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Republic of the Philippines Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part that:
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933
ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.
Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, requiring the register
of deeds of the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331,
covering lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and issue in lieu thereof new
certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without requiring him to present any
document showing that the succession tax due under Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code has been paid.
The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered by said
certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva
Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto, California, on November 28, 1929; that
at the time of her death she and her husband were citizens of the State of California and
domiciled therein.
It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the state
of his said deceased wife in case No. 36795 in the same court, entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in said intestate proceedings, the said
Allison D. Gibbs, on September 22,1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged "that the
parcels of land hereunder described belong to the conjugal partnership of your petitioner and his
wife, Eva Johnson Gibbs", describing in detail the three facts here involved; and further alleging
that his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died on November 28,1929; that in
accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of
California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the
surviving husband without administration; that the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and
Eva Johnson Gibbs, deceased, has no obligations or debts and no one will be prejudiced by
adjucating said parcels of land (and seventeen others not here involved) to be the absolute
property of the said Allison D. Gibbs as sole owner. The court granted said petition and on
September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and
absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Gibbs
presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and demanded that the latter issue to
him a "transfer certificate of title".
Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document
transferring real property or real rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of
gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this
article and actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately notify the
Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding provincial treasurer of the non
payment of the tax discovered by them. . . .
Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to
accept as binding said decree of court of September 22,1930, and refused to register the
transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the
corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930,
Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds
"to issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any
inheritance tax. After due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of September 22,
1930, and entered the order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.
On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial upon
additional evidence in regard to the pertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of
Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with reference to the dates of the
acquisition of the property involved in this suit and with reference to the California law in force at
the time of such acquisition. The case is now before us with the supplementary evidence.
For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following facts as established by the
evidence or the admissions of the parties: Allison D. Gibbs has been continuously, since the
year 1902, a citizen of the State of California and domiciled therein; that he and Eva Johnson
Gibbs were married at Columbus, Ohio, in July 1906; that there was no antenuptial marriage
contract between the parties; that during the existence of said marriage the spouses acquired
the following lands, among others, in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property:lawphil.net
1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by transfer certificate of title No. 20880,
dated March 16, 1920, and registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva Johnson
Gibbs".
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28336,
dated May 14, 1927, in which it is certified "that spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson
Gibbs are the owners in fee simple" of the land therein described.
3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28331,
dated April 6, 1927, which it states "that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the
owner of the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson Gibbs died intestate on November
28, 1929, living surviving her her husband, the appellee, and two sons, Allison J. Gibbs , now
age 25 and Finley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole heirs of law.
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on inheritances, legacies and
other acquisitionsmortis causa" provides in section 1536 that "Every transmission by virtue of
inheritance ... of real property ... shall be subject to the following tax." It results that the question
for determination in this case is as follows: Was Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the
owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine lands above-mentioned?
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The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent of the
title, if any, that vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three certificates of title Nos. 20880,
28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature
and extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the
laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of
the Civil Code.
Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal
capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign
country." It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real
estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, therefore, be settled by
the law governing her personal status, that is, the law of California. But our attention
has not been called to any law of California that incapacitates a married woman from
acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitae.
There is not the slightest doubt that a California married woman can acquire title to
land in a common law jurisdiction like the State of Illinois or the District of Columbia,
subject to the common-law estate by the courtesy which would vest in her husband.
Nor is there any doubt that if a California husband acquired land in such a jurisdiction
his wife would be vested with the common law right of dower, the prerequisite
conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of purely personal relations and
status and capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both personal and
real, being governed by article 10 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very
terms, is applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to citizens of the
Philippine Islands).
with the norms of the State of his domicile in the United States. (Cf. Babcock Templeton vs.
Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130, 137; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)
The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire
community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the
absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by
virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the
wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the
beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or
expentancy which is extinguished upon her death. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke (167
Cal., 415, 419), the court said: "The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California)
are uniform to the effect that the husband does not take the community property upon the death
of the wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though
required by himself. ... It never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife."
The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by
succession from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked?
Can the appellee be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law of the Philippine
Islands and no legal succession under the law of California? It seems clear that the second
paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in
the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is
consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in
other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was
vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law ed., 1028, 1031), the court said:

The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, known
It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated
as the "Jones Law") as regards the determination of private rights, grants practical
we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for
autonomy to the Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government, therefore,
the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. (United States vs. Crosby,
may apply the principles and rules of private international law (conflicts of laws) on the
7 Cranch, 115; 3 L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6 Wheat., 577; 5 L. ed., 334;
same footing as an organized territory or state of the United States. We should,
McGoon vs. Scales, 9 Wall., 23; 19 L. ed., 545; Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S.,
therefore, resort to the law of California, the nationality and domicile of Mrs. Gibbs, to
627; 24 L. ed., 858.)" (See also Estate of Lloyd, 175 Cal., 704, 705.) This fundamental
ascertain the norm which would be applied here as law were there any question as to
principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows:
her status.
"Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real
property to the laws of the country in which it is situated.
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower court's decision rests upon the
second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows:
It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of

In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitae, the respective
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract,
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
are determined by the law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in
the domicile of the parties or to the place where the marriage was celebrated. (See
which it may be situated.
also Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin [N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.];
Heidenheimer vs. Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)
In construing the above language we are met at the outset with some difficulty by the expression
"the national law of the person whose succession is in question", by reason of the rather
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the
anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. (Cf. Manresa, vol. 1, Codigo Civil, pp. 103,
time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be determined in
104.) We encountered no difficulty in applying article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey.
accordance with the lex rei sitae.
(Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 867.) Having regard to the practical autonomy of the Philippine
Islands, as above stated, we have concluded that if article 10 is applicable and the estate in
question is that of a deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in accordance

It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community property of
the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands,
she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband. Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides:
All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of
proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article 1395 provides:
"The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law applicable to the contract of
partnership in all matters in which such rules do not conflict with the express provisions of this
chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may dispose by will of his half only of the
property of the conjugal partnership." Article 1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal
partnership and after inventory and liquidation, "the net remainder of the partnership property
shall be divided share and share alike between the husband and wife, or their respective heirs."
Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the
acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title
therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which
the law vests in the husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no obligations of the
decedent, as is true in the present case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her
heirs by succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code; cf. alsoCoronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456,
469.)
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a
descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates
of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to the date of her death.
That appellee himself believed that his wife was vested of such a title and interest in manifest
from the second of said certificates, No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, introduced by him in
evidence, in which it is certified that "the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are
the owners in fee simple of the conjugal lands therein described."
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her
heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the language of section
1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances.
(Cf. Re Estate of Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N. E., 402; 29 L. R. A. [N. S.], 780.) It is unnecessary
in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of the successional
rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code
of California which was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
The record does not show what the proper amount of the inheritance tax in this case would be
nor that the appellee (petitioner below) in any way challenged the power of the Government to
levy an inheritance tax or the validity of the statute under which the register of deeds refused to
issue a certificate of transfer reciting that the appellee is the exclusive owner of the Philippine
lands included in the three certificates of title here involved.
The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed with directions to dismiss the
petition, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 75242. September 2, 1992.]
MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RUBEN MANAHAN, Respondents.
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Ceferino Padua Law Office for Petitioner.
Rafael Y. Viola for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; ACT NO. 3110; NOT APPLICABLE TO RECORDS
DESTROYED BY FIRE IN CASES PENDING BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION; TECHNICAL RULES NOT BINDING IN LABOR CASES. Act No. 3110 which
took effect on March 19, 1923, and which deals with the procedure of reconstituting records of
pending judicial proceedings destroyed by fire, strictly speaking, has no application to records
destroyed by fire in cases pending with the NLRC, a quasi-judicial body. Act No. 3110 as its Title
indicates refers to "the reconstruction of the records of pending judicial proceedings. . . ."
Moreover, Article 221 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that findings of facts in labor
cases should be speedily ascertained without regard to technicalities of law or procedure all in
the interest of due process.
2. ID.; EMPLOYMENT AGENCY; SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE FOREIGN BASED
EMPLOYER FOR ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND
RECRUITMENT AGREEMENT. We find no need to rule on the constitutionality of Section
10(a)(2), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code. A similar question
though not under the guise of the unconstitutionality of said rule cropped up in Royal
Crown International v. NLRC, (178 SCRA 569) There, We ruled that:" [P]etitioner conveniently
overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed solidary liability under the various contractual
undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Service . . . It was also required to file
with the Bureau a formal appointment of agency contract executed by the foreign based
employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained a provision
empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the
violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment [Section 10(a) (2), Rule
V, Book I of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. Petitioner was required as well to
post such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee
compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and
conditions of employment as appropriate [Section 1 of Pres. Dec. 1412 (1978) amending Article
31 of the Labor Code]. These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding
petitioner, and other private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with
its principal, the foreign based employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which may arise
in connection with the implementation of the service agreements or employment contracts . . .
3. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT BY THE NLRC ARE GENERALLY BINDING ON APPEAL.
Regarding petitioners other minor arguments, the first of which is whether or not the foreign
employer, OBALCO, could dismiss private respondent for misrepresenting his qualifications,
plus the fact that such dismissal was allegedly in line with the three-month probationary period
embodied in the supplemental agreement private respondent signed with his foreign employer
upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, this matter has already been disposed of in the WAAO, POEA
decision and affirmed by the NLRC, whose findings of fact are binding on Us, absent the
exceptions which do not obtain in this case.
4. CIVIL LAW; PARTY AUTONOMY IN CONTRACTS, NOT AN ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLE;
PARTIES NOT AT LIBERTY TO CONTRACT AWAY PROVISIONS OF LAW HEAVILY
IMPRESSED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST. As to petitioners argument over the primacy of the
labor laws of Saudi Arabia over Philippine labor laws, suffice it to say that in the Pakistan
International Airlines (Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople, 190 SCRA 99, 103)
case We had already ruled that Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by

the parties agreeing on some other laws to govern their relationship. "As We stated in said case:
A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a contract is
the law between the parties. [Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11 (1987)] The
principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article
1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is
the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to
matters affected with public policy are deemed written into the contract. [Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. United Lines Co., 5 SCRA 175 (1962)]. Put a little differently, the governing
principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory
provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor
and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and
their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each
other. It is thus necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in
terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations."cralaw virtua1aw
library
5. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS;
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. As to petitioners complaint of denial
of due process, settled is the rule that submission of position papers and memoranda in labor
cases fulfills the requirements of due process. In the case at bar, aside from filing a position
paper with the WAAO, POEA, petitioner filed a Memorandum of Appeal in the NLRC, aside from
numerous other pleadings. Since the right to be heard was accorded petitioner, it cannot now
claim that it was denied due process in the resolution of its case.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
Petitioner Manila Resource Development Corporation questions the Jurisdiction of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission in issuing its Decision 1 promulgated on July
3, 1986 affirming with modification the Decision 2 promulgated on April 22, 1983 by public
respondent Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office, Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.
As found by the public respondent NLRC, the antecedents or this case are as follows:cralawnad
"It appears that sometime in June 1981, the complainant applied for overseas employment with
respondent Manila Resource Development Corporation (MANRED) and after he was
interviewed, he was directed to submit his bio-data, which he did. Upon receipt by MANRED of
an advice from its principal, Obaid & Al Mulla Construction Company (OBALCO) to the effect
that the latter needed, among others, a Mechanical Engineer with at least ten years experience
in sheeting ventilation, heavy duty air-conditioning and piping and duct works installation, the
complainant was summoned for another interview at which time the telex message from
OBALCO was allegedly shown to him and he allegedly gave full assurance that he was qualified
for the position. He was allegedly required again to submit a bio-data stating therein his
qualifications and experience that would meet the skill and experience required by the job order
of OBALCO. He also allegedly submitted another bio-data wherein he unqualifiedly declared that
he had all the qualifications and experience called for but, according to the respondents, his
record folder was misplaced and could not be found. On the basis of his representation
concerning his work experience and qualifications, an employment contract dated 5 August 1981
was signed by him and Wilfredo V. Fernandez, General Manager of MANRED. The contract
4
provided that the complainant was hired as a Mechanical Engineer for a basic monthly pay of
US$1,000.00 with a duration of two years from the date of his departure for Saudi Arabia.
"On 27 January 1982, the complainant left Manila and arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 28
January 1982. He reported for duty at OBALCO on 30 January 1982 and was given a final
examination concerning his qualifications and experience before starting to work. The
respondents claim that by his own verbal and written admission, he failed to meet the
qualifications and experiences needed for the work. In a memorandum dated 30 January 1982, it
was stated that the summary of work experience indicated in his hand written bio-data were not
useful or suitable for the mechanical engineering work at the Royal Terminal. On the same day,
he was advised that OBALCO was not willing to employ him for US$1,000.00 per month but he
would be retained if he was willing to accept US$360.00 per month as basic pay. He pleaded
that his salary be as provided in his employment contract or reduced by 20% only but this was
turned down. Consequently, he was repatriated to Manila on 14 February 1982." 3
Consequently, private respondent filed a complaint with the Bureau of Employment Services
against petitioner and its General Manager, Wilfredo Fernandez, Sr., and consequently
amended the same to include OBAID AL MULLA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. 4
The Bureau of Employment Services, now renamed Workers Assistance and Adjudication
Office and placed under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, rendered a
Decision on April 22, 1983 which in its dispositive portion reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, decision is hereby made and entered in favor of complainant
ordering respondents Manila Resource Development Corporation and/or Wilfredo Fernandez
and its foreign principal, Obaid and Al Mulla Construction Company Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, jointly
and solidarily liable to pay complainant, thru this Office within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
the sum of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$24,000.00) or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency at the current, exchange rate, representing complainants unexpired portion
of his contract for twenty four (24) months at US$1,000.00 per month.chanrobles law library
"Respondents are also hereby ordered to pay complainant the sum of FOUR THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED TWENTY TWO (P4,622.00) pesos, representing the amount demanded from and
paid by complainant to theRespondent." 5
Petitioner filed its Memorandum of Appeal from said WAAO decision on June 14, 1983, which
appeal was docketed as NLRC Case No. 82-108.
Meanwhile, a fire occurred on or about November, 1983 which burned the building housing the
NLRC office where the records were kept. 6 In an attempt to reconstitute the records of the
instant case, private respondent filed on March 12, 1984 an untitled pleading dated March 11,
1984 furnishing the Commission with a xerox copy of the complete file of the case in his
possession in compliance with an Order dated March 7, 1984 of the NLRC Hearing Officer. He
alleged that petitioner was also sent copies of the same. 7
Petitioner opposed the untitled pleading of March 11, 1984 claiming it was in effect a petition for
reconstitution which did not follow the requirements of Act No. 3110. 8
Nevertheless proceedings continued in the NLRC. On July 3, 1986, public respondent NLRC
promulgated the assailed decision, which in its dispositive portion states as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, except for the modification excluding respondent Wilfredo Fernandez from the
respondents who are ,jointly and solidarily liable to pay the judgment sum, and the reduction of
the award in favor of the complainant to his salaries for twelve (12) months at US$1,000.00 per

month, aside from the refund of the P4,622.00 paid by him and the 10% attorneys fees, the
Decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects." 9
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner claims (1) that the NLRC could not validly decide the
instant case as all the original records were burned by fire; (2) that petitioner was denied due
process at the WAAO, POEA, in view of the summary nature of the proceeding therein; (3) that
there is no clear evidence showing that the petitioner is solidarily liable with the foreign
employer; and (4) that the foreign employer could dismiss private respondent as he
misrepresented his qualifications for the job he was hired to do and he had signed a
supplemental employment contract with the foreign employer wherein he agreed to a three-
month probationary period at the start of his employment.
On October 6, 1986, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order "enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the writ of execution or any alias writ of execution issued in NLRC
Case No. 82-108, 10 upon motion by petitioner."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 5, 1986, petitioner filed a supplemental petition claiming that the supplemental
employment contract which private respondent signed in Saudi Arabia upon his arrival
specifically stipulates that only Saudi Arabian laws can be invoked by either party in any dispute
regarding the same, and that the supplemental employment contract prevails over the contract
private respondent signed with petitioner in the Philippines and under the generally accepted
principles of international law which form part of the law of the land 11 Saudi Arabian Laws
govern.
Private respondent, in his Comment to the Petition and Supplemental Petition, countered
that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Private respondent certified under oath to the authenticity of the records he submitted to
public respondent NLRC pursuant to the agreement of January 11, 1985. 12 While petitioner
also agreed to submit its own copies of the case, it never did so. There was, therefore,
substantial compliance with the requirements of Act No. 3110;
2. There was no denial of due process in the manner the WAAO Director decided the case
because he decided the same on April 22, 1983 or 10 months after petitioner submitted its
Position Paper on June 28, 1982. 13 The delay, if any, was due to the fact that the WAAO
waited for petitioner to submit its alleged evidence coming from Saudi Arabia, namely: (a) The
"undertaking" that private respondent allegedly made in Saudi Arabia before his employer,
OBALCO, that he does not know anything about air-conditioning, 14 (b) The "missing" bio-data
submitted in 1981 by private respondent and (c) The "Supplemental Agreement" allegedly
signed by private respondent on January 28, 1982, 15 all of which petitioner never submitted;
3. Petitioner should have made private respondent undergo a trade test before sending him to
Saudi Arabia to determine his qualification and competency for the position applied for. And the
Saudi employer should have tested him through actual work performance instead of rejecting
him alone on the basis of private respondents handwritten bio-data;
4. Petitioner never submitted to the WAAO Hearing Officer, nor to the NLRC, the copy of the
Supplemental Agreement private respondent was supposed to have signed on January 28,
1982, one day after his arrival at Saudi Arabia, which Supplemental Agreement was supposed to
have included a provision that private respondent was only a probationary employee for the first
three (3) months of his two (2) year contract with OBALCO. The fact that private respondents
Contract with petitioner was for a two-year period rules out any notion that he was supposedly a
probationary employee for three months;
5. Section 10, par (a)(2), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code is
the basis for holding petitioner jointly and severally liable with the foreign employer for violations
5
of the recruitment agreement and the contract of employment.
In his Memorandum, petitioner adds another argument to bolster its case, which is that Section
10, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules is unconstitutional because the said rule is without any
statutory basis.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioners two main arguments are that (1) public respondent NLRC could not validly
promulgate a Decision because the records of the case which were destroyed by fire sometime
in November, 1983, were not validly reconstituted in accordance with Act No. 3110 and that (2)
Section 10, par. (a)(2), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code, is
unconstitutional for want of proper legislative standards, and, therefore, petitioner is not solidarily
liable with OBALCO for the latters violations, if any, of private respondents service agreement.
Regarding petitioners first main argument, it appears from the Original Record that in a
conference held on February 27, 1984, both petitioner and private respondent were advised of
the total loss of the record of the case as a result of the fire that razed the third floor of the
Phoenix Building where the records were kept. 16
When the parties met again on March 7, 1984, private respondent agreed to submit copies of all
the documents in his possession to the hearing officer, copy furnished the petitioner who would
comment on said reproduced copies and submit additional documents in its possession within
ten (10) working days. The case would then be deemed submitted for decision. 17 Both
petitioner and private respondent signed their conformity to said agreement on reconstitution of
records.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Petitioner filed a Manifestation opposing the, apparent reconstitution by private respondent of
the case without complying with Act No. 3110. 18 Also, when Private respondent filed on
January 14, 1985 a "verified Motion to Admit Reconstructed Records Previously Filed," 19
petitioner opposed the same but still did NOT submit to the NLRC Hearing Officer copies of the
documents in its own possession.
At any rate, Act No. 3110 which took effect on March 19, 1923, and which deals with the
procedure of reconstituting records of pending judicial proceedings destroyed by fire, strictly
speaking, has no application to records destroyed by fire in cases pending with the NLRC, a
quasi-judicial body. Act No. 3110 as its Title indicates refers to "the reconstruction of the records
of pending judicial proceedings . . ." Moreover, Article 221 of the Labor Code, as amended,
provides that findings of facts in labor cases should be speedily ascertained without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure all in the interest of due process. 20
The plain fact is that petitioner had all the time from March 7, 1984 to July 3, 1986, the date of
promulgation of the assailed decision, within which to submit copies of the documents in its
possession, but for reasons, known only to itself, it did not do so. As the Solicitor General states,
"It is too late now, after losing the case, for petitioner to complain about the record." 21
As to petitioners second main argument, We find no need to rule on the constitutionality of
Section 10(a)(2),, Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules to Implement the Labor Code. A similar
question though not under the guise of the unconstitutionality of said rule cropped up in
Royal Crown International v. NLRC, 22 There, We ruled that: 23
" [P]etitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed solidary liability
under the various contractual undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services.
In applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment and
placement, petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking
whereby it assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of

the contracts of employment with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas
employment [Section 2(e), Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. It was
also required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment of agency contract executed by the
foreign based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained
a provision empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for
any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment Section
10(a) (2), Rule V, Book I of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. Petitioner was
required as well to post such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to
guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms
and conditions of employment as appropriate [Section 1 of Pres. Dec. 1412 (1978) amending
Article 31 of the Labor Code].
"These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other
private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its principal, the
foreign based employer, for all claims flied by recruited workers which may arise in connection
with the implementation of the service agreements or employment contracts [See Ambraque
International Placement and Services v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77970, January 28, 1988, 157 SCRA
431; and other cases cited herein.]
And, as in the above-cited case, petitioner questions the effectivity of said rule when the
omnibus rules were allegedly not published in the Official Gazette citing Taada v. Tuvera. 24
This issue was already resolved by Us in the Royal Crown International case 25 when We
held:chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
" [I]t must be emphasized again that petitioner assumed the obligations and liabilities of a private
employment agency by contract. Thus, whether or not this omnibus rules are effective in
accordance with Taada v. Tuvera is an issue, the resolution of which does not render at all
nugatory the binding effect upon petitioner of its own contractual undertaking.
The Court, consequently, finds it unnecessary to pass upon . . . the implications of Taada v.
Tuvera on the omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Regarding petitioners other minor arguments, the first of which is whether or not the foreign
employer, OBALCO, could dismiss private respondent for misrepresenting his qualifications,
plus the fact that such dismissal was allegedly in line with the three month probationary period
embodied in the supplemental agreement private respondent signed with his foreign employer
upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, this matter has already been disposed of in the WAAO, POEA
decision and affirmed by the NLRC, whose findings of fact are binding on Us, absent the
exceptions which do not obtain in this case. 26
As to petitioners argument over the primacy of the labor laws of Saudi Arabia over Philippine
labor laws, suffice it to say that in the Pakistan International Airlines 27 case We had already
ruled that Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing on
some other laws to govern their relationship. As We stated in said case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a contract
is the law between the parties. [Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 11 (1987)]
The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in
Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is
the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to
matters affected with public policy are deemed written into the contract. [Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. United Lines Co. 5 SCRA 175 (1962)]. Put a little differently, the governing
principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory
6
provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor
and employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and
their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each
other. It is thus necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in
terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations."cralaw virtua1aw
library
"x x x
"Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which
specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays
the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement only
[in] courts of Karachi, Pakistan. The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent
the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the
employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have
already pointed out that relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise
applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing
upon some other law to govern their relationship . . . Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA
did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must
therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the
applicable provisions of Philippine law. [Miciano v. Primo, 50 Phil. 867 (1924); Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher, 110 Phil. 686 [1961]. 28
Lastly, as to petitioners complaint of denial of due process, settled is the rule that submission of
position papers and memoranda in labor cases fulfills the requirements of due process. 29 In the
case at bar, aside from filing a position paper with the WAAO. POEA, petitioner filed a
Memorandum of Appeal in the NLRC, aside from numerous other pleadings. Since the right to
be heard was accorded petitioner, it cannot now claim that it was denied due process in the
resolution of its case. 30
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition, the same is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed
decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED en toto. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued last October 6, 1986 is hereby lifted. Costs against
petitioner.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO,
JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA
MOONYEEN MAMASIG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.

Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for private respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila two (2) separate
contracts of employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other with
private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective on 9 January
1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended by
the mutual consent of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the
right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE
notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in
lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's
salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of
Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction
to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.
Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their training period, they began
discharging their job functions as flight attendants, with base station in Manila and flying
assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.
On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the
contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local
branch of PIA, sent separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private respondents Farrales
and Mamasig advising both that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated
"effective 1 September 1980, conformably to clause 6 (b) of the employment agreement [they
had) executed with [PIA]." 2
7
On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint,
docketed as NCR-STF-95151-80, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits
and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment ("MOLE"). After
several unfruitful attempts at conciliation, the MOLE hearing officer Atty. Jose M. Pascual
ordered the parties to submit their position papers and evidence supporting their respective
positions. The PIA submitted its position paper, 3 but no evidence, and there claimed that both
private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from
abroad sizeable quantities of "personal effects"; and that PIA personnel at the Manila
International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private
respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private
respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract.
In his Order dated 22 January 1981, Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella ordered the
reinstatement of private respondents with full backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to
them of the amounts equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period
of their employment contracts; the payment to private respondent Mamasig of an amount
equivalent to the value of a round trip ticket Manila-USA Manila; and payment of a bonus to each
of the private respondents equivalent to their one-month salary. 4 The Order stated that private
respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a
year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to
three (3) years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal,
having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled
private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
On appeal, in an Order dated 12 August 1982, Hon. Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Deputy Minister,
MOLE, adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of the Regional Director and affirmed the
latter's award save for the portion thereof giving PIA the option, in lieu of reinstatement, "to pay
each of the complainants [private respondents] their salaries corresponding to the unexpired
portion of the contract[s] [of employment] . . .". 5
In the instant Petition for Certiorari, petitioner PIA assails the award of the Regional Director and
the Order of the Deputy Minister as having been rendered without jurisdiction; for having been
rendered without support in the evidence of record since, allegedly, no hearing was conducted
by the hearing officer, Atty. Jose M. Pascual; and for having been issued in disregard and in
violation of petitioner's rights under the employment contracts with private respondents.
1. Petitioner's first contention is that the Regional Director, MOLE, had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint initiated by private respondents for illegal dismissal, jurisdiction
over the same being lodged in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission ("NLRC") It appears to us beyond dispute, however, that both at the time the
complaint was initiated in September 1980 and at the time the Orders assailed were rendered on
January 1981 (by Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella) and August 1982 (by Deputy Minister
Vicente Leogardo, Jr.), the Regional Director had jurisdiction over termination cases.
Art. 278 of the Labor Code, as it then existed, forbade the termination of the services of
employees with at least one (1) year of service without prior clearance from the Department of
Labor and Employment:
Art. 278. Miscellaneous Provisions . . .

(b) With or without a collective agreement, no employer may shut down his
establishment or dismiss or terminate the employment of employees with at
least one year of service during the last two (2) years, whether such service
is continuous or broken, without prior written authority issued in accordance
with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may promulgate . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code,
made clear that in case of a termination without the necessary clearance, the Regional
Director was authorized to order the reinstatement of the employee concerned and the
payment of backwages; necessarily, therefore, the Regional Director must have been
given jurisdiction over such termination cases:
Sec. 2. Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. Any shutdown or
dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be
termination of employment without a just cause. The Regional Director shall,
in such case order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the
payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the
time of reinstatement. (emphasis supplied)
Policy Instruction No. 14 issued by the Secretary of Labor, dated 23 April 1976, was
similarly very explicit about the jurisdiction of the Regional Director over termination of
employment cases:
Under PD 850, termination cases with or without CBA are now placed
under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Director. Preventive
suspension cases, now made cognizable for the first time, are also placed
under the Regional Director. Before PD 850, termination cases where there
was a CBA were under the jurisdiction of the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration, while termination cases where there was no CBA were
under the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Section.
In more details, the major innovations introduced by PD 850 and its
implementing rules and regulations with respect to termination and
preventive suspension cases are:
1. The Regional Director is now required to rule on every application for
clearance, whether there is opposition or not, within ten days from receipt
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
2. The second contention of petitioner PIA is that, even if the Regional Director had jurisdiction,
still his order was null and void because it had been issued in violation of petitioner's right to
procedural due process . 6 This claim, however, cannot be given serious consideration.
Petitioner was ordered by the Regional Director to submit not only its position paper but also
such evidence in its favor as it might have. Petitioner opted to rely solely upon its position paper;
we must assume it had no evidence to sustain its assertions. Thus, even if no formal or oral
8
hearing was conducted, petitioner had ample opportunity to explain its side. Moreover, petitioner
PIA was able to appeal his case to the Ministry of Labor and Employment. 7
There is another reason why petitioner's claim of denial of due process must be rejected. At the
time the complaint was filed by private respondents on 21 September 1980 and at the time the
Regional Director issued his questioned order on 22 January 1981, applicable regulation, as
noted above, specified that a "dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed
to be termination of employment without a cause", and the Regional Director was required in
such case to" order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages
from the time of the shutdown or dismiss until . . . reinstatement." In other words, under the then
applicable rule, the Regional Director did not even have to require submission of position papers
by the parties in view of the conclusive (juris et de jure) character of the presumption created by
such applicable law and regulation. In Cebu Institute of Technology v. Minister of Labor and
Employment, 8 the Court pointed out that "under Rule 14, Section 2, of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations, the termination of [an employee] which was without previous clearance from
the Ministry of Labor is conclusively presumed to be without [just] cause . . . [a presumption
which] cannot be overturned by any contrary proof however strong."
3. In its third contention, petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of employment
with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was
governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the general provisions of the Labor
Code. 9
Paragraph 5 of that contract set a term of three (3) years for that relationship, extendible by
agreement between the parties; while paragraph 6 provided that, notwithstanding any other
provision in the Contract, PIA had the right to terminate the employment agreement at any time
by giving one-month's notice to the employee or, in lieu of such notice, one-months salary.
A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a contract is
the law between the parties. 10 The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an
absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient, "providedthey are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Thus, counter-balancing the principle of
autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law,
especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the
contract. 11 Put a little differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away
applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily
impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area
and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of
labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to appraise
the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their consistency with applicable
Philippine law and regulations.
As noted earlier, both the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Minister, MOLE, in effect held that
paragraph 5 of that employment contract was inconsistent with Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor
Code as they existed at the time the contract of employment was entered into, and hence
refused to give effect to said paragraph 5. These Articles read as follows:
Art. 280. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of

seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time his reinstatement.
Art. 281. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment
is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: provided, that, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which
he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually
exists. (Emphasis supplied)
In Brent School, Inc., et al. v. Ronaldo Zamora, etc., et al., 12 the Court had occasion to examine
in detail the question of whether employment for a fixed term has been outlawed under the
above quoted provisions of the Labor Code. After an extensive examination of the history and
development of Articles 280 and 281, the Court reached the conclusion that a contract providing
for employment with a fixed period was not necessarily unlawful:
There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition that where from the
circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude
acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down
or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc. But where no such
intent to circumvent the law is shown, or stated otherwise, where the reason
for the law does not exist e.g. where it is indeed the employee himself who
insists upon a period or where the nature of the engagement is such that,
without being seasonal or for a specific project, a definite date of termination
is a sine qua non would an agreement fixing a period be essentially evil or
illicit, therefore anathema Would such an agreement come within the scope
of Article 280 which admittedly was enacted "to prevent the circumvention of
the right of the employee to be secured in . . . (his) employment?"
As it is evident from even only the three examples already given that Article
280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only
fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a
fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without
reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his
employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a
literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given
reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing
the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle
of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employers" using it as a means
to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off
the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping
off the head.
9
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of
legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly
appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the
employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article
indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements
conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should
be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled
out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It
should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment
was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force,
duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and
absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it
satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other
on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being
exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview,
the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly
stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its
effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences. (emphasis
supplied)
It is apparent from Brent School that the critical consideration is the presence or
absence of a substantial indication that the period specified in an employment
agreement was designed to circumvent the security of tenure of regular employees
which is provided for in Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. This indication must
ordinarily rest upon some aspect of the agreement other than the mere specification of
a fixed term of the ernployment agreement, or upon evidence aliunde of the intent to
evade.
Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment agreement between
petitioner PIA and private respondents, we consider that those provisions must be read together
and when so read, the fixed period of three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to
have been effectively neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement. Paragraph
6 in effect took back from the employee the fixed three (3)-year period ostensibly granted by
paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a facultative one at the option of the employer
PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized to shorten that term, at any time and for any
cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month period, or even less by simply paying the employee a
month's salary. Because the net effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is
to render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at
the pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to
prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even during the
limited period of three (3) years, 13 and thus to escape completely the thrust of Articles 280 and
281 of the Labor Code.
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies,
firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue
for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts
of Karachi Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to prevent the
application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to the subject matter of this case, i.e., the
employer-employee relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have
already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the
otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties
agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the

second clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the
settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant
circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine
law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the
other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least
partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although
a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence
resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between
their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the
Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual
disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment
agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction
vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not
undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be
presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable
provisions of Philippine law. 14
We conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig were illegally dismissed and that
public respondent Deputy Minister, MOLE, had not committed any grave abuse of discretion nor
any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering their reinstatement with backwages.
Private respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction.
Should their reinstatement to their former or other substantially equivalent positions not be
feasible in view of the length of time which has gone by since their services were unlawfully
terminated, petitioner should be required to pay separation pay to private respondents
amounting to one (1) month's salary for every year of service rendered by them, including the
three (3) years service putatively rendered.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the Order
dated 12 August 1982 of public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED, except that (1) private
respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages, without deduction or qualification; and (2)
should reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions or to substantially
equivalent positions not be feasible, then petitioner shall, in lieu thereof, pay to private
respondents separation pay amounting to one (1)-month's salary for every year of service
actually rendered by them and for the three (3) years putative service by private respondents.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 13 September 1982 is hereby LIFTED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor
and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
10
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi,
Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse
Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her
legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be
payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains
the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
(now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years
ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except
my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at
any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria
Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to
her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until
the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as
aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the
income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I
may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and
project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that
the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the
California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a
testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions
for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING
FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
11
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that
the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher,
was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed
in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there
for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was
teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However,
in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here
the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own
country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military
Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for
the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after
the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed
at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in
the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for
nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely

and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to
denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws,
p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears
never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a
place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he
may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between
which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went
on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It
is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular
business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as
physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of
meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is
not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
12
quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to
no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952.
But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the
case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly
cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should
govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such
law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of therenvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum
refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal
rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its
Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the
renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter
back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is
the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to
Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of
references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi
or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original
reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true
that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted
the renvoitheory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference
and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit
more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that
greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more
strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem
is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation
disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept
the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the
case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have

been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they
too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would
happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if
both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is
in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases
the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the
divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized
by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable
property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the
conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the
law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France,
the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute
of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a
French court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it
would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts
court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French
court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course,
thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of
the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the
matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The
German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol.
31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing
a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it
has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of
frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would
in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the
law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of
the doctrine of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining the question before
it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to
conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the
13
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of
therenvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918,
pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to
be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state
or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law
of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of
foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its
nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by
the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be
certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing
the determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his
domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality
that is the English law he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws
rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere,
the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946
should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions.
The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
 14

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is
the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co.
the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that
international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
55 N.J. 511 (1970)
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than
ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
263 A.2d 129

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
STEVEN PFAU ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. TRENT ALUMINUM COMPANY ET
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the
citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to
go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal The Supreme Court of New Jersey.
law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

Argued January 20, 1970.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be Decided March 17, 1970.
sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article
946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. *513 Mr. Jacob D. Fuchsberg, of the New York Bar, argued the cause for Plaintiffs-Appellants
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case,
when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the (Messrs. Yesko and Marcus, attorneys; Mr. Elliot F. Topper, of the New York Bar, of counsel).
case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California;
such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like
a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the Mr. Richard D. Catenacci argued the cause for Defendants-Respondents (Messrs. Pindar,
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be McElroy, Connell, Foley & Geiser, attorneys; Mr. John A. Pindar of counsel; Mr. Richard D.
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes Catenacci on the brief).
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; The opinion of the court was delivered by PROCTOR, J.
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs
vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply
in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be This appeal presents a conflct of laws problem regarding a host's liability to his guest for
a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not
appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to negligence arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff, a Connecticut domiciliary, was injured
or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
in Iowa while a passenger in an automobile driven by a New Jersey domiciliary and owned by a
 15

New Jersey corporation. Iowa has a guest statute which provides that a host-driver is not liable In Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226 (1967) this Court abandoned the old lex loci delicti rule for

to his passenger-guest for ordinary negligence.[1] The defendants pleaded, inter alia, the Iowa determining choice of law in tort cases, e.g., Harber v. Graham, 105 N.J.L. *515 213, 214-215

guest statute as a defense. On plaintiff's motion, Judge Demos, in the Law Division, struck *514 (E. & A. 1928), 61 A.L.R. 1232 and adopted the governmental interest analysis approach. We

this defense, holding that the New Jersey law requiring a host to use at least ordinary care for did so because we believed that the lex loci delicti doctrine worked unjust results in many cases

the safety of his guest was applicable. The Appellate Division ruled that the Iowa guest statute and ignored the interests which jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred may have in

applied to the case and accordingly reversed and reinstated the defense. 106 N.J. Super. 324 the resolution of the particular issues involved. Id. at 229. In Mellk, the plaintiff was injured while

(1969). Plaintiff petitioned this Court for certification. Since we were not confronted with a final riding as a passenger in the defendant-driver's car when it struck a parked vehicle in Ohio.

judgment, we granted defendants' motion to dismiss, but allowed plaintiff 15 days to file a motion Plaintiff and defendant were both New Jersey domiciliaries and their guest-host relationship

for leave to appeal an interlocutory order. Such a motion was filed and granted. began in this state. When the accident happened, they were returning from a brief visit to the

home of a mutual friend in Wisconsin. Defendant's automobile was insured and registered in
The facts pertinent to this appeal are undisputed. Plaintiff, Steven Pfau, a domiciliary of
New Jersey. In those circumstances we declined to apply the Ohio guest statute. The purposes
Connecticut, was a student at Parsons College in Iowa, and the defendant, Bruce Trent, a
discerned in the Ohio statute by that state's own courts were the prevention of collusive suits
domiciliary of New Jersey, was a student at the same college. The boys met for the first time at
and the preclusion of suits by "ungrateful guests." Since both plaintiff and defendant were New
Parsons.
Jersey domiciliaries and since the car was insured in New Jersey, we did not believe that Ohio

had any interest in the application of its guest statute to the case. Instead, we applied New
Following the Easter vacation in 1966, the defendant, Bruce Trent, drove the automobile
Jersey's strong declared policy of requiring a host to exercise at least ordinary care for the safety
involved in the accident back to Iowa for his use at college. The automobile was registered in
of his guest. Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 N.J. 276, 283 (1961).
New Jersey in the name of the Trent Aluminum Company, a New Jersey corporation owned by

Bruce's father. Bruce was using the car with the owner-corporation's consent. The vehicle was
Our decision in Mellk followed Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191
insured in New Jersey by a New Jersey carrier.
N.E.2d 279 (1963) in which the New York Court of Appeals rejected the traditional choice of law

rule which looked invariably to the place of the tort, and reached the same result as Mellk on
About a month after Bruce's return to college and several days before the accident, he agreed to
similar facts. There, two New York residents began an automobile trip from that state to Ontario.
drive the plaintiff to Columbia, Missouri, for a weekend visit. They never reached their
The plaintiff, a guest in defendant's car, was injured when the defendant-driver struck a stone
destination. Shortly after leaving Parsons on April 22, 1966, and while still in Iowa, Bruce failed
wall in Ontario. Although the Ontario statute barred any recovery by a guest-passenger against a
to negotiate a curve and the car he was operating collided with an oncoming vehicle driven by
host-driver, the court applied New York law which permitted the guest to sue his host. Babcock
Joseph Davis. Mr. Davis and his wife and child, who were Iowa domiciliaries, were injured in the
achieved widespread acclaim from legal scholars, e.g., Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, *516
accident. Their claims have now been settled by defendants' insurance carrier. The sole
Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese, "Comments on Babcock v. Jackson," 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212
question presented by this appeal is whether the Iowa guest statute is applicable to this action.
(1963), and New York has continued to apply the Babcock approach in subsequent decisions.

See Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1965); Macey
 16

v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591, 221 N.E.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1966); Tooker v. Defendants contend, however, that application of the Iowa guest statute is required because the

Lopez, 24 N.Y 2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 249 N.E.2d 394 (Ct. App. 1969). These post-Babcock plaintiff and the individual defendant were residing in Iowa at the time of the accident, because

decisions have indicated some of the difficulties which are inevitable when a court applies a new the host-guest relationship began and ended in Iowa, and because non-guest Iowa domiciliaries

approach to various factual patterns. We are faced with the same problem in the present case, were injured in the accident. These factors were treated as significant in the post-Babcock

for defendants do not argue that New Jersey should return to lex loci delicti; they disagree, decision of Dym v. Gordon, supra.

however, with the plaintiff over what state's law modern conflicts principles dictate should be
In Dym the plaintiff sued for injuries which she suffered in a collision between two automobiles in
applied.
Colorado. Both the plaintiff-guest and the defendant-host were New York domiciliaries who were

In order to determine whether the Iowa guest statute should apply to this case, we must first attending summer school at the University of Colorado when the accident occurred. They had

examine its purposes as articulated by the Iowa courts. See Mellk v. Sarahson, supra, 49 N.J., gone separately to Colorado. The defendant was driving the plaintiff to a nearby golf course

at 230. These purposes are: "to cut down litigation arising from the commendable unselfish when the car they were riding in collided with another vehicle. Defendant's car was registered

practice of sharing with others transportation in one's vehicle and protect the Good Samaritan and insured in New York and he had brought it to Colorado for use at college. After returning to

from claims based on negligence by those invited to ride as a courtesy," Rainsbarger v. New York, the plaintiff brought suit to recover for her injuries. Defendant pleaded the Colorado

Shepherd, 254 Iowa 486, 492, 118 N.W.2d 41, 44, 1 A.L.R.3d 1074 (1962); to prevent guest statute which required a showing of intentional misconduct, intoxication, or "negligence

ingratitude by guests, Knutson v. Lurie, 217 Iowa 192, 195, 251 N.W. 147, 149 (1933); to consisting of a willful and wanton disregard of the rights of others" in order for a guest to recover

prevent suits by hitchhikers, Id.; "to prevent collusion suits by friends and relatives resulting in from his host.

excessively high insurance rates," Hardwick v. Bublitz, 253 Iowa 49, 54, 111 N.W.2d 309, 312
In a four to three decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Colorado guest statute
(1961).
was applicable. The majority reasoned that the statute was based on three policy

The above policies expressed by the Iowa courts would not appear to be relevant to the present considerations, i.e., "the protection of Colorado drivers and their insurance carriers against

matter. This action will not increase litigation in the Iowa courts; no hitchhiker is involved; no fraudulent claims, the prevention of suits by `ungrateful guests', and the priority of injured parties

Iowa insurer will be subjected to a "collusive suit" since the insurer is a New Jersey corporation; in other cars in the assets of the negligent *518 defendant." 16 N.Y.2d at 124, 262 N.Y.S.2d at

there is no "Good Samaritan" Iowa host-driver to be protected; and finally, there is no Iowa guest 466, 209 N.E.2d at 794. Since another vehicle was involved in the accident, the majority

displaying his "ingratitude" *517 by suing for ordinary negligence. The desire of Iowa to prevent believed that the policy of priority of claims was a significant factor. The majority also noted that

collusive suits and suits by ungrateful guests and to cut down litigation would ordinarily apply to the parties had become temporary residents of Colorado, and that the host-guest relationship

Iowa domiciliaries, defendants insuring motor vehicles there, and persons suing in its courts. began and ended in that state. This latter factor the seat of the relationship was strongly

Melik v. Sarahson, supra, 49 N.J., at 231. emphasized.

 17

In a dissent, Judge Fuld (now Chief Judge) contended that the case was not materially Accordingly, he thought that Dym should no longer be followed. 18 N.Y.2d, at 296-298, 274

distinguishable from Babcock, supra. He noted that the majority's conclusion that Colorado's N.Y.S.2d, at 596-598, 221 N.E.2d, at 384-385.

guest statute envisioned a third party priority policy found no support in any judicial or legislative
Most recently, the New York Court of Appeals decided Tooker v. Lopez, supra, which explicitly
pronouncements in Colorado. 16 N.Y.2d at 132, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 473, 209 N.E.2d at 799.
rejected the rationale and holding of Dym. 24 N.Y.2d, at 574-575, 301 N.Y.S.2d, at 523, 249

In the later case of Macey v. Rozbicki, supra, the same court, in a six to one decision, N.E.2d, at 394. See also the concurring opinion of Judge Burke who wrote for the majority in

substantially narrowed Dym. In Macey, the defendants, husband and wife, were New York Dym, 23 N.Y.2d, at 591, 301 N.Y.S.2d, at 538, 249 N.E.2d, at 407-408. In Tooker, Catharina

domiciliaries who were vacationing at their summer home in Ontario. They invited the plaintiff, Tooker, a student at Michigan State University, was killed when the car in which she was a

who was the wife's sister and who was also a New York domiciliary, to spend a 10-day vacation passenger overturned after the driver had lost control of the vehicle while attempting to pass

with them. During this visit the plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger when defendants' another car. The driver, Marcia Lopez, was also killed and another passenger, Susan Silk, was

automobile collided with another vehicle owned and operated by a Canadian. The plaintiff and seriously injured. The two girls were classmates of Miss Tooker at the University. At the time of

wife defendant had intended to drive to church in nearby Niagara Falls, Ontario, and then return the accident they were en route from the University to Detroit, Michigan, to spend a weekend.

to the defendants' summer home. Plaintiff sued in New York and the defendants pleaded the Miss Tooker and Miss Lopez were both New York domiciliaries. The automobile which Miss

Ontario guest act which immunizes an automobile owner and driver from liability for personal Lopez was driving belonged to her father who lived in New York, where the car was registered

injury to or death of his guest. The court held that New York law permitting a guest to sue his and insured.

host for ordinary negligence was applicable and rejected the defense of the Ontario guest
*520 The administrator of Miss Tooker's estate sued for wrongful death. The defendant pleaded
statute. That the trip in question was to begin and end in Canada was said to be "not particularly
as a defense the Michigan guest statute which bars a guest's recovery from his host for ordinary
significant," since the parties were living permanently in New York and "undoubtedly" had made
negligence.
the plans for the plaintiff's visit in New York. 18 N.Y.2d at *519 292, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593, 221

N.E.2d at 381. The court distinguished Dym by saying that in that case the principal situs of the
Judge Keating, this time writing for the majority of the court, held that the New York standard of
relationship was in Colorado. No mention was made of any priority of claims theory based on the
ordinary care for a guest was applicable to the case and that Michigan's guest statute could not
Canadian car involved in the accident.
be raised as a defense. The court held that in light of the policy considerations which underlie

the ostensibly conflicting laws of Michigan and New York, it was clear that the latter had the only
In a concurring opinion Judge Keating pointed out that Dym and Macey were indistinguishable
real interest in whether recovery should be granted. Judge Keating reasoned that the application
except for two facts: 1) in Dym, there was no prior arrangement for the plaintiff and defendant to
of Michigan law would defeat New York's legitimate interest without serving any legitimate
meet in Colorado; and 2) that the parties in Dym were going to reside in Colorado for a longer
interest of Michigan. He identified New York's interest as its strong policy of holding all drivers of
period of time. He could not accept the majority's conclusion that these factors were grounds for
motor vehicles financially responsible for their negligent acts irrespective of the guest status of
a valid distinction. He reasoned that where the parties were New York domiciliaries and the
the victims. Michigan, on the other hand, had no interest in whether a New York plaintiff is
automobile was insured under the laws of that state, the "seat of the relationship was irrelevant."
 18

denied recovery against a New York defendant where the car was insured in New York. He We are in accord with both Tooker and Mullane. While Iowa was the "seat of the relationship" in

rejected as "plainly irrevelant" the fact that the deceased guest and driver were residing in the instant case, this "contact" does not relate to any interest or policy behind Iowa's guest

Michigan for an extended period of time. 24 N.Y.2d, at 577, 301 N.Y.S.2d, at 525, 249 N.E.2d statute. Nor do we attach any importance to the temporary Iowa residence of plaintiff and

399. Although Judge Keating did not specifically treat the "seat of the relationship" factor, i.e., defendant. Both parties were still permanently domiciled in other states which retained interests.

that the trip was arranged for and began and ended in Michigan, it is obvious that he considered Moreover, the insurer is a New Jersey corporation which issued its policy at rates applicable to

this factor equally irrevelant. Judge Burke in his concurring opinion, while marking the passing of New Jersey. See Ehrenzweig, "Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws Towards a Theory of

Dym with regret, conceded that the "origin of the relationship" could not be considered in an Enterprise Liability Under `Foreseeable and Insurable Laws,'" 69 Yale L.J. 595, 603 (1960).

interest analysis approach. 24 N.Y.2d, at 590-591, 301 N.Y.S.2d, at 537-538, 249 N.E.2d, at Iowa's interest in these temporary residents is limited to enforcement of its *522 rules of the road

407-408. at least where the litigation is not in that state.[2] Finally, we are not persuaded by the third-

party-fund theory. Iowa has never expressed such a purpose behind its guest statute, and it is
Finally, Judge Keating abjured the third-party-fund theory enunciated in Dym, saying:
not appropriate for us to impute inarticulated purposes to the legislature of another state. See

Comment, "Conflict of Laws Two Case Studies in Governmental-Interest Analysis," 65 Colum. L.

*521 If the purpose of the statute is to protect the rights of the injured "non-guest", as opposed to
Rev. 1448, 1459 (1965). The danger of injured Iowa domiciliaries being deprived of available
the owner or his insurance carrier, we fail to perceive any rational basis for predicating that
funds because of recovery by the negligent driver's guest is merely speculative. If Iowa had
protection on the degree of negligence which the guest is able to establish. 24 N.Y.2d at 575,
identified the protection of these third parties as a policy underlying its guest statute, we could
301 N.Y.S.2d at 524, 249 N.E.2d at 397.
still give effect to that policy by giving priority to the third party's judgment lien against

In Mullane v. Stavola, 101 N.J. Super. 184 (Law Div. 1968), a pre-Tooker decision, Judge defendant's assets. See Baade, "Counter-Revolution or Alliance For Progress? Reflections on

Halpern, sitting in the Law Division in our state, reached the same result on similar facts. There, Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process," 46 Tex. L. Rev. 141, 168 (1967). We need not

plaintiffs-guests and defendant-host were all New Jersey domiciliaries in attendance at St. Leo's decide whether such a procedure is the proper solution to this problem because the claims of

College in Florida. The defendants' vehicle was registered and insured in New Jersey. While the Iowa domiciliaries have been settled.[3]

returning to the campus from Dade City, Florida, the automobile operated by the defendant,
It is clear to us that Iowa has no interest in this suit. Recovery for negligence in this action will
William Stavola, and owned by his mother, Mary Stavola, collided with a telephone pole. Utilizing
not transgress any of the purposes behind Iowa's guest statute as enunciated by that state's
the same governmental-interest analysis approach taken later in Tooker, the court refused to
courts or legislature, and will not in the slightest impair traffic safety in Iowa. Nor do we believe
apply Florida's guest statute which barred guests' suits for the ordinary negligence of their hosts.
that the reasons urged by defendants for applying Iowa law *523 are valid. We are convinced
Judge Halpern reasoned that since all of the parties were domiciled here and since the car was
that if the plaintiff were a New Jersey domiciliary Iowa's guest statute would be inapplicable.
registered and insured here, New Jersey had the "paramount governmental interest, or concern,

in fixing the rights and liabilities between the parties." Id., at 187-189. He explicitly rejected the
In this case, however, we are faced with a more complex situation since plaintiff is a domiciliary
result and rationale in Dym.
of Connecticut. Thus, we must consider the law of both New Jersey and Connecticut.
 19

Connecticut long ago repealed its guest statute, Con. Public Acts, 1931, Chap. 270, 1937 Supp. Writing for a unanimous court Chief Justice Traynor rejected defendant's contention that the

351d repealing 1628, and now permits guest-passengers to recover from their host-drivers Missouri ceiling applied. The court held that Missouri had no substantial interest in extending the

for ordinary negligence. See Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 3 A.2d 839, 120 A.L.R. 939 benefits of its statute to travelers from states having no similar limitation. Having resolved that

(1939); Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 475-476, 78 A.2d 693, 697, 25 A.L.R.2d 592 Missouri law did not apply, Justice Traynor next examined the interests of California and Ohio.

(1951). There is no doubt that if this plaintiff-guest had been injured in a Connecticut accident by He refused to give any weight to the plaintiffs' California domicile since they had moved to

a Connecticut host-driver, there would be no bar to recover for ordinary negligence if suit were California after the accident. Nor did he believe that defendant's California domicile was

brought in that state. See Palombizio v. Murphy, 146 Conn. 352, 150 A.2d 825, 73 A.L.R.2d significant since that state did not have any limitation on damages to protect its defendants.

1173 (1959); Costanzo v. Sturgill, 145 Conn. 92, 139 A.2d 51 (1958). Accordingly, he concluded that Ohio, the state of decedents' domicile at the time of the accident,

was the only interested state and that its law should apply to the case.
Turning to New Jersey's law, we are led to Cohen v. Kaminetsky, supra, where we held that the

strong policy of this state is to allow a guest-passenger to be compensated by his host-driver in It may well be that in this case, however, New Jersey has an interest. We are not certain that a

cases of ordinary negligence. Thus, the substantive laws of Connecticut and New Jersey are in defendant's domicile lacks an interest in seeing that its domiciliaries are held to the full measure

accord. of damages or the standard of care which that state's law provide for. A state should not only be

concerned with the protection and self-interest of its citizens. See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d, at
In Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967), commented on by
577, 301 N.Y.S.2d, at 525-526, 249 N.E.2d, at 399. In Cohen v. *525 Kaminetsky, supra, we
Cavers, Cheatham, D. Currie, Ehrenzweig, Gorman, Horowitz, Kay, Leflar, Rosenberg, Scoles,
emphasized a host's duty to his guests. There we said: "We see no reason why the host should
Trautman, and Weintraub in 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 551 (1968), the California Supreme Court was
be less vigilant for his own guest than he must be for the guest in another car. The duty to
faced with a situation similar in principle to the present case. There the court dealt with a
exercise reasonable care is as appropriate in the one situation as in the other." 36 N.J., at 283. It
Missouri statute which limited damages for wrongful death. Lee and Jeffry Reich, father and son,
would not seem just to limit the imposition of this duty to instances where a New Jersey host
brought a wrongful death action for damages arising out of a head-on collision between two
negligently injures a New Jersey guest in a state which has a guest statute. See Mellk v.
automobiles in Missouri. One of the automobiles was owned and operated by the defendant, a
Sarahson, supra. Therefore, if Connecticut had a guest statute in this case, we would be forced
domiciliary of California, *524 who was on his way to a vacation in Illinois. The other automobile
to choose between our state's policy of holding our hosts to a duty of ordinary care and
was owned and operated by plaintiffs' decedent, Mrs. Reich. The Reichs were domiciled in Ohio
Connecticut's policy of denying a guest recovery for the ordinary negligence of his host and we
and Mrs. Reich and her two children were on their way to California where the family was
might have a true conflict. But since Connecticut has the same policy of applying principles of
contemplating settling. Mrs. Reich and one child were killed in the collision. Plaintiffs later
ordinary negligence to the host-guest relationship as does New Jersey, this case presents a
became California domiciliaries. The estates of Mrs. Reich and the deceased child were being
false conflict and it is unnecessary for use to decide whether this state has an interest sufficient
administered in Ohio. Neither Ohio nor California limits recovery in wrongful death actions.
to warrant application of its law. See Leflar, American Conflicts Law at 328-29.
Missouri's statute limits damages in such cases to a maximum of $25,000. It was stipulated that

the damages for Mrs. Reich's death were substantially in excess of that amount.
 20

It would appear that Connecticut's substantive law allowing a guest to recover for his host's Connecticut plaintiff should have the right to maintain an action for ordinary negligence in our

ordinary negligence would give it a significant interest in having that law applied to this case. courts. In this situation principles of comity, and perhaps the equal protection and privileges and

Defendants argue, however, that if we apply Connecticut's substantive law, we should apply its immunities clauses of the Constitution, dictate that we should afford the Connecticut plaintiff the

choice-of-law rule as well. In other words, they contend Connecticut's interest in its domiciliaries same protection a New Jersey plaintiff would be given. Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 144

is identified not only by its substantive law, but by its choice-of-law rule. Connecticut adheres to n. 8, 299 n. 14 (1965).

lex loci delicti and according to its decisions would most likely apply the substantive law of Iowa
For the reasons expressed the order of the Appellate Division is reversed and the order of the
in this case. E.g., Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966). Defendants
trial court striking the separate defense of the Iowa guest statute is reinstated.
contend that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover when he could not do so in either Iowa

where the accident occurred or in Connecticut where he is domiciled. We cannot agree for two
For reversal Chief Justice WEINTRAUB and Justices JACOBS, FRANCIS, PROCTOR, HALL,
reasons. First, it is not definite that plaintiff would be unable to recover in either *526 of those
SCHETTINO and HANEMAN 7.
states.[4] More importantly, however, we see no reason for applying Connecticut's choice-of-law

rule. To do so would frustrate the very goals of governmental-interest analysis. Connecticut's For affirmance NONE.

choice-of-law rule does not identify that state's interest in the matter. Lex loci delicti was born in
Republic of the Philippines
an effort to achieve simplicity and uniformity, and does not relate to a state's interest in having its SUPREME COURT
Manila
law applied to given issues in a tort case. See B. Currie, "The Disinterested Third State," 28 Law
EN BANC
& Contemp. Prob. 754, 784-85 (1963); Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process at 106; Ehrenzweig,

Conflict of Laws at 235; Comment, "False Conflicts," 55 Calif. L. Rev. 74, 84-85 (1967). It is G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

significant that in Reich v. Purcell, supra, the California Supreme Court applied the substantive
law of Ohio to the Missouri accident. The court did not apply Ohio's choice-of-law rule which was
lex loci delicti, and would have called for application of the Missouri limitation on damages.
Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St.2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965). Professor Kay in her comment on
Reich v. Purcell was in agreement with *527 the above authorities that only the foreign
substantive law should be applied, and she agreed with the court in Reich that Ohio's choice-of-
law rule should be ignored. Kay, "Comment on Reich v. Purcell," 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rev., supra at
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

589 n. 31 See also Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 BENGZON, J.P., J.:

(1959).
We conclude that since Iowa has no interest in this litigation, and since the substantive laws of
Connecticut and New Jersey are the same, this case presents a false conflict and the
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A.
Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total
of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In
the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court,
on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law.
21
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In
the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since
the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to
the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession.
As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
 22

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed
in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.