G.R. No.
193459 February 15, 2011 violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its
GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
Facts:
1. On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an
impeachment complaint (First Complaint) against
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez
(petitioner) based on betrayal of public trust and
culpable violation of the Constitution.
2. On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by
Reyes, et al. against the same respondent also
based on betrayal of public trust and culpable
violation of the Constitution.
3. On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were
referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on
Justice at the same time.
4. On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice
found the First and Second Complaints sufficient in
form. On 7 September 2010, the Committee on
Justice, found the First and Second Complaints were
sufficient in form.
5. On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court
seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice from
proceeding with the impeachment proceedings. The
petition prayed for a temporary restraining order.
Petitioner: She invokes the Courts expanded certiorari
jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not
yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her
disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
course of the proceedings before public respondent.
Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed
the present petition on September 13, 2010, it had
not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency
of form and substance of the two complaints. Hence,
certiorari is unavailing.
6. The following day, during the en banc morning
session of 14 September 2010, the majority of the
Court voted to issue a status quo ante order
suspending the impeachment proceedings against
petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a matter of
practice for the Court that all the Justices should
have been given time, at least an hour or two, to
read the petition before voting on the issuance of
the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not
done.)
7. Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year."
Issue #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to
determine whether public respondent committed a
discretion relating to impeachment proceeding?
Held: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial
review. The Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of
the exercise of such discretion, through the power of
judicial review.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention
that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that
insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy
over the Legislature in this instance, but simply
upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the
repository of the sovereign will.
Issue #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for
adjudication?
Held: NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that
questions on the validity of the simultaneous referral of
the two complaints and on the need to publish as a
mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for
immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public
respondent two impeachment complaints presents a
novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot
thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she
took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only
one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against
an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Issue #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed
initiated?
Held: There are two components of the act of initiating
the complaint: the filing of the impeachment complaint
AND the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee
on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.
Issue #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for
comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency
of form and substance?
Held: YES. Contrary to petitioner contention, the
Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the
constitutional requirements and providing that there must
be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the
substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the committee.
In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an
impeachment complaint is made necessary. This
requirement is not explicitly found in the Constitution
which merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article
XI). In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House
deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and
substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to
effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence,
such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
Issue #5: May the Supreme Court look into the
narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis
petitioners submissions disclaiming the allegations in
the complaints?
Held: NO. This issue would "require the Court to make
a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of
Representatives.)
Issue #6: Was petitioner denied of due process,
because of the delay in the publication of the
Impeachment Rules?
Held: NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference
between publication and promulgation.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July
26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent
provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the
14th Congress and thereafter published on September
2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially
identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two
newspapers of general circulation.
Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she
was deprived of due process since the Impeachment
Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day
after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of
the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on
Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs
that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section."
Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this
case refers to "the publication of rules in any medium of
information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation."
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to
"publication," there is a statutory difference in their
usage. The Constitution notably uses the word
"promulgate" 12 times. A number of those instances
involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and
issuances emanating from Congress, the Supreme
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other
constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the
terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of the
Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of
these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of
judgments is concerned, however, PROMULGATION
means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which
it is generally understoodthat is, to make known. Since
the Constitutional Commission did not restrict
"promulgation" to "publication," the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It is
within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to
promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same
way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to
promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to
the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for the
Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government
how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court
is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation
beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution
where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a
set of rules of procedure. (Neri vs. Senate)
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required,
lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to
the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully
comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the
Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment
complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the
mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution would already run or even lapse while
awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of
publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment
Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the
Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment
complaints pending the completion of the
publication requirement. (Just like what happened in
this case, where the complaint was filed even before the
15th Congress open its first session)
Given that the Constitution itself states that any
promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at
"effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment
proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion when the House deemed it proper
to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the
14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of
early filing and in keeping with the "effective"
implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment
provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of
the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the
power of the House to promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed
purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated
by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or
supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment.
Being procedural in nature, they may be given
retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws does not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws." In
the present case, petitioner fails to allege any
impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid
of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved,
impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people
as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the
offender.
Issue #7: When do we reckon the start of the one-year
ban?
Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of
the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22,
2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of
the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from
July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may
be accepted and referred to public respondent.
Held: Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate"
means to file the complaint and referral of the complaint
to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period
ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint,
but on the date it is referred to the House Committee on
Justice.
Petitioner submits that referral could not be the
reckoning point of initiation because "something prior to
that had already been done. This is wrong. Following
petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the
complaint or the endorsement by a member of the
House steps done prior to the filing would already
initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Issue #8: Does an impeachment complaint need to
allege only one impeachable offense?
Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused
its discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment
Rules, which provides that "the Rules
of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as
far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings
before the House." Petitioner invokes the application of
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
on one offense per complaint rule. To petitioner, the two
impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and
substance since each charges her with both culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one
complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense;
expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political
nature of the impeachment process; constitute a
whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her
performance of official functions as well as that of the
House; and prevent public respondent from completing
its report within the deadline.
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement
in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must
charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable
offenses precludes the application of the above-said
Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms
cannot be defined with the same precision required in
defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the
grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political
judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also
considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel
group adds that impeachment is a political process and
not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal
prosecution stage the complaint or information referred
thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment
complaint, must already be in the name of the People of
the Philippines.
Held: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
impeachment offenses, with each charge representing
an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known
as the "Articles of Impeachment." It, therefore, follows
that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.
Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.
Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory
application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in
carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which
prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and
without delving into the practicability of the application of
the one offense per complaint rule, the initial
determination of which must be made by the
House93 which has yet to pass upon the question, the
Court finds that petitioners invocation of that particular
rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state
that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
impeachment offenses, with each charge representing
an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known
as the "Articles of Impeachment."94 It, therefore, follows
that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.
The second procedural matter deals with the rule on
consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner
maintains that the Constitution allows only one
impeachment complaint against her within one year.

Records show that public respondent disavowed any

immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep.
Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the
Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may
come today or may come later on after determination of
the sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for
purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide
when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need
to consolidate."95 Petitioners petition, in fact, initially
describes the consolidation as merely "contemplated." 96

Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon

motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will
not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it
would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory. 97

Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance

that the two impeachment complaints
were deemedconsolidated,98 her claim that consolidation
is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioners theory obviously
springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation
which the Court already brushed aside.