A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013 September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty.
September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in
Civil Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores
defendant a suit for damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo,
Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan
(Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan
issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from
hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of
dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but
also to the bench and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a
malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a member of the bar
pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline
Committee, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for
appropriate investigation and sanction.2
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
deemed the pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative
Complaint against Atty. Flores. Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal for investigation, report
and recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine
Zarate Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as
follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold
Balmores. The Public Attorneys Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon
represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores appeared as counsel for the
defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his
appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010,
respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE
compliance hence it was expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing
of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty.
Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for
failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating
thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated
submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered
a waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September
14, 2010 stating among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth,
justice and fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a
cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by
the Sandiganbayan.1wphi1 But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine
Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the
plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and human laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number
which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of
compliance. During the preliminary conference on November 24, 2010, respondent
Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of his MCLE on the
following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear
and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent
Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am
hereby filing the attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste
basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for
another lawyer to represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I
feel I cannot do anything right in your sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the
court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance
with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for
using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended
that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge.7
Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial courts order to submit
proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him.
"Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be
respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to
the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our
Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in
them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government
to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial
system."8
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of
the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his
client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his c1iticism within the
context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be
exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense
of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of
reason and common sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with
the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction
committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the
penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested
before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a century.10 Thus, he
is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine
respondent in the amount of P5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in
his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of
P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191837 September 19, 2012
MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES MARILYN LIM and GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF
DEEDS OF VALENZUELA CITY, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated October
15, 20091 and March 11, 20102 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
109265.
The facts leading to the filing of this petition are undisputed.
Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4.4
hectares and located at Bignay, Valenzuela City. The property is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-73892, registered in the names of George
and Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim).
On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed
before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for
Region IV-A a petition to be recognized as a tenant of a property located at Bignay,
Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato (Deato). At that time, the property, which has
an approximate area of 4.4 hectares, was covered by TCT No. 24759 under Deatos
name. During the pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim.
The sale was registered on December 21, 2004 leading to the issuance of TCT No.
V-73892 in favor of Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed
a motion on March 3, 2005 to implead Spouses Lim as respondents.3
The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012-04, was
granted byRegional Adjudicator Conchita C. Mias (RA Mias) in a Decision4 dated
December 2, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by succession
from her deceased father;
2) Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligation of spouses Danilo and Divina Deato;
3) Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to maintain
petitioner in peaceful possession and cultivation of the agricultural land subject
hereof;
4) Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption of the
subject parcel of agricultural land pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844 as amended;
and
5) Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny Boy
Rivera for having no proximate tenurial relationship with the petitioner hence
beyond the jurisdictional ambit of this Office.
SO ORDERED.5
On July 7, 2006, the foregoing decision became final.6
Upon Consolacions motion for execution filed on January 7, 2008, RA Mias
issued a writ of execution on January 8, 2008.7
On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the
Registrar of Deeds of Valenzuela City praying for the issuance of an order directing
Spouses Lim to accept the amount of P 10,000,000.00 which she undertook to tender
during the initial hearing, declaring the property redeemed, and cancelling TCT No.
V-73892.8Consolacion consigned with the RARAD the amount of P 10,000,000.00
on March 3, 2008.9
Consolacions petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-001-08,
was given due course by RA Mias in a Decision10 dated June 2, 2008, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. As prayed for, declaring that the landholding subject of the petition as lawfully
redeemed;
2. Ordering respondent spouses to accept and withdraw the amount of the
redemption price consigned with this Office which was deposited for safekeeping
indicated in Managers Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name
of Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A
in the amount of ten (10) million pesos;
3. Upon acceptance and the withdrawal of the redemption price as ordered in
paragraph 2 hereof, ordering respondent spouses to execute a Deed of Redemption
in favor of petitioner;
4. In case of refusal and/or failure of respondent spouses to execute the Deed of
Redemption as ordered above, the Regional Clerk of the Board is hereby ordered to
execute a Deed of Redemption in the name of the petitioner; and
5. Directing the Register of Deeds for Valenzuela City to cause the cancellation of
TCT No. V-73892 registered in the name of respondent spouses Marilyn and George
Lim and a new one issued in the name of petitioner upon presentment of the Deed of
Redemption.
SO ORDERED.11
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
issued a Decision12 on February 18, 2009 reversing RA Mias Decision dated June
2, 2008. Specifically:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated 02 June
2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered: Consolacion moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a
1. DECLARING the landholding to be not lawfully redeemed;
2. DECLARING petitioner-appellee not a bona fide tenant of the subject
landholding;
3. DECLARING that petitioner-appellee cannot redeem the subject parcel
registered in the names of the respondents-appellants;
4. ORDERING the respondents-appellants to be maintained in peaceful possession
of the subject landholding; and
5. DIRECTING the Clerk of the Board of the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Region IV-A to return the Managers Check No. 0000004518 issued
by Allied Bank in the name of Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR
Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the amount of Ten Million pesos to herein
petitioner-appellee.
SO ORDERED.13
On April 13, 2009, Consolacion moved for reconsideration,14 which the DARAB
denied in a Resolution15 dated June 8, 2009 for being filed out of time.
SECTION 12 Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides that a Motion for
Reconsideration shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the
order, resolution, or decision of the Board or Adjudicator. Records show that both
the petitioner-appellee and her counsel received a copy of the Decision dated 18
February 2009 on 27 February 2009 and that Legal Officer Nancy Geocada, the
alleged new counsel of the herein petitioner-appellee, filed the Motion for
Reconsideration only on 13 April 2009, clearly the Motion for Reconsideration was
filed beyond the fifteen (15) days (sic) reglementary period thus the herein Decision
has already become final and executory. x x x.16
On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court with the CA.17
On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacions counsel to submit within
five (5) days from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended Verification and
Certification Against Non-Forum-Shopping.18 Apparently, Consolacions counsel
failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption
Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of Consolacions
verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to indicate any
competent evidence of Consolacions identity apart from her community tax
certificate.
Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a
Resolution19 on October 15, 2009 dismissing the petition.
On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the above-mentioned
Resolution. However, the counsel for the petitioner failed to comply with the said
Resolution which was due on July 19, 2009.
For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the Resolution dated July
1, 2009, despite receipt of the notice thereof, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.20
Resolution21 dated March 11, 2010.
Consolacion is, before this Court, claiming that the CAs summary dismissal of her
petition on technical grounds is unwarranted.1wphi1 Consolacion invoked
substantial justice against the CAs strict application of the rule requiring her
counsel to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and the
rule rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-forum-shopping
defective in the absence of the details of any one of her current identification
document issued by an official agency bearing her photograph and signature. That
there was merit in her petition and that she complied, albeit belatedly as her
counsels MCLE Compliance Certificate Number was indicated and a verification
and certificate on non-forum-shopping with a proper jurat was attached to her
motion for reconsideration, should have sufficed for the CA to reverse the dismissal
of her petition and decide the same on its merits. Consolacion alleged that
procedural rules or technicalities are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice
and their rigid application should be avoided if this would frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice.
The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error
committed by the CA in dismissing Consolacions petition before it on the ground of
petitioners unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural requirements
attendant to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the opportunity
afforded to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this
took place, however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of Consolacions
petition and without reasonable cause proffered to justify its belatedness.
Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but they did not
explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the
requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be
an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need meriting
the relaxation of the rules. Neither does this Court see any.
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally
construed. However, in these cases, outright dismissal is rendered unjust by the
presence of a satisfactory and persuasive explanation. The parties therein who
prayed for liberal interpretation were able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving
that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Courts intent "to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity."22
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the
duty of every member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty
to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their
omission by harking on liberal construction.
While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate
result, she is bound by such.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions
dated October 15, 2009 and March 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 109265 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.
PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which
complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better
Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C.
Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations
with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of
Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint
charges the respondent with the following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without
sufficient justification, to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163
Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of
the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of
obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested
therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection
with pending official transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of
Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of
lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from
the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny
registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action
except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify
certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron
suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a
certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide
him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as
pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house
and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act
favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute
clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to
respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare,
respondent imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up with the
respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20,
1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G
within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163
certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale
with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987,
Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly
fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which
have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only
during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same
documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15,
Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator,
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the
Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta
No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable.
Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163
deeds of sale with assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on
June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against
respondent Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed
respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be
taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case
on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of
directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the
official transactions awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to
hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right
to a formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the
pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges
of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law
and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated
requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the
registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material
benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a
public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit
for himself in connection with pending official transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator
Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice
Sedfrey A. Ordoez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of
duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for
registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt
with more severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoez found respondent guilty of
grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence
supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave
misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for
registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for
expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration
of the documents involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability
of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the
registration thereof, that the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability
of the said documents in question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator
notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded
from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to
in his previous denial.
xxx xxx xxx
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that
he neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record remains
uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him
the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original
denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample
opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5
September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to
mitigate his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of
applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best
in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron
be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective
immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by
Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the
government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA,
Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint
against said respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds,
as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public
official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a
violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground
for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E.
Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress
upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on
whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper.
fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is
subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion
he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession
its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice
Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of
honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously
described as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the
highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a
fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790;
emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to
process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and
prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in
any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the
Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule
103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable"
may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every
lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court
Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a
public official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling
of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs.
Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be
disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys
OMAR P. ALI Vs ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG
Facts: It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the
administrative caseearlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said
case, which was initiallyinvestigated by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), complainant charged respondent withillegal exaction; indiscriminate
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 inthe names of
Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae
BauduliDatu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and
manipulating the criminalcomplaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu
and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the
records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.Issue: did atty.
Bubong violate Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?Held:
yes , he did.In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as
established by the Office of thePresident and subsequently affirmed by this
Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer.By taking advantage of his
office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing hisknowledge
of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his
relatives,respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to
perform the functions of acivil servant but also to retain his membership in
the bar.
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this
matter. It reads:Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promoteor advance his private interests, nor allow the
latter to interfere with his public duties.Respondents conduct manifestly
undermined the peoples confidence in the public office heused to occupy
and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived
useof his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than
the withdrawal of hisprivilege to practice law.As for the letter sent by Bainar
Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting forthe withdrawal of
this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of
this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement,compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of
the complainant toprosecute the same. As we have previously explained in
the case of
Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest
or lack of interestof the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis
of the facts borne out by therecord, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule ispremised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension ordisbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and
therespondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest andafford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for thepublic welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from theofficial
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer tothe court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant
or the person whocalled the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party
OCA V LADAGA
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the
Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro
bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885,
entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification of Public Document
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40.[1] While
respondents letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator,
dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondents
authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case.[2] On
September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to
respondent for comment.[3]
In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had
appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out
that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to
handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the
services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a
member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore,
he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office
nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position.In any
case, his appearances in court were covered by leave application approved by the
presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court
Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without the
required authorization from the Court.[5] On January 25, 1999, the Court
Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for
violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on
the administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood
cousins who belong to a powerless family from the impoverished town of Bacauag,
Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had
always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an
adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and
advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the
private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said
criminal case was to seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his cousins
discord with Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left
the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit
affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of
their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga.
Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his
duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did not have enough
funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his
seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the Commission on
Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty
and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had been
administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a
free legal assistance for humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his
position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding
office. He stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as
shown by his approved leave applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and referred
the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following
findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and
in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal
Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of
Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said
case was without the previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the
respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he
was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His
cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent
did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and
respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her
out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever
handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He
appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case
amicably.Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as
counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in
government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as
counsel for his cousin without first securing permission from the court, and
considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said
appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding
Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED
with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more
severely.[6]
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found
under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain
attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section
reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession, specifically the
law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court
appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
we explained the meaning of the term private
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7]
practice prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the
Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.[8]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent
appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not
constitute the private practice of the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a
private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the
head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to
engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should
be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of
his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer of the board of directors.[9]
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous
occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as
borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to
which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by
law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
PIMENTEL V FABROS
A complaint for disbarment was filed against Attys. Vitaliano C. Fabros and
Pacifico S. Paas by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. for "unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct" in relation to the discharge of their duties as chairman
and vice-chairman, respectively, of the provincial board of canvassers, Province of
Isabela (PBC-Isabela) in the 1995 elections.
Complainant alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
8. Among the duties of the [PBC-Isabela] was to canvass the results of the elections
from the various municipalities and component cities of the Province of Isabela and
submit the Provincial Certificate of Canvass to the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). This Provincial Certificate of Canvass was to be submitted to the
COMELEC together with its supporting Statement
of Votes per Municipality for the Province of Isabela, and as required by law, these
documents were prepared under the control and supervision of the [PBC-Isabela] of
which herein respondents are officials.
9. In fact, with respect to the Provincial Certificate of Canvass of Isabela,
respondents were required to certify under oath that they duly canvassed the votes
cast for each candidate for Senator in the election held on May 8, 1995. And with
respect to the Statement of Votes per Municipality, they were required to certify that
each entry made is true and correct.
xxx xxx xxx
11. It would appear, however, that the Statement of Votes per Municipality (annex
"B") prepared and certified to be true and correct by herein respondents was actually
a fraudulent statement which had been altered and which contain false and untrue
entries. By comparing the said statements with the Municipal/City Certificates of
Canvass of some of the municipalities and component cities for the Province of
Isabela, it is clearly apparent that in nine (9) municipalities and one (1) city of the
said province, the votes of candidates Enrile, Honasan and Mitra were padded and
increased by some 27,755, 10,000 and 7,000, respectively.
xxx xxx xxx
13. The anomalous, irregular and illegal padding of the votes in the Provincial
Certificate of Canvass for the Province of Isabela cannot be attributed [to] mere
computation or recording error, but was ostensibly the result of a premeditated
scheme knowingly implemented by herein respondents.
14. The respondents, chairman and vice chairman of the [PBC-Isabela],
willfully, feloniously, unethically and in wanton and reckless regard of the
duties and responsibilities reposed upon them by virtue of their official
positions, signed the Provincial Certificate of Canvass (annex "A") and the
Statement of Votes per Municipality (annex "B") for the Province of Isabela,
well aware that the same contained false statements which has altered the
results of the senatorial elections in said province. Their submission of these
falsified documents to the COMELEC is an act constituting a gross violation of
the Omnibus Election Code and existing penal laws, and a serious breach of
public trust and of their oaths as duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar.
15. For under section 27 of R.A. 6646 it is provided that any member of the board of
canvasser who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in
any election shall be guilty of [an] election offense.
16. And, under provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxx xxx xxx.1
(Emphasis ours)
In his comment, respondent Fabros reproduced the counter-affidavit he filed with
the COMELEC-Manila since the issues raised in the complaint were identical to
those brought before the Commission. He denied committing any act which violated
his oath as a lawyer. Specifically, he stated that: (1) he neither consented nor
allowed any member of PBC-Isabela to increase the votes of Senators Enrile,
Honasan and Mitra; (2) the canvassing was done in public view; (3) he faithfully
read the votes as reflected in the municipal/city certificates of canvass, repeating the
same twice or thrice and (4) the canvassing proceeded in an orderly manner after
counsels and watchers were given the chance to examine the certificates of canvass.2
Aside from substantially echoing the statements of Fabros, respondent Paas alleged
that he was in no position to manipulate the figures since Fabros did the reading
throughout the canvass, while he attended to maintaining the integrity of the
envelopes containing the statement of votes. Both attributed to human fatigue or
simple negligence any error in the figures since the board and its staff allegedly
worked continuously to finish the canvassing within 72 hours as directed.3 Paas
claimed that if there were figures in the certificates of canvass which did not match
the statement of votes prepared by the PBC, he honestly believed that this was due
to human fatigue.4 He alleged that, if at all, he could only be faulted for failing to see
for himself if the reading by Fabros of the number of votes and the tabulation
thereof faithfully reflected the figures in the PBC's copy of the election returns.
Both respondents do not, however, deny that they authenticated the provincial
certificate of canvass and signed the statement of votes as "true and correct." Their
only excuse for any discrepancy was their alleged reliance on the documents
prepared by the secretary of PBC-Isabela, Olympia Marquez.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner George
Briones heard the case on January 20, 1997.5 By agreement of the parties, the
Investigating Commissioner ordered the parties to submit simultaneous verified
position papers with the affidavits of their witnesses.6 On June 21, 2003, the IBP
board of governors issued a resolution adopting the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents were found guilty of violating Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and were penalized with a fine of
P10,000 each, with a warning that a violation on similar grounds will be dealt with
more severely.
Based on the evidence presented, we find respondents guilty of misconduct. The
records reflect, and respondents admit, the discrepancy between the questioned
certificate of canvass and the statement of votes of the Province of Isabela in the
1995 elections. While there was no question that the municipal/city certificates of
canvass were not tampered with, the tabulation of the figures on the statement of
votes was anomalous. For this, respondents were responsible.7
As chairman and vice-chairman of PBC-Isabela, respectively, respondents were
mandated to receive the municipal/city certificates of canvass, and to canvass them
for the votes of the members of the Senate, among others.8 They were also required
to determine the provisional total votes of each candidate as of each adjournment.
On final adjournment, they were tasked to prepare a statement of votes with a
certification of the same as official.9In addition, they prepared the provincial
certificate of canvass (in which the padded figures were discovered) with the
certification under oath as public officers that the entries were true and correct.10
More than simply affixing their signatures for the purpose of identifying the
documents, respondents signed the documents certifying (and vouching) for the
correctness and accuracy of their contents. Even if they allegedly had no
participation in the misdeed, they nevertheless remained responsible for it as
officials of PBC-Isabela. Respondents must bear the consequences of any
misstatement or falsehood arising from such certification.11 They cannot evade
responsibility by pointing to other persons who supposedly prepared the documents
in question.12They had the opportunity to check, as they should have checked, the
accuracy of the figures they were certifying to.13 By certifying to false figures, they
committed misconduct subject to disciplinary action.14 In fact, by invoking the
defenses of honest mistake, oversight due to fatigue, even simple negligence,
respondents virtually admitted the existence of the discrepancies in the number of
votes reflected in the questioned documents.15
As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the high degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill required of them.16 As lawyers, they were
found to have engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.17
They also violated their oath as officers of the court to foist no falsehood on anyone.
Furthermore, by express provision of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the avoidance of such conduct is demanded of them as lawyers in the
government service:
CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.
As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under an even greater
obligation to observe the basic tenets of the legal profession because public office is
a public trust.18
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Atty. Vitaliano C. Fabros and Atty.
Pacifico S. Paas GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on them a FINE in the
amount of P10,000 each, with a WARNING that the commission in the future of a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and entered in the records of respondents.
SO ORDERED.
BERENGUER-LANDERS v FLORIN
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo
Berenguer (complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin),
Marcelino Jomales (Jomales) and Pedro Vega (Vega).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre,
Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer (Berenguers) are the registered
owners of a 58.0649-hectare land in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Sometime in
April 1998, a notice of coverage was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) regarding the acquisition of their landholding pursuant to Republic Act No.
6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Berenguers
protested and applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice
to lift coverage based on the ground that their landholdings have been used
exclusively for livestock pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 09.2
On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the
application for exclusion, cancelled the Berenguers certificates of title on the land
and issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award3 (CLOAs) in favor of the
members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative
(BARIBAG).
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied their
application for exclusion from the CARPs coverage in the Order4 dated February
15, 1999 based on the Investigation Report dated February 9, 1999 submitted by the
DAR Region V Investigation that said area sought to be excluded is principally
devoted to coconuts and not the raising of livestock.5
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal6 with the Secretary of DAR.
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition7 for the
implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). This was granted by Florin, as RARAD, in an
Order8 dated March 15, 1999. Accordingly, Florin directed the issuance and
implementation of the Writ of Possession.9
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration,10 claiming
that they were denied due process as they were not furnished with a copy of
BARIBAGs petition for implementation. Florin denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit in an Order11 dated March 22, 1999.
On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed12 to the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB). BARIBAG, on other hand, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.13 The Berenguers opposed14 the motion saying that the execution would
be premature in view of their pending appeal before the DARAB. Nevertheless,
BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff.15
In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro
denied the Berenguers appeal.
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution,17 which granted BARIBAGs Motion
for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance of the writ of
possession prayed for.
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside18 the Resolution dated
April 8, 1999, arguing that: the DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case
when they seasonably filed an appeal before it; and that Florin should have waited
until the DARAB has decided the appeal. In an Order19 dated April 21, 1999, Florin
denied the said motion prompting the Berenguers to move for her inhibition20 on
ground of partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals
(CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51858, which was denied outright on procedural
grounds, to wit: (1) copy of the assailed order bears the words "certified true copy"
but the name and authority of the person certifying is not indicated as required in SC
Circular No. 3-96, and the signature therein is illegible; (2) only one of the
petitioners signed the certification on non-forum shopping which is an insufficient
compliance of Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court; and (3) there is
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as the assailed order of the Regional
Director is not directly reviewable by the CA.21
Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53174, which questioned the Orders dated March 15,
1999 and March 22, 1999 issued by Florin. The petition was also denied on grounds
of lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode of appeal.22
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession23 in favor of BARIBAG.
Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of possession
pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court in spite of the Berenguers protestations.24
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash25 the Writ of Possession, to no
avail.
On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint26 for the
disbarment of respondents Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant Regional
Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly
conspiring and confederating in the commission of the following acts:
A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY
RENDERING AN UNJUST JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS;
B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION
EX-PARTE AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING AND SIGNING THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION WITHOUT CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY ISSUED BY THE
PROPER OFFICER FULLY KNOWING THAT SHE HAS NO AUTHORITY
AND TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE RULES AND IN
CONTRAVENTION WITH THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD;
FURTHER, HIDING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS
INSPITE OF REQUEST FOR A COPY;
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY PETITIONERS
THRU COUNSEL AND FAILING AND REFUSING TO CONDUCT A
HEARING AS PRAYED FOR BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND REFUSING TO
FORWARD THE APPEAL TO THE PROPER APPELLATE BOARD;
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIPS TO THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS AND LAWYER;
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO CITE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN
CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF ARREST WITHOUT HEARING
CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF COURT;
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF
THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION,
PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
WRIT OF POSSESSION TO THE PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS
AND PETITIONERS.27
Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of possession is
anchored on the CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, and not on a final and
executory decision that would require a certification of finality as prescribed by the
DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus (De Jesus), as Berenguers counsel, was
not furnished with a copy of the writ because it was not yet issued at the time when
it was requested; (3) there was no intent to hide the writ; (4) when the writ of
possession was finally signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and
enforcement; (4) it was unfair to impute illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as
DAR lawyers in view of the DARs denial of the motion for a cease and desist order
and because of the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty;
(5) the petitions for certiorari filed with the CA were both dismissed; and (6) the
findings of DAR and the issuance of the CLOAs remain undisturbed. Florin also
claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus who wants her disbarred and not the Berenguers.
In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against him arguing that: (1)
the writ of possession is not illegal in the absence of a court order stating its
invalidity; (2) he did not participate in the issuance of the writ of possession because
he did not appear as the farmers counsel; (3) the Legal Division he heads has no
control or influence over the DARAB; and (4) his presence in the execution of the
writ of possession was to ascertain that no violations against any law are committed
by the person/s executing the writ.30
Jornales Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima facie
infirmity; (2) he is not privy to the issuance thereof; (3) he has no supervision and
control over the DAR which issued the writ; and (4) he has no authority to
determine the writs validity or invalidity. Jornales admitted, however, that he was
in the meeting presided by the PNP Provincial Director of Sorsogon prior to the
writs implementation in his capacity as Regional Assistant Director for Operations
of DAR Region V and not as a lawyer. He added that the disbarment complaint
against him is not only malicious for lack of legal basis but is also meant to harass
and intimidate DAR employees in implementing the CARP.32
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply,33 the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended34
that Florin be "suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, Orders and Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the
interests of the Complainants."
Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against Jornales
and Vega be dismissed for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges
against them.35
Commissioner San Juans recommendation against Florin is based on the findings36
of the CA in its Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53174,37
which reads:
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of Appeals
was treated as a petition for review and the court found the following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being
devoted to pasture and livestock and already classified as residential and industrial
land, hence, outside the coverage of Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law) The generation and issuance of Certificate of Landownership Award
(CLOA) was therefore void;"
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent Hon.
Isabel E. Florin who is exercising delegated jurisdiction from the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over Petitioners Properties as held in Krus na Ligas Farmers Coop vs.
University of the Philippines; G.R. No. 107022, 8 December 1992, which is
squarely in point with the case at bar."
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the Court
ruled thus "Assuming that the lands are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand
why the DAR awarded them to members of respondent Baribag and not to the
farmers in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of the CARL x x x."
The court further stated "We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning
our observation on the actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel
Florin. Just why she issued a writ of execution and eventually a Writ of Possession
in favor of respondent Baribag puzzles us no end. She knew that Baribag is not a
party in petitioners application for exclusion filed with the Office of DAR Regional
Director Percival Dalugdug. Obviously, she never acquired jurisdiction over
Baribag. She also knew that petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary from the
Order of Regional Director Dalugdug dismissing petitioners application for
exclusion. Clearly, such order was not yet final and executory when she issued the
assailed writs of execution and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would
be set aside."38
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No.
XVII-2006-282 modifying the recommended penalty, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for knowingly rendering
an unjust Judgment, Orders and Resolutions, adverse and prejudicial to the interest
of the complainants, Atty. Isabel F. Florin is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year. The charges against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Peter
Vega are DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges
against Respondents.39
In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over
BARIBAG at the time it filed a petition for the implementation of the Order dated
February 15, 1999; (2) the DARAB has jurisdiction to issue the CLOAs; (3) as
RARAD, she has concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB; (4) the Berenguers were not
denied due process; and (5) the Berenguers never questioned the regularity of the
DARs acquisition of their landholding nor did they file a petition for the
cancellation of the CLOAs issued to BARIBAG.
This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the
penalty to be imposed.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party without authority so to do. x x x.
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross
misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of
a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind
this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.42
(Citations omitted)
In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction
against the three (3) respondents as members of the bar. The grounds asserted by the
complainants in support of the charges against the respondents, however, are
intrinsically connected with the discharge of their quasi-judicial functions.
Nevertheless, in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,43 the Court already ruled that if a
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer, then a lawyer may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar.
xxxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June
21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of
all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 644 of
said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity
to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of
the public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.1wphi1 Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.45 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,46 the Court ruled that an administrative case
against a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the
DARAB may be likened to administrative cases against judges considering that he is
part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.47
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government, performs official functions of a RARAD that are akin to those of
judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be likened that of a judge whose
decision, including the manner of rendition, is made subject of an administrative
complaint.
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No.
06-00 provides:
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the President, or
the Court of Appeals shall have the following effects:
(a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.The
appeal shall stay the order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution
pending appeal, as he may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of
the case (Executive Order No. 292 [1987], Book VII, Chapter 4, Sec. 21).
xxxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR
Secretary clearly stayed the implementation of Regional Director Dalugdugs Order
dated February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is the DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to
order execution pending appeal. Records reveal that there was no order by the DAR
Secretary directing execution of the Order dated February 15, 1999 during the
pendency of the Berenguers appeal.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when
execution may be had, namely: (1) after a decision or order has become final and
executory;48 (2) pending appeal, only upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order after due hearing;49 and (3) execution of several, separate or partial
judgments.50
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:
Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.Execution shall issue upon an
order, resolution or decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such
execution shall issue as a matter of course and upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a
resolution, order or decision has been served to the counsel or representative on
record and to the party himself, and has become final and executory, and, upon
motion or motu proprio, issue a writ of execution ordering the DAR Sheriff or any
DAR officer to enforce the same. In appropriate cases, the Board or any of its
Members or its Adjudicator shall deputize and direct the Philippine National Police,
Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of their component units or other law
enforcement agencies in the enforcement of any final order, resolution or decision.
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. Any motion for execution of the decision of
the Adjudicator pending appeal shall be filed before the Board which may grant the
same upon meritorious grounds, upon the posting of a sufficient bond in the amount
conditioned for the payment of damages which the aggrieved party may suffer, in
the event that the final order or decision is reversed on appeal, provided that the
bond requirement shall not apply if the movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper
litigant. (Emphasis ours)
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug
denying the Berenguers application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final
and executory as it was seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also
nothing in the records that will show whether BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to
the Rules.
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such
error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice,51 the
facts on hand prove otherwise. Florins issuance of the writ of execution and writ of
possession in order to fully implement Regional Director Dalugdugs Order dated
February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of
execution is issued only after the subject judgment or order has already become final
and executory.52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin ordered the
issuance of such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the DARAB.53
Consequently, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of suspension.
As to the penalty
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate
intent to do injustice will be administratively sanctioned.54 In this case, it appears,
however, that this is the first time that Florin has been made administratively liable.
Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith attended the commission of
the acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin executed an act
that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the
writ of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment
but an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended
and instead impose the penalty of suspension for three (3) months55 without pay. As
also held in Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months suspension without pay
was imposed against a judge after finding out that the ignorance of the law he
committed was not tainted with bad faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees and
adopts the finding of the IBP that no sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate
the charges against them. Hence, the complaint against them should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is
found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she
is penalized with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for three (3) months
effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and
Atty. Pedro Vega is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
People v Pineda
Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted
before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5)
separate cases, four for murder, viz:
Criminal Case 1246 murder of Neceforo Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1247 murder of Epifania Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1248 frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1249 murder of Teofilo Mendoza;
Criminal Case 1250 murder of Marcelo Mendoza.
The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney
from his investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the
crucible of a full-dress trial on the merits.
The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo
Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep.
It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in
rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter,
defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein, and let loose
several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor children of the couple and
wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.
Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed Tomas
Narbasa and Tambak Alindo moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1)
criminal case." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and
motivated by one impulse."
Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13,
1966, directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one
single information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos.
1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."
The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon
the ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and
more than one victim was killed." The defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the
position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on
the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one
impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots
killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple murder
should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."
Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as
having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion, the People came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.
This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.
The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either
for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of
robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five
indictments remain as they are?
1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which reads:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single
penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other (delito complejo).1
Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in
the death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting,
the complex crime defined in the first part of Article 48 finds application.2 A similar
rule obtains where one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter's body
through and wounded another. The first died instantaneously; the second, seven days
later. This Court convicted the assailant of double murder.3 So where a person plants
a bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a number of
persons are killed, that single act again produces a complex crime.4
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed.
Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.5 Thus, where the six defendants,
with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also a submachine gun and Garand
rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several others, each of
the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths
(eleven).6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for quadruple murder with the use
of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo of a man, his
common-law wife, and their two children in cold blood. The accused were found
guilty by the trial court of such offense. This Court, in reversing this ruling below,
held that "[t]he four victims were not killed by a single act but by various acts
committed on different occasions and by different parties"; that such acts "may not
be regarded as constituting one single crime"; and that "[t]hey should be held as
separate and distinct crimes."7 And a third. At the commencement exercises of an
elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots"
from a pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on
also died. This Court there ruled that there were "three distinct and separate
murders" committed by appellant Juan Mones.8 And finally, in People vs.
Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima
Capule who were asleep were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and
then, by a second burst of machinegun fire, two of the couple's children also
asleep were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial
court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must be
declared guilty of four murders."9
The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30,
1955. There, on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of
home guards. It was held that there was only one complex crime. In that case,
however, there was no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing. In the case at bar,
defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge conspiracy amongst
them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all.10 Not material here, therefore
is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths
caused by each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this point,
that apply the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of
criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.11 to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the
The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of
the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of
trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the
statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the
fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied.12
Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly
presented the five separate informations four for murder and one for frustrated
murder.
2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit
of one of the witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to
commit robbery, and that the acts constituting murders and frustrated murder
complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. If true, this would bring the
case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48, which treats as a
complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.
A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly
performed.13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it
is alleged that certain personal properties (transistor radio and money) were taken
away by the culprits after the shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor's
opinion thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there
is the grave problem of proving the elements of that offense robbery. For another,
the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent to kill. Appropriately
to be noted here is that all the informations charged evident premeditation. With
ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons
for the Fiscal's action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has
abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that
he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points
to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of
abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a
prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction.
In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result
in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a
criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play may be
transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made the
pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one
charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be
filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party."14
3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted
for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The
question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of
the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be
supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then
fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those
of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject
to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may
not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it
purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly
administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford
adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the
statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' "15 Nothing in the record
would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just
recited.1wph1.t suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired
And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we
are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing
separate cases for murder and frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the
complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide under the
provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for
multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion
should not be controlled.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the
orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and
declared null and void, and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said
orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to
reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were
commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.
Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres. So
ordered.
Misamin v San Juan
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a
member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the
legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of
Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose
Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua,
owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There
was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would
seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well
be the explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the
scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of
things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such
referral was to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that
there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice.
Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed, This is
one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice.
Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having
appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC
while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he
contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his
profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government
position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the
with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick
the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay.
Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese
community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the
resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office
set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant
failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter
date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said
counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the
complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again called
for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to
appear. The complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy
"preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he
was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the
complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that he wished his
complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the present action in an outburst
of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust
dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after
reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good
person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice
of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced
in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds
for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the
labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City
of Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the
Civil Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground
have been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila
and the National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired
with complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his
separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why
the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper
is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922,
the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the
attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer
of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been
subsequently adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations
there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his
profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force.
That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be
dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to
avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public
trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but
the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to
frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to
be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that
should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the
bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his
fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar.
He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take
care that his honor remains unsullied
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San
Juan is dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be
spread on his record.
Vitriolo v Dasig
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,[1] an
official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross
misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her
public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation
of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED.
In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998,
complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service,
CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,[2] Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation
as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C.
Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches,
Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending
before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded
from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth
anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less
for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms.
Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the
application for correction of name.[3]
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by
filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.[4]
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22),
Section 36[5] of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts
owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by the
dishonored checks she issued,[6] the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to
respondent.[7]
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime
against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when
she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the
evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats
against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was
lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.[8]
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President
Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and
reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill
motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an
appointment for herself.[9]
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on
the charges.[10] A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at
Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned
to this Court with the notation Unclaimed.[11]
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be
served by registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office
informed the Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and
signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27,
1999.[12]
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to
the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed
respondent to submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be
considered in default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said
order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer,
but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled
that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and
the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in
violation of her oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed
made unlawful demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had
pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act
favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her
public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the Commission on Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further
warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of
respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XV-2002-393, the full text of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
A:; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her
public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.[13]
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court
for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the
complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development
Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official.[14] However, if said misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar.[15]
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her
tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon,
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests
before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure,
despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a
lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member
of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical
and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and
any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary
action. The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay
no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.[16] Respondents demands for sums of money to
facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office
violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar.
Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June
21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of
all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6[17] of
said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity
to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of
the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests
pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01[18] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating
in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach
of Rule 6.02[19] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his
office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondents conduct
in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all
lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public
office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher
than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of
Canon 1[20] and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal
Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years
suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name
shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross
misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
records of the respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Huyssen v Gutierrez
Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation officer,
received US$20,000 from complainant Huyssen. Accused of falsely representing
that it was needed in complainants application for visa and failing to return the
same, respondent denied misappropriating the said amount, claiming that he gave it
to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their
application for visa. He failed however to substantiate such denial.
Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could not immediately be
returned to the complainant, and promised her several times that he would repay her
out of his personal funds. He even issued personal post-dated checks on this, but
which later bounced.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondents conduct violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility and merits the penalty of disbarment?
RULING
Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. It is settled that
denial, which is inherently a weak defense, to be believed must be buttressed by a
strong evidence of non-culpability. The evidence, respondents letters to the
complainant, shows that he made it appear that the US$20,000 was officially
deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. If this is true, how come
only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his
receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by the said
Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return
of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the
Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated
the same for his personal use.
Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more
restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more
severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of
his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation
and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."
Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude. Respondent's acts
are more despicable, for not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant;
worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued
checks to cover up his misdeeds.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is
a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally.
A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous
as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the
loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with
the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession. Section 27 Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended
for, among other acts, gross misconduct in office.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and ordered to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal
interest from his receipt of the money until payment. The case shall be referred to
the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate
administrative action.
Ramos v Imbang
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension[1] against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for
multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
THE COMPLAINT
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty.
Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and
Elenita Jovellanos.[2] She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter
issued a receipt for P5,000 only.[3]
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and
always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to
inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.[4] This happened six
times and for each appearance in court, respondent charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She
personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San
Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case
against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO).[5]
RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government
service from the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a
district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of
Bian, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.[6]
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages
against the Jovellanoses.[7] Because he was with the PAO and aware that the
complainant was not an indigent, he declined.[8] Nevertheless, he advised the
complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private
practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she
was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.[10] Notwithstanding
Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on
suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash on hand, the
complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance of
Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.[11]
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt
because one of her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously
given the respondent for safekeeping.[12] Because the complainant was a friend, he
agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.[13]
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.[14] A few months later or in
September 1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the
Jovellanoses.Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to
prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with
the complainant.[15]
RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from
the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and
recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.[16]
The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was
still with the PAO.[18] It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a
shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these
reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would
respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the
receipt to accommodate a friend's request.[19] It found respondent guilty of violating
the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving
lawyer's fees other than their salaries.[20] The CBD concluded that respondent
violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with
the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three
years and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of
P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.[21]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that
respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the
restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in
case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of
six months.[22]
THE COURT'S RULING
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.[23] More
specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of
their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of
the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.[24]
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public
service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section
7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.[25]
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for
they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their
respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July
15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he accepted money
from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship
between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the
complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the
prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created
for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.[27] Section 14(3), Chapter
5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance
to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.[28]
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.[29] Respondent
violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This undertaking includes the
observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent
when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in
consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the
cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from
acting as the complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and
accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant.
Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first
place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that
he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the
cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for
hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the
lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[31]
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character
required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public
office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.[32]
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the
money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He
neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by
the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)[33] nor was it
given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond).[34] Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government
lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.[35]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyers oath,
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also
ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal rate,
reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
PNB V CEDO
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine
National Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst.
Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank with violation
of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank
in which respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in
arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of
Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his
subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the
pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil
action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since
left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong
Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case
filed by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for
grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to
be later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainants
Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the
spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand
letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the
Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the
law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the
Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel
for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC
decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the
trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that
he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo
Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is
actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not
enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers
named therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm
maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as well as
one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases
independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared
among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and
recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent
was previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with
G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for
forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong
Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully
substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the
Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the
attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings
of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty.
Ferrer, and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to
Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing
of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly
admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that
respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in
itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the
clients secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other
lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to
devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank
since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer,
a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the
IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the
money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4,
1994, submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the
recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On
December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before
this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the
Court took into consideration the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to
emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting
interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95
SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO
who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo
Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this
Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him,
that even if respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence
acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to
information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated
in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the
mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This
Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and
well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings
between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the
revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice
the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former
client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their
previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the
other side in the forcible entry case. In the case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this
Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been
said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect
to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank,
respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his
former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an
employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY.
TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective
immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
all courts in Metro Manila.
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover
from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and
the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANKs
assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and
supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After
EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged
ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several
writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage
of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where
as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as
Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. laws or briefing abstract principles of law. The court rules that the intervention of
al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives
disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGGs motion to disqualify litigator protecting the interest of government.
respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
respondent Mendozas former function as SolGen and his present employment as Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should
ISSUE not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Mendoza. The prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on
he had intervened while in the said service. certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this
HELD restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office. A plain
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted government and 2. relates to his accepting engagement or employment in
as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
However there is still the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest
conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents
et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of matter and the metes and bounds of
intervention that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the matter or the act
of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is advising the
Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by
respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and
cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an
issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter
involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the
intervention. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of