CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW: Article X & PUBLIC CORPORATION LAW CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS v COA, G.R. No.
GENERAL SANTOS v COA, G.R. No.199439, April 22, 2014 -SLYNN
Veloso vs. COA, G.R. No. 193677, Sept. 6, 2011 -DONNA
ISSUE: Does Manila Ordinance No. 8040, which authorized the conferment to the former three-term
councilors retirement and gratuity pay remuneration, a valid exercise of the powers of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod?
RULING: No. In the exercise of the above power, the City Council of Manila enacted on December 7, 2000
Ordinance No. 8040, but the same was deemed approved on August 23, 2002. The ordinance authorized
the conferment of the EPSA to the former three-term councilors and, as part of the award, the qualified
city officials were to be given retirement and gratuity pay remuneration. We believe that the award is a
gratuity which is a free gift, a present, or benefit of pecuniary value bestowed without claim or demand,
or without consideration.
However, as correctly held by the COA, the above power is not without limitations. These
limitations are embodied in Section 81 of RA 7160, to wit:
SEC. 81. Compensation of Local Officials and Employees. The
compensation of local officials and personnel shall be determined by the
sanggunian concerned: Provided, That the increase in compensation of elective
local officials shall take effect only after the terms of office of those approving such
increase shall have expired: Provided, further, That the increase in compensation of
the appointive officials and employees shall take effect as provided in the ordinance
authorizing such increase; Provided however, That said increases shall not exceed
the limitations on budgetary allocations for personal services provided under Title
Five, Book II of this Code: Provided finally, That such compensation may be based
upon the pertinent provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-seven fifty-eight
(R.A. No. 6758), otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
The IRR of RA 7160 reproduced the Constitutional provision that "no elective or appointive local official
or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by
law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind
from any foreign government." Section 325 of the law limit the total appropriations for personal
services37 of a local government unit to not more than 45% of its total annual income from regular
sources realized in the next preceding fiscal year.
While it may be true that the above appropriation did not exceed the budgetary limitation set by RA
7160, we find that the COA is correct in sustaining ND No. 06-010-100-05.
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8040 provides for the payment of "retirement and gratuity pay
remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3) consecutive terms" as
part of the EPSA. The recomputation of the award disclosed that it is equivalent to the total
compensation received by each awardee for nine years that includes basic salary, additional
compensation, Personnel Economic Relief Allowance, representation and transportation allowance,
rice allowance, financial assistance, clothing allowance, 13th month pay and cash gift. This is not
disputed by petitioners. There is nothing wrong with the local government granting additional benefits
to the officials and employees. The laws even encourage the granting of incentive benefits aimed at
improving the services of these employees. Considering, however, that the payment of these benefits
constitute disbursement of public funds, it must not contravene the law on disbursement of public
funds.
ISSUE: Does the constitutional mandate for local autonomy grant local governments the power to
streamline and reorganize as well as the authority to create a separate or supplementary retirement
benefit plan?
RULING: Yes. The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner citys issuance of
Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams as an initial step for its
organization development masterplan.
Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and reorganize. This power is
inferred from Section 76 of the Local Government Code on organizational structure and staffing pattern,
and Section 16 otherwise known as the general welfare clause.
Petitioner citys vision in 2005 of "Total Quality Service" for "the improvement of the quality of services
delivered by the city to the delight of its internal and external customers" is a matter within its discretion.
It then conducted a process and practice review for each and every unit within the city, resulting in the
formulation of an organization development masterplan adopted as Executive Order No. 13, series of
2009.
Resolution No. 004, series of 2009, was later passed requesting for the mayors support for GenSan
SERVES. The third preambular clause states that in order "to transform the bureaucracy into [an] effective
and result[s]-oriented structure, redounding to improved governance, there is a need to entice
employees aged 50-59 years old, to retire earlier than [age] 65 for them to enjoy their retirement while
they are still healthy." Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed creating the GenSan
SERVES program.
Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. 195390, Dec. 10, 2014 -EDGAR
Issue: Do the assailed DILG Memorandum Circulars violate LGUs local and fiscal autonomy?
Ruling: No. The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of promoting good governance
through transparency, accountability and participation. The action of the respondent is certainly within
the constitutional bounds of his power as alter ego of the President.
MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly
intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the
20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine
themselves if they have been complying with the law.
MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08, on the other hand, are but implementation of the policy of the State to
make public officials accountable to the people. They are amalgamations of existing laws, rules and
regulation designed to give teeth to the constitutional mandate of transparency and accountability as the
Constitution, which was drafted after long years of dictatorship and abuse of power commands the strict
adherence to full disclosure of information on all matters relating to official transactions and those
involving public interest with a view of protecting the nation from repeating its atrocious past.
Additional Notes:
Reasons why MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08 do not violate LGUs local and fiscal autonomy
1. The issuances do not interfere with the discretion of the LGUs in the specification of their
priority projects and the allocation of their budgets. The posting requirements are mere
 transparency measures which do not at all hurt the manner by which LGUs decide the
utilization and allocation of their funds.
2. It appears that even Section 352 of the LGC that is being invoked by the petitioners does not
exclude the requirement for the posting of the additional documents stated in MC Nos. 2010-
83 and 2011-08. Apparently, the mentioned provision requires the publication of a summary
of revenues collected and funds received, including the appropriations and disbursements of
such funds.
3. The Court believes that the supervisory powers of the President are broad enough to
embrace the power to require the publication of certain documents as a mechanism of
transparency. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre, the Court reminded that local fiscal autonomy
does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in
order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.
The President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the
government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated
and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.
Fernando vs. St. Escolastica College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013
Issue: Is Marikina City Ordinance No. 192, insofar as imposing a five-meter set back, a valid exercise of
police power?
Ruling: NO. The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the
public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be
available for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on
eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the property
will continue to remain with the respondents. The implementation of the setback requirement would be
tantamount to a taking of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of the respondents private property for
public use without just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness," it is obvious
that providing for a parking area has no logical connection to, and is not reasonably necessary for, the
accomplishment of these goals. Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has
long been settled that the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of
the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the
community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially
divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly,
Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
SJS vs. Lim, G.R. Nos. 187836, etc., Nov. 23, 2014 -GEORGE
Issue: Is Manila Ordinance No. 8027, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 was declared as a
guarantee for the protection of the constitutional right to life of the residents of Manila. There, the Court
said that the enactment of the said ordinance was a valid exercise of police power with the concurrence
of the two requisites: a lawful subject to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila; and a lawful method the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the
land use from industrial to commercial, which effectively ends the continued stay of the oil depots in
Pandacan. The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has
already been passed upon in G. R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment of the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila and the then position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is imminent. Even assuming that the
respondents and intervenors were correct, the very nature of the depots where millions of liters of highly
flammable and highly volatile products, regardless of whether or not the composition may cause
explosions, has no place in a densely populated area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil depots, be
it related to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise, would definitely cause not only destruction to
properties within and among the neighboring communities but certainly mass deaths and injuries.
Aquino vs. Mun. of Malay, G.R. 211356, Sept. 29, 2014 -VALZ
ISSUE: Do LGUs have the power to establish no-build-zones and to demolish structures which are
nuisance per se and per accidens?
Ruling: Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se.
It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance
per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing
is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such.
Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing, be in fact, a
nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution
of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may nevertheless properly
order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare
clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local Government Code authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. The office of the
mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments.
League of Provinces vs. DENR, G.R. 175368, April 11, 2013 - KEN
Issue: Did the act of respondent (DENR) in cancelling the small-scale mining permits amount to executive
control, not merely supervision, and usurpation of the devolved powers of provinces?
Ruling: No. The act of respondent (DENR) cancelling the small-scale mining permits issued by the
Provincial Governor emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No.
7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and, therefore,
decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits, is a quasi-
judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the
contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary
can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale
Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the
rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
Talaga vs. Alcala, G.R. Nos. 196804 & 197015, Oct. 11, 2012- MARV
ISSUE: Will the Vice Mayor succeed under the law on succession as provided for in Sec. 44 of the Local
Government Code?
RULING: YES. Section 44 of the LGC states:
Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x
Abundo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, Jan. 8, 2013 -CARMELA
Issue 1: Is the service of a term less than the full three years by Mayor Abundo, in view of an election
protest, considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive
term limit for elective local officials?
Ruling 1: NO. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived
of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings,
was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. The two-year period during
which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which
effectively removed Abundos case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
Issue 2: Under what instances are the consecutive terms not involuntary broken or interrupted?
Ruling 2: Under jurisprudence, the following are instances where consecutive terms are NOT considered
as involuntary broken or interrupted:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the
position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired
portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated
under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the
application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.).
2. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by
itself, work to interrupt the incumbent officials continuity of service (Latasa).
3. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officers continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred
from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
4. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official
had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an
interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the
defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his
proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
GOH VS. BAYRON & COMELEC, G.R. NO. 212584, NOV. 25, 2014 -ANGEL
ISSUE: Was there legal and factual bases for the Comelec in cancelling the recall election in Puerto
Princesa for lack of funds?
RULING: No legal and factual bases. The 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA) expressly provides
for a line item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections. This is found in the
Programs category of its 2014 budget, which the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a
"line item for the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.'"
When the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its "Current Operating Expenditures,"
such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the
conduct of recall elections. Thus, in Socrates v. COMELEC (Socrates), recall elections were conducted
even without a specific appropriation for recall elections in the 2002 GAA.
The Court found it difficult to justify the COMELEC's reasons why it is unable to conduct recall elections in
2014 when the COMELEC was able to conduct recall elections in 2002 despite lack of the specific words
"Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x" in the 2002 GAA. In the 2002 GAA, the phrase
"Conduct and supervision of elections and other political exercises" was sufficient to fund the conduct of
recall elections. In the 2014 GAA, there is a specific line item appropriation for the "Conduct and
supervision of x x x recall votes x x x."
More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has "a line item for
the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.'" This admission of the
COMELEC is a correct interpretation of this specific budgetary appropriation. To be valid, an appropriation
must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose. However, the purpose may be specific even if it is
broken down into different related sub-categories of the same nature. For example, the purpose can be
to '"conduct elections," which even if not expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or recall elections.
The purpose of the appropriation is still specific - to fund elections, which naturally and logically include,
even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also special or recall elections.
Maquiling vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, Apr. 16, 2013 -MARY
ISSUE: By using his foreign passport after renouncing his foreign citizenship, is a dual citizen divested of
his Filipino citizenship and, thus, disqualified to hold public office?
RULING: Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009,
the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No.63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless
an act which constitute a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the
passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein
as its national. Thus to allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a
foreign passport even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete
disregard of RA 9225 in relation to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Arnado vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 210164, Aug. 18, 2015 -RUTH
Issue: Will a landslide election victory override eligibility requirements?
Ruling: No. Popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado
won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same
"cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications." Election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless.
Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because
the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.

Umali vs. Comelec, Ermita, GR 203974, April 22, 2014 -KYLE
ISSUE: In the plebiscite for the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City to a highly urbanized city, who
are qualified to cast their votes: the registered voters of Cabanatuan City only or the registered voters of
the province of Nueva Ecija?
RULING: The registered voters of the province of Nueva Ecija. In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should
be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit
or units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the change.
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for determining the qualified voters who will
participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue.
Section 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally apply to
conversions as well. While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution, the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of
boundaries.
The phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but the
entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the province are qualified to cast their
votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City.
Republic vs. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013 ROSING
Issue: Does the President have the power to merge administrative regions and transfer the regional
center and regional offices?
Ruling: Yes. This Court has held that while the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for
expressly in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. This power of
supervision is found in the Constitution as well as in the Local Government Code of 1991. In Chiongbian v.
Orbos, the Court held further that the power of the President to reorganize administrative regions carries
with it the power to determine the regional center.
NPC vs. City of Cabanatuan, G.R. 177332, Oct. 1, 2014 -YANG
Issues: Can local governments impose interest and surcharges on taxes due? Did the City of Cabanatuan
impose the correct surcharge?
Ruling:
1) Yes, both the surcharge and interest are imposable upon failure of the taxpayer to pay the tax
on the date fixed in the law for its payment. The surcharge is imposed to hasten tax payments
and to punish for evasion or neglect of duty, while interest is imposed to compensate the
State "for the delay in paying the tax and for the concomitant use by the taxpayer of funds
that rightfully should be in the government's hands."
2) No, it effectively exceeded the prescribed 72% ceiling for interest under Section 168 of the
Local Government Code. The law allows the local government to collect an interest at the rate
not exceeding 2% per month of the unpaid taxes, fees, or charges including surcharges, until
such amount is fully paid. However, the law provides that the total interest on the unpaid
amount or portion thereof should not exceed thirty-six (36) months or three (3) years. In
other words, respondent cannot collect a total interest on the unpaid tax including surcharge
that is effectively higher than 72%. Here, respondent applied the 25% cumulative surcharge
for more than three years. Its computation undoubtedly exceeded the 72% ceiling imposed
under Section 168 of the Local Government Code. Hence, respondent's computation of the
surcharge is oppressive and unconscionable.
LIM VS. COLET, G.R. 120051, DEC. 10, 2014 -NININ
ISSUE: Is Section 21(B) of Manila City Ordinance No. 7794, aka Manila Revenue Code, as amended,
insofar as it imposes business tax on businesses already assessed with percentage taxes, valid and
constitutional?
RULING: No. Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, is null and void for being in
violation of the guidelines and limitations on the taxing powers of the LGUs under the LGC. It is already
well-settled that although the power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for the LGUs to
whom the power must be delegated by Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines and
limitations that Congress may provide.
Among the common limitations on the taxing power of LGUs is Section 133(j) of the LGC, which states
that "[u]nless otherwise provided herein," the taxing power of LGUs shall not extend to "[t]axes on the
gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or
freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code[.]"
Section 133(j) of the LGC clearly and unambiguously proscribes LGUs from imposing any tax on the gross
receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by
hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water. Yet, confusion arose from the phrase "unless otherwise
provided herein," found at the beginning of the said provision. The City of Manila and its public officials
insisted that said clause recognized the power of the municipality or city, under Section 143(h) of the
LGC, to impose tax "on any business subject to the excise, value-added or percentage tax under the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended." And it was pursuant to Section 143(h) of the LGC that the
City of Manila and its public officials enacted, approved, and implemented Section 21(B) of the Manila
Revenue Code, as amended.
The Court is not convinced. Section 133(j) of the LGC prevails over Section 143(h) of the same Code, and
Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, was manifestly in contravention of the former.
FDCP v. Colon Heritage, GR No. 203754, June 16, 2015 -BEV
ISSUE: Are Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 unconstitutional for violating local fiscal autonomy?
RULING: Yes. The power of taxation, being an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belongs, as
a matter of right, to every independent government, and needs no express conferment by the people
before it can be exercised. It is purely legislative and, thus, cannot be delegated to the executive and
judicial branches of government without running afoul to the theory of separation of powers. It however,
can be delegated to municipal corporations, consistent with the principle that legislative powers may be
delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local concern.
The authority of provinces, cities, and municipalities to create their own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, therefore, is not inherent and may be exercised only to the extent that such power might be
delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute.
According to the court, what RA 9167 seeks to accomplish is the segregation of the amusement taxes
raised and collected by Cebu City and its subsequent transfer to FDCP. The court concluded that this
arrangement cannot be classified as a tax exemption but is a confiscatory measure where the national
government extracts money from the local government's coffers and transfers it to FDCP, a private
agency, which in turn, will award the money to private persons, the film producers, for having
produced graded films.
The court further held that Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 are contrary to the basic policy in local
autonomy that all taxes, fees, and charges imposed by the LGUs shall accrue exclusively to them, as
articulated in Article X, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution. This edict, according to the court, is a limitation
upon the rule-making power of Congress when it provides guidelines and limitations on the local
government unit's (LGU's) power of taxation. Therefore, when Congress passed this "limitation," it
went beyond its legislative authority, rendering the questioned provisions unconstitutional.
MCIAA vs. City of Lapu-Lapu PEZA, G.R. No. 181756, June 15, 2015 -SHEILA
ISSUE: Can the City of Lapu-Lapu tax MCIAA?
RULING: No. The petitioner is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties actually, solely
and exclusively used for public purposes, consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway,
taxiway and the lots on which they are situated, are not subject to real property tax and respondent City
is not justified in collecting taxes from petitioner over said properties.
Ferrer vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015 -RAM
ISSUE: Are Quezon City Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized Housing
Tax and Garbage Fee, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
1. SP-2095, S-2011 on the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) is VALID.
The SHT charged by the QC Government is a tax which is within its power to impose. Cities are allowed to
exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which
include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings. The
collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of
taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in
the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public
interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless
constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well.
2. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee is INVALID. Although it does not violate the rule on double
taxation, it nonetheless violates the rule on equality.
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a
condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in
size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed
rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is
from a condominium or from a socialized housing project. (No need to copy this paragraph, just an
example)
Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of
promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-
consuming the present resources and in generating waste. Instead of simplistically categorizing the
payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount
of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household
age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to
pay, and actual occupancy of the property.
ALTA VISTA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB VS. CEBU CITY, G.R. NO. 180235, JAN. 20, 2016 - MARQ
ISSUE: Is Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, imposing amusement tax on
golf courses within the authority of Cebu City to enact under the Local Government Code?
RULING: No. Section 42 of the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, imposing amusement tax
on golf courses is null and void as it is beyond the authority of respondent Cebu City to enact under the
Local Government Code.
The Local Government Code authorizes the imposition by LGUs of amusement tax under Section 140 to
be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses,
boxing stadia, and "other places of amusement". "Amusement places," as defined in Section 13l(c) of the
Local Government Code, "include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of
amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performance." In light of Pelizloy Realty, a golf course cannot be considered a place of amusement.
[As petitioner asserted, people do not enter a golf course to see or view a show or performance.
Petitioner also, as proprietor or operator of the golf course, does not actively display, stage, or present a
show or performance. People go to a golf course to engage themselves in a physical sport activity, i.e., to
play golf; the same reason why people go to a gym or court to play badminton or tennis or to a shooting
range for target practice, yet there is no showing herein that such gym, court, or shooting range is
similarly considered an amusement place subject to amusement tax. There is no basis for singling out golf
courses for amusement tax purposes from other places where people go to play sports. This is in
contravention of one of the fundamental principles of local taxation: that the "taxation shall be uniform
in each local government unit." Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection,
requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities. ]
Section 186 of the Local Government Code expressly grants LGUs the residual power to levy taxes, fees,
or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated therein or taxed under the
provisions of the NIRC or other applicable laws. Respondents, however, cannot claim that Section 42 of
the Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance, as amended, imposing amusement tax on golf courses, was
enacted pursuant to the residual power to tax of respondent Cebu City. An LGU may exercise its
residual power to tax when there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute; or when such taxes,
fees, or charges are not otherwise specifically enumerated in the Local Government Code, NIRC, as
amended, or other applicable laws. In the present case, Section 140, in relation to Section 131 (c), of
the Local Government Code already explicitly and clearly cover amusement tax and respondent Cebu
City must exercise its authority to impose amusement tax within the limitations and guidelines as set
forth in said statutory provisions.