Political Law

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976

VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976

RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

MARTIN, J,:

The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of
the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the
absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his
present powers.1

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"
(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text
of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the
questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree
recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The questions ask, to wit:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have
the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa.
Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise
provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from
the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by
their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the
Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the
sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the,
manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.

2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly
and the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power
provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.

3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection
of the members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker
shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he
shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and
ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives
under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the
Prime Minister under this Constitution.

4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be
subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President
(Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime
Ministers as he may deem necessary.

5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall
have been lifted.

6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or
a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters
of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.

7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions,
powers, and composition may be altered by law.

Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may
be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding
any important matter whether of national or local interest.

8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue
in full force and effect.

9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that
they have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976
National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-
44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well
as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections,
The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a
step towards normalization.

On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-
44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the
transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII
of the Constitution.3

Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL
M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October
16.

These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a
referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the
proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to
lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to
vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those
citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the
incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process
confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable
question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum
fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the
question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure
adopted for submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A
clear Descartes fallacy of vicious cycle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act,
provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is
indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no
power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that
power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for
amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e.,
before the submission to and ratification by the people.

Labor Law
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 161104 September 27, 2006

NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT INC. and/or NYK SHIP MANAGEMENT HK., LTD., petitioners,

vs.

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND LAURO A. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

For respondent to thus claim that the issuance of a clean bill of health to a seafarer after a PEME means
that his illness was acquired during the seafarer's employment is a non sequitor.

We do not agree with the respondent's claim that by the issuance of a clean bill of health to Roberto,
made by the physicians selected/accredited by the petitioners, it necessarily follows that the illness for
which her husband died was acquired during his employment as a fisherman for the petitioners.

The pre-employment medical examination conducted on Roberto could not have divulged the disease
for which he died, considering the fact that most, if not all, are not so exploratory. The disease of GFR,
which is an indicator of chronic renal failure, is measured thru the renal function test. In pre-
employment examination, the urine analysis (urinalysis), which is normally included measures only the
creatinine, the presence of which cannot conclusively indicate chronic renal failure.59 (Underscoring
supplied)

It having been satisfactorily shown that respondent was really not fit to work as a boatswain due to his
pre-existing illness and, therefore, he is not entitled to disability compensation, necessarily, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees.

Civil Law
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,

vs.

ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

----------------------------------------

G.R. No. L-23662 October 12, 1967

MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners,

vs.

ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

Jose D. Villena for petitioners.

Antonio Barredo and Exequiel M. Zaballero for respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for a review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals (in CA-G. R. No. 31221-R) affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding No. 831 of said Court, admitting to probate the alleged last will and testament of the
deceased, and overruling the opposition to the probate.

It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to
the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los
Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner as
the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio
Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia,
all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate
asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by
laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of
the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances
were finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on August 3, 1954, in cases G.R.
Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).

After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision of June 20, 1958, found that
the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and
revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or
when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the
issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court
overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving
unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."

On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole
purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.

On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the
testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in
1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter under
Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against
the oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the
deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had become
final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied
revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal revocation by
the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the
legatee herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.

Oppositors then appealed to this Court.

In this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants pose three main issues: (a) whether or not the
decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal; (b)
whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by
oppositors-appellants had likewise become final; and (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de
los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the
proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.

As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate should be
considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in
their opposition. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is untenable. It is
elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether
its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs.
Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the probate order is final and
appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically
prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . .
where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."

Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds of
their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the
higher Courts. This contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six
different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.

There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the
same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree
nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the
decree was correctly dismissed.

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the
testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was
duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of
revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to
revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but
merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the
original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not
affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation
can preclude probate of the revoked testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).

As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the
presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect
the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's
ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian
of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation
(Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of
estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the
defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.

The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950
(Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:

Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:

(1) ....

(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it
being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to
the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be
by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the
reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase;

xxx xxx xxx

It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes, the basis of the quoted provision is a
presumed change of intention on the part of the testator. As pointed out by Manresa in his
Commentaries on Article 869 of the Civil Code (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 743)

Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador. Si este, despues de legar, se desprende de la
cosa por titulo lucrativo u oneroso, hace desaparecer su derecho sobra ella, dando lugar a la presuncion
de que ha cambiado de voluntad, y no quiere que el legado se cumpla. Mas para que pueda presumirse
esa voluntad, es necesario que medien actos del testador que la indiquen. Si la perdida del derecho
sobre la cosa ha sido independiente de la voluntad del testador, el legado podraquedar sin efecto, mas
no en virtud del numero 2 del articulo 869, que exige siempre actos voluntarios de enajenacion por
parte del mismo testador.

As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original
intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that
the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee
Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed
in that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620,
promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on
account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to
her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her
testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we
believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.

Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not necessarily
result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision
decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also that it was the moral
influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution of
Exhs. A and B (the 1943 and 1944 conveyances). (Decision, L-5618 and L-5620).

If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the transferor was
not expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded,
either, that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the original legacy.

True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of the alienated property "even if it
be by reason of the nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy; but as pointed out by Scaevola
(Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the "nullity of the contract" can not be taken in an absolute
sense.2 Certainly, it could not be maintained, for example, that if a testator's subsequent alienation
were avoided because the testator was mentally deranged at the time, the revocatory effect ordained
by the article should still ensue. And the same thing could be said if the alienation (posterior to the will)
were avoided on account of physical or mental duress. Yet, an alienation through undue influence in no
way differs from one made through violence or intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not
expressing his real intent,3 and it can not be held that there was in fact an alienation that could produce
a revocation of the anterior bequest.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and Fernandez. So ordered.

Taxation Law
G.R. No. 114231 May 18, 2001

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
NELIA A. BARLIS, in her capacity as Officer-in-Charge/Acting Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa,
substituting EDUARDO A. ALON, former Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,1 respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

At the crux of this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the issue of whether or not the trial
court has jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition which seeks to set aside the warrants of
garnishment over petitioner's bank deposits in satisfaction of real property taxes, without paying under
protest the tax assessed and without exhausting available administrative remedies.

In its 11 August 1993 Decision,2 the Court of Appeals ruled in the negative and declared void for lack of
jurisdiction the 17 June 1992 Order of the Regional Trial Court3 as the petition for prohibition lacked
sufficient cause of action and was filed without exhaustion of available administrative remedies. Thus,
the petitioner seeks to set aside the appellate court's Decision and its 28 February 1994 Resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration of its decision.1wphi1.nt

The facts are as follows:

From 1968 to 1972 the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), a duly-organized corporation in the
Philippines engaged in the distribution of electricity, erected four (4) power generating plants in Sucat,
Muntinlupa, named as Gardner I, Gardner II, Snyder I and Snyder II stations. To equip the power plants,
various machineries and equipment were purchased both locally and abroad. When the Real Property
Tax Code took effect on 1 June 1974, MERALCO filed its tax declarations covering the Sucat power
plants, the buildings thereon and the machineries and equipment therein. From 1975 to 1978 MERALCO
paid the real property taxes on the said properties on the basis of their assessed value as stated in the
tax declarations. On 29 December 1978 MERALCO sold all the power-generating plants including the
landsite to the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), a corporation fully owned and controlled by the
Philippine government.

In 1985, the Offices of the Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa, while reviewing
records pertaining to assessments and collection of real property taxes, discovered, among others, that
MERALCO, for the period beginning 1 January 1976 to 29 December 1978, misdeclared and/or failed to
declare for taxation purposes a number of real properties, consisting of several equipment and
machineries, found in the said power plants. A review of the Deed of Sale which MERALCO executed in
favor of NAPOCOR when it sold the power plants to the latter convinced the municipal government of
Muntinlupa of the misdeclaration/non-declaration of the true value of the said machineries and
equipment. The Municipal Assessor of Muntinlupa then declared and assessed the subject real
properties for taxation purposes and on 19 November 1985 furnished MERALCO their corresponding tax
declarations.4 There was no response from MERALCO. Thereafter, on 3 September 1986, the then
Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa, Norberto A. San Mateo1 issued several collection notices5 to
MERALCO, ordering it to pay the deficiency in the real property taxes covering the machineries and
equipment found in the said power plants. Still MERALCO did not pay the tax assessed.

The Municipality of Muntinlupa sought the assistance of the Bureau of Local Government Finance-
Department of Finance (BLGF-DOF), and a number of hearings were conducted with both MERALCO and
the Municipality of Muntinlupa participating. Finally, on 14 August 1989, the BLGF-DOF issued a Letter-
Endorsement declaring MERALCO liable to pay the deficiency or delinquent real property taxes claimed
by the Municipality of Muntinlupa on the grounds that the properties were not declared for taxation
purposes by MERALCO, and that they were not used in a new and preferred industry.6
On the basis thereof, Municipal Treasurer Eduardo A. Alon forwarded a supplemental collection notice
to MERALCO, dated 31 October 1989, demanding the immediate payment of thirty six million pesos
(P36,000,000.00) of unpaid real property taxes inclusive of penalties and accrued interest.7 In addition,
Municipal Treasurer Alon also sent a formal letter to MERALCO, dated 20 November 1989, reiterating
his demand for tax payment.8

Again, MERALCO did not pay. Accordingly, after issuing the requisite certification of non-payment of real
property taxes and complying with the additional requirement of public posting of the notice of
delinquency, Municipal Treasurer Eduardo A. Alon issued warrants of garnishment, copies of which were
served on MERALCO on 10 October 1990, ordering the attachment of the bank deposits of MERALCO
with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(METROBANK) and the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) to the extent of its unpaid real property
taxes.9

Immediately, MERALCO filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Metro Manila a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
order (TRO) praying, among others, that a TRO be issued to enjoin the Municipal Treasurer of
Muntinlupa from enforcing the warrants of garnishment. Thereupon, the trial court issued a TRO10
which, after hearing on the injunctive aspect of the case, was modified to the effect that the warrants of
garnishment against the bank accounts shall be in full force and effect, provided, that the Municipal
Treasurer shall not in the meantime collect, receive or withdraw the frozen bank deposits; and that
MERALCO can withdraw from the frozen deposits provided that it does not leave a balance less than the
tax claim of the Municipality of Muntinlupa.11

On 17 October 1990 MERALCO filed an Amended Petition. For its part, the Municipal Treasurer filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of: (1) lack of jurisdiction since, under Sec. 64 of the Real Property Tax
Code, courts are prohibited from entertaining any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed thereunder
until the taxpayer shall gave paid, under protest, the tax assessed against him; and (2) lack of cause of
action by reason of MERALCO's failure to question the notice of assessment issued to it by the
Municipality of Muntinlupa before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. In its 17 June 1991 Order the
trial court denied the said motion.12

On a Petition for Certiorari filed before the Supreme Court, later endorsed to the Court of Appeals, the
Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa assailed the order of 17 June 1991 of the RTC.13 On 11 August 1993
the Court of Appeals in its Decision granted the petition declaring the assailed order "void and without
life in law, having been issued without jurisdiction, on a petition that further does not state a sufficient
cause of action, filed by a party who had not exhausted available administrative remedies,"14 MERALCO
moved for a reconsideration of the Decision, but was denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated 28
February 1994.

Two (2) questions require our resolution, to wit: (a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over a
petition for prohibition which seeks to set aside the warrants of garnishment over the bank deposits of
petitioner MERALCO without payment under protest of the tax assessed as required in Sec. 64 of the
Real Property Tax Code, as amended (RPTC, for brevity); and (b) Whether or not the Petition for
Prohibition had no cause of action by reason of MERALCO's failure to exhaust available administrative
remedies, i.e., to question the notice of assessment issued to it by the Municipality of Muntinlupa
before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals prior to the filing of the said petition before the trial
court.
Petitioner MERALCO maintains that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for
Prohibition since it is not the taxpayer, referred to in Sec. 64 of the RPTC, required to make a protest
payment of the tax assessed before a tax action may be taken cognizance of by the court. Petitioner
reasons that by inference from Secs. 27 and 34 of the RPTC, the term "taxpayer" alludes to the property
owner, a person in whose name the property is declared, or the owner or administrator, but not a
previous owner which petitioner was at the time the notice of collection was sent to it. Hence, it argues
that its protest payment of the tax assessed is not a condition precedent to the court's acquiring
jurisdiction over its petition.

Petitioner further maintains that the trial court has jurisdiction over the Petition for Prohibition as it has
sufficient cause of action - the annulment of the warrants of garnishment over its bank deposits in PCI
Bank, METROBANK and BPI. Petitioner contends that it need not exhaust any administrative remedies,
i.e., to appeal the tax assessment before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals since, first, the petition
merely seeks to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of garnishment over its deposits, and
not the tax assessment; second, it is not a taxpayer for purposes of appealing a real property tax
assessment over the power plant machineries and equipment since it is no longer the owner thereof;
and, third, even if it were to follow the prescribed remedies on protesting a tax assessment it had
nothing to appeal since the respondent municipal treasurer issued notices of collection and not notices
of assessment.

Petitioner contends that, assuming arguendo, what respondent sent were notices of assessment, such
act was irregular since pursuant to Secs. 7 and 90 of the RPTC, it is only the provincial or city assessor,
and the municipal deputy assessor, who has the authority to conduct and issue tax assessments, and not
respondent municipal treasurer.

We find the petitioner's arguments to be without merit. The trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain a
Petition for Prohibition absent petitioner's payment, under protest, of the tax assessed as required by
Sec. 64 of the RPTC.15 Payment of the tax assessed under protest, is a condition sine qua non before the
trial court could assume jurisdiction over the petition and failure to do so, the RTC has no jurisdiction to
entertain it.

The restriction upon the power of courts to impeach tax assessment without a prior payment, under
protest, of the taxes assessed is consistent with the doctrine that taxes are the lifeblood of the nation
and as such their collection cannot be curtailed by injunction or any like action; otherwise, the state or,
in this case, the local government unit, shall be crippled in dispensing the needed services to the people,
and its machinery gravely disabled.

Petitioner is begging the question when it asserts that it is not the taxpayer contemplated under Sec.
64 of the RPTC. It is an accepted principle in taxation that taxes are paid by the person obliged to
declare the same for taxation purposes. Under the Real Property Tax Code, the duty to declare the true
value of real property for taxation purposes is imposed upon the owner, or administrator, or their duly
authorized representatives.16 They are thus the taxpayers. When these persons fail or refuse to make a
declaration of the true value of their real property within the prescribed period, the provincial or city
assessor shall declare then property in the name of the defaulting owner and assess the property for
taxation.17 In this wise, the taxpayer assumes the character of a defaulting owner, or defaulting
administrator, or defaulting authorized representative, liable to pay back taxes.

Respondent Municipal Treasurer claims that petitioner MERALCO misdeclared and/or failed to declare
the true value of the Sucat power plant machineries and equipment during the taxable years 1976-1978
when it was still the owner thereof, and that it is the deficiency in the realty tax on the real property's
reassessed value which it seeks to collect. Based on the foregoing, the notice of assessment and
collection was directed to petitioner, not because it is still the present owner of the subject real
property including the machineries and equipment thereon, but because it is the defaulting owner
thereof who has failed to make proper tax declaration and the proper tax payment thereon. Thus,
petitioner is the taxpayer contemplated under Sec. 64 of the RPTC, and payment under protest of the
tax assessed is necessary for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over its petition.

The fact that NAPOCOR is the present owner of the Sucat power plant machineries and equipment does
not constitute a legal barrier to the collection of delinquent taxes from the previous owner, MERALCO,
who has defaulted in its payment. In Testate Estate of Concordia T. Lim v. City of Manila,18 the Court
held that the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable against the person who had actual or
beneficial use and possession of it regardless of whether or not he is the owner. In that case, the Court
declared that to impose the real property tax on the subsequent owner which was neither the owner
nor the beneficial user of the property during the designated periods would not only be contrary to law
but also unjust. Correspondingly, petitioner MERALCO, not NAPOCOR, is liable for the payment of the
back taxes on said properties.

There is no merit in petitioner's argument that the trial court could take cognizance of the petition as it
only question the validity of the issuance of the warrants of garnishment on its bank deposits and not
the tax assessment. Petitioner MERALCO in filing the Petition for Prohibition before the RTC was in truth
assailing the validity of the question of validity of the warrants of garnishments that would have to be
tackled, but in addition the issues of tax warrants of garnishment were issued to collect back taxes from
petitioner, the petition for prohibition would be for no other reason than to forestall the collection of
back taxes on the basis of tax assessment arguments. This, petitioner cannot do without first resorting
to the proper administrative remedies,19 or as previously discussed, by paying under protest the tax
assessed, to allow the court to assume jurisdiction over the petition.

Respondent claims that on 19 November 1985 the Municipal Assessor of Muntinlupa sent petitioner a
real property tax declaration containing the reassessed valuation of the Sucat power plant machineries
and equipment therein, and this served as notice of assessment to petitioner. The Municipal Treasurer
thereafter sent petitioner notices of collection dated 3 September 1986. The records are, however,
bereft of any evidence showing actual receipt by petitioner of the real property tax declaration sent by
the Municipal Assessor. However, the respondent in a Petition for Certiorari (G.R. No. 100763)20 filed
with this Court which later referred the same to the Court of Appeals for resolution, narrated that "the
municipal assessor assessed and declared the afore-listed properties for taxation purposes as of 28
November 1985." Significantly, in the same petition, respondent referred to former Municipal Treasurer
Norberto A. San Mateo's notices to MERALCO, all dated 3 September 1986, as notices of assessment21
and not notices of collection as it claims in this present petition. Respondent cannot maintain diverse
positions.

A notice of assessment should effectively inform the taxpayer of the value of a specific property, or
proportion thereof subject to tax, including the discovery, listing, classification, and appraisal of
properties.22 From the tone and content of the notices, the 3 September 1986 notices sent by former
Municipal Treasurer Norberto A. San Mateo to petitioner MERALCO are the notices of assessment
required by the law as it merely informed the petitioner that it has yet to pay the taxes in accordance
with the reassessed values of the real property mentioned therein.23 The 31 October 1989 notices sent
by Municipal treasurer Eduardo A. Alon to MERALCO is likewise of the same character.24 Only the letter
dated 20 November 1989 sent by Municipal Treasurer Eduardo A. Alon to petitioner MERALCO could
qualify as the actual notice of collection since it is an unmistakable demand for payment of back
taxes.25

Be that as it may, petitioner was correct when it pointed out that the Municipal Treasurer, contrary to
the required by law, issued the notices of assessment.26 However, the trial court is without authority to
address the alleged irregularity in the issuance of the notices of assessment without prior tax payment,
under protest, by petitioner. Section 64 of the RPTC, prohibits courts from declaring any tax invalid by
reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the officers charged with the assessment or
collection of taxes except upon the condition that the taxpayer pays the just amount of the tax, as
determined by the court in the pending proceeding.27 As petitioner failed to make a protest payment of
the tax assessed, any argument regarding the procedure observed in the preparation of the notice of
assessment and collection is futile as the trial court in such a scenario cannot assume jurisdiction over
the matter.1wphi1.nt

It cannot be gainsaid that petitioner should have addressed its arguments to respondent at the first
opportunity - upon receipt of the 3 September 1986 notices of assessment signed by Municipal
treasurer Norberto A. San Mateo. Thereafter, it should have availed of the proper administrative
remedies in protesting an erroneous tax assessment, i.e., to question the correctness of the assessment
before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA), and later, invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA).28 Under the doctrine of primacy of administrative
remedies, an error in the assessment must be administratively pursued to the exclusion of ordinary
courts whose decisions would be void for lack of jurisdiction.29 But an appeal shall not suspend the
collection of the tax assessed without prejudice to a later adjustment pending the outcome of the
appeal. The failure to appeal within the statutory period shall render the assessment final and
unappealable.30 Petitioner having failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to it, the
assessment attained finality and collection would be in order.

To quell any further argument regarding the valididty of the issuance of the warrants of garnishment of
the bank deposits of petitioner, we shall rule upon it.

Petitioner contends that real property tax constitutes a lien on the property subject to tax, thus,
payment thereof should be made by proceeding against the real property itself or any personal property
located therein, and not the separate personal property of petitioner, specifically its bank deposits.

Real property itself or any personal property located therein, and not the separate personal property of
petitioner, specifically its bank deposits.

Respondent, while agreeing to that proposition, in turn points out that the Real Property Tax Code, as
amended, affords local government units three (3) concurrent and simultaneous remedies to enforce
the Code's provisions, namely; (a) distraint of personal property, (b) sale of delinquent real property,
and (c) collection of real property tax through ordinary court action. From the foregoing, respondent
argues that it is not limited to the enforcement of tax lien but is also authorized to proceed against the
personal properties of the defaulting taxpayer unless it could be shown that the personal properties
being subject to distraint are exempt from attachment, which the bank deposits are not.

We agree with the respondent. The remedy of levy can be pursued by putting up for sale the real
property subject of tax, i.e., the delinquent property upon which the tax lien attaches, regardless of the
present owner or possessor thereof. The remedy of distraint and levy of personal property meanwhile
allows the taxing authority to subject any personal property of the taxpayer to execution,31 save certain
exceptions as enumerated under Sec. 69 of the RPTC.32 bank deposits are not among those exceptions.
WHEREFORE, the 11 August 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring as void the 17 June 1992
Order of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellate court's 28 February 1994
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its subject Decision is likewise AFFIRMED.

Mercantile Law
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 179115 September 26, 2012

ASIA INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONEERS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated August 3,
2007 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc, 1 and the Resolutions dated November 20, 20062 and
February 22, 20073 of the CTA First Division dismissing Asia International Auctioneers, Inc.s (AIA) appeal
due to its alleged failure to timely protest the Commissioner of Internal Revenues (CIR) tax assessment.

The Factual Antecedents

AIA is a duly organized corporation operating within the Subic Special Economic Zone. It is engaged in
the importation of used motor vehicles and heavy equipment which it sells to the public through
auction.4

On August 25, 2004, AIA received from the CIR a Formal Letter of Demand, dated July 9, 2004,
containing an assessment for deficiency value added tax (VAT) and excise tax in the amounts of P
102,535,520.00 and P 4,334,715.00, respectively, or a total amount of P 106,870,235.00, inclusive of
penalties and interest, for auction sales conducted on February 5, 6, 7, and 8, 2004.5

AIA claimed that it filed a protest letter dated August 29, 2004 through registered mail on August 30,
2004.6 It also submitted additional supporting documents on September 24, 2004 and November 22,
2004.7

The CIR failed to act on the protest, prompting AIA to file a petition for review before the CTA on June
20, 2005,8 to which the CIR filed its Answer on July 26, 2005.9

On March 8, 2006, the CIR filed a motion to dismiss10 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction citing the
alleged failure of AIA to timely file its protest which thereby rendered the assessment final and
executory. The CIR denied receipt of the protest letter dated August 29, 2004 claiming that it only
received the protest letter dated September 24, 2004 on September 27, 2004, three days after the lapse
of the 30-day period prescribed in Section 22811 of the Tax Code.12
In opposition to the CIRs motion to dismiss, AIA submitted the following evidence to prove the filing
and the receipt of the protest letter dated August 29, 2004: (1) the protest letter dated August 29, 2004
with attached Registry Receipt No. 3824;13 (2) a Certification dated November 15, 2005 issued by
Wilfredo R. De Guzman, Postman III, of the Philippine Postal Corporation of Olongapo City, stating that
Registered Letter No. 3824 dated August 30, 2004 , addressed to the CIR, was dispatched under Bill No.
45 Page 1 Line 11 on September 1, 2004 from Olongapo City to Quezon City;14 (3) a Certification dated
July 5, 2006 issued by Acting Postmaster, Josefina M. Hora, of the Philippine Postal Corporation-NCR,
stating that Registered Letter No. 3824 was delivered to the BIR Records Section and was duly received
by the authorized personnel on September 8, 2004;15 and (4) a certified photocopy of the Receipt of
Important Communication Delivered issued by the BIR Chief of Records Division, Felisa U. Arrojado,
showing that Registered Letter No. 3824 was received by the BIR.16 AIA also presented Josefina M. Hora
and Felisa U. Arrojado as witnesses to testify on the due execution and the contents of the foregoing
documents.

Ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals

After hearing both parties, the CTA First Division rendered the first assailed Resolution dated November
20, 2006 granting the CIRs motion to dismiss. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 it ruled that "while
a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the course of the mail, still, this is merely a
disputable presumption, subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the
burden upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter indeed was received
by the addressee."18

The CTA First Division faulted AIA for failing to present the registry return card of the subject protest
letter. Moreover, it noted that the text of the protest letter refers to a Formal Demand Letter dated
June 9, 2004 and not the subject Formal Demand Letter dated July 9, 2004. Furthermore, it rejected
AIAs argument that the September 24, 2004 letter merely served as a cover letter to the submission of
its supporting documents pointing out that there was no mention therein of a prior separate protest
letter.19

AIAs motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CTA First Division in its second assailed
Resolution dated February 22, 2007. On appeal, the CTA En Banc in its Decision dated August 3, 2007
affirmed the ruling of the CTA First Division holding that AIAs evidence was not sufficient to prove
receipt by the CIR of the protest letter dated August 24, 2004.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue Before the Court

Both parties discussed the legal bases for AIAs tax liability, unmindful of the fact that this case stemmed
from the CTAs dismissal of AIAs petition for review for failure to file a timely protest, without passing
upon the substantive merits of the case.

Relevantly, on January 30, 2008, AIA filed a Manifestation and Motion with Leave of the Honorable
Court to Defer or Suspend Further Proceedings20 on the ground that it availed of the Tax Amnesty
Program under Republic Act 948021 (RA 9480), otherwise known as the Tax Amnesty Act of 2007. On
February 13, 2008, it submitted to the Court a Certification of Qualification22 issued by the BIR on
February 5, 2008 stating that AIA "has availed and is qualified for Tax Amnesty for the Taxable Year 2005
and Prior Years" pursuant to RA 9480.
With AIAs availment of the Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480, the Court is tasked to first determine
its effects on the instant petition.

Ruling of the Court

A tax amnesty is a general pardon or the intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose
penalties on persons otherwise guilty of violating a tax law. It partakes of an absolute waiver by the
government of its right to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance to
start with a clean slate.23

A tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored or presumed in law. The grant of a tax
amnesty, similar to a tax exemption, must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority.24

In 2007, RA 9480 took effect granting a tax amnesty to qualified taxpayers for all national internal
revenue taxes for the taxable year 2005 and prior years, with or without assessments duly issued
therefor, that have remained unpaid as of December 31, 2005.25

The Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480 may be availed of by any person except those who are
disqualified under Section 8 thereof, to wit:

Section 8. Exceptions. The tax amnesty provided in Section 5 hereof shall not extend to the following
persons or cases existing as of the effectivity of this Act:

(a) Withholding agents with respect to their withholding tax liabilities;

(b) Those with pending cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government;

(c) Those with pending cases involving unexplained or unlawfully acquired wealth or under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;

(d) Those with pending cases filed in court involving violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Law;

(e) Those with pending criminal cases for tax evasion and other criminal offenses under Chapter II of
Title X of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, and the felonies of frauds, illegal
exactions and transactions, and malversation of public funds and property under Chapters III and IV of
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and

(f) Tax cases subject of final and executory judgment by the courts.(Emphasis supplied)

The CIR contends that AIA is disqualified under Section 8(a) of RA 9480 from availing itself of the Tax
Amnesty Program because it is "deemed" a withholding agent for the deficiency taxes. This argument is
untenable.

The CIR did not assess AIA as a withholding agent that failed to withhold or remit the deficiency VAT
and excise tax to the BIR under relevant provisions of the Tax Code. Hence, the argument that AIA is
"deemed" a withholding agent for these deficiency taxes is fallacious. (Fallacy of presumption)
Indirect taxes, like VAT and excise tax, are different from withholding taxes.1wphi1 To distinguish, in
indirect taxes, the incidence of taxation falls on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted or
passed on to another person, such as when the tax is imposed upon goods before reaching the
consumer who ultimately pays for it.26 On the other hand, in case of withholding taxes, the incidence
and burden of taxation fall on the same entity, the statutory taxpayer. The burden of taxation is not
shifted to the withholding agent who merely collects, by withholding, the tax due from income
payments to entities arising from certain transactions27and remits the same to the government. Due to
this difference, the deficiency VAT and excise tax cannot be "deemed" as withholding taxes merely
because they constitute indirect taxes. Moreover, records support the conclusion that AIA was assessed
not as a withholding agent but, as the one directly liable for the said deficiency taxes.28

The CIR also argues that AIA, being an accredited investor/taxpayer situated at the Subic Special
Economic Zone, should have availed of the tax amnesty granted under RA 939929 and not under RA
9480. This is also untenable.

RA 9399 was passed prior to the passage of RA 9480. RA 9399 does not preclude taxpayers within its
coverage from availing of other tax amnesty programs available or enacted in futuro like RA 9480. More
so, RA 9480 does not exclude from its coverage taxpayers operating within special economic zones. As
long as it is within the bounds of the law, a taxpayer has the liberty to choose which tax amnesty
program it wants to avail.

Lastly, the Court takes judicial notice of the "Certification of Qualification"30 issued by Eduardo A.
Baluyut, BIR Revenue District Officer, stating that AlA "has availed and is qualified for Tax Amnesty for
the Taxable Year 2005 and Prior Years" pursuant to RA 9480. In the absence of sufficient evidence
proving that the certification was issued in excess of authority, the presumption that it was issued in the
regular performance of the revenue district officer's official duty stands.31

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC in view of Asia International
Auctioneers, Inc.'s (AlA) availment of the Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480. Accordingly, the
outstanding deficiency taxes of AlA are deemed fully settled.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

Criminal Law
G.R. No. 200508 September 4, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.

CHRISTOPHER RIVERA Y ROYO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the June 23, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming the Judgment2
handed down by the Regional Trial Court Branch 17, Manila (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 04-230720,
finding the accused, Christopher Rivera y Royo (Rivera), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and penalized under Article 266-B
thereof.

The Facts

On October 4, 2004, an Information for Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code was filed
against Rivera stating:

That on or about September 29, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd
designs and by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there forcibly undressing one AAA
and inserting his penis in her vagina, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.

As succinctly stated in the decision of the CA, AAA narrated the following:

She was 20-years old and worked as a housemaid in a house located at Quezon City. She came to know
Rivera on September 28, 2004 because he was also working thereat as a security guard. She told Rivera
about a misunderstanding with a co-worker. Rivera then offered to help her look for another job.

At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of September 29, 2004, AAA went with Rivera believing that the
latter will bring her to his parent's house in Quiapo. Rivera brought her to Ilang Ilang Motel4 located
along Quezon Boulevard. AAA asked Rivera if that was his parent's house, to which he replied "Yes."

Rivera shoved her inside, pushed her towards the bed, forced her to remove her clothes. He went on
top of her, shoved her penis into her underwear and inserted the same into her vagina. She struggled to
push Rivera but the latter held her hands tightly. She shouted for help, but nobody heard her.

Rivera stayed on top of AAA for about ten (10) minutes. Thereafter, they went to her cousin's house in
Antipolo City. She reported the incident to the police authorities and Rivera was apprehended.

It cannot be argued that because AAA voluntarily went with Rivera to the Ilang-Ilang Lodge, she
consented to have sex with him. To presume otherwise would be non sequitur. It must be noted that
AAA, who was not in good terms with a co-worker, wanted a change in employer. She easily believed
Rivera who convinced her that he could help her look for a new job. Thus, she trusted Rivera and went
along with him because of his assurance that he could help her find a new employment.
Remedial Law
G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa City, ARNE STROM
and GRACE REYES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:

Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 of the
court a quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law,
respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 1, 1995, and
a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated April 26, 1995.

For reasons of his own but the purposes of which can easily be deduced, separate copies of the basic
motion were furnished the Chief Justice, Judicial and Bar Council, Solicitor General, Bar Confidant,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Court Administrator and his deputies, Secretary of Justice, and
Ombudsman. Copies of the supplemental motion were also furnished by him to the same officials or
entities and, additionally, to the individual members of this Court.

In the judgment now sought to be reconsidered, the Second Division of the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the only issue to be resolved in this case was whether or not
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the motion to quash the aforementioned
criminal case. We quote the pertinent portions of his ponencia not only for easy reference but to serve
as a basis for determining whether the sanctions imposed were commensurate to the administrative
offense, to wit:

The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No.
1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not
have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of
Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the
text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was
issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he would
have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D. No. 1, issued by the former
President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by
Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the former
President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other
acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos in the exercise
of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has
been expressly or impliedly revoked or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law
(Rollo, pp. 7-8).

xxx xxx xxx

But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the citations of the
prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a particular
case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever may be the advocate before the court.
Respondent judge should be reminded that courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws
of the land (Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are presumed to be well-
informed of the existing laws, recent enactments and jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as
members of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties is
subject to censure. But where, as in the present case, the error could have been entirely avoided were it
not for the public respondent's irresponsibility in the performance of his duties, it is but proper that
respondent judge be reprimanded and his order of dismissal set aside for grave ignorance of the law.
For, respondent judge's error is not a simple error in judgment but one amounting to gross ignorance of
the law which could easily undermine the public's perception of the court's competence.

We could stop here, since the rehashed arguments raised by respondent judge in his aforesaid original
and supplemental motions are completely refuted by the foregoing discussion demonstrative not only of
his adjudicatory error but also of judicial incompetence. In fact, just to cite a few representative cases, it
may be worthwhile for respondent judge to ponder upon the Court's observations in Aducayan vs.
Flores, etc., et al., 1 Ajeno vs. Inserto, 2 Libarios vs. Dabalos, 3 and Estoya, et al. vs. Singson, etc., 4 which
would put his asseverations at rest.

Respondent judge, however, would want this Court to pass upon his other supplications, arguments,
and even his insinuations for that matter, which although born more of fecundity in formulation and less
of bases in law, we have decided to anatomize even with some expense of prolixity.

Respondent judge prefaces his remedial approach with the assurance that "(t)he only purpose of (h)is
motion is to plead with bended knees and with all humility for the kind reconsideration" of the
decision in this case, specifically the findings that he is "grossly ignorant of the law and as such, (he)
was reprimanded and fined in the amount of P10,000.00; and that the aforesaid decision is to be
spread on (his) personal records." 5
He adverts to his good conduct as a person and as a judge, reiterates that the error primarily stemmed
from the shortcomings of the public prosecutor and, on a personal note, he expresses this concern: ". . .
I am again begging with humility that the spreading of the aforesaid Decision on my personal records
be reconsidered because doing so will foreclose any chance for me to aspire for promotion in the
judiciary in the future. This is very painful. I will agonize up to my last day and my last breath in life." 6

The Court assures respondent judge that it has taken all the aforesaid matters into consideration and is
not insensitive thereto, including his argumentum ad misericordiam. It feels, however, that there is
more than ample substantiation for the findings of the ponente in the main case, and compelling legal
warrant for the administrative penalties imposed which are even milder than those meted by it under
similar and comparable situations.

The spreading of the decision on the personal record of a respondent is an official procedure and
requirement which, incredibly, respondent judge would want this very Court to violate and forego, in
suppression of facts which must appear in official documents. His further argument that

The spreading of such decision on my personal records will not only open criticisms on my
private qualifications as a minister in the temple of justice but will open more comments on
my official acts, competence and credibility as a judge that might undermine the people's
faith in the judicial system in the Province of Palawan, in Puerto Princesa City and in the
entire country because it is always difficult to disassociate my private credential from that of
my public qualifications. 7

is, to put it mildly, a mite too exaggerated and a tad too melodramatic. The Court regrets that
respondent judge appears unaware that he is actually the recipient of uncommon sympathetic
consideration in this case.

Administrative penalties do not play the final strains of the valkyrian chant to a public career, judicial or
otherwise. It is for respondent judge, by subsequently demonstrating his true worth through observance
of judicial standards, to vindicate himself from a misjudgment which is the heritage of the heedless and
to rise to higher levels which is the destiny of the deserving. Besides, it is a curious fact that assuming as
valid his meticulosity on the confidential nature of disciplinary cases, he nevertheless sent copies of his
motions to all the persons enumerated at the start of this resolution. It is elementary that copies of such
motions are merely filed with the court and furnished only to the adverse party. Here, he wants us to
keep sub rosa what he himself publicizes.

From his initial exhibition of humility and penitential pose, respondent judge then goes into a critical
second gear by rhetorically wondering aloud in this fashion:

On July 27, 1994, the Third Division of the Honorable Supreme Court required me to comment on the
above-entitled petition. On August 23, 1994 I filed my comment thereto and on October 24, 1994, in a
Resolution the Third Division of the Supreme Court resolved to note my Comment. When the Third
Division of the Honorable Court required me to comment in G.R. No. 116049, the supposition is that a
valid raffle of said case to that Division had already been made. That was my thinking and impression
for, why would the case go to that Division except thru a valid raffle. I am now in quandary, however, as
to why all of a sudden, G.R. No. 116049 was transferred to the Second Division of the Supreme Court
without us or any party being informed by the Honorable Supreme Court about it. In our level at the
Regional Trial Court in Palawan, we observe the raffle of cases with solemnity and abide by the result of
the raffle faithfully. And the said Second Division meted me out excessive penalties when it was the
Third Division that required me to comment. Why did this happen? (Emphasis supplied.) 8
Since this was obviously spoken with the ascriptive courage of the uninformed, we assure His Honor that
the Supreme Court also conducts "a valid raffle," observes such raffle of its cases "with solemnity," and
abides by the result thereof "faithfully." This case was validly and solemnly raffled to Mr. Justice Bidin
who was then with the Third Division of the Court. On January 23, 1995, he was transferred to the
Second Division where he served as working chairman until his retirement on April 7, 1995. In
accordance with the internal rules of the Court, this case remained with him as the original ponente and
he accordingly penned the decision therein for and as a member of the Second Division. There is no rule
in the Court that the parties be informed that a case has been transferred to another division, as
respondent judge would want or expect. To do so would easily be revelatory of the identity of the
ponente which is precisely what some litigants used to, and still, watch for and speculate upon.

In anticipation of a similar insinuendo, respondent judge is further informed that because of the
retirement of Mr. Justice Bidin and the uncertainty of the date when his replacement could act upon his
unfinished cases and the subsequent proceedings therein, after its summer session and working recess
the Court en banc, after due deliberation on respondent judge's successive motions, decided to assign
the preparation of this resolution to the present writer thereof, he having been and still is with the
Second Division. Respondent judge, with his claim of extensive magisterial experience, should have
verified all the foregoing facts from the records of this Court, instead of proceeding upon speculations.

Finally, shifting to what he obviously fancies to be high gear on a constitutional basis, respondent judge
questions the competence of the Second Division of this Court to administratively discipline him.
Exordially, a mere allegatio nudus does not create a constitutional issue as to require the referral of this
case, or at least the disciplinary aspect thereof, to the Court en banc. The disposition of that matter
merely involves a clarification of the misconception of respondent judge thereon, presumably because
of his unfamiliarity with circulars adopted and followed by this Court, some of them being on internal
procedure. Be that as it may, since all the members of this Court are aware of the submissions of
respondent judge on this point through the copies of the motions which he furnished them, and he
insistently harps on constitutional grounds therein, the Court en banc resolved to accept this aspect of
the case from the Second Division.

His Honor relies on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of the present Constitution which
reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order
their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon." This provision is an expansion of and was taken from the second
sentence of Section 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution which provided: "The Supreme Court shall have
the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their
dismissal."

Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge on the inclusion of the adverbial phrase "en banc" in
referring to this Court in the quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution and, from this, he argues that it
is only the full Court, not a division thereof, that can administratively punish him.

Fortuitously, the writer of this resolution, as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, had the opportunity to take up that precise matter with the committee
chairman, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, by pointing out the equivalent provision in the 1973
Constitution, hereinbefore quoted, which merely referred to the "Court," without qualification. It was
accordingly explained and agreed that insofar as the power to discipline is concerned, the qualification
was not intended to make a difference, as a reference to the Court by itself necessarily means the Court
en banc. It was only decided to state "en banc" there because all internal procedural and administrative
matters, as well as ceremonial functions, are always decided by or conducted in the Court en banc. On
the other hand, where the reference is to the Court acting through its divisions, it would necessarily be
so specified. For lack of transcription of the proceedings of the committees of said Commission, the
writer has perforce to rely on his recollection and notes, but he assures this Court of the foregoing facts
as they transpired.

At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually
two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary
power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was
not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole
Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally
separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in his instance, the administrative case must be
deliberated upon and decided by the full itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, on
February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. In the Matter
of the Amendment and/or Clarification of Various Supreme Court Rules and Resolutions," and providing
inter alia:

For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:

xxx xxx xxx

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one
(1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.

xxx xxx xxx

This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted provision
was maintained.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or
cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue
delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases
involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the
constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution
of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of
authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven members. 10

Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are
specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and
judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty
imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the
administrative matter may be decided in division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-
89 which clarifies that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its

members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in
no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the
Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).

That guideline or rule in the referral to the Court en banc of cases assigned to a division thereof rests on
the same rationale and applies with equal force to confute the antithetical theory of respondent Judge
Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it would indeed be desirable for said respondent to hereafter
deal with situations like the one subject of this resolution with more perspicacity and circumspection.

WHEREFORE, the basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the case at bar
are hereby DENIED. This resolution is immediately final and executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Legal and Judicial Ethics

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119 June 30, 2008

[Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI No. 07-2709-RTJ]

ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By letter-complaint dated May 19, 20061 which was received by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
(respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of "demean[ing],
humiliat[ing] and berat[ing]" him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003-C,
"Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al" in which he was counsel for the plaintiff.

To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in the course of the proceedings
conducted on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by stenographer Elenita C. de Guzman, viz:

COURT:

. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?

ATTY. MANE:

No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.

COURT:

No, you're not from UP.

ATTY. MANE:

I am very proud of it.

COURT:

Then you're not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know
this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are
created equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance.2
(Emphasis supplied)

Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings were "duly recorded in a tape recorder" by
stenographer de Guzman, and despite his motion (filed on April 24, 2006) for respondent to direct her
to furnish him with a copy of the tape recording, the motion remained unacted as of the date he filed
the present administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He, however, attached a copy of the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on February 27, 2006.

In his Comments3 dated June 14, 2006 on the complaint filed in compliance with the Ist Indorsement
dated May 31, 20064 of the OCA, respondent alleged that complainant filed on December 15, 2005 an
"Urgent Motion to Inhibit,"5 paragraph 36 of which was malicious and "a direct assault to the integrity
and dignity of the Court and of the Presiding Judge" as it "succinctly implied that [he] issued the order
dated 27 September 2005 for [a] consideration other than the merits of the case." He thus could not
"simply sit idly and allow a direct assault on his honor and integrity."

On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to furnish complainant with a copy of the "unedited"
tape recording of the proceedings, respondent quoted paragraphs 4 and 37 of the motion which, to him,
implied that the trial court was "illegally, unethically and unlawfully engaged in 'editing' the transcript of
records to favor a party litigant against the interest of [complainant's] client."

Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the two motions that he ordered complainant, by
separate orders dated June 5, 2006, to explain within 15 days8 why he should not be cited for contempt.

Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4, 2006,9 stating that it was a mere
result of his impulsiveness.

In its Report dated November 7, 2007,10 the OCA came up with the following evaluation:

. . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an administrative complaint does not
divest the Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials and personnel. Thus, the complainant's
withdrawal of the instant complaint will not bar the continuity of the instant administrative proceeding
against respondent judge.
The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not the statements and actions made by the
respondent judge during the subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a
judge and a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the respondent's comment and the documents at hand, we
find that there is no issue as to what actually transpired during the February 27th hearing as evidenced
by the stenographic notes. The happening of the incident complained of by herein complainant was
never denied by the respondent judge. If at all, respondent judge merely raised his justifications for his
complained actuations.

xxxx

. . . [A] judge's official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from
the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A judge must at all times be temperate in
his language. Respondent judge's insulting statements which tend to question complainant's capability
and credibility stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law school is
clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate language, the lawyer can
return the attack on his person and character, through an administrative case against the judge, as in
the instant case.

Although respondent judge's use in intemperate language may be attributable to human frailty, the
noble position in the bench demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are
demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language.

xxxx

Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and civility. In
addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a controversial tone or a tone that
creates animosity. Judges should always be aware that disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to
them. There must be mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge
should be respected but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an
essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If a judge
desires not to be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will
reap a storm.

It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make insulting and
demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary "lecturing" and "debating". . .
xxxx

Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by complainant, but,
instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that falls below the standard of
decorum expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that there is a need to admonish complainant
Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his chambers where he can advise him privately rather than
battering him with insulting remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school
he came from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is highly
reprehensible. It betrays the judge's lack of patience and temperance. A highly temperamental judge
could hardly make decisions with equanimity.

Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or debating with
them during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and integrity. While judges should
possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more
important that they should act and behave in such manner that the parties before them should have
confidence in their impartiality.11 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.12

By Resolution of January 21, 2008,13 this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. Respondent
complied on February 26, 2008,14 manifesting in the affirmative.

The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads:

Rule 3.04. - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced,
to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.

An author explains the import of this rule:

Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be courteous to counsel,
especially to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all those others appearing or
concerned in the administration of justice in the court. He should be considerate of witnesses and
others in attendance upon his court. He should be courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to
utter intemperate language during the hearing of a case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a
judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute
between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition. He should not interrupt counsel in their arguments
except to clarify his mind as to their positions. Nor should he be tempted to an unnecessary display of
learning or premature judgment.

A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the courts, to their clients and to the adverse party and his lawyer, so as
to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business before the court. He may utilize his opportunities to
criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do so
in an insulting manner.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted verbatim, taken during the
February 27, 2006 hearing show that respondent made sarcastic and humiliating, even threatening and
boastful remarks to complainant who is admittedly "still young," "unnecessary lecturing and debating,"
as well as unnecessary display of learning:

COURT:

xxx

Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis?

ATTY. MANE:

Ah, with due respect your

COURT:

Tell me, what is your school?

ATTY. MANE:

I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.

COURT:

Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the principle of Stare Decisis and the interpretation of
the Supreme Court of the rules of procedure where it states that if there is already a decision by the
Supreme Court, when that decision shall be complied with by the Trial Court otherwise non-compliance
thereof shall subject the Courts to judicial sanction, and I quote the decision. That's why I quoted the
decision of the Supreme Court Sir, because I know the problem between the bank and the third party
claimants and I state, "The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who
is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy." Sir, that's very clear, that
is what fair market value and that is not assessment value. In fact even you say assessment value, the
Court further state, "the assessed value is the fair market value multiplied. Not mere the basic assesses
value. Sir that is the decision of the Supreme Court, am I just reading the decision or was I inventing it?

ATTY. MANE:

May I be allowed to proceed.

COURT:

Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court decision which I quoted and which you should have
researched too or I was merely imagining the Supreme Court decision sir? Please answer it.

ATTY. MANE:

No your Honor.

COURT:
Please answer it.

xxxx

COURT:

That's why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own pleadings, hale me to the Supreme Court
otherwise I will hale you to the bar. Prove to me that I am grossly ignorant or corrupt.

ATTY. MANE:

Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . .

COURT:

No, sir.

ATTY. MANE:

Yes your Honor . . .

COURT:

No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to the IBP Because hindi naman ako ganon. I am
not that vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take cover from the instruction of your client because
even if the instruction of a client is "secret." Upon consideration, the language of the pleader must still
conform with the decorum and respect to the Court. Sir, that's the rule of practice. In my twenty (20)
years of practice I've never been haled by a judge to any question of integrity. Because even if I believed
that the Court committed error in judgment or decision or grave abuse of discretion, I never imputed
any malicious or unethical behavior to the judge because I know and I believe that anyone can commit
errors. Because no one is like God. Sir, I hope sir you understand that this Court, this Judge is not God
but this Judge is human when challenge on his integrity and honor is lodged. No matter how simple it is
because that is the only thing I have now.

Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of assets and liabilities?

ATTY. MANE:

I think that is not necessary your Honor.

COURT:

No counsel because the imputations are there, that's why I want you to see. Show him my assets and
liabilities for the proud graduate of MLQU. Sir, look at it. Sir, I have stock holdings in the U.S. before I
joined the bench. And it was very clear to everyone, I would do everything not be tempted to accept
bribe but I said I have spent my fifteen (15) years and that's how much I have worked in fifteen (15)
years excluding my wife's assets which is more than what I have may be triple of what I have. May be
even four fold of what I have. And look at my assets. May be even your bank can consider on cash to
cash basis my personal assets. That is the reason I am telling you Atty. Mane. Please, look at it. If you
want I can show you even the Income Tax Return of my wife and you will be surprised that my salary is
not even her one-half month salary. Sir, she is the Chief Executive Officer of a Multi-National Publishing
Company. That's why I have the guts to take this job because doon po sa salary niya umaasa na lamang
po ako sa aking asawa. Atty. Mane, please you are still young. Other judges you would already be haled
to the IBP. Take that as a lesson. Now that you are saying that I was wrong in the three-day notice rule,
again the Supreme Court decision validates me, PNB vs. Court of Appeals, you want me to cite the
quotation again that any pleadings that do not conform with the three-day notice rule is considered as
useless scrap of paper and therefore not subject to any judicial cognizance. You know sir, you would say
but I was the one subject because the judge was belligerent. No sir, you can go on my record and you
will see that even prior to my rulings on your case I have already thrown out so many motion for non-
compliance of a three-day notice rule. If I will give you an exception because of this, then I would be
looked upon with suspicion. So sir again, please look again on the record and you will see how many
motions I threw out for non-compliance with the three-day notice rule. It is not only your case sir,
because sir you are a practitioner and a proud graduate of the MLQU which is also the Alma Mater of
my uncle. And I supposed you were taught in thought that the three-day notice rule is almost sacrosanct
in order to give the other party time to appear and plead. In all books, Moran, Regalado and all other
commentators state that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule makes the pleading and motion
a useless scrap of paper. If that is a useless scrap of paper, sir, what would be my ground to grant
exception to your motion? Tell me.

xxxx
COURT:

Procedural due process. See. So please sir don't confuse the Court. Despite of being away for twenty
years from the college of law, still I can remember my rules, In your motion you said . . . imputing things
to the Court. Sir please read your rules. Familiarize yourself, understand the jurisprudence before you be
the Prince Valiant or a Sir Gallahad in Quest of the Holy Grail. Sir, ako po ay mahirap na tao, karangalan
ko lang po ang aking kayang ibigay sa aking mga anak at iyan po ay hindi ko palalampasin maski kanino
pa. Sir, have you ever heard of anything about me in this Court for one year. Ask around, ask around.
You know, if you act like a duck, walk like a duck, quack like a duck, you are a duck. But have you ever
heard anything against the court. Sir in a judicial system, in a Court, one year is time enough for the
practitioner to know whether a judge is what, dishonest; 2), whether the judge is incompetent; and 3)
whether the judge is just playing loco. And I have sat hear for one year sir and please ask around before
you charge into the windmill. I am a proud product of a public school system from elementary to
college. And my only, and my only, the only way I can repay the taxpayers is a service beyond reproach
without fear or favor to anyone. Not even the executive, not even the one sitting in Malacanang, not
even the Supreme Court if you are right. Sir, sana po naman inyo ring igalang ang Hukuman kasi po kami,
meron nga po, tinatanggap ko, kung inyo pong mamarapatin, meron pong mga corrupt, maaari pong
nakahanap na kayo ng corrupt na Judge pero hindi po lahat kami ay corrupt. Maaari ko rin pong
tanggapin sa inyong abang lingcod na merong mga Hukom na tanga pero hindi po naman lahat kami ay
tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito po ako sa husgado ko. Aalis po ako dito sa hapon, babasahin
ko lahat ang kaso ko para ko po malaman kung any po ang kaso, para po pagharap ko sa inyo at sa
publiko hindi po ako magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please have the decency, not the respect, not to me
but to the Court. Because if you are a lawyer who cannot respect the Court then you have no business
appearing before the Court because you don't believe in the Court system. That's why one of my
classmates never appeared before Court because he doesn't believe in that system. He would rather
stay in their airconditioned room because they say going to Court is useless. Then, to them I salute, I
give compliment because in their own ways they know the futility and they respect the Court, in that
futility rather than be a hypocrite. Atty. Mane hindi mo ako kilala, I've never disrespect the courts and I
can look into your eyes. Kaya po dito ko gusto kasi di po ako dito nagpractice para po walang makalapit
sa akin. Pero kung ako po naman ay inyong babastusin ng ganyang handa po akong lumaban kahit saan,
miski saan po. And you can quote me, you can go there together to the Supreme Court. Because the
only sir, the only treasure I have is my name and my integrity. I could have easily let it go because it is
the first time, but the second time is too much too soon. Sir, masyado pong kwan yon, sinampal na po
ninyo ako nung primero, dinuran pa po ninyo ako ng pangalawa. That's adding insult to the injury po.
Hindi ko po sana gagawin ito pero ayan po ang dami diyang abugado. I challenge anyone to file a case
against me for graft and corruption, for incompetence.

xxxx

COURT:
I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they believe that you are not imputing any wrong doing
to me I will apologize to you.

Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect the old practitioner, whose integrity is
unchallenged.

Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to defend your position, so be it.

Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I know that you are an old practitioner hammered
out by years of practice and whose integrity by reputation precedes you. Please read what your younger
companero has written to this Honorable Court in pleading and see for yourself the implications he
hurled to the Court in his honest opinion. Remember he said honest. That implication is your honest
opinion of an implication sir.

Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your honest opinion. Remember the word you said honest
opinion.

Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant and vigorous in the pursue of pride. But if you
are vigilant and vigor, you should never crossed the line.

Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three paragraphs?

ATTY. HILDAWA:

There will be some . . .

COURT:

What sir?

ATTY. HILDAWA:
. . . indiscretion.

COURT:

Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an old practitioner could say to the Court
because of respect.

Sir, salamat po.

xxxx

COURT:

Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado. Indiscretion na lang. Now you say that is your honest
opinion and the old practitioner hammered through years of practice could only say indiscretion
committed by this judge. Much more I who sits in this bench?

Now is that your honest opinion?16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken.

An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar
Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of
Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia,
an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the
fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in
an argumentum ad hominem.

A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that
his integrity and dignity were being "assaulted," he acted properly when he directed complainant to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the
above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and
personal discourse.

This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those
they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of
the court.17

Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by
any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3)
reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36, Calamba City, is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and is REPRIMANDED
therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice