REMEDIAL LAW GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1. Classification of courts in the Philippines: a. Courts of general jurisdiction: Those competent to decide their own jurisdiction and to take cognizance of all kinds of cases, unless otherwise provided by the law or Rules. Example: Regional Trial Courts. Courts of special or limited jurisdiction: Those which have no power to decide their own jurisdiction and can only try cases permitted by statute. Example: Municipal Trial Courts. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts had the rank of Courts of First Instance but were courts of special jurisdiction. Under B.P. Blg. 129, they have been integrated into the Regional Trial Courts as branches thereof. b. Courts of original jurisdiction: Those courts in which, under the law, actions or proceedings may originally be commenced. Courts of appellate jurisdiction: Courts which have the power to review on appeal the decisions or orders of a lower court. c. Superior courts: Courts which have the power of review or supervision over another and lower court. Inferior courts: Those which, in relation to another court, are lower in rank and subject to review and super- vision by the latter. While, in a generic sense, a court is considered an inferior court in relation to the powers of another tribunal higher in rank, in its technical sense and unless otherwise intended, it was formerly provided that the phraseREMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM “inferior court” referred to the then municipal or city courts (former Sec. 1, Rule 5, in relation to R.A. 3820 and R.A. 3828), now called Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Note, also, that under Sec. 2, Rule 5, the term “municipal trial court” as used in these revised Rules includes all other courts of the same rank. In legal circles, they are also called “courts of the first level.” In some official issuances, the Supreme Court refers to them as “first level courts.” However, the “inferior courts” whose decisions are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Sec. 17, R.A. 296) refer to all the courts lower than the Supreme Court. The term “lower courts” is now used for that purpose in the 1987 Constitution (Sec. 5/2], Art. VIII), in lieu of “inferior courts” used in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. d. Courts of record: Those whose proceedings are enrolled and which are bound to keep a written record of all trials and proceedings handled by them (see Luzano us. Romero, et al., L-33245, Sept. 30, 1971). Courts not of record: Courts which are not required to keep a written record or franscript of proceedings held therein. Prior to the effectivity of R.A. 6031 on August 4, 1969, inferior courts were not of record; but if a municipal court of the capital of a province or a city court tried a criminal case wherein the imposable penalty is imprisonment of more than 6 months but not exceeding 6 years and/or a fine of more than P200 but not exceeding P6,000, its proceedings were required to be recorded as its decisions were appealable to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court (R.A. 296, as amended by R.A. 2613 and R.A. 3828, Sec. 87{c], last paragraph). However, under R.A. 2613, amending Sec. 45, R.A. 296, all inferior courts are now required to record their proceedings and are accordingly courts of record. 2GENERAL PRINCIPLES e. Constitutional courts: Those which owe their creation and existence to the Constitution and, therefore cannot be legislated out of existence or deprived by law of the jurisdiction and powers unqualifiedly vested in them by the Constitution. The Supreme Court and the Sandiganbayan are the only courts specifically provided for in the Constitution. With regard to the latter, the better view is that the Sandiganbayan is only a constitutionally-mandated court since, although its existence is provided for in the Constitution, its creation was by statutory enactment. Statutory courts: Those created, organized and with jurisdiction exclusively determined by law. Accordingly, all other courts in the Philippines are statutory courts. 2. The Court of Tax Appeals created by R.A. 1125 has been held to be a part of the judicial system vested with special jurisdiction to act only on protests of private persons adversely affected by the tax, customs or assessment laws (Ursal us. CTA, et al., 101 Phil. 209). On March 30, 2004, said law was amended by R.A. 9282 expanding the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction, of the same level as the Court of Appeals, and consisting of a Presiding Justice and 5 Associate Justices who shall sit en banc or in 2 divisions of 3 justices each. The court shall, inter alia, have exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in disputes arising from the tax law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases, the Commissioner of Customs in matters administered by the Bureau of Customs, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in assessments of real property, the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Trade and Industry in matters specified therein. The decision 3REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM of said court en banc may be reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (see Appendix CC). 3. The distinction obtaining in other jurisdictions between courts of law and courts of equity, and among civil, criminal and probate courts, does not apply in the Philippines wherein all courts are courts both of law and equity (Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil. 280; Roa, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-27294, June 28, 1983; Galman, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 72670, Sept. 12, 1986); and Regional! Trial Courts and, to a limited extent, the lower courts, exercise jurisdiction, according to the case involved, as civil, criminal or probate courts or courts of land registration. Before B.P. Blg. 129 became operative, there were special courts, such as the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Circuit Criminal Courts and the Courts of Agrarian Relations, which were courts exercising only limited and special jurisdiction. 4. Under our present statutory and jurisprudential taxonomy, jurisdiction is classified, based on its nature, as follows: a. General jurisdiction, or the power to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from the plenary powers of the court; and special or limited jurisdiction, which restricts the court’s jurisdiction only to particular cases and subject to such limitations as may be provided by the governing law. b. Original jurisdiction, or the power of the court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law; and appellate jurisdiction, or the authority of a court higher in rank to reexamine the final order or judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review. c. Exclusive jurisdiction, or the power to adjudicate a case or proceeding to the exclusion of all other courts 4GENERAL PRINCIPLES at that stage; and concurrent jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as confluent or coordinate jurisdiction, which is the power conferred upon different courts, whether of the same or different ranks, to take cognizance at the same stage of the same case in the same or different judicial territories. Concurrent original jurisdiction between trial courts of different ranks has in the main been eliminated by B.P. Blg. 129. For instance, there is no more concurrent jurisdiction in adoption or guardianship proceedings between inferior courts and the present Regional Trial Courts as was provided by the Judiciary Act with respect to the former Courts of First Instance, which Act also provided for concurrence in criminal cases and special civil actions. However, as among courts of the same rank, it appears that a phase of concurrent original jurisdiction still obtains in some instances as, for example, in civil and criminal cases for libel or the settlement of the estate of a nonresident with properties in different judicial regions. Withal, in point of strict law, these situations are matters of venue except in criminal cases for libel, since in criminal procedure, venue is, as a rule, jurisdictional. For a discussion of other criminal cases covered by the same rule, see the Preliminary Considerations in Criminal Procedure in Volume Two of this work. Where such concurrence exists, the court first taking cognizance of the case does so to the exclusion of the other courts, although the Supreme Court may order a transfer of venue or place of trial to another court of competent jurisdiction. At any rate, B.P. Blg. 129 provides for concurrent original jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and either the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Courts, or among all three courts in certain cases. To illustrate, the Supreme Court has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against 5REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM the Regional Trial Courts; with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts over the same petitions against the inferior courts; and with the Regional Trial Courts in actions affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. 5. Also, under B.P. Blg. 129, delegated jurisdiction is provided for, i.e., the grant of authority to inferior courts to hear and determine cadastral and land registration cases under certain conditions (see Sec. 34, infra); and special jurisdiction, which is the power of inferior courts to hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or applications for bail in the absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in the province or city (see Sec. 35, infra). This latter type of jurisdiction was formerly included, with variations, in what was known as the interlocutory jurisdiction of inferior courts under the Judiciary Act. 6. Mention must also be made of the territorial jurisdiction of a court, which refers to the geographical area within which its powers can be exercised. As already stated, this assumes importance in criminal cases wherein considerations of the territory vis-d-vis the locus of the crime determine not only the venue of the case but the jurisdiction of the court; and, in civil cases, the venue of real or mixed actions. In all cases, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have national jurisdiction; the Regional Trial Courts have regional jurisdiction; and the inferior courts have such territorial jurisdiction as may be defined by the Supreme Court pursuant to Secs. 25, 28 and 31, B.P. Blg. 129. Other classifications of original jurisdiction are based on the subject-matter or the nature of the action being tried by the court, such as civil, criminal, probate, admiralty and maritime, juvenile and domestic relations, agrarian, and land registration. Most of these different areas of jurisdiction are exercised by the regular trial 6GENERAL PRINCIPLES courts, since the special courts like the circuit criminal courts and the juvenile and domestic relations courts have been abolished. With respect to the latter, domestic cases are now generally handled by the newly created Family Courts, hereinafter discussed. Other subjects of controversies requiring special training and knowledge, such as taxation, labor and securities, are handled by quasi-judicial agencies, subject to the power of judicial review by the appellate courts. 7. Jurisdiction and venue are distinguished as follows: a. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried. b. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law. c. Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject-matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent. d. Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523). In criminal cases, the venue of the crime goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court (Lopez us. Paras, L-25795, Oct. 29, 1966), hence where the criminal action is instituted not in the place specified by the Rules and declared by the substantive law as within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, the motion to quash should be grounded on lack of jurisdiction, and not improper venue. 8, The authority to decide a case and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction, the decision of all questions arising in the case is but an exercise of jurisdiction (De la Cruz 7REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM us. Moir, 36 Phil. 213; Associated Labor Union vs. Ramolete, L-23527, Mar. 31, 1965). Consequently, a court may have jurisdiction over the case but at the same time act in excess of such jurisdiction. 9. The errors which a court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction differ from errors of judgment. The former is reviewable in an original action for certiorari, while the latter is correctible by appeal (Henderson, et al. vs. Tan, etc., et al., 87 Phil. 466; Maritime Co. of the Phil. vs. Paredes, L-24811, Mar. 3, 1967; Bulan vs. Masakayan, L-24428, June 26, 1968; Palma us. Q & S, Inc., L-20366, May 19, 1986). Errors of jurisdiction render a judgment void or, at least voidable (see Sec. Ifa] and [b], Rule 16; Rule 65), while errors of judgment are grounds for reversal only if it is shown that prejudice has been caused thereby (Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 821; Bimeda us. Perez, et al., 93 Phil. 636). 10. Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction: a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner. b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons (Sharuff vs. Bubla, L-17029, Sept. 30, 1964; Aban vs. Enage, L-30666, Feb. 25, 1983). c. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter: This is con- ferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.GENERAL PRINCIPLES d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times, by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10 (see Lazo, et al. vs. Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., L-27365, Jan. 30, 1970). e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation): This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or subject-matter within its territorial juris- diction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a nonresident defendant. In two instances, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Phil- ippines in which the defendant claims an interest (see Sec. 15, Rule 14). In such cases, the service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due process requirements (Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; De Midgely us. Ferandos, et al., L-34314, May 13, 1975). Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or proceeded against before our courts or administrative tribunals. 11. As a general proposition, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action (People vs. Paderna, 9REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM L-28518, Jan. 29, 1968; People vs. Mariano, et al., L-40527, June 30, 1976; Lee, et al. vs. Presiding Judge, etc., et al., G.R. No. 68789, Nov. 10, 1986), unless such statute provides for its retroactive application, as where it is a curative legislation (Atlas Fertilizer Corp. us. Navarro, etc., et al., G.R. No. 72074, April 30, 1987). 12. The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter is determined by the alle- gations of the complaint (Edward J. Nell & Co. us. Cubacub, L-20843, June 23, 1965; Time, Inc. us. Reyes, et al., L-28882, May 31, 1971; Ganadin us. Ramos, et al., L-23547, Sept. 11, 1980), but this rule is not without exceptions. Thus, it was held that while the allegations in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by way of defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the case should properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian Relations (Ignacio vs. CFI of Bulacan, L-27897, Oct. 29, 1971). However, with the integration of the courts of agrarian relations as branches of the Regional Trial Courts under B.P. Blg. 129, the case was required to be filed with the corresponding Regional Trial Court if it was within the jurisdiction thereof, for assignment to the appropriate branch. Also, although the allegations in the complaint make out a case cognizable by a Regional Trial Court, where, however, the acts complained of are shown at the trial to be interwoven with an unfair labor practice case, the action should be dismissed since jurisdiction is vested in the National Labor Relations Commission. This is so since the Rules now permit a motion to dismiss based upon facts not alleged in the complaint (Mindanao Rapid Co., Inc. vs. Omandam, et al., L-23058, Nov. 27, 1971, jointly deciding therein L-23473, 23871, 24232, 24718 and 24956). 13. Where the complaint is for actual damages of P978, but the other claims for damages and attorney's 10GENERAL PRINCIPLES fees bring the total relief sought to more than P10,000 (which was then the jurisdictional limit for civil cases in the inferior courts), the totality of said claims puts the case within the jurisdiction of the then Court of First Instance and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint upon its mere impression that the other claims were “bloated” for the purpose of invoking its jurisdiction, without hearing and proof of such fact (Enerio us. Alampay, L-40010, May 26, 1975; Ratila vs. Tapucar, L-45018, Jan. 24, 1977). This doctrine is still applicable subject to the increased jurisdictional amount under B.P. Blg. 129 and subsequent legislation. 14. The jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events although of a charac- ter which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance (Ramos, et al. vs. Central Bank, L-29352, Oct. 4, 1971, and cases therein cited; Dioquino vs. Cruz, et al., L-38579, Sept. 9, 1982) and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case (Republic us. Pielago, et al., G.R. No. 72218, July 21, 1986). 15. The constitutionality of a statute must be ques- tioned at the earliest opportunity, except in criminal cases where the question may be raised at any stage and, in civil cases, if the determination of the question is necessary for the decision of the case, even if raised for the first time on appeal. A constitutional question will also be considered by the appellate court at any time if it involves the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The same rule applies to ordinances (San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Magno, L-21879, Sept. 9, 1967). 16. Basic in the law on procedure is the doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and that the Rules of Court yield to substantive law, in llREMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM this case, the Judiciary Act and B.P. Big. 129, both as amended, and of which jurisdiction is only a part. Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, en- larged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties; neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court (De Jesus, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., L-26816, Feb. 28, 1967; Calimlim, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al., L-34363, Nov. 19, 1982). Jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law (People us. Casiano, L-15309, Feb. 16, 1961), Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal even if such issue was not raised in the lower court (Government us. American Surety Co., 11 Phil. 203; Vda. de Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957; People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640). A court can motu proprio dismiss a case which is outside its jurisdiction (Sec. 1, Rule 9). 17. Nevertheless, in some cases, the principle of estoppel by laches has been availed of by our appellate courts to bar attacks on jurisdiction and this principle has been applied to both civil and criminal cases, thus: a. Inthe early case of Santiago, et al. vs. Valenzuela (78 Phil. 397), it was held that if a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that said appeal was perfected out of time, is filed for the first time with the appellate court after the appellant had paid the docket fee and the cost of printing the record on appeal, and after the filing of appellant’s brief, the appellate court should deny the motion as the appellee may be considered in estoppel by his failure to object on time. This doctrine was subsequently abandoned in Miranda vs. Guanzon (92 Phil. 168) since the “require- ment regarding the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but juris- dictional,” a ruling subsequently reiterated in Garganta vs. CA (105 Phil. 412), Valdez vs. Ocumen (106 Phil. 12GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 929), Galima us. CA (L-21046, Jan. 31, 1966), Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco (L-20051, May 30, 1966), Roque us. Vda. de Del Rosario (L-24873, Sept. 23, 1966) and Arellano, et al. us. CA, et al. (L-31856, Nov. 24, 1972). b. In the later case, however, of Tijam us. Sibong- hanoy, et al. (L-21450, April 15, 1968), the co-defendant surety company never raised the issue of jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance despite several opportunities to do so and, although the claim being for only P1,908, the case was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal court. It was only after the court of Appeals had affirmed the decision of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff but before the finality of this decision of the Court of Appeals that the co-defendant surety company filed its motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of original jurisdiction of the trial court. Denying said motion, the Supreme Court stated: “Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, we would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.” It further stated that “after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court .. . it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty,” citing Pindangaz, etc. vs. Dans, et al. (L-14591, Sept. 26, 1962), Young Men’s Labor Union, etc. vs. CIR, et al. (L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965) and Mejia us. Lucas (100 Phil. 277). See also Capilitan us. De la Cruz, (L-29536-37, Feb. 28, 1974), Summit Guaranty vs. CA, et al. (G.R. No. 51139, Dec. 14, 1981), Tajonera, et al. vs. Lumaroza, et al. (L-48907 & L-49035, Dec. 19, 1981), Nieva vs. Manila Banking Corp. (L-30811, 13REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM Sept. 2, 1983), Florendo, et al. vs. Coloma, et al. (G.R. No. 60544, May 19, 1984), and Medijia us. Patcho (L-30310, Oct. 23, 1984). c. In Rodriguez us. CA (L-29264, Aug. 29, 1969), the action involved property worth more than P200,000, at that time within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Despite several opportunities to raise that issue in the Court of Appeals where the appeal was taken, defendant did not challenge the appellate jurisdiction of the court and did so only after decision was rendered therein against him. He raised the issue of jurisdiction, for the nullification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, when the case was on appeal in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied his plea under the doctrine of estoppel by laches. d. The same ruling was applied in Crisostomo vs. CA, et al. (L-27166, Mar. 25, 1970) and Libudan us. Gil (L-21163, May 17, 1972) under the justification that “the principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of the laws,” citing the Tijam case. The Supreme Court pointed out that the doctrine of laches is “based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims” and “is principally a question of the inequity or unfair- ness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.” e. In Sarmiento us. Salud (L-25211, Aug. 18, 1972), the Supreme Court, in resolving the motion for recon- sideration filed therein, held that while it is true that a record on appeal must show on its face that it was perfected on time and such requirement is jurisdictional in nature, nevertheless if the record on appeal does not comply with this requirement but the motion to dismiss the appeal is filed more than 6 months after the appellee filed his brief, the motion should be denied. The same ruling was applied in Dequito vs. Lopez (L-27757, Mar. 28, 1968) involving virtually the same set 14GENERAL PRINCIPLES of facts. These rulings would still apply in cases wherein a record on appeal is required, as where multiple appeals are allowed or in special proceedings. f. In Vera us. People (L-31218, Feb. 18, 1970), it was held that while a judgment is null and void where it was promulgated when the presiding judge had already ceased to hold office, since the accused failed to raise that issue in the trial court and only did so after the Court of Appeals had rendered a judgment adverse to him, it would be an injustice if all the proceedings had in the case would be set aside since, after all, the court that rendered sentence was one of competent jurisdiction. The case of Carillo us. Allied Workers’ Association of the Philippines (L-23689, July 31, 1968) was cited in support of this ruling. g-. In People us. Casuga (L-37642, Oct. 22, 1973), the accused was convicted of grave slander, which offense was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the then Courts of First Instance and the municipal courts of capitals of provinces or the City Courts. Instead of appealing to the then Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as would have been proper, he appealed to the Court of First Instance which affirmed said conviction. On his subsequent challenge to the appellate jurisdiction exercised by the Court of First Instance, the Supreme Court held that the accused, having taken his appeal to the Court of First Instance, is in estoppel to challenge the appellate jurisdiction of the said court. h. In People vs. Tamani (L-22160-61, Jan. 21, 1974), although the appeal of the accused was demon- strably filed out of time, the Supreme Court nevertheless reviewed the case and rendered a judgment on the merits thereof, while declaring in the same decision the dismissal of the appeal, in view of the fact that the filing of the appeal out of time was due to the fault of the defense counsel and the further consideration that the briefs for the parties had already been filed. 16REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM i. The doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibong- hanoy, supra, has been reiterated in many succeeding cases and is still good case law. The rule up to now is that a party’s active participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, which includes invoking the court's authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging the jurisdiction of the said court (Gonzaga, et al. us. CA, et al., G.R. No. 144025, Dec. 27, 2002). j. See, moreover, the summary in Figueroa us. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008) which apparently presents the prevailing position of the Supreme Court on the issue of when a litigant is estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a court, in light of its other and subsequent holdings on the matter. 18. Jurisdiction over a person may also be acquired even if he was never impleaded nor summoned in the action as a defendant if he thereafter voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, where the spouses voluntarily signed the compromise agreement to guarantee the payment by the original impleaded defendants, and that compromise agreement was approved and made the basis of the judgment rendered by the court, said spouses are bound by the judgment as they are in estoppel to deny the very autho- rity which they invoked. By voluntarily entering into the compromise agreement, they effectively submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court (Rodriguez, et al. us. Alikpala, et al., L-38314, June 25, 1974). 19. Since a Court of First Instance (now, the Regional Trial Court) is a court of general original jurisdiction, whether a particular matter should be resolved by it in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, or in its limited jurisdiction as a probate or land registration court, is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural question involving a mode of practice 16GENERAL PRINCIPLES which, therefore, may be waived (Manalo us. Mariano, et al., L-33850, Jan. 22, 1976; Santos vs. Banayo, L-31854, Sept. 9, 1982). Parenthetically, Sec. 2 of P.D. 1529 has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting as a cadastral court (Ligon us. CA, et al., G.R. No. 107751, June 1, 1995). However, the holding that such situations present only procedural, and not jurisdictional, questions still applies. 20. Questions involving ownership of or title to real property should be litigated in an ordinary civil action or in the proceeding where the incident properly belongs, before a court of general jurisdiction and not before a land registration court (Santos vs. Aquino, L-32949, Nov. 28, 1980). 21. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, but not to actions which have already become final and executory (Borre, et al. us. CA, et al., G.R. No. 57204, Mar. 14, 1988). Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764; Liam Law vs. Olympic Sawmill Co., et al., L-30771, May 26, 1984; Yakult Philippines, et al. us. CA, et al., G.R. No. 91856, Oct. 5, 1990). Thus, the provision of B.P. Blg. 129 which eliminated the need for a record on appeal was given retroactive effect to authorize the giving of due course to an appeal, which should have been perfected in 1982 with the required record on appeal, by relieving the appellant of the need therefor in line with the change of procedure under B.P. Blg. 129 (Alday us. Camilon, G.R. No. 60316, Jan. 31, 1983; Ouano vs. CA, et al., L-44823, June 27, 1985; De Guzman, et al. us. CA, et al., G.R. No. 52738, July 23, 1985; Lagunzad vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 52007, Sept. 24, 1987; Mun. Gov't of 17REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM Coron vs. Carino, et al., G.R. No. 65896, Sept. 24, 1987; Sarmiento vs. Gatmaitan, et al., L-38173, Nov. 12, 1987). However, new court rules apply to pending cases only with reference to proceedings therein which take place after the date of their effectivity. They do not apply to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply. Thus, where the application of the Rule on Summary Procedure will mean the dismissal of the appeal of the party, the same should not apply since, after all, the procedure they availed of was also allowed under the Rules of Court (Laguio, et al. vs. Gamet, et al., G.R. No. 74903, Mar. 21, 1980). 22. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs (Primicias vs. Ocampo, 81 Phil. 650). Procedural law refers to the adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice (Lopez vs. Gloria, 40 Phil. 33). Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights, as opposed to “adjective or remédial law” which prescribes the method of enforcing the rights or obtaining redress for their invasion (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1429; citations omitted). Procedure is the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives or defines the right, and which, by means of the proceeding, the court is to administer. This term is com- monly opposed to the sum of legal principles constituting the substance of the law, and denotes the body of rules, whether of practice or pleading, whereby rights are effectuated through the successful application of the Proper remedies (op. cit., pp. 1367-1368; id.).GENERAL PRINCIPLES In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court abridges, enlarges or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by the substantive low and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right, such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right, then the rule deals merely with procedure (Fabian vs. Desierto, etc., et al., G.R. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998). It is, therefore, the nature and the purpose of the law which determines whether it is substantive or procedural, and not its place in the statute or its inclusion in a code. Thus, for instance, Arts. 539 and 1674 of the Civil Code and Sec. 85, R.A. 296 provided injunctive rules in ejectment cases in the trial and appellate stages, but these have been properly incorporated with modifications as Secs. 8 and 9, respectively, of Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court (now, Sec. 15 of revised Rule 70). These subsequent amendatory provisions on injunctions were proper since the mere fact that those provisions on in- junctions were formerly included in a substantive statute or code does not convert them into or detract from the fact that they are procedural laws, contrary to common misimpression. In fact, there are many such procedural rules found in the Civil Code or, for that matter, in other codes or basically substantive laws but they do not thereby lose their character as procedural laws. This matter is being clarified and emphasized here in view of the Constitutional provision that the rules which the Supreme Court is authorized to promulgate shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights (Sec. 5 [5], Art. VIH, 1987 Constitution). The improbable position that a clearly procedural provision becomes a 19REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM substantive law by the mere fact that it is included in a compilation, codification or statutory enactment of substantive rights, although only to indicate the remedial complement for the enforcement thereof, would effectively subvert the Constitutional intent and diminish the scope and extent of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.