Spouses Yu vs.

PCIB

GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006

FACTS:

Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over
several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine
Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a
loan.

As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon,
respondent filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan
City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3,
1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998.

Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the highest
bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1,
1998. After two months before the expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-
parte petition for writ of possession before the regional trial court of Dagupan. Petitioners
complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of
Rodante Manuel was denied by the said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on
February 14, 2000 arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial
issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative
of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.

ISSUE:

Whether prejudicial question exists in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale
and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

RULING:

No. Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a
civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can
proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before
the criminal action may proceed because issue raised in civil action would be determinative de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
Donato vs. Luna

GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988

FACTS:

An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23,
1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz
Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that
Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donatos second since she had no
previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June
30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without
a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of
the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26,
1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76
of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their
home upon learning that Donato already previously married.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended
in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic
relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

RULING:

No. Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for
annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained
by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must
be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued
by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

In view of the foregoing, the instant petition was dismissed for lack of merit. There was
no pronouncement as to the costs.
Quimiguing vs Icao

34 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in
Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married,
he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation
and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by
defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at
P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower
court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground of lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the
court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of
action.

ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

RULING:

Yes. Supreme Court held that, a conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in
Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceived child may also receive donations
and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens
rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

The orders under appeal were reversed and set aside. The case was let remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs were against the
appellate, Felix Icao.
Geluz vs CA

2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the
petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in
1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from
her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on
October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two
years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez
Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.

ISSUE:

Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death
of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which
trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.

Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages
evidently because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or
criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil
action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It
shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000
damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the
circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
De Jesus v Syquia

58 Phil 866

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop
owned by the defendants brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23
years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have
his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous
relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17,
1931.

In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, the defendant was a constant visitor. On
February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a Rev. Father confirming that the child is his and he
wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously
wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant
ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph
Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street
Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second
pregnancy, the defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this
time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in
charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given
instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by the
defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and
that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the
said Ismael Loanco.

RULING:

1. Yes. The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the
other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by
Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.
 2. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the
status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the
father's resolution to admit the status.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to
Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in
civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the
defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to
modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount
of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has
jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. vs Montao
G.R. No. 182836, October 12, 2009

FACTS:

In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the
death of their unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement,
then filed death benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation which denied the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both
parties agreed to have Atty. Allan Montao act as the arbitrator. Montao ruled that Hortillano is
entitled to his claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Montao.
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the
CBA, death benefits are awarded if an employees legitimate dependent has died; but that in
this case, no death has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a
fetus has no juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil
Code which provides a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus
was not born hence it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer
death as contemplated under civil laws.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?

RULING:
1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never
put in question, hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already
a legitimate dependent the moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).
2. No. Death is defined as cessation of life. Certainly, a child in the womb has life.
There is no need to discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality that
is not the issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover,
while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it
does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this
case, Hortillanos fetus had life inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for
38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence
Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.
Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante

45 OG No. 9, p.397

FACTS:

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued
a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate
Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of
certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.

RULING:

Yes. The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because
under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person
for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the
exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante
which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application
for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case
No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of
the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and
decreed.
 29

Dumlao vs QPPI (Article 37 of the Civil Code)

Dumlao vs Quality Plastic Products Incorporated G.R. No. L-27956

Original text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1976/apr1976/gr_27956_1976.html

Case Digest
Facts:

Herein petitioner Dionisio Dumlao, acting as the administrator of the testate of Pedro Oria along with
other heirs of Oria's estate, sued Quality Plastic Products Inc. for auctioning the nine and six-tenths
hectares land of Oria which was used as security. In a previous case, dated February 28, 1962, the
CFI of Pangasinan rendered judgement ordering Oria along with other sureties to pay solidarity to
Quality Plastic Products, Inc., failure of which will result to the foreclosure of the surety bond. The
sale commenced on November 20, 1962.
The petitioners contend that QPPI does not have jurisdiction over the estate of Oria because Oria
died on April 23, 1959, long before June 13, 1960 when the case against them was filed, therefore
Oria did not have juridical capacity on the day the summons was served.

Issue: Whether or not QPPI lacked jurisdiction on the contention that Oria lost his juridical capacity
upon death.

Ruling:

The CFI of Pangasinan's judgement against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He
was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. His juridical capacity, which is
the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Article 37 and 42, Civil Code).
Consequently, the execution sale of Oria's land is also void.
 PT&T vs. NLRC

272 SCRA 596

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990
until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was
again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2
periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary

employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the
job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch
supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the
discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of
not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status
of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on
account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the
services of an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that
company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to
their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful
discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts
marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our
labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with
PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are
not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts
of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated
in the labor code:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as
a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on
the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection
with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a
woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as
an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately,
family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect,
disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land
not only for order but also imperatively required.
 Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda

35 Phil 252

FACTS:

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were
married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They
stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a
complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the
legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by
word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial
court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to
support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting
her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal
home.

HELD:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill
the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at
his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away
from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was
forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the
husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home.
 Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997

FACTS:

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their
Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate
at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and
Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.

Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They
have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in
1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of
Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the
estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware
that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity
of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself
admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as
the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.

In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage,
they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and
Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife
and that they have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt
presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.

On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family
residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to
the effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which
was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing
as well.

Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have
been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was
the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.

Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven
only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof
have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which
case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of
husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their
children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering
Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third
of their grandparents estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take
effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the
extension of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force.
Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must
be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of
the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence.
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married.

Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it

would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where
in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to
prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of
whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and
by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
 Cosca vs. Palaypayon

237 SCRA 249

FACTS:

The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process
Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B.
Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a
marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo &
Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio
Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the
marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.

Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the
Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage
contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to
solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with
the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because
Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not
included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay
& Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them
in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid
embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

HELD:

Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the
other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs
taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya
declared that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and
bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband and
wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained
that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering
that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the
marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was
simulated.

On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between
Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage
license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit
that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years
already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs
2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already
before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less
than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon
should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting
parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license
requirement.

Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the
formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.
 Eugenio vs Velez
185 SCRA 45

FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August 28, 1988
filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was
confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to
surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be
subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure
due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered that the body
should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of
jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD:

The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides:

Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a
child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased.

Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where a man and a woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in
any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.
 Restituto Alcantara vs Rosita Alcantara
531 SCRA 446 Civil Law Family Code Marriage Valid Marriage Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio
FACTS:
Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita Alcantara
alleging that on December 8, 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a fixer who could
arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same
day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on
March 26, 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a
marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they
never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said
place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Restituto prayed that after due
hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to
cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Rosita however asserts
the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite;
that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children; that Restituto only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed
a case for concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: Yes. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. Restituto cannot insist on the absence of a marriage
license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the
absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In this case, the marriage contract between the parties reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to
whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario,
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Restituto, in
a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither
he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, the Supreme Court still
holds that there is no sufficient basis to annul the marriage. Issuance of a marriage license
in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance
of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-
day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of
the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in
favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is
not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
 CASE NO. 36

Navarro vs. Domagtoy

AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of
gross misconduct, ineffiency in office and ignorance of the law.

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27,
1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they
are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and
been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnizes marriage of Floriano Dadoy
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge
holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50
km away.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

HELD:

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a
subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and
the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a
summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where
it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not
invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
 CASE NO. 37

ARANES VS OCCIANO

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law.
Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the MTCt of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by
Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner

HELD:

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. In People vs. Lara, the Court held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota
of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in
gross ignorance of the law.
 CASE NO. 38

Laxamana vs. Baltazar

92 Phil 32

FACTS:

When in July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended, the vice-mayor Jose T. Salazar,
assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the
provincial governor, acting under section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code (R.A. 180), with the consent
of the provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan, who immediately took the
corresponding official oath.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provision in the revised administrative was repealed by the subsequent provision of
the Revised Election Code

HELD:

No. In the revised administrative code it explicitly says that in the absence of the municipal president
the vice-president should take its place.

Sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that when the mayor of a municipality is
suspended, absent or temporarily unable, his duties should be discharged by the vice-mayor in
accordance with.

In fact even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, the Department of the Interior and the office
of executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision of provincial and municipal governments
have "consistently held that in case of the suspension or other temporary disability of the mayor, the
vice-mayor shall, by operation of law, assume the office of the mayor, and if the vice-mayor is not
available, the said office shall be discharged by the first councilor."

Needless to say, the contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the executive officers
charged with its execution deserves great weight in the courts.
 CASE NO. 39

Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete

66 SCRA 425

FACTS:

Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner
and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese
Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in
name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed
complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and the
other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through
fraud and machination took actual and active management of the partnership and that she alleged
entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets,
both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime."

According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom Tee Hoon had
four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently
residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and
what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife and children.

Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the drugstore business;
that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore for P125,000.00
which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that
after the investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it
embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI
sheets and under huge profits.

Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law wife of Tee
Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from the company of
the latters share.

HELD:

No. Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each
other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their
witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage
must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the
certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such
marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is
first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M.
Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence,
there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the
authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial
fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as
the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.

An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for her
subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and promised not to
interfere with each others affairs since they are incompatible and not in the position to keep living
together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-
law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000.
 CASE NO. 40

Vda de Chua vs CA

GR No. 70909, January 5, 1994

FACTS:

Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo
from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride
Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May 28, 1992. Vallejo filed on July
2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of guardianship of the two child and their
properties worth P5,000,000.00.

Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true wife of
Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter but a pretender to
the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and died a bachelor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua.

HELD:

The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent. She could not
produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage certificate. Furthermore, a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such marriage contract between
petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them, attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the
alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage, that he has not solemnized such alleged
marriage.

Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful
wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she failed to produce.
 CASE NO. 41

Republic vs CA and Castro

GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did
not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they
decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted
ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of
her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the
celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied
by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently proves that the office did not issue a marriage license to
the contracting parties. The fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is
not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore,
Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
 CASE NO. 42

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on
March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued
purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual
Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3,
1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE:

Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal
capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and
recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former
presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as
evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will
be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or
trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free
him on the ground of bigamy.
Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February
14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested
to Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already
been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose
of tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for reconsideration.

Ruling: Yes.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the
case at bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after
the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust
and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and when
it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as
regards child custody and support.

Ruling: Yes.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of
custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section
50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as
res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children.
The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmens
participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court
was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care,
support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.
 Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC
Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982
and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
 Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was
married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with
Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners
business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein
that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator
of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada
is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before
the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to
be served.
 CANG VS COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998
Herbert Cang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano,
respondents.
_______________________________________________________________________

Facts: Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Ana Marie upon learning
of her husband's illicit liaison file a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite which was
approved. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Ana Marie. He was
issued a divorce decree and granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner. Private respondents who were the brother and
sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition for adoption of the three minor Cang children. The trial court
granted the petition for adoption. Ana Marie was the only parent who gives consent to the adoption of
their children. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue: Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
necessary.

Ruling: The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. Deprivation of parental authority is
one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case
precisely because the findings of the lower courts on the issue of abandonment of facts on record. The
petition for adoption must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law
and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)
Tenchavez vs. Escao

FACTS:
Vicenta Escao, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24,
1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil
registrar. However, the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June
1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same
year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on
the ground of Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. A decree of divorce, final and
absolute was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had
several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicentas parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughters acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escao is valid and binding upon courts
of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaos parents were sufficient in form.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez marriage remain existent and undissolved
under the Philippine Law. Escaos divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid
under the Philippine Law to which Escao was bound since in the time the divorce decree
was issued, Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not
complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause,
leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally
getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the
husbands feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus
entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.

2. No. Tenchavez charge against Vicentas parents are not supported by credible
evidence. The testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaos animosity toward him strikes the
court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez own letters
written before the suit had begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents
of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their
part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover
damages.
 REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO
472 SCRA 114, GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 [Article 26;Divorce]

FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children. Wife went to US to work and later became a
US citizen. Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife obtained divorce and married another man.
Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. RTC
Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition. The SolGen's motion for reconsideration was denied. Orbecido
filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).

RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at
the time the divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry.

However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not present competent evidence showing
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.
 Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year
and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing
the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos
marriage after his death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.
 Manzano vs. Sanchez
AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married
on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On
March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
separated thus, respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He
claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they
both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant
quarrels.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have
an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under
Article 34 of Family Code.

HELD:

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage
contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent
marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent
Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.
51

COSCA V. PALYPAYON JR. 237 SCRA 249

FACTS:
Complainants (Juvy Cosca et al.,) are employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the same
Court while Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint
was field with the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondents , among others,
illegal solemnization of marriage. Complainants alleged that respondent Judge solemnized 6
marriages even without the requisite marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage
contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. The respondent Judge did not sign their
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of respondent Judge proper.
HELD:
[i]The Family Code pertinently proves that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a
valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares
that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that , while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity
of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly , criminally
and administratively liable.
* The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriage, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsible. The Revised Penal Code
provides that priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law. This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial
agencies of the Government.
52

Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with
his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano
and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia
and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other
hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named
Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children
namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of
the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known
in the community to be such.

Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a
voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The
siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father
and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no evidence
was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no
divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
53

Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On
August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of
the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy
against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand,
Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only
in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November
1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of
Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact
that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose
and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.
54

Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter
filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-
month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because
their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and
superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the
purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties
acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.

HELD:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it
is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or
her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being
charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply
be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence,
the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime
of property relations governing them.
55

Ninal vs. Bayadog

328 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year
and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They
instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing
the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos
marriage after his death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.
56

Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married
in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband
and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on
his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In
1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit
her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at
the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this
case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be
respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state.
 LOUEL SANTOS vs. CA AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo.
The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter,
by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound.
Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally,
the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julias
parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit
US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or
somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him
for more than 5 years are circumstances that show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

HELD:

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific
answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
__________
Notes:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
 Brenda Marcos vs Wilson Marcos (G.R. No. 136490)
FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging
that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage on the ground that
Wilson Marcos has psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void
under Article 36 which was however reversed by the Court of Appeals

ISSUES: 1. Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a

physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

HELD: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidencepresented. There is no requirement, however that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditionsince qua non for
such declaration.Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may haveresorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on hispart. There is
absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they areincurable.Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had
lost his job and was not gainfully employed for aperiod of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,and even
left the family home.Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and
not to the inception of the marriage. Equallyimportant, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.In sum, this
Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the
alleged psychologicalincapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined inMolina.
 Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio
started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16,
1987.

In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She
wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio
visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the
petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a
motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

HELD:

The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not
needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that
a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical
illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
 Choa vs. Choa
GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002

FACTS:

Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and
Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an
amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological
incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum
evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.

Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows
latters psychological incapacity because according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only
wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way
show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows
grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three
aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an
intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes
psychological incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It

must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not
constitute psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify and prove root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity. It just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a
defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of evidence
presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity more so
without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
 Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a
year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church
wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently
lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her
husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition
to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their
marriage null and void.

HELD:

Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as

opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony
presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme
jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes
behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes
case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain
unchanged.

Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they
proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during
their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their
honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there
was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping
on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the
same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted
themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of
the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even
the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to
maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming
Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other
hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has
no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still
young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another
physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of
erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a

serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
 Ma. Armida Amy Perez-Ferraris vs Brix Ferraris

Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couples relationship before the marriage and
even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that
relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company
of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their
problems began when Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It was only when they started
fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner,
and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armidas
lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix
could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological
expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This
is evidenced by Brixs
leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to
spend more time with his band mates than his family.

ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant in the case at bar.

HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality
disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies
during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further, the expert was not
able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder can be part of his family upbringing She
stated that there was a history of Brixs parents having difficulties in their relationship- this is
of course inconclusive for such has no direct bearing to the case at bar.
Navarro v. Navarro
G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007

FACTS:
On January 8, 2003, petitioner Narciso Navarro Jr. filed a declaration of nullity of
marriage with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against Cynthia Navarro on the grounds of
psychological incapacitation. Petitioner and respondent were college sweethearts and were
both married in the court and in church. Since the petitioner was still a medical student, while
the respondent was a student of pharmacy; they lived with the petitioners parents, on whom
they were financially dependent. Eventually, their union bore four children. Petitioner alleged
that respondent constantly complained about not having more time for her; and that she
constantly quarreled with him even before marriage when he could not give the things she
wanted. She even told him to look for other women for she refused to have sex with him. He
filed the said petition because he later found out that their eldest daughter had been made
pregnant by a man whom respondent hired to follow him. She averred that she had no marital
problems, not until petitioner had an illicit affair with a certain Dr. Lucila Posadas. They were
given a psychiatric test in which the respondent refused to take but would do so only when her
defense requires it. On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that petitioner and respondent
were both psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations.

ISSUE:
Is the conclusion of the Regional Trial court erred in finding the parties both
incapacitated under Article 36 of The Family Code correct or not?

RULING:
No. In article 36 of the Family Code states: a marriage contracted by any party who, at
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after solemnization. Supreme Court held that the spouses frequent squabbles and
respondents refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute
psychological incapacity. The record shows that in the early years of their marriage they were
living in harmony, which bore them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than
just a difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations, it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Te vs.Te
G.R. No. 161793, February 13 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the
Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas close friend
but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which
happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused
bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however made him relent. They left
Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80, 000 and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.
They decide to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house
and Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license.
Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by
Rowena and her uncle. Edwards parents wanted them to at their house but Rowena refused
and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for
them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the marriage between the respondent and petitioner is
void because psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder. The petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligation of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity, and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from
others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions. As for the respondent, her
being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential
marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights, of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others.
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms
in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity,
the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

FACTS:
On April 10, 1990, petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez of the City Trial Court
of Lapu-Lapu City. The respondent and Ancajas live together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991. Tenebro infomed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. After he told Ancajas of the previous marriage
he was going to leave their conjugal dwelling saying that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, the petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a
certain Nilda Villegas before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the
latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. She filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner, that the accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda
Villareyes and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
contract a second marriage with Leticia Ancajas, which second or subsequent marriage of the
accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner committed bigamy, even though the second marriage
was void.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the offense of bigamy is committed when one
contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgement rendered in the proper proceedings. During the subsistence of the valid first
marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. As a final point the petitioner
contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of
this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of
marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities.
Morigo vs. People
G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four years. After school year 1977-
78, Lucio and Lucia lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio receive a card from Lucia from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In
1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take
effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant married Maria Jececha Lumbago at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused file a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint
seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground
that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged
with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran, with the Regional trial
Court of Bohol.
On August 5, 1996, Lucio Morigo y Cacho was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy and was sentenced a prison term of prision correctional as minimum and prision mayor
as maximum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good
faith is valid.

RULING:
No. Because the trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a
mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void. The first element of bigamy is a crime
that the accused must have been legally married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. The Office of the Solicitor General submits that good faith in the instant
case is a convenient but flimsy excuse because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario
court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking judicial declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Lucia . The petitioner Lucio Morigo is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on
the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
Weigel vs. Sempio Dy
143 SCRA 449

FACTS:
On July, 1978 at the Holy Apostolic Christian Church in Makati Metro Manila, Lilia Olivia
Wiegel married Karl Heinz Wiegel. Lilia had a previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
Maxion, in which the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City. The respondent Karl asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
for the fact that Lilia was already married. Lilia claimed that her first marriage was null and void
because of the first husband, Eduardo A. Maxion, allegedly forced to enter said marital union.

ISSUE:
Was said prior marriage void? Or was it merely voidable?

RULING:
The marriage was merely voidable. The Supreme Court ruled that assuming that they
were forced to the said marital union, the marriage will not be void be merely voidable, and
therefore valid until annulled. Since there is no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that
when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently,
her marriage to respondent is void.
Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 6

FACT:
On December 24, 1981, Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member
of the Philippine Bar with grossly immoral conduct, consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with
the complainant remained subsisting. She and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as
fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School; she was still married to Merlito
Bercenilla, while he was single. The respondent was aware that she was married but told her
that their marriage was null and void due to the fact they are first cousins. They were married
before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1981. She supported the
respondent while he was still studying law. While she was pregnant with their child Jason Terre,
the respondent disappeared and didnt support her. She later found out that he was later again
married to Helina Malicdem. On the City Court of Pasay she filed a case for abandonment of
minor and for bigamy against the respondent.

ISSUE:
Can the respondent be charged with grossly immoral conduct?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty
and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling
before her the mirage of marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies,
keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. The Court
held such acts indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar.
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filled a petition for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for
the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facia presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said partys effort consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family.
 Case No. 71
People vs Aragon
(100 Phil. 1033)

FACTS:
On September 28, 1925, the accused Proceso Aragon, under the name of Proceso Rosima,
contracted marriage with Maria Gorrea in Cebu. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was
subsisting, the accused contracted another marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934 in
Iloilo under the name of Proceso Aragon.
When the first wife of the accused died on August 5, 1939, the accused contracted another
marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953 in Cebu.
The Court of First instance of Cebu held that the accused could not legally contract marriage
with Jesusa C. Magsalang without the declaration of nullity of his second marriage. The court
also declared that the accused is guilty of bigamy.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the accused is guilty of bigamy.
2. Whether or not declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary in contracting another
marriage.

RULING:
The judgement appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant is acquitted
without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage.

Held:
1. The last marriage is valid because the second marriage of the accused was not renewed
after the death of the first. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy.
2. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, there is no need for declaration
of its nullity. Hence, the last marriage of the accused was valid.
 Case No. 72
Mercado vs Tan
337 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Dr. Vincent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted
marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva
null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the
former marriage.

HELD:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right
after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He
contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
 Case No. 73
Bobis vs Bobis
GR No 138509, July 31, 2000

FACTS:

On October 21,1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-
affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initaiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.

ISSUE:
Wether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

RULING:
No. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes
presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage
was contracted rests upon the defense, but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the
bigamy case. In the meantime. It should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil
action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action.
The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy.

Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage
ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that
he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent,
therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial
question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution.
 Case No. 74
Cario vs Cario
403 Phil. 861 (February 2, 2001)

FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in
their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of
P21,000.

Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the
marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the
previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.

In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148 of the Family
Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships.

Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the
deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.

As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even
if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling
Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first
marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the
deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.

The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and
SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before
he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of
nullity is necessary.
 Case No. 75
De Castro vs De Castro
GR No. 160172, February 13, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Reniel Anthony B De Castro and respondent Annabelle Assidao-De Castro met and
became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first
sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When
the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already
expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge
Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the
civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.

HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner
and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years.
However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked
during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity
in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement
for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The
aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit
which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void
ab initio.
 Case No. 76
Republic vs Nolasco
220 SCRA 20

FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that,
Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of
Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January
1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter
from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left.
Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by
securing another seamans contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where
they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of
presumptive death of Janet.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that
he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking
assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More
so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.
 Case No. 77
Lukban vs Republic
(L-8492, 29 February 1956)

FACTS:
Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left
Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents
and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since
he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to
have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.

ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can
remarry.

HELD:
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her
husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that for the
purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the
law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse
to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
 78

GUE vs REPUBLIC
No. L-14058 March 24, 1960
 79

Armas vs. Calisterio

GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000

FACTS:

Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992
leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of
Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared
without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and
Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds
presumptive death.

Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole
surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly
bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as
administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after
all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.

ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration
of presumptive death.

HELD:

The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the law
in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August
1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it
thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before
contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to
remarry then Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim
portion of the estate.
 80

Republic vs. CA
GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005

FACTS:

Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in
February 1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to
go back to her parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents house but
was not there and even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-laws house and
learned that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the
Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free
time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local
police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July
2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.

ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

HELD:

The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition
with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain.
He even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He
also failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his
petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-
law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did
report and seek help of the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the
OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in RTC.
 81

SSS v. BAILON
G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006

FACTS: On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage in Barcelona,
Sorsogon. On October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the CFI of Sorsogon a petition to declare Alice
presumptively dead. On December 10, 1970, the CFI granted the petition. Close to 13 years after his wife
Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita
Jarque in Casiguran, Sorsogon. She was designated as SSS beneficiary of Bailon. SSS cancelled the
claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly pension for death benefits on the basis of the opinion
rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted during the
subsistence of Bailons marriage with Alice. Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for
death benefits asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as
bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque
may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon

HELD: The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is
only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and
upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. The two
marriages involved here falls under the Civil Code. Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who
reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, no judicial
proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides the
subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance
of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance will not terminate such marriage. Since
the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouses physical reappearance. In the case at bar, as no step was
taken to nullify Bailon & Jargues marriage, Teresita is proclaimed to be rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.
 82

Valdez vs. Republic

GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972,
they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until
in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that
effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that
Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilios application for
naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in
March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.

HELD:

The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil Code
governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only
needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.
 83

Anaya vs. Palaroan

36 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment
of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting
Auroras counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged
to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative
of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in
obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those
enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for
an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would
not warrant an annulment of marriage.
 84

Buccat v Buccat (1941)

Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat

April 25, 1941

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.

Facts:

Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in
September, and got married in Nov 26.

On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a
son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.

On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed
to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.

The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

Issue:

Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida
concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Held:

No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which
the State is interested and where society rests.

In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting
fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not
suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach) when they got married.

Decision:

SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant

 85

Aquino vs. Delizo

109 Phil 21

FACTS:

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita
Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she
was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage,
gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the
proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence
presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any
evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA
thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such
fraud as would annul a marriage.

HELD:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was
allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is
hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally plump or
fat. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans abdomen reaches a
height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.

In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is
set aside.
 86

Jimenez vs. Canizares

L-12790, August 31, 1960

FACTS:

Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios
Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to
exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court
summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered
to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was
given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore
rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.

HELD:

The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend
herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women
in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical
examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not
self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness
against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was
remanded to trial court.
 87

ALMELOR VS RTC

GR NO. 179620, 26 AUGUST 2008

Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3
children. 11 years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Leonida
testified that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children are
often unconventional and was the cause of their frequent fight. Manuel has an
unreasonable way of imposing discipline towards their children but is remarkably so gentle
towards his mom. He is more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor which is
unreasonable for Leonida. Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as
evidenced by his unusual closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his
homosexuality from Leonida prior to their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a
man affectionately over the phone and she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel
kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null and void not because of PI but rather
due to fraud by reason of Manuels concealment of his homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC).
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due
to fraud by reason of Manuels concealment of his homosexuality.

HELD: The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage.
It is the concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not
proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should not have taken the publics
perception against Manuels sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court
as an indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not sufficient
enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing
in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such
sexuality from Leonida and that Leonidas consent had been vitiated by such.
 88

Sin vs. Sin

GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS:

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence
filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued
and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial
court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994
stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other
than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the
participation of the State in the proceedings.

HELD:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as
the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in
the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
 89

De Ocampo vs. Florenciano

107 Phil 35

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who
are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the
wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff
discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the
wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955,
plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his
intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided
she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal
separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment
disallowed by the Family Code.

HELD:

Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of
evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by
Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in
court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants
statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would
not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law
prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be granted
based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
90
 91

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA vs. EDWARD RUMBAUA

GR 166738, August 14, 2009

FACTS: Rowena Padilla and Edward Rumbaua were married. However, they never lived together in one habitat
because their marriage was a secret to Edward's family. Rowena filed for nullity of their marriage due to
psychological incapacity. She alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise
to be true with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her
for his mothers death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in
Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman.
The RTC nullified the marriage in its decision. The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals due to prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of required certifications from the Solicitor
General. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court due to prematurity thus denied the
nullification of the parties' marriage. Rowena, then filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying for the Court
of Appeal's decision be set aside and RTC's decision be reinstated.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the psychologist was able to prove that the respondent is indeed psychologically
incapacitated according to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

RULING: No. The testimony of Dr. Tayag, together with her report, suffers from very basic flaws.

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondents exact condition except in a very
general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars,
most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to
what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage;
and the effects of the disorder on the respondents awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioners case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the
petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent,
only the petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course,that the person sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
non to arrive at such declaration. If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence, however,
appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondents early life and
associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter.