Case 1
ROMUALDEZ-YAP v. CSC
225 SCRA 285
FACTS:
Petitoner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) on September 20, 1972 and
after several promotions, was appointed in 1983 as a Senior
Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer Department. The
case at bar is a special civil action for certiorari assailing Res.
No. 92-201 of the respondent which upheld the petitioners
separation from PNB in light of EO 80 or the Revised Charter
of PNB. Petitioner contends that there is an existence of bad
faith in its reorganization and that there is an erroneous
application of the one year prescriptive period for quo warranto
proceedings in her case.
ISSUE:
Is the reorganization of PNB, a government-owned or
controlled corporation performing ministrant functions, valid?
HELD:
Ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing
the general interests of society and are merely optional.
Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not a
governmental but a private sector endeavour, an optional
function of the government. There are functions of the
government which it may exercise to promote merely the
welfare, progress, and prosperity of the people. Thus,
reorganization of such corporations like PNB are valid so long
as they are done in good faith as prescribed in the Dario v.
Mison doctrine. Accordingly, the reorganization of PNB is
found to be done in good faith by the Court.
Case 2
Shipside Incorporated vs. The Court of Appeals
352 SCRA 334, February 20, 2011
Doctrine:
Prescription of action does not run against the State: it is not
applicable to artificial bodies created by the State for special
purpose.
Facts:
OCTs were issued in favor of Rafael Galvez over four
parcels of land. Lots 1 and 4 were conveyed by Galvez to
Mamaril, who later sold the same Order declaring his OCT null
and void. Lepanto sold Lots 1 and 4 to herein petitioner.
Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the
Order declaring his OCT null and void. The motion was
denied. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the Republic and
issued a writ of execution. The order was not executed. After
twenty-five long years, the Sol Gen filed a complaint for revival
of judgment and cancellation of titles.
Issue:
Whether or not the Republic may still for revival of
judgment.
Held:
NO. While it is true that prescription does not run
against the State, the same may not be invoked by the
government in this case since it is no longer interested in the
subject matter. While Camp Wallance may have belonged to
the government at the time Galvez title was ordered cancelled,
the same no longer holds true today.
RA 7277 created Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BSDA). With the transfer of Camp
Wallance to the BCDA, the government has no longer a right
or protect.
The rule that prescription does not run against the
State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created
by the State for special purposes, it being said that when the
title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees, although
artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as
ordinary persons.
Case 3
Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to
be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies
while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be
administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when
the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge
of Florentinos benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of
the child Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the
delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to
be the childs trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the
insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of
parens patriae to the terms of the insurance policy?
YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as
the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof
such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve according to the best interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the
mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child
and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards
the child than an uncle.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the
judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is
called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one
who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may
happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It
would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of
things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be
preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were
between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a
mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot
remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
Case 4
Laurel vs. Misa
77 Phil. 856
FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the
Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by
giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be
tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was
suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried
under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts
were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already
by the Republic.
HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute
and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No
transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that
the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover,
sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or
eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasnt
suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was
suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance.
Regarding the change of government, there is no such change
since the sovereign the Filipino people is still the same.
What happened was a mere change of name of government,
from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.
Case 5
Sanders v. Veridano
GR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US
Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private respondents
Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens
permanently residing in the Philippines and who were
employed as gameroom attendants in the special services
department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents
were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter
addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the
hearing officers report of the reinstatement of private
respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages.
Respondents allege that the letters contained libellous
imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed
for damages against petitioners.
ISSUE:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private
capacities when they did the acts for which the private
respondents sued them for damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for
which the petitioner are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
Given the official character of the letters, the petioners were,
legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the
government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its
consent to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their
claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the
Unites States of which they are all citizens and under whose
jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.
Case 6
SEAFDEC v NLRC
FACTS:
Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents
against the petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In
these cases, the private respondents claim having been
wrongfully terminated from their employment by the petitioner.
The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-
government organization composed of various Southeast
Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the
jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the
above cases.
The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter,
allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming
that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has,
however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by
belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
HELD:
The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that
petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying
diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department
vs. National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773,
206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-
AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of
public respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including
its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and
freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located. One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is
immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason
for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium
thru which the host government may interfere in their
operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge
its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
Case 7
MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142396, 2003 February 11
FACTS
Sometime in May 1986, an information for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against petitioner Khosrow
Minucher with the RTC. The criminal charge followed a "buy-
bust operation" concluded by the Philippine police narcotic
agent in the house if Minucher where a quantity of heroin, a
prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic
agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo
who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses
for the prosecution. On January 1988, Presiding Judge Migrino
rendered a decision acquitting the accused. Minucher filed Civil
Case before the RTC for damages on account of what he
claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking
made by Arthur Scalzo.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic
immunity
2. Whether the Doctrine of State Immunity from suit is
applicable herein
RULING
1. Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him
absolute immunity from suit being an agent of the US Drugs
Enforcement Agency. However, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to
immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs
duties of diplomatic nature. The Vienna Convention lists the
classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a)
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b)
envoys, ministers or inter nuncios accredited to the head of
states, and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of
foreign affairs. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as
the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus
impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others.
Scalzo asserted that he was an Assistant Attache of the US
diplomatic mission. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his
duties and are administratively under him. These officials are
not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission,
nor they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.
2. While the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain
contentions, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he
worked for the USDEA. If it should be ascertained that Scalzo
was acting well within his assigned functions when he
committed the acts allegedly complained of, the present
controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine
of State Immunity from Suit. While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against against the State without its consent,
it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
State for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
their duties. The official exchanges of communication,
certifications from officials, as well as participation of members
of the Philippine Narcotics Command may be inadequate to
support to support the diplomatic status of Scalzo but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given its
imprimatur to the activities of Scalzo. It can hardly be said that
he acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. All
told, Scalzo is entitled to the defense os state immunity from
suit.
Case 8
Callado v IRRI
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). On February 11,
1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI,
petitioner figured in an accident. After evaluating petitioner's
answer, explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human
Resource Development Department Manager, the latter issued
a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990.
Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for
illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Private
respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through
counsel, that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process
by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that
it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an
international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner,
not having waived the same.
However, the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to
have waived its immunity considered the defense of immunity
no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this
dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the
petition. Theres no merit in petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's
immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No.
1620, Article 3 provides:
Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy
immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings,
except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by
the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an
express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which
it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early
on, made its position clear. Through counsel, the Institute
wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the
Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity.
Case 9
SSS vs. CA(120 SCRA 707)
FACTS
Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a real
estate loan by the SSS with residential lot located at Pateros,
Rizal as collateral. The spouses Cruz complied with their
monthly payments. When delayed were incurred in their
monthly payments SSS filed a petition for foreclosure of their
real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the
ground that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant
for these application for foreclosure notices were published on
the second notice the counsel for spouses Cruz sent a letter to
SSS informing the latter that his clients are up to date in their
payment of the monthly amortization and the SSS should
discontinued the publication of the notices of foreclosure. This
request remain unheaded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for
damages against SSS before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its
immunity from suit being an agency of the government
performing government function. The trial court and court of
appeal nevertheless awarded damages in favor of spouses
Cruz which was affirmed by court of appeal, Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not SSS is immune from suit.
HELD: Negative. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and
it can be sued for damages. The SSS does not enjoy immunity
from suit by express statutory consent. It has corporated power
separate and distinct from the government. SSS own organic
act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in court.
These words sue and be sued embrace all civil process
incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the SSS,
as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing
governmental function, by virtue of the explicit provision of the
aforecited enabling law, the government must be deemed to
have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does
not thereby concede its liability that statutory law has given to
the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection
of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to
the jurisdiction of the court; subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense.
Case 10
BOP v BPEA, 1 SCRA, 340
Facts: BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting
prosecutor of the Industrial Court against petitioners BOP
(secretary of Department of General Services and Director of
BOP). The complaint alleged that both the secretary of DOG
and the director of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor
practices. Answering the complaint, the petitioners (BOP),
denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to them
and alleged that the BPEA complainants were suspended
pending result of administrative investigation against them for
breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the BOP is
not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but
of the republic performing governmental functions. For relief,
they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
But later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court
sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the
functions of the BOP are exclusively proprietary in nature,
since they receives outside jobs and that many of its
employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days
and holidays, therefore consequently denied the prayed for
dismissal, which brought the petitioners (BOP) to present
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued.
Held: As an office of the Government, without any corporate or
juridical personality, the BOP cannot be sued (Sec.1, Rule 33,
Rules of court).
It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its
employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days
and holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that
its functions are exclusively proprietary in nature. Overtime
work in the BOP is done only when the interest of the service
so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime
compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary
with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current
appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that
the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in
character.
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce
any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding
against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the
Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less
over its jurisdiction.
Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The
orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair
labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs
against respondents other than the respondent court.
Case 11
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, vs THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Facts:
The case is regarding money claim against Department of
Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security
Agency entered into a contract for security services to be
provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant
to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan
Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter,
several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages,
non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night
shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as
for damages against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly
and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of
money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and
the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the
decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued
a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the DA and the security agency.
Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor
vehicles of the DA.
The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The
petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a
money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the
petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issues:
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies
in the case.
Discussions:
Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be
sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied. However, the money claim should
first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Act 3083 stands
as the general law waiving the States immunity from suit,
subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof
that no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by
any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and
that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing
money claims against the Government must be strictly
observed.
Rulings:
No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued
under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is
found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government
consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied,
which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it
entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims
of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money
claims.
Case 12
DA v NLRC
Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan
Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to
be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by
Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA.
Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment
of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances,
night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as
well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly
and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of
money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and
the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the
decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued
a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the DA and the security agency.
Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor
vehicles of the DA.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State
applies in the case
Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that
the State may not be sued without its consent reflects nothing
less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State
and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the
very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit
based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State
may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at
times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general
law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is
conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a
contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and to
have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as
a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made
between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
A State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of
its sovereign functions.
In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it
entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security
guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the
consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.
Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended
by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the
Commission on Audit.
Case 13
USA v Ruiz
FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales provided under the Military Bases Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in
May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for
some projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the
invitation and submitted bids. But the United States inform the
company that the company did not qualify to receive an award
for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the
boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay and that
the projects had been awarded to third parties.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the
purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over
the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant
United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not
given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of
action asserted in the complaint."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the US naval base can invoke the state
immunity.
HELD:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from
being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles
of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-
between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The
result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the
rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states
in western Europe.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when
it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and
the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of
the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
Case 14
RCBC v De Castro
Facts: Badoc Planters, Inc. filed an action for recovery of
unpaid tobacco deliveries against PVTA. Hon. Lourdes P. San
Diego, then Presiding Judge, ordering the defendants therein
to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as BADOC) within 48 hours the
aggregate amount of P206,916.76, with legal interests thereon.
Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the very same day,
issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special Sheriff
Faustino Rigor, who then issued a Notice of Garnishment
addressed to the General Manager and/or Cashier of Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
RCBC). However, PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Judge set aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment
and the Writ of Execution and ordering petitioner and BADOC
to restore, jointly and severally, the account of PVTA with the
said bank in the same condition and state it was before.
Issues:
1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to
garnishment;
2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the
herein petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the Special
Sheriff by virtue of the execution issued pursuant to the
Order/Partial Judgment dated January 15, 1970.
1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to
garnishment;
Republic Act No. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary
corporation with all the attributes of a corporate entity subject
to the provisions of the Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses
the power to sue and be sued and to acquire and hold such
assets and incur such liabilities resulting directly from
operations authorized by the provisions of this Act or as
essential to the proper conduct of such operations. Among the
specific powers vested in the PVTA are: 1) to buy Virginia
tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona fide
tobacco manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b),
R.A. No. 2265]; 2) to contracts of any kind as may be
necessary or incidental to the attainment of its purpose with
any person, firm or corporation, with the Government of the
Philippines or with any foreign government, subject to existing
laws [Section 4(h), R.A. No. 22651; and 3) generally, to
exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation
Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act [Section 4(k), R.A. No. 2265.]
From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed
with a personality distinct and separate from the government
which owns and controls it. Accordingly, this Court has
heretofore declared that the funds of the PVTA can be
garnished since funds of public corporation which can sue and
be sued were not exempt from garnishment. Inasmuch as the
Tobacco Fund, a special fund, was by law, earmarked
specifically to answer obligations incurred by PVTA in
connection with its proprietary and commercial operations
authorized under the law, it follows that said funds may be
proceeded against by ordinary judicial processes such as
execution and garnishment. Garnishment is considered as a
specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the
judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the
litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the garnishee [the third
person] is obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the proper
officer issuing the writ and the law exempts from liability the
person having in his possession or under his control any
credits or other personal property belonging to the defendant,
, if such property be delivered or transferred, , to the clerk,
sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the action is
pending.
2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the
herein petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the Special
Sheriff
No. The bank was in no position to question the legality of the
garnishment since it was not even a party to the case. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioner, it had neither the
personality nor the interest to assail or controvert the orders of
respondent Judge. It had no choice but to obey the same
inasmuch as it had no standing at all to impugn the validity of
the partial judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff or of the
processes issued in execution of such judgment. RCBC cannot
therefore be compelled to make restitution solidarily with the
plaintiff BADOC. Plaintiff BADOC alone was responsible for the
issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order of Payment and
so, the plaintiff alone should bear the consequences of a
subsequent annulment of such court orders; hence, only the
plaintiff can be ordered to restore the account of the PVTA.
Case 15
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Judge RTC of Makati,
Branch CXLII ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS
CONSORTIUM, INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R. PASTRANA,
respondents.
Defante & Elegado for petitioner.
Roberto B. Lugue for private respondent Admiral Finance
Creditors' Consortium, Inc.
RESOLUTION
CORTS, J.:
The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation
proceedings initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati
against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors
Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation
and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and
improvements thereon located at Mayapis St., San Antonio
Village, Makati and registered in the name of Arceli P. Jo under
TCT No. S-5499.
It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on May
20, 1986, docketed as Civil Case No. 13699. Attached to
petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account
(Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened with the
PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the
sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the provisions of Pres.
Decree No. 42. After due hearing where the parties presented
their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the
property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June
4, 1987, fixing the appraised value of the property at
P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount
minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was
earlier released to private respondent.
After this decision became final and executory, private
respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This
motion was granted by respondent RTC judge. After issuance
of the writ of execution, a Notice of Garnishment dated January
14, 1988 was served by respondent sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana
upon the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. However,
respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed
on the account of petitioner. As a result of this, private
respondent filed a motion dated January 27, 1988 praying that
an order be issued directing the bank to deliver to respondent
sheriff the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance due under
the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground
that the manner of payment of the expropriation amount should
be done in installments which the respondent RTC judge failed
to state in his decision. Private respondent filed its opposition
to the motion.
Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on
July 20, 1988 a "Manifestation" informing the court that private
respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner of the
subject property because a new title over the property had
been registered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank, Inc.
(PSB) Respondent RTC judge issued an order requiring PSB
to make available the documents pertaining to its transactions
over the subject property, and the PNB Buendia Branch to
reveal the amount in petitioner's account which was garnished
by respondent sheriff. In compliance with this order, PSB filed
a manifestation informing the court that it had consolidated its
ownership over the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale held on April 20, 1987. After
several conferences, PSB and private respondent entered into
a compromise agreement whereby they agreed to divide
between themselves the compensation due from the
expropriation proceedings.
Respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order dated
September 8, 1988 which: (1) approved the compromise
agreement; (2) ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately
release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 which corresponds
to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property
under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, from the
garnished account of petitioner; and, (3) ordered PSB and
private respondent to execute the necessary deed of
conveyance over the subject property in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner's motion to lift the garnishment was denied.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was duly
opposed by private respondent. On the other hand, for failure
of the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch to comply with the
order dated September 8, 1988, private respondent filed two
succeeding motions to require the bank manager to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. During
the hearings conducted for the above motions, the general
manager of the PNB Buendia Branch, a Mr. Antonio Bautista,
informed the court that he was still waiting for proper
authorization from the PNB head office enabling him to make a
disbursement for the amount so ordered. For its part, petitioner
contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could
neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so
would result in the disbursement of public funds without the
proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of
Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May
29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899].
Respondent trial judge issued an order dated December 21,
1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the doctrine enunciated in Republic v. Palacio did
not apply to the case because petitioner's PNB Account No.
S/A 265-537154-3 was an account specifically opened for the
expropriation proceedings of the subject property pursuant to
Pres. Decree No. 42. Respondent RTC judge likewise declared
Mr. Antonio Bautista guilty of contempt of court for his
inexcusable refusal to obey the order dated September 8,
1988, and thus ordered his arrest and detention until his
compliance with the said order.
Petitioner and the bank manager of PNB Buendia Branch then
filed separate petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which were eventually consolidated. In a decision promulgated
on June 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed both
petitions for lack of merit, sustained the jurisdiction of
respondent RTC judge over the funds contained in petitioner's
PNB Account No. 265-537154-3, and affirmed his authority to
levy on such funds.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court
of Appeals, petitioner now files the present petition for review
with prayer for preliminary injunction.
On November 20, 1989, the Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent RTC judge,
respondent sheriff, and their representatives, from enforcing
and/or carrying out the RTC order dated December 21, 1988
and the writ of garnishment issued pursuant thereto. Private
respondent then filed its comment to the petition, while
petitioner filed its reply.
Petitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its
petition before the Court of Appeals, but also alleges for the
first time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB
Buendia Branch, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 exclusively for the
expropriation of the subject property, with an outstanding
balance of P99,743.94.
(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 for statutory obligations
and other purposes of the municipal government, with a
balance of P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
[Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 11-12.]
Because the petitioner has belatedly alleged only in this Court
the existence of two bank accounts, it may fairly be asked
whether the second account was opened only for the purpose
of undermining the legal basis of the assailed orders of
respondent RTC judge and the decision of the Court of
Appeals, and strengthening its reliance on the doctrine that
public funds are exempted from garnishment or execution as
enunciated in Republic v. Palacio [supra.] At any rate, the
Court will give petitioner the benefit of the doubt, and proceed
to resolve the principal issues presented based on the factual
circumstances thus alleged by petitioner.
Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was
specifically opened for expropriation proceedings it had
initiated over the subject property, petitioner poses no
objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of the
funds deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it
is petitioner's main contention that inasmuch as the assailed
orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in
excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for
the municipal government's other statutory obligations, are
exempted from execution without the proper appropriation
required under the law.
There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the
second PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds
of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is
the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v. Palacio,
supra.; The Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,
G.R. No. L-30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More
particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or
personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be
attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money
judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived
from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are
exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The
Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926): The Municipality
of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 (1950);
Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No.
61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56]. The foregoing rule finds
application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the
municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance
appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to
the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987,
less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-
537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on
the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A
263-530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and
PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails
or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a
final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may
avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the
enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal
funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal
Council of Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960);
Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247 (1960)].
In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June
4, 1987 is not disputed by petitioner. No appeal was taken
therefrom. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed
possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its
inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just
compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of
the property since the same has been the site of Makati West
High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will
not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal
obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact
initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that, within the context
of the State's inherent power of eminent domain,
. . . [j]ust compensation means not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss
[Cosculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, 400. See also
Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, G.R.
No. 64037, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291].
The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised
within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar,
considering that valuable property has been taken, the
compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full
possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for
three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has had
more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner
Municipality of Makati to immediately pay Philippine Savings
Bank, Inc. and private respondent the amount of
P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this
Court a report of its compliance with the foregoing order within
a non-extendible period of SIXTY (60) DAYS from the date of
receipt of this resolution.
The order of respondent RTC judge dated December 21, 1988,
which was rendered in Civil Case No. 13699, is SET ASIDE
and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
November 20, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Case 16
Fontanilla vs Maliaman
FACTS: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation
Administration and driven officially by its regular driver, Hugo
Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla,
which resulted in the latter's death. The parents of Francisco
filed a suit for damages against Garcia and the NIA, as
Garcia's employer. After trial, the court awarded actual, moral
and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA appealed.
The Solicitor General contends that the NIA does not perform
solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of
the government tasked with governmental functions, and is
therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia,
who was not its special agent.
ISSUE:
May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special
agent?
HELD:
Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere
agency of the government but a corporate body performing
proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the
damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not
its special agent. (Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963
& 61045, February 27, 1991)
RATIO:
Section 1 of RA No. 3601 tells us that NIA is a government
agency invested with a corporate personality separate and
distinct from the government, thus is governed by the
Corporation Law. Section 2, subsection f of PD 552 provides
that NIA also has its own assets and liabilities and has
corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.
Section 2, subsection b of PD 552 provides that NIA may sue
and be sued in court.
Of equal importance is the case of National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) vs. NWSA Consolidated
Unions, 11 SCRA 766, which propounds the thesis that "the
NAWASA is not an agency performing governmental functions;
rather it performs proprietary functions . . . ." The functions of
providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as
mere optional functions of government even though the service
rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is
for the general interest of society.
Like the NAWASA, the National Irrigation Administration was
not created for purposes of local government. While it may be
true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the
government aimed at promoting public interest and public
welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and
purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created
for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and
administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines,
including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly,
the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited
by the services the agency renders, but these functions are
only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the
irrigation of lands.
NOTES:
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the
tortious acts of special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in
private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary
employer. Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963 &
61045, December 1, 1989)
CASE 17
G.R. No. 183591 PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
Summarized by Manu and Kim
This is a consolidation of a number of cases regarding the issues,
mostly in relation to its constitutionality, surrounding the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
between the Government of the Philippines (GPR) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)[1] and the issue regarding the extent
of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. The
following are the cases that have been consolidated:
G.R. 183591 (23 July 2008) the Province of North
Cotabato and Vice Governor Emmanuel Piol (Mandamus and
 Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and TRO) sought to compel respondents to disclose
the MOA-AD and attachments, prohibit the signing, hold a
public consultation and declare the MOA-AD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
G.R. 183752 the City of Zamboanga (Mandamus and
Prohibition and similar injunctive reliefs) prayed that
Zamboanga City be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland
and/or Bangasmoro Judicial Entity (BJE) and that the MOA-
AD be declared null and void
G.R. 183893 City of Iligan (Injunction and Declaratory
Relief) sought to enjoin respondents from signing the MOA-AD
and if it has been signed, from implementing it. Additionally
impleaded ES Eduardo Ermita as respondent.
G.R. 183951 - the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al
(petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition), prayed to
declare null and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect
and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD
G.R. 183962 Maceda, Binay, Pimentel III filed a petition
for Prohibition, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and
executing the MOA-AD as well as to nullify the MOA-AD for
being unconstitutional and illegal. Additionally impleaded as
responded the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel (represented by
Chairman Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted to file
their petitions/comments in-intervention.
Important People:
Aforementioned petitioners and respondents
Hermogenes Esperon Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (PAPP)
GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
FACTS (In order of chronological events) AND AN OVERVIEW
OF THE MOA-AD
1. 1996 the beginning of the long process of GRP-MILF
peace negotiations
2. 18 July 1997 the GRP and the peace panel signed the
Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities
3. 27 August 1998 signed the General Framework of
Agreement of Intent
4. 1999 to early 2000 numerous municipalities in Central
Mindanao were attacked by the MILF which affected the
peace negotiations; MILF took control of the town hall in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in March 2000 and in
response, then President Estrada declared an all-out-war
against the MILF
5. 2001 President GMA assumed office and suspended the
military offense against the MILF and sought a resumption
of the peace negotiations; MILF was first apprehensive but
were convinced when GMA asked the Government of
Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to
help convince them, the MILF convened its Central
Committee seriously to discuss the matter and eventually
met with the GRP
6. 28 February 2001 GRP Negotiating Panel was
established through Executive Order No. 3 s. 2001
7. 24 March 2001 parties met in Kuala Lumpur with talks
facilitated by the Malaysian Government; parties signed the
Agreement on the General Framework and the Resumption
of Peace Talks. The MILF thereafter suspended all its
military actions.
8. 20-22 June 2001 formal peace talks held in Tripoli,
Libya the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace Process which contained the
following basic principles and agenda on the negotiations:
security aspect, rehabilitation aspect, and ancestral
domain aspect (this aspect had a colatilla saying that it
shall be discussed further by the Parties in their next
meeting)
9. 5-7 August 2001 second round of peace talks in
Cyberjaya, Malaysia which ended in the signing of the
Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001 which led to a ceasefire between
parties
10. 7 May 2002 signed the Implementing Guidelines on the
Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of
the Tripoli Agreement 2001
11. 13 July 2003 Chairman Salamat Hashim of the MILF
passed away and subsequently replaced by Al Haj Murad
(previously chair peace negotiator). His position was taken
over by Mohagher Iqbal.
12. 2005 exploratory talks between parties in Malaysia, to
draft the MOA-AD
13. 23 July 2008 the Province of North Cotabato file with the
Supreme Court and was docketed as G.R. 183591
14. 04 August 2008 the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) commanding and directing
respondents and agents to cease and desist from formally
signing the MOA-AD. Court also required SolGen to
submit to the court and petitioners the official copy of the
MOA-AD
15. 05 August 2008 scheduled signing date for the final form
of Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace (MOA-AD)
16. 15, 22, 29 August 2008 cases were heard on oral
argument with the following issues discussed:
a. Whether the petitions have become moot and
academic
i. Insofar as mandamus is concerned in
view of the disclosure of the official copies of the MOA-
AD
ii. Insofar as prohibition aspect is
concerned if consultation has become fait accompli with
the finalization of the draft
b. Whether the constitutionality and legality of the MOA
is ripe for adjudication;
c. Whether respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when
it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES (d)
and (e)
d. Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to
information. If yes, whether prohibition is an appropriate
remedy
e. Whether by signing the MOA the GRP would be
binding itself to
i. Create and recognize the BJE as a separate
state/ juridical, territorial, political
subdivision not recognized by law
 ii. Revise or amend the constitution and
existing laws to conform to the MOA-AD
iii. Concede/ recognize claim of MILF for
ancestral domain in violation of IPRA
If yes, whether the Executive Branch has the
authority to bind the GRP
f. Whether the inclusion of North Cotabato, Zamboanga
City, Iligan and Isabela and Linamon, Lanao del Norte in
the Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question
g. Whether not signing the MOA derogates any valid
prior commitment of the GRP
17. 19 August 2008 - Maceda, Binay, Pimentel III filed with
the SC
18. 19 August 2008 Respondents (through Manifestation by
Motion) stated that the Executive Department shall
thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further
negotiations to address the issues raised and thus moved to
dismiss the cases
OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD
Parties: GRP (used interchangeably with CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT) and the MILF
Main body is divided into four (4) strands: CONCEPTS
AND PRINCIPLES, TERRITORY, RESOURCES, AND
GOVERNANCE
CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
o Defines Bangsamoro People as natives or
original inhabitants of Mindanao and
adjacent islands (including Palawan and
Sulu archipelago) at the time of conquest/
colonization and their descendants and
spouses
o Not only Moros but included indigenous
peoples of Mindanao and adjacent islands
(adds that the freedom of choice of the IPs
shall be respected)
o MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
Bangsamoro Homeland the ownership
of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation; both parties
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not
form part of the public domain.
o Bangsamoro people have a right to self-
governance
o Describes Bangsamoro as the First Nation
suggests exclusive entitlement to that
designation (departs from Canadian usage
used to refer to their indigenous collectively
as First Nations plural)
TERRITORY
o Land mass, maritime, terrestrial, fluvial,
alluvial including aerial domain and
atmospheric space embracing Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region
o Present geographic area of ARMM including
certain Municipalities in Lanao del Norte
voted for in the 2001 plebiscite
o Outside this, the BJE is to cover other
provinces and municipalities grouped into
Category A (to be subjected to plebiscite not
later than 12 months after MOA-AD
signing) and B [subjected to a plebiscite
twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a
separate agreement the Comprehensive
Compact]
o BJE shall have jurisdiction (did not say joint
with GRP) over all natural resources within
its internal waters (15km from coastline) and
territorial waters from beyond this up to
baselines of RP South East and South
West of mainland Mindanao; within
territorial waters, there is joint jurisdiction
with GRP
o Indicates sharing of minerals on the
territorial waters in favor of BJE. Nothing
said about sharing the minerals in the
internal waters
RESOURCES
o BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation/ trade relations with foreign
countries and can establish foreign trade
missions to other countries
o External defense remain the duty and
obligation of GRP
o GRP should take steps to include BJE in
international meetings and events such as
but not limited to ASEAN events
o Exploring, producing, obtaining potential
sources of energy jurisdiction and control is
under the BJE but in times of national
emergency, when public interest requires,
the GRP may, for a fixed period and
reasonable terms agreed by both parties,
assume or direct the operation of such
resources
o The sharing between the GRP and the BJE of
total production pertaining to natural
resources is 75:25 in favor of BJE.
o BJE may modify or cancel forest concessions,
timber licenses, mining concessions,
Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements
(MPSA) Industrial Forest Management
Agreements (IFMA) and the like, granted by
the GRP, including those issued by the
present ARMM.
GOVERNANCE
o Binds parties to invite a multinational third-
party to observe and monitor
implementation of COMPREHENSIVE
COMPACT a compact to embody the
details for effective enforcement and
mechanisms and modalities of actual
implementation of the MOA-AD but
explicitly says that the participation of the
third party shall not in any way affect the
relationship of the GRP and BJE
o Defines relationship of Central Government
and BJE as associative [take note of this
as this will be an issue tackled later on]
characterized by shared authority and
responsibility
o Provides that provisions requiring
amendments to the existing legal
framework shall take effect upon signing of
the comprehensive compact and upon
effecting the aforesaid amendments with due
regard to the non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated
 timeframe to be indicated in the
comprehensive compact [take note as the
legality of this provision is one of the main
points of the controversy violates
Constitution]
o BJE can build, develop, maintain own
institutions (banking, education, legislation,
judiciary etc.) details will be discussed in the
negotiation of the comprehensive compact
Annexed to the MOA-AD are documents containing the
lists and maps of the places included under Categories A and B
mentioned under TERRITORY
ISSUES AND HOLDING:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONS
HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
a. RIPENESS COURT RULES THAT IT
IS RIPE.[2]
Petitions allege acts or omissions by
respondents exceed their authority by
violating their duty under EO No. 3,
the Constitution and statutes. There
is a prima facie case for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus and thus
an actual case for controversy ripe
for adjudication exists. When an act
of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.
Concrete acts not necessary; cites
Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre: mere
enactment of the questioned law/
approval of the challenged action the
dispute is said to have ripened into
judicial controversy even without
any overt act. Indeed even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty. Also cites Santa Fe
Independent School District v.
Doe: US SC held that challenge for
the constitutionality of the schools
policy on student-led prayers/
speeches before games was ripe even
without it happening because it is the
policy being challenged, not the
concrete acts per se
When law or act in question is not yet
effective does not negate ripeness;
cites New York v. United States:
action of New York challenging a
radioactive waste policy was ripe in
order to avoid the provisions
consequences
b. LOCUS STANDI
Province of North Cotabato, Province
of Zamboanga del Norte, City of
Iligan, City of Zamboanga and
petitioners-in-intervention Province
of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela
and Municipality of Linamon have
locus standi in view of the direct
and substantial injury that they as
LGUs would suffer as their
territories are to be included in the
intended domain of the BJE
Petitioners allege that they did not
vote for their inclusion
Maceda, Binay, Pimentel III would
have no standing for their failure to
specify that they would have rights
that will be denied or that there is a
wastage of public funds BUT court
grants them standing due to their
invocation of the transcendental
importance of the issue
Intervenors Drilon and Tamayo can
be given standing in their claim as
tax payers and that government
funds will be used to conduct an
illegal and unconstitutional
plebiscite; transcendental importance
argument also gives them standing
Intervenor Mar Roxas has standing as
his premise is that he is a member of
the Senate and a citizen (publics
right to be informed on the MOA-
AD) and has genuine legal interest in
the matter in litigation (personally,
we no idea why the last one gives
him standing)
Intervenors Lopez, Ridao, Gomez,
and Buxani failed to allege any
proper legal interest in the present
petitions
Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement
for Peace and Development and
Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation
may be prejudiced and therefore they
have standing
c. MOOTNESS
COURT RULES THAT
PETITIONS ARE NOT
MOOTED[3]
1. Non-signing and
eventual dissolution of
the GRP Peace Panel did
not moot the petitions. It
bears emphasis that the
signing did not push
through due to the TRO
issued by this Court
2. Cannot be mere
consensus points given
the nomenclature and
need to have it initialed
by involved parties + far
reaching constitutional
implications
3. As discussed, there is a
commitment to change
statutes and possibly
amend the constitution
in order to conform to
the MOA-AD;
consequently, present
petitions are not
confined to the terms
 and provisions of the
MOA-AD but to other
on-going and future
negotiations and
agreements necessary
for its realization
4. It is of paramount public
interest.
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS
HAVE VIOLATED CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON
PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND THE
RIGHT TO INFORMATION WHEN
THEY NEGOTIATED THE MOA-AD
a. Constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern as provided in
Section 7, Article III Bill of Rights as is
complimented by Section 28[4], Article
II, Declaration of Principles and State
Policies (splendid symmetry in the
words of Commissioner Blas Ople)
It is a self-executory
constitutional right (Legazpi v.
Civil Service Commission)
There can be no realistic
perception and participation by
the public of the nations
problems nor meaningful
democratic decision-making if
the public is denied access of
information of general interest
(Baldoza v. Judge Dimaano)
The MOA-AD is a matter of
public concern, and matters of
public concern covered by the
right to information contemplates
inclusion of steps and
negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract/
transaction (Chavez v. PEA)
Effectivity of the policy of public
disclosure need not wait for a
passing of a statute. Respondents
cannot point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an
excuse in not effecting such
policy (merely provided for
reasonable safeguards in the
implementation but not a
necessity for the policy to be in
effect)
b. Three pertinent laws [EO No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code), and Republic Act
No. 8371 (IPRA)] animate petitioners
right to be consulted on the peace
agenda corollary to the constitutional
right to information and disclosure.
E.O. No. 3
1. In the perambulatory
clauses (the first
WHEREAS clauses in
the EO) it is stated that
there is a need to
enhance contribution of
CSOs by
institutionalizing
peoples participation
2. Enumerates
responsibilities of the
PAPP such as
conducting regular
dialogues with the
National Peace Forum
and other peace partners
Local Government Code
1. Requires all national
offices to conduct
consultations before any
project or program
critical to environment
and human ecology
which the MOA-AD
falls under as it vests
ownership of a vast
territory to the
Bangsamoro people
which could result to the
diaspora of a great
number of inhabitants
from the said
environment
IPRA
1. Entails the observance
of prior informed
consent of the
indigenous cultural
communities (ICCs) and
indigenous peoples (IPs)
(under IPRA)
PAPP committed grave abuse of
discretion
1. No consultation/ lack of
information cannot
invoke executive
privilege doctrine[5]
since copies of the
MOA-AD were given
upon request of the
Court anyway
2. Lacked prior consent/
informing of ICCs and
indigenous peoples IPs
(under IPRA)
3. MOA AD recognition of
ancestral domains seems
to delineate ancestral
domains which IPRA
does not grant the
Executive Department
thus respondents clearly
transcended the
boundaries of their
authority
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTENTS
OF THE MOA-AD ARE IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND STATUTES
a. MOA-AD is inconsistent with the provisions, such as in
Constitution and Laws as presently Article X[8]
worded.
Powers of BJE exceed those granted It violates of a number of articles
to any LGU under present laws in the Constitution
The international law concept of
association is discussed in length as 1. Article X, Section 20
it is envisioned to be the relationship (defines the powers of
between the BJE and the Central autonomous regions)
Government[6]
Quotes Keitner and Reisman (authors Section 20. Within its
of Free Association: The United territorial jurisdiction and
States Experience): [a]n association subject to the provisions of
is formed when two states of this Constitution and national
unequal power voluntary establish laws, the organic act of
durable links. In the basic model, one autonomous regions shall
state, the associate, delegates certain provide for legislative powers
responsibilities to the other, the over:
principal while maintaining its
international status as a state. Free (1) Administrative
associations represent a middle organization;
ground between integration and (2) Creation of sources of
independence. xxx (Emphasis and revenues;
underscoring supplied) xxx
Free association is understood as an (9) Such other matters as may
international association between be authorized by law for the
sovereigns promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the
The MOA-AD contains many region. (Underscoring
provisions which are consistent supplied)
with the international legal
concept of association[7] 2. It is only the President
1. BJEs capacity to enter who has the power to
into economic and trade enter into treaties[9]
relations with foreign however, paragraph 3
countries under RESOURCES in
2. Commitment of the the MOA-AD states that
Central Government to the BJE is free to enter
ensure participation of into any economic
BJE in ASEAN events cooperation and trade
and UN agencies relations with foreign
3. BJEs right to countries: provided
participate in Philippine however that such
official missions bearing relationships and
on negotiation of border understandings do not
agreements include aggression
4. Sharing of revenues against the Government
5. These resemble rights of of the Republic of the
governments of the Philippines x x x
Federated States of
Micronesia (an example 3. Article II, Section 22 of
of an associated state in the Constitution must
the US) also be amended to
effect the scheme
Concept of ASSOCIATION is not envisioned in the MOA-
recognized in our Constitution AD.
1. No province, city or
municipality has an The State recognizes and
associative promotes the rights of
relationship with the indigenous cultural
national government communities within the
2. Court says: even the framework of national unity
mere concept of and development
animating many of the
MOA-ADs provisions Court says that because of the
already require for the associative ties between the
amendment of BJE and the national
constitutional government, the act of
placing a portion of
 Philippine territory in a status non-derogation of prior
which in international agreements and within the
practice has generally been stipulated timeframe to be
a preparation for contained in the
independence, is certainly Comprehensive Compact.
not conducive to national
unity. 2. Court opines that this
stipulation does not bear
MOA-AD is also not in consonance a mark of a suspensive
with a number of statutes. condition defined in
civil law as a future and
1. Article X Section 3 of uncertain event but of
the Organic Act of the a term. It is not a
ARMM is a bar to the question of whether
adoption of the the necessary changes
definition of to the legal framework
Bangsamoro people will be effected but
used in the MOA WHEN. There is no
uncertainty, thus
MOA-AD lumps together the pursuant to this, it is
identities of the Bangsamoro mandatory for the GRP
with the other indigenous to effect the changes to
peoples living in Mindanao the legal framework.
(the Organic Act of the
ARMM distinguishes This is inconsistent with the
between Bangsa Moro people limits of the Presidents
and Tribal peoples) authority to propose
constitutional amendments, it
2. Chapter VII Section 52 being a virtual guarantee
of the IPRA lays down a that the Constitution and
detailed procedure in the other laws will certainly be
delineation and adjusted to conform to the
recognition of ancestral MOA-AD.
domains which is not
what is in the MOA-AD 3. Upholding such would
be authorizing a
MOA-AD simply states in usurpation of the
Paragraph 1 TERRITORY, constituent powers
[t]he Bangsamoro homeland vested only in Congress,
and historic territory refer to a Constitutional
the land mass as well as the Convention or the
maritime x x x embracing the people themselves
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan through initiative
geographic region. because the only way
that the Executive can
The suspensive clause in the guarantee these
MOA-AD is amendments is through
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. undue influence and
interference with the
1. Paragraph 7 in legislative process.
GOVERNANCE section Thus, it should be
of the MOA-AD states: struck down as
UNCONSTITUTIONA
7. Parties agree that the L.
mechanisms and modalities
for the actual implementation
of this MOA-AD shall be VERDICT:
spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to 1. Respondents motion to dismiss is DENIED. Main and
mutually take such steps to intervening petitions are GRANTED.
enable it to occur effectively. 2. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001
Any provisions of the MOA- is declared CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE
AD requiring amendments to CONSTITUTION.
the existing legal framework
shall come into force upon LAWS CITED:
effecting the necessary
changes to the legal Executive Order No. 3 Defining Policy and Administrative Structure
framework with due regard to for Governments Comprehensive Peace Efforts
The 1987 Philippine Constitution In our system of government, the President, being the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) (R.A. 8371) head of state is regarded as the sole organ and
Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) authority in external relations and is the countrys
sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect x x x the President is vested with authority to
deal with foreign states and governments x x x In the
realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
[1] A rebel group established in March 1984 when it splintered, authority to negotiate with other states.
under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim from the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari.
It separated on the ground of what Salamat perceived to be a Case 18
manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards PH v CHINA
Marxist-Maoist orientations. Hushet rajan. 501 pages ang ph v ch (to follow)
[2] SOLGEN SAYS: NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
THAT IS RIPE
1. Unsigned MOA AD is just a list of consensus points
for further negotiations
2. Remains to be a proposal that does not create legally
demandable rights until the list of operative acts have
been complied with
3. He cites the provision on the need for plebiscites (with
regard to the additional areas in Annex A and B
4. He also cites that the COMPREHENSIVE
CONTRACT is yet to be drafted (with a deadline within
15 months from signing of the MOA-AD)
5. Law or act in question is not yet effective does not
negate ripeness
6. Present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel
and PAPP Esperon drafted MOA-AD without
consulting LGUs affected is a departure from their
mandate under E.O. No. 3

[3] Moot and academic argument not applicable if:

a. There is grave violation of constitution
b. Situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved
c. Constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar and the public
d. Case is capable of repetition yet evading review
[4] Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest.
[5] This doctrine means the non-disclosure of sensitive
information by the Executive, as regards, for example, national
security
[6] 4. The relationship between the Central Government and
the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a
structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial
and administrative institutions
[7] Such as the BJEs capacity to enter into economic and
trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the
Central Government to ensure the BJEs participation in
meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN
agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Centre
[8] SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided

SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in

Muslim Mindanao xxx within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

[9] Pimentel v. Executive Secretary instructs: