ARMANDOBARCELLANO,

Petitioner,
versus
SECONDDIVISIONG.R.No.165287

DOLORESBAAS,representedbyhersonandAttorneyinfactCRISPINO
BERMILLO,Respondent.

xxDECISION

PEREZ, J.:Before the Court is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the
Fifteenth Division

of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 67702 dated 26 February 2004, granting
the petition of

Dolores Baas, herein respondent, to reverse and set aside the Decision of the lower
court. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
decision of the court a quo is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and in its stead
another one is rendered GRANTING to petitionerappellants the right to redeem the
subject property for the amount of Php 60,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the
finality of this decision.

The facts as gathered by the court follow:

Respondent Baas is an heir of Bartolome Baas who owns in fee simple Lot 4485,
PLS722D situated in Hindi, Bacacay, Albay. Adjoining the said lot is the property
of Vicente Medina (Medina), covered by Original Certificate of Title No. VH9094,
with an area of 1,877 square meters. On 17 March 1997, Medina offered his lot for
sale to the adjoining owners of the property, the heirs of Bartolome Baas, including
herein respondent Dolores Baas, Crispino Bermillo

(Bermillo) and Isabela BermilloBeruela (Beruela) Crispino Bermillo, as the

representative of his family, agreed to the offer of Medina, the sale to take place
after the harvest season. On 3 April 1997, Medina sold the property to herein
petitioner Armando Barcellano for P60,000.00. The following day, the heirs of Baas
learned about the sale and went to the house of

Medina to inquire about Medina confirmed that the lot was sold to Barcellano. The
heirs conveyed their intention to redeem the property but Medina replied that there
was already a deed of

sale executed between the parties. Also, the Baas heirs failed to tender the
P60,000.00 redemption amount to Medina.
Aggrieved, the heirs went to the Office of the BarangayCouncil on 5 April 1997.
Medina sent only his tenant to attend the proceeding. On 9 April 1997, the Baas
heirs and Barcellano, with neither Medina nor his tenant in attendance, went to the
Office of the BarangayCouncil to settle the dispute. According to one of the Baas
heirs, Barcellano told them that he would be willing to sell the

property but for a higher price of P90,000.00. Because the parties could not agree
on the price and for failure to settle the dispute, the Luponissued a Certification to
File Action.

On 24 October 1997, Dolores Baas filed an action for Legal Redemption before the
Regional Trial Court. However, on 5 February 1998, the petition was withdrawn on
the ground that:
xxx considering the present worse economic situation in the country, petitioner
opted that the amount they are supposed to pay for the redemption be readily
available for their immediate and emergency needs.

On 11 March 1998, Dolores Baas, as represented by Bermillo, filed another action

for Legal Redemption. It was opposed by Barcellano insisting that he complied with
the provisions of Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code but Baas failed to exercise her
right within the period provided by law.

Trial ensued. On 15 March 2000, the trial court dismissed the complaint of the Baas
heirs for their failure to comply with the condition precedent of making a formal
offer to redeem and for failure to file an action in court together with the
consignation of the redemption price within the reglementary period of 30 days.
The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court
and granted the heirs the right to redeem the subject property. The appellate court
ruled that the filing of a complaint before the KatarungangPambarangayshould be
considered as a notice to Barcellano and Medina that the heirs were exercising their
right of redemption over the subject property; and as having set in motion the
judicial process of legal redemption. Further, the appellate court ruled that a formal
offer to redeem, coupled with a tender of payment of the redemption price, and
consignation are proper only if the redemptioner wishes to avail himself of his right
of redemption in the future. The tender of payment and consignation become
inconsequential when the redemptioner

files a case to redeem the property within the 30day period. Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari.

In this petition, Barcellano questions the ruling of the appellate court for being
contrary to the admitted facts on record and applicable jurisprudence.
TheCourtsRuling

Barcellano maintains that the written notice required under Art. 1623 to be given to
adjoining owner was no longer necessary because there was already actual notice.
Further, he asserts that the appellate court erred in ruling that the tender of payment
of the redemption price and consignation are not required in this case, effectively
affirming that the respondents had validly exercised their right of redemption.
Lastly, he questions as erroneous the application of Presidential Decree No. 1508,
otherwise known as EstablishingaSystemofAmicablySettlingDisputesatthe
BarangayLevel,thereby ruling that the filing by the heirs of the complaint before
the Barangaywas an exercise of right of redemption.

We need only to discuss the requirement of notice under Art. 1623 of the New Civil
Code, which provides that:
The right of legal preemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as
the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice
thereof to all possible redemptioners.

Nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties shows that there was
a written notice sent to the respondents. Without a written notice, the period of
thirty days within which the right of legal preemption may be exercised, does not
start.

The indispensability of a written notice had long been discussed in the early case of
Conejerov.CourtofAppeals,penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
With regard to the written notice, we agree with petitioners that such notice is
indispensable, and that, in view of the terms in which Article of the Philippine Civil
Code is couched, mere knowledge of the sale, acquired in some other manner by the
redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The written notice was obviously exacted
by the Code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to
quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The statute not having provided
for any alternative, the method of notification prescribed remains exclusive.
This is the same ruling in Verdadv.CourtofAppeals:
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a coowner, the latter is still entitled to a
written notice from the selling coowner in order to remove all uncertainties about
the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
Lately, in GosiengfiaoGuillenv.theCourtofAppeals, this Court again emphasized
the mandatory character of a written notice in legal redemption:
From these premises, we ruled that [P]etitionerheirshavenotlosttheirrightto
redeem,forintheabsenceofawrittennotificationofthesalebythevendors,the
30dayperiodhasnotevenbeguntorun.These premises and conclusion leave no
doubt about the thrust of Mariano: Therightofthepetitionerheirstoexercise
theirrightoflegalredemptionexists,andtherunningoftheperiodforits
exercisehasnotevenbeentriggeredbecausetheyhavenotbeennotifiedin
writingofthefactofsale.(Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner argues that the only purpose behind Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code
is to ensure that the owner of the adjoining land is actually notified of the intention
of the owner to sell his property. To advance their argument, they cited Destritov.
CourtofAppealsas cited in Alonzov.

IntermediateAppellateCourt, where this Court pronounced that written notice is no

longer necessary in case of actual notice of the sale of property.
The Alonzo case does not apply to this case. There, we pronounced that the
disregard of the mandatory written rule was an exception due to the peculiar
circumstance of the case. Thus:
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents'
pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in
1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our
eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus
exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make
sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the
other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the
sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in
1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the
first complaint for redemption was filed, the other coheirs were actually informed of
the sale and that thereafter the 30day period started running and ultimately expired.
This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none
of the coheirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words,
when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been
extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an
alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which
he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced
inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry,
but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if
he had known the facts.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the coheirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo,
who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build
thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary
possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet,
given this unseemly situation, none of the coheirs saw fit to object or at least
inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen
years before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was
already too late. x xxx
The coheirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30day period began
and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
complaint for redemption in 1977, without the coheirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

The Court clarified that:

Werealizethatinarrivingatourconclusiontoday,wearedeviatingfromthe
strict letter ofthelaw,whichtherespondent courtunderstandablyapplied
pursuanttoexistingjurisprudence.Thesaidcourtactedproperlyasithadno
competencetoreversethedoctrineslaiddownbythisCourtintheabovecited
cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not
abandoningtheDeConejeroandButtledoctrines.Whatwearedoingsimply
is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstancesofthiscase. (Emphasis supplied)

Without the peculiar circumstances in the present case, Alonzo cannot find
application. The impossibility in Alonzoof the parties not knowing about the sale of
a portion of the property they were actually occupying is not presented in this case.
The strict letter of the law must apply. That a departure from the strict letter should
only be for extraordinary reasons is clear from the second sentence of Art. 1623 that
The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompaniedbyanaffidavitofthevendorthathehasgivenwrittennoticethereof
toallpossibleredemptioners.

Justice Edgardo Paras, referring to the origins of the requirement, would explain in
his commentaries on the New Civil Code that despite actual knowledge, the person
having the right to redeem is STILLentitled to the written notice. Both the letter
and the spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope
of the written notice by including therein any other kind of notice such as an oral
one, or by registration. If the intent of the law has been to include verbal notice or
any other means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, there
would have been no necessity or reason to specify in the article that said notice be
in writing, for
under the old law, a verbal notice or mere information was already deemed
sufficient.

Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the
law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.
There is only room for

application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to
an injustice. The law is clear in this case, there must first be a written notice to the
family of Baas.
AbsoluteSentenciaExpositoreNonIndiget, when the language of the law is clear,
no explanation of it is required.

We find no need to rule on the other issues presented by the petitioner. The
respondent Baas has a perfect right of redemption and was never in danger of losing
such right even if there was no redemption complaint filed with the barangay, no
tender of payment or no consignation.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 26 February 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 67702, granting to petitionerappellants the
right to redeem the subject property for the amount of Php60,000.00 within thirty
(30) days from the finality of this decision is hereby AFFIRMED.No cost.

SOORDERED.