a

counselfortheRegisterofDeeds.

ATTY. CONCEPCION:Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a

privatecounsel,yourHonor.

COURT:Thatisatyourpleasure.TheCourtwillconsiderthatyoushouldbe
amplyrepresented.
ATTY.BARZAGA:Yes, your Honor.Well actually your Honor, after
reviewingtherecordofthecaseyourHonor,Inoticedthatthemotionfor
contemptofCourtwasfiledonNovember6,1966andinparagraph6
thereof,yourHonoritisstatedthat,therecordofthecaseshowsuptothe
filing of this motion,theRegister as well as the Deputy Register
DiosdadoConcepcion of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
ProvinceofCavite,didnotcomplywiththeCourtOrdersdatedFebruary
27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.However, your Honor, Atty.
DiosdadoConcepcionhasshowntomealettercomingfromAtty.Efren
A.BugaringdatedSeptember18,1996addressedtotheRegisterregarding
thisnoticeofLisPendenspertainingtoTCTNos.T519248,519249and
519250andthisletterrequest,yourHonorfortheannotationofthelis
pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered in the book of
primaryentry.WewouldlikealsotoinvitetheattentionoftheHon.Court
that the Motion for Contempt of Court was filed on November 6,
1996.Theletterfortheannotationofthelispendenswasmadebythe
counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996, your
Honor.However,yourHonor,asearlyasAugust16,1996anOrderhas
alreadybeenissuedbytheHon.Courtreadingasfollows,Whereforein
view ofthe above, themotion ofthe defendantis GRANTEDand the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby directed to
CANCELthenoticeoflispendensannotatedatthebackofCertificateof
TitleNos.519248,51949(sic)and51950(sic).
ATTY. BUGARING:Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will
firstmarkourdocumentaryevidence.
COURT:Youwait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do,
okay.The counsel has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for
anything.Soletuswaituntilheisfinishedandthenwaitforthedirection
ofthisCourtwhattodotohaveanorderlyproceedingsinthiscase.
ATTY.BARZAGA:ConsideringyourHonor,thattheissuesappeartobealittle
bit complicated your Honor, considering that the order regarding the
annotationofthelispendenshasalreadybeenrevokedbytheHon.Court
yourHonor,wejustrequestthatwebegivenaperiodoftendaysfrom
todayyourHonor,withinwhichtosubmitourformalwrittenopposition
yourHonor.
COURT:Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation
filedearlierbyAtty.TutaaninconnectionwiththerefusaloftheRegister
ofDeedstoannotatethelispendensbecauseofcertainreasons.According
tothemanifestationofAtty.Tutaananditisappearingintheearlierpart
of the record of this case, the reason for that is because there was a
pending subdivision plan, it is so stated.I think it was dated March,
1996.MayIhavetherecordplease.
ATTY.BARZAGA:Yes,yourHonor.
COURT:ThisCourtwouldliketobeenlightenedwithrespecttothatmatter.
ATTY.BARZAGA:Well,accordingtoAtty.DiosdadoConcepcionhecould
alreadyexplainthis,yourHonor.
COURT:Haveitproperlyaddressedaspartofthemanifestationsothatthis
courtcanbeguidedaccordingly.BecausethisCourtbelievesthattheroot
ofthematterstartedfromthat.Afterthesubmissionofthe.whatareyou
supposetosubmit?
ATTY. BARZAGA:Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty.
DiosdadoConcepcionincontemptofCourt.
COURT:AfterthesubmissionoftheCommentandfurnishingacopyofthe
commenttothecounselfortheplaintiff,thisCourtisgoingtogivethe
counselfortheplaintiffanequaltimewithinwhichtosubmithisreply.
ATTY.BUGARING:YourHonorplease,itisthepositionofthisrepresentation
your Honor please, that we will be marking first our documentary
evidencebecausethisissetforhearingfortoday,yourHonorplease.
COURT:Ifyouaregoingtomarkyourevidenceandtheydonothavetheir
commentyetwhatarewegoingtoreceiveasevidence.
ATTY.BUGARING:IfyourHonorplease
COURT:WillyoulistentotheCourtandjustdowhateveryouhavetodoafter
thesubmissionofthecomment.
ATTY. BUGARING:I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will
showthatthemotionforcontemptwascopyfurnishedwiththeRegisterof
DeedsandDiosdadoConcepcion.
COURT:Precisely,ifyouarelisteningthenyouwillgetwhattheCourtwould
wanttodo.Thisshouldbeanorderlyproceedingsandconsideringthatthis
isaCourtofrecordthecommenthastobeinfirsttheninyourreplyyou
cansubmityourevidencetorebuttheargumentthatisgoingtobeputup
bytherespondentandsowewillbeabletohearthecasesmoothly.
ATTY.BUGARING:MypointhereyourHonorplease,isthattherespondent
hadbeenlongtimefurnishedofthiscontemptproceedings.Withacopyof
themotiontheyshouldhavefileditinduetimeinaccordancewiththe
 rules and because it is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our
evidenceandpresenttothisCourt,yourHonor.
COURT:(Bangingthegavel)Willyoulisten.
ATTY.BUGARING:Iamlistening,yourHonor.
COURT:AndthisCourtdeclaresthatyouareoutoforder.
ATTY.BUGARING:Well,ifthatisthecontentionoftheCourtyourHonor
please,weareallofficersoftheCourt,yourHonor,please,wehavealso
andweknowalsoourprocedure,yourHonor.
COURT:If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the
Courtfirstandthendowhateveryouwant.
ATTY.BUGARING:Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the
antagonistic approach of the Court to this representation ever since I
appearedyourHonorpleaseandIputonrecordthatIwillbefilingan
inhibitiontothisHon.Court.
COURT:Dothatrightaway.(Bangingthegavel)
ATTY.BUGARING:Becausewecouldnotfindanysortofjusticeintown.
COURT:Dothatrightaway.
ATTY.BUGARING:Wearereadytopresentourwitnessandwearedepriveto
presentourwitness.
COURT:Youhavepresentedawitnessanditwasanadversewitnessthatwas
presented.
ATTY.BUGARING:Ididnot.
COURT:Withrespecttothis,theprocedureoftheCourtisfortherespondentto
filehiscomment.
ATTY.BUGARING:WellyourHonorplease,atthispointintimeIdontwant
tocommentonanythingbutIreservemyrighttoinhibitthisHonorable
Courtbeforetryingthiscase.
COURT:Youcandowhateveryouwant.
ATTY.BUGARING:Yes,yourHonor,thatisourprerogativeyourHonor.
COURT:AsfarasthisCourtisconcerneditisgoingtofollowtherules.
ATTY.BUGARING:Yes,yourHonor,weknowalltherules.
COURT:Yes,youknowyourrulesthatswhyyouareputtingthecartaheadof
thehorse.
ATTY.BUGARING:NoyourHonor,IvebeenchallengedbythisCourtthatI
knowbetterthanthisCourt.Modestly(sic)asideyourHonorplease,Ive
beenwinninginmanycertioraricases,yourHonor.
COURT:Okay,okay,dothat,dothat.Iamgoingtociteyouforcontemptof
Court.(Bangingthegavel)YoucallthepoliceandIamgoingtosendthis
lawyerinjail.(TurningtotheSheriff)
ATTY.BUGARING:Iamjustmanifestingandarguinginfavorofmyclient
yourHonorplease.
COURT:You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the
discretionofthisCourt.
ATTY.BUGARING:IamverysorryyourHonor,ifthatistheappreciationof
theCourtbutthisisonewayIamprotectingmyclient,yourHonor.
COURT:That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the
discretionofthisCourt.(TurningtotheSheriff)Willyouseetoitthatthis
guyisputinjail.(pp.2942.Rollo)
Hence,inanOrderdatedDecember5,1996,JudgeEspaolcitedpetitionerin
directcontemptofcourt,thus:
Duringthehearingofthiscase,plaintiffsandcounselwerepresenttogetherwithone
(1)operatingavideocamerawhowastakingpicturesoftheproceedingsofthecase
whilecounsel,Atty.RexieEfrenBugaringwasmakingmanifestationtotheeffect
thathewasreadytomarkhisdocumentaryevidencepursuanttohisMotiontocite
(incontemptofcourt)theDeputyRegisterofDeedsofCavite,Diosdado
Concepcion.
TheCourtcalledtheattentionofsaidcounselwhoexplainedthathedidnotcause
theappearanceofthecameramantotakepictures,however,headmittedthatthey
camefromafunction,andthatwasthereasonwhythesaidcameramanwasintow
withhimandtheplaintiffs.Notwithstandingtheflimsyexplanationgiven,the
counselsentoutthecameramanaftertheCourttookexceptiontothefactthat
althoughtheproceedingsareopentothepublicandthatitbeingacourtofrecord,
andsinceitspermissionwasnotsought,suchsituationwasanabuseofdiscretionof
theCourt.
Whentherespondent,DeputyRegisterofDeedsConcepcionmanifestedthathe
neededtheservicesofcounselandrightthenandthereappointedAtty.Elpidio
Barzagatorepresenthim,thecasewasallowedtobecalledagain.Onthesecond
call,Atty.Bugaringstartedtoinsistthathebeallowedtomarkandpresenthis
documentaryevidenceinspiteofthefactthatAtty.Barzagawasstillmanifesting
thathebeallowedtosubmitawrittenpleadingforhisclient,consideringthatthe
Motionhassomanyramificationsandtheissuesarecomplicated.
Atthispoint,Atty.Bugaringwasinsistingthathebeallowedtomarkhis
documentaryevidenceandwasraringtoargueasinfacthewasalreadyperorating
despitethefactthatAtty.Barzagahasnotyetfinishedwithhismanifestation.As
Atty.Bugaringappearstodisregardorderlyprocedure,theCourtdirectedhimto
listenandwaitfortherulingoftheCourtforanorderlyproceeding.
Whileclaimingthathewaslistening,hewouldspeakupanytimehefeltlikedoing
so.Thus,theCourtdeclaredhimoutoforder,atwhichpoint,Atty.Bugaringflared
upandutteredwordsinsultingtheCourt;suchas:thatheknowsbetterthanthelatter
ashehaswonallhiscasesofcertiorariintheappellateCourts,thatheknowsbetter
theRulesofCourt;thathewasgoingtomovefortheinhibitionofthePresiding
Judgeforallegedlybeingantagonistictohisclient,andotherinvectiveswerehurled
tothediscreditoftheCourt.
Thus,inopencourt,Atty.Bugaringwasdeclaredindirectcontemptandorderthe
Courtssherifftoarrestandplacehimunderdetention.
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoingandthefactthatAtty.
RexieEfrenBugaringcommittedanopendefiance,evenchallengingtheCourtina
disrespectful,arrogant,andcontumaciousmanner,heisdeclaredindirectcontempt
ofCourtandissentencedtothree(3)daysimprisonmentandpaymentofafine
ofP3,000.00.HisdetentionshallcommenceimmediatelyattheMunicipalJailof
Imus,Cavite.[5]
PursuanttosaidOrder,thepetitionerservedhisthree(3)daysentenceatthe
ImusMunicipalJail,andpaidthefineofP3,000.00.[6]
WhileservingthefirstdayofhissentenceonDecember5,1996,petitioner
filedamotionforreconsiderationoftheOrdercitinghimindirectcontemptof
court.Thenextday,December6,1996,petitionerfiledanothermotionprayingfor
theresolutionofhismotionforreconsideration.Bothmotionswereneverresolved
andpetitionerwasreleasedonDecember8,1996.[7]
Toclearhisnameinthelegalcircleandthegeneralpublic,petitionerfileda
petitionbeforetheCourtofAppealsprayingfortheannulmentoftheOrderdated
December5,1996citinghimindirectcontemptofcourtandthereimbursementof
thefineofP3,000.00ongroundsthatrespondentJudgeDoloresS.Espaolhadno
factualandlegalbasisincitinghimindirectcontemptofcourt,andthatsaidOrder
wasnullandvoidforbeinginviolationoftheConstitutionandotherpertinentlaws
andjurisprudence.[8]
TheCourtofAppealsfoundthatfromathoroughreadingofthetranscriptof
stenographicnotesofthehearingheldonDecember5,1996,itwasobviousthatthe
petitionerwasindeedarrogant,attimesimpertinent,tooargumentative,totheextent
ofbeingdisrespectful,annoyingandsarcastictowardsthecourt.[9]Itaffirmedthe
orderoftherespondentjudge,butfoundthatthefineofP3,000.00exceededthe
limitofP2,000.00prescribedbytheRulesofCourt, [10]andorderedtheexcessof
P1,000.00 returned to petitioner.On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the
dispositiveportionofwhichreads:
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyDISMISSEDforlackofmeritandtheassailed
orderdatedDecember5,1996issuedbythetrialcourtisherebyAFFIRMEDwith
themodificationthattheexcessfineofP1,000.00isORDEREDRETURNEDtothe
petitioner.
Beforeus,petitionerascribestotheCourtofAppealsthisloneerror:
THEAPPELLATECOURTCOMMITTEDAREVERSIBLEERRORIN
AFFIRMINGTHEASSAILEDORDEROFTHETRIALCOURTWHICHTO
PETITIONERSSUBMISSIONSSMACKSOFOPPRESSIONANDABUSEOF
AUTHORITY,HENCEITCOMMITTEDAGRAVEERROROFLAWINITS
QUESTIONEDDECISION.[11]
Petitionerinsiststhatacarefulexaminationofthetranscriptofstenographic
notesofthesubjectproceedingswouldrevealthatthecontemptorderissuedby
respondentjudgehadnofactualandlegalbasis.Itwouldalsoshowthathewas
politeandrespectfultowardsthecourtashealwaysaddressedthecourtwiththe
phraseyourhonorplease.
Wedisagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by
AdministrativeCircularNo.2295provides:
Directcontemptpunishedsummarily.Apersonguiltyofmisbehaviorinthe
presenceoforsonearacourtorjudgeastoobstructorinterrupttheproceedings
beforethesame,includingdisrespecttowardthecourtorjudge,offensive
personalitiestowardothers,orrefusaltobeswornortoanswerasawitness,orto
subscribeanaffidavitordepositionwhenlawfullyrequiredtodoso,maybe
summarilyadjudgedincontemptbysuchcourtorjudgeandpunishedbyafinenot
exceedingtwothousandpesosorimprisonmentnotexceedingten(10)days,orboth,
ifitbeasuperiorcourt,orajudgethereof,orbyafinenotexceedingtwohundred
pesosorimprisonmentnotexceedingone(1)day,orboth,ifitbeaninferiorcourt.
WeagreewiththestatementoftheCourtofAppealsthatpetitionersalleged
deferencetothetrialcourtinconsistentlyaddressingtherespondentjudgeasyour
Honorpleasethroughouttheproceedingsisbeliedbyhisbehaviortherein:
1.theveiledthreattofileapetitionforcertiorariagainstthetrialcourt
(pp.1415,tsn,December5,1996;pp.4142,Rollo)iscontraryto
Rule11.03,Canon11oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility
which mandates that a lawyer shall abstainfrom scandalous,
offensiveormenacinglanguageorbehaviorbeforetheCourts.
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was
partialinfavoroftheotherparty(pp.1314,tsn,December5,1996;
pp.4041,Rollo)isagainstRule11.04,Canon11oftheCodeof
ProfessionalResponsibilitywhichenjoinslawyersfromattributing
to a judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materialitytothecase.
3.behavingwithoutdueregardtothetrialcourtsordertomaintainorder
in the proceedings (pp. 913, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 3640,
Rollo)isinutterdisregardtoCanon1oftheCanonsofProfessional
Ethicswhichmakesitalawyersdutytomaintaintowardsthecourts
(1) respectful attitude in order to maintain its importance in the
administrationofjustice,andCanon11oftheCodeofProfessional
Responsibilitywhichmandateslawyerstoobserveandmaintainthe
respectduetotheCourtsandtojudicialofficersandshouldinsiston
similarconductbyothers.
4.behavingwithoutdueregardordeferencetohisfellowcounselwhoat
thetimehewasmakingrepresentationsinbehalfoftheotherparty,
was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to
furtherputawordinedgewise(pp.713,tsn,December5,1996;pp.
3439,Rollo)isviolativeofCanon8oftheCodeofProfessional
ResponsibilityandCanon22oftheCanonsofProfessionalEthics
whichobligesalawyertoconducthimselfwithcourtesy,fairness
andcandortowardhisprofessionalcolleagues,and
5.therefusalofthepetitionertoallowtheRegistrarofDeedsofthe
ProvinceofCavite,throughcounsel,toexercisehisrighttobeheard
(Ibid)isagainstSection1ofArticleIII,1997Constitutiononthe
righttodueprocessoflaw,Canon18oftheCanonsofProfessional
Ethicswhichmandatesalawyertoalwaystreatanadversewitness
with fairness and due consideration, and Canon 12 of Code of
ProfessionalResponsibilitywhichinsistsonalawyertoexertevery
effortandconsiderithisdutytoassistinthespeedyandefficient
administrationofjustice.
TheCourtcannotthereforehelpbutnoticethesarcasminthepetitionersuseofthe
phraseyourhonorplease.For,afterusingsaidphrasehemanifestedutterdisrespect
tothecourtinhissubsequentutterances.Surelythisbehaviorfromanofficerofthe
Courtcannotandshouldnotbecountenanced,ifproperdecorumistobeobserved
andmaintainedduringcourtproceedings.[12]
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary
evidencemarkedtotheextentofinterruptingtheopposingcounselandthecourt
showeddisrespecttosaidcounselandthecourt,wasdefiantofthecourtssystemfor
anorderlyproceeding,andobstructedtheadministrationofjustice.Thepowerto
punishforcontemptisinherentinallcourtsandisessentialtothepreservationof
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.
[13]
Directcontemptiscommittedinthepresenceoforsonearacourtorjudge,asin
the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. [14]Hence,
petitionercannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent
judgeinissuingthecontemptorderinsideherchamberwithoutgivingthepetitioner
the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration.The
recordsshowthatpetitionerwascitedincontemptofcourtduringthehearinginthe
sala of respondent judge, and heeven filed a motion for reconsideration of the
contemptorderonthesameday.[15]
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his
emotionsinespousingthecaseofhisclientbypersistingtohavehisdocumentary
evidencemarkeddespitetherespondentjudgescontraryorderhedidsointhe
honestbeliefthathewasboundtoprotecttheinterestofhisclienttothebestofhis
abilityandwithutmostdiligence.
TheCourtofAppealsaptlystated:
Butalawyershouldnotbecarriedawayinespousinghisclientscause(Buenaseda
v.Flavier,226SCRA645,656).Heshouldnotforgetthatheisanofficerofthe
court,boundtoexerteveryeffortandplacedunderduty,toassistinthespeedyand
efficientadministrationofjusticepursuanttoCanon12,CanonsofProfessional
Responsibility(Gomezv.PresidingJudge,RTC,Br.15,OzamisCity,249SCRA
432,439).Heshouldnot,therefore,misusetherulesofproceduretodefeattheends
ofjusticeperRule10.03.Canon10oftheCanonsofProfessionalResponsibility,or
undulydelayacase,impedetheexecutionofajudgmentormisusecourtprocesses,
inaccordancewithRule12.04,Canon12ofthesameCanons(Ibid).
Lawyersshouldberemindedthattheirprimarydutyistoassistthecourtsinthe
administrationofjustice.Anyconductwhichtendstodelay,impedeorobstructthe
administrationofjusticecontravenessuchlawyersduty.[16]
Althoughrespondentjudgewasjustifiedincitingpetitionerindirectcontempt
ofcourt,sheerredinimposingafineintheamountofP3,000.00whichexceeded
theceilingofP2,000.00underSupremeCourtAdministrativeCircularNo.2295
whichtookeffectonNovember16,1995.Itwasnotestablishedthatthefinewas
imposedinbadfaith.TheCourtofAppealsthusproperlyorderedthereturnofthe
excessofP1,000.00.Asidefromthefine,thethreedaysimprisonmentmetedoutto
petitionerwasjustifiedandwithinthe10daylimitprescribedinSection1,Rule71
oftheRulesofCourt,asamended.
Itisourviewandwehold,therefore,thattheCourtofAppealsdidnotcommit
anyreversibleerrorinitsassaileddecision.
WHEREFORE,theassailedDecisiondatedMarch6,1998oftheCourtof
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90,
Imus,Caviteisorderedtoreturntothepetitioner,RexieEfrenA.Bugaring,thesum
ofP1,000.00outoftheoriginalfineofP3,000.00.
SOORDERED.
ReyesvChiong
Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility.The
bickeringandthehostilityoftheirclientsshouldnotaffecttheirconductandrapport
witheachotherasprofessionalsandmembersofthebar.
TheCase
BeforeusisaSwornComplaint[1]filedbyAtty.RamonP.Reyeswiththe
OfficeoftheBarConfidantofthisCourt,seekingthedisbarmentofAtty.Victoriano
T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyers oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility.AftertheThirdDivisionofthisCourtreferredthecase
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar
Disciplineresolvedtosuspendhimasfollows:
xxx[C]onsideringthatrespondentisboundbyhisoathwhichbindshimtothe
obligationthathewillnotwittinglyorwillinglypromoteorsueanygroundless,
falseorunlawfulsuit,norgiveaidnorconsenttothesame.Inaddition,Canon8of
theCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityprovidesthatalawyershallconducthimself
withcourtesy,fairnessandcandortowardshisprofessionalcolleagues,andshall
avoidharassingtacticsagainstopposingcounsel.Inimpleadingcomplainantand
ProsecutorSalangainCivilCaseNo.4884,whenitwasapparentthattherewasno
legalgroundtodoso,respondentviolatedhisoathofofficeaswellastheabove
quotedCanonoftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,[r]espondentishereby
SUSPENDEDfromthepracticeoflawfortwo(2)years.[2]
TheFacts
In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998, his
services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu,[3]a ChineseTaiwanese, in a business
venturethatwentawry.XuinvestedP300,000onaCebubasedfishball,tempura
andseafoodproductsfactorybeingsetupbyacertainChiaHsienPan,another
ChineseTaiwaneseresidinginZamboangaCity.Eventually,theformerdiscovered
thatthelatterhadnotestablishedafishballfactory.WhenXuaskedforhismoney
back, Pan became hostile, making it necessary for the former to seek legal
assistance.
Xu,throughhereincomplainant,filedaComplaintforestafaagainstPan,who
was represented by respondent.The Complaint, docketed as IS 98J51990, was
assignedtoAssistantManilaCityProsecutorPedroB.Salanga,whothenissueda
subpoenaforPantoappearforpreliminaryinvestigationonOctober27and29,
1998.Thelatterneitherappearedonthetwoscheduledhearingsnorsubmittedhis
counteraffidavit.Hence,ProsecutorSalangafiledaCriminalComplaint [4]forestafa
againsthimbeforetheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofManila. [5]OnApril8,1999,
theManilaRTCissuedaWarrantofArrest[6]againstPan.
Thereafter,respondentfiledanUrgentMotiontoQuashtheWarrantofArrest.
[7]
He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil Complaint for the
collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for the dissolution of a
businessventureagainstcomplainant,XuandProsecutorSalanga.
Whenconfrontedbycomplainant,respondentexplainedthatitwasPanwho
haddecidedtoinstitutethecivilactionagainstAtty.Reyes.Respondentclaimedhe
wouldsuggesttohisclienttodropthecivilcase,ifcomplainantwouldmoveforthe
dismissaloftheestafacase.However,thetwolawyersfailedtoreachasettlement.
In his Comment[8]dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that he had
shownnodisrespectinimpleadingAtty.ReyesascodefendantinCivilCaseNo.
4884.Heclaimedthattherewasnobasistoconcludethatthesuitwasgroundless,
andthatithadbeeninstitutedonlytoexactvengeance.HeallegedthatProsecutor
Salangawasimpleadedasanadditionaldefendantbecauseoftheirregularitiesthe
latter had committed in conducting the criminal investigation.Specifically,
ProsecutorSalangahadresolvedtofiletheestafacasedespitethependencyofPans
Motion for an Opportunity to Submit CounterAffidavits and Evidence, [9]of the
appeal[10]tothejusticesecretary,andoftheMotiontoDefer/SuspendProceedings.
[11]
Ontheotherhand,complainantwasimpleaded,becauseheallegedlyconnived
withhisclient(Xu)infilingtheestafacase,whichtheformerknewfullywellwas
baseless.According to respondent, the irregularities committed by Prosecutor
Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainants connivance therein were
discoveredonlyaftertheinstitutionofthecollectionsuit.
TheThirdDivisionofthisCourtreferredthecasetotheIBPforinvestigation,
reportandrecommendation.[12]Thereafter,theBoardofGovernorsoftheIBPpassed
itsJune29,2002Resolution.[13]
ReportandRecommendationoftheIBP
InherReportandRecommendation,[14]CommissionerMilagrosV.SanJuan,
towhomthecasewasassignedbytheIBPforinvestigationandreport,averredthat
complainantandProsecutorSalangahadbeenimpleadedinCivilCaseNo.4884on
thesolebasisoftheCriminalComplaintforestafatheyhadfiledagainstrespondents
client.InhisComment,respondenthimselfclaimedthatthereasonxxxwasxxx
theirregularitiesofthecriminalinvestigation/connivanceandconsequentdamages.
CommissionerSanJuanmaintainedthatthecollectionsuitwithdamageshad
beenfiledpurposelytoobtainleverageagainsttheestafacase,inwhichrespondents
clientwasthedefendant.TherewasnoneedtoimpleadcomplainantandProsecutor
Salanga,sincetheyhadneverparticipatedinthebusinesstransactionsbetweenPan
andXu.Improperandhighlyquestionablewastheinclusionoftheprosecutorand
complainantinthecivilcaseinstitutedbyrespondentontheallegedproddingofhis
client.Verily,thesuitwasfiledtoharasscomplainantandProsecutorSalanga.
Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to implead
ProsecutorSalangaandcomplainantinCivilCaseNo.4884.Insodoing,respondent
violatedhisoathofofficeandCanon8oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.
The IBP adopted the investigating commissioners recommendation for his
suspensionfromthepracticeoflawfortwo(2)years.
ThisCourtsRuling
WeagreewiththeIBPsrecommendation.
Lawyersarelicensedofficersofthecourtswhoareempoweredtoappear,
prosecuteanddefend;anduponwhompeculiarduties,responsibilitiesandliabilities
aredevolvedbylawasaconsequence.[15]Membershipinthebarimposesuponthem
certainobligations.Mandatedtomaintainthedignityofthelegalprofession,they
mustconductthemselveshonorablyandfairly.Moreover,Canon8oftheCodeof
Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy,fairnessandcandortowardshisprofessionalcolleagues,andshallavoid
harassingtacticsagainstopposingcounsel.
RespondentsactionsdonotmeasureuptothisCanon.CivilCaseNo.4884
was for the collection of a sum of money, damages and dissolution of an
unregisteredbusinessventure.IthadoriginallybeenfiledagainstSpousesXu,but
waslatermodifiedtoincludecomplainantandProsecutorSalanga.
TheAmendedandSupplementalComplaints[16]allegedthefollowing:
27.TheinvestigatingprosecutordefendantPedroSalangaknowinglyand
deliberatelyrefusedandfailedtoperformhisdutyenjoinedbythelawandthe
ConstitutiontoaffordplaintiffChiaHsienPandueprocessbyviolatinghisrights
undertheRulesonpreliminaryinvestigations;healsofalselymadeaCertification
underoaththatpreliminaryinvestigationwasdulyconductedandplaintiff[was]
dulyinformedofthechargesagainsthimbutdidnotanswer;hemaliciouslyandxx
xpartiallyruledthattherewasprobablecauseandfiledaCriminalInformationfor
estafaagainstplaintiffChiaHsienPan,knowingfully[well]thattheproceedings
werefatallydefectiveandnullandvoid;xxx;
28.Saidassistantprosecutor,knowingalsothatplaintiffChiaHsienPanfiledsaid
appealandmotiontodeferforthevalidgroundsstatedthereindeliberatelyrefused
tocorrecthiserrorsandconsentedtothearrestofsaidplaintiffunderaninvalid
informationandwarrantofarrest.
29.DefendantAtty.RamonReyes,knowingthatthesuitofdefendantZongoiXuis
baselessconnivedwiththelattertoharassandextortmoneyfromplaintiffChia
HsienPanbysaidcriminalprosecutioninthemannercontrarytolaw,moralsand
publicpolicy,resultingtothearrestofsaidplaintiffandcausingplaintiffsgrave
irreparabledamages[.][17]
WeconcurwiththeIBPthattheamendmentoftheComplaintandthefailure
toresorttotheproperremediesstrengthencomplainantsallegationthatthecivil
actionwasintendedtogainleverageagainsttheestafacase.Ifrespondentorhis
clientdidnotagreewithProsecutorSalangasresolution,theyshouldhaveusedthe
properproceduralandadministrativeremedies.Respondentcouldhavegonetothe
justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for
ReinvestigationofProsecutorSalangasdecisiontofileaninformationforestafa.
Inthetrialcourt,aMotiontoDismisswasavailabletohimifhecouldshow
that the estafa case was filed without basis.Moreover, he could have instituted
disbarmentproceedingsagainstcomplainantandProsecutorSalanga,ifhebelieved
thatthetwohadconspiredtoactillegally.Asalawyer, respondentshouldhave
advisedhisclientoftheavailabilityoftheseremedies.Thus,thefilingofthecivil
casehadnojustification.
The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the
businesstransactionsubjectofthecollectionsuitshowsthattherewasnoreasonfor
their inclusion in that case.It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a
personalaffrontandusedthecivilcaseasatooltoreturntheinconveniencesuffered
by hisclient.His actionsdemonstrate amisuse ofthe legalprocess.Theaim of
everylawsuitshouldbetorenderjusticetothepartiesaccordingtolaw, not to
harassthem.[18]
Lawyersshouldtreattheiropposingcounselsandotherlawyerswithcourtesy,
dignityandcivility.Agreatpartoftheircomfort,aswellasoftheirsuccessatthe
bar,dependsupontheirrelationswiththeirprofessionalbrethren.Sincetheydeal
constantlywitheachother,theymusttreatoneanotherwithtrustandrespect.Any
undueillfeelingbetweenclientsshouldnotinfluencecounselsintheirconductand
demeanor toward each other.Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and
offensivebehavioramonglawyersnotonlydetractfromthedignityofthelegal
profession,[19]but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to
disciplinaryaction.
Furthermore,theLawyersOathexhortslawpractitionersnottowittinglyor
willinglypromoteorsueanygroundless,falseorunlawfulsuit,norgiveaidnor
consenttothesame.
Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading
complainantandProsecutorSalanga.Suchexcuseisflimsyandunacceptable.While
lawyersoweentiredevotiontotheinterestsoftheirclients,theirofficedoesnot
permitviolationofthelaworanymanneroffraudorchicanery. [20]Theirrenditionof
improper service invites stern and just condemnation.Correspondingly, they
advancethehonoroftheirprofessionandthebestinterestsoftheirclientswhenthey
renderserviceorgiveadvicethatmeetsthestrictestprinciplesofmorallaw.[21]
Thehighestrewardthatcanbebestowedonlawyersistheesteemoftheir
professional brethren.This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or
gainedbyartificeorcontrivance.Itisbornofsharpcontestsandthrivesdespite
conflictinginterests.Itemanatessolelyfromintegrity,character,brainsandskillin
thehonorableperformanceofprofessionalduty.[22]
WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is
herebySUSPENDEDfor two (2) years from the practice of law, effective
immediately.
SOORDERED.
DallongGalcinaovCastro
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of
Court. Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a
mannerbefittingtheirnobleprofession.
ComplainantAtty.RosalieDallongGalicinaoistheClerkofCourtofthe
RegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofBambang,NuevaVizcaya.On8May2003,shefiled
with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) aComplaintAffidavit[1]with supporting documents[2]against
respondentAtty.VirgilR.CastroforUnprofessionalConduct,specificallyviolation
of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[3]Thechargeinthecomplaintissummedupasfollows:
RespondentAtty.CastrowasaprivatepractitionerandVicePresidentofIBPNueva
VizcayaChapter.On5May2003,respondentwenttocomplainantsofficetoinquire
whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitledSps. Crispino
Castillanov.Sps.FedericoS.CastillanoandFelicidadAberin,hadalreadybeen
remandedtothecourtoforigin,MCTCDupaxdelNorte,AlfonsoCastaned,Nueva
Vizcaya.Itmustbenotedthatrespondentwasnotthecounselofrecordofeither
partyinCivilCaseNo.784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been
transmittedsinceacertifiedtruecopyofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsshould
firstbepresentedtoserveasbasisforthetransmittaloftherecordstothecourtof
origin.Tothisrespondentretortedscornfully,WhowillcertifytheCourtofAppeals
Decision,theCourtofAppeals?Youmeantosay,IwouldstillhavetogotoManila
togetacertifiedtruecopy?Surprisedatthisoutburst,complainantreplied,Sir,itsin
the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be
representing.Respondentthenreplied,Thenyoushouldhavenotifiedmeofthesaid
requirement.ThatwastwoweeksagoandIhavebeenfrequentingyourofficesince
then,butyouneverbotheredtonotifyme.Complainantreplied,Itisnotourduty,
Sir,tonotifyyouofthesaidrequirement.
Respondentthenanswered,Youmeantosayitisnotyourdutytoremand
therecordofthecase?Complainantresponded,No,Sir,Imean,itsnotourdutyto
notify you that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals decision.
RespondentangrilydeclaredinIlocano,Kayatmongasawen,awanpakialamyon?
Kasdiay?(Youmeantosayyoudontcareanymore?Isthatthewayitis?)Hethen
turnedandlefttheoffice,bangingthedooronhiswayouttoshowhisanger.The
bangingofthedoorwassolouditwasheardbythepeopleattheadjacentRTC,
Branch30whereahearingwastakingplace.[4]
Afterafewminutes,respondentreturnedtotheoffice,stillenraged,andpointedhis
fingeratcomplainantandshouted,Ukinnan,noaddatiungetmoitikilientekhaan
mongaibaleskaniakah!(Vulvaofyourmother!Ifyouareharboringillfeelings
against my client, dont turn your ire on me!) Complainant was shocked at
respondentswordsbutstillmanagedtoreply,Idontevenknowyourclient,Sir.
Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainants window, he again
shouted,Ukinnamngababai!(Vulvaofyourmother,youwoman!)[5]
Complainantsufferedacuteembarrassmentattheincident,asithappenedinher
officeofwhichshewas,andstillis,theheadandinfrontofherstaff.Shefeltthat
hercredibilityhadbeentarnishedanddiminished,elicitingdoubtonherabilityto
commandfullrespectfromherstaff.[6]
TheComplaintAffidavit, filed three days after the incident,was supported by
anAffidavit[7]signed by employees of RTCBambang, Nueva Vizcaya who
witnessedtheincident.TheAffidavitnarratedthesameincidentaswitnessedbythe
saidemployees.AMotiontoFileAdditionalAffidavit/DocumentaryEvidencewas
filedbycomplainanton25September2003.[8]
On26May2003,theCBDIBPissuedanOrder[9]requiringrespondenttosubmithis
answer to the complaint. Respondent submitted hisCompliance[10]dated 18 June
2003.RespondentexplainedthathewascounselfortheplaintiffsinCivilCaseNo.
847,entitledSps.FedericoCastillano,etal.v.Sps.CrispinCastillano,etal.,filed
with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30.He learned of the finality of the
decisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.No.64962withrespecttoCivilCase
No.847beforethelowercourt.Priortotheincident,hewenttotheofficeofthe
complainanttorequestforthetransmittaloftherecordsofthecasetotheMCTC
andthecomplainantreassuredhimofthesame.
Respondentadmitshavinginquiredaboutthestatusofthetransmittalof
therecordson5May2003.However,hehasnoexplanationastowhattranspiredon
thatday.Instead,henarratesthaton25May2003,twelvedaysaftertheincident,the
recordshadnotyetbeentransmitted,andhesubsequentlylearnedthattheserecords
werereturnedtothecourtoforigin.
ThehearingfortheadministrativecomplaintbeforetheCBDwasseton
25 September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan.
However,onsaiddate,onlycomplainantappeared.Thelatteralsomovedthatthe
casebesubmittedforresolution.[11]RespondentlateronfiledaManifestationstating
thatthereasonforhisnonappearancewasbecausehewasstillrecuperatingfrom
physicalinjuriesandthathewasnotmentallyfittopreparetherequiredpleadingsas
hisvehiclewasrainedwithbulletson19August2003.Healsoexpressedhispublic
apologytothecomplainantinthesameManifestation.[12]
ComplainantfiledaManifestationexpressingherdesirenottoappearon
thenexthearingdateinviewofrespondentspublicapology,addingthatrespondent
personallyandhumblyaskedforforgivenesswhichsheaccepted.[13]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
reprimandedandwarnedthatanyothercomplaintforbreachofhisprofessional
dutiesshallbedealtwithmoreseverely.[14]TheIBPsubmittedtothisCourtaNotice
of Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.[15]

 Attheonset,itshouldbenotedthatrespondentwasnotthecounselof
recordofCivilCaseNo.784.Hadhebeencounselofrecord,itwouldhavebeen
easyforhimtopresenttherequiredcertifiedtruecopyofthedecisionoftheCourt
ofAppeals.HeneednothavegonetoManilatoprocureacertifiedtruecopyofthe
decisionsincetheCourtofAppealsfurnishesthepartiesandtheircounselofrecord
aduplicateoriginalorcertifiedtruecopyofitsdecision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its
records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the
counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties to
representthem,respondenthadnorighttoimposehiswillontheclerkofcourt.
Rule8.02oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitystates:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
encroachupontheprofessionalemploymentofanotherlawyer;
however,itistherightofanylawyer,withoutfearorfavor,to
giveproperadviceandassistancetothoseseekingreliefagainst
unfaithfulorneglectfulcounsel.
Throughhisactsofconstantlycheckingthetransmittaloftherecordsof
CivilCaseNo.784,respondentdeliberatelyencroacheduponthelegalfunctionsof
thecounselofrecordofthatcase.Itdoesnotmatterwhetherhedidsoingoodfaith.
Moreover,inthecourseofhisquestionableactivitiesrelatingtoCivilCase
No.784,respondentactedrudelytowardsanofficerofthecourt.Heraisedhisvoice
attheclerkofcourtandutteredatherthemostvulgarofinvectives.Notonlywasit
illmanneredbutalsounbecomingconsideringthathedidallthesetoawomanand
infrontofhersubordinates.
As held inAlcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16]respondent ought to have
realizedthatthissortofpublicbehaviorcanonlybringdownthelegalprofessionin
thepublicestimationanderodepublicrespectforit.[17]TheseactsviolateRule7.03,
Canon8andRule8.01,towit:
Rule7.03Alawyershallnotengageinconductthat
adverselyreflectonhisfitnesstopracticelaw,nowshallhe,
whetherinpublicorprivatelifebehaveinscandalousmannerto
thediscreditofthelegalprofession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues,andshallavoidharassingtacticsagainstopposing
counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings,uselanguagewhichisabusive,offensiveorotherwise
improper.
Moreover,Canon8oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitydemands
that lawyersconduct themselveswith courtesy, fairnessand candortoward their
fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal
profession.Theymustacthonorably,fairlyandcandidlytowardseachotherand
otherwiseconductthemselveswithoutreproachatalltimes.[18]
AscorrectlyevaluatedbytheInvestigatingCommissioner,respondentdid
not categorically deny the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy
narrationoftheprefatoryfactsofthecaseaswellasoftheincidenton5May2003.
Complainant also alleged in herComplaintAffidavitthat respondents
uncharacteristicbehaviorwasnotanisolatedincident.Hehassupposedlydonethe
same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter
havingfiledacaseagainstrespondentpendingbeforethisCourt. [19]We,however,
cannotacknowledgesuchallegationabsentanyevidenceshowingtheveracityof
suchclaim.NoaffidavitstothateffectweresubmittedbyeitherAtty.Asuncionor
Atty.Lambino.
Nonetheless,thepenaltytobeimposedshouldbetemperedowingtothe
factthatrespondenthadapologizedtothecomplainantandthelatterhadacceptedit.
Thisisnottosay,however,thatrespondentshouldbeabsolvedfromhisactuations.
Peopleareaccountablefortheconsequencesofthethingstheysayanddoevenif
theyrepentafterwards.Thefactremainsthatthingsdonecannotbeundoneand
wordsutteredcannotbetakenback.Hence,heshouldbeartheconsequencesofhis
actions.
Thehighestrewardthatcanbebestowedonlawyersistheesteemoftheir
brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by
artificeorcontrivance.Itisbornofsharpcontextsandthrivesdespiteconflicting
interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the
honorableperformanceofprofessionalduty.[20]
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,respondentisherebyFINEDintheamountof
TENTHOUSAND(P10,000.00)PESOSwithawarningthatanysimilarinfraction
withbedealtwithmoreseverely.LetacopyofthisDecisionbefurnishedtheBar
Confidantforappropriateannotationintherecordoftherespondent.
SOORDERED.
AlcantaravPefianco
ThisisacomplaintagainstAtty.MarianoPefiancoforconductunbecominga
memberofthebarforusingimproperandoffensivelanguageandthreateningand
attemptingtoassaultcomplainant.
Thecomplainant,Atty.AntonioA.Alcantara,istheincumbentDistrictPublic
AttorneyofthePublicAttorneysOfficeinSanJose,Antique.Heallegedthaton
May18,2000,whileAtty.RamonSalvaniIIIwasconferringwithaclientinthe
PublicAttorneysOffice(PAO)attheHallofJusticeinSanJose,Antique,awoman
approachedthem.Complainantsawthewomanintears,whereuponhewenttothe
groupandsuggestedthatAtty.Salvanitalkwithheramicablyasahearingwas
takingplaceinanotherroom.Atthispoint,respondentAtty.MarianoPefianco,who
was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client,
saying,Ngaaginaareglomoina,ipapresoangimongakliyenteparamahibalan
naanangsala.(Whydoyousettlethatcase?Haveyourclientimprisonedsothathe
willrealizehismistake.)
ComplainantsaidhewassurprisedatrespondentPefiancosoutburstandasked
himtocooloff,butrespondentcontinuedtofulminateatAtty.Salvani.Atty.Salvani
triedtoexplaintorespondentthatitwasthewomanwhowasaskingifthecivil
aspectofthecriminalcasecouldbesettledbecauseshewasnolongerinterestedin
prosecutingthesame.Respondentrefusedtolistenandinsteadcontinuedtoscold
Atty.Salvaniandthelattersclient.
AsheadoftheOffice,complainantapproachedrespondentandaskedhimto
takeiteasyandleaveAtty.Salvanitosettlethematter.Respondentatfirstlistened,
butshortlyafterheagainstartedshoutingatandscoldingAtty.Salvani.Toavoid
anyscenewithrespondent,complainantwentinsidehisoffice.Heaskedhisclerkto
putanoticeoutsideprohibitinganyonefrominterferingwithanyactivityinthe
PublicAttorneysOffice.
Complainantsaidthathethenwentouttoattendahearing,butwhenhecame
backheheardrespondentPefiancosaying:NagsilingsiAtty.Alcantarangapagwa
onnakunoakodyasaPAO,buyonngaklasekatawo.(Atty.Alcantarasaidthathe
wouldsendmeoutofthePAO,whatanidiot.)Then,uponseeingcomplainant,
respondentpointedhisfingerathimandrepeatedhisstatementfortheotherpeople
in the office to hear. At this point, according to complainant, he confronted
respondentPefiancoandtoldhimtoobservecivilityorelsetoleavetheofficeifhe
hadnobusinessthere.Complainantsaidrespondentresentedthisandstartedhurling
invectives at him.According to complainant, respondent even took a menacing
stancetowardshim.
Thiscausedacommotionintheoffice.Atty.PepinMarfilandMr.Robert
Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent
Pefianco.Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take respondent out of the
office,butbeforetheycoulddoso,respondenttriedtoattackcomplainantandeven
shoutedathim,Gagoka!(Yourestupid!)Fortunately,theguardswereabletofend
offrespondentsblowandcomplainantwasnotharmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III,
FelizardoDelRosario,Atty.PepinJoeyMarfil,RobertMinguez,HerbertYsulatand
RamonQuintayotocorroboratehisallegations.
InhisCommentandCounterComplaint, respondent Pefianco said that the
sightofthecryingwoman,whosehusbandhadbeenmurdered,movedhimand
prompted him to take up her defense.He said that he resented the fact that
complainanthadorderedanemployee,NapoleonLabonete,toputasignoutside
prohibitingstandbysfromhangingroundinthePublicAttorneysOffice.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the
womanscase,complainant,withhisbodyguard,arrivedandshoutedathimtoget
outofthePublicAttorneysOffice.Heclaimedthattwosecurityguardsalsocame,
and complainant ordered them to take respondent out of the office.Contrary to
complainantsclaims,however,respondentsaidthatitwascomplainantwhomoved
topunchhimandshoutathim,Gagoka!(Yourestupid!)
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint
againstcomplainant.However,thecomplaintwasdismissedbythesaidoffice.
The Committeeon BarDiscipline ofthe IntegratedBar ofthe Philippines
found that respondent committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he
violatedCanon8oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.TheCommitteenoted
thatrespondentfailednotonlytodenytheaccusationsagainsthimbutalsotogive
anyexplanationforhisactions.Forthisreason,itrecommendedthatrespondentbe
reprimandedandwarnedthatrepetitionofthesameactwillbedealtwithmore
severelyinthefuture.
WefindtherecommendationoftheIBPCommitteeonBarDisciplinetobe
welltaken.
 TheevidenceonrecordindeedshowsthatitwasrespondentPefiancowho
provokedtheincidentinquestion.The affidavits of several disinterested persons
confirm complainants allegation that respondent Pefianco shouted and hurled
invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on him
(complainant).

Canon8oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility[1]admonisheslawyersto
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow
lawyers.Lawyersaredutyboundtoupholdthedignityofthelegalprofession.They
mustacthonorably,fairlyandcandidlytowardeachotherandotherwiseconduct
themselveswithoutreproachatalltimes.[2]

Inthiscase,respondentsmeddlinginamatterinwhichhehadnorighttodo
socausedtheuntowardincident.Hehadnorighttodemandanexplanationfrom
Atty.Salvaniwhythecaseofthewomanhadnotorcouldnotbesettled.Evenso,
Atty.Salvaniinfacttriedtoexplainthemattertorespondent,butthelatterinsisted
onhisviewaboutthecase.

Respondentsaidhewasmovedbytheplightofthewomanwhosehusband
hadbeenmurderedasshewaspleadingforthesettlementofhercasebecauseshe
neededthemoney.Bethatasitmay,respondentshouldrealizethatwhathethought
wasrighteousdidnotgivehimtherighttodemandthatAtty.Salvaniandhisclient,
apparentlytheaccusedinthecriminalcase,settlethecasewiththewidow.Even
when he was being pacified, respondent did not relent.Instead he insulted and
beratedthosewhotriedtocalmhimdown.Twoofthewitnesses,Atty.PepinMarfil
andRobertMinguez,whowenttothePublicAttorneysOfficebecausetheyheard
thecommotion,andtwoguardsattheHallofJustice,whohadbeensummoned,
failed to stop respondent from his verbal rampage.Respondent ought to have
realizedthatthissortofpublicbehaviorcanonlybringdownthelegalprofessionin
thepublicestimationanderodepublicrespectforit.Whatevermoralrighteousness
respondenthadwasnegatedbythewayhechosetoexpresshisindignation.An
injusticecannotberightedbyanotherinjustice.

WHEREFORE,Atty.MarianoPefiancoisfoundGUILTYofviolationof
Canon8oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityand,consideringthistobehis
firstoffense,isherebyFINEDintheamountofP1,000.00andREPRIMANDED
withawarningthatsimilaractioninthefuturewillbesanctionedmoreseverely.

SOORDERED.
BarandosvFerrer
Thisadministrativecaseconcernsalawyerwhoisclaimedtohavehurled
invectivesuponanotherlawyerandfiledabaselesssuitagainsthim.
TheFactsandtheCase
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty.BonifacioT.Barandon, Jr. filed a
complaintaffidavit[1]withtheIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesCommissiononBar
Discipline(IBPCBD)seekingthedisbarment,suspensionfromthepracticeoflaw,
or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin
Z.Ferrer,Sr.forthefollowingoffenses:
1.On November 22, 2000 Atty.Ferrer, as plaintiffs
counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to
motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and
improper language which insinuated that
Atty.Barandonpresentedafalsifieddocumentincourt.
2.Atty.Ferrerfiled a fabricated charge against
Atty.Barandonin Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification of
publicdocumentwhenthedocumentallegedlyfalsifiedwasa
notarizeddocumentexecutedonFebruary23,1994,atadate
when Atty.Barandonwas not yet a lawyer nor was assigned
inCamarinesNorte.Thelatterwasnotevenasignatorytothe
document.
3.On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom
ofMunicipalTrialCourt(MTC)Daetbeforethestartofhearing,
Atty.Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened
Atty.Barandonsaying,Labankunglaban,patayankungpataya
n,kasamaanglahatngpamilya.Walanapalangmagalingnaa
bogadosaCamarinesNorte,angabogadonaritoaymgataga
CamarinesSur,umuwinakayosaCamarinesSur,hindikayota
garito.
4.Atty.Ferrermadehisaccusationoffalsificationof
publicdocumentwithoutbotheringtocheckthecopywiththe
OfficeoftheClerkofCourtand,withgrossignoranceofthe
law,failedtoconsiderthatanotarizeddocumentispresumedto
begenuineandauthenticuntilprovenotherwise.
5.The Court had warned Atty.Ferrerin his first
disbarmentcaseagainstrepeatinghisunethicalact;yethefaces
adisbarmentchargeforsexualharassmentofanofficesecretary
oftheIBPChapterinCamarinesNorte;arelatedcriminalcase
foractsoflasciviousness;andcriminalcasesforlibelandgrave
threatsthatAtty.Barandonfiledagainsthim.InOctober2000,
Atty.Ferrerasked Atty.Barandonto falsify the daily time
record of his son who worked with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice.When
Atty.Barandondeclined, Atty.Ferrerrepeatedly harassed him
withinflammatorylanguage.
Atty.Ferrerraisedthefollowingdefensesinhisanswerwithmotiontodismiss:
1.Instead of having the alleged forged document
submittedforexamination,Atty.Barandonfiledchargesoflibel
and grave threats against him.These charges came about
because Atty.Ferrersclients filed a case for falsification of
publicdocumentagainstAtty.Barandon.
2.The offended party in the falsification case,
ImeldaPalatolon,vouchsafedthatherthumbmarkinthewaiver
documenthadbeenfalsified.
3.At the time Atty.Ferrerallegedly uttered the
threateningremarksagainstAtty.Barandon,theMTCDaetwas
alreadyinsession.Itwasimprobablethatthecourtdidnottake
stepstostop,admonish,orciteAtty.Ferrerindirectcontempt
forhisbehavior.
4.Atty.Barandonpresentednoevidenceinsupportof
his allegations that Atty.Ferrerwas drunk on December 19,
2000 andthat hedegraded thelaw profession.Thelatter had
receivedvariouscitationsthatspeakwellofhischaracter.
5.The cases of libel and grave threats that
Atty.Barandonfiled against Atty.Ferrerwere still
pending.Theirmerefilingdidnotmakethelatterguiltyofthe
charges.Atty.Barandonwasforumshoppingwhenhefiledthis
disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave
threatssubjectofthecriminalcases.
Inhisreplyaffidavit,[2]Atty.Barandonbroughtupasixthgroundfordisbarment.He
allegedthatonDecember29,2000atabout1:30p.m.,whileAtty.Ferrerwason
board hissons taxi, itfigured ina collisionwith atricycle, resulting inserious
injuries to the tricycles passengers.[3]But neither Atty.Ferrernor any of his co
passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he denied
knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk.
Atty.Ferreralso prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the
authorities.[4]
Atty.Barandonclaimed that the falsification case against him had already been
dismissed.HebelittledthecitationsAtty.Ferrerallegedlyreceived.Onthecontrary,
initsResolution001,[5]theIBPCamarinesNorteChapteropposedhisapplication
toserveasjudgeoftheMTCofMercedes,CamarinesSur,onthegroundthathedid
nothavethequalifications,integrity,intelligence,industryandcharacterofatrial
judgeandthathewasfacingacriminalchargeforactsoflasciviousnessanda
disbarmentcasefiledbyanemployeeofthesameIBPchapter.
OnOctober10,2001InvestigatingCommissionerMilagrosV.SanJuanoftheIBP
CBDsubmittedtothisCourtaReport,recommendingthesuspensionfortwoyears
ofAtty.Ferrer.TheInvestigatingCommissionerfoundenoughevidenceonrecord
toproveAtty.FerrersviolationofCanons8.01and7.03oftheCodeofProfessional
Responsibility.HeattributedtoAtty.Barandon,ascounselinCivilCase7040,the
falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the
documenthadinfactbeenfalsifiedandthatAtty.Barandonwasapartytoit.The
Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty.Ferreruttered the threatening
remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and
litigantsbeforethestartofhearing.
OnJune29,2002theIBPBoardofGovernorspassedResolutionXV2002225,
[6]
adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but
reducedthepenaltyofsuspensiontoonlyoneyear.
Atty.FerrerfiledamotionforreconsiderationbuttheBoarddenieditin
itsResolution[7]ofOctober19,2002onthegroundthatithadalreadyendorsedthe
mattertotheSupremeCourt.OnFebruary5,2003,however,theCourtreferredback
thecasetotheIBPforresolutionofAtty.Ferrersmotionforreconsideration.[8]On
May22,2008theIBPBoardofGovernorsadoptedandapprovedtheReportand
Recommendation[9]of the Investigating Commissioner that denied
Atty.Ferrersmotionforreconsideration.[10]
OnFebruary17,2009,Atty.FerrerfiledaCommentonBoardofGovernorsIBP
NoticeofResolutionNo.XVIII2008.[11]OnAugust12,2009theCourtresolvedto
treatAtty.FerrerscommentasapetitionforreviewunderRule139oftheRevised
Rules of Court.Atty.Barandonfiled his comment,[12]reiterating his arguments
before the IBP.Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts
inCamarinesNortethatwarnedAtty.Ferreragainstappearingincourtdrunk.[13]
TheIssuesPresented
Theissuespresentedinthiscaseare:
1.WhetherornottheIBPBoardofGovernorsandtheIBPInvestigating
CommissionererredinfindingrespondentAtty.Ferrerguiltyofthechargesagainst
him;and
2.If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is
justified.
TheCourtsRuling
Wehaveexaminedtherecordsofthiscaseandfindnoreasontodisagreewiththe
findingsandrecommendationoftheIBPBoardofGovernorsandtheInvestigating
Commissioner.
Thepracticeoflawisaprivilegegiventolawyerswhomeetthehighstandardsof
legalproficiencyandmorality.Anyviolationofthesestandardsexposesthelawyer
toadministrativeliability.[14]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to
conductthemselveswithcourtesy,fairnessandcandortowardstheirfellowlawyers
andavoidharassingtacticsagainstopposingcounsel.Specifically,inRule8.01,the
Codeprovides:
Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwiseimproper.
Atty.FerrersactionsdonotmeasureuptothisCanon.Theevidenceshowsthathe
imputedtoAtty.BarandonthefalsificationoftheSalaysayAffidavitoftheplaintiff
in Civil Case 7040.He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no
evidencethattheaffidavithadbeenfalsifiedandthatAtty.Barandonauthoredthe
same.
 Moreover, Atty.Ferrercouldhave airedhis chargeof falsificationin a
properforumandwithoutusingoffensiveandabusivelanguageagainstafellow
lawyer.Toquoteportionsofwhathesaidinhisreplywithmotiontodismiss:
1.That the answer is fraught with grave and
culpable misrepresentation and FALSIFICATION of
documents,committedtomisleadthisHonorableCourt,but
with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for
Defendants,fordistortionandseriousmisrepresentationto
thecourt,forpresentingagrosslyFALSIFIEDdocument,in
violationofhisoathofofficeasagovernmentemployeeand
as member of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff,
IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the
SALAYSAYAFFIDAVIT,whereinherfingerprinthasbeen
falsified,inviewwhereof,herebyDENYthesameincluding
the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or
informationtoformabeliefastothetruthofthesame,from
pars.(1)topar.(15)whichareallliesandmerefabrications,
sufficientgroundforDISBARMENToftheoneresponsible
forsaidfalsificationanddistortions.[15]
TheCourthasconstantlyremindedlawyerstousedignifiedlanguagein
theirpleadingsdespitetheadversarialnatureofourlegalsystem.[16]
Atty.Ferrerhad likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibilitywhichenjoinslawyerstoupholdthedignityandintegrityofthelegal
professionatalltimes.Rule7.03oftheCodeprovides:
Rule7.03.A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adverselyreflectonhisfitnesstopracticelaw,norshallhe,
whether in public or private life behave in scandalous
mannertothediscreditofthelegalprofession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty.Ferrersdrunken invectives at
Atty.Barandonshortlybeforethestartofacourthearing.Atty.Ferrerdidnotpresent
convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge.He merely
presentedacertificationfromthepolicethatitsblotterforthedaydidnotreportthe
threathesupposedlymade.Atty.Barandonpresented,however,thepoliceblotteron
asubsequentdatethatrecordedhiscomplaintagainstAtty.Ferrer.
Atty.Ferrersaid,Labankunglaban,patayankungpatayan,kasamaanglahatngpa
milya.WalanapalangmagalingnaabogadosaCamarinesNorte,angabogadona
ritoaymgatagaCamarinesSur,umuwinakayosaCamarinesSur,hindikayotaga
rito.Evidently,heutteredthesewithintenttoannoy,humiliate,incriminate,and
discreditAtty.Barandoninthepresenceoflawyers,courtpersonnel,andlitigants
waitingforthestartofhearingincourt.Theselanguageisunbecomingamemberof
thelegalprofession.TheCourtcannotcountenanceit.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
alwaysbedignifiedandrespectful,befittingthedignityofthelegalprofession.The
useofintemperatelanguageandunkindascriptionshasnoplaceinthedignityof
judicialforum.[17]Atty.Ferreroughttohaverealizedthatthissortofpublicbehavior
canonlybringdownthelegalprofessioninthepublicestimationanderodepublic
respectforit.WhatevermoralrighteousnessAtty.Ferrerhadwasnegatedbythe
wayhechosetoexpresshisindignation.
ContrarytoAtty.Ferrersallegation,theCourtfindsthathehasbeenaccordeddue
process.Theessenceofdueprocessistobefoundinthereasonableopportunityto
beheardandsubmitanyevidenceonemayhaveinsupportofonesdefense. [18]So
longasthepartiesaregiventheopportunitytoexplaintheirside,therequirementsof
due process are satisfactorily complied with.[19]Here, the IBP Investigating
CommissionergaveAtty.Ferreralltheopportunitiestofilecountlesspleadingsand
refutealltheallegationsofAtty.Barandon.
Alllawyersshouldtakeheedthattheyarelicensedofficersofthecourtswhoare
mandatedtomaintainthedignityofthelegalprofession,hencetheymustconduct
themselves honorably and fairly.[20]Atty.Ferrersdisplay of improper attitude,
arrogance,misbehavior,andmisconductintheperformanceofhisdutiesbothasa
lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent
transgressionoftheveryethicsthatlawyersaresworntouphold.
ACCORDINGLY,theCourtAFFIRMStheMay22,2008ResolutionoftheIBP
BoardofGovernorsinCBDCase01809andORDERSthesuspensionofAtty.
EdwinZ.Ferrer,Sr.fromthepracticeoflawforoneyeareffectiveuponhisreceipt
ofthisDecision.
LetacopyofthisDecisionbeenteredinAtty.Ferrerspersonalrecordas
anattorneywiththeOfficeoftheBarConfidantandacopyofthesamebeservedto
theIBPandtotheOfficeoftheCourtAdministratorforcirculationtoallthecourts
intheland.
SOORDERED.

SanchezvAguilos
ComplainantNenitaD.SanchezhaschargedrespondentAtty.RomeoG.Aguilos
(respondent)withmisconductforthelatter'srefusaltoreturntheamountof
P70,000.00shehadpaidforhisprofessionalservicesdespitehisnothaving
performedthecontemplatedprofessionalservices.SheaversthatinMarch2005,she
soughtthelegalservicesoftherespondenttorepresentherintheannulmentofher
marriagewithherestrangedhusband,JovencioC.Sanchez;thattherespondent
acceptedtheengagement,fixinghisfeeatP150,000.00,plustheappearancefeeof
P5,000.00/hearing;thatshethengavetohimtheinitialamountofP90,000.00;1that
shehadgonetohisresidenceinMay2005toinquireonthedevelopmentsinher
case,buthetoldherthathewouldonlystartworkingonthecaseuponherfull
paymentoftheacceptancefee;thatshehadonlylearnedthenthatwhathehad
contemplatedtofileforherwasapetitionforlegalseparation,notoneforthe
annulmentofhermarriage;thathefurthertoldherthatshewouldhavetopaya
higheracceptancefeefortheannulmentofhermarriage;2thatshesubsequently
withdrewthecasefromhim,andrequestedtherefundoftheamountsalreadypaid,
butherefusedtodothesameashehadalreadystartedworkingonthecase;3thatshe
hadsenthimaletter,throughAtty.IsidroS.C.Martinez,todemandthereturnofher
paymentlesswhateveramountcorrespondedtothelegalserviceshehadalready
performed;4thattherespondentdidnotheedherdemandletterdespitehisnot
havingrenderedanyappreciablelegalservicestoher;5andthathisconstantrefusal
toreturntheamountspromptedhertobringanadministrativecomplaintagainst
him6intheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines(IBP)onMarch20,2007.
InhisanswerdatedMay21,2007,7therespondentallegesthatthecomplainantand
herBritishfianceesoughthislegalservicestobringthepetitionfortheannulmentof
hermarriage;thatbasedonhisevaluationofhersituation,themoreappropriatecase
wouldbeoneforlegalseparationanchoredonthepsychologicalincapacityofher
husband;thatsheandherBritishfianceeagreedonP150,000.00forhislegal
servicestobringtheactionforlegalseparation,withthefianceepayinghim
P70,000.00,asevidencedbyhishandwrittenreceipt;8thatforpurposesofthe
petitionforlegalseparationherequiredthecomplainanttosubmitcopiesofher
marriagecontractandthebirthcertificatesofherchildrenwithherhusband,aswell
asforhertosubmittofurtherinterviewsbyhimtoestablishthegroundsforlegal
separation;thathelateroncommunicatedwithherandherfianceeuponfinalizing
thepetition,buttheydidnotpromptlyrespondtohiscommunications;thatinMay
2005,sheadmittedtohimthatshehadspentthemoneythatherfianceehadgivento
paythebalanceofhisprofessionalfees;andthatinJune2005,shereturnedtohim
withanoteatthebackofthepreparedpetitionforlegalseparationessentially
requestinghimnottofilethepetitionbecauseshehadmeanwhileoptedtobringthe
actionfortheannulmentofhermarriageinstead.
TherespondentadmitsthathereceivedthedemandletterfromAtty.Martinez,but
statesthathedismissedtheletterasamerescrapofpaperbecausethedemand
lackedbasisinlaw.ItisnotedthathewroteinthelastpartofhisanswerdatedMay
21,2007inrelationtothedemandletterthefollowing:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence,respondentaccordinglytreatedthesaidletterdemandforrefunddated15
August2005(Annex"B"ofthecomplaint)asamerescrapofpaperorshouldhave
been addressed by her counselATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ,
whounskillfullyrelied on anunverifiedinformation furnished him, to the urinal
project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful
purpose.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
FindingsandRecommendationoftheIBP
TheIBPCommissiononBarDiscipline(IBPCBD)summonedthepartiestoa
mandatoryconferenceonAugust3,2007,10butonlythecomplainantandher
counselattendedtheconference.Onhispart,therespondentsentaletterdatedJuly
20,2007totheIBPCBDtoreiteratehisanswer.11Duetohisnonappearance,the
IBPCBDterminatedtheconferenceonthesameday,butrequiredthecomplainant
tosubmitaverifiedpositionpaperwithin10days.Shedidnotsubmittheposition
paperintheend.
Inhiscommissioner'sreportdatedJuly25,2008,12IBPInvestigatingCommissioner
JoseI.DeLaRama,Jr.declaredthattherespondent'sinsistencethathecouldhave
broughtapetitionforlegalseparationbasedonthepsychologicalincapacityofthe
complainant'shusbandwassanctionablebecausehehimselfwasapparentlynot
conversantwiththegroundsforlegalseparation;thatbecauseherenderedsome
legalservicestothecomplainant,hewasentitledtoreceiveonlyP40,000.00outof
theP70,000.00paidtohimasacceptancefee,theP40,000.00beingthevalueofthe
servicesrenderedundertheprincipleofquantummeruit;andthat,accordingly,he
shouldbemadetoreturntohertheamountofP30,000.00.
IBPInvestigatingCommissionerDeLaRama,Jr.observedthattherespondent's
statementinthelastpartofhisanswer,totheeffectthatthedemandlettersentby
Atty.Martinezinbehalfofthecomplainantshouldbetreatedasascrapofpaper,or
shouldhavebeenaddressed"totheurinalprojectoftheMMDAwhereitmayserve
itsrightfulpurpose,"wasuncalledforandimproper;andheopinedthatsuch
offensiveandimproperlanguageutteredbytherespondentagainstafellowlawyer
violatedRule8.0113oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.
IBPInvestigatingCommissionerDeLaRama,Jr.ultimatelyrecommendedas
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 TheundersignedCommissionerismostrespectfullyrecommendingthefollowing:
(1) ToordertherespondenttoreturntothecomplainanttheamountofP30,000.00
whichhereceivedforthepurposeofpreparingapetitionforlegalseparation.
Undersignedbelievesthatconsideringthedegreeofprofessionalserviceshe
hasextended,theamountofP40,000.00hereceivedonMarch10,2005would
besufficientpaymentforthesame.
(2) Forfailuretodistinguishbetweenthegroundsforlegalseparationand
annulmentofmarriage,respondentshouldbesanctioned.
(3) Lastly,forfailuretoconducthimselfwithcourtesy,fairnesstowardshis
colleaguesandforusingoffensiveorimproperlanguageinhispleading,which
wasfiledrightbeforetheCommissiononBarDiscipline,hemustalsobe
sanctionedanddisciplinedinordertoavoidrepetitionofthesaidmisconduct.
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,itismostrespectfullyrecommendedthat
Atty.RomeoG.AguilosbeorderedtoreturntocomplainantNenitaD.Sanchezthe
amount of P30,000.00 which the former received as payment for his services
because it is
ItisalsorecommendedthattheAtty.RomeoG.Aguilosbesuspendedfromthe
practiceoflawforaperiodofsix(6)monthsforfailuretoshowhisrespecttohis
fellowlawyerandforusingoffensiveandimproperlanguageinhispleadings.
ThroughResolutionNo.XVIII2008476datedSeptember20,2008,14theIBP
BoardofGovernorsaffirmedthefindingsofInvestigatingCommissionerDeLa
Rama,Jr.,butmodifiedtherecommendationofthepenalty,viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVEDtoADOPTandAPPROVE,asitisherebyunanimouslyADOPTED
AND APPROVED,with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this
ResolutionasAnnex"A",and,findingtherecommendationfullysupportedbythe
evidenceonrecordandtheapplicablelawsandrules,andconsideringrespondent's
failuretoshowrespecttohisfellowlawyerandforshowingoffensiveandimproper
wordsinhispleadings,Atty.RomeoG.Aguilos,isherebyWARNEDandOrdered
toReturntheThirtyThousand(P30,000.00)Pesostocomplainantwithinthirty(30)
daysfromreceiptofnotice.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Therespondentfiledamotionforreconsideration,16whichtheIBPBoardof
GovernorsdeniedthroughResolutionNo.XXI2014177datedMarch23,2014.17
Issues
Thetwoissuesforconsiderationandresolutionare:(a)whetherornotthe
respondentshouldbeheldadministrativelyliableformisconduct;and(b)whetheror
notheshouldbeorderedtoreturntheattorney'sfeespaid.
RulingoftheCourt
WeadoptandaffirmResolutionNo.XVIII2008476andResolutionNo.XXI
2014177,butmodifytherecommendedpenalty.
1.
Respondentwasliableformisconduct,andheshouldbeorderedtoreturnthe
entireamountreceivedfromtheclient
Therespondentofferedhimselftothecomplainantasalawyerwhohadtherequisite
excessive. professionalcompetenceandskilltohandletheactionfortheannulmentofmarriage
forher.HerequiredhertopayP150,000.00asattorney'sfees,exclusiveofthefiling
feesandhisappearancefeeofP5,000.00/hearing.Ofthatamount,hereceivedthe
sumofP70,000.00.
Ontherespondent'sconductofhimselfinhisprofessionalrelationshipwiththe
complainantashisclient,wereiterateandadoptthethoroughanalysisandfindings
byIBPInvestigatingCommissionerDeLaRama,Jr.tobeveryaptandcogent,viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
AsappearinginAnnex"4",whichisthehandwrittenretainer'scontractbetweenthe
respondent and the complainant, there is a sweeping evidence that there is an
attorneyclientrelationship.Therespondentagreedtoacceptthecaseintheamount
ofP150,000.00.Theacceptancefeewasagreedupontobepaidoninstallmentbasis.
Excludedintheagreementisthepaymentofappearancefee,filingfeeandother
legal documentation.
ThatnextquestionisforwhatcasetheP150,000.00wasintendedfor?Wasit
intended for the filing of the annulment case or legal separation?
IntheverifiedAnswerfiledbytherespondent,eventhelatterisquiteconfusedasto
whatactionheisgoingtofileincourt.TheintentionoftheBritishnationalandthe
complainantwastogetmarried.Atthattimeandmaybeuptonow,thecomplainant
isstilllegallymarriedtoacertainJovencioC.Sanchez.Thatconsideringthatthe
twoareintendingtogetmarried,wecansafelyassumethatthecomplainantwas (h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;
contemplatingoffilingapetitionforannulmentofmarriageinordertofreeherfrom
themarriagebondwithherhusband.Itisonlythen,grantingthatthepetitionwillbe (i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or
granted,thatthecomplainantwillbefreetomarrytheBritishsubject.Thelegal
separationisbutaseparationofhusbandandwifefromboardandbedandthe (j)Abandonmentofpetitionerbyrespondentwithoutjustifiablecauseformorethan
marriage bondstill exists. Grantingthat thepetition forlegal separationwill be oneyear.
granted, one is not free to marry another person. Psychologicalincapacity,contrarytowhatrespondentexplainedtothecomplainant,
is not one of those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal separation.
Areadingoftheanswerfiledbytherespondentwouldshowthathehimselfisnot
wellversedinthegroundsforlegalseparation.Hestatedthefollowing; EveninArticle55oftheFamilyCodeofthePhilippines,psychologicalincapacityis
...respondentsuggestedtothemtofileinsteadalegalseparationcaseforthe never a ground for the purpose of filing a petition for legal separation.
allegedpsychological incapacityof her husband to comply with his marital
obligationsdevelopedoroftheirmarriageonFebruary6,1999.(pleaseseepar.2of Ontheotherhand,psychologicalincapacityhasalwaysbeenusedforthepurposeof
theAnswer). filing a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage.
Iftheintentionwastofileapetitionforlegalseparation,underA.M.021111SC,
the grounds are as follows: That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
Sec. 2. Petition psychologicallyincapacitatedtocomplywiththeessentialmaritalobligationsof
marriage,shalllikewisebevoidevenifsuchincapacitybecomesmanifestonlyafter
(a)Whomayandwhentofile(1)Apetitionforlegalseparationmaybefiledonly its solemnization."
bythehusbandorthewife,asthecasemaybe,withinfiveyearsfromthetimeof
the occurrence of any of the following causes: That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in
continuing legal education program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the Responsibility)inordertopreventrepetitionofsuchkindofadvisethatrespondent
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish
betweenthegroundsforlegalseparationandgroundsforannulmentofmarriage.
(b)Physicalviolenceormoralpressuretocompelthepetitionertochangereligious Butastherespondentstatedinhisanswer,itappearsthatheismixedupwiththe
or political affiliation; basicprovisionsofthelaw.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly,therespondentmisrepresentedhisprofessionalcompetenceandskilltothe
(c)Attemptofrespondenttocorruptorinducethepetitioner,acommonchild,ora complainant.Astheforegoingfindingsreveal,hedidnotknowthedistinction
childofthepetitioner,toengageinprostitution,orconnivanceinsuchcorruptionor betweenthegroundsforlegalseparationandforannulmentofmarriage.Such
inducement; knowledgewouldhavebeenbasicandexpectedofhimasalawyeracceptinga
professionalengagementforeithercausesofaction.Hisexplanationthattheclient
(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six initiallyintendedtopursuetheactionforlegalseparationshouldbedisbelieved.The
years, even if pardoned; caseunquestionablycontemplatedbythepartiesandforwhichhisserviceswas
engaged,wasnootherthananactionforannulmentofthecomplainant'smarriage
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; withherhusbandwiththeintentionofmarryingherBritishfiancee.Theydidnot
contemplatelegalseparationatall,forlegalseparationwouldstillrenderher
(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent; incapacitatedtoremarry.Thattherespondentwasinsistinginhisanswerthathe
hadpreparedapetitionforlegalseparation,andthatshehadtopaymoreas
(g)Contractingbytherespondentofasubsequentbigamousmarriage,whetherinor attorney'sfeesifshedesiredtohavetheactionforannulmentwas,therefore,beyond
outside the Philippines; comprehensionotherthantoserveasahallowafterthoughttojustifyhisclaimfor
servicesrendered.

Assuch,therespondentfailedtoliveuptothestandardsimposedonhimasan
attorney.HethustransgressedCanon18,andRules18.01,18.02and18.03of
theCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,towit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON18ALAWYERSHALLSERVEHISCLIENTWITHCOMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
Rules18.01Alawyershallnotundertakealegalservieewhichheknowsor
shouldknowthatheisnotqualifiedtorender.However,hemayrendersuch
serviceif,withtheconsentofhisclient,hecanobtainascollaboratingcounsela
lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule18.03Alawyershallnotneglectalegalmatterentrustedtohim,andhis
negligenceinconnectiontherewithshallrenderhimliable.(Emphasissupplied)
Thenexttobedealtwithisthematteroftheattorney'sfees.Wecaneasilyagreethat
everyattorneyisentitledtohaveandreceiveajustandreasonablecompensationfor
servicesperformedatthespecialinstanceandrequestofhisclient.Aslongasthe
attorneyisingoodfaithandhonestlytryingtorepresentandservetheinterestsof
theclient,heshouldhaveareasonablecompensationforsuchservices.19
Theattorney'sfeesshallbethosestipulatedintheretainer'sagreementbetweenthe
clientandtheattorney,whichconstitutesthelawbetweenthepartiesforaslongasit
isnotcontrarytolaw,goodmorals,goodcustoms,publicpolicyorpublic
order.20Theunderlyingtheoryisthattheretainer'sagreementbetweenthemgivesto
theclientthereasonablenoticeofthearrangementonthefees.Oncetheattorneyhas
performedthetaskassignedtohiminavalidagreement,hiscompensationis
determinedonthebasisofwhatheandtheclientagreed.21Intheabsenceofthe
writtenagreement,thelawyer'scompensationshallbebasedonquantummeruit,
whichmeans"asmuchashedeserved."22Thedeterminationofattorney'sfeesonthe
basisofquantummeruitisalsoauthorized"whenthecounsel,forjustifiablecause,
wasnotabletofinishthecasetoitsconclusion."23Moreover,quantum
meruitbecomesthebasisofrecoveryofcompensationbytheattorneywherethe
circumstancesoftheengagementindicatethatitwillbecontrarytotheparties'
expectationtodeprivetheattorneyofallcompensation.
Nevertheless,thecourtshalldetermineineverycasewhatisreasonable
compensationbasedontheobtainingcircumstances,24providedthattheattorney
doesnotreceivemorethanwhatisreasonable,inkeepingwithSection24ofRule
138oftheRulesofCourt,towit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section24.Compensationofattorneys;agreementastofeesAnattorneyshallbe
entitledtohaveandrecoverfromhisclientnomorethanareasonablecompensation
for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy,theextentoftheservicesrendered,andtheprofessionalstandingofthe
attorney.Nocourtshallbeboundbytheopinionofattorneysasexpertwitnessesas
to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its
conclusiononitsownprofessionalknowledge.Awrittencontractforservicesshall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionableorunreasonable.
Thecourtssupervisionofthelawyer'scompensationforlegalservicesrenderedis
notonlyforthepurposeofensuringthereasonablenessoftheamountofattorney's
feescharged,butalsoforthepurposeofpreservingthedignityandintegrityofthe
legalprofession.25cralawred
Therespondentshouldnothaveacceptedtheengagementbecauseasitwaslater
revealed,itwaswayabovehisabilityandcompetencetohandlethecasefor
annulmentofmarriage.Asaconsequence,hehadnobasistoacceptanyamountas
attorney'sfeesfromthecomplainant.Hedidnotevenbegintoperformthe
contemplatedtaskheundertookforthecomplainantbecauseitwasimprobablethat
theagreementwithherwastobringtheactionforlegalseparation.Hishaving
supposedlypreparedthepetitionforlegalseparationinsteadofthepetitionfor
annulmentofmarriagewaseitherhiswayofcoveringupforhisincompetence,or
hismeansofcharginghermore.Eitherwaydidnotentitlehimtoretaintheamount
hehadalreadyreceived.
ThewrittenreceiptdatedMarch10,2005showsthattherespondentreceived
P70,000.00asacceptancefee.Hisrefusaltoreturntheamounttothecomplainant
restedonhisclaimofhavingalreadycompletedthefirstphaseofthepreparationof
thepetitionforlegalseparationafterhavingheldconferenceswiththecomplainant
andherBritishfiancee.Inthisrespect,IBPInvestigatingCommissionDelaRama,
Jr.opinedthattherespondentcouldretainP40,000.00oftheP70,000.00becausethe
respondenthadrenderedsomelegalservicestothecomplainant,specifically:(a)
havingthecomplainantundergofurtherinterviewstowardsestablishingtheground
forlegalseparation;(b)reducingintowritingthegroundsdiscussedduringthe
interviewsbasedonherstatementinherowndialect(Annexes1and2)afterhe
couldnotunderstandthewrittenstatementpreparedforthepurposebyherBritish
fiancee;(c)requiringhertosubmithermarriagecontractwithherhusbandJovencio
C.Sanchez(Annex3),andthecertificatesoflivebirthofherfourchildren:Mary
Joy,Timothy,Christine,andJanetteAnne,allsurnamedSanchez(Annexes4,5,6
and7);and(d)finalizingherpetitionforlegalseparation(Annex8)inthelaterpart
ofApril,2007.

TheopinionofIBPInvestigatingCommissionDelaRama,Jr.infavorofthe
respondentwastoogenerous.Wecannotseehowtherespondentdeservedany
compensationbecausehedidnotreallybegintoperformthecontemplatedtasksif,
evenbasedonhisversion,hewouldpreparethepetitionforlegalseparationinstead
ofthepetitionforannulmentofmarriage.Theattorneywhofailstoaccomplishthe
tasksheshouldnaturallyandexpectedlyperformduringhisprofessional
engagementdoesnotdischargehisprofessionalresponsibilityandethicalduty
towardhisclient.Therespondentwasthusguiltyofmisconduct,andmaybe
sanctionedaccordingtothedegreeofthemisconduct.Asaconsequence,hemaybe
orderedtorestitutetotheclienttheamountreceivedfromthelatterinconsideration
oftheprofessionalengagement,subjecttotheruleonquantummeruit,ifwarranted.
Accordingly,therespondentshallbefinedintheamountofP10,000.00forhis
misrepresentationofhisprofessionalcompetence,andheisfurthertobeorderedto
returntheentireamountofP70,000.00receivedfromtheclient,pluslegalinterestof
6%perannumreckonedfromthedateofthisdecisionuntilfullpayment.
2.
Respondentdidnotconducthimselfwithcourtesy,fairnessandcandortowards
hisprofessionalcolleague
TheRulesofCourtmandatesmembersofthePhilippineBarto"abstainfromall
offensivepersonalityandtoadvancenofactprejudicialtothehonororreputationof
apartyorwitness,unlessrequiredbythejusticeofthecausewithwhichheis
charged."26ThisdutyoflawyersisfurtheremphasizedintheCodeofProfessional
Responsibility,whoseCanon8provides:"Alawyershallconducthimselfwith
courtesy,fairnessandcandortowardhisprofessionalcolleagues,andshallavoid
harassingtacticsagainstopposingcounsel."Rule8.01ofCanon8specifically
demandsthat:"Alawyershallnot,inhisprofessionaldealings,uselanguagewhich
isabusive,offensiveorotherwiseimproper."
TheCourtrecognizestheadversarialnatureofourlegalsystemwhichhas
necessitatedlawyerstousestronglanguageintheadvancementoftheinterestof
theirclients.27However,asmembersofanobleprofession,lawyersarealways
impressedwiththedutytorepresenttheirclients'cause,or,asinthiscase,to
representapersonalmatterincourt,withcourageandzealbutthatshouldnotbe
usedaslicensefortheuseofoffensiveandabusivelanguage.Inmaintainingthe
integrityanddignityofthelegalprofession,alawyer'slanguagespokenorinhis
pleadingsmustbedignified.28Assuch,everylawyerismandatedtocarryouthis
dutyasanagentintheadministrationofjusticewithcourtesy,dignityandrespect
notonlytowardshisclients,thecourtandjudicialofficers,butequallytowardshis
colleaguesintheLegalProfession.
Therespondent'sstatementinhisanswerthatthedemandfromAtty.Martinez
shouldbetreated"asamerescrapofpaperorshouldhavebeenaddressedbyher
counselxxxtotheurinalprojectoftheMMDAwhereitmayserviceitsrightful
purpose"constitutedsimplemisconductthatthisCourtcannottolerate.
Inhismotionforreconsideration,therespondenttriedtojustifytheoffensiveand
improperlanguagebyassertingthatthephraseologywasnotperseuncalledforand
improper.Heexplainedthathehadsufficientcauseformaintainingthatthedemand
lettershouldbetreatedasamerescrapofpaperandshouldbedisregarded.
However,hisassertiondoesnotexcusetheoffensivenessandimproprietyofhis
language.Hecouldhaveeasilybeenrespectfulandproperinrespondingtothe
letter.
Aspenaltyforthisparticularmisconduct,heisreprimanded,withthesternwarning
thatarepetitionoftheoffensewillbeseverelypunished.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE,theCourtAFFIRMStheResolutionNo.XVIII2008476dated
September20,2008oftheIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesBoardofGovernors,
withtheMODIFICATIONthatAtty.RomeoG.Aguilosis
herebyFINEDP10,000.00formisrepresentinghisprofessionalcompetencetothe
client,andREPRIMANDShimforhisuseofoffensiveandimproperlanguage
towardshisfellowattorney,withthesternwarningthatarepetitionoftheoffense
shallbeseverelypunished.
TheCourtORDERSAtty.RomeoG.AguilostoRETURNtothecomplainant
withinthirty(30)daysfromnoticethesumofP70,000.00,pluslegalinterestof
6%perannumreckonedfromthedateofthisdecisionuntilfullpayment.
LetcopiesofthisdecisionbeattachedtothepersonalrecordsofAtty.RomeoG.
AguilosasamemberofthePhilippineBar,andbefurnishedtotheOfficeoftheBar
Confidant,theIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesandtheOfficeoftheCourt
Administratorforproperdisseminationtoallcourtsthroughoutthecountry.
SOORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
CamachovPangulayan
RespondentlawyersstandindictedforaviolationoftheCodeofProfessionalEthics,
specificallyCanon9thereof,viz:
"Alawyershouldnotinanywaycommunicateuponthesubject
ofcontroversywithapartyrepresentedbycounsel,muchless
shouldheundertaketonegotiateorcompromisethematterwith
him,butshouldonlydealwithhiscounsel.Itisincumbentupon
thelawyermostparticularlytoavoideverythingthatmaytendto
misleadapartynotrepresentedbycounselandheshouldnot
undertaketoadvisehimastolaw."barth
Atty.ManuelN.Camachofiledacomplaintagainstthelawyerscomprisingthe
PangulayanandAssociatesLawOffices,namely,AttorneysLuisMeinradoC.
Pangulayan,ReginaD.Balmores,CatherineV.Laurel,andHerbertJoaquinP.
Bustos.Complainant,thehiredcounselofsomeexpelledstudentsfromtheAMA
ComputerCollege("AMACC"),inanactionfortheIssuanceofaWritof
PreliminaryMandatoryInjunctionandforDamages,docketedCivilCaseNo.Q97
30549oftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch78,ofQuezonCity,chargedthat
respondents,thencounselforthedefendants,procuredandeffectedonseparate
occasions,withouthisknowledge,compromiseagreements("ReAdmission
Agreements")withfourofhisclientsintheaforementionedcivilcasewhich,in
effect,requiredthemtowaiveallkindsofclaimstheymighthavehadagainst
AMACC,theprincipaldefendant,andtoterminateallcivil,criminaland
administrativeproceedingsfiledagainstit.Complainantaverredthatsuchanactof
respondentswasunbecomingofanymemberofthelegalprofessionwarranting
eitherdisbarmentorsuspensionfromthepracticeoflaw.
Inhiscomment,AttorneyPangulayanacknowledgedthatnotoneofhisco
respondentshadtakenpartinthenegotiation,discussion,formulation,orexecution
ofthevariousReAdmissionAgreementscomplainedofandwere,infact,nolonger
connectedatthetimewiththePangulayanandAssociatesLawOffices.TheRe
AdmissionAgreements,heclaimed,hadnothingtodowiththedismissalofCivil
CaseQ9730549andwereexecutedforthesolepurposeofeffectingthesettlement
ofanadministrativecaseinvolvingninestudentsofAMACCwhowereexpelled
therefromupontherecommendationoftheStudentDisciplinaryTribunal.The
students,namely,IanDexterMarquez,AlmiraO.Basalo,NeilJasonR.Salcedo,
MelissaF.Domondon,MelydaB.DeLeon,LeilaD.Joven,SignorelliA.Santiago,
MichaelEjercito,andCleoB.Villareiz,,wereallmembersoftheEditorialBoardof
DATALINE,whoapparentlyhadcausedtobepublishedsomeobjectionable
featuresorarticlesinthepaper.The3memberStudentDisciplinaryTribunalwas
immediatelyconvened,andafteraseriesofhearings,itfoundthestudentsguiltyof
theuseofindecentlanguageandunauthorizeduseofthestudentpublicationfunds.
Thebodyrecommendedthepenaltyofexpulsionagainsttheerringstudents.Jksm
ThedenialoftheappealmadebythestudentstoDr.AmableR.AguiluzV,
AMACCPresident,gaverisetothecommencementofCivilCaseNo.Q9730549
on14thMarch1997beforetheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch78,ofQuezonCity.
Whilethecivilcasewasstillpending,lettersofapologyandReAdmission
Agreementswereseparatelyexecutedbyand/orinbehalfofsomeoftheexpelled
students,towit:LetterofApology,dated27May1997,ofNeilJasonSalcedo,
assistedbyhismother,andReAdmissionAgreementof22June1997withthe
AMACCPresident;letterofapology,dated31March1997,ofMrs.VeronicaB.De
LeonforherdaughterMelydaB.DeLeonandReAdmissionAgreementof09May
1997withtheAMACCPresident;letterofapology,dated22May1997,ofLeila
Joven,assistedbyhermother,andReAdmissionAgreementof22May1997with
theAMACCPresident;letterofapology,dated22September1997,ofCleo
VillareizandReAdmissionAgreementof10October1997withtheAMACC
President;andletterofapology,dated20January1997,ofMichaelEjercito,assisted
byhisparents,andReAdmissionAgreementof23January1997withtheAMACC
President.
FollowingtheexecutionofthelettersofapologyandReAdmissionAgreements,a
Manifestation,dated06June1997,wasfiledwiththetrialcourtwherethecivilcase
waspendingbyAttorneyReginaD.BalmoresofthePangulayanandAssociates
LawOfficesfordefendantAMACC.Acopyofthemanifestationwasfurnished
complainant.InhisResolution,dated14June1997,JudgeLopezoftheQuezonCity
RegionalTrialCourtthereupondismissedCivilCaseNo.Q9730549.
On19June1999,theBoardofGovernorsoftheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines
("IBP")passedResolutionNo.XIII99163,thus:
"RESOLVEDtoADOPTandAPPROVE,asitishereby
ADOPTEDandAPPROVED,theReportandRecommendation
oftheInvestigatingCommissionerintheaboveentitledcase,
hereinmadepartofthisResolution/DecisionasAnnex'A,'and,
findingtherecommendationfullysupportedbytheevidenceon
recordandtheapplicablelawsandrules,withanamendment
Atty.MeinradoPangulayanissuspendedfromthepracticeof
lawforSIX(6)MONTHSforbeingremissinhisdutyand
DISMISSALofthecaseagainsttheotherRespondentsforthey
didnottakepartinthenegotiationofthecase."Chief
ItwouldappearthatwhentheindividuallettersofapologyandReAdmission
Agreementswereformalized,complainantwasbythenalreadytheretainedcounsel
forplaintiffstudentsinthecivilcase.RespondentPangulayanhadfullknowledgeof
thisfact.Althoughawarethatthestudentswererepresentedbycounsel,respondent
attorneyproceeded,nonetheless,tonegotiatewiththemandtheirparentswithoutat
theveryleastcommunicatingthemattertotheirlawyer,hereincomplainant,who
wascounselofrecordinCivilCaseNo.Q9730549.Thisfailureofrespondent,
whetherbydesignorbecauseofoversight,isaninexcusableviolationofthecanons
ofprofessionalethicsandinutterdisregardofadutyowingtoacolleague.
Respondentfellshortofthedemandsrequiredofhimasalawyerandasamember
oftheBar.
TheallegationthatthecontextoftheReAdmissionAgreementscentersonlyonthe
administrativeaspectofthecontroversyisbeliedbytheManifestation[1]which,
amongotherthings,explicitlycontainedthefollowingstipulation;viz:
"1.......Amongthenine(9)signatoriestothecomplaint,four(4)
ofwhomassistedbytheirparents/guardianalreadyexecuteda
ReAdmissionAgreementwithAMACCPresident,AMABLE
R.AGUILUZVacknowledgingguiltforviolatingtheAMA
COMPUTERCOLLEGEMANUALFORDISCIPLINARY
ACTIONSandagreedamongotherstoterminateallcivil,
criminalandadministrativeproceedingswhichtheymayhave
againsttheAMACCarisingfromtheirpreviousdismissal.Esm
"xxx......xxx......xxx
"3.Consequently,assoonaspossible,anUrgentMotionto
WithdrawfromCivilCaseNo.Q9730549willbyfiledthem."
TheCourtcanonlythusconcurwiththeIBPInvestigatingCommissionandtheIBP
BoardofGovernorsintheirfindings;nevertheless,therecommendedsixmonth
suspensionwouldappeartobesomewhattooharshapenaltygiventhe
circumstancesandtheexplanationofrespondent.
WHEREFORE,respondentAtty.LuisMeinradoC.Pangulayanisordered
SUSPENDEDfromthepracticeoflawforaperiodofTHREE(3)MONTHS
effectiveimmediatelyuponhisreceiptofthisdecision.Thecaseagainsttheother
respondentsisDISMISSEDforinsufficiencyofevidence.
Letacopyofthisdecisionbeenteredinthepersonalrecordofrespondentasan
attorneyandasamemberoftheBar,andfurnishedtheBarConfidant,theIntegrated
BarofthePhilippinesandtheCourtAdministratorforcirculationtoallcourtsinthe
country.
SOORDERED.
SpousesSuarezvSalazar
Considering respondents Motion to expunge All Pleadings Filed by Atty.
Filemon A. Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court and to
Dismiss the Petition and said Atty. Manangans admission at the hearing this
morning, September 29, 1999, that he is not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the
Philippines, and that he is the same Filemon A. Manangan who was found by this
Court G.R. No. 82760 (Filemon Manangan v. Court of First Instance of Nueva
Viscaya, Branch 28) decided on August 30, 1990, to be in reality Andres Culanag
who is not a member of the Philippine Bar, but despite these facts he has continued
to misrepresent himself to be an attorney-at-law and has appeared as counsel for
petitioners in this case, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who is in reality Andres
Culanag, is hereby declared guilty of indirect contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he
is hereby sentenced to three (3) months imprisonment to be served at the
Headquarters of the National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila, until
further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED
AguirrevRana
BeforeoneisadmittedtothePhilippineBar,hemustpossesstherequisite
moralintegrityformembershipinthelegalprofession.Possessionofmoralintegrity
isofgreaterimportancethanpossessionoflegallearning.Thepracticeoflawisa
privilegebestowedonlyonthemorallyfit.Abarcandidatewhoismorallyunfit
cannotpracticelawevenifhepassesthebarexaminations.
 TheFacts
RespondentEdwinL.Rana(respondent)wasamongthosewhopassedthe
2000BarExaminations.
On21May2001,onedaybeforethescheduledmassoathtakingofsuccessful
barexamineesasmembersofthePhilippineBar,complainantDonnaMarieAguirre
(complainant) filed against respondent aPetition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar.Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct,violationoflaw,andgravemisrepresentation.
TheCourtallowedrespondenttotakehisoathasamemberoftheBarduring
the scheduled oathtaking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International
ConventionCenter.However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the
RollofAttorneyspendingtheresolutionofthechargeagainsthim.Thus,respondent
tookthelawyersoathonthescheduleddatebuthasnotsignedtheRollofAttorneys
uptonow.
Complainantchargesrespondentforunauthorizedpracticeoflawandgrave
misconduct.Complainantallegesthatrespondent,whilenotyetalawyer,appeared
ascounselforacandidateintheMay2001electionsbeforetheMunicipalBoardof
ElectionCanvassers(MBEC)ofMandaon,Masbate.Complainantfurtherallegesthat
respondentfiledwiththeMBECapleadingdated19May2001entitledFormal
ObjectiontotheInclusionintheCanvassingofVotesinSomePrecinctsforthe
OfficeofViceMayor.Inthispleading,respondentrepresentedhimselfascounselfor
andinbehalfofViceMayoraltyCandidate,GeorgeBunan,andsignedthepleading
ascounselforGeorgeBunan(Bunan).
Onthechargeofviolationoflaw,complainantclaimsthatrespondentisa
municipalgovernmentemployee,beingasecretaryoftheSangguniangBayanof
Mandaon,Masbate.Assuch,respondentisnotallowedbylawtoactascounselfora
clientinanycourtoradministrativebody.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accusesrespondentofactingascounselforvicemayoraltycandidateGeorgeBunan
(Bunan)withoutthelatterengagingrespondentsservices.Complainantclaimsthat
respondentfiledthepleadingasaploytopreventtheproclamationofthewinning
vicemayoraltycandidate.
On22May2001,theCourtissuedaresolutionallowingrespondenttotakethe
lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is
cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondenttocommentonthecomplaintagainsthim.
InhisComment,respondentadmitsthatBunansoughthisspecificassistance
torepresenthimbeforetheMBEC.Respondentclaimsthathedecidedtoassistand
adviceBunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.Respondent
admitssigningthe19May2001pleadingthatobjectedtotheinclusionofcertain
votesinthecanvassing.Heexplains,however,thathedidnotsignthepleadingasa
lawyerorrepresentedhimselfasanattorneyinthepleading.
OnhisemploymentassecretaryoftheSangguniangBayan,respondentclaims
thathesubmittedhisresignationon11May2001whichwasallegedlyacceptedon
thesamedate.HesubmittedacopyoftheCertificationofReceiptofRevocable
Resignationdated28May2001signedbyViceMayorNapoleonRelox.Respondent
further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainantisthedaughterofSilvestreAguirre,thelosingcandidateformayorof
Mandaon,Masbate.Respondentpraysthatthecomplaintbedismissedforlackof
meritandthathebeallowedtosigntheRollofAttorneys.
On22June2001,complainantfiledherReplytorespondentsCommentand
refutedtheclaimofrespondentthathisappearancebeforetheMBECwasonlyto
extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001
EmilyEstiponaHao(EstiponaHao)filedapetitionforproclamationasthewinning
candidateformayor.RespondentsignedascounselforEstiponaHaointhispetition.
WhenrespondentappearedascounselbeforetheMBEC,complainantquestioned
hisappearanceontwogrounds:(1)respondenthadnottakenhisoathasalawyer;
and(2)hewasanemployeeofthegovernment.
RespondentfiledaReply(Re:ReplytoRespondentsComment)reiteratinghis
claimthattheinstantadministrativecaseismotivatedmainlybypoliticalvendetta.
On17July2001,theCourtreferredthecasetotheOfficeoftheBarConfidant
(OBC)forevaluation,reportandrecommendation.
OBCsReportandRecommendation
TheOBCfoundthatrespondentindeedappearedbeforetheMBECascounsel
forBunanintheMay2001elections.TheminutesoftheMBECproceedingsshow
thatrespondentactivelyparticipatedintheproceedings.TheOBClikewisefound
thatrespondentappearedintheMBECproceedingsevenbeforehetookthelawyers
oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a
seriousdoubtonhismoralfitnesstobeamemberoftheBar.TheOBCalsobelieves
thatrespondentsunauthorizedpracticeoflawisagroundtodenyhisadmissionto
the practice of law.The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admissiontothePhilippineBar.
Ontheothercharges,OBCstatedthatcomplainantfailedtocitealawwhich
respondentallegedlyviolatedwhenheappearedascounselforBunanwhilehewas
agovernmentemployee.Respondentresignedassecretaryandhisresignationwas
accepted.Likewise,respondentwasauthorizedbyBunantorepresenthimbeforethe
MBEC.
TheCourtsRuling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engagedintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawandthusdoesnotdeserveadmissionto
thePhilippineBar.
Respondenttookhisoathaslawyeron22May2001.However,therecords
showthatrespondentappearedascounselforBunanpriorto22May2001,before
respondenttookthelawyersoath.InthepleadingentitledFormalObjectiontothe
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice
Mayordated19May2001,respondentsignedascounselforGeorgeBunan.Inthe
first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was
the(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
GEORGET.BUNAN.BunanhimselfwrotetheMBECon14May2001thathehad
authorizedAtty.EdwinL.RanaashiscounseltorepresenthimbeforetheMBEC
andsimilarbodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily EstiponaHao also retained
respondentashercounsel.Onthesamedate,14May2001,ErlyD.Haoinformed
theMBECthatAtty.EdwinL.RanahasbeenauthorizedbyREFORMALMPPC
asthelegalcounselofthepartyandthecandidateofthesaidparty.Respondent
himselfwrotetheMBECon14May2001thathewasenteringhisappearanceas
counselforMayoraltyCandidateEmilyEstiponaHaoandfortheREFORMA
LMPPC.On19May2001,respondentsignedascounselforEstiponaHaointhe
petitionfiledbeforetheMBECprayingfortheproclamationofEstiponaHaoasthe
winningcandidateformayorofMandaon,Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath.Clearly,
respondentengagedinthepracticeoflawwithoutbeingamemberofthePhilippine
Bar.
InPhilippineLawyersAssociationv.Agrava,[1]theCourtelucidatedthat:
Thepracticeoflawisnotlimitedtotheconductofcasesorlitigationincourt;it
embracesthepreparationofpleadingsandotherpapersincidenttoactionsand
specialproceedings,themanagementofsuchactionsandproceedingsonbehalfof
clientsbeforejudgesandcourts,andinaddition,conveyancing.Ingeneral,
alladvicetoclients,andallactiontakenfortheminmattersconnectedwiththe
law,incorporationservices,assessmentandcondemnationservicescontemplatingan
appearancebeforeajudicialbody,theforeclosureofamortgage,enforcementofa
creditor'sclaiminbankruptcyandinsolvencyproceedings,andconducting
proceedingsinattachment,andinmattersofestateandguardianshiphavebeenheld
toconstitutelawpractice,asdothepreparationanddraftingoflegal
instruments,wheretheworkdoneinvolvesthedeterminationbythetrainedlegal
mindofthelegaleffectoffactsandconditions.(5Am.Jur.p.262,263).(Italics
supplied)xxx
InCayetano v. Monsod,[2]the Court held that practice of law means any
activity,inoroutofcourt,whichrequirestheapplicationoflaw,legalprocedure,
knowledge,trainingandexperience.Toengageinthepracticeoflawistoperform
actswhichareusuallyperformedbymembersofthelegalprofession.Generally,to
practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledgeorskill.
Verily,respondentwasengagedinthepracticeoflawwhenheappearedinthe
proceedingsbeforetheMBECandfiledvariouspleadings,withoutlicensetodoso.
Evidenceclearlysupportsthechargeofunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.Respondent
calledhimselfcounselknowingfullywellthathewasnotamemberoftheBar.
Havingheldhimselfoutascounselknowingthathehadnoauthoritytopracticelaw,
respondenthasshownmoralunfitnesstobeamemberofthePhilippineBar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege.Itislimitedtopersonsofgoodmoralcharacterwithspecialqualifications
dulyascertainedandcertified.Theexerciseofthisprivilegepresupposespossession
ofintegrity,legalknowledge,educationalattainment,andevenpublictrust [4]sincea
lawyer is an officer of the court.A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilegethatcanbewithheldevenfromonewhohaspassedthebarexaminations,
ifthepersonseekingadmissionhadpracticedlawwithoutalicense.[5]
Theregulationofthepracticeoflawisunquestionablystrict.InBeltran,Jr.v.
Abad,[6]acandidate passedthe barexaminations buthad nottaken hisoath and
signedtheRollofAttorneys.Hewasheldincontemptofcourtforpracticinglaw
evenbeforehisadmissiontotheBar.UnderSection3(e)ofRule71oftheRulesof
Court,apersonwhoengagesintheunauthorizedpracticeoflawisliableforindirect
contemptofcourt.[7]
 True,respondentherepassedthe2000BarExaminationsandtookthelawyers
oath.However,itisthesigningintheRollofAttorneysthatfinallymakesonea
fullfledged lawyer.The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial.Passingthebarisnottheonlyqualificationtobecomeanattorneyat
law.[8]Respondentshouldknowthattwoessentialrequisitesforbecomingalawyer
stillhadtobeperformed,namely:hislawyersoathtobeadministeredbythisCourt
andhissignatureintheRollofAttorneys.[9]
Onthechargeofviolationoflaw,complainantcontendsthatthelawdoesnot
allowrespondenttoactascounselforaprivateclientinanycourtoradministrative
bodysincerespondentisthesecretaryoftheSangguniangBayan.
RespondenttenderedhisresignationassecretaryoftheSangguniangBayan
priortotheactscomplainedofasconstitutingunauthorizedpracticeoflaw.Inhis
letterdated11May2001addressedtoNapoleonRelox,vicemayorandpresiding
officeroftheSangguniangBayan,respondentstatedthathewasresigningeffective
upon your acceptance.[10]ViceMayor Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.[11]Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that
respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
SangguniangBayan.
Onthechargeofgravemisconductandmisrepresentation, evidence shows
thatBunanindeedauthorizedrespondenttorepresenthimashiscounselbeforethe
MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonethelesshadnoauthoritytopracticelaw.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
PhilippineBar.
SOORDERED.
AlawivAlauya
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator)ofE.B.Villarosa&PartnersCo.,Ltd.ofDavaoCity,arealestateand
housingcompany.AshariM.Alauyaistheincumbentexecutiveclerkofcourtofthe
4thJudicialShari'aDistrictinMarawiCity.Theywereclassmates,andusedtobe
friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchaseoninstallmentsbyAlauyaofoneofthehousingunitsbelongingtothe
above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
MortgageFinanceCorporation(NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya
addressedalettertothePresidentofVillarosa&Co.advisingoftheterminationof
hiscontractwiththecompany.Hewrote:
"**Iamformallyandofficiallywithdrawingfromandnotifyingyouofmyintent
toterminatetheContract/Agreemententeredintobetweenmeandyourcompany,as
representedbyyourSalesAgent/Coordinator,SOPHIAALAWI,ofyourcompany's
branchofficehereinCagayandeOroCity,onthegroundsthatmyconsentwas
vitiatedbygrossmisrepresentation,deceit,fraud,dishonestyandabuseof
confidencebytheaforesaidsalesagentwhichmadesaidcontractvoidabinitio.Said
salesagentactinginbadfaithperpetratedsuchillegalandunauthorizedactswhich
madesaidcontractanOnerousContractprejudicialtomyrightsandinterests."
Hethenproceededtoexpoundinconsiderabledetailandquiteacerbiclanguageon
the"groundswhichcouldevidencethebadfaith,deceit,fraud,misrepresentation,
dishonestyandabuseofconfidencebytheunscrupuloussalesagent**;"andclosed
withthepleathatVillarosa&Co."agreeforthemutualrescissionofourcontract,
evenasIinformyouthatIcategoricallystateonrecordthatIamterminatingthe
contract**.IhopeIdonothavetoresorttoanylegalactionbeforesaidonerousand
manipulatedcontractagainstmyinterestbeannulled.Iwasactuallyfooledbyyour
salesagent,hencetheneedtoannulthecontroversialcontract."
AlauyasentacopyofthelettertotheVicePresidentofVillarosa&Co.atSan
Pedro,Gusa,CagayandeOroCity.Theenvelopecontainingit,andwhichactually
wentthroughthepost,borenostamps.Insteadattherighthandcornerabovethe
descriptionoftheaddressee,thewords,"FreePostagePD26,"hadbeentyped.
Onthesamedate,December15,1995,AlauyaalsowrotetoMr.FerminT.
Arzaga,VicePresident,Credit&CollectionGroupoftheNationalHomeMortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as
fraudulentandvoidhiscontractwithVillarosa&Co.;andaskingforcancellationof
hishousingloaninconnectiontherewith,whichwaspayablefromsalarydeductions
attherateofP4,338.00amonth.Amongotherthings,hesaid:
"**(T)hroughthiswrittennotice,Iamterminating,asIherebyannul,cancel,
rescindandvoided,the'manipulatedcontract'enteredintobetweenmeandtheE.B.
Villarosa&PartnerCo.,Ltd.,asrepresentedbyitssalesagent/coordinator,SOPHIA
ALAWI,whomaliciouslyandfraudulentlymanipulatedsaidcontractand
unlawfullysecuredandpursuedthehousingloanwithoutmyauthorityandagainst
mywill.Thus,thecontractitselfisdeemedtobevoidabinitioinviewofthe
attendingcircumstances,thatmyconsentwasvitiatedbymisrepresentation,fraud,
deceit,dishonesty,andabuseofconfidence;andthattherewasnomeetingofthe
mindsbetweenmeandtheswindlingsalesagentwhoconcealedtherealfactsfrom
me."
And,asinhislettertoVillarosa&Co.,henarratedinsomedetailwhathetooktobe
theanomalousactuationsofSophiaAlawi.
AlauyawrotethreeotherletterstoMr.ArzagaoftheNHMFC,datedFebruary
21,1996,April15,1996,andMay3,1996,inallofwhich,forthesamereasons
alreadycited,heinsistedonthecancellationofhishousingloananddiscontinuance
ofdeductionsfromhissalaryonaccountthereof.aHealsowroteonJanuary18,1996
toMs.CorazonM.Ordoez,HeadoftheFiscalManagement&BudgetOffice,andto
theChief,FinanceDivision,bothofthisCourt,tostopdeductionsfromhissalaryin
relationtotheloaninquestion,againassertingtheanomalousmannerbywhichhe
wasallegedlydupedintoenteringintothecontractsby"theschemingsalesagent."b
TheupshotwasthatinMay,1996,theNHMFCwrotetotheSupremeCourt
requestingittostopdeductionsonAlauya'sUHLPloan"effectiveMay1996,"and
began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buyback of** (Alauya's)
mortgage,and**therefundof**(his)payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,
SophiaAlawifiledwiththisCourtaverifiedcomplaintdatedJanuary25,1996to
which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope
bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1]In that complaint, she
accusedAlauyaof:
1."Imputationofmaliciousandlibelouschargeswithnosolidgroundsthrough
manifestignoranceandevidentbadfaith;"
2."Causingundueinjuryto,andblemishingherhonorandestablishedreputation;"
3."Unauthorizedenjoymentoftheprivilegeoffreepostage**;"and
4.Usurpationofthetitleof"attorney,"whichonlyregularmembersofthe
PhilippineBarmayproperlyuse.
ShedeploredAlauya'sreferencestoheras"unscrupulous,swindler,forger,
manipulator,etc."without"evenabitofevidencetocloth(sic)hisallegationswith
theessenceoftruth,"denouncinghisimputationsasirresponsible,"allconcoctions,
lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and
asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent.SheclosedwiththepleathatAlauya"bedismissedfromtheservice,or
beappropriatelydisciplined(sic)**"
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.
Conformablywithestablishedusagethatnoticesofresolutionsemanatefromthe
correspondingOfficeoftheClerkofCourt,thenoticeofresolutioninthiscasewas
signedbyAtty.AlfredoP.Marasigan,AssistantDivisionClerkofCourt.[2]
Alauyafirstsubmitteda"PreliminaryComment"[3]inwhichhequestionedthe
authorityofAtty.Marasigantorequireanexplanationofhim,thispowerpertaining,
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an
ExecutiveClerkofCourt."butonlytotheDistrictJudge,theCourtAdministratoror
theChiefJustice,andvoicedthesuspicionthattheResolutionwastheresultofa
"stronglink"betweenMs.AlawiandAtty.Marasigan'soffice.Healsoaverredthat
thecomplainthadnofactualbasis;Alawiwasenviousofhimforbeingnotonly"the
ExecutiveClerkofcourtandexofficioProvincialSheriffandDistrictRegistrar,"
butalso"ascionofaRoyalFamily**."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less
aggressive,evenobsequioustones,[5]Alauyarequestedtheformertogivehimacopy
ofthecomplaintinorderthathemightcommentthereon. [6]Hestatedthathisactsas
clerkofcourtweredoneingoodfaithandwithintheconfinesofthelaw;andthat
SophiaAlawiassalesagentofVillarosa&Co.had,byfalsifyinghissignature,
fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions
ofP4,333.10fromhissalary.
AndinhiscommentthereaftersubmittedunderdateofJune5,1996,Alauya
contendedthatitwashewhohadsuffered"undueinjury,mentalanguish,sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months,atotalofP26,028.60hadbeendeductedfromhissalary.[7]Hedeclaredthat
therewasnobasisforthecomplaint;incommunicatingwithVillarosa&Co.hehad
merelyactedindefenseofhisrights.Hedeniedanyabuseofthefrankingprivilege,
saying that he gaveP20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrustedwiththemailingofcertainletters;thatthewords:"FreePostagePD26,"
weretypewrittenontheenvelopebysomeotherperson,anavermentcorroborated
bytheaffidavitofAbsamenC.Domocao,ClerkIV(subscribedandsworntobefore
respondenthimself,andattachedtothecommentasAnnexJ); [8]andasfarashe
knew,hissubordinatemailedtheletterswiththeuseofthemoneyhehadgivenfor
postage,andifthoseletterswereindeedmixedwiththeofficialmailofthecourt,
thishadoccurredinadvertentlyandbecauseofanhonestmistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexicallysynonymous"with"Counsellorsatlaw,"atitletowhichShari'alawyers
have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term
"consial,"connotingalocallegislatorbeholdentothemayor.Withal,hedoesnot
considerhimselfalawyer.
HepleadsfortheCourt'scompassion,allegingthatwhathedid"isexpectedof
any man unduly prejudiced and injured."[10]He claims he was manipulated into
reposinghistrustinAlawi,aclassmateandfriend. [11]Hewasinducedtosignablank
contractonAlawi'sassurancethatshewouldshowthecompleteddocumenttohim
laterforcorrection,butshehadsinceavoidedhim;despite"numerouslettersand
followups"hestilldoesnotknowwherethepropertysubjectofhissupposed
agreementwithAlawi'sprincipal,Villarosa&Co.issituated; [12]HesaysAlawi
somehowgothisGSISpolicyfromhiswife,andalthoughshepromisedtoreturnit
thenextday,shedidnotdosountilafterseveralmonths.Healsoclaimsthatin
connectionwithhiscontractwithVillarosa&Co.,Alawiforgedhissignatureon
suchpertinentdocumentsasthoseregardingthedownpayment,clearance,layout,
receiptofthekeyofthehouse,salarydeduction,noneofwhichheeversaw.[13]
Averringinfinethathisactsinquestionweredonewithoutmalice,Alauya
praysforthedismissalofthecomplaintforlackofmerit,itconsistingof"fallacious,
malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the
Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being
apparentanddemonstrable.
Itmaybementionedthatincontrasttohistwo(2)letterstoAssistantClerkof
CourtMarasigan(datedApril19,1996andApril22,1996),andhistwo(2)earlier
lettersbothdatedDecember15,1996allofwhichhesignedas"Atty.AsharyM.
Alauya"inhisCommentofJune5,1996,hedoesnotusethetitlebutrefersto
himselfas"DATUASHARYM.ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation,reportandrecommendation.[14]
ThefirstaccusationagainstAlauyaisthatinhisaforesaidletters,hemade
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifestignoranceandevidentbadfaith,"resultingin"undueinjuryto(her)and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had
writteninteraliathat:
1)Alawiobtainedhisconsenttothecontractsinquestion"bygross
misrepresentation,deceit,fraud,dishonestyandabuseofconfidence;"
2)Alawiactedinbadfaithandperpetrated**illegalandunauthorizedacts****
prejudicialto**(his)rightsandinterests;"
3)Alawiwasan"unscrupulous(and"swindling")salesagent"whohadfooledhim
by"deceit,fraud,misrepresentation,dishonestyandabuseofconfidence;"and
4)AlawihadmaliciouslyandfraudulentlymanipulatedthecontractwithVillarosa
&Co.,andunlawfullysecuredandpursuedthehousingloanwithout**(his)
authorityandagainst**(his)will,"and"concealedtherealfacts**."
Alauya'sdefenseessentiallyisthatinmakingthesestatements,hewasmerely
actingindefenseofhisrights,anddoingonlywhat"isexpectedofanymanunduly
prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights,
woundedfeelingsanduntoldfinancialsuffering,"consideringthatinsixmonths,a
totalofP26,028.60hadbeendeductedfromhissalary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713)interaliaenunciates the State policy of promoting a high
standardofethicsandutmostresponsibilityinthepublicservice. [16]Section4ofthe
Codecommandsthat"(p)ublicofficialsandemployees**atalltimesrespectthe
rightsofothers,and**refrainfromdoingactscontrarytolaw,goodmorals,good
customs,publicpolicy,publicorder,publicsafetyandpublicinterest." [17]Morethan
oncehasthisCourtemphasizedthat"theconductandbehaviorofeveryofficialand
employeeofanagencyinvolvedintheadministrationofjustice,fromthepresiding
judgetothemostjuniorclerk,shouldbecircumscribedwiththeheavyburdenof
responsibility.Theirconductmustatalltimesbecharacterizedby,amongothers,
strictproprietyanddecorumsoastoearnandkeeptherespectofthepublicforthe
judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customsorpublicpolicy,orrespectfortherightsofothers,tocouchdenunciations
ofactsbelievedhoweversincerelytobedeceitful,fraudulentormalicious,in
excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently
convincedthathehasarightofactionagainstSophiaAlawi.Thelawrequiresthat
heexercisethatrightwithpropriety, without malice or vindictiveness, orundue
harmtoanyone;inamannerconsistentwithgoodmorals,goodcustoms,public
policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyonehisdue,andobservehonestyandgoodfaith."[19]Righteousindignation,or
vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
namecalling.AsamemberoftheShari'aBarandanofficerofaCourt,Alawiis
subjecttoastandardofconductmorestringentthanformostothergovernment
workers.Asamanofthelaw,hemaynotuselanguagewhichisabusive,offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20]As a judicial employee, it is
expectedthatheaccordrespectforthepersonandtherightsofothersatalltimes,
and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy,dignity.Hisradicaldeviationfromthesesalutarynormsmightperhapsbe
mitigated,butcannotbeexcused,byhisstronglyheldconvictionthathehadbeen
grievouslywronged.
AsregardsAlauya'suseofthetitleof"Attorney,"thisCourthasalreadyhad
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not fullfledged
membersofthePhilippineBar,hencemayonlypracticelawbeforeShari'acourts.
[21]
WhileonewhohasbeenadmittedtotheShari'aBar, and one who has been
admittedtothePhilippineBar,maybothbeconsidered"counsellors,"inthesense
thattheygivecounseloradviceinaprofessionalcapacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." Thetitleof"attorney" is reserved to those who, havingobtainedthe
necessarydegreeinthestudyoflawandsuccessfullytakentheBarExaminations,
havebeenadmittedtotheIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesandremainmembers
thereofingoodstanding;anditistheyonlywhoareauthorizedtopracticelawin
thisjurisdiction.
Alauyasayshedoesnotwishtousethetitle,"counsellor"or"counsellorat
law,"becauseinhisregion,therearepejorativeconnotationstotheterm,oritis
confusinglysimilartothatgiventolocallegislators.Theratiocination,validornot,
isofnomoment.Hisdisinclinationtousethetitleof"counsellor"doesnotwarrant
hisuseofthetitleofattorney.
Finally,respectingAlauya'sallegedunauthorizeduseofthefrankingprivilege,
therecordcontainsnoevidenceadequatelyestablishingtheaccusation.
WHEREFORE,respondentAshariM.AlauyaisherebyREPRIMANDED
fortheuseofexcessivelyintemperate,insultingorvirulentlanguage,i.e.,language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warnedthatanysimilarorotherimproprietyormisconductinthefuturewillbe
dealtwithmoreseverely.
SOORDERED.
HALILIvCIR
BeforeUsforresolutionistheurgentmotiontociteAtty.BenjaminC.Pineda,
RicardoCapunoandManilaBank(CubaoBranch)incontemptforthealleged
continuedfailureofaforenamedpartiestocomplywiththetemporarymandatory
restrainingorderissuedbythisCourtonSeptember1,1983andwiththeresolution
datedSeptember13,1983whichagaindirectedAtty.Pinedaandunion
administratorCapunotocomplywiththeaforesaidmandatoryrestrainingorderand
whichorderedtheManilaBanktotransferthefundsallocatedfortheworkerstothe
NLRC(p.376,L24864,rec.;p.301,L027773rec.).
Theissuanceofthetemporarymandatoryrestrainingorderstemmedfromthe
questionedordersofSeptember23,1982andFebruary9,1983issuedbyLabor
ArbiterRaymundoValenzuelainCaseNo.1099VbeforetheNLRCwhichorders
respectivelyallowedthesaleofthepropertyawardedtosatisfyoranswerforthe
claimsoftheunionmembersinthesefourcasesandauthorizedthedistributionof
theproceedsofthepurchase.
Forabetterappreciationoftheaforesaidmotionforcontempt,Wemustrecall
certainprefatoryfactswhichtheSolicitorGeneralhassoaptlysummedup.Thus:
Theaboveentitledcasesinvolvedisputesregardingclaimsfor
overtimeofmorethanfivehundredbusdriversandconductors
ofHaliliTransit.Litigationinitiallycommencedwiththefiling
ofacomplaintforovertimewiththedefunctCourtofIndustrial
RelationsonAugust20,1958docketedasCIRCaseNo.1099
V.Thedisputeswereeventuallysettledwhenthecontending
partiesreachedanAgreementonDecember23,1974,the
pertinentportionsofwhichareasfollows:
WHEREAS,inthefaceofthisstrongurgingonthepartofthe
SupremeCourtJusticesuponthepartiestoputanimmediateend
tothiscasebyamicablesettlement,thepartiesrepeatedlycame
toconference,conscientiouslyexploredallavenuesof
settlement,andfinallyarrivedatthetentativeagreement
(tentativebecauseoftheconditionthatthesamebesanctioned
bythecourtintheestatecase)wherebytheAdministratrix
wouldtransfertotheemployeestitletothattractofland,
coveredbyTCTNo.36389,containinganareaofapproximately
33,952squaremeters,situatedintheBarrioofSanBartolome,
MunicipalityofCaloocan,ProvinceofRizal,andpayinaddition
thecashamountofP25,000.00infullandfinalsatisfactionofall
theclaimsandcausesofactionofalloftheemployeesagainst
theestateofFortunatoF.HalilisubjectofCIRCaseNo.1099
V.
xxxxxxxxx
NOW,THEREFORE,forandinconsiderationoftheforegoing
andofthecovenants,stipulationsandundertakingshereinafter
contained,thepartieshaveagreedasfollows:
l.TheUNION,itsofficersandmembersclaimantsrelativeto
CIRCaseNo.1099V,shallwithdrawanddismisswith
prejudiceCaseNo.1099VfiledbytheUNIONinbehalfofits
membersclaimantsbeforetheCourtofIndustrialRelationsand
allitsincidentsthereto.
2.TheESTATEshalldeliverorcausetobedelivered,tothe
UNIONthefollowing:
(a)DeedofTransferofaparceloflandsituatedinBarrioSan
Bartolome,CaloocanCity,containinganareaofTHIRTY
THREETHOUSANDNINEHUNDREDFIFTYTWO
(33,952)SquareMeters,moreorless,andcoveredbyTransfer
CertificateofTitleNo.35389oftheRegistryofDeedsofRizal,
tobemade,uponauthorityandapprovalgrantedbytheCourtof
FirstofRizal,BranchIV,atQuezonCity,inProc.No.Q10852
inthenameoftheHaliliBusDrivers&ConductorsUnion
(PTGWO),freefromanyandallliensencumbrances,andany
andallclaimswhatsoever.
(b)NegotiableCheckforTWENTYFIVETHOUSAND
(P25,000.00)PESOSinthenameofDomingoD.Cabading,
PresidentoftheUNION.
3.Thetransferoftheabovedescribedparceloflandandreceipt
oftheamountofP25,000.00constitutethefullandfinal
satisfactionoftheclaimsandawardinsaidCIRCaseNo.1099
V,aswellasanyandallattorney'sliensinsaidcase,forandin OnAugust9,1982,theUnion,throughAtty.BenjaminC.
considerationofwhichtheUNIONmembersclaimantsinCIR
CaseNo.1099Vbythesepresentnowandforeverreleaseand
quitclaimHaliliEnterprises,HaliliTransit,FortunatoF.Halili
hisestate,heirsandsuccessorsbyreasonofCIRCaseNo.1099
V,itbeingtheirintentionthattheybeabsolutely,completely
andfinallyabsolvedandreleasedfromanyandallliabilityin
saidcase,includingattorneys'liensthetransferoftheproperty
andpaymentoftheamounthereinabovestatedconstitutingfor
allintentsandpurposesafull,finalandcompletesettlementand
satisfactionoftheawardinCIRCaseNo.1099Vandall
incidentsthereto.
4.TheUNIONanditsundersignedofficersherebywarrantthat
theUNIONisadulyregisteredlabororganizationandthatina
specialmeetingcalledforthepurposetheyweredulyauthorized
onDecember22,1974,byallthemembersclaimantsinCIR
CaseNo.1099VtosignthisMemorandumofAgreementwith
ReleaseandQuitclaimwhichwasunanimouslyapprovedand
ratifiedbysaidmembersclaimantsasevidencedbyaResolution
datedDecember22,1974,acopyofwhichisattachedhereto
andmadeaparthereofasAnnex"B",andherebyjointlyand
severallyholdtheestateandheirsofFortunatoF.Halilifreeand
harnessfrom,andundertaketoindemnifythemfor,anyandall
liabilityforanyclaimsbymembersoftheUNION,theirheirs,
assignsandagentsrelatingtoCIRCaseNo.1099Vor
attorneys'liensinconnectiontherewith(69SCRA509510).
OnJanuary6,1975,pursuanttotheAgreement,the
administratrixoftheestateofFortunatoF,Haliliexecuteda
DeedofConveyanceofRealProperty,transferringthe
aforementionedparceloflandtotheHaliliBusandConductors
Union(PTGWO)intrustforthemembersoftheunion
claimants.Theparceloflandwaseventuallyregisteredinthe
nameoftheUniononFebruary14,1975.Hence,onFebruary
10,1976,thecontendingpartiesmovedforthedismissalofG.R.
No.L30110andG.R.No.L38655,whichthisHonorable
CourtgrantedonFebruary27,1976(69SCRA505).Thetwo
othercases,G.R.No.L24864andG.R.No.L27773,were
previouslydisposedofonFebruary26,1968andDecember28,
1970,respectively(22SCRA785.and36SCRA522).
Pineda,filedanurgentmotionwiththeMinistryofLaborand
Employment(MOLE)requestingforauthoritytoselland
disposeoftheproperty.Themotionwasgrantedinanorder
datedSeptember23,1982.Aprospectivebuyer,theManila
MemorialParkCemetery,inc.expresseditsmisgivingsonthe
authorityoftheUniontosellthepropertyinviewofsec.66of
PD1529whichrequiresnolessthananorderfromacourtof
 competentjurisdictionasauthoritytosellpropertyintrust.So,
Atty.PinedafiledamotionwiththeSupremeCourton
December1,1982requestingforauthoritytoselltheproperty,
ThisHonorableCourt,however,merelynotedthemotionina
resolutiondatedDecember8,1982.
Nevertheless,Atty.Pineda,withoutauthorityfromtheSupreme
Courtbutrelyingontheearlierauthoritygivenhimbythe
MinistryofLabor,filedanotherurgentmotionwiththelatter,
prayingthattheUnionbeauthorizedtosellthelottotheManila
MemorialParkCemetery,Inc.andtomakearrangementswithit
suchthatpaymentwillbeadvancedfortherealestatetaxes
inclusiveofpenalties,attorney'slienwhichisequivalenttoa
thirtyfivepercent(35%)ofthetotalpurchaseprice,andhome
developer'sfeeofP69,000.00.Apparently,theprospective
purchaserhaddecidedtowithdrawitsobjectionregardingthe
Union'sauthoritytosell.InanOrderdatedFebruary9,1983,
LaborArbiterRaymundoR.Valenzuelagrantedthemotion.So,
thesalewasfinallyconsummatedonJune7,1983,resultingin
theexecutionofanescrowagreementonJune8,1983wherein
thepurchasepricewasdepositedunderescrowwiththeManila
BankCubaoBranch.TheBankthenreleasedtheamountsdue
theclaimantsinaccordancewiththeescrowagreement"(pp.
352356,L24864rec.).
ThedispositiveportioninL24864isrestatedhereunder:
WHEREFORE,theappealedorderandresolutionenbancare
herebyaffirmedandtheCourtofIndustrialRelationsishereby
enjoinedtomakeajudicialdeterminationoftheunion
membershipoftheclaimants,whiletheExaminingDivisionof
saidcourtshallproceedwithitscomputationofthecompensable
hoursofworkrenderedby,andthecorrespondingcompensation
payableto,thedriversandconductorsadmittedbybothparties
tobeunionmemberssinceOctober1,1956andthosecontended
bytheuniontobesuchmembersbutdisputedbytheemployer.
Nocosts.Soordered(p.186,L24864rec.).
WhenAtty.JoseC.Espinas(hereinmovantandallegedoriginalcounselforthe
Union)learnedofthesaleandapportionmentoftheproceedsfrompastUnion
presidentAmadoLopez,herequestedLaborArbiterRaymundoValenzuelatoallow
himtolookintotherecordsofCaseNo.1099V.Thelatter,however,toldhimthat
therecordsoftheaforecitedcaseweremissing.Thereupon,Atty.Espinasrequested
DirectorPascualReyesoftheNLRCtolocatetherecords(p.356,L24864rec.).
Hence,Atty.Espinasfiledtheurgentmotionwithprayerforatemporarymandatory
restrainingorderonAugust26,1983andthesupplementtheretoonAugust29,1983
(pp.215,227,L24864rec.).
OnAugust30,1983,therecordsofCaseNo.1099VwerefinallyfoundandAtty.
Espinaswasdullyinformedofthedevelopment,
TheabovetwomotionsquestionthelegalityoftheordersdatedSeptember23,1982
andFebruary9,1983issuedbyLaborArbiterRaymundoValenzuelainCaseNo.
1099VbeforetheNLRCwhichauthorizedthesaleoftheawardedpropertyandthe
distributionoftheproceedsfromsuchpurchase.
MovantsUnionandcounselEspinasuponfilingofthemotionsurgentlyprayof
thisourtto:
1.RequireAtty.BenjaminC.PinedatodepositwiththeNLRCtheamountof
P712,992.00paidtohimordepositedtohisaccountatManilaBank,Cubao
Branch,allegedlyrepresenting35%attorney'sfeesonthesaleof33,952square
metersofthelotregisteredinthenameoftheUnion;
2.RequiretheHaliliDriversandConductorsUnionthroughDomingoCabadingor
anyofhisrepresentativestodepositwiththeNIRCthe6%allegedunionexpenses
paidtothemorsimilarlydepositedtotheiraccount;
3.ImpleadwithleaveofcourtthisManilaBankCubaoBranchtorequirethesaid
banktopreventfurtherwithdrawalsofamountdepositedinthenameofAtty.Pineda
and/ortheHaliliDriversandConductorsUnionoranyofitsofficersandtoturn
overanyremainingdepositstotheNLRCforproperdisposition;
4.ShouldAtty.PinedaandtheUnionofficershavealreadywithdrawnthedeposits
orpartsthereof,requirethemtopostabondintheequivalentamountsof35%
(attorney'sfee),6%(unionexpenses),and5%(broker'sfee)respectivelyofthetotal
proceedsofthesaleoftheproperty,solidarity(p.219,L24864rec.;p.160,L
27773rec.).
Likewise,andafterdueconsiderationofthemerits,movantsprayedthat
1.theorderofArbiterValenzueladatedFebruary9,983benullifiedinsofarasit
allowsAtty.Pineda35%attorney'sfees;
2.theNLRCbedirectedtolocatetherecordsofCaseNo.1099Vorreconstitutethe
sameandthereaftertoequitablydispose20%asfeestoalllawyerswhoparticipated
intheproceedingsandanyexcessamountstobeagaindistributedtotheworkers;
and
3.thesecasesberemandedtotheNLRCwithinstructionsasabovestatedandthat
theproperpenaltybeimposedonthoseinvolvedandwhohaveactedfraudulently
andillegally(p.220,L24864rec.;p.165,L27773rec.).
Thesucceedingpleadingsanddevelopmentswhicharecommontoallthesecases
arenowpresentedchronologically.
OnAugust29,1983,Atty.Espinas,forhimselfandmembersoftherespondent
Union,filedasupplementtourgentmotionstatingthattheprayersintheurgent
motionofAugust26,1983arereiteratedandprayingforthenullificationofArbiter
Valenzuela'sordernotonlyontheawardofattorney'sfeesbutalsoontheallowance
ofpaymentof"unionobligations"notpreviouslyauthorizednorapprovedbythe
NLRC(p.227,L24864,rec.;p.176,L27773rec.).
InitsresolutiondatedSeptember1,1983,thisCourtimpleadedtheManilaBank,
CubaoBranchaspartyrespondentanddirectedtheissuanceofatemporary
mandatoryrestrainingorder(p.234,L24864rec.&p.187,L27773rec.).This
Courtcorrespondinglyissuedatemporarymandatoryrestrainingorderonthesame
datewhichenjoinedAtty.BenjaminC.Pinedaorhisagentsoranypersonactingin
hissteadtodepositwiththeNLRCtheamountofP712,992.00paidtohimor
depositedinhisaccountatManilaBank,CubaoBranchallegedlyrepresenting35%
attorney'sfeesonthesaleof33,952squaremetersofthelotregisteredinthename
ofHaliliDriversandConductorsUnion;directedtheUnionthruDomingoCabading
orhisagentstodepositwiththeNLRC6%allegedunionexpensespaidtotheUnion
orsimilarlydepositedtoitsaccount;andorderedtheNLRCandManilaBank,
CubaoBranch,ortheiragentsorpersonsintheirsteadnottoallowwithdrawalsof
amountsdepositedinthenameofAtty.BenjaminC.Pinedaand/ortheUnionorany
ofitsofficers(P.235,L24864;p.188,L27773rec.).
OnSeptember6,1983,respondentUnion,thruAtty.Pineda,fileditscomment,in
compliancewiththeresolutionofSeptember1,1983,ontheurgentmotionandthe
supplementtheretobothfiledbycounselEspinas,allegingthereinthatthesubject
mattersoughttobeenjoinedormandatedbytherestrainingorderceasedtoexist
renderingthesamemootandacademic,andthusprayingforthedismissalofthe
saidmotionandthesupplementthereto(p.237,L24864rec.;p.191,L27773rec.).
OnSeptember7,1983,Atty.PedroLopez,anoriginalassociateofAtty.Espinas,
filedhismotionforleavetointervene,withthesubmissionthatthelawyersinvolved
shouldonlydivide20%feesaspertheworkers'contractandtherestrefundedby
Atty.Pinedaandthealleged"unionofficers"forredistributiontothemembers(p.
265,L24864,rec.;p.219.L27773rec.).
Atty.Espinas,inbehalfoftheworkers,filedamanifestationandmotiontorequire
Atty,Pinedaandtheuniontocomplywiththetemporarymandatoryrestraining
orderonSeptember9,1983,withprayerthattheManilaBankbeorderedtotransfer
thefundsallocatedfortheworkerstotheNLRC,whichshouldbeinstructedtopay
theworkersuponproperIdentification(withoutprejudicetoadditionalshares)orto
mailsuchamountsbymoneyorderormanager'schecktotheworkers'addressesas
furnishedtotheNLRC(p.274,L24864,rec.;p.231,L27773rec.).
OnSeptember12,1983,petitionerfiledamanifestationincompliancewiththe
resolutionofSeptember2,1983stating,amongotherthings,thatitsliabilityhad
beencompletelyextinguishedwiththeapprovaloftheMemorandumofAgreement
withReleaseandQuitclaiminL38655andL30110;thatsaidagreementoperated
asanabsoluteandcompletereleaseofpetitionerfromanyliabilitytotheUnion;and
thatpetitionerhadnotbeengivenanynoticeofanyproceedingsrespectingcases
subsequenttothepromulgationofthedecisionsaforestated(p.281,L24864,rec.;p.
237,L27773rec.).
CounselEspinas(fortheworkersinvolved)filedhisreplytocommentsof
respondentUniononSeptember14,1983prayingforthisCourtto:
1.nullifytheorderofFebruary9,1983issuedbyArbiterRaymundoValenzuelain
CIRCaseNo.1099Vandothersconnectedtherewithregardingthedistributionof
proceedsofthesaleofthelandbelongingtothemembersclaimantsforlackofdue
processandforbeingcontrarytolaw;
2.nullifythe35%attorney'sfeesofAtty.BenjaminPinedaasillegaland
unconscionableandindisregardofotherlawyersinthecase;
3.requirereimbursementtothemembersfromtheUnionP101,856.00allocated
withouttheirconsentasUnionexpenses;P101,856unreceiptedbrokers'feesless
P4,020.40expensesforthetransferoftitle;torefundthe1%ofthenetproceeds,
P9,596.18,fornamedclaimants;andtosecurearefundofP308,000.00fromthe
P712,992.00feesofAtty.Pineda(theexcessof20%feesforalllawyers);
4.subjectthebalanceofP404,992.00oftheremainderofAtty.Pineda's35%fees
fordistributionamongthethreelawyersasmaybedeterminedbytheNLRC;and
5.shouldthisCourtsodecides,fixthefees(p.285,L24864rec.;p.240,L27773
rec.).
OnSeptember13,1983,theSolicitorGeneralfiledhiscommentontheurgent
motionandthesupplementtheretodatedAugust25,1983andAugust29,1983,
respectivelywiththerecommendationsthat(1)theordersofArbiterValenzuela
datedSeptember23,1982andFebruary9,1983benullifiedforhavingbeenissued
withoutdueprocess;(2)thecasemustberemandedtotheNLRCforfurther
proceedings;and(3)thetemporaryrestrainingorderissuedbythisCourton
September1,1983bemaintained,pendingfinalresolutionbytheNLRC(p.351,L
24864rec.).
TheSolicitorGeneral,onOctober6,1983,filedhismanifestationandmotioninlieu
ofcommentonthemotionofAtty.PedroLopezforleavetointerveneinL24864
andL27773(p.360,L24864rec.;p.289,L27773rec.).
OnOctober6,1983,counselEspinasfiledhiscommentontheinterventionofAtty.
PedroLopezwhereinheoffersnoobjectiontothelatter'sinterventionandstatesthat
saidcounselisalsoentitledtoattorney'sfeesinaccordancewithhisparticipation(p.
364,L24864rec.;p.292,L27773rec.).
Atty.PinedafiledhiscommentandmanifestationonOctober7,1983,incompliance
withtheresolutionofSeptember13,1983,allegingthereinthatasperRetainer's
ContractdatedJanuary1,1967,hehandledCaseNo.1099VbeforetheCourtof
IndustrialRelationsalone.Onthemandatoryrestrainingorder,Atty.Pinedaclaims
thatasofOctober4,1983,hehadabalanceofP2,022.70inhisaccountwiththe
ManilaBank(p.370,L24864rec.;p.295,L27773rec.).
InitsresolutiondatedOctober18,1983,thisCourt(1)set,asideasnullandvoidthe
ordersofSeptember23,1982andFebruary9,1983ofArbiterRaymundoR.
Valenzuela;(2)allowedtheinterventionofAtty.PedroLopez;(3)directedthe
ManilaBank(CubaoBranch),Atty.BenjaminPineda,andtheHaliliDriversand
ConductorsUnionthroughDomingoCabadingoranyofhisrepresentatives,to
complywiththetemporarymandatoryrestrainingorderissuedonSeptember1,
1983andtheresolutiondatedSeptember13,1983,withinten[10]daysfromreceipt
thereof;and(4)remandedthesecasestotheNLRCforfurtherproceedings(p.374,
L24864rec.;p.299,L27773rec.).
ThedaybeforeoronOctober17,1983,SergiodePedro,asrepresentativeofthe
workersandassistedbyAtty.Espinas,thusfidedtheurgentmotiontociteAtty.
Pineda,RicardoCapuiloandManilaBank(CubaoBranch)incontempt,alleging
thereinthataftertwolettersdatedOctober6andOctoberl4,l983totheNLRC
whichinquiredastowhetherornotcompliant,withtherestrainingorderhadbeen
made,theCommissioncertifiedthatasofOctober14,1983,nodepositshadbeen
effectedbythepartiesso(directed(p.376,L24864rec.;p.301,L27773rec.).
InitsmanifestationandmotionfiledonNovember2,1983,respondentManila
BankingCorporation(RustanCubaoBranch),incompliancewiththisCourt's
resolutionofSeptember13,1983,statedthatittransmittedorpaidtotheNLRCthe
amountofP417,380.64underCashier'sCheckNo.34084190fortheaccountofthe
UnionandP2,022.70underCashier'sCheckNo.34084191fortheaccountofAtty.
Pinedaandthusprayedthereinthattheaforesaidtransmittalsbedeemedas
sufficientcompliancewiththeaforecitedresolutionandthattheurgentmotionto
citerespondentsincontemptdatedOctober17,1983beconsideredmootand
academic(p.390,L24864rec.).
OnNovember8,1983,respondentAtty.Pinedafiledhismanifestationandmotion
inlieuofcommentincompliancewiththisCourt'sresolutionofOctober20,1983,
statingthatheandrespondentUniontherebyadopttheaforecitedmanifestationand
motionofrespondentManilaBankingCorporationandthusprayedthatsincethey
havecompliedwiththisCourt'sresolutionofSeptember13,1983,theurgentmotion
tocitethemforcontemptbeconsideredmootandacademic(p.394,L24864rec.;p.
310,L27773rec.).
OnNovember10,1983,respondentManilaBankingCorporationfiledanother
manifestationandmotioninlieuofcommence,bywayofcompliancewiththe
Court'sresolutionofOctober20,1983withprayerthatitspreviousmanifestation
andmotiondatedOctober28,1983andfiledonNovember2,1983beconsideredas
sufficientcompliancewiththeresolutionofSeptember13,1983whichwouldrender
theurgentmotiontociterespondentsincontemptmootandacademic(p.396,L
24864rec.p.312,L27773rec.).
Ontheforegoingmanifestationsandmotions,representativeSergiodePedro,with
theassistanceofAtty.Espinas,filedacommentonNovember16,1983whereinhe
allegedthatoutoftheP2,037,120.00purchaseprice,onlyPl,940,127.29was
depositedwiththeManilaBank;thatAtty.Pinedahasyettoreturnthebalanceof
P710,969,30;andthattheUnionhasstilltoaccountforP111,452.18(p.399,L
24864rec.;p.315,L27773rec.).
December14,1983,respondentUnionfileditsreplytoMr.dePedro'sabove
unsignedcommentthereinstatingamongotherthingsthattheallegedmissing
amountofP96.992.71wasusedforthepaymentofoutstandingrealestatetaxeson
realpropertyofsaidUnioncoveredbyTCTNo.205755andthattheamountof
P2,022.70onlywasremittedbyManilaBanktotheNLRCfortheaccountofAtty.
Pineda(p.323,L27773rec.)
OnDecember20,1983,Mr.dePedroandAtty.Espinas,fortheworkersinvolved,
filedtheirrejoindertothecommentofAtty.PinedaandMr.Capunoreiterating
thereintheirpleatodeclareAtty.PinedaandMr.Capunoincontemptofcourtand
tometeouttheproperpenalty(p.328,L27773rec.).
TheManilaBankingCorporationfileditscompliancewiththeCourtresolutionof
November22,1983onFebruary3,1984,prayingthatitsreporttotheNLRConthe
amountofwithdrawalsbeconsideredassufficientcompliancewiththesaid
resolution(p.343,L27773rec.).
Atty.EspinasfiledhiscommentandmotiononMarch15,1984,statingamongother
thingsthatasperreportoftheManilaBanktotheNLRC,Atty.Pinedahasnotyet
compliedwiththesaidorder.HethusmovedthatAtty.Pinedaberequiredtoposta
bondontheundepositedbalanceintheamountsofP710,969.30andthatMr.
CapunobealsorequiredtopostabondbeforetheNLRContheundepositedbalance
ofP52,236.04duringthependencyofthemotionforcontempt(p.373,L27773
rec.).
OnApril4,1984,Mr.SergiodePedrofiledhisreplytotheaforesaidcommentof
theUnionadministratorandAtty.Pinedastatingthereinthattherearestillquestions
toberesolvedonthemeritsbeforetheNLRCandhence,praysthatArbiterAntonio
Tironaberequiredtocontinuehearingthemeritsofthecasependinginthesaid
Commission(p.377,L27773rec.).
BeforeWeresolvethemotionforcontempt,certaincrucialfactswhichhave
surfacedandwhichprecipitatedOurissuanceoftheresolutionofOctober18,1983
declaringthetwoquestionedordersofArbiterValenzuelaasnullandvoid,mustbe
retraced.
ThenUnionPresidentAmadoLopez,inaletterdatedAugust21,1958,informed
J.C.EspinasandAssociatesthatthegeneralmembershipofthesaidUnionhad
authorizeda20%contingentfeeforthelawfirmbasedonwhateveramountwould
beawardedtheUnion(p.267,L24864rec.).
Atty.JoseC.Espinas,theoriginalcounsel,establishedtheawardof897workers'
claiminthemaincasesbeforethedefunctCIRandtheSupremeCourt.InL24864,
theNoticeofJudgmentofthisCourtdatedFebruary26,1968wasservedonMessrs.
J.C.Espinas&Associates(p.188,L24864rec.).InL27773,theNoticeof
JudgmentdatedDecember29,1970wassenttoAtty.B.C.Pineda&Associates
undersameaddress716PuyatBldg.,Suit404atEscolta,Manila(p.147,L27773
rec.)NotethatthisisthesameaddressofAtty.J.C.Espinas&Associates.
WhenAtty.'PinedaappearedfortheUnioninthesecases,stillanassociateofthe
lawfirm,hisappearancecarriedthefirmnameB.C.PinedaandAssociates,"giving
theimpressionthathewastheprincipallawyerinthesecases.
Atty.PinedajoinedthelawfirmofAtty.Espinasin1965whenthesecaseswere
pendingresolution.Healwaysheldofficeinthefirm'splaceatPuyatBuilding,
Escoltauntil1974,exceptin1966to1967whenhetransferredtotheLakasng
ManggagawaOffices.Duringthisoneyearstintatthelatteroffice,Atty.Pineda
continuedhandlingthecasewiththearrangementthathewouldreportthe
developmentstotheEspinasfirm.Whenherejoinedthelawfirmin1968,he
continuedworkingonthesecasesandusingthePuyatBuildingofficeashisaddress
inthepleadings.
WhenAtty.PinedarejoinedtheEspinasfirmin1968,hedidnotrevealtohis
partners(hewasmadethemostseniorpartner)thathehadaretainer'scontract
enteredintoonJanuary1,1967whichallegedlytookeffectin1966.Hestayedwith
thelawfirmuntil1974andstilldidnotdivulgethe1967retainer'scontract.Onlythe
officersoftheUnionknewofthecontract.
Theallegedretainer'scontractbetweenAtty.PinedaandtheUnionappears
anomalousandevenillegalaswellasunethicalconsideringthat
1.ThecontractwasexecutedonlybetweenAtty.Pinedaandtheofficersofthe
Unionchosenbyabout125membersonly.Itwasnotacontractwiththegeneral
membership,Only14%ofthetotalmembershipof897wasrepresented.This
violatesArticle242(d)oftheLaborCodewhichprovides:
Themembersshalldeterminebysecretballot,afterdue
deliberation,anyquestionofmajorpolicyaffectingtheentire
membershipoftheorganization,unlessthenatureofthe
 organizationorforcemajeurerenderssuchsecretballot
impractical,inwhichcasetheboardofdirectorsofthe
organizationmaymakethedecisioninbehalfofthegeneral
membership(emphasissupplied).
2.Thecontingentfeeof30%forthosewhowerestillworkingwithHaliliTransit
andthe45%feeforthosewhowerenolongerworkingworkedtotheprejudiceof
thelattergroupwhoshouldandwereentitledtomorebenefits.Thus,too,whenthe
allegedretainer'scontractwasexecutedin1967,theHaliliTransithadalready
stoppedoperationsinMetroManila.Bythen,Atty.Pinedaknewthatalltheworkers
wouldbeoutofworkwhichwouldmeanthatthe45%contingentfeewouldapplyto
all.
3.ThecontractwhichretroactivelytookeffectonJanuary1,1966,wasexecuted
whenAtty.EspinaswasstillhandlingtheappealofHaliliTransitinthemaincase
beforetheSupremeCourt.Atty.Pinedawouldhavebutdidnotsubstitutehimselfin
placeofAtty.Espinasorthelawfirmonthebasisofsuchcontract.
4.WhenAtty.Pinedafiledhismotionforapprovalofhisattorney'slienwithArbiter
ValenzuelaonFebruary8,1983,hedidnotattachtheretainer'scontract.
5.Theretainer'scontractwasnotevennotarized(p.248,L24864rec.).
TheManilaMemorialParkCemetery,Inc.,astheprospectivebuyer,initially
expressesitsmisgivingsovertheauthorityoftheUniontosellsubjectproperty
conformablywithSection66ofP.D.No.1529,whichrequiresanorderfromacourt
ofcompetentjurisdictionauthorizingthesaleofapropertyintrust.Thepertinent
portionofSection66provides:
Noinstrumentswhichtransfersormortgagesorinanyway
dealswithregisteredlandintrustshallberegistered,unlessthe
enablingpowertheretoisexpresslyconferredinthetrust
instrument,orunlessafinaljudgmentororderofacourtof
competentjurisdictionhasconstruedtheinstrumentinfavorof
thepower,inwhichcaseacertifiedcopyofsuchjudgmentor
ordermayberegistered.
ThedecisionofaforenamedpurchasertostopquestioningtheUnion'sauthorityto
sellandtheexpeditiousmannerbywhichArbiterValenzuelagrantedAtty.Pineda's
motionforsuchauthoritytosellthepropertymaketheentiretransactiondubious
andirregular.
Thus,withoutnoticetotheotherlawyersandparties,Atty.Pinedacommencedthe
proceedsbeforetheNLRCwiththefilingofamotionandmanifestationonAugust
9,1982withArbiterValenzuelaoftheNLRCOfficeoftheLaborMinistrywherein
heaskedforauthoritytoselltheproperty.OnSeptember23,1983orjustovera
month,ArbiterValenzuelaapprovedthemotionperorderofthesamedate.Notably,
onlyAtty.Pinedaandthelawyersofthepurchaserwereinformedofsuchorder.
OnFebruary4,1983,againwithoutnoticetoAtty.EspinasandAtty.Lopez,Atty.
PinedafiledamotionwithArbiterValenzuelawhereinheaskedforauthorityto
distributetheproceedsofthesaleoftheproperty.Thisdistributionwouldinclude
hisattorney'sfeewhichwasallegedlythesubjectofaretainercontractenteredinto
betweenhimandtheallegedUnionofficers,OnFebruary9,1983,orbarelyfive
daysfromthedaythemotionwasfiled,ArbiterValenzuela,withoutinformingthe
otherlawyersandrelyingexclusivelyontheunverifiedmotionofAtty.Pineda(the
recordsofthecasewerenotonhand),approvedthesaidmotionwhichauthorized
theappointment.
ThisCourt,asearlierstated,nullifiedsaidordersdatedSeptember23,1982and
February9,1983ofLaborArbiterValenzuelaasviolativeofthedueprocessclause.
Itisasettledrulethatinadministrativeproceedings,orcasescomingbefore
administrativetribunalsexercisingquasijudicialpowers,dueprocessrequiresnot
onlynoticeandhearing,butalsotheconsiderationbytheadministrativetribunalof
theevidencepresented;theexistenceofevidencetosupportthedecision;its
substantialityadecisionbasedthereonoratleastcontainedintherecordand
disclosedtotheparties;suchdecisionbytheadministrativetribunalrestingonits
ownindependentconsiderationofthelawandfactsofthecontroversy;andsuch
decisionacquaintingthepartieswiththevariousissuedinvolvedandthereasons
therefore(AngTibayvs.Court,69Phil.635,citedonp.84,Philippine
ConstitutionalLaw,Fernando,1984ed.)
SignificantlyAtty.Pineda'sactoffilingamotionwiththisCourtonDecember1,
1982prayingforauthoritytosellwasbyitselfanadmissiononhispartthathedid
notpossesstheauthoritytosellthepropertyandthatthisCourtwastheproperbody
whichhadthepowertograntsuchauthority.Hecouldnotanddidnotevenwaitfor
suchvalidauthoritybutinsteadpreviouslyobtainedthesamefromthelaborarbiter
whomheknewwasnotempoweredtosoauthorize.UnderArticle224(a)ofthe
LaborCode,onlyfinaldecisionsorawardsoftheNLRC,theLaborArbiter,or
compulsoryorvoluntaryarbitratorsmaybeimplementedormaybethesubjectof
implementingordersbyaforenamedbodyorofficers.
WhenAtty.Espinasdiscoveredthesaleoftheproperty,hewenttoArbiter
ValenzuelatolookintothetransactionwhotoldhimthattherecordsofCIRCase
No.1099Vweremissing.IttookdirectorPascualReyesoftheNLRCtolocatethe
records.
The45%attorney'slienontheawardofthoseunionmemberswhowerenolonger
workingandthe30%lienonthebenefitsofthosewhowerestillworkingas
providedforintheallegedretainer'scontractareveryexorbitantandunconscionable
inviewofSection11,RuleVIIIofBookIIIwhichexplicitlyprovides:
Sec.11.Attorney'sfeesAttorney'sfeesonanyjudicialor
administrativeproceedingsfortherecoveryofwagesshallnot
exceed10%oftheamountawarded.Thefeesmaybededucted
fromthetotalamountduethewinningparty.
TheamountofP101,856.00whichAtty.PinedadonatedtotheUnionandwhich
actuallycorrespondsto5%ofthetotal35%attorney'sfeestakenfromtheproceeds
(p.263,L24864,rec.)appearsimpropersinceitamountstoarebateorcommission.
Thisamountwassubsequentlytreatedasunionmiscellaneousoperatingexpenses
withouttheconsentofthegeneralmembership.
Thus,inthecaseofAmalgamatedLaborers'Associationvs.CourtofIndustrial
Relations(L23467,22SCRA1267[March27,1968]),Wedeclared:
AdeeperscrutinyofthepleadingsinL24864notablyindicatesafraudulentor
deceitfulpatternintheactuationsofAtty.Pineda.Thus,inhismotionforexecution
ofjudgmentfiledonSeptember18,1965inthiscase,hesignedforandinbehalfof
"J.C.Espinas&Associates"(p.323,rec.).InhismanifestationdatedDecember10,
1968,hesignedas"B.C.Pineda,"lonecounselforpetitioner(p.327,rec.);andyet,
hecarriedtheaddressofEspinas&Associatesat716G.PuyatBuilding,Escolta.
However,intheOctober29,1968resolutionofthisCourt,acopythereofwas
servedon"Messrs.J.C.Espinas,B.CPineda,J.J.delaRosa&Associates"atPuyat
Building,Escolta(p.324,rec.).InthenoticeofjudgmentdatedDecember29,1970,
thisCourtaddressedthesaidpleadingto"Attys.B.C.Pineda&Associateswiththe
samePuyatBuildingaddress(p.325,rec.).Notablyalso,thenUnionPresident
AmadoLopezaddressedhisletterdatedAugust21,1958toJ.C.Espinas&
Associates"whereinheinformedthelatterthatthegeneralmembershipoftheUnion
hadauthorizedthema20%,contingentfeeonwhateverawardwouldbegiventhe
workers(p.267,rec.).
TheManilaBankingCorporation(CubaoBranch)hasmanifestedthatitturnedover
totheNLRCtheamountofP417,380.64fortheUnion'saccount,whichappearsto
bethebalanceofP950,021.76correspondingtothenetproceedsfordistributionto
theworkersafterdeductingP525,480.40,thetotalpaymentstoclaimants.The
amountofP417,380.64appearslacking,sinceaccuratelycomputed,thebalance
shouldbeP424,541,36.

Westrikedowntheallegedoralagreementthattheunion
presidentshouldshareintheattorney'sfees.Canon34ofLegal
Ethicscondemnsthisarrangementintermsclearandexplicit.It
says:'Nodivisionoffeesforlegalservicesisproper,except
withanotherlawyer,baseduponadivisionofserviceor
responsibility.'Theunionpresidentisnottheattorneyforthe
laborers.Hemayseekcompensationonlyassuchpresident.An
agreementwherebyaunionpresidentisallowedtosharein
attorney'sfeesisimmoral.Suchacontractweemphatically
reject.Itcannotbejustified.
Acontingentfeecontractspecifyingthepercentageofrecovery
anattorneyistoreceiveinasuit'shouldbereasonableunderall
thecircumstancesofthecase,includingtheriskanduncertainty
ofthecompensation,butshouldalwaysbesubjecttothe
supervisionofacourt,astoitsreasonableness.(emphasis
supplied).
However,theUnionhasyettoaccountforP101,856.00,the5%donationorshare
fromAtty.Pineda'sattorney'sfeeof35%.
FortheaccountofAtty.Pineda,theManilaBankingCorporationhasremittedtothe
NLRCtheamountofP2,022.70only.ThismeansthatAtty.Pinedaisstill
accountablefortheamountofP710,969.30.Heisdirectedtoreturntheamountof
P712,992.00representingthe35%attorney'sfeesheunlawfullyreceived.
InviewofOurresolutionofOctober18,1983,whichsetasideasnullandvoidthe
questionedordersdatedSeptember23,1982andFebruary9,1983issuedbyArbiter
RaymundoValenzuela,thesaleoftheUnionpropertyandthedistributionofthe
proceedstherefromhadbeeneffectedwithoutauthorityand,therefore,illegal
Consequently.Atty.PinedaandArbiterValenzuelabecomeliablefortheir
unauthorizedacts,
Atty.Pinedashouldbecitedforindirectcontemptunderparagraphs(b),(c)and(d)
ofSection3,Rule71oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,Thesaidparagraphsreadthus:
 Sec.3.indirectcontemptstobepunishedafterchargeand
hearing.
xxxxxxxxx
(b)Disobedienceoforresistancetoalawfulwrit,process,order,
judgment,orcompanycourt,orinjunctiongrantedbyacourtor
judge,includingtheactofapersonwho,afterbeing
dispossessedorejectedfromanyrealpropertybythejudgment
orprocessofanycourtofcompetentjurisdiction,entersor
attemptsorinducesanothertoenterintooruponsuchreal
property,forthepurposeofexecutingactsofownershipor
possession,orinanymannerdisturbsthepossessiongiventothe
personadjudgedtobeentitledthereto;
(c)Anyabuseoforanyinterferencewiththeprocessor
proceedingsofacourtnotconstitutingdirectcontemptunder
section1ofthisrule;
(d)Anyimproperconducttending,directlyorindirectlyto
impede,obstruct,ordegradetheadministrationofjustice.
Contemptofcourtisadefianceoftheauthority,justiceordignityofthecourt;such
conductastendstobringtheauthorityandadministrationofthelawintodisrespect
ortointerferewithorprejudicepartieslitigantortheirwitnessesduringlitigation
(12Am.jur.389,citedin14SCRA813).
Contemptofcourtisdefinedasadisobediencetothecourtbyactinginoppositionto
itsauthority,justiceanddignity.Itsignifiesnotonlyawillfuldisregardor
disobedienceofthecourt'sorders,butsuchconductastendstobringtheauthorityof
'thecourtandtheadministrationoflawintodisreputeorinsomemannertoimpede
thedueadministrationofjustice(17C.J.S.4).
ThisCourthasthusrepeatedlydeclaredthatthepowertopunishforcontemptis
inherentinallcourtsandisessentialtothepreservationoforderinjudicial
proceedingsandtotheenforcementofjudgments,orders,andmandatesofthecourt,
andconsequently,tothedueadministrationofjustice(SladePerkinsvs.Directorof
Prisons,58Phil.271;InreKelly,35Phil.944;CommissionerofImmigrationvs.
Cloribel,20SCRA1241;Montalbanvs.Canonoy,38SCRA1).
Inthematterofexercisingthepowertopunishcontempts,thisCourtenunciatedin
theSladePerkinscasethat"theexerciseofthepowertopunishcontemptshasa
twofoldaspect,namely(1)theproperpunishmentoftheguiltypartyforhis
disrespecttothecourtoritsorder;and(2)tocompelhisperformanceofsomeactor
dutyrequiredofhimbythecourtwhichherefusestoperform.Duetothistwofold
aspectoftheexerciseofthepowertopunishthem,contemptsareclassifiedascivil
orcriminal.Acivilcontemptisthefailuretodosomethingorderedtobedonebya
courtorajudgeforthebenefitoftheopposingpartytherein;andacriminal
contempt,isconductdirectedagainsttheauthorityanddignityofacourtorofa
judge,asinunlawfullyassailingordiscreditingtheauthorityordignityofthecourt
orjudge,orindoingadulyforbiddenact.Wherethepunishmentimposed,whether
againstapartytoasuitorastranger,iswhollyorprimarilytoprotectorvindicate
thedignityandpowerofthecourt,eitherbyfinepayabletothegovernmentorby
imprisonment,orboth,itisdeemedajudgmentinacriminalcase.Wherethe
punishmentisbyfinedirectedtobepaidtoapartyinthenatureofdamagesforthe
wronginflicted,orbyimprisonmentasacoercivemeasuretoenforcethe
performanceofsomeactforthebenefitofthepartyorinaidofthefinaljudgmentor
decreerenderedinhisbehalf,thecontemptjudgmentwill,ifmadebeforefinal
decree,betreatedasinthenatureofaninterlocutoryorder,or,ifmadeafterfinal
decree,asremedialinnature,andmaybereviewedonlyonappealfromthefinal
decree,orinsuchothermodeasisappropriatetothereviewofjudgmentsincivil
cases....Thequestionofwhetherthecontemptcommittediscivilorcriminal,does
notaffectthejurisdictionorthepowerofacourttopunishthesame....(58Phil.
271,272).
Forcivilcontempt,Section7,Rule71oftheRevisedRulesofCourtexplicitly
provides:
Sec.7,Rule71.Imprisonmentuntilorderobeyed.Whenthe
contemptconsistsintheomissiontodoanactwhichisyetinthe
poweroftheaccusedtoperform,hemaybeimprisonedbyorder
ofasuperiorcourtuntilheperformsit.
Thus,inthecaseofHardenvs.DirectorofPrisons(L2349,81Phil.741[Oct.22,
1948]),wherepetitionerwasconfinedinprisonforcontemptofcourt,thisCourt,in
denyingthepetitionandresolvingthequestionofpetitioner'sindefinite
confinement,hadtheoccasiontoapplyandclarifytheaforequotedprovisioninthe
followingtenor:
Thepenaltycomplainedofisneithercruelunjustnorexcessive.
InExparteKemmler136U.S.436,theUnitedStatesSupreme
Courtsaidthat'punishmentsarecruelwhentheyinvolvetorture
oralingeringdeath,butthepunishmentofdeathisnotcruel,
withinthemeaningofthatwordasusedintheconstitution.It
impliestheresomethinginhumanandbarbarous,something
morethantheextinguishmentoflife.
Thepunishmentmetedouttothepetitionerisnotexcessive.Itis
suitableandadaptedtoitsobjective;anditaccordswithsection
7,Rule64oftheRulesofCourtwhichprovidesthat"whenthe
contemptconsistsintheomissiontodoanactwhichisyetinthe
poweroftheaccusedtoperform,hemaybeimprisonedbyorder
ofasuperiorcourtuntilheperformsit."
Ifthetermofimprisonmentinthiscaseisindefiniteandmight
lastthroughthenaturallifeofthepetitioner,yetbythetermsof
thesentencethewayisleftopenforhimtoavoidservingany
partofitbycomplyingwiththeordersofthecourt,andinthis
mannerputanendtohisincarceration.Inthesecircumstances,
thejudgmentcannotbesaidtobeexcessiveorunjust.(Davisvs.
Murphy[1947],188P.,229231.)Asstatedinamorerecent
case(DeWees[1948],210S.W.,2d,145147),'toorderthat
onebeimprisonedforanindefiniteperiodinacivilcontemptis
purelyaremedialmeasure.Itspurposeistocoercethe
contemnertodoanactwithinhisorherpowertoperform.He
musthavethemeansbywhichhemaypurgehimselfofthe
contempt.ThelatterdecisioncitesStaleyvs.SouthJersey
RealtyCo.,83N.J.Eq.,300,90A.,1042,1043,inwhichthe
theoryisexpressedinthislanguage:
Ina"civilcontempt"theproceedingis
remedial,itisastepinthecasetheobjectof
whichistocoerceonepartyforthebenefit
oftheotherpartytodoortorefrainfrom
doingsomeactspecifiedintheorderofthe
court.Hence,ifimprisonmentbeordered,it
isremedialinpurposeandcoercivein
character,andtothatendmustrelateto
somethingtobedonebythedefendantby
thedoingofwhichhemaydischarge
himself.Asquaintlyexpressed,the
imprisonedmancarriesthekeystohis
prisoninhisownpocket(pp.747748).
Likewise.Americancourtshadlongenunciatedtheserulings:
Thecommitmentofonefoundincontemptofacourtorderonly
untilthecontemnorshallhavepurgedhimselfofsuchcontempt
bycomplyingwiththeorderisadecisivecharacteristicofcivil
contempt.Maggiov.Zeitz,333US56,92L.ed.476,68SCt
401.
Civilorquasicriminalcontemptiscontemplatedbyastatute
providingthatifanypersonrefusedtoobeyorperformanyrule,
order,orjudgmentofcourt,suchcourtshallhavepowertofine
andimprisonsuchpersonuntiltherule,order,orjudgmentshall
becompliedwith.Evansv.Evans,193Miss468,9So2d.641.
(17Am.Jur.2d.)
Thereasonfortheinherentpowerofcourtstopunishforcontemptisthatrespectof
thecourtsguaranteesthestabilityofthejudicialinstitution.Withoutsuchguarantee
saidinstitutionwouldberestingonaveryshakyfoundation(Salcedovs.Hernandez,
61Phil.724;Cornejovs.Tan,85Phil.722),
Likewise,Atty.PinedashouldbesubjecttodisbarmentproceedingsunderSection
27ofRule138oftheRevisedRulesofCourtwhichprovides:
Sec.27.AttorneysremovedorsuspendedbySupremeCourton
whatgrounds.Amemberofthebarmayberemovedor
suspendedfromhisofficeasattorneybytheSupremeCourtfor
anydeceit,malpractice,orothergrossmisconductinsuch
office,grosslyimmoralconduct,orbyreasonofhisconviction
ofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude,orforanyviolationofthe
oathwhichheisrequiredtotakebeforeadmissiontopractice,or
forawillfuldisobedienceofanylawfulorderofasuperior
court,orforcorruptorwillfullyappearingasanattorneyfora
partytoacasewithoutauthoritysotodo.Thepracticeof
solicitingcasesatlawforthepurposeofgain,eitherpersonally
orthroughpaidagentsorbrokers,constitutesmalpractice.
TheCourtmaysuspendordisbaralawyerforanyconductonhispartshowinghis
unfitnessfortheconfidenceandtrustwhichcharacterizetheattorneyandclient
relations,andthepracticeoflawbeforethecourts,orshowingsuchalackof
personalhonestyorofgoodmoralcharacterastorenderhimunworthyofpublic
confidence(7C.J.S.733).
Itisawellsettledrulethatthestatutorygroundsfordisbarmentorsuspensionare
nottobetakenasalimitationonthegeneralpowerofthecourtsinthisrespect.The
inherentpowersofthecourtoveritsofficerscannotberestricted(InrePelaez,44
Phil.567).
Finally,Atty.Pinedacouldbeprosecutedforbetrayaloftrustbyanattorneyunder
Article209oftheRevisedPenalCode.Saidarticleprovides:
sufficientcompliancewithOurrestrainingorderandresolutionofSeptember13,
1983andhence,theManilaBankingCorporationcannolongerbeliablefor
contemptofcourt.
Veryrecently,onAugust23,1984,respondentUnion,thruActingAdministrator
RicardoCapuno,fileditsmotiontodropHaliliBusDriversandConductorsUnion
fromthecontemptchargeinviewofthesereasons:

Art.209.Betrayalofmustbyanattorneyorsolicitor.Revelation
ofsecrets.Inadditionoftheproperadministrativeaction,the
penaltyofprisioncorreccionalinitsminimumperiod,orafine
rangingfrom200to1,000pesos,orbothshallbeimposedupon
anyattorneyatlaworsolicitor(procuradorjudicial)who,by
anymaliciousbreachofprofessionaldutyorinexcusable
negligenceorignorance,shallprejudicehisclient,orrevealany
ofthesecretsofthelatterlearnedbyhiminhisprofessional
capacity(emphasissupplied).
Theaforequotedcriminalsanctionforunprofessionalconductofanattorneyis
withoutprejudicetoproperadministrativeaction,suchasdisbarmentorsuspension
ofattorneys(p.503,CriminalLawAnnotated,Padilla,1972Ed.).
1.TheManilaBankhasalreadyturnedovertotheNLRCtheamountofP59,716.14
whichrepresentstheremainingbalanceof5%earmarkedforUnionexpenses
incurredinthecaseasidefromtheamountsdepositedinescrowfortheworkers.The
amountofP42,140.00wasspentlegitimatelybytheUnionforadministration
purposesrelativetothesubjectproperty.TheUnionassertsthatitisreadyand
willingtoaccountforallexpensesandwithdrawalsfromthebankbeforetheNLRC.
2.Thealleged5%donationofAtty.PinedatotheUniontakenfromthe35%
attorneys'feeswasgiventoandreceivedbythenPresidentDomingoCabading
alone,whothereafterleftfortheUnitedStates.
3.The1%allocatedforunknownclaimantsorthosenotpreviouslylistedinthe
amountofP9,596.18caneasilybeaccountedforbytheUnionbeforetheNLRC.

LaborArbiterRaymundoValenzuelashouldbemadetoanswerforhavingacted
withoutorbeyondhisauthorityinproperadministrativecharges.Hecouldalsobe
prosecutedbeforetheTanodbayanundertheprovisionsoftheAntiGraftLaw.
Independentlyofhisliabilitiesasagovernmentofficer,hecouldbethesubjectof
disbarmentproceedingsunderSection27,Rule138oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
Atty.BenjaminPinedacouldalsobeheldliableunderSection4(b)ofR.A.No.3019
(AntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct)whichmakesitunlawfulforanyperson
knowinglytoinduceorcauseanypublicofficialtocommitanyoftheoffenses
definedinSection3ofsaidact.Section3enumeratesthecorruptpracticeswhich
publicofficersmaybeprosecutedfor.Atty.Pinedaknowinglyinducedorcaused
LaborArbiterValenzuelatoissuethequestionedorderswithoutorbeyondthe
latter'sauthorityandtowhichorderstheformerwasnotentitled,consideringthathe
wasnotthesoleandproperrepresentative.
TheManilaBankingCorporation(CubaoBranch)permanifestationandmotion
datedOctober28,1983andreiteratedonNovember10,1983,hadtransmittedtothe
NLRCtheremainingbalanceofP417,380.64andP2,022.70fortheaccountofthe
UnionandAtty.Pineda,respectively.Thisturnoveroftheaforecitedamountsisa
Inthesamemotion,Mr.Capunoclarifiesthatwithregardtoattorneys'fees,Atty.
PinedamadetheUnionofficersbelievethathewouldbetheonetopaythefeesof
Attys.EspinasandLopezforwhichreason,the35%increasedfeeswasapprovedby
theUnion'sboardingoodfaith.TheUnionlikewiseconfirmsthatAtty.Pinedacame
intothepictureonlywhenhewasassignedbyAtty.Espinasin,1965toexecutethe
CIRdecisionwhich,thruAtty.Espinashandling,wasupheldbythisCourtinL
24864in1968.TheUnionofficerswereawarethatAtty.Espinaswastheprincipal
counselevenafterAtty.Pineda'sassignment.Theyalsoknewoftheoriginal
contractfor20%attorney'sfeeswhichwasincreasedto35%byAtty.Pinedaupon
thearrangementthatwiththeincrease,hewouldanswerforthepaymentofAttys.
EspinasandLopez'feesandfornecessaryrepresentationexpenses(p.450,L24864
rec.).
Actingontheaforesaidmotion,thisCourtinitsresolutionofAugust28,1964,
droppedtheUnionanditsofficersfromthewithincontemptcharge(p.455,L
24864rec.).
WHEREFORE,ATTY.BENJAMINPINEDAISHEREBYFOUNDGUILTYOF
INDIRECTCONTEMPTOFCOURTFORWHICHHEISHEREBY
SENTENCEDTOIMPRISONMENTINTHEMANILACITYJAILUNTILTHE
ORDERSOFTHISCOURTDATEDSEPTEMBER1ANDSEPTEMBER13,
1983ARECOMPLIEDWITH.
ATTY.BENJAMINPINEDAISALSODIRECTEDTOSHOWCAUSEWHYHE
SHOULDNOTBEDISBARREDUNDERRULE138OFTHEREVISEDRULES
OFCOURT.
LETCOPIESOFTHISRESOLUTIONANDTHERESOLUTIONOFOCTOBER
18,1983BEFURNISHEDTHEMINISTRYOFLABORANDTHE
TANODBAYANFORAPPROPRIATEACTION.
SOORDERED.
LijuaicovTerrado
OnFebruary 13, 2004, an administrative complaint [1]was filed by
complainantLuzvimindaC.LijaucoagainstrespondentAtty.RogelioP.Terradofor
grossmisconduct,malpracticeandconductunbecomingofanofficerofthecourt
when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment
representingattorneysfees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent
sometimeinJanuary2001forP70,000.00toassistinrecoveringherdepositwith
PlantersDevelopmentBank,Buendia,MakatibranchintheamountofP180,000.00
and thereleaseofherforeclosedhouseandlotlocatedinCalamba,Laguna.The
propertyidentifiedasLotNo.408C2andregisteredasTCTNo.T402119inthe
nameofsaidbankisthesubjectofapetitionfortheissuanceofawritofpossession
thenpendingbeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofBinan,Laguna,Branch24docketed
asLRCCaseNo.B2610.
Complainantallegedthatrespondentfailedtoappearbeforethetrialcourt
inthehearingfortheissuanceoftheWritofPossessionanddidnotprotecther
interestsintheCompromiseAgreementwhichshesubsequentlyenteredintotoend
LRCCaseNo.B2610.[2]
Respondentdenied the accusations against him.He averred that the
P70,000.00hereceivedfromcomplainantwaspaymentforlegalservicesforthe
recoveryofthedepositwithPlantersDevelopmentBankanddidnotincludeLRC
CaseNo.B2610pendingbeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofBian,Laguna.
Thecomplaintwasreferred[3]totheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines(IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. OnSeptember 21, 2005, the
Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding respondent guilty of
violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provide:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.
Rule 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practicelaw,except:
a)Where there is a preexisting agreement with a
partnerorassociatethat,uponthelattersdeath,moneyshallbe
paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the
personsspecifiedintheagreement;or
b)Wherealawyerundertakestocompleteunfinished
legalbusinessofadeceasedlawyer;or
c)Where a lawyer or law firm includes nonlawyer
employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in
wholeorinpart,onaprofitsharingarrangement.
InfindingtherespondentguiltyofviolatingRules1.01and9.02ofthe
CodeofProfessionalResponsibility,theInvestigatingCommissioneropinedthat:
Indisbarmentproceedings,theburdenofproofrests
uponthecomplainant.Tobemadethesuspensionordisbarment
of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by
convincingproof.Therecordmustdiscloseasfreefromdoubta
casewhichcompelstheexercisebytheSupremeCourtofits
disciplinarypowers.Thedubiouscharacteroftheactdoneas
wellasofthemotivationthereofmustbeclearlydemonstrated.x
xx.
Intheinstantscenario,despitethestrongprotestation
of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and
solelyfortherecoveryofthePhp180,000.00savingsaccountof
complainantsubsequentactsandeventssayotherwise,towit:
 1.)The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a
Php180,000.00savingsdepositistoohigh;
2.)Respondent actively acted as complainants lawyer to
effectuatethecompromiseagreement.
ByopenlyadmittinghedividedthePhp70,000.00to
other individuals as commission/referral fees respondent
violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibilitywhichprovidesthatalawyershallnotdivideor
stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to
participate in a compromise agreement with a false and
misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after
Three(3)yearsherforeclosedpropertyrespondentviolatedRule
1.01,Canon1oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitywhich
saysalawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,immoral
ordeceitfulconduct.[4]
TheInvestigatingCommissionerthusrecommended:
WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for
aforestated violations to protect the public and the legal
profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be
suspendedforSix(6)monthswithasternwarningthatsimilar
actsinthefuturewillbeseverelydealtwith.[5]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the
investigatingcommissioner.[6]
WeagreewiththefindingsoftheIBP.
Thepracticeoflawisaprivilegebestowedonthosewhoshowthatthey
possessedandcontinuetopossessthelegalqualificationsforit.Indeed,lawyersare
expectedtomaintainatalltimesahighstandardoflegalproficiencyandmorality,
includinghonesty,integrityandfairdealing.Theymustperformtheirfourfoldduty
tosociety,thelegalprofession,thecourtsandtheirclients,inaccordancewiththe
valuesandnormsofthelegalprofessionasembodiedintheCodeofProfessional
Responsibility.[7]
Lawyersareprohibitedfromengaginginunlawful,dishonest,immoral
ordeceitfulconduct[8]andaremandatedtoservetheirclientswithcompetenceand
diligence.[9]They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this
negligenceinconnectiontherewithshallrenderthemliable.[10]
Respondentsclaimthattheattorneysfeepertainsonlytotherecoveryof
complainants savings deposit from Planters Development Bank cannot be
sustained.Recordsshowthatheactedascomplainantscounselinthedraftingofthe
compromiseagreementbetweenthelatterandthebankrelativetoLRCCaseNo.
B2610.Respondentadmittedthatheexplainedthecontentsoftheagreementto
complainant before the latter affixed her signature.Moreover, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the
recoveryofthedepositamountingtoP180,000.00isunreasonable.Alawyershall
chargeonlyfairandreasonablefees.[11]
Respondentsdisregardforhisclientsinterestsisevidentintheiniquitous
stipulations in the compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the
validityoftheforeclosureofherproperty;thattheredemptionperiodhasalready
expiredthusconsolidatingownershipinthebank,andthatshereleasesherclaims
againstit.[12]AsfoundbytheInvestigatingCommissioner,complainantagreedto
these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she could still
redeemthepropertyafterthreeyearsfromtheforeclosure.Thedutyofalawyerto
safeguardhisclientsinterestscommencesfromhisretaineruntilhisdischargefrom
thecaseorthefinaldispositionofthesubjectmatteroflitigation.Acceptanceof
moneyfromaclientestablishesanattorneyclientrelationshipandgivesrisetothe
dutyoffidelitytotheclientscause.Thecanonsofthelegalprofessionrequirethat
onceanattorneyagreestohandleacase,heshouldundertakethetaskwithzeal,care
andutmostdevotion.[13]
Respondents admission[14]that he divided the legal fees with two other
peopleasareferralfeedoesnotreleasehimfromliability.Alawyershallnotdivide
orstipulatetodivideafeeforlegalserviceswithpersonsnotlicensedtopractice
law,exceptincertaincases.[15]
UnderSection27,Rule138oftheRulesofCourt,amemberoftheBar
maybedisbarredorsuspendedonthefollowinggrounds:1)deceit;2)malpractice,
orothergrossmisconductinoffice;3)grosslyimmoralconduct;4)convictionofa
crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyers oath; 6) willful
disobediencetoanylawfulorderofasuperiorcourt;and7)willfullyappearingas
anattorneyforapartywithoutauthority.
InSantosv.Lazaro[16]andDalisayv.Mauricio,Jr.,[17]weheldthatRule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal
ethics.Whenalawyertakesaclientscause,hecovenantsthathewillexercisedue
diligenceinprotectinghisrights.Thefailuretoexercisethatdegreeofvigilanceand
attentionmakessuchlawyerunworthyofthetrustreposedinhimbyhisclientand
makeshimanswerablenotjusttohisclientbutalsotothelegalprofession,the
courtsandsociety.
 Alawyershouldgiveadequateattention,careandtimetohisclientscase.
Onceheagreestohandleacase,heshouldundertakethetaskwithdedicationand
care.Ifhefailsinthisduty,heisnottruetohisoathasalawyer.Thus,alawyer
shouldacceptonlyasmuchcasesashecanefficientlyhandleinordertosufficiently
protecthisclientsinterests.Itisnotenoughthatalawyerpossessesthequalification
tohandlethelegalmatter;hemustalsogiveadequateattentiontohislegalwork.
Utmostfidelityisdemandedoncecounselagreestotakethecudgelsforhisclients
cause.[18]

Inviewoftheforegoing,wefindthatsuspensionfromthepracticeoflaw
forsixmonthsiswarranted.Inaddition,heisdirectedtoreturntocomplainantthe
amounthereceivedbywayoflegalfeespursuanttoexistingjurisprudence.[19]

WHEREFORE,Atty.RogelioP.TerradoisfoundGUILTYofviolating
Rules1.01,9.02,18.02and20.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.He
isSUSPENDEDfromthepracticeoflawforsix(6)monthseffectivefromnotice,
andSTERNLYWARNEDthat any similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely.HeisfurtherorderedtoRETURN,withinthirty(30)daysfromnotice,the
sumofP70,000.00tocomplainantLuzvimindaC.Lijaucoandtosubmittothis
Courtproofofhiscompliancewithinthree(3)daystherefrom.

LetcopiesofthisDecisionbeenteredintherecordofrespondentand
servedontheIBP,aswellasontheCourtAdministratorwhoshallcirculateittoall
courtsfortheirinformationandguidance.

SOORDERED.