EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS VS. DANS
Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and Provinces
Facts: This petition was filed to compel the
respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station
DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of
national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due
process when it was closed on the mere allegation that
the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It
alleged that no hearing was held and no proof was
submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure.
The petitioner was not informed beforehand why
administrative action which closed the radio station was
taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents
to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the
closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of
freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the
respondents' general charge of "inciting people to
commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's
shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public
events and the airing of programs geared towards public
affairs. ISSUE: Was the closure, without hearing,
violative of the freedom of the press?
RULING: Yes. All forms of communication are entitled to
the broad protection of the freedom of expression
clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television
and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than
the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
Yet the freedom to comment on public affairs is
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.
Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given
to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of
expression clauses of the Constitution
The cardinal primary requirements in
administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in
AngTibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635)
should be followed before a broadcast station may be
closed or its operations curtailed.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC,
Facts:
1. On October 23, 1989, RA 6766, entitled AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION was enacted into law;
2.
of Benguet, Abra, Mt. Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-
Apayao, all comprising the autonomous region shall take
part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for December
27, 1989 but was reset to January 30, 1990 specifically
for the ratification or rejection of the said act;
3. By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881), the Comelec issued Comelec
Resolution No. 2167, Section 19 of which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or
announcers.- During the plebiscite campaign period, on
the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall
use his column or radio or television time to campaign
for or against the plebiscite issues.
4. On November 20, 1989, petitioner PABLITO V.
SANIDAD who is a columnist (OVERVIEW) for the
Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper circulated
in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, filed a petition
for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Comelec to enjoin the latter from
enforcing Section 19 of resolution No. 2167. Petitioner
claims that the said provision is violative of his
constitutional freedom of expression and of the press
and it also constitutes a prior restraint because it
imposes subsequent punishment for those who violate
the same;
5. On November 28, 1989, the Supreme Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent
from enforcing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167;
6. On January 9, 1990, Comelec through the Solicitor
General filed its Comment and moved for the dismissal
of the petition on the ground that Section 19 of
Resolution No. 2167 does not absolutely bar the
petitioner from expressing his views because under
Section 90 and 92 of BP 881, he may still express his
views or campaign for or against the act through the
Comelec space and airtime.
Held: What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to
the Comelec is the power to supervise and regulate the
use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or
other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity,
time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are insured.
The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give
undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising
time and space. This is also the reason why a columnist,
commentator or announcer is required to take a leave
of absence from his work during the campaign period if
he is a candidate.
HOWEVER, NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE
CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B), 2ND PAR. OF RA
6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE
COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO
SUPERVISE AND REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY MEDIA
PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT TO
EXPRESSION DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIODS. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during the plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates in a plebiscite.
While it is true that the petitioner is not
absolutely barred from campaigning for or against the
Organic Act, said fact does not cure the constitutional
infirmity of Section 19, Comelec Resolution No. 2167.
This is so because IT IS STILL A RESTRICTION ON HIS
CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS
VIEW.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and
importance. The peoples right to be informed and to be
able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be
better served by access to an unabridged discussion of
the issues, INCLUDING THE FORUM. The people affected
by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be
unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the
right to expression may be exercised.
ACCORDINGLY, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to
the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil
action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter
informed him through a telegram that his certificate of
candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited
from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with
sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner
accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional
right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its
prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional
Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the
candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute
sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights,
athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts,
hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of
domestic or foreign origin. COMELEC contended that
the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer
used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material
and was, under the above statute, subject to
confiscation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the
petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the
COMELEC.
HELD: The Court held that the general words following
any enumeration being applicable only to things of the
same kind or class as those specifically referred to. The
COMELECs contention that a candidates jingle form
part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase
and the like, could not merit the courts approval by
principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that
what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution
of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution.
Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe
construction of the statute which should be in
consonance to the express terms of the constitution.
The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be
laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the
candidates constitutional rights.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC
FACTS:
 COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the
issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any
other groups, its agents or representatives from
conducting exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by
the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of
the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote
during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be
broadcasted immediately. The electoral body believed
that such project might conflict with the official Comelec
count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also
noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN
to undertake the exit survey.
Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998,
the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was
directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining
order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit
polls were actually conducted and reported by media
without any difficulty or problem.
ISSUE: W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers,
can absolutely ban exit polls
ABS-CBn: The holding of exit polls and the nationwide
reporting of their results are valid exercises of the
freedoms of speech and of the press
COMELEC:
1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its
constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean,
honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections";
and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot."
2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might
unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the
surveys were designed "to condition the minds of
people and cause confusion as to who are the winners
and the losers in the election," which in turn may result
in "violence and anarchy."
3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional
principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the
"voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in
violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution and
relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. It
submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms
invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by
the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power,"
such as in the present case.
4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise
thereof creates a clear and present danger to the
community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then
contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow
confusion considering the randomness of selecting
interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly
unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit
poll may not be in harmony with the official count made
by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the
exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying
the credibility and integrity of the electoral process."
SUPREME COURT: The COMELEC Resolution on exit
polls ban is nullified and set aside.
1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity
of electoral processes
Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a
survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at
random, so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or
view of the community or group polled. Second, the
survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with
the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the
opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in
general has probably voted for, based on the limited
data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at
stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the
elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the
reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine
those of the elections, since the former is only part of
the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be
indicative of the other.
2) Overbroad
The Comelec's concern with the possible
noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and
confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total
ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec
Resolution is too broad, since its application is without
qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or
not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code
prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers.
[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the
means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers.
Neither has any evidence been presented proving that
the presence of exit poll reporters near an election
precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.
Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the
collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose.
The valuable information and ideas that could be
derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the
survey questions will forever remain unknown and
unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates,
researchers, social scientists and the electorate in
general would be deprived of studies on the impact of
current events and of election-day and other factors on
voters' choices.
3) Violation of Ban Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit polls
indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the
ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not
seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot
system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to
avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus,
voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of
their official ballots to other persons, from making
copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks
thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding
out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters
or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who
have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the
association of voters with their respective votes, for the
purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in
accordance with the instructions of a third party. This
result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the
voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of
whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not
actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom
an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but
voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their
identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures
may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or
suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit
polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of
our people.
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by
qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the
purpose of determining the probable result of an
election by confidentially asking randomly selected
voters whom they have voted for, immediately after
they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the
survey are announced to the public, usually through the
mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the
opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the
electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had
not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998
elections.
SWS vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct
an election survey throughout the period of the
elections and release to the media the results of such
survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue
that the restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint.
Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the
holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination
of their results through mass media, valid and
constitutional?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or
beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may
well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as
diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.
ADIONG v. COMELEC
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic
Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following
are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly
exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether
public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the
COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards.
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial
candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the
COMELECs Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting
of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and
other moving vehicles. According to him such
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No.
6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the
posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public
or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of
Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC
providing that decals and stickers may be posted only
in any of the authorized posting areas provided in
paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL
and VOID. The COMELECs prohibition on posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in designated areas provided for by the
COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizens fundamental right of free speech enshrined in
the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the
freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned
prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of
an individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with
him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on
the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution
is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the
decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizens private property, which
in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions
allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they
include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of
ones living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this
prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of
the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law.
(The right to property may be subject to a greater
degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a
liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part
of the Government must be exceptionally convincing
and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give
a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity
to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies,
mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII,
section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and
stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be
reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars,
calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles
needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence,
the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind
of election propaganda not the financial resources of
the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified
by the Constitution.
Gitlow v. New York
Facts. The Petitioner was charged with criminal anarchy
because he was an advocate of socialist reform in the
United States. The Petitioner is a member of the Left
Wing Section of the Socialist Party. He served as the
business manager for the paper that was run by the
organization. In 1919 he published the groups
manifesto and prepared for widespread distribution
from the New York City headquarters.
Issue. Did the statute prohibiting such activity deprive
the Petitioner of his First Amendment constitutional
right to freedom of expression?
Held. No. The current statute is not an unreasonable or
arbitrary means of exercising the states police power. It
is within the states power to prevent the disturbance of
the peace and regulate speech that may incite crime
even if the threat of such action is not immediate.
Dissent. A state may not prohibit speech unless it
presents a clear and present danger to the public
interest.
Discussion. Freedom of speech and press do not confer
an absolute right to publish or speak without being held
responsible for the results of such speech. The state
may regulate to protect its interests in general welfare
of its citizens.
Espuelas vs People
Facts: On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates
inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar
Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to
appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a
piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree,
when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a
barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas
sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News,
the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other
local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also
throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he
made to appear that it was written by a fictitious
suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's
supposed wife translation of which letter or note,
stating his dismay and administration of President
Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and
Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to
President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that
in the Philippines the government is infested with many
Hitlers and Mussolinis.
Issue: Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel
under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of
the Philippines?
Held: Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty
as charged. And there being no question as to the
legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will
be affirmed with costs.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its
consequences, the article written bybthe accused,
cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to
sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating
language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with
the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to
martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize.
When the use irritating language centers not on
persuading the readers but on creating disturbances,
the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the
speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit
the entire governmental structure but only President
Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes
not only all libels against the Government but also
"libels against any of the duly constituted authorities
thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government
obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and
the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty,
Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this
score alone the conviction could be upheld.
Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites
rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up
people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke
violence from opposition who may seek to silence the
writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense
under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to its
immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the
pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to
resort to illegal methods other than those provided by
the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which
press upon their minds.
Schenck v Us
Facts. This case is based on a three count indictment.
The first charge was a conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act of 1917. The second alleges a conspiracy
to commit an offense against the United States. The
third count alleges an unlawful use of the mails for the
transmission of unlawful matter. The document in
question claims that the draft is a violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution and
encourages people to assert your opposition to the
draft. The Defendants, Schenck and other publishers of
the leaflets (Defendants), were found guilty on all of the
counts.
Issue. Whether the words used in the leaflets are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
protect?
Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. In
many places and in ordinary times, the Defendants in
saying all that was said in the leaflets would have been
within their constitutional rights. However, the
character of every act depends on the circumstances in
which it is done. The question in every case is whether
the words are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to protect. When a nation is at war,
many things that might be said in a time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will
not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right. Therefore, the words used in the leaflets are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
protect.
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833;
18 APR 1969]
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967,
prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and
limiting the period of election campaign or partisan
political activity was challenged on constitutional
grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free
speech and free press, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act.
Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the
petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of
Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently
elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on
the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter
in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-
petitioner. There was the further allegation that the
nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of
election campaign are matters of political expediency
and convenience which only political parties can
regulate or curtail by and among themselves through
self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement
and that the regulation and limitation of these political
matters invoking the police power, in the absence of
clear and present danger to the state, would render the
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and
without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to
appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No.
4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the
preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of
association. He did justify its enactment however under
the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the
substantive evil of elections, whether for national or
local officials, being debased and degraded by
unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and
undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well. The
Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the
U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle
were requested to give their opinions. Respondents
contend that the act was based on the police power of
the state.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are
two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are
the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous
tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before the utterance can be punished.
The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive
evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of
establishing according to the above decision a definite
rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words may be publicly established. The
"dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state
has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.
It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts
of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms.
Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent.
The challenged statute could have been more
narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional
requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and
present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly
explained, such provisions were deemed by the
legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary
and appropriate response not merely to a clear and
present danger but to the actual existence of a grave
and substantive evil of excessive partisanship,
dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of
late has invariably marred election campaigns and
partisan political activities in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in
form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs
and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case
of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches,
announcements or commentaries, or the holding of
interviews for or against the election of any party or
candidate for public office and the prohibition of the
publication or distribution of campaign literature or
materials, against the solicitation of votes whether
directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any
campaign literature or propaganda for or against any
candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional
command.
chaplinsky vs new hampshire
Facts. A New Hampshire statute prohibited any person
from addressing any offensive, derisive or annoying
word to any other person who is on any street or public
place or calling him by any derisive name. Chaplinsky, a
Jehovahs Witness, called a City Marshal a God damned
racketeer and a damned fascist in a public place and
was therefore arrested and convicted under the statute.
Issue. Did the statute or the application of the statute to
Chaplinskys comments violate his free speech rights
under the First Amendment of the Constitution?
Held. No. The lower court is affirmed.
Considering the purpose of the First
Amendment of the Constitution, it is obvious that the
right to free speech is not absolute under all
circumstances. There are some narrowly defined classes
of speech that have never been protected by the First
Amendment of the Constitution. These include fighting
words, words that inflict injury or tend to excite an
immediate breach of the peace. Such words are of such
little expositional or social value that any benefit they
might produce is far outweighed by their costs on social
interests in order and morality.
The statute at issue is narrowly drawn to define
and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of
government power. Moreover, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire, which is the ultimate arbiter of the
meanings of New Hampshire law, has defined the
Statute as applying only to fighting words. Therefore,
the Statute does not unconstitutionally impinge upon
the right of free speech.
Discussion. By holding that fighting words are not
protected forms of speech the Supreme Court of the
United States (Supreme Court) announced a rare form
of content based restriction on speech that is
permissible. The student should consider what
characteristics distinguish a fight word from a bona
fide criticism. One difference may lie in the speakers
intent. Fighting words are intended to inflict harm,
bona-fide criticisms are intended to communicate ideas.
Another difference may lie in the differing likely effects
of each: fighting words are likely to provoke the
average person to violence while bona fide criticisms
are not.
U.S. v Bustos
Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a
petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges
against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of
Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery
charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not
all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found
him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he
was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an
auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against
him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor
General but it wasnt acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by
Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants
guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the
objection made by Punsalan. The trial court denied the
motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed.
Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was
not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond
reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous
statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the
introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits
upon which the petition forming the basis of the
libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire
the objection in advertently interposed by their counsel
to the admission in evidence of the expediente
administrativo out of which the accusation in this case
arose.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants and appellants
are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace in Pampanga.
Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.
Ratio: Freedom of speech was non existent in the
country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform
made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution,
on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley
himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine
Liberty when he wrote, that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were
references to public opinion should be the constant
source of liberty and democracy. It also said the
guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of
the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the
law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject
for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a
justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other
public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of
the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.
It is a duty which every one owes to society or
to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any
official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the
wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to
the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and
punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the
necessary consequence of republican institutions and
the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly
means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably
for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition
means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or
office of the government for a redress of grievances.
The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course,
assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for
public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the
result of this. Privilged communications may in some
instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public
policy is the unfettered administration of justice.
Privilege is either absolute or qualified.
Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by
proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints made in
good faith against a public officials conduct having a
duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to
be false, the protection of privilege may cover the
individual given that it was in good faith. There must be
a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any
subject-matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory
matter which without this privilege would be slanderous
and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from
defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption.
The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The
plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.
Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will
amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the
information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se. The charges might also
under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a
libel of a government official. As a general rule words
imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty
or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him
in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the
beginning we do not have present a simple case of
direct and vicious accusations published in the press,
but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the
proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express
malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further,
although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by
the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and
the motives of these citizens to secure the removal
from office of a person thought to be venal were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These
respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous
matter but on instances which not only seemed to them
of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an
investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him
of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to
the petition. The manner of commenting on the
conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.
IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO
Facts: Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of
general circulation, the Manila Standard. He describes
himself as a columnist, who incidentally happens to be
a lawyer,, had been writing about alleged improperties
and irregularities in the judiciary over several months
(from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). Other
journalists had also been making reports or comments
on the same subject. At the same time, anonymous
communications were being extensively circulated, by
hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and
corruption in the courts. And all these were being
repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain sectors
of society. Events Directly Giving Rise to the Proceeding
at Bar.
The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by
the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27,
1992, in the so-called controversial case of Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), G.R. No, 94374. In that decision
the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in
favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority.
In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374,
the Philippine Daily Inquirer and one or two other
newspapers published, on January 28, 1993, a report of
the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes, an
alleged expert in linguistics. This gentleman, it appears,
had been commissioned by one of the parties in the
case, Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), to
examine and analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in
relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings
of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to
ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in
part, by the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that
the Gutierrez decision looks, reads and sounds like the
writing of the PLDTs counsel, Thus, he speaks of the
Magnificent Seven, by merely referring to undisclosed
regional trial court judges in Makati; the Magnificent
Seven in the Supreme Court, as some undesignated
justices who supposedly vote as one; the Dirty Dozen,
as unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other
cities. He adverts to an anonymous group of justices and
judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a party; and
six unnamed justices of this Court who reportedly spent
a prepaid vacation in Hong Kong with their families.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order
Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports
of Corruption in the Judiciary, to investigate the said
reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit
was also received from the public utility, denying the
allegations in Jurados column. The Supreme Court then
issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with
in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company
be docketed and acted upon as an official Court
proceeding for the determination of whether or not the
allegations made by Jurado are true.
HELD: Jurados actuations, in the context in which they
were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and
indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he
might cause to the name and reputation of those of
whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court,
directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the
administration of justice and the judges engaged in that
function. By doing them, he has placed himself beyond
the circle of reputable, decent and responsible
journalists who live by their Code or the Golden Rule
and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and
nobility of their calling.
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate,
may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free
speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public official, should
enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement
and the false statement made with reckless disregard of
the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the
norm for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional
or otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. The provision is
reflective of the universally accepted precept of abuse
of rights, one of the most dominant principles which
must be deemed always implied in any system of law.
 Requirement to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements when
publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded
as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of
conduct which embody more stringent standards of
honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly
required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons
who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot
reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to
private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to
discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain
their self-respect from becoming judges. The public
interest involved in freedom of speech and the
individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all
other public officials) in the maintenance of private
honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to
the other. And the point of adjustment or
accommodation between these two legitimate interests
is precisely found in the norm which requires those
who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements
which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or
other public officials to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish.
The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee
the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm
does prohibit the reckless disregard of private
reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory
statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the
truth thereof.
Policarpio Vs Manila Times
Facts : Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover
P150,000.00, as actual damages, P70,000, as moral
damages, P60,000 as correctional and exemplary
damages, and P20,000, as attorney's fees, aside from
the costs, by reason of the publication in the Saturday
Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in the Daily Mirror of
August 13, 1956, of two (2) articles or news items which
are claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous and false,
and to have exposed her to ridicule, jeopardized her
integrity, good name and business and official
transactions, and caused her grave embarrassment,
untold and extreme moral, mental and physical anguish
and incalculable material, moral, professional and
business damages. The defendants are The Manila
Times Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher of The Saturday
Mirror and The Daily Mirror, which are newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines, and Constante C.
Roldan, Manuel V. Villa-Real, E. Aguilar Cruz and
Consorcio Borje, as the reporter or author of the first
article and the managing editor, the associate editor and
the news editor, respectively, of said newspaper.
Issue : WON the
Held : It goes without saying that newspapers must
enjoy a certain degree of discretion in determining the
manner in which a given event should be presented to
the public, and the importance to be attached thereto,
as a news item, and that its presentation in a
sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspaper may
publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or
other official proceedings, which are not of confidential
nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth
with respect to such proceedings, which, being official
and non-confidential, are open to public consumption.
But, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing
derogatory information must be not only true, but, also,
fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any
comments or remarks In the case at bar, aside from
containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the
article published on August 11, 1956, presented her in a
worse predicament than that in which she, in fact, was.
In other words, said article was not a fair and true
report of the proceedings there in alluded to. What is
more, its sub-title "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON
FRAUD" is a comment or remark, besides being false.
Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in
said article are "presumed to be malicious". We note
that the news item published on August 13, 1956,
rectified a major inaccuracy contained in the first article,
by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed
the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's
office. It, likewise, indicated the number of sheets of
stencil involved in said complaints. But, this rectification
or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility
arising from the publication of the first article, although
it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil.
52). For this reason, we feel that the interest of justice
and of all parties concerned would be served if the
defendants indemnify the plaintiff in the sums of
P3,000, by way of moral damages, and P2,000, as
attorney's fees
AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861;
G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and
his movie production company, Ayer Productions,
envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing
and for Philippine and international release, the historic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed
motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government
agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of
the intended film production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-
series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style,
creating four fictional characters interwoven with real
events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading
playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New
South Wales) is an American historian have developed a
script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in
any cinema or television production, film or other
medium for advertising or commercial exploitation.
petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of
Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and
petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile
invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the
desistance of the movie production and making of any
reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any
fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless
is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance
to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was
violated.
Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression
includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or
to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture
films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet
uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial
Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and
present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy.
Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The
subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the
history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the
momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was
a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have
lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of
the instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may
be marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of events.
LAGUNZAD vs.VDA. DE GONZALES & CA
FACTS
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman,
began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises
Padilla Story" portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a
mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental and for
whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of
the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried
and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was on the
public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which
dealt with his private and family life including the
portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto,
private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his
girl friend. Padillas half sister, for and in behalf of her
mother, Vda.de Gonzales, objected to the "exploitation"
of his life and demanded in writing for certain changes,
corrections and deletions in the movie. After some
bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad and
Vda. de Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement"
whereby the latter as LICENSOR granted Lagunzad
authority and permission to exploit, use, and develop
the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing
the picture for consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad
paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00.
Subsequently, the movie was shown indifferent theaters
all over the country. Because petitioner refused to pay
any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement,
Vda. de Gonzales instituted the present suit against him
praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1)
to pay her the balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest
from of the Complaint; and 2) to render an accounting
of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the
corresponding 2-1/2% royalty there from, among
others. Petitioner contended in his Answer that the
episodes in life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie
were matters of public knowledge and occurred at or
about the same time that the deceased became and
was a public figure; that private respondent has no
property right over those incidents; that the Licensing
Agreement was without valid cause or consideration
and constitutes an infringement on the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and of the press; and that he
paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only
because of the coercion and threat employed upon him.
As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification
of the Licensing Agreement, Both the trial court and the
CA ruled in favor of Vda. deGonzales.
ISSUES
Whether or not the fictionalized representation
of Moises Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to privacy
notwithstanding that he was a public figure.
Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother,
has any property right over the life of Moises Padilla
considering that the latter was a public figure.
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement
constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right
of freedom of speech and of the press.
HELD
YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not
automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy.
The right to invade as person's privacy to disseminate
public information does not extend to a fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how
public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar,
while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present
a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits
that he included a little romance in the film because
without it, it would be a drab story of torture and
brutality.
YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need
for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs
to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and
in that of his mother and the members of his family. As
held in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the
surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his
memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the
living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation
of their own rights in the character and memory of the
deceased."
NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a
newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts
in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior
restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed,
occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil
liberties." It is not, however, without limitations. One
criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of
speech and of the press is the "balancing-of-interests
test." The principle requires a court to take conscious
and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right
to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of
-freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking
into account the interplay of those interests, and
considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing
Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of
such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are reached
when expression touches upon matters of essentially
private concern.
Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)
Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the
refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to
hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of
grievances to the government. The reason alleged by
the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is,
"that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing
upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, specially on the part of the losing groups,
remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in
the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten
breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order."
Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power
to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances
of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace,
and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public
place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a
body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or
disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of
Public Place.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was
violated.
Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec.
1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1)
the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting,
parade, or procession in the streets and other public
places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is
subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or public places to be used with the view to
prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient
use of the streets and public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the
risk of disorder. The court favored the second
construction. First construction tantamount to
authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets.
Under our democratic system of government no such
unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of
the government, except perhaps in cases of national
emergency.
The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free
men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech
is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that
speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression. There must be the probability of serious
injury to the state.
IBP vs Atienza
Facts:
In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
filed an application for a rally permit with the office of
Manila Mayor Jose Lito Atienza. The IBP sought their
rally to be staged at the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza
granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is
only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a
freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the
rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally. Cadiz
immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the
permit because what Atienza did was only a partial
grant which was alleged to be a violation of the
constitutional right to freedom of expression and a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza.
Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally
not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge.
Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a
criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly violating the
Public Assembly Act or specifically, for staging a rally in a
place different from what was indicated in the rally
permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza.
The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within his
power; that freedom of expression is not absolute.
 Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz
also prayed for the suspension of the criminal case
against him on the ground that the certiorari case he
filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against
Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case
filed against him (Cadiz).
2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienzas
power to modify the rally permit without consulting
with the IBP.
HELD:
1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of
prejudicial question at this stage and in this certiorari
case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is
a ground to suspend the criminal proceeding. However,
Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal
proceeding in the said criminal case. The determination
of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be
made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not
before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil
action.
2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally
permit which contains a time and place different from
that applied for, the mayor must first consult with the
applicant at the earliest opportunity. This is in order to
give the applicant some time to determine if such
change is favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he
can seek judicial remedies) Section 6 of the Public
Assembly Act.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal
or modification that the clear and present danger test
be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil, the applicant must be heard on the
matter. In this case, Atienza did not consult with the IBP.
Atienza capriciously and whimsically changed the venue
without any reason therefor. Such is a grave abuse of
discretion and a violation of the freedom of expression.
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
Facts:
The Director of Post announced that he would order the
issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration of
City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Roman Catholic Church pursuant to Act No.
4052 for the purpose of appropriating funds for the making of
new postage stamps. Aglipay requested Atty. Vicente Sotto to
denounce the matter to the President. It was alleged that Ruiz
is in direct violation of the Constitution by issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress. That such act was violative of Art. VI,
Sec. 23 (3) of the Philippines, to wit:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or
support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the
principle of separation of church and state.
Issue:
Is the production and selling of the International Eucharistic
Congress commemorative stamps violation of the separation
of Church and State and Art. VI, Sec. 23 (3)?
Ruling:
No, we are much impressed with the vehement appeal of
counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete
separation of church and state and curb any attempt to
infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in
the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and
prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our
political development nothing is done by the Government or
its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is
taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or
institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of
Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we
have come to the conclusion that there has been no
constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052
grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to
misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose. What it
gives is the discretionary powers to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous to
the government.
Cantwell v Connecticut
Facts. Jesse Cantwell (Cantwell), a Jehovahs Witnesses, was
convicted on the charge of breach of the peace for playing a
phonograph record sharply critical of the Catholic religion to
persons he encountered on the street. His intent was to
proselytize his listeners. Prior to his arrest, there was no
evidence that Cantwells deportment was noisy or offensive.
Moreover, although the message on the record was offensive,
it was only played to persons who voluntarily agreed to listen.
Issue. Did the arrest and conviction of Cantwell for violating
the common law offense of breach of the peace violate his
constitutional rights of free speech under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)?
Held. Yes. The lower court is reversed.
Justice Owen Roberts (J. Roberts) stated that while it is
obvious that the principles of freedom of speech and religion
do not sanction incitement to riot or violence, it is equally
obvious that a State may not unduly suppress free
communication of views under the guise of maintaining
desirable conditions. With these considerations in mind, we
note that there was no evidence of assaultive behavior or
threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no profane,
abusive, indecent remarks directed to the person of the
hearer. Thus, it cannot be said that Cantwells actions resulted
in a breach of the peace or an incitement to a breach thereof.
Employment Division vs Smith
Facts. The Respondent was a member of the Native American
Church, which has as a part of is religious rituals, the
supervised consumption of peyote. Peyote is a controlled
substance under Oregon law and possession of peyote is a
criminal offense. The Respondent was fired from his job at a
private drug rehabilitation clinic because he ingested peyote
as part of his churchs ritual. The Respondent sought
unemployment benefits, which where denied as he had been
dismissed for work related misconduct. On his appeal from
denial of unemployment benefits, the Oregon Supreme Court
ruled that as the state law did not contain an exemption from
its criminal statute for religious consumption of peyote, that
the criminal ban was unconstitutional as applied to peyote in
this setting and that the Respondent was entitled to
unemployment compensation. The Petitioner appeals the
case.
ISSUE:
Can the state of Oregon deny unemployment benefits to the
respondents because they were fired for using illegal drugs
for religious purposes?
HOLDING:
Yes, the state can deny unemployment benefits because the
use of the drug is prohibited under Oregon law and this
prohibition is constitutional.
REASONING:
Rule:
The court stated that the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).
The U.S. Supreme Court lists some cases that they have ruled
the same in because the court is going by precedent. Then,
the court distinguishes this case from others where they have
ruled the opposite of this rule. These other cases involved the
Free Exercise Clause with other constitutional protections.
The case the court is hearing now only involves the Free
Exercise Clause, by itself.
APPLICATION:
The respondents are asking for the court to require religious
exemptions from civic obligations of nearly every possible
kind. The court cannot grant such favors. The respondents are
asking for something that the court cannot do. This matter
would be up to the legislative body to decide whether or not
each law should be able to have a religious exception. The
court refers to Reynolds v. U.S., where they stated that
permitting an individuals obligations to obey a law depending
on this individuals religious beliefs would make religious
doctrines supreme to the Constitution. Every man would
become a law unto himself. The Constitution would only be
applicable by name, not by practice. The court says that the
same circumstance is happening in this current case at hand.
The court ends with saying that they agree to leave this
matter up to the legislature because a system in which judges
weigh the social importance of each law against the
significance of all.
Estrada vs. Escritor , 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006
FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the
RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio,
a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty
five years and had a son with him as well. Respondents
husband died a year before she entered into the
judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of
said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal
arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace
Society. They allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments
render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize
respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent
for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The
free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one
of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As
Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of
human rights. The States interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in
order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or
her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to
the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and
secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution
adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the
OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an
exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of
religion.
HELD:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests
but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty
to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is
entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been
afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling
state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus
the case is remanded to the RTC.
Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the
Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise
given a compelling state interest. It is the respondents
stance that the respondents conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it comes within the
scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court
prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by
the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a
passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom,
but must instead apply the compelling state interest
test. The government must be heard on the issue as it
has not been given an opportunity to discharge its
burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest
which can override respondents religious belief and
practice.
HELD : The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist
or accommodationist - are anchored on a different
reading of the "wall of separation." Separationist - This
approach erects an absolute barrier to formal
interdependence of religion and state. Religious
institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or
indirect, from the state. Nor could the state adjust its
secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs
placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist
view is largely used by the Court, showing the Courts
tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular
society Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus
recognizes that religion plays an important role in the
public life of the United States as shown by many
traditional government practices which An
accommodationist holds that it is good public policy,
and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state
to make conscious and deliberate efforts to avoid
interference with religious freedom. On the other hand,
the strict neutrality adherent believes that it is good
public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the
government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the
cost of inhibiting religious exercise First, the
accommodationist interpretation is most consistent
with the language of the First Amendment. Second, the
accommodationist position best achieves the purposes
of the First Amendment. Third, the accommodationist
interpretation is particularly necessary to protect
adherents of minority religions from the inevitable
effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and
indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth,
the accommodationist position is practical as it is a
commonsensical way to deal with the various needs and
beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct
is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has
different effects on the states interests: some effects
may be immediate and short-term while others delayed
and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests
of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether
immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary In
applying the test, the first inquiry is whether
respondents right to religious freedom has been
burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her employment and abandoning her religious
belief and practice and family on the one hand, and
giving up her employment and keeping her religious
practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on
her free exercise of religion The second step is to
ascertain respondents sincerity in her religious belief.
Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief
and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for
immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after
entering the judiciary where the moral standards are
strict and defined, much less only after an
administrative case for immorality was filed against
herIndeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a
private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be
discharged by the proper agency of the government
which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly
settle the issue in the case at bar, the government
should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing
the respondents stance that her conjugal arrangement
is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the
scope of free exercise protection.
GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25
MAY 1981]
Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of
Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-
religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided
for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer
and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the
said projects will be obtained through the selling of
tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of
the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San
Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his
residence for one year and until the election of his
successor. The image would be made available to the
Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints
feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272
voters, and said projects were implemented. The image
was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic
Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to
the barangay council, as it was the churchs property
since church funds were used in its acquisition.
Resolution No. 10 was passed for the
authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case
against the priest for the recovery of the image.
Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a
representative to the case. The priest, in his answer
assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The
priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan
Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2)
Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in
the Constitution violated.
Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty
quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the
barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs
of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate
the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition)
is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a
laymans custody so that it could easily be made
available to any family desiring to borrow the image in
connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils
funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is
their property. Right of the determination of custody is
their right, and even if they decided to give it to the
Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since
private funds were used. Not every government activity
which involves the expenditure of public funds and
which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church
and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of
public money or property.
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila
Facts:
American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock,
non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly
registered and doing business in the Philippines through
its Philippine agency established in Manila in November,
1898
City of Manila is a municipal corporation with
powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila
American Bible Society has been distributing and
selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several
Philippine dialect
City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible
Society that it was violating several Ordinances for
operating without the necessary permit and license,
thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit
and license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q
1953
To avoid closing of its business, American Bible
Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license
fees under protest
American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the
constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529
and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made
to the City of Manila. They contended:
a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and
were not required to pay any license fee or sales tax
b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles
City of Manila prayed that the complaint be
dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the
Ordinances in question
Trial Court dismissed the complaint
American Bible Society appealed to the Court of
Appeals
Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales
tax for the distribution and sale of bibles
Ruling: NO
Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the
ordinance in question, person or entity engaged in any
of the business, trades or occupation enumerated under
Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayors permit and license from
the City Treasurer. American Bible Societys business is
not among those enumerated
However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance
provides that all other businesses, trade or occupation
not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not
empowered to license or to tax P5.00
Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to
depend upon the power of the City to license or tax said
business, trade or occupation.
2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this
case:
a. Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is empowered
to tax and fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged
in the sale of books
b. Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee
on dealers in general merchandise, including importers
and indentors, except those dealers who may be
expressly subject to the payment of some other
municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise
shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail
dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers,
general merchandise shall be classified into four main
classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury
articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4)
miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be
prescribed for each class but where commodities of
different classes are sold in the same establishment, it
shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more
than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of
tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay
the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinance
The only difference between the 2 provisions is
the limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that
a retail dealer has to pay per annum
As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to
impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms
provided for in the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as
the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly
struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a
regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing
the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It
is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to
the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed
by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is
almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and
evil of this flat license tax.
Further, the case also mentioned that the power
to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control
or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the
exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise
so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for
its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of
engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close
all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse
Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or
the National Internal Revenue Code, Corporations or
associations organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .:
Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind
and character from any of its properties, real or
personal, or from any activity conducted for profit,
regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall
be liable to the tax imposed under this Code shall not be
taxed
The price asked for the bibles and other religious
pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than
the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that
American Bible Society was engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit
Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in
doing so it would impair American Bible Societys free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing
considerations, We hereby reverse the decision
appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff
the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received
complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the
Jehovahs Witness, and enrolled in various public and
private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National
Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B.
Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant
issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17,
1989, directing District Supervisors, High School
Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions
to remove from service, after due process, teachers and
school employees, and to deprive the students and
pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do
not participate in daily flag ceremony and doesnt obey
flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find
such memorandum to be contrary to their religious
belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of
appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to
let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow
their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was
issued by the district supervisor of Daan Bantayan
District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the
dropping from the list in the school register of all
Jehovahs Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to
Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is against
the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-
accepted if they change their mind.
 Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to
the Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer
to their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents
filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior
notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to
due process, their right to free public education and
their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship.
Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of
expulsion or dropping from the rolls issued by the
District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining
respondent from barring them from classes; and
compelling the respondent and all persons acting for
him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I
their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding
the respondents to immediately re-admit the
petitioners to their respective classes until further
orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a
consolidated comment to the petitions defending the
expulsion orders issued by the respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take
part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in external acts or behavior that would offend
their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through observance of the flag ceremony. They
quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to
show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not
engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for
their expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of
Jehovahs Witness from the schools violates right
receive free education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs
Witness from the schools where they are enrolled will
violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty
of the state to protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education, and to make such
education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV). Nevertheless,
their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does
not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we
do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the
peace, or pose a grave and present danger of a serious
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
legitimate public interest that the state has a right and
duty to prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese
occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every
Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the
invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before
every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived
through that dark period of our history, they would not
quibble now about saluting the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and
set aside.
VICTORIANOvs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS
FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of
the religious sect known as the Iglesia ni Cristo, had
been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(Company) since 1958. He was a member of the Elizalde
Rope Workers Union (Union) which had with the
Company a CBA containing a closed shop provision
which reads as follows: Membership in the Union shall
be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement.
Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its
amendment by RA 3350, the employer was not
precluded from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees. On June 18, 1961,
however, RA 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA 875,
as follows: xxx but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
of their members in any such labor organization.
Being a member of a religious sect that
prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to
appellant Union. The Union wrote a formal letter to the
Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from
the service because he was resigning from the Union as
a member. The Company in turn notified Appellee and
his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a
satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company
would be constrained to dismiss him from the service.
Appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin
the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee.
The Union invoked the union security clause of the
CBA and assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and
contends it discriminatorily favors those religious sects
which ban their members from joining labor unions.
ISSUE:
Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining
the union or not.
RULING:
YES. The Constitution and RA 875 recognize
freedom of association. Sec 1 (6) of Art III of the
Constitution of 1935, as well as Sec 7 of Art IV of the
Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of RA 875 provides
that employees shall have the right to self-organization
and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their
own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.
What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act
recognize and guarantee is the right to form or join
associations. A right comprehends at least two broad
notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the
absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may
act for himself without being prevented by law; and
second, power, whereby an employee may, as he
pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is,
therefore, the employee who should decide for himself
whether he should join or not an association; and
should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind
as to which association he would join; and even after he
has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to
leave and cancel his membership with said organization
at any time. The right to join a union includes the right
to abstain from joining any union. The law does not
enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor
organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial
Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection
granted to such right to refrain from joining is
withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and
an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of
which the employer may employ only members of the
collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of
the contract in order to keep their jobs. By virtue of a
closed shop agreement, before the enactment of RA
3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs,
wishes to be employed or to keep his employment he
must become a member of the collective bargaining
union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the
labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed
shop arrangement, RA No.3350 introduced an
exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the
Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization. Republic Act No. 3350 merely
excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of
the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members with any labor organization. What the
exception provides is that members of said religious
sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor
unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any
closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects
cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their
jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of
the collective bargaining union. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affiliating with
labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty
and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor
unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the
members of said religious wets prefer to sign up with
the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and
fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they
can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither
does the law prohibit them from joining, and neither
may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
The Company was partly absolved by law from
the contractual obligation it had with the Union of
employing only Union members in permanent positions.
It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an
impairment of said union security clause.
The prohibition to impair the obligation of
contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The
prohibition is general. The prohibition is not to be read
with literal exactness, for it prohibits unreasonable
impairment only. In spite of the constitutional
prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to
safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation
appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify
or abrogate contracts already in effect. For not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read
into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The
contract clause of the Constitution. must be not only in
harmony with, but also in subordination to, in
appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state
to safeguard the vital interests of the people. This has
special application to contracts regulating relations
between capital and labor which are not merely
contractual, and said labor contracts, for being
impressed with public interest, must yield to the
common good.
The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is to
insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote
the general welfare by preventing discrimination against
those members of religious sects which prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby
their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work,
the fruits of which work are usually the only means
whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of
their dependents.
The individual employee, at various times in his
working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power
collective labor, directed by a union, and collective
capital, directed by management. The union, an
institution developed to organize labor into a collective
force and thus protect the individual employee from the
power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the
champion of employee rights, and a new source of their
frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with
management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group
strength from which the individual also needs
protection the collective bargaining relationship.
The free exercise of religious profession or belief
is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the
latter must yield to the former.
The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the secular
purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be
refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be
dispossessed of their right to work and of being
impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by
reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens
to find gainful employment whereby they can make a
living to support themselves and their families is a valid
objective of the state. The Constitution even mandated
that the State shall afford protection to labor, promote
full employment and equality in employment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed and regulate the relation between workers and
employers.
The primary effects of the exemption from
closed shop agreements in favor of members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from
affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of
said employees against the aggregate force of the
collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain
citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by
eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due
to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the
health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State,
the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our
view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop
agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the
interests of any particular religion. Although the
exemption may benefit those who are members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is
merely incidental and indirect.
The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant rights
to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply
provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor
Code.
The Act does not require as a qualification, or
condition, for joining any lawful association membership
in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither
does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that
prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a
condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor
union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union
requires a positive act Republic Act No. 3350 only
exempts members with such religious affiliation from
the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this
Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive
act-to exercise the right to join or to resign from the
union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any
positive act on his part. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal
is dismissed.
Pamil Vs Teleron
FACTS : Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971,
elected to the position of municipal mayor of
Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly
proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by
petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his
disqualification based on this Administrative Code
provision: "In no case shall there be elected or
appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in
active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or
contractors for public works of the municipality." The
suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the
right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor.
He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly
repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was
then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his
contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it
is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific
question raised.
ISSUE WON the disqualification of the respondent
based on Administrative Code provision Constitutional
HELD: The challenged Administrative Code provision,
certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to
any elective or appointive office, is, on its face,
inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by
the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a
religious test. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore
professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a
public office. There is thus an incompatibility between
the Administrative Code provision relied upon by
petitioner and an express constitutional mandate.
FONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS [96 PHIL 417; G.R. L-
5917; 28 JAN 1955]
Facts: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente
(IFI), represented by its supreme bishop Gerardo
Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an
accounting of his administration of all the temporal
properties and to recover the same on the ground that
he ceased to be the supreme bishop of IFI. Isabelo De
los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop.
Petitioner claims that he was not properly
removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor was
Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was an accounting
of his administration and was turned over to bishop
Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have
abandoned their faith and formally joined the
Prostestant Episcopal Church of America.
CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los
Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of
IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his
admistration. CA affirmed the decision of the CFI
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should still be
regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.
Held: Supreme Court affirmed CAs decision. The
legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De los Reyes,
Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election
of Bishop Delos Reyes as the Supreme Bishop based on
their internal laws
To finally dispose of the property issue, the
Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the rule
in property controversies within religious congregations
strictly independent of any other superior ecclesiastical
association (such as the Philippine Independent Church)
is that the rules for resolving such controversies should
be those of any voluntary association. If the
congregation adopts the majority rule then the majority
should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted
authorities within the congregation, then that should be
followed.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS
(177 SCRA 668) Case Digest
Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the
presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his
deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the
respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin
the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend
under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the
President is without power to impair their liberty of
abode because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor, according to the petitioners,
may the President impair their right to travel because
no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?
Ruling: The President has the obligation, under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents
power as protector of the peace. The president is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems
of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time
would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the state and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is
not precluded from taking preemptive actions against
threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct
protection of the people is the essence of the duty of
the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did
not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the return of the petitioners at the present
time and under present circumstances poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their
return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
Legaspi Vs Civil Serv. Comm.
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to
information on matters of public concern is invoked in
this special civil action for mandamus instituted by
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in
the Health Department of Cebu City. These government
employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service
eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access
government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not
open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are
"subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The
law may therefore exempt certain types of information
from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security It follows that, in every case, the availability of
access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought,
i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves
public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The
threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public
concern. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does
not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or
deny access. In case of denial of access, the government
agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from
the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will
serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly
observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous
position to marshall and interpret arguments against
release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To
safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access
by the government agency concerned is subject to
review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may
be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being
a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to
ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to
the people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing
to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the
respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil
Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to
know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles.
We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of
those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,
neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this
case, the government employees concerned claim to be
civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has
a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a
sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said position, the
duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny
the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the
position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies
GONZALES VS. NARVASA
FACTS: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as
a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the
positions of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants. The Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President
Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive
Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to
the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing
the same. Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of
the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office
which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal
standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 43
HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen
acquires standing only if he can establish that he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to
the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress,
not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case
since, according to petitioner, the President has
encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a
public office and to propose amendments to the Charter
by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct,
or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that
his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of
being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities.
Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi
so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
 Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the
standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is
readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by
the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by
E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount
of P3 million is appropriated for its operational
expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of
the President. Being that case, petitioner must show
that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to
be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will
be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his
pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a
representation.
AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO
Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the
Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was
hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo as a milestone in the continuing cooperation
and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic
partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for
both countries).
JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega
treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up of
markets in goods and services as well as removing
barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that
encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more
evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the
Committee on Trade and Commerce last November
2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas,
heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one
hand the committee heard Governments rosy
projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on
the other hand the views of environmental and trade
activists who raised there very serious concerns about
the country being turned into Japans toxic waste
basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA
is not just an issue concerning trade and economic
relations with Japan but one that touches on broader
national development concerns.
Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this
action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the
Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction
of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition.
3. Are the documents and information being requested
in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules
on transparency and full public disclosure such that the
Philippine government is justified in denying access
thereto.
Rulings: The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last
July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan Citizens
Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No.
170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for
mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel
respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI)
Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish
petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists
of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during
the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments
and annexes thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text
of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public
since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be
furnished with copy of the said document has become
moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the
Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar
as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to
the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the
negotiations.
The Court held: Applying the principles
adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the
final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually
confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity
for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers
exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would
govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair
the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan
but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations.
It also reasoned out that opening for public
scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations
would discourage future Philippine representatives from
frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The
Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations
normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where
negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area
of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable
terms in an area of greater national interest.
In the same Decision, the Court took time to
address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It
said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief
Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right
to information against any abuse of executive privilege.
It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its
endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive
privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the
opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down
as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.
IN RE: EDILLON
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly
licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A
and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP,
payment of membership fee and suspension for failure
to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty.
Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which
every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished
from bar associations in which membership is merely
optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply
with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar
including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of
the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him
to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in
order to further the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require thet the cost of the regulatory program the
lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.
Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement
of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may
compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their
annual dues.
Padcom Condominium Corporation vs. Ortigas Center
Association, Inc.
Facts:
 Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation
(PADCOM) owns and manages the Padilla Office
Condominium Building (PADCOM BUILDING). The land
on which the building stands was originally acquired
from the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, by
Tierra Development Corporation (TDC) under a Deed of
Sale with a condition that the transferee and its
successor-in-interest must become members of an
association for realty owners and long-term lessees in
the area later known as the Ortigas Center.
Subsequently, the said lot, together with the
improvements thereon, was conveyed by TDC in favor of
PADCOM in a Deed of Transfer.
Thereafter, respondent Ortigas Center
Association, Inc. (ASSOCIATION) was organized to
advance the interests and promote the general welfare
of the real estate owners and long-term lessees of the
lots in the Ortigas Center and sought the collection of
membership dues from PADCOM. In view of PADCOM'S
failure and refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues,
the Association filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money before the trial court, but the same was
dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the trial court's dismissal. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not PADCOM is unjustly enriched by
the improvements made by the Association, thus
requiring the former to pay dues to the latter.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court held that as resident and
lot owner in the Ortigas area, PADCOM was definitely
benefited by the Association's acts and activities to
promote the interests and welfare of those who acquire
property therein or benefit from the acts or activities of
the Association.
Generally, it may be said that a quasi-contract is
based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor
dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute
justice. Examples of these principles are: (1) it is
presumed that a person agrees to that which will
benefit him; (2) nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly
at the expense of another; or (3) one must do unto
others what he would want others to do unto him under
the same circumstances.
Finally, PADCOM's argument that the collection
of monthly dues has no basis since there was no board
resolution defining how much fees are to be imposed
deserves scant consideration. Suffice it is to say that
PADCOM never protested upon receipt of the earlier
demands for payment of membership dues. In fact, by
proposing a scheme to pay its obligation, PADCOM
cannot belatedly question the Association's authority to
assess and collect the fees in accordance with the total
land area owned or occupied by the members, which
finds support in a resolution dated 6 November 1982 of
the Association's incorporating directors and Section 2
of its By-laws.
REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has
been rented and occupied by the government in 1947
refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced
expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the
assessment of just compensation, the government
argued that it had taken the property when the contract
of lease commenced and not when the proceedings
begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was
not taken when the government commenced to occupy
the said land as lessee because the essential elements
of the taking of property under the power of eminent
domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by
condemnor upon the private property for more than a
momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken
place when the condemnor has entered and occupied
the property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when
the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1)
Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more
than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of
legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously
affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof.
 In the case at bar, these elements were not
present when the government entered and occupied
the property under a contract of lease.
Manosca vs. CA
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the
parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the
birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni
Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to
be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the
intended expropriation was not for a public purpose
and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an
application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious
entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article
VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land
whereat Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.
Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use.
There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever
project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as
in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation
is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the
constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what public use is. One is the expropriation
of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at
cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the
exercise of this power, of utilities and other private
enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state
then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
[CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the
expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the
conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff
claims that it is necessary that such public improvement
be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and
that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said
expropriation was not necessary because other routes
were available. They further claimed that the
expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable
loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing
and interested in the graves and monuments that would
have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public
improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip
of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they
have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain
and that the courts have no right to inquire and
determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the
same filed an appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and
hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.
Held: The courts have the power of restricting the
exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated
by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or
entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions accompanying the
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority
upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question that the courts have the
right to inquire to.