Topics/Sub-topics

1 I. Legal Research, Writing and Analysis

A. Finding a Case, Parts of a Case and Legal Writing

1.) Caption and Title
2.) Introduction (Optional)
3.) Statement of Case
4.) Findings of Facts
5.) Statement of Issue
6.) Court ruling
7.) Dispositive Portion

B. Ratio and Obiter Dictum

Ratio Decidendi Principle of law/ Legal reasoning necessary for court to come to its decision
Rule judge used to answer question
Obiter Dicta- Things judges said which were of interest but were not necessary for decision
-not essential to decision
TEST : OBITER DICTUM
Can you insert the opposite of proposition w/o requiring a change in the courts judgment

C. Case Analysis and Case Briefs

2 II. The Philippine Legal System

A. Courts: Who interprets the Constitution and the Law

1.) Judicial Power Defined: Lopez v. RoxasConcepcion

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies/disputes involving rights that are enforceable & demandable before courts of
justice/redress of wrongs for violation of such rights.

PROPER EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY TO SETTLE JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSIES REQUIRES LEGISLATIVE ACTION

1.) Defining such enforceable rights/prescribing remedies for violation therepf
2.) Determining the court w/ jurisdiction to hear & decide controversy/dispute
FACTS:
 Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were main contenders for the Office of Vice President of Philippines in the general elections held
Nov 1965.
Houses of Congress, in joint session assembled as board charged with duty to canvass the votes then cast for President and Vice President.
Proclaimed Fernando Lopez elected.
Respondent filed with Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), contesting that it was not he, but said respondent who had obtained largest number of votes for
office.
Lopez instituted in Supreme Court present original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction against respondent Roxas, to prevent PET from hearing and
deciding the election contest
Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other
ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is
appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not PET, being composed of CJ and members of SC is constitutional?
HELD:
a) PET is not a newly created and separate court aside from SC
b) Appointment of members of SC to PET merely impose additional duties to them
c) PET is not inferior to SC although its functions cover limited scope compared to original jurisdiction of the latter
d) Separation of powers among the branches not violated as congress merely acts as board of canvassers while PET has authority to determine
through electoral protest whether rightful winner is really proclaimed.
e) No constitutional tenure for public elected officials is abridged when it is determined that holder of office has no legal right to hold such office
based on election results.
f) Congress did not encroach the appointing power of executive branch in imposing new duties through the functions of tribunal

2.) Separation and Blending of Powers: Angara v. Electoral Commission Laurel

Facts:
Angara, Ynsua, Castillo & Mayor were candidates for member of National Assembly of 1 st district of Tayabas (congressman)
Provincial board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner as winner
Petitioner took oath of office
Ynsua filed before Electoral Commission : Motion of Protest --- He be decared as member of NA
Electoral Commission adopted a resultion which ficed a date for last day of filing election protest (Dec 9) which fixed a date for last day of filing election proest
against election returns and qualifications of members of NA notwithstanding previous proclamation made by NA
Angara filed motion to dismiss arguing that by virtue of NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest
Ynsua argued that Electoral Commission proclamation governs, that EC can take cognizance of election protest ad that EC cannot be subject to writ of
 prohibition by SC
ISSUE:
WON SC has jurisdiction over subject matter
HELD:
I. Yes. In case of conflict between several departments and among agencies thereof, the judiciary with SC as final arbiter is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries
II. Judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases & controversies and the power and duty to see that no
branch of government transcends the constitution as the source of its authority
III. Electoral Commission valid: Admitting motion of protest
Consti organ created to determine all contests relaing to election, returns and qualifications of members of national assembly,
3.) Hierarchy of Philippine Judicial System
a. Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts: Diocese of Bacolod v. Commissionn on Elections-- Carpio
Facts :
Petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private compound in San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod
Each Tarpulin 6x10 feet in size, were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within pubic view
First tarp contains IBASURA RH LAW
2nd tarp is the subject of present case. It contains Conscience vote and list of candidates Team buhay (voted against it) and Team Patay(voted for it) .
Candidates were classified according to their vote of the adoption of RA 10354/ RH bill.
Feb 22, Respondent Atty.Majarucon (Electoral officer of Bacolod) issued a letter: a Notice to remove Campaign Materials within 3 days for being oversized
Feb, 27 letter: ordering immediate removal of tarp otherwise it will be constrained to file an election offense. (Violation of Comelec Resp No. 9615)
Petitioners filed a case directl with SC to assail COMELEC resolution-- Concerned about imminent threat of prosecution for exercise of free speech
ISSUE
I. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of hierarchy of courts as the case was not
brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
HELD:
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right.
The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners speech.
Breach of fundamental right of expression by COMELEC amounts to grave abuse of discretion. Thus constitutionality of notice and letter is
within the courts power to review.
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of judiciary performs its designated role in an effective and
 efficient manner To effectively perform functions they are territorially organized into regions and branches.
Trial Court Determine facts from evaluation of evidence presented before them
Determine issues of law
Court of Appeals Appellate Cort that reviews determination of facts and law by Trial Court
Supreme Court Leads judiciary by breaking new ground/further reiterating existing precedence
SCs role to interpret consti & act in order to protect consti rights should not be emasculated by doctrine of hierarchy of courts. (Not an iron
clad rule)

EXCEPTIONS TO DOCTRINE
1.) There are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time
Assailed issuance not only prejudices petitioners right to freedom of expression, also other future similar cases.
2.) Issues involved are of transcendental importance
There is clear threat to paramount right to freedom of speech and freedom of expression.
Protection of these fundamental constitutional rights therefore allows immediate resort to this court
3.) Cases of First Impression
No jurisprudence yet exists that will guide lower courts on this matter.
Whether right of suffrage includes the right to freedom of expression.
4.) Constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court
SC within constitutionally enshrined judicial power that can rule w/ finality whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion/performed acts contrary to the consti through assailed issuances.
5.) Time element cannot be ignored
Case filed during 2013 election
Although elections have already conculed future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution.
6.) Filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ (COMELEC)
Ruling by his ourt would be in the best interest of repondents, in order that their action may be guided in the future
7.) No other plain, speedy and adequate remedy inn ordering course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of
respondent acts in violation of their freedom of expression
8.) Petition includes questions dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy/demanded by broader
interests of justice/orders complained were found to be patent nullities/appeal was considered as clearly inappropriate
remedy

b. Highest Court of the Land: The Supreme Court

i. En Banc and Division Cases:
Art 8 : JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, Sec 4 (2,3)
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of
 its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for
the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Firestone Ceramics v. CA; Purisima J
Facts:
On March 7, 2000, Firestone Ceramics, Inc, through a pleading, moved for the referral of the case between the People of the Philippines versus Fire
Ceramics to the Supreme Court En Banc. The case aforementioned sought to determine the classification of the 99 hectares tract of land which is
presumed to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines but was adjudicated to private individuals.
The validity of the disposition of lands to private persons is what is in question in this case since the validity of decision, original certificate of title and
transfer certs of title issued pursuant to the decision the hinges on classification of the subject area at time it was so adjudicated
Said decision does not indicate the classification of land in question when private respondents obtained their decree of registration
ISSUE
Whether cases can be referred to the Court En Banc pending Motion for reconsideration in one of its divisions
HELD:
Yes, the case at bar constitutes as an En Banc case. Supreme Court Circular 2-98 dtd November 18, 1993 states the En Banc cases are cases
which:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2.Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;
3.Cases raising novel questions of law;
4.Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5.Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit;
6..Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the
suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7.Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed;
8.Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are
acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en banc; and
9.All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.

In this case, there was submitted to Court en consulta, petitioners motion to refer to Court en Banc these consolidated cases for consideration of Court.
The pleading was presented but whe the same was first brought to its attention, the Court opined that since 3 rd division had not yet acted on subject
 motion to refer the case to Banc, it was premature for court to resolve the consulta. However Court succinctly cautioned that the action of 3 rd division on
the matter would just be tentative.
Clear that these consolidated caseshave been found to be of sufficient importance to merit the attention and disposition of the entire court en banc and
therefore the prayer of the rep of Philippines and private petitioners for Court En Banc to hear and resolve pending motion for reconcideration is
meritous.
Under section 9 of the aforementioned circular, the court exercises its residual Power to deem or admit as En Banc cases those which are of sufficient
importance. In the case at bar, not only is the size of the land in question 99 hectares of land material but the fact that it is being claimed as a
government property deems it of sufficient importance. Being of sufficient importance, the courts use of its residual power to admit the case at bar as
an En Banc case is validated. Therefore, the case at bar is considered as an En Banc Case.
Court En Banc entertain a case for its resolution and disposition, It does so without implying that division of origin is incapable of rendering objective
and fair justice.
The action of the court simply means that the nature of case calls for en banc attention and consideration

Separate Opinion: J. PUNO

Justice Puno votes to have the court en banc defer from assuming jurisdiction over the case in order for the Court of Appeals Third Division to set out straight the facts of
the case in the originally planned March 21, 2000 Oral Arguments before the Court En Banc assumes jurisdiction.
Dissenting Opinion: J. Gonzaga-Reyes
J. Gonzaga-Reyes votes to deny the motion to refer the MR to the Supreme Court En Banc for the ff. reasons:
1. the value of the property in question is not determinant of whether a case should be referred to the court en banc.
2. the motion for reconsideration is still pending in the 3rd division of the court of appeals and therefor should be left for the decision of such court unless there is a proving
of incapacity or disqualification in such division.
3.it is implies in the 3rd par. Of Art. VIII of Sec. 4 of the 1987 constitution that the court en banc is nt an appellate court to which rulings of the divisions of the court, which
are deemed Supreme court decisions if concurred by a majority of its members, are appealed.
4. the 1993 circular, which deems cases of sufficient importance as en banc cases, is of doubtful validity and soundness because the resolution thereto was an
amendment to the rules of court ( Rule 136, sec. 15 and 16) dealing with the form of papers to be filed in court.
5. the residual power of the Supreme Court En Banc to admit cases of sufficient importance must be shielded from the importunings of litigants in order for thecourt to not
be suspected of irregularity
Dissenting Opinion: J. Panganiban
J. Panganiban agrees with the dissenting opinion of j. Gonzaga-Reyes and stresses the point that the mere reason why the Court En Banc admitted the case was because
of it being of sufficient importance with no reason why it is deemed as that. J. Panganiban argues that in the Sumilao farmers case, a 2-2 vote was present and J. Melo
has presented why such case was of sufficient importance. However, the Sumilao Case was not taken over by the Court En Banc. J. Panganiban now questions the En
Banc on why it did not take over the controversial Sumilao case but it took over the case at bar wherein majority of the third division rejected it for not having any legal
reason to be referred to the Court En Banc. J. Panganiban also noted that the lone dissenter in the third divisions rejection, J. Purisima just asked the Court En Banc to take
cognizance of the case at bar without any evidence presented to justify such case to be accommodated en banc.

ii. Rule-Making Powers

ARTICLE VIII: JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Sec of National Defense v. Manalo Puno

Facts:
Farmer brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are from Bulacan.
They were suspected for being members of NPA and were abducted, detained in various locations and tortured by CAFGU and military units questioning
them of their knowledge about NPA.
After several days in captivity, the brothers recognized abductors as members of Armed Forces led by General Palparan. They also learned that they were
beig held in place of their brother, Bestre, suspected leader of communist insurgens.
After 18 months of detention and torture, respondents were able to escape
Manalo brothers filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and TRO before the CA to stop military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to
liberty and basic rights.
While said case was pending, Writ of Amparo took effect (Oct 24,2007)
Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition
CA granted privilege of writ of amparo.
CA ordered Sec of National Defense and Chief of Staff of AFP to furnish Manalos and Court official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalo
custody, confirm present places of official assignment of military official involved and produce medical reports and records of Manalo brothers while under
military custody
Herein petitioners presented lone witness in summary hearings, Lt.Col Ruben U. Jimenez Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division PA having territorial
jurisdiction in the 24th infantry battalion.
Jimenez testified: Alleged involvement heretofore that incident is considered doubtful, hence no basis to indict them as charge in this investigation
WHAT DOES AMPARO RULE INTEND TO ADDRESS?
a) Extra-judicial killings without due process of law
b.) Enforced disappearances attended by the following characteristics:
 1.Arrest, detention or abduction of person by govt official or organized groups or private individuals acting with direct/indirect acquiescence of govt
2. Refusal of state to disclose the fate/whereabouts of the person concerned or the refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
person outside protection of law
ISSUES AND HELD
I. Whether evidence presented is strong to satisfy degree of proof required
that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not corroborated by their other independent and credible pieces of evidence.
Raymond Manalos testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of Reynaldo Manalo.
The testimony and medical reports presented by Dr. Molino and picture of scars left by physical injuries inflicted on respondents , also
corraborate respondent s account of torture they endured while in detention.
Respondent Raynold Manalos familiarity with the facilities of Fort Magsaysay such as DTU and confirmed by Lt. Col Jimenez of the Division
training unit
--- ALL FIRMS UP RESPONDENTS STORY THAT THEY WERE DETAINED FOR SOME TIME IN SAID MILITARY FACILITY.
---- With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and torture perpetrated on victim it logically holds that much of the information
and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves.

II. Whether there is a continuing violation of respondents right to life, liberty and security in order for writ of amparo to be validly granted
Respondents assert that their cause of action consists of the threat to their right to life and liberty and a violation of their right to security.
Right to Security/Security of Persons
ART III, Sec 2 : Consti
The right of people to secure their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable and no search
warrant/ warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by judge.
RIGHT TO LIFE
Guarantees essentially the right to be alive, upon which
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditionedright to
security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of
his life.
Right to security of person yield various permutations of exercise of this
right
 1.) Right to security of person is freedom from fear
Univ. Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a
world In which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
the belief and freedom from fear.
Art 9(1) of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) provides for security of persons
PH : signatory to boh UDHR and ICCPR
Thus, in the amparo context it is more apparent that right to security is actually
freedom from fear
Violation (In the case)
Respodents were detained, threatened that if they escape their families including them
will be killed.
At time they escaped, condition of threat to be killed come to pass.
With their escape, continuing threat to life is apparent, moreso now that they have
surfaced and implicated specific officers.
2.) Right to security of persons is a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity and security
Art III, Sec 12 Consti specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion
: No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Violation (In the case)
Apart from the failure of military elements to provide for protection of
respondents, they also miserably failed in conducting effective investigation of
abduction
3.) Right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights
by the government In the context of WoA, this right is built into the guarantees
of right to life and liberty (Art III of Sec 1 of Consti) and the right to security of
persons (Art III, Sec 2 of Consti)

We conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from threat is violated by apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of persons.
c. Third Level Courts
i. Court of Appeals: Carpio-Morales v. CA
Facts:
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and
other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al),
 Accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5)
phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the
necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).
Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6)
administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
As to Binay, Jr., OBM complaint alleged that he was involved in the anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of Makati Parking
Building Project committed during his previous and present term as City Mayor of Makati
Before Binay Jr. et als filing, Ombudsman upon recommendation of 2nd Special Panel issued on March 10,2015 the subject preventive suspension for not more than 6
months without pay during pendency of OMB cases.
Ombudsman directed DILG Sec Roxas to immediately implement the preventive suspension order against Binay.
March 16,2015 Roxas implemented preventive suspension order through NCR Director Brion
Assistant City Prosecutor Evangelista administered oath of Vice Mayor Pena who assumed office as acting mayor.
Same day, CA issued Reso. Granting Binay Jrs prayer for TRO.
ISSUES AND HOLDING:
I. Whether or not the present petition and not motions for reconsideration of assailed CA issuances, is the Ombudsmans plain, speedy and adequate remedy
YES
A common requirement for both petition for certiorari and petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure is that
petitioner has no plain, speedy ad adequate remedy in ordinary course of law.
In this case, it is clear that exceptions attend since for the first time, the question on authority of CA and of this court for that matter to enjoin
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by Ombudsman is put to force.
This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key govt institutions (Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature,
and the Judiciary) it involves issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than careful but expedious resolution
II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over main petition for certiorari
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless
there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Since 2nd paragraph of Sec 14, RA 6770 limits remedy against decision or findings of the ombudsman to Rule 45 appeal and thus similar to the 4th
paragraph of Sec 27 Ra 6770 attempts to effectively increase the SCs appellate jurisdiction without its advice or concurrence, it is therefore concluded
unconstitutional and perforce invalid.
Thus with unconstitutionality of 2nd paragraph of Sec 14, RA 6770,the court consistent with existing jurisprudence
As such,the CA was held to have correctly issued the injunctive relief in enjoining thepreventive suspension against Binay, Jr.

III. Whether the independence of Office of Ombusman can be invoked as basis to insulate it from judicial power
 No.
(Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231 and 19232, 28 January 2014)
Office of the Ombudsmans independence covers thefollowing:
(1) it is the creation of the Constitution;
(2) it enjoys fiscalautonomy; and
(3) it is insulated from executive supervision and control.
o SC held that the Ombudsman was meant to be protected from political harassment and pressure, to free it from the insidious tentacles of
politics.
o Hence, ombudsman notion it it can be exempt from incident of judicial power clearly strays from the concepts rationale of insulating office from
political harassment and pressure.

IV. Whether or not CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually the WPI enjoining implementation of the preventive suspension order against
Binay Jr. based on condonation doctrine
NO
SC abandoned the condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the WPI, as it did so based on
good case law, considering that the abandonment is prospective in nature.
Ombudsman convinced the SC not to adhere to stare decisis, thereby enriching Philippine jurisprudence on this matter.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cite legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of
condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the
1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local officials administrative liability for a misconduct committed during
a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense,and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses
The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory basis at all. By abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC would remove this defense oft-
times used by elected officials,

V. Whether or not CAs directive for Ombudsman to comment on Binay Jr.s petition for contempt in CA is improper and illegal
refused to be resolved on the ground there are no contempt proceedings yet.

ii. Court of Tax Appeals

Republic Act No. 9282 March 30 2004
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (CTA), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL
 JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
iii. Sandiganbayan:
ARTICLE XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Ducano v. Sandiganbayan PERALTA
Facts:
Danilo Ducano, was the Regional Director of BIR with Salary Grade 26 as classified in RA 6758.
On March 24,2009 Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman filed a criminal case against him for violation of Sec 8, in relation to Sec 11 of RA 6713
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6713]
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-
HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING
PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public
has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen
(18) years of age living in their households.
(Statement of Assets and Liabilities)
Section 11: penalties
At the heart of controversy is the determination of whether according to PD 1606, as amnded by Sec 4 (A) (1) of RA o. 8249, only regional directors with salary grade
of 27 and higher as clarified under RA 6758 fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of thee Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him who merely a regional director with Salary grade of 26.
On the contrary OSP maintains that a Regional Director irrespective of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
Whether the Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction over Ducano
NO. The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big time cases involving so called big fishes in the
government.
Yet, those with classified Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold positions
enumerated by law. In this category, it is the position held not the salary grade which determine the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan. Specific inclusion
constitutes an exception to general qualification
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
 "(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he belong to any of the positions enumerated in Sec 4.
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Sec 3 (a) and (c) of RA 3091 unless committed by public officials occupying positions of regional
director and salary grade higher than 27.
(a) "Government" includes the national government, the local governments, and
all other instrumentalities, agencies or branches of the Republic of the Philippines
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and their subsidiaries.
(c) "Gift" refers to a thing or a right disposed of gratuitously, or any act or
liberality, in favor of another who accepts it, and shall include a simulated sale or an
ostensibly onerous disposition thereof. It shall not include an unsolicited gift of nominal
or insignificant value not given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor from a
public official or employee
d. Second Level Courts
i. Regional Trial Courts- Courts of General Jurisdiction: Act Recognizing Judiciary, Appropriating Funds, Therefore and for other purposes,
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now
provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
 Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review
to the
Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed
an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and
domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such other special cases as the
Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. Whenever a Regional Trial Court takes cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation cases and/or agrarian cases, the special rules of
procedure applicable under present laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless subsequently amended by law or by rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court.
e. First Level Courts
ii. Municipal Trial Coutrs, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities: An act expaninding the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Coutrs Amending BP 129, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, RA 7691
(1994)
BP129: AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
RA 7691 AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"

4.) Jurisdiction: Echegaray v. Sec of Justice--Puno

Facts:
Leo Echeraray is a convict subject to lethal injection (Rape of10 y/o daughter of his common law spouse)
He filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration raising constitutionality of RA 7659
AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES and death penalty for rape. Both were denied.
Consequently, Congress changed the mode of execution of death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection and passed RA 8177 designating death by lethal
injection
Public respondents submit certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of law imposing death penalty has become
null
Public pronouncement of Pres. Estrada that he will veto any law imposing death penalty involving heinous crimes
Resolution of Congressma Golez, et al that they are against repeal of the law
The fact that Sen. Rocos resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel
Moreover, they contend that SC lost its jurisdiction over case at bar and hence ca no longer restrain the execution
of petitioner
 ISSUE: WON court loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment
HELD:
NO. The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rendered upon it. What it cannot do is modify or amend final decision.
The court held that by finality of judgment, court loses its jurisdiction to amend the decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it.
There is a difference between jurisdiction of court to execute its judgment and jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a decision.
The former continues for the purpose of enforcing the judgment while latter terminates after final judgment is rendered for after judgment becomes
final, facts and circumstances may transpire which may render execution unjust or impossible.
Power of control of execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction.
To be sure, important part of litigation is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change circumstances of parties ad
compel courts to intervene and adjust rights of litigants to prevent unfairness.

5.) Basis of Decision:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. CAMartinez
Facts:
Dispute between the parties had its origin in the non-delivery of 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even if private respondent Pacific Cement
Company, Incorporated had already received payment and despite petitioners several demands.
Petitioner informed private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that the venue for
arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N Malhorta, resolved the dispute in favor of petitioner setting forth the arbitral award.
To execute award, petitioner filed before Court of Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India praying that the decision of arbitrator made the Rule of Court in India
Despite notice sent to private respondent, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by foreign court as owing to petitioner.
Accordingly petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of RTC SurigaoCity for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of foreign court. RTC found the
referral of the dispute between the parties to arbitrator under Clause 16 erroneous.
In its decision, appellate court concurred with RTCs ruling that arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute bwteen the parties, thus the foreign court could
not validly adopt the arbitrators award.
In addition, the appellate court observed that full texts of judgment of foreign court contains the dispositive portion and indicates no finding of facts and law as
basis of award.
Hence, the said judgment cannot be enforced by any Philippine court as it would violate the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
The appellate court ruled further that the dismissal of the private respondents objections for nonpayment of the required legal fees, without the foreign court first
 replying to the private respondents query as to the amount of legal fees to be paid, constituted want of notice or violation of due process. Lastly, it pointed out
that the arbitration proceeding was defective because the
Arbitrator was appointed solely by the petitioner, and the fact that the arbitrator was a former employee of the latter gives rise to a presumed bias on his part in
favor of the petitioner.
ISSUES AND HOLDINGS:
1. Whether the non-delivery of cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under Clause 16. No.
To fall within the purview of this phrase, the claim, right or thing whatsoever must arise out of or relate to the design, drawing, specification, or instruction of
the supply order/contract.
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, although a rule in the construction of statutes, is equally applicable in the ascertainment of the meaning and scope of vague
contractual stipulations, such as the aforementioned phrase. According to the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of the words in
which it is found or with which it is associated, or stated differently, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associated words .
The non-delivery of the oil well cement is definitely not in the nature of a dispute arising from the failure to execute the supply order/contract design, drawing,
instructions, specifications or quality of the materials. That Clause 16 should pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the contract is but a
logical inference considering that the underlying purpose of a referral to arbitration is for such technical matters to be deliberated upon by a person
possessed with the required skill and expertise which may be otherwise absent in the regular courts.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. The petitioners interpretation that Clause 16 is of such latitude as to contemplate even
the non-delivery of the oil well cement would in effect render Clause 15 a mere superfluity. A perusal of Clause 16 shows that the parties did not intend
arbitration to be the sole means of settling disputes.

2. Whether the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction. Yes
Even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions
thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the
facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B1 consists of 18 single spaced pages.
This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. Thus, if under the
procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrators findings, then the same
must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and
executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply
because our rules provide otherwise.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to
presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. The party attacking a foreign judgment, the private respondent
herein, had the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the instant case.
 3. Whether memorandum decisions transgress the constitutional requirement in Art. VIII, Sec. 14. No.
The foreign court explicitly declared in its Order that Award Paper No. 3/B1 shall be part of the decree. Nonetheless, it would be more prudent
for a memorandum decision not to be simply limited to the dispositive portion but to state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with
references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunals assessments and conclusions
on the case.
This practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to
be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision. This is
particularly true where the decisions, orders, or resolutions came from a court in another jurisdiction. Otherwise, the enforcement of the
decisions would be based on presumptions that laws in other jurisdictions are similar to our laws, at the expense of justice based on the
merits.
Moreover, the constitutional guideline set forth in Article VIII, Section 14 cannot prevail over the fundamental elements of due process.
Matters of procedure even if laid down in the Constitution must be tempered by substantial justice provided it has factual and legal basis.
Considering that the case involves significant properties, the overriding consideration of a judgment based on the merits should prevail over
the primordial interests of strict enforcement on matters of technicalities.
Procedural lapses, absent any collusion or intent to defraud the parties or mislead the tribunals, should not be allowed to defeat the claim of a
party who is not well-informed in the technical aspects of the case but whose interest is merely to enforce what he believes to be his rightful
claim. The case is REMANDED.

6.) Judicial and Bar Council

Section 8.
1.) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
2.) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
3.) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
4.) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the
Council.
5.) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
De Castro v. JBC
Facts:
The case started with the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, which occurs just seven days after the coming presidential
elections on May 10, 2010.
Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. HOWEVER Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution bans the
 President from appointing two (2) months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term.
On a January 18, 2010 meeting en banc , the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) passed a resolution that opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the
Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.
It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that in
their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the framers neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against
midnight appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice versa; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they
could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article
VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of
the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
ISSUES AND HOLDING:
Whether the President can appoint a Supreme Court Justice under the circumstances. Yes.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (ExecutiveDepartment):
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department):
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President.
The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of
this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices.
The court believes then that had the framers of the Constitution intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Membersof the Supreme Court.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not consider the intent of the
 Constitutional Commission. The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme
Court within the 90-day period was a true mandate for the President.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections
4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days. It did not consider that Section 4(1) of Art. VIII is
independent of other provision. We thus reverse Valenzuela.
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section
15 as part of Article VII was made in order to eliminate midnight appointments of the outgoing Chief as a form of vote buying.
Given the rationale, it is proper then to assume that the framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC
and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no
longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
Lastly, Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
B. The Power of Judicial Review: What is Constitutional or Unconstitutional?
1. Origins of Judicial Review:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Marbury v. Madison
Facts:
Marbury was appointed a justice of peace, a minor judicial officer, in the District of Columbia, by President Adamsa few days before President Jefferson took office
after defeating Adams in the election of 1800. His appointment was signed by Adams Secretary of State, John Marshall, who was also appointed and sworn in as the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court only days before Jefferson took office. Oddly, neither Adams nor Marshall delivered the commission to Marbury before they left
office, creating the basic circumstances to which this dispute arose.
ISSUE:
 1) Whether the applicant has a right to the commission he demands;
2) Whether if he does have a right, the laws of his country afford him a remedy; and
3) Whether if he is afforded remedy, it is a mandamus issuing from this Court.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The 2d section of the 2d article of the Constitution declares, that the president shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are otherwise not provided for.
The 3d section declares, that he shall commission all the officers of the United States.
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president and sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office
gave the officer the right to hold for five years independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights which
are protected by laws of this country. To withhold the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested
legal right.
(2) Yes. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.
The case will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. The office of the justice of
peace in the District of Columbia is an office worthy of the attention and guardianship of laws; it has been created by a special act of congress, and has been
secured, so far as the laws can give security to the person to fill it, for five years.
(3) Yes. The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by
principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.
The secretary of state, being a person holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of description, and if this court
is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of
conferring the authority, and assigning duties which its words purport to confer and assign.

Francisco v. House of RepresentativesCarpio Morales

Facts:
7-22-02- House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Rep. Felix Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation,
in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the CJ of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)
6-2-03- Former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment against CJ Hilario Davide and 7 Associate Justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
public trust and other high crimes Endorsed by Reps. Rolex Suplico, Ronaldo Zamora, and Didagen Dilangalen
10-13-03- House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in
substance
10-23-03- second impeachment complaint was filed (after 4 mos. And 3 weeks) with the Secretary General of the House by Rep. Gilberto Teodoro, Jr and Felix
Funtabella against CJ Davide Attached was a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least 1/3 of the House
Thus, the instant petitions contending that the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Sec. 5, Art. XI of the
Constitution\
Petitioners and standing:
oAtty. Ernesto B. Franciso, Jr. as a member of the Integrated Bar, duty bound
o Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. Al as citizens and taxpayers, issues are of transcendental importance
o Arturo M. de Castroand Soledad Cagampang- as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers, and members of the IBP, involves public interest due to use of public funds to
proceed with the impeachment trial
o Francisco I. Chavez- Court has granted him locus standi in the cases of Chavez vs. PCGG and Chavez vs. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,
declaring the unconstitutionality of the 2nd complaint
o Atty. Harry Roque, et. Al. as taxpayers and members of the legal profession
o Reps. Salacnib Baterina and Dep. Speaker Raul Gonzales- as members of the House to assue only constitutional proceedings are initiated
o Leonilo Alfonso, et. Al, right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending as taxpayers
o Public Interest Center, Inc. and Atty. Crispin Reyes whose members are citizens and taxpayers and member of the Bar
o Atty. Fernando Perito- as citizen and member of the Philippine Bar Association
o IBP- mandated y the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution
o Atty. Claro Flores- as taxpayer
o UP Law Alumni Foundation, Inc., et. Al- as class suit
o Fr. Ranhilio Aquino- as taxpayer
o Nilo Malanyaon as taxpayer
o Attys. Vencio S. Flores and Hector Hofilea- as professors of law
o Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr.- not alleging locus standi, but stating that the House has no jurisdiction on the audit of the JDF
o Philippine Bar Assoc. complaint involves transcendental importance
o Democrit Barcenas, et. Al as citizens and taxpayers
10-28-03- motion to transmit impeachment was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum
Justice Puno and Vitug offered to rescue themselves but the Court rejected their offer.
Justice Panganiban inhibited himself but the Court directed him to participate
10-28-03- Court consolidated petitions and invited amici curae
Same day- Speaker Jose De Venecia submitted a manifestation asserting that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House, which is an
independent and co-equal branch of government
oSen. Aquilino Pimintel, Jr. filed a motion to intervene and comment with prayer to dismiss petitions for lack of jurisdiction of the Court reasoning that the sole power,
authority, and jurisdiction of the Senate
10-29-03- Senate President Drilon filed Manifestation stating that the petitions are premature having no basis in law or in fact, and it does not have a justiciable
question
10-30-03 Atty. Jaime Soriano filed Petition for Leave to Intervene questioning the status quo resolution
oMotion for leave to intervene filed also by Romulo Macalintal and Nagmamalasakit na mga Mananaggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.
11-5 to 6- 03- Court heard the view of the amici curaie
Issues:
WON power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings
WON the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled
Ruling:
Yes. The courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the Government in Sec. 1, Art. VII .In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof
The moderating power is to direct the courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is the power of the court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
It does not follow that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other
oThere is the system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of government
oThe SC is the final arbiter checking the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law and declare acts violative of the Constitution
Judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers
Words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where the technical terms are employed
Where there is no ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. Must be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers
The constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
The Supreme Court is given the duty of an expanded definition to include power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality
Limitations on the Courts power of judicial review:
oAn actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
oPerson challenging the act must have standing to challenege
oChallenge must be raised at the earliest time possible
oThe issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the cases
Locus standi- personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged
oWhen suing as citizen- interest of the petitioner assailing must be direct and personal. Must sustain or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of enforcement
oWhen suing as taxpayer- allowed where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional law.The court grants standing to most of the petitioners
oWhen suing as a legislator- allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claimes infringes his prerogatives as a legislator
Member of the House has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the Consti in his office
An association has legal personality since it is composed of taxpayers and the outcome will affect their interest. but in this case, the IBP is not clothe with standing its
interest being too general
oThe court relaxed the rules on standing since the petition shows it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve attention of the Court
In respect to class suits- persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned
oSince petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, their petition will not stand
Two species of political questions:
oTruly political questions- beyond judicial review
oNot truly political questions- subject to judicial review
The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies
o If there are, then courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch properly acted within such limits
THE GROUNDS OF THE IMPEACHEMENT ARE NOT UPON THE COURT TO DECIDE BEINGNON-JUSTICIABLE POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH IS BEYOND
THE SCOPE OF ITS JUDICIAL POWER
The lis mota of the case are:
oWhether sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Rules on impeachment are unconstitutional
oWhether the second impeachment complained is barred
Initiate- to file or as understood by ordinary men to mean
The framers intended initiation to start with the filing of the complaint
The initiation of impeachment proceedings start with the filing of the complaint
oThe vote of 1/3 of the members of the house does not initiate the impeachment proceedings
The 2nd impeachment complaint filed by Teodoro and Fuentebella is unconstitutional having filed within the one-year ban period
the court did not exercise judicial restraint since it is not an option for the court before justiciable issues
O the court is not legally disqualified thus, adjudication must commence

SEPARATE OPINIONS
Bellosillo, J.
Finds no urgency for judicial intervention at this time although conscious of the transcendental implications and importance of the issues
Doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts proper restraint born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for other departments
The constitutional power of impeachment rightfully belongs to Congress
oPower to initiate- House
oPower to try and decide- Senate
The matter of impeachment is a political question that must be addressed to a political branch
3 departments must accord mutual respect to each other
Incumbent upon the Court to exercise judicial restraint in rendering a ruling in this particular case to preserve the principle of separation of powers
The second impeachment complaint filed is constitutionally infirm justiciable by the Court for GADLEJ
Puno, J., concur and dissent
The modern concept of impeachment is part of the British legal legacy to the world, especially to the US
The issues at bar are justiciable
There being a commixture of political and judicial components in our reengineered concept of impeachment
oImpeachment proceedings are classified as sui generis
The courts have the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (GADLEJ) on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government
Judicial restraint assumes a setting of a government that is democratic and republican in character
The government cannot act beyond the outer limits demarcated by constitutional boundaries without becoming subject to judicial intervention
Judicial restraint gives due deference to the co-equal political branches
Adherents of judicial restraint warn that under certain circumstances, the active use of judicial review has a detrimental effect on the capacity of the democratic system to function
effectively
Grant locus standi, issue within the power of the court to define, alleged violation of the constitution is justiciable and that the coordinacy theory of constitutional and prudential
considerations demand that the Court defer the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction
Vitug, J.
Republican government rests on conviction that sovereignty should reside in the people and that all government authority must emanate from them
Where the House transgresses the detailed procedure of the Constitution, the issue is removed from the sphere of a political question and is transformed into a constitutional issue
within the jurisdiction of the Court
The term initiate should be construed as the physical act of filing the complaint, coupled with an action by the House taking cognizance of it
Panganiban, J. concurs
Reasons for inhibition:
oOne of the petitioners, Dean Antonio Abad, Jr was a partner when still in practice and it was common practice to inhibit when he was counsel or a party
oAn amicus curiae, former Sen. Pres. Jovito Salonga due to close personal and former professional relations with a petitioner
It was deemed presenting an issue of transcendental importance, thus he was directed to not inhibit
GADLEJ was again mentioned
The interpretation of the constitutional prohibition involved the legality and not the wisdom of the acts of the House of Representatives. Thus, the court must settle it
The proceedings were null and void for violation of the due process clause in the absence of:
oNotice
oOpportunity to be heard was not afforded to the CJ
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Agree:
oAll petitioners except Atty. Vallejos, Jr. do have locus standi
oCourt has power of judicial review
Disagree:
oThe rule that 1/3 of the house must file the impeachment complaint is necessary for the determination of the case
The court is empowered to decide issues even though they are not raised in the pleadings
The signing of the impeachment complaint by the purported 1/3 of the Congressmen was done without due process , CJ was not notified
The majority has acted on the issue prematurely and should have allowed the impeachment to run its course first
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. concurs
The province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is
The court can exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress when there exists a clear violation of the Constitution
When the Court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it is upholding is not its own supremacy but the supremacy of the
Constitution
The jurisdiction of the Court is the constitutionality of the House rules on impeachment and not the impeachment itself
The court should not exercise judicial restraint since it a judicial prerogative is not just a power but also a duty
Impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated either:
oOn the day the Committee on Justice finds the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance
oThe date the House through a vote of 1/3, overturns or affirms the finding of the committee on justice
Initiation starts with the filing of the complaint
oThe getting of 1/3 of the vote is almost the last step necessary for the accused to be successfully impeached
The petitioners have legal standing to file the present petitions
oIt involves matters of first impression and of immense importance to the public
Corona, J.
The constitution intended impeachment to be an instrument of last resort
The Court is vested power by the Constitution to rule on the constitutionality or legality of an act, even of a co-equal branch
The Court have not only the authority but also the duty to settle actual controversies when there is GADLEJ
Disagree on the exercise of judicial restraint
oThe Court should not evade its duty to decide the pending petitions because of its sworn responsibility as the guardian of the Constitution
oTo refuse cognizance of the case is equivalent to impartial justice
The Court has the legal and moral obligation to resolve these constitutional issues regardless of who is involved
The words exclusive or sole should not be interpreted as driving away the Supreme Court that is prohibiting it from exercising its power of judicial review when necessary
COA alone has broad powers to examine and audit all forms of government revenues even those granted fiscal autonomy
Congress is precluded from usurping the COAs power to audit the JDF
Callejo, J.
Concurs with modifications
The court has jurisdiction over the respondents and the subject matter of the petitions
oPowers of congress and senate must be exercised not in derogation of the Constitution
The court has jurisdiction over the issues
Petitions were premature, the issues being those that relate solely to the proceedings in the House of Representatives before the complaint of impeachment is transmitted by the
House to the Senate
The word initiate means to begin with or get going; make a beginning, perform or facilitate the first action
The impeachment was deemed initiated in the House on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the said complaint is of sufficient in substance
 Azcuna, J.
The petitioners have locus standi
There was an actual controversy
It is worth noting that the constitution places impeachment not in Arts. VI, VII, VIII, on governmental powers but in Art. XI on Accountability of Public Officers
oTo signal the importance of the accountability of Public officers, impeachment being an instrument of securing accountability
When Consti gives or allocates power only to one branch of government, it also provides certain limits to its exercise which the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the
Consti
Tinga, J.
The power of impeachment is not inherently legislative; it is executive in character
The power of impeachment is circumscribed by constitutional limitations
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act
If the constitution provides how something must be done, the judiciary as the interpreter of the Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was
valid or not
The determination of compliance with a rule, requirement, or limitation prescribed by the Constitution on the exercise of a power delegated by the Constitution itself on a body or
official is invariably a justiciable controversy
The senate does not have the jurisdiction to determine whether or not the House Rules on Impeachment violate the Constitution
oSenate cannot be expected to declare void the Articles of Impeachment, as well as the offending Rules of the house based on which the House completed the impeachment process
The second impeachment was not barred forever only that it must not have been filed within the 1-year period prescribed by the constitution
2. Political Question: Tanada v. Cuenco Concepcion
Facts:
Senator Lorenzo M. Taada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina
Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-
namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Taada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and
the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear
violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office
therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding
into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes,
as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado -who caused said appointments to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as
representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-
protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest
number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five
 members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral
Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.
I
ISSUES AND HOLDING

1.Whether the SC has jurisdiction over the case. Yes.

This is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of
said House.
Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor
of the Senate.
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised.
The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have
been validly exercised.
In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not
the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are
merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attended by either an executive official or the legislative.
Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines.
Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be
no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the
exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former
Electoral Commission under the original Constitution, and annulled certain acts of the Executive as incompatible with the fundamental law. In fact, whenever the conflicting
claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual
destruction.
2. Whether the membership of the SET is a political question. No.
It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred
upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.
What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado,
by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of
 votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen
"upon nomination. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void.
This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its
power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass
upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

3. Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality

Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation Velasco
Facts:
In 1993, Cebu City passed City Ordinance No. LXIX otherwise known as the "Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu (tax ordinance)." Central to the case at
bar are Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI thereof which require proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts of admission fees to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City.
In 2002, Congress passed RA9167 creating the Film Development Council of the Philippines, in part providing for the tax treatment of certain graded films:
Section 13: Privileges of Graded Films Films which have obtained an "A" or "B" grading from the Council pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 of this Act shall be entitled to the
following privileges:
a. Amusement tax reward. A grade "A" or "B" film shall entitle its producer to an incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed and collected on the
graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized and independent component cities
b. in the Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 to 151 of Republic Act No. 7160 at the following rates:
For grade "A" films 100% of the amusement tax collected on such film; and
For grade "B" films 65% of the amusement tax collected on such films. The remaining thirty-five (35%) shall accrue to the funds of the Council.

Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. All revenue from the amusement tax on the graded film which may otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities
in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during the period the
graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within thirty (30) days from the
termination of the exhibition to the Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the producers of the graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to remit the amusement tax proceeds within the prescribed period shall be liable to a surcharge
equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount due for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to the Council.
According to petitioner, from the time RA 9167 took effect up to the present, all the cities and municipalities in Metro Manila, as well as urbanized and independent
component cities, with the sole exception of Cebu City, have complied with the mandate of said law. Accordingly, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sent
on January 2009 demand letters for unpaid amusement tax reward (with 5% surcharge for each month of delinquency) due to the producers of the Grade "A" or "B" films to
the following cinema proprietors and operators in Cebu City.
 ISSUES AND HOLDING
1.Whether Sec. 13 and 14 of RA9167 is constitutional. No.
Fiscal autonomy was defined as "the power [of LGUs] to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the
national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials
in tum have to work within the constraints thereof."
The Fundamental Principles governing the taxing power of LGUs under the LGC:
a.Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU
b.Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
c.Be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayers ability to pay;
d. Be levied and collected only for public purposes;
e. Not be unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory;
f. Not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in the restraint of trade
g. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private person
h. The revenue collected pursuant to provisions of the LGC shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee, charge, or
other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided by the LGC
i. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve progressive system of taxation.
What Congress did in this instance was not to exclude the authority to levy amusement taxes from the taxing power of the covered LGUs, but to earmark, if not
altogether confiscate, the income to be received by the LGU from the taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of the taxing authority. This, to
Our mind, is in clear contravention of the constitutional command that taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue exclusively to said LGU and is repugnant to the power
of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their priorities.

2.Whether RA9167 should be voided in toto. No

It is well to emphasize that if it appears that the rest of the law is free from the taint of unconstitutionality, then it should remain in force and effect if said law
contains a separability clause. A separability clause is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one provision shall not invalidate the other provisions
of the act. Such a clause is not, however, controlling and the courts, in spite of it, may invalidate the whole statute where what is left, after the void part, is not
complete and workable.
Where a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. The exception to this is when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, in which case, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.

3.Whether the amount collected by FDCP may be refunded. No.

It is a well- settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
 An exception to the above rule, however, is the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a matter of equity and fair play. This doctrine nullifies the effects of
an unconstitutional law or an executive act by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and
may have consequences that cannot always be ignored. It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law.
Here, to order FDCP and the producers of graded films which may have already received the amusement tax incentive reward pursuant to the questioned
provisions of RA 9167, to return the amounts received to the respective taxing authorities would certainly impose a heavy, and possibly crippling, financial
burden upon them who merely, and presumably in good faith, complied with the legislative fiat subject of this case. With respect to the amounts retained by the
cinema proprietors due to petitioner FDCP, said proprietors are required under the law to remit the same to petitioner. Obeisance to the rule of law must always
be protected and preserved at all times and the unjustified refusal of said proprietors cannot be tolerated. The operative fact doctrine equally applies to the non
-remittance by said proprietors since the law produced legal effects prior to the declaration of the nullity of Secs. 13 and 14 in these instant petitions. It can be
surmised, however, that the proprietors were at a loss whether or not to remit said amounts to FDCP considering the position of the City of Cebu for them to
remit the amusement taxes directly to the local government. For this reason, the proprietors shall not be liable for surcharges.
4. Grave Abuse of Discretion
Ocampo v. Enriquez (All concurring and Dissenting Opinion) --PERALTA, J
FACTS:
During the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the election, and formally assumed his office on June 30 2016.
As fulfillment of his promise, Duterte gave a verbal order to the Secretary of National Defense, Delfin N. Lorenzana, to make the necessary arrangements. Sec. Lorenzana
then, issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Ricardo Visaya, Chief of Staff of the AFP, to undertake all the necessary planning and preparations regarding the interment
of Marcos at the LNMB. As such, on August 09 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army Commanding General to provide
humeral honors, services, and other courtesies for the interment of Marcos at LNMB. The directive further instructed to provide all necessary military honors accorded for a
President.
Dissatisfied with the issuance, the following petitioners filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition to stop the said interment:
1. Saturnino Ocampo and others as human rights advocates and human rights violations victims;
2. Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, Algamar A. Latiph, and several others former Chairperson of the CHR and victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during
the martial law regime;
3. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son members of the Bar and human rights lawyers;
4. Rep. Edcel C. Lagman member of the House of Representatives and Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND);
5. Sen. Leila De Lima member of the Senate of the PH and public official;
6. Former Sen. Heherson Alavarez and Zaira B. Baniaga and several others concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayer

ISSUES:
Procedural
1. Whether or not President Dutertes determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy;
2. Whether or now petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petition;
3. Whether or not petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts.
Substantive
1. Whether or not Sec. Lorenzana and AFP Rear Admiral Enriquez committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they issued
the assailed memorandum and directive;
2. Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution and domestic and international laws;
3. Whether historical facts and laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former
President to interment at the LNMB;
4. Whether or not Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of Marcos at the LNMB when they entered into an agreement with the PH Govt as
to the conditions and procedures by which Marcos remains shall be brought back to the Philippines.

RULING:
Procedural Grounds
* No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial
inquiry are present:
1.) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
2.) the person challenging the act must have locus standi or the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
3.) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
4.) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Lis mota litigation moved; the cause or motivation of a legal action or lawsuit.

First two requisites absent in the instant case.

1. JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
Actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution
NO. The limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of the government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. These areas are concerned with political
questions. In the instant case, President Duterte merely exercised his powers under the Constitution and Administrative Code to allow the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB, a land of public domain devoted for national military shrine purposes. Being specifically empowered by the Constitution, his decision involves a question of
policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national hearing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in his exercise of such discretion, his decision
is outside the ambit of judicial review.
2. PETITIONERS HAVE NO LOCUS STANDI
Locus standi requires the parties to show that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a results of the act complained of.

Petitioners in the instant case failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at LNMB.
1. Human rights violations victims: decry re-traumatization, historical revisionism and disregard of their state recognition as heroes
Argument founded on the wrong premise that the LNMB is the National Pantheon intended to perpetuate memory of Presidents and national heroes. LNMB is not the
National Pantheon; it is a national military cemetery under the AFP.
2. As members of the bar, petitioners failed to prove any direct or potential injury which the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or its members may suffer. Duty to
uphold the rule of law inadequate; too general and shared by other groups.
3. As legislators suing to defend the Constitution, failed to show any direct injury to their person or the institution to which they belong. Also, they did not specifically
claim that the actions complained of (Memorandum and directive) encroach on their prerogatives as legislators.
4. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claimed illegal disbursement of public funds without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by law.
5. As concerned citizens, petitioners required to substantiate that issues raised are of 1.) transcendental importance or; 2.) of overreaching significant to society; or 3.)
of paramount public interest.
At this point, interment of Marcos would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that more than 27
years have passed since his death;
Also failed to demonstrate clear and imminent threats to their fundamental rights.

3. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND HIERARCHY OF COURTS

YES, petitioners violated the two doctrines.
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of
administrative processes available.
Petitioners should have first sought reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National Defense. If still dissatisfied with the
Secretarys decision, they could have further elevated the matter before the Office of the President which has control and supervision over the Department of National
Defense before going to the Court. Petitioners also should not brushed aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which requires their petitions to be filed first with the
proper Regional Trial Court.

Substantive Grounds
1 and 2 GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION/VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL, DOMESTIC, AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS
NO, Sec. Lorenzana and AFP Rear Admiral Enriquez did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
memorandum and directive. The assailed memorandum and directive likewise do not violate any constitutional provision, domestic or international law.
There is grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction when an act is: 1.) done contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence or
executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. not done contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence
 Petitioners cite several provisions in the 1987 Constitution to support the assertion that Marcos interment an the LNMB has the effect of rewriting history and
thereby violating the letter and the spirit of the 1987 Constitution which is a post-dictatorship charter and a human rights constitution.
No merit to the contentions. Constitution should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law
period such as the proposed burial of Marcos at the LNMB.
Constitutional provisions allegedly violated:
1. Article 2 and Sec 1 of Art 11 non self-executing; needs legislative enactments to be implemented and cannot be a cause of action to an alleged infringement of
broad constitutional principles.
Art 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies; Sec 1 Art 11: Public office is a public trust
2. Sec 17 of Art 7: pertaining to the duty of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed likewise not violated; merely underscores that the President
is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them; Duterte was acting pursuant and within his powers
3. Art 14 and Art 18 reliance of petitoners misplaced:
Art 14: refers to the duty of educational institutions to teach values of patriotism, nationalism and respect for human rights;
Art 18: provision on sequestration in relation to the recovery of Marcos ill-gotten wealth; no direct prohibition to his interment.

Domestic laws allegedly violated:

1. RA 289: authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial place of all Philippine Presidents, national heroes and patriots
Petitioners contend that respondents Lorenzana and Enrique are not members of the Board on National Pantheon which is authorized by law to cause the burial of
deceased presidents at the LNMB
National Pantheon and LNMB are distinct; RA 289 revoked by Pres Magsaysay and National Pantheon does not exist at present
LNMB under PVAO, which in turn is under Department of National Defense
2. RA 10368: An Act Providing Compensation to Victims of Human Rights Violations during the Marcos Regime
Petitioners contend that the benefits provided by RA 10368 are not exclusive and includes the prohibition on Marcos burial at the LNMB
No such prohibition; undue to extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates; the law is silent and the Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there
Enforcement of HRRVs rights under RA 10368 will not be impaired by Marcos interment

International human rights laws that require full and effective reparation to HRVVs likewise not violated; PH more than compliant with its international obligations and
the 3 branches of the govt have done their fair share.
Presidents decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB not done whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarilt, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
Petitioners contend that Marcos burial at the LNMB will desecrate it as a sacred and hallowed place and a revered national shrine where the mortal remains of our
countrys great men and women are interred. They erred.
National shrine refer to sites or structures hallowed and revered for their history or association as declared by the National Historical Commission of the Philippines
(NHCP).
Excluded however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military memorials and battle monuments declared as national shrines, which have been under the
administration and development of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) of the Department of National Defense. The LNMB is considered as a national shrine
for military memorials.

3. MARCOS ENTITLEMENT TO BE INTERRED AT THE LNMB

Historical facts and laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies have nullified Marcos entitlement to interment at the LNMB as a
former President, but NOT as a soldier.
AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Under the said regulation, the
following are qualified for interment at the LNMB:

1. Medal of Valor Awardees;

2. Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP
3. Secretaries of National Defense;
4. Active and retired military personnel of the AFP;
5. Veterans of the Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas;
6. Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief,
Congress or he Secretary of National Defense;
7. Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of
Staff.
On the other hand, the following are not qualified to be interred at the LNMB:
1. Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and
2. Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Qualifications
For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him the
right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he received. Our laws give high regard to Marcos as a Medal of Valor awardee
and veteran.
Disqualifications
Marcos was neither convicted by final judgment of the offenses involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military
service.
It is argued that Marcos committed offenses involving moral turpitude for his gross human rights violations, massive graft and corruption, and dubious
military records as found by foreign and local courts as well as administrative agencies. However, the fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final
judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held answerable for a criminal
offense without due process of law. The various cases cited by petitioners, which were decided with finality by courts here and abroad, have no bearing in this
case since they are merely civil in nature; hence, cannot and do not establish moral turpitude.
 It is further argued that Marcos ouster from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion, or discharge
from the military service since, being the President at the time of his ouster, he was the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the Constitution. This
contention is erroneous. The provision designating the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP only enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian
authority over the military. The disqualifications set forth in the AFP Regulation also only pertains to military personnel. Not being a military personnel who
may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly be deemed dishonorably discharged from service as contemplated by AFP Regulations
G-161-375. In fact, PVAO expressly recognized him as a retired veteran.
Petitioners contend that the limited application of the disqualifying provisions of AFP Regulations only to soldiers would be unfair and lead to absurd results
since among those qualified to be interred, only the soldiers would have an additional cause for disqualification. Petitioners assert that this limited application
then, would be voilative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.
First of all, generally, there is no property right to safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the
privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the Commander-in-Chief, or the Secretary of National Defense, no right can
be said have ripen. Second, even assuming that there is a property right to protect, the equal protection clause is still inapplicable. Under the doctrine,
persons similarly situation or alike in circumstances and conditions must be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. However, in
the instant case,

4. 1992 AGREEMENT

NO. Again, the LNMB is under the administration of the PVAO which is under the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in turn, is under the
Office of the President. The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing Constitutional provision and
does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn by the legislature. This is why Pres. Duterte is not
bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former Pres. Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos
Norte. Being the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke, or rescind political agreements entered into by his precedessors.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use any of the lands of the public domain. The allotment of
a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a legislator, Secretary of Defense, military personnel, veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee satisfied the
public use requirement. Likewise, Pres. Dutertes determination to have Marcos remains interred at the LNMB was inspired by his desire for national
healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners highly disputed allegation that he was
actually motivated by utang na loob to the Marcoses. Petitioners had the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim but they failed to
overcome it.
The purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and historial perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of hero nor to
require that only those interred therein should be treated as a hero. Our nations history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of Pres.
Duterte to bury Marcos at the LNMB. The lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present
generation of Filipinos. The preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and
 collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.

DISSENTING OPINION: CARPIO, J

Memorandum and order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because Marcos is not qualified to be interred at the LNMB. Therefore, memo and order
contrary to law, i.e., AFP Regulation G 161-375
Dishonorably discharged from office: forcibly removed from the Presidency by the People Power Revolution; this is the strongest form of dishonorable discharge from office since it is meted out by
the direct act of the sovereign people
Disagrees that the disqualifications are only applicable to military personnel:
oSuch situation unduly favors non-military personnel who will always be eligible, regardless of crimes committed against the State or humanity as long as they are included in the list of those qualified
oViolative of the Equal Protection Clause (Art III, Sec. 1): no substantial distinction between military and civilian personnel, for purposes of interment at the LNMB, that would warrant applying the
disqualifications to military personnel and not to civilian personnel

DISSENTING OPINION: CAGUIOA, J

Ponencia considers the decision of Duterte to inter Marcos at LNMB as his exercise of his power to reserve tracts of land of the public domain for public purpose
oThis power is found in the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) and Public Land Act. Under both laws, the power may be exercised through a Presidential Proclamation or by an
executive order
oThis power is also qualified by standards stated in Sec 14, Chapter 4 of Book 3, Title I of the RAC, to wit:
1.Reservation must be for a specific public purpose (in furtherance of the public good or in the public interest)
2.Use of the land sought to be reserved is not otherwise directed by law
oPower exercised by Duterte through a VERBAL ORDER; absent a Presidential Proclamation or Executive Order, these laws cannot be used to justify the decision
oNo public purpose: Solicitor General has admitted the decision to inter Marcos at LNMB was in fulfillment of Dutertes campaign promise to the Marcos family
Solicitor General claims that the decision to inter Marcos at LNMB is also an exercise of the residual powers of Pres. Duterte
* Residual powers found in Sec. 20, Chapter 7, Book 3, Title 1:
Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically
enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.
oSolGen failed to provide constitutional or statutory basis for Pres. Dutertes exercise of residual power
oJurisprudence mandates that there is no gave abuse of discretion provided there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of residual powers. Absent such factual basis, this will result in finding of
arbitrariness, whimsicality, and capriciousness
oNo factual basis that his decision would promote national healing and forgiveness
oNational healing: heirs of Marcos regained their former political stature; victims of martial law have partly won their day in court and have been so far awarded sizeable judgments; no correlation
between burial and the supposed national healing
oForgiveness cannot be exacted from the victims of the Marcos martial rule because the State has no right to impose the same upon them
oNo tangible or material benefit that the nation will reap with the interment; only the heirs of Marcos, who are private citizens, will benefit
Memo and Order issuance violate the Constitution, laws, executive issuances, public policy, and international obligations and this constitutes grave abuse
Executive Issuances
LNMB rightfully a military memorial declared as a national shrine
Interment of Marcos constitutes as a violation of the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national shrine, which the State has the obligation to conserve. Specifically, it violates:
1. Proclamation No. 86 (decree that changed the name of Republic Memorial Cemetery to LNMB) which established the standards of esteem and reverence for LNMB
2. Proclamation No. 208 which constituted LNMB as a national shrine
3. PD 105 which provides that all national shrines shall be sacred and hallowed places
AFP Regulation
Moral turpitude: an act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general
This Courts pronouncements, the provisions of RA 10368, coupled with the observations of the NHCP on the gravity and depravity of the acts that formet Pres. Marcos perpetrated and allowed to be
perpetrated are sufficient to qualify them as acts involving moral turpitude, justifying the application of the provision on disqualification in the AFP Regulations.
oSC has referred to Marcos as a dictator in 20 cases, and his rule characterized as authoritarian in 18 cases
oRA 10368 an act providing for reparation and recognition of victims of human rights violations during the marcos regime; it is a recognition by the legislative that summary execution, torture, and
other gross human rights violations were committed during the regime o Marcos
oNHCP, in General Order No. 167, concluded that Marcoss military record is fraught with myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies
Certainly, this Court cannot close its eyes to the established facts from which it can be legitimately concluded that Marcos was guilty of crimes involving moral turpitude, and would have been
convicted thereof were it not for his flight and subsequent death
THE 1987 Constitution
Ponencia fails to recognize that several laws have been passed that enabled Article 2, Section 11*, among which are RA 10353 and RA 10368
*Sec 11: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights
oRA 10368 echoes Sec 11 of the 1987 Constitution in one of its provisions; RA 10368 gives HRVVs the right against re-traumatization
oMarcos interment would re-open wounds and re-traumatize HRVVs for impunity must be considered as a continued and ongoing form of torture
oTo bury the architect of martial law in the LNMB would be an act of impunity
oViolation of RA 10368 which enabled Sec 11, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution is tantamount to the violation of the article itself.

DISSENTING OPINION: LEONEN, J

RA 289 still operative and covers LNMB
oArt 7, Civil Code: law are repealed ONLY by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, custom or practice to the contrary.
oNo law ever repealed RA 289
oRA 289 does not specify what the name of the National Pantheon shall be; wherever the mortal remains of Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots are buried, is thus, the burial
envisioned and covered by RA 289
oRe-interment of all the dead war heroes to the Republic Memorial Cemetery transformed it to the National Pantheon
RA 289 mandates that those buried at the LNMB must have led lives worthy of inspiration and emulation; Ferdinand Marcos does not meet this standard.
oThe Courts findings in a catena of cases, a legislative determination in RA 10368, the findings of the National Historic Commission, and the actual testimony of petitioners during the oral arguments
clearly show that the life of Ferdinand Marcos either as president or as a solider is bereft of inspiration.
Memo and order issuance whimsical and capricious: no showing that respondents conducted any evaluation process to determine whether Marcos deserved to be buried at the LNMB.
Burials are act of honoring. And when the burial is state-sanctioned, it is the State that honors the deceased person.
oInterment of Marcos then confers honors to him as person. The claim that he is being buried only as a President, soldier, and Medal of Valor awardee is a fallacy. When a person is buried, the whole
person is buried, not just parts of him or her. Thus, if govt buried and honors Marcos body as a former soldier, it will, at the same time, be burying and honoring the body of a human rights violator,
dictator, and plunderer.
oThis is in clear violation of RA 10368 which mandates that the State must restore the honor and dignity of human rights victims.
oBeing a clear violation of law, the issuances are acts tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Disagrees with J. Brions opinion that only a breach of the Constitution will be considered a grave abuse of discretion
oART 7, Sec 1 is clear. This Court is possessed of the duty to exercise its judicial power to determine whether there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
provision does not limit the Courts jurisdiction exclusively in cases of violations of the constitution.
oAn illegal is an illegal act; it is the exercise of discretion that must be subjected to review, and it is the discretion of any branch or instrumentality of government.
oThis expanded power of the court was added as a safeguard from abuses of other branches of the Govt, which were justified under the doctrine of political question.
oIt is not about violations that may or may not be constitutional or statutory in character; it is about discretion gravely abused.
Petitioners have locus standi as human rights violations victims
oRespondents questioned acts affect their right to reparation and recognition under RA 10368 and international laws.
oAlso, the rule on standing has been relaxed when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
oInstructive determinants of matters of transcendental importance (formulated by former SC Justice Feliciano):
1. the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
2. the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government
3. the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
oGiven that public property and funds are involved and there are allegations of disregard of constitutional and statutory limitations by the executive department, this Court may properly act on the
petitions.

DISSENTING OPINION: SERENO, CJ

The whole thesis of respondents on the substantive issues lies in the absence of an express prohibition against the burial of Marcos; hence they argue that this Court cannot characterize the decision
to have Marcos buried at the LNMB as one made in grave abuse of discretion
oNot everything legally required is written in black and white; the Judges role is to discern within the penumbra.
oFrom the oldest cases in the Philippines Reports to its latest decision, this Court has been in the business of filling in gaps, interpreting difficult texts, so that right and justice will prevail. This is
the entire reason for the existence of the Judiciary
Expanded certiorari of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court enabled the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory; that is, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
oFollowing the effectivity of the present Constitution, only a select number of issues continue to be recognized by the Court as truly political and thus beyond its power of review. These include:
1. the executives determination by the executive of sovereign or diplomatic immunity
2. its espousal of the claims of its nationals against a foreign government
3. the electorates expression of confidence in an incumbent official.
oApart from these matters, all other acts of government have been the subject of the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Court under Art 8, Sec 2.
oThat the order was supposedly founded on an election campaign promise does not transform the matter into a political issue that is beyond our power to review
The President acted with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of his duty to faithfully execute the laws when he ordered the burial of Marcos at the LNMB
Art 7, Sec 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides: The President shall have full control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
oThe duty of the President to faithfully execute the law extends to all rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by
the nature of the government under the Constitution.
oStatutes and jurisprudence establish a clear policy to condemn the acts of Marcos and what he represents, which effectively prohibits the incumbent President from honoring him through a burial in
the LNMB.
oMarcos, through E.O No. 1 which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) tasked to recover all the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos family and their cronies, effectively
declared Marcos as a plunderer.
oRA 10368 an act providing for reparation for the injuries suffered by HRVVs during the Martial Law period serves to signify the legislatures pronouncement that Marcos was a perpetrator of human
rights violations.
oThese laws not only condemn him as a thief; they equally recognize his criminal liability for the atrocities inflicted on innumerable victims while he was in power.
oThe President cannot arbitrarily and whimsically decide that the acts attributed to Marcos during Martial Law are irrelevant, solely because he possessed the title to the presidency until his ouster. It
would be the height of absurdity for the Executive branch to insist on paying tribute to an individual who has been condemned by the two other branches of government as a dictator, a plunderer, and
a human rights violator.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION: BRION, J
Present case do not fall within the Courts expanded power of judicial review. The power of judicial review pertains to the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for
their conformity with the Constitution. As such, the grave abuse of discretion that triggers the Courts power must necessarily involve a violation of the Constitution.
oThe petitions in the instant case collectively assert that the burial order violates several statutes and implementing rules and regulations; violations of statures by the Executive may be assailed
through administrative bodies that possess the expertise on the applicable laws and that possess as well the technical expertise on the information subject of, or relevant to, the dispute.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION: BERSAMIN, J

Interment of any remains at the LNMB is a political question within the exclusive domain of the Chief Executive
The several laws the petitioners have invoked are not relevant to the LNMB; no legal foundation for directly testing the issuance of the challenged executive issuances.

SEPARATE CONCUNRRING OPINION: MENDOZA, J

No justiciable controversy in the present case: petitioners challenge the wisdom of the decision of the President. The Court should defer exercising jurisdiction when the acts of the State are
challenged based on their wisdom or propriety for this is essentially a political question.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of: whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies
No grave abuse of discretion
Grave abuse of discretion a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
oIn the instant case, no grave abuse of discretion is manifest as there is no violation of any constitutional provision or law.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION: PEREZ, J

No grave abuse of discretion
The burial of former Pres. Marcos at the LNMB is a matter about which the Filipino public was consulted as a campaign promise of candidate Duterte who, when he became president, redeemed the
pledge.
The issue in the instant case involves essentially a political question of the wisdom behind Pres. Dutertes campaign promise. Being a political question, the public at large may decide on the matter
as they did, when Duterte was elected to the presidency.
A Marcos vote came out of the elections, substantial enough to be a legitimate consideration in the executive policy formulation. The election result is a showing that, while there may have once been,
there is no longer a national damnataion of Pres. Marcos.
The redemption of an election pledge and policy which has the basis in the result of the election, cannot be tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The issue has already been resolved politically.
C. Judges: New Code of Judicial Conduct of Philippine Judiciary of 2004 , A.M No. 03-05-01-SC
1. Qualification:
Section 7.
1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines
and a member of the Philippine Bar.
 3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Kilosbayan v. Executive Secretary
2. Roles and Standards
a. Independence: In Re Alegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet
b. Integrity: Office of Court Administration v. Judge Florentino Floro
c. Impartiality: People of the Philippines v. CA
d. Propriety: In Re Allegations make under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing held on Sept 26,2013 against Associate Justice Gregory Ong,
Sandiganbayan
e. Competence and Diligence: Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua
3. Liabilities of a Judge
a. Civil Liability: An Act to Ordain and Institute the Civil Code of the Philippines
RA 386

Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
And Damages in general
What is DAMAGES?
A pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether to his
person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another.
(Black's Law Dictionary)

b. Criminal Liability: An Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws (RPC)
Chapter Two
MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE
Section One. - Dereliction of duty
Article 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. - Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be
punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.
Article 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. - Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance shall render a manifestly unjust judgment
in any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary special disqualification.

Article 206. Unjust interlocutory order. - Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly
unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.
Santiago III v. Enriquez Carpio Morales
Facts:
Santiago filed before RTC of QC a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title No. 56, registered in the name of Pantaleon
 Santiago and Blas Fajardo. RTC granted the petition. Rep. of the Phils. through OSG appealed the decision of CA. The case was raffled to Justice
Gonzales-Sision of the appellate courts 13th Division of which respondent was Chairperson.
On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her Report which was used as basis for the Divisions consultation and deliberation.
On July 18, 2007, by letter addressed to Justice Gonzales-Sison and Justice Veloso, respondent expressed his dissent from the report of Justice Sison.
Justice Veloso, in view of the letter, wanted to take a second look on the decision.
In view of his dissent, respondent requested the Raffle Committee of the CA to designate 2 associate justices to complete the composition of Special
Division of five (5) . Raffle Committee designated Justice Cruz and Justice Bersamin.
Respondents Dissenting Opinion thus became the majority opinion of the Special Division and the Report-opinion of Justice Gonzales-Sison became the
Dissenting Opinion as such the special division reversed the decisions of the RTC.
Santiago filed a Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 1, Rule 137. The appellate court denied the motion (because of the
pending administrative complaint). The allegations of the present complaint are that despite the overwhelming evidence of Santiago, Associate Justice
Enriquez deliberately twisted the law and existing jurisprudence to grant the appeal, to the extreme prejudice of Santiago. Associate Justice Enriquez
branded the complaint as "a mere nuisance", a "dirty tactic" in order to harass him for the purpose of making him inhibit from handling the case.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
Whether Justice Enriquez is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence and gross incompetence. No.

That Cases cited to support a Decision are not applicable, and the appreciation of evidence and facts is erroneous, do not necessarily
warrant the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge, unless the decision is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or with
deliberate intent to cause injustice. The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge, but to
elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate
remedy where judicial recourse is still available unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonest.
The failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render a judge administratively liable.
There is no showing that the decision is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or was rendered with deliberate intent to cause injustice.
The principle of JUDICIAL IMMUNITY insulates judges, and even Justices of superior courts, from being held to account criminally, civilly
or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public
policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary. This principle is of universal application and applies
to all grades of judicial officers from the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a court.
The filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. The Decision was not rendered by
respondent in his individual capacity. It was a product of the consultations and deliberations by the Special Division of five.
Anti Graft and Corupt Practices Act RA 3019
c. Administrative Liability:
Re: Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, AM No. 01-8-10
 d. Discipline of Members of Bench
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 3. (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.
Office of Court Administration v. Judge Eliza N, Yu (See resolution)
Facts:
DECISION
CONSOLIDATED CASES AGAINST JUDGE ELIZA YU
NOVEMBER 22, 2016
FACTS: Judge Eliza Yu is the Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Metropolitan Trial Court in Pasay City.

OCA v YU
-The Court, through CJ Corona, issued A.O. No. 19-2011 in response to the specific request of Secretary Alberto Lim of the DOT to establish night courts in
Pasay and Makati City. Upon issuance of Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Bibiano Colasito of a Memorandum prescribing the night court service schedules of
all Pasay MeTC judges and employees, Judge Yu did not desire to comply and thus expressed her dissent through inscribing a marginal note in the
Memorandum of Judge Colasito. Subsequently, her note reached the Station Investigation and Detective Management Section of the Pasay City Police Station.
She then communicated her reservations about the night court by letter directly to DOT Secretary Lim. The OCA replied but Judge Yu was still unsatisfied and still
refused to comply with the memorandum, which prompted Judge Colasico to assign additional night court duties to other MeTC judges. The OCA submitted a
Memorandum to the Court, recommending that her insubordination, gross misconduct and violation of The New Code of Judicial Conduct be docketed as an
administrative complaint against her.
TEJERO-LOPEZ v YU
-Judge Yu repeatedly refused the appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez as Clerk of Courtciting her as incompetent. Judge Yu recommended Ms. Bernardo but was
found by the OCA Selection and Promotion Board for the Lower Courts to have lacked the required training. Subsequently, CJ Corona approved Ms. Tejero-
Lopezs appointment, to which Judge Yu issued a letter expressing her protest against the formers appointment due to her lacking of the requirement of the
personal endowment by the judge. It was then also learned that Judge Yu threatened Ms. Tejero-Lopez with the revocation of her appointment later on, prompting
the latter to withdraw her application. Upon investigation that established Ms. Tejero-Lopezs involuntary withdrawal, the latter was eventually appointed Clerk of
Court. Judge Yu then refused to administer her oath, protested her appointment to the OCA-Office of Administrative Services, and wrote another letter expressing
her refusal to honor the void ab initio appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez, which she characterized as a big joke. Judge Yu then wrote a formal protest to the
Court, but was denied, hence this filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching to her Supplemental Explanation.
RE: APPOINTMENT OF MS. MARIEJOY P. LAGMAN, CLERK III,
RTC BRANCH 108, PASAY CITY
-Judge Yu initiated a complaint against Ms. Lagman, Legal Researcher, for grave misconduct, falsification, usurpation of judicial functions, and dishonesty. Ms.
Lagman then requested to be transferred, and was subsequently appointed as Clerk III of Branch 108 of the RTC in Pasay City. Judge Yu questioned the fast
appointment for being made, despite her pending administrative complaint. Judge Yu then wrote a letter to the OCA requiring updates on the report on the
investigation of Ms. Lagman, and threatened to file formal charges against the members of the OCA-SPBLC. OCA then filed a Memorandum denouncing the
misconduct and insubordination of Judge Yu relative to the appointments of Ms. Tejero-Lopez and Ms. Lagman
RE: LETTER OF JUDGE COLASITO AND (3) OTHER JUDGES
FOR THE SUSPENSION OR DETAIL TO ANOTHER STATION
OF JUDGE ELIZA YU
ABAD, et al. v YU
COLASITO, et al. v YU
-The common issue in the three complaints concerned the conduct of Judge Yu in relation to her staff, fellow Judges and other officers of the Supreme Court, her
disobedience of the Courts issuances, and her manner of disposing cases. The complaining staffmembers averred that Judge Yu had (a) assigned the duty of
correcting draft decisions, orders, and resolutions to OJTs in violation of Memorandum Circular No. 5-2003, prohibiting the accommodation of students to
undergo on-the-job training in offices of the court; (b) had designated an OIC for Branch 47, who did not possess the minimum qualifications for the position and
without approval from the court; and (c) ordered her staff to advertise and offer for sale the books she had authored in violation of SC Administrative Circular No.
09-99. Judge Yu denied the accusations, and attributed malice and fraud to all the complainants, branding their accusation as the manifestation of a tyranny in
numbers.
COLASITO, et al., ALL OF THE MeTC PASAY CITY v YU
-In this case, Judge Yu, in issuing her order in the case of People v Fuentes, et al., ordered her co-judges to explainregarding their complaint against her
alleging gross ignorance of the law due to her allowing of a trial in the absence of a public prosecutorwhy they should not be cited in contempt of court.
LABID v YU
-This administrative matter stemmed from the complaint filed by Mrs. Labid charging Judge Yu with oppression, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct
unbecoming of a judge in connection with the fate of her son, Noel, who served as Utility Worker I at the MeTC Branch 47. When Noel had been diagnosed with
cancer, Noel applied for leave of absence covering the period of his treatment, which Judge Yu had approved. Upon going back to work, Mrs. Labid noticed that
Noel would appear exhausted upon arriving home from work, and that Noel confided to her that Judge Yu orders him to do strenuous tasks at work. Thereafter,
Noel became delirious and weak, and Mrs. Labid personally went to Branch 47 to file her sons applications for leave, but was left unsigned by Judge Yu. Upon
personally talking to Judge Yu, the latter exclaimed that she was nice to her son but was confused as to why Noel signed a complaint saying that she was bobo
and corrupt. Judge Yu never signed Noels application for leave, and required several certificates not required by law.
SAN GASPAR v YU
-Judge Yu added Judge San Gaspar on Facebook in 2009. Upon being Facebook friends, Judge Yu normally sent long messages on Facebook and on her Yahoo
Mail account, with some of the messages containing sexual innuendos. When Judge San Gaspar filed the present administrative complaint, Judge Yu submitted
her comment by way of a compliance and attached her own complaint-affidavit, alleging that Judge San Gaspar violated Sec. 32 of R.A. 8792, which was on the
confidentiality of electronic messages. Judge Yu then withdrew her complaint; then sent a letter to Judge San Gaspars brother, with the header of the MeTC,
inviting the latter with an opening statement of our court is inviting you xxx. In the meantime, the Court referred the matter to the CA to allow the Chief of
Management Information System Office to gain access to Judge San Gaspars Yahoo and Facebook accounts. In Judge Yus Memorandum, she accused Judge
San Gaspar with dishonesty and violation of the right to privacy.

HELD:
(1) NONCOMPLIANCE WITH A.O. NO. 19-2011
- A.O. No. 19-2011 was not a mere request for her to comply with only partially, inadequately or selectively, or for her to altogether disregard. At the very least, her
resistance manifested an uncommon arrogance on the part of a Judge of a court of the first-level towards the Court itself. Although she might have regarded her
reservations as impressed with outstanding merit, that was no justification for her to defer the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011 in her court for any length of
time, and to be public about it. Regardless of her reasons for dissenting, she was absolutely bound to follow the A.O. She did not have the unbridled freedom to
publicly speak against the A.O., for her being the Judge, she was differentiated from the ordinary citizen exercising her freedom of speech and expression who
did not swear obedience to the orders and processes of the Court without delay. Her resistance to the implementation of the A.O. constituted gross
insubordination and gross misconduct (emphases and italics supplied).

(2) REFUSAL TO HONOR THE APPOINTMENTS OF COURT PERSONNEL

- Judge Yu had no good reason to reject the appointments; the authority to appoint emanated from the Court itself. Judge Yu had no right to reject the
appointment, making her rejection another instance of gross insubordination. Judge Yu can only recommend and applicant. Secondly, a pending administrative
complaint shall not disqualify an employee from promotion (Sec. 34, Rule II, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service). Thirdly, Judge Yus
disrespectful language uttered against the Court was highly offensive and intemperate. She was thereby guilty of another serious misconduct. Fourthly, the
making of verbal threats by Judge Yu to compel a subordinate to withdraw her application constitutes grave abuse of authority; also, the intimidation exerted upon
Ms. Tejero-Lopez amounted to oppression.
(3) ISSUING A SHOW-CAUSE ORDER AGAINST FELLOW JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL
- Only the SC has the power to issue directives requiring parties in an administrative case to appear and to present their respective arguments in support of their
petition. The issuance of the show-cause order by Judge Yu represented clear abuse of court processes, and revealed her arrogance in the exercise of her
authority as a judicial officer. Moreover, the Court notes that Judge Yus issuance of the show-cause order emanated from her desire to retaliate against her fellow
Judges and the concerned court employees considering that the alleged contumacious conduct was the copying of court records to be used as evidence in the
administrative complaint against her. By insisting on her inherent authority to punish her fellow Judges for contempt of court, Judge Yu wielded a power that she
did not hold. Hence, she was guilty of gross misconduct.
(4) REFUSAL TO SIGN LEAVE OF ABSENCE AND OTHER ALLEGATIONS OF OPPRESSION
- Paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, Chapter X of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court require the submission of a medical certificate of proof of sickness prior
to the approval of the application for sick leave. Noel Labid complied with such manual by submitting the medical certificate and clinical abstracts issued and
certified by the PGH. Noels medical certificate and clinical abstracts had sufficiently established the reason for his absence and his hospital admission. Despite
his obvious critical condition, Judge Yu chose to ignore the medical records certified by a government health institution, and unjustifiably demanded the
submission of documents that the 2002 Revised Manual did not require. Accordingly, Judge Yu was again guilty of grave abuse of authority. The other allegations
for oppression are dismissed for failure of complainants to substantiate the same; in administrative cases, the complainant bears the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.
(5) CHARGES OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
I. Allowing On the Job Trainees
- The memorandum issued by Judge Yu indicated her intention to delegate the duties of an encoder to a certain Ms. Rosali. That the Memorandum was not
disseminated to the person concerned, and that it was not implemented were immaterial to the charge. The fact that Judge Yu issued the Memorandum signified
her intention to treat Ms. Rosali as a trainee, instead of as a mere observer. In this regard, Judge Yu deliberately ignored OCA Circular No. 111-2005 in prohibiting
OJTs.
II. Designating an Officer-in-Charge
- Judge Yu designated as OIC Mr. Ferdinand Santos, who occupied the position of Clerk III, which was a first level position; the position of Clerk of Court III was a
second level position. Designating a first level personnel as OIC defied CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05, which provided that designees can only be
designated to positions within the level they are occupying. Judge Yus contention that the designation of the OIC was based on trust and confidence had no
basis. Ineluctably, Judge Yu ignored the clear import of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05.
III. Ordering presentation of ex parte evidence before the OIC who was not a member of the Bar.
- Section 9, Rule 30 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure expressly requires that only clerks of court who are members of the Bar can be delegated to receive
evidence ex parte. Breach of the rule on reception of evidence represented her ignorance of the rule of the procedure in question, and subjected her to
administrative liability for misconduct.
IV. Allowing criminal proceedings without the actual participation of the public prosecutor
- Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy
work schedule or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the
Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the Court. The exception stated, should be strictly construed. Judge Yu
committed a flagrant error by allowing the direct examination of the defense witness without the public prosecutor, or without the private counsel duly authorized
by the public prosecutor. As such, Judge Yu was guilty of gross ignorance of the law, which is the ignorance of the law when the law is so elementary, and when
one professes not to know it, or when one acts as if she doesnt know it.

(6) SENDING OF INAPPROPRIATE MESSAGES WAS CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDICIAL OFFICER

- Judge Yu maintained that the messages were confidential and inadmissible as evidence under the exclusionary rule. However, this reliance on the exclusionary
rule shall fail. The rule, or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, presupposes a violation of law on the part of the agents of the Government, and bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures expressly defined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution,
which refers to the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Judge Yu did not specify that the State had unlawfully
intruded her privacy. Regardless of the mode of transmission, the ownership of the messages pertained to Judge San Gaspar-Gito as the recipient. Considering it
was the latter who granted access to such message, there was no violation of Judge Yus right to privacy. The messages, however they may be read and
 understood, were at least vexatious and annoying. In any case, the sender showed her deep-seated proclivities reflective of conduct unbecoming of a member of
the Judiciary. Finally, Judge Yus use of the letterhead of her office or court in summoning to a conference Atty. Reynaldo San Gaspar constituted abuse of power
for advancing her personal interests.

(7) DISBARMENT CANNOT BE METED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may be disbarred on the ground of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court. The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yus misbehavior and, misconduct as a judicial officer. By penalizing her with the
supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, she should not anymore be allowed to remain a member of the Law Profession. However, this rule of fusing the
dismissal of the Judge with disbarment does not in any way dispense with or set aside the respondents right to due process. As such, her disbarment as an
offshoot of this administrative case without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be violative of her right to due process. To accord due process to
her, therefore, she should first be afforded the opportunity to defend her professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would determine whether or not to
disbar her.

(8) FINAL WORD

The Court will not hesitate to impose the extreme penalty on any judicial officer who has fallen short of the responsibilities of her worthy office. No act or omission
by a Judge or Justice that falls short of the exacting norms of holding the public office of dispensing justice can be condoned, for the most important thing for
every Judge or Justice is to preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the Judiciary as well as in the individuals who dispense justice. The Court will not shirk
from its duty of removing from the Bench any Judge or Justice who has stained the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary.

BRION, J.,: Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

- I CONCUR with the ponencias findings and conclusions that Judge Eliza Yu should be dismissed from the service effective immediately, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office or employment. I DISAGREE however, with the conclusion that notwithstanding the severity and grossness of the various administrative
offenses committed by Judge Yu that warrants her disbarment, the Court cannot, in these proceedings, order her disbarment. I submit that the Court can properly disbar Judge
Yu in these same proceedings. The proceedings the OCA and the Court undertook in the various administrative cases filed against Judge Yu, as borne by the records,
sufficiently supports the conclusion that Judge Yu had been accorded more than ample opportunity to defend her professional standing as a lawyer justifying her disbarment.
Under A.M. No. 02-09-02 SC, an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for disciplinary action against members of the
Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as member of the Bar. Likewise, it provides that judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution. Jurisprudence also settles that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. In administrative hearings,
it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case before him is decided. Thus I submit thataside from being dismissed from the service and as a
consequence of the findings of this Court which no other tribunal in this land can reverse she should likewise be disbarred and her name stricken out from the roll of attorneys.

e. Misconduct :
In Re: Charges of Plagiarism against Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo
Facts:
 In the landmark decision of Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, promulgated last April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition
filed by a group of Filipino comfort women during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines.
The Court, speaking through Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, held that the petition seeking to compel the Executive Department to espouse the petitioners
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals has NO
MERIT because: (1) the prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan belongs exclusively to the Executive Department;
and (2) the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse the petitioners claims.
Discontented with the foregoing decision, the petitioners in Vinuya filed a motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, they also filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration, this time accusing the Justice del Castillo of plagiarizing (copying without attribution) and twisting passages from three foreign legal articles
to support the Courts position in the Vinuya decision:
(1) A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Professors Evan J. Criddle (Associate Professor of Syracuse University College of Law) and Evan Fox-Descent
(Assistant Professor of McGill University Faculty of Law) published in the Yale Journal of International Law in 2009;
(2) Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis (Executive Director of the International Bar Association), published in the Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006; and
(3) Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law by Professor Christian J. Tams (Chair of International Law of University of Glasgow School of Law),
published in Cambridge University Press (2005)

The Court then referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, chaired by Chief Justice Renato
Corona, for investigation and recommendation. After the proceedings before it, the Committee submitted its findings and recommendations to the Court
en banc, which then treated and decided the controversy as an administrative matter.

THE ISSUES
1. Did Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, plagiarize the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis?
2. Did Justice Del Castillo twist the works of these authors to make it appear that such works supported the Courts position in the Vinuya decision?

III. THE RULING

[By a 10-2 vote, with three Justices including Justice del Castillo taking no part, the Court DISMISSED the charges for lack of merit and held that
Justice del Castillo was NOT GUILTY of plagiarizing and twisting the cited materials and hence did NOT commit gross negligence.]

1. NO, Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, did NOT plagiarize the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-
Descent, and Ellis.
At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to
 Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own. The passing off of the work of another as ones own is thus an
indispensable element of plagiarism.
As regards that one passage from Professor Tams, the Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the
footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of writing. The statement See Tams, Enforcing
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005) in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less
credit than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off the challenged passages as his own.
That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase cited in rather than the phrase See would make a case of mere
inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism.
If the Justices citations were imprecise, it would just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would be
target of abuse for every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and for every technical detail of form.
As regards the passages from Ellis, the Court notes that the lengthy passages in Footnote 65 of Vinuya came almost verbatim from Ellis article but did
not contain an acknowledgment or introduction that they are from that article. Moreover, as regards the passages from the work of Professors Criddle and
Descent, it was also observed that the Vinuya decision lifted the portions, including their footnotes, from Criddle-Descents article, A Fiduciary Theory of
Jus Cogens as footnotes in the Vinuya decision without any attributions made to the two authors. Unless amply explained, these unattributed lifting from
the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be construed as plagiarism.
The explanation came from one of Justice Del Castillos researchers, a court-employed attorney. She explained how she accidentally deleted the
attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of her report to him, which report eventually became the working draft of the decision. She said
that, for most parts, she did her research electronically. For international materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service
for legal and law-related materials to which the Court subscribes. The researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in the Vinuya case
and these included the passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it
happened, in the course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the attributions.
It was notable that neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or reason for omitting attribution for the lifted passages to Criddle-Descent
or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly respected professors of international law. The law journals that published their works have exceptional
reputations. It did not make sense to intentionally omit attribution to these authors when the decision cites an abundance of other sources. Citing these
authors as the sources of the lifted passages would enhance rather than diminish their informative value. Both Justice Del Castillo and his researcher
gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the failure to mention the works of Criddle-Decent and Ellis was unquestionably due to inadvertence or pure
oversight.

2. NO, Justice Del Castillo did NOT twist the works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis to make it appear that such works supported the
Courts position in the Vinuya decision.
The decision [in Vinuya] did NOT twist the passages from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.
To twist means to distort or pervert the meaning of. For example, if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and declares that Jose
Palma who wrote it did not love his country, then there is twisting or misrepresentation of what the anthems lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya
 decision said or implied that, based on the lifted passages, authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the Courts conclusion that the Philippines
is not under any obligation in international law to espouse Vinuya et al.s claims.
Atty.Melvin Mane v. Judge Medel BelenCarpio Morales
Facts:
Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of
demeaning, humiliating and berating him during the hearing for a case for which he was counsel for the plaintiff, specifically for the following exchange:

COURT: Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?

ATTY. MANE: No, Your Honor, from Manuel L. Quezon University, Your Honor.
COURT: No, youre not from UP
ATTY. MANE: I am very proud of it.
COURT: Then youre not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all
law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His for and substance.

ISSUES AND HOLDING

Whether Judge Belen is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Yes.
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of
the Lawyers oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of
the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma
mater is clearly an engagement in argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he
acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he engaged on a
supercilious legal and personal discourse
This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a
manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court.
D. Lawyers: Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers
1. Nature and Scope of Legal Profession
Cayetano v. Monsod
Facts:
Cayetano v. Monsod
Facts:
Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections in 1991. The Commission on Appointment affirmed his appointment.
Renato Cayetano opposed Monsods appointment on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the
chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:
1.Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.
2.Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
3.Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various positions in various foreign corporations.
4.In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations until 1986.
5.In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

Issues:
Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC and what constitutes practice of law?
Ruling:
Monsod is a lawyer who has been practiced law for at least ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law
who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as business
counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.

Dissenting:

Justice Padilla dissenting:

Monsod did not practice law. Justice Padilla emphasized the following criteria in determining what constitutes practice of law:
1.Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public as a lawyer such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law, or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the
Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country.
2.Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
exercise.
3.Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging
for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term practice of law and one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law. If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law.
4.Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term practice of law.
5Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which
requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the
practice of his profession or a lawyer.
Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he performed activities which are related to the practice of law like drafting legal documents and giving
legal advice, but he only did so as isolated incidents.

Justice Gutierrez dissenting:

Monsod only practiced law for one year, and that was the time he spent in his fathers law office. The Chairman of the COMELEC should have engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be engaged in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of ones decisive
choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
What kind of Judges or Justices will this country have if their main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee,
working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant
past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
There is nothing in Monsods track record which will show that he has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would
support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. He has lawyers working for him instead of him working as a lawyer,.
Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the one adviced and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

Ulep v. Legal ClinicRegalado

Facts:
Atty. Rogelio Nograles formed the Legal Clinic in 1984 with the aim, according to him, of moving toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms.
Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latters advertisements which contain the following as Annex A and Annex B:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

An article was published about The Legal Clinic entitled Rx for Legal Problems in Star Week of Philippine Star, a newspaper of general circulation, wherein Nogales
stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a clients problem no matter how complicated it is. An example given was the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors in medical clinics, are specialists in various fields and will provide the
means to take care of the problems. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These
specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that
besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

Issues:
Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether their activities such as the advertisement may be allowed.

Ruling:
The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered
include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction
however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the
bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
On the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyers advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the
advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is
highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court noted that there are some exceptions to the prohibition. The canons of profession allow the following:
a. Publication in a reputable law list, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons
b. The use of an ordinary simple professional card containing his name, firm, address, telephone number, and special branch of law practiced.
c. Listing his name in a telephone directory but not under a designation of a special branch of law.
2. Admission to practice of law
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
In re Cunanan-Diokno
Facts:
There has been fewer issues as controversial as R.A. 972 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he
obtains a general average of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, for the previous exams, however, the passing grades were changed
depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations.
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated
against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in
1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill
no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

Issues: Whether or not R.A. 972 is constitutional

Ruling:
1. That (a) the portion of Article 1 of R.A. No. 972, referring to exams from 1946 to 1952, and all of Article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore,
void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight justices that part of Article 1, which refers to examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from
1953 to 1955, is valid and shall continue to be on force.
R.A. 972 would admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations, who are inadequately prepared to practice law.
 With this law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on Admission to the Bar. It is the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render decisions on who may be admitted and may continue the practice of law.

3. Nature of Lawyers Oath Form 28 Rules of Court

Sebastian v. Calis
For unlawful, dishonest, immoral, deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Facts:
Complainant alleged that she was referred to respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required for complainants trip to USA for
Php150,000.00
Complainant paid (20k,65k,65k)
Atty.Calis informed the former that she will be assuming the name of Lizette Ferrer.
Realizing that she was traveling with spurious documents, complainant demanded for refund, however she was assured that there is nothing to worry about
for he was engaged in the business for quite sometime, with promise that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
Upon arrival at Singapore International Airport, complainat with Belo & Maribel were apprehended for carrying spurious documents and were deported back to
the Philippines
Complainant asked for a refund was partially paid (15k,6k,5k) (114k-Still lacking)
No response from Atty.Calis
Comission on bar discipline found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in lawful, dishonest, immoral,deceitful conduct.
Therefore recommended Atty.Calis to be suspended
HELD:
SC concurs. Herein respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral/deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1.01 of CPR.
Respondent deceived complainant by assuring her that nothing untoward could give her visa & travel documents despite beig spurious and even promised refund
of her fees and expenses already paid in case something went wrong.ALL FOR MATERIAL GAIN.
**Essence of lawyers oath**
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable
A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized with highest degree of good faith
Lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow but sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.
Nature of office of an atty requires that he should be a person of good moral character: not a condition precedent to admission to practice of law but a
continued possession is also essential in practice of law
Membership in bar is a privilege burdened with conditions
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes
 Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
4. Qualifications: Cojuanco v. Palma
Facts:
Cojuangco and Atty. Palma met sometime in the 70s. Cojuanco was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala&Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and Atty. Palma was
the lawyer assigned to handle his cases.
Owing to his growing business concerns, Cojuangco decided to hire Atty. Palma as his personal counsel.
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of Cojuangcos family, Atty. Palma married Lisa, the 22-year-old daughter of Eduardo Cojuangco whom he tutored,
in Hongkong. It was only the next day that Atty. Palma informed Cojuangco and assured him that "everything is legal."
Cojuangco was shocked, knowing fully well that Atty. Palma was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children.
Upon investigation, Cojuangco found that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions.
Immediately, Cojuangco sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family.Lisa was persuaded.
Cojuangco filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Palma, alleging as grounds "deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a
lawyer and grossly immoral conduct."

ISSUES AND HOLDING

Whether Atty. Palma should be disbarred. Yes.
Atty. Palmas action constitutes gross immoral conduct. A gross immoral conduct, the Court said, is a conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
Thus, Atty. Palmas act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into
marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land. In particular, adds the Court, "he made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality."
Moreover, the circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was his closeness to the Cojuangco family as well as
the latters complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be the legal affairs only, he
sneaked at the latters back and courted his daughter.
Moreover, he availed of the resources of Cojuangco by securing a plane ticket from their own office in order to marry the latters daughter in Hongkong. He
did this without Cojuangcos knowledge.
The Court stressed again the principle that law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may
not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the
profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities. Atty. Palma cannot rely on Cojuangcos admission
 that he is a good lawyer, because professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an
indispensable and continuing requirement.
5. The Lawyer and Society: Castaneda v. Ago
Facts:
1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries.
1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson
1961 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Agos motion denied, levy was made on Agos house and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago
moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC affirmed dismissal.
Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied.

1963 sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem
1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties
1964 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife share in their
conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the
sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued
1966 Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA
which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition

Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.

ISSUES AND HOLDING

Whether Atty. Luison instigated controversy. Yes.
Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied
the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused
legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become and instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC
does not and cannot countenance is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position.
It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack thereof of his clients case. If he finds his clients cause as defenseless, then it
is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of
his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate.
6. The Lawyer and the Legal Profession: In Re. Edillion
Facts:
The IBP recommended to the Court the removal of Atty. Edillion from the Roll of Attorneys for his stubborn refusal to pay the membership dues to the IBP
despite notice.
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the rules governing the integration of the Philippine Bar constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic,
he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said
matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

ISSUES AND HOLDING

Whether the IBP is a valid body. Yes
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to
do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated
by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to
his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree
of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.
Let it be stated that even without RA6397 and looking solely to the language of the Constitutional grant to the SC the power to regulate the practice of law, it
at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the SC with plenary power in ALL cases regarding admission to and supervision of the
practice of law.
Whether the compulsory membership violates constitutional freedoms. No
Freedom of association: Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar
when he passes the Bar exams. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
 incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Deprivation of property without due process: The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such bow to the inherent regulatory power
of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.

7. The Lawyer and the Courts: In Re Letter of UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement of Faculty of UP College of Law on allegations of plagiarism and
misinterpretation in SC
RE: LETTER OF UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UP LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION OF THE SUPREME COURT
AM. NO. 10-10-4-SC, MARCH 8, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Facts:
Various submissions of 37 respondent law professors in response to the resolution dated October 19, 2010 directing them to show cause why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provision of the Code pf Professional Responsibility
The show cause resolution dockets this as an administrative matter not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71, ROC
4-28-10- Ponencia Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo in Vinuya, et. Al vs. Executive Secretary was promulgated
5-31-10- counsel for Vinuya, et. Al filed a MFR of the Vinuya decision
7-19-10- counsel for Malaya Lolas, Attys. Harry Roque and Romel Bagares, filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration where they posited the first time charge
of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the VInuya decision
oAlso claimed that there was twisting of the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed judgement for denying the
petition
The works allegedly plagiarized are:
Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents article A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens
Christian J. Tams book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law
Mark Ellis article Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime
7-19-10- journalists Aries Rufo and Purple Romero posted an article entitle SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women
oThis also appeared on GMA News TV website on 7-19-10
7-22-10-Atty. Roques column, entitled Plagiarized and Twisted appeared in the Manila Standard Today
7-22-10- Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues in reply to the charge of plagiarism
7-23-10- Dr. Mark Ellis, another plagiarized author wrote to the Court
oSee letter pp.575-576
7-27-10- Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards
8-2-10- Ethics Committee required Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo
8-9-10- the Statement entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement of the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of law in the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was posted in Newsbreaks website and on Roques blog
oReport of the statement also appeared on various online news sites (GMA News TV and the Sun Star)
oAlso posted in the UP Law bulletin board
8-11-10- Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement to CJ Corona
oThe copy of the Statement did not contain the actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with notation (SGD.)
appearing beside each name
Excerpt of the Statement:
oAn ordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war
othey also had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land
oThe plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a
serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System
oIn the field of writing, it (plagiarism) is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes taking of someone elses ideas and expressions, including all effort and
creativity
oA judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty
oThis exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to
mislead and deceive
oBut instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost 7 years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice
from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By
doing so, the Supreme Court added insult to injury
oIts callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belied a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basis values of decency and respect
oCourt cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts
oxxx (1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court. xxx
oxxx (3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of
justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as petitioners therein xxx
8-18-10- Prof. Tams made known his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court through a letter to the chief justice
The Statement was signed by 37 out of the 81 faculty members appearing therein
10-19-10- Court en banc made the following observations regarding the UP Law Faculty statement
oStatement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening statement alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead
oThe insult of the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted
sources
oThe Court must insist on being permitted to proceed to the interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice
oThis runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice
The court directed the law professors to show cause why they should not be disciplined
Respondents however allege their noble intentions, focused on constructive action
oThe correctness of respondents position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of
academic writing
oRespondents belief that they are being singled out by the Court when others have already spoken on the plagiarism issue
oFreedom of expression
oAcademic freedom
Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan Bautista (additional averments)
oInvokes due process and if the Statement be considered indirect contempt, such may be punished only after charge and hearing
oShe enjoys academic freedom and constitutional right of freedom of expression
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
oThe lawyer has the right to comment on acts of public officers like other citizens
oThere was never the intention to attack the integrity of the Court
Separate compliance of Dean Leonen
oThere were 3 drafts of the UP Law faculty statement
Restoring Integrity I- contained actual signatures of 37 faculty members
Restoring Integrity II- does not bear any physical signature but reflects the (SGD.) of the 37 professors
Restoring Integrity III- reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, official file copy of the Deans office containing 8 physical additional signatures of other members (never
submitted to court)
oDean instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate the statement for those who woul like to sign
oDean was informed that there were some faculty who cannot actually sign but manifested that they would as soon as they could manage
oThe practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances is for the integrity of the documents
and to avoid vandals and pranksters
oWith respect to Justice Mendoza, the Dean explained that his administrative officer told him that the Justice has permitted him to sign on his behalf since he would
be leaving for the US but when the Statement was seen by the judge, he then declined to sign
oWith respect to the omission of Atty. Armovits name in the signature page of Restoring integrity II when he was one of the signatories on the first version, the dean
explained that his name was left out in reformatting the signing pages
oHe believes that he had not committed any violation of the codes and that the quantum of evidence has not been met
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch
oHe is not a member of the Philippine bar but of the State of Minnesota
oInvokes that effective speech should be forceful to make the intended recipients listen
With the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar are decidedly
unsatisfactory
Provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved:
oCanon 1, Rule 1.02, Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02, 10.03, Canon 11, Rule 11.05, Canon 13
When lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession
oThey must avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for a decision it has rendered
oEspecially during the pendency of a motion for such decisions reconsideration
Issues:
WON the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents of their freedom of expression
WON the show Cause resolution violate the respondents academic freedom?
WON the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined?
WON the separate compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined
WON respondents are entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution for hearing and are they entitled to require the production or presentation of evidence

Ruling:
SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION DOES NOT DENY RESPONDENTS OF THEIR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
It was the manner of the criticism and not the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed
their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the proper disposition and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said resolution
The Show Cause itself recognized respondents freedom of expression
oHowever, the court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence
of the judiciary be protected from due influence and interference
oThe court has authority to discipline its lawyers whose statements regarding the Courts and fellow lawyers has exceeded the limits of fair comment and common
decency
oThe first canon of legal ethics enjoins him to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance
oRight to criticize must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation
FREEDOM IS NOT FREEDOM FROM RESPONSIBILITY, BUT FREEDOM WITH RESPONSIBILITY
oWhile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, the same must not justify the use of offensive and abusive language
SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH RESPONDENTS ACADMIC FREEDOM
There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of instruction
It is not inconsistent to the principle that the Court subject the lawyer to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in
favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure
COURTS RULINGS ON SUBMISSIONS REGARDING THE CHARGE OF VIOLATION OF CANONS 1, 11, AND 13- THEY WERE NOT DISCIPLINED
There was a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya
decision and the merits of the decision itself
When law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil
liberalities, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal education in our country
The 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance be reminded of their lawyerly duty to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from intemperate and
offensive language
With respect to Prof. Vasquez- Court favorably noted the difference of his compliance to those of his colleagues
oHe showed true candor and sincerity
oHis compliance was satisfactory
With regard Prof. Lynch- is not under disciplinary authority of the Court but should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students
THE COURTS RULING ON DEAN LEONENS COMPLIANCE REGARDING THE CHARGE OF VIOLATION OF CANON 10- UNSATISFACTORY
It is accepted that the reformatting of the documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks ins necessitated by vandalism concerns
Dean did not explain any explanation why he deviated from the practice of having the original document signed or at least a photocopy which was submitted to court
The court cannot find the unexplainable urgency on the submission of the statement to Court
Dean Leonen is admonished for failure to observe full honesty and candor in his dealings
RESPONDENTS REQUEST FOR A HEARING AND PRODUCTION/PRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES ARE UNMERITORIOUS
This is not an indirect contempt proceeding
A formal investigation is merely discretionary and not mandatory on the Court
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis
oMay be initiated by the Court motu propio
Respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their reservation of a right they do not have and has no effect on these proceedings
IN SUM
Prof. Vasquez- satisfactory compliance
35 respondents- unsatisfactory and reminded of lawerly duty
Dean Leonen- unsatisfactory and admonished
Prof. Lynch- excused
Request for hearing denied

SEPARATE OPINIONS
CARPIO, J. dissents
Finds the Compliance of the 37 legal scholars satisfactory and no need to admonish or warn them for supposed use of disrespectful language in their statement
The matter of Justice Del Castillos reported misuse and non-attribution of sources in his ponencia is an issue of public concern
In testing whether speech critical of judges and judicial processes falls outside the ambit of constitutionally protected expression, the Court adheres to the clear and
present danger test
 oThe statement did not pose any danger, much less one that is extremely serious to the Courts independence
The conclusion that the UP law faculty statement disrespects the Court and its members is valid only if the statement is taken apart, its dismembered parts
separately scrutinized to isolate and highlight perceived offensive phrases and words
oThe professors only spoke of a matter of public concern that is of vital importance to them
The academic bar is the judiciarys partner in a perpetual intellectual conversation to promote the rule of law and build democratic institutions.
oIt serves the interest of sustaining this vital relationship for the Court to constructively respond to the academics criticism
CARPIO-MORALES, J., dissents
There was no reasonable ground to motu propio initiate the administrative case
oThe therein discussed injudiciousness attending the resolution, anchored on an irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt with adverse declarations
prematurely describing the subject Statement of UP Law faculty that could taint the disciplinary ation
oThe Courts conventionally permissive attitude toward the expression of belief or manner of criticism
VILLARAMA, J., separate opinion
Voted to render the compliance satisfactory with reminder to be more circumspect in future statements
SERENO, J., dissents
Vote to exonerate all respondents
Joined dissents of Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Villarama
Show Cause Order failed to specify which particular mode of contempt was committed by the respondents and the guilt of respondents had already been prejudged
The order violated respondents right to due process since it never afforded them the categorical requirements of notice and hearing
The essence of a courts contempt powers stems from a much-needed remedy for the violation of lawful court orders and for maintaining decorum during
proceedings, as an essential auxiliary to the due administration of justice
Judiciary is required to demonstrate moral authority and legitimacy, not only legality, at all times

8. Lawyer and Client

a. Atty-Client Relationship: Burbe v. Magluta
FACTS
Atty. Magulta served as counsel to Burbe for the filing of a complaint following Burbes failure to secure a dispute settlement. Burbe deposited P25,000.00 to Atty.
Magulta for the filing fees. Five months after giving the deposit, Burbe found out that no case was filed.
Atty. Magulta argued that contrary to Burbes claims, he was never paid for his services and that his failure to pay the filing fee on behalf of Burbe was a
consequence of the latters failure to pay Atty. Magultas acceptance fee.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
1.Whether Atty. Magulta and Burbe had a lawyer-client relationship. Yes.
 A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers
business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It
is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
handle the case for which his service had been sought. A lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between
the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formers fees. The Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the
cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.

2.Whether Atty. Magulta is liable for misappropriation of his clients funds. Yes.

Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of the clients cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and
candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the
community for the legal profession. Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non- filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his
appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.

Members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a moneymaking
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration. Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent the latter
also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.

3.Whether Atty. Magultas actions warrant his disbarment. No.

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of
the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. Consequently, for his violations of Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the CPR, Atty. Magulta is suspended for
one year.
b. Conflict of Interest: Pacana Jr. v. Pascual-Lopez
Facts:
Complainant was the Operations Director for Precedent, an affiliate company of Multitel. In mid-2002, Multitel was besieged with demand letters from
its members and investors due to the failure of its investment schemes. Complainant alleged that he earned the ire of Multitel investors after
becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to 30 million pesos.
Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent. From then on, both constantly communicated with each other, with the complainant
disclosing all his involvement and interests with Precedent and the latters relation with Multitel, and the respondent giving him legal advice, and even
helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. A retainer agreement was proposed by respondent but was left unsigned by the complainant
due to the fees not being within his means. Subsequently, complainant received a demand letter from the respondent, asking for the return and
immediate settlement of the funds invested by respondents clients in Multitel. The respondent explained that she had to send the letter so that her
clientsdefrauded investors of Multitelwould know that she was doing something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to
worry about. When the complainant went to the US, he received messages from the respondent warning him not to go back to the Philippines as he
might be implicated in Multitels failed investment system. Contrary to respondents advice, complainant returned to the country. Respondent then
called the latter and conveniently informed him that he has been cleared by the NBI and BID. A month thereafter, respondent personally met with
complainant and said that she has accumulated 12.5 million in attorneys fees and was willing to give 2 million pesos to complainant due to his help.
Respondent however, failed to fulfill her promise. Nearly a year thereafter, the respondent was evading complainant. Complainant wrote a letter asking
for full accounting of all the money, documents, and properties given to the latter. Respondent rendered an accounting which confused complainant.
Dismayed, complainant filed an affidavit-complaint against respondent seeking her disbarment. In her Answer-Affidavit, respondent vehemently
denied being the lawyer for Precedent, maintaining that no formal engagement was ever executed.

ISSUES: (1) Whether through her act of constant and active communication with the complainant without a written contract led to the establishment of
a lawyer-client relationship, and thus liable for violating the prohibition against conflict of interest;
(2) Whether an administrative case against a lawyer may be dismissed or rendered moot and academic by her act of voluntarily terminating her
relationship in the Bar.

HELD:
(1) Yes. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the
relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession. Respondent
must have known that her act of constant communication with the complainant, who, at that time was beleaguered with demands from investors,
eventually led to the establishment of a professional relationship. The respondent admitted that several Multitel investors are her clients, hence she is
liable for violating the prohibition against conflict of interest. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
with the clients case, including its weak and strong points, which knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.
(2) No. To terminate ones membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is
not a ploy to further prejudice the public or to evade liability. The resolution of the administrative case filed against the respondent is necessary in
order to determine the degree of her culpability and liability to complainant. Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. The
conduct of a lawyer may make him civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if this
 Court were to allow voluntary termination of membership.
c. Atty-Client Privilege: Regala v. Sandiganbayan-Kapunan
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB), through the Presidential Commission on Good Govt (PCGG)
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients and in the performance of
these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings.

In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal
and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as
partydefendant, Roco having promised hell reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in
PCGG Case # 33.
Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted, devised, schemed, conspired & confederated w/each other in setting up, through
the use of coconut levy funds, the financial & corporate framework & structures that led to establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK,
CIC, & more than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & its institutionalization through presidential
directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means & machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp., became the holder of roughly 3.3% of the
total outstanding capital stock of UCPB.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that their participation in the acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in
the alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG exclude them as parties-defendants like Roco. PCGG set the ff.
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:
(a)the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b)submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c)the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.
In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by PCGG. It held, ACCRA lawyers cannot
excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege: the existence and
 identity of the client.

ISSUES AND HOLDING

Whether Attorney -Client privilege prohibits the ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and other information requested by PCGG.
Yes.
Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one
person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may
be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his
name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-
agent and lessor-lessee.
An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. An
attorney occupies a "quasi- judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court & exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken
favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his
client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of
necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.
The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons for this rule are:
The Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Privilege begins to exist only after attorney-client relationship has been established
Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship
Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
Exceptions to the general rule: Information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the clients name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal the clients confidences. Specifically:
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyers advice.
Where the subject matter of the relationship is closely related to the issue of the clients identity, the privilege actually attaches to both.
Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
If the content of a client communication to a lawyer is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance
Where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the
client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.
 Instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or
the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship). Secondly, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name
would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.
In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case
should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the
name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal.

d. Attys fees: Roxas v. Zuzuarregui

Facts:
A Letter-Agreement was executed by and between Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., Pacita Javier and Enrique De Zuzuarregui, on the one hand, and Attys.
Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago Pastor, on the other. It confirms an amendment to their agreement regarding the attorneys fees. The Zuzuarreguis
confirmed and agreed that they are willing to accept as final and complete settlement for their 179 hectares expropriated by NHA a price of SEVENTEEN
PESOS (P17.00) per square meter, or for a total of THIRTY MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P30.4 Million), all payable in NHA Bonds.
And that they also agree and confirm to pay their lawyers and counsels the contingent attorneys fees any and all amount in excess of the SEVENTEEN
PESOS (P17.00) per square meter payable in NHA bonds.

A resolution was issued by the NHA stating that the Zuzuarregui property would be acquired at a cost of P19.50 per square meter; that the Zuzuarreguis
would be paid in NHA Bonds, subject to the availability of funds; and that the yield on the bonds to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis shall be based on the
Central Bank rate at the time of payment.

The total amount in NHA bonds released by the NHA Legal Department to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to
P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 in
NHA bonds.

Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00.
The total amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.

A letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis
the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action.
 Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered via a letter stated therein, among other things, that the amount that they got seems huge from the surface, but it just
actually passed their hands, as it did not really go to them.

A letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis through Antonio De Zuzuarregui, Jr., to Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, informing the latter that
their services as counsels of the Zuzuarreguis (except Betty) in the expropriation proceedings filed by the NHA was being formally terminated.

The Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages before the RTC, Quezon City against the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty. Romeo G.
Roxas and Atty. Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be turned over to them.

ISSUES AND HOLDING

Whether the letter-agreement between the Zuzuarreguis and Atty. Roxas and Pastor should stand as law between the parties. Yes

a contract is the law between the parties. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith. Unless the stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the same are binding as
between the parties.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that
contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under
all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees. Indubitably entwined with the lawyers duty to charge only
reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorneys fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable.
Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to
determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory
prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid (including the
yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no
full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under
the circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order.